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

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
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

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A

HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT

BY

GEORGE GROTE

IN FOUR VOLUMES.—VOL. I.

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PREFACE.

THE first idea of this history was conceived many years ago, at a time when ancient Hellas was known to the English public chiefly through the pages of Mitford; and my purpose in writing it was to rectify the erroneous statements as to matter of fact which that history contained, as well as to present the general phenomena of the Grecian world under what I thought a juster and more comprehensive point of view. My leisure, however, was not at that time equal to the execution of any large literary undertaking; nor is it until within the last three or four years that I have been able to devote to the work that continuous and exclusive labor, without which, though much may be done to illustrate detached points, no entire or complicated subject can ever be set forth in a manner worthy to meet the public eye.

Meanwhile the state of the English literary world, in reference to ancient Hellas, has been materially changed in more ways than one. If my early friend Dr. Thirlwall's History of Greece had appeared a few years sooner, I should probably never have conceived the design of the present work at all; I should certainly not have been prompted to the task by any deficiencies, such as those which I felt and regretted in Mitford. The comparison of the two authors affords, indeed, a striking proof of the progress of sound and enlarged views respecting the ancient world during the present generation. Having studied of course the same evidences as Dr. Thirlwall, I am better enabled than others to bear testimony to the learning, the sagacity, and the candor which pervade his excellent work; and it is the more incumbent on me to give expression to this sentiment, since the particular points on which I shall have occasion to advert to it will unavoidably be points of dissent oftener than of coincidence.

The liberal spirit of criticism, in which Dr. Thirlwall stands so much distinguished from Mitford, is his own: there are other features of superiority which belong to him conjointly with his age. For during the generation since Mitford's work, philological studies have been prosecuted in Germany with remarkable success: the stock of facts and documents, comparatively scanty, handed down from the ancient world, has been combined, and illustrated in a thousand different ways: and if our witnesses cannot be multiplied, we at least have numerous interpreters to catch, repeat, amplify and explain their broken and half-inaudible depositions. Some of the best writers

in this department—Boeckh, Niebuhr, O. Müller—have been translated into our language; so that the English public has been enabled to form some idea of the new lights thrown upon many subjects of antiquity by the inestimable aid of German erudition. The poets, historians, orators and philosophers of Greece, have thus been all rendered both more intelligible and more instructive than they were to a student in the last century; and the general picture of the Grecian world may now be conceived with a degree of fidelity, which, considering our imperfect materials, it is curious to contemplate.

It is that general picture which an historian of Greece is required first to embody in his own mind, and next to lay out before his readers;—a picture not merely such as to delight the imagination by brilliancy of coloring and depth of sentiment, but also suggestive and improving to the reason. Not omitting the points of resemblance as well as of contrast with the better-known forms of modern society, he will especially study to exhibit the spontaneous movement of Grecian intellect, sometimes aided but never borrowed from without, and lighting up a small portion of a world otherwise clouded and stationary. He will develop the action of that social system, which, while insuring to the mass of freemen a degree of protection elsewhere unknown, acted as a stimulus to the creative impulses of genius, and left the superior minds sufficiently unshackled to soar above religious and political routine, to overshoot their own age, and to become the teachers of posterity.

To set forth the history of a people by whom the first spark was set to the dormant intellectual capacities of our nature—Hellenic phenomena as illustrative of the Hellenic mind and character—is the task which I propose to myself in the present work; not without a painful consciousness how much the deed falls short of the will, and a yet more painful conviction, that full success is rendered impossible by an obstacle which no human ability can now remedy—the insufficiency of original evidence. For in spite of the valuable expositions of so many able commentators, our stock of information respecting the ancient world still remains lamentably inadequate to the demands of an enlightened curiosity. We possess only what has drifted ashore from the wreck of a stranded vessel; and though this includes some of the most precious articles among its once abundant cargo, yet if any man will cast his eyes over the citations in Diogenes Laertius, Athenæus or Plutarch, or the list of names in Vossius de Historicis Græcis, he will see with grief and surprise how much larger is the proportion which, through the enslavement of the Greeks themselves, the decline of the Roman empire, the change of religion, and the irruption of barbarian conquerors, has been irrecoverably submerged. We are thus reduced to judge of the whole Hellenic world, eminently multiform as it was, from a few compositions; excellent, indeed, in themselves, but bearing too exclusively

the stamp of Athens. Of Thucydidês and Aristotle, indeed, both as inquirers into matter of fact and as free from narrow local feeling, it is impossible to speak too highly; but unfortunately that work of the latter which would have given us the most copious information regarding Grecian political life—his collection and comparison of 150 distinct town-constitutions—has not been preserved; while the brevity of Thucydidês often gives us but a single word where a sentence would not have been too much, and sentences which we should be glad to see expanded into paragraphs.

Such insufficiency of original and trustworthy materials as compared with those resources which are thought hardly sufficient for the historian of any modern kingdom, is neither to be concealed nor extenuated, however much we may lament it. I advert to the point here on more grounds than one. For it not only limits the amount of information which an historian of Greece can give to his readers—compelling him to leave much of his picture an absolute blank, but it also greatly spoils the execution of the remainder. The question of credibility is perpetually obtruding itself, and requiring a decision, which, whether favorable or unfavorable, always introduces more or less of controversy; and gives to those outlines, which the interest of the picture requires to be straight and vigorous, a faint and faltering character. Expressions of qualified and hesitating affirmation are repeated until the reader is sickened; while the writer himself, to whom this restraint is more painful still, is frequently tempted to break loose from the unseen spell by which a conscientious criticism binds him down—to screw up the possible and probable into certainty, to suppress counterbalancing considerations, and to substitute a pleasing romance in place of half-known and perplexing realities. Desiring in the present work to set forth all which can be ascertained, together with such conjectures and inferences as can be reasonably deduced from it, but nothing more—I notice at the outset that faulty state of the original evidence which renders discussions of credibility, and hesitation in the language of the judge, unavoidable. Such discussions, though the reader may be assured that they will become less frequent as we advance into times better known, are tiresome enough even with the comparatively late period which I adopt as the historical beginning; much more intolerable would they have proved had I thought it my duty to start from the primitive terminus of Deukalion or Inachus, or from the unburied Pelasgi and Leleges, and to subject the heroic ages to a similar scrutiny. I really know nothing so disheartening or unrequited as the elaborate balancing of what is called evidence—the comparison of infinitesimal probabilities and conjectures all uncertified—in regard to these shadowy times and persons.

The law respecting sufficiency of evidence ought to be the same for ancient times as for modern; and the reader will find in this history an application to the former, of criteria analogous to those which

have been long recognized in the latter. Approaching, though with a certain measure of indulgence, to this standard, I begin the real history of Greece with the first recorded Olympiad, or 776 B.C. To such as are accustomed to the habits once universal, and still not uncommon, in investigating the ancient world, I may appear to be striking off one thousand years from the scroll of history; but to those whose canon of evidence is derived from Mr. Hallam, M. Sismondi, or any other eminent historian of modern events, I am well-assured that I shall appear lax and credulous rather than exigent or sceptical. For the truth is, that historical records, properly so called, do not begin until long after this date; nor will any man, who candidly considers the extreme paucity of attested facts for two centuries after 776 B.C., be astonished to learn that the state of Greece in 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400 B.C., etc.—or any earlier century which it may please chronologists to include in their computed genealogies—cannot be described to him upon anything like decent evidence. I shall hope, when I come to the lives of Socrates and Plato, to illustrate one of the most valuable of their principles—that conscious and confessed ignorance is a better state of mind, than the fancy, without the reality, of knowledge. Meanwhile, I begin by making that confession, in reference to the real world of Greece, anterior to the Olympiads; meaning the disclaimer to apply to anything like a general history—not to exclude rigorously every individual event.

The times which I thus set apart from the region of history are discernible only through a different atmosphere—that of epic poetry and legend. To confound together these disparate matters is, in my judgment, essentially unphilosophical. I describe the earlier times by themselves, as conceived by the faith and feeling of the first Greeks, and known only through their legends—without presuming to measure how much or how little of historical matter these legends may contain. If the reader blame me for not assisting him to determine this—if he ask me why I do not undraw the curtain and disclose the picture—I reply in the words of the painter Zeuxis, when the same question was addressed to him on exhibiting his masterpiece of imitative art—"The curtain *is* the picture." What we now read as poetry and legend was once accredited history, and the only genuine history which the first Greeks could conceive or relish of their past time: the curtain conceals nothing behind, and cannot by any ingenuity be withdrawn. I undertake only to show it as it stands—not to efface, still less to re-paint it.

Three-fourths of the two volumes now presented to the public are destined to elucidate this age of historical faith, as distinguished from the later age of historical reason: to exhibit its basis in the human mind—an omnipresent religious and personal interpretation of nature; to illustrate it by comparison with the like mental habit in early modern Europe; to show its immense abundance and

variety of narrative matter, with little care for consistency between one story and another: lastly, to set forth the causes which overgrew and partially supplanted the old epical sentiment, and introduced, in the room of literal faith, a variety of compromises and interpretations.

The legendary age of the Greeks receives its principal charm and dignity from the Homeric poems: to these, therefore, and to the other poems included in the ancient epic, an entire chapter is devoted, the length of which must be justified by the names of the Iliad and Odyssey. I have thought it my duty to take some notice of the Wolfian controversy as it now stands in Germany, and have even hazarded some speculations respecting the structure of the Iliad. The society and manners of the heroic age, considered as known in a general way from Homer's descriptions and allusions, are also described and criticised.

I next pass to the historical age, beginning at 776 B.C.; prefixing some remarks upon the geographical features of Greece. I try to make out, amidst obscure and scanty indications, what the state of Greece was at this period; and I indulge some cautious conjectures, founded upon the earliest verifiable facts, respecting the steps immediately antecedent by which that condition was brought about. In the present volumes I have only been able to include the history of Sparta and the Peloponnesian Dorians, down to the age of Peisistratus and Crœsus. I had hoped to have comprised in them the entire history of Greece down to this last-mentioned period, but I find the space insufficient.

The history of Greece falls most naturally into six compartments, of which the first may be looked at as a period of preparation for the five following, which exhaust the free life of collective Hellas.

I. Period from 776 B.C. to 560 B.C., the accession of Peisistratus at Athens and of Crœsus in Lydia.

II. From the accession of Peisistratus and Crœsus to the repulse of Xerxes from Greece.

III. From the repulse of Xerxes to the close of the Peloponnesian war and overthrow of Athens.

IV. From the close of the Peloponnesian war to the battle of Leuktra.

V. From the battle of Leuktra to that of Chæroneia.

VI. From the battle of Chæroneia to the end of the generation of Alexander.

The five periods from Peisistratus down to the death of Alexander and of his generation, present the acts of an historical drama capable of being recounted in perspicuous succession, and connected by a sensible thread of unity. I shall interweave in their proper places the important but outlying adventures of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks—introducing such occasional notices of Grecian political constitutions, philosophy, poetry, and oratory, as are requisite to

exhibit the many-sided activity of this people during their short but brilliant career.

After the generation of Alexander, the political action of Greece becomes cramped and degraded—no longer interesting to the reader, or operative on the destinies of the future world. We may, indeed, name one or two incidents, especially the revolutions of Agis and Kleomenês at Sparta, which are both instructive and affecting; but as a whole, the period between 300 B.C. and the absorption of Greece by the Romans, is of no interest in itself, and is only so far of value as it helps us to understand the preceding centuries. The dignity and value of the Greeks from that time forward belong to them only as individual philosophers, preceptors, astronomers and mathematicians, literary men and critics, medical practitioners, etc. In all these respective capacities, especially in the great schools of philosophical speculation, they still constitute the light of the Roman world; though as communities, they have lost their own orbit, and have become satellites of more powerful neighbors.

I propose to bring down the history of the Grecian communities to the year 300 B.C., or the close of the generation which takes its name from Alexander the Great, and I hope to accomplish this in eight volumes altogether. For the next two or three volumes I have already large preparations made, and I shall publish my third (perhaps my fourth) in the course of the ensuing winter.

There are great disadvantages in the publication of one portion of a history apart from the remainder; for neither the earlier nor the later phenomena can be fully comprehended without the light which each mutually casts upon the other. But the practice has become habitual, and is indeed more than justified by the well-known inadmissibility of "long hopes" into the short span of human life. Yet I cannot but fear that my first two volumes will suffer in the estimation of many readers by coming out alone—and that men who value the Greeks for their philosophy, their politics, and their oratory, may treat the early legends as not worth attention. And it must be confessed that the sentimental attributes of the Greek mind—its religious and poetical vein—here appear in disproportionate relief, as compared with its more vigorous and masculine capacities—with those powers of acting, organizing, judging, and speculating, which will be revealed in the forthcoming volumes. I venture, however, to forewarn the reader that there will occur numerous circumstances in the after political life of the Greeks which he will not comprehend unless he be initiated into the course of their legendary associations. He will not understand the frantic terror of the Athenian public during the Peloponnesian war, on the occasion of the mutilation of the statues called Hermæ, unless he enters into the way in which they connected their stability and security with the domiciliation of the gods in the soil; nor will he adequately appreciate the habit of the Spartan king on military expeditions—when he offered

his daily public sacrifices on behalf of his army and his country—"always to perform this morning service immediately before sunrise, in order that he might be beforehand in obtaining the favor of the gods," if he be not familiar with the Homeric conception of Zeus going to rest at night and awaking to rise at early dawn from the side of the "white-armed Hêrê." The occasion will, indeed, often occur for remarking how these legends illustrate and vivify the political phenomena of the succeeding times, and I have only now to urge the necessity of considering them as the beginning of a series, not as an entire work.

LONDON, March 5, 1846.

PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION OF VOLUMES I. AND II.

In preparing a second edition of the two first volumes of my history, I have profited by the remarks and corrections of various critics, contained in reviews both English and foreign. I have suppressed, or rectified, some positions which had been pointed out as erroneous, or as advanced upon inadequate evidence. I have strengthened my argument in some cases where it appeared to have been imperfectly understood—adding some new notes, partly for the purpose of enlarged illustration, partly to defend certain opinions which had been called in question. The greater number of these alterations have been made in Chapters XVI. and XXI. of Part I., and in Chapter VI. of Part II.

I trust that these three chapters, more full of speculation, and therefore more open to criticism than any of the others, will thus appear in a more complete and satisfactory form. But I must at the same time add that they remain for the most part unchanged in substance, and that I have seen no sufficient reason to modify my main conclusions even respecting the structure of the Iliad, controverted though they have been by some of my most esteemed critics.

In regard to the character and peculiarity of Grecian legend, as broadly distinguished throughout these volumes from Grecian history, I desire to notice two valuable publications with which I have only become acquainted since the date of my first edition. One of these is a short "Essay on Primeval History," by John Kenrick, M.A. (London, 1846, published just at the same time as these volumes), which illustrates with much acute reflection the general features of legend, not only in Greece, but throughout the ancient world—see especially pages 65, 84, 92, *et seq.* The other work is "Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official," by Col. Sleeman, first made known to me through an excellent notice of my history in the Edinburgh Review for October, 1846. The description given by Col. Sleeman of the state of mind now actually prevalent among the native population of Hindostan, presents a vivid comparison, helping the modern reader to understand and appreciate the legendary

era of Greece. I have embodied in the notes of this second edition two or three passages from Col. Sleeman's instructive work; but the whole of it richly deserves perusal.

Having now finished six volumes of this history, without attaining a lower point than the peace of Nikias in the tenth year of the Peloponnesian war, I find myself compelled to retract the expectation held out in the preface to my first edition, that the entire work might be completed in eight volumes. Experience proves to me how impossible it is to measure beforehand the space which historical subjects will require. All I can now promise is, that the remainder of the work shall be executed with as much regard to brevity as is consistent with the paramount duty of rendering it fit for public acceptance.

G. G.

LONDON, April 3, 1849.

NAMES OF GODS, GODDESSES, AND HEROES.

FOLLOWING the example of Dr. Thirlwall and other excellent scholars, I call the Greek deities by their real Greek names, and not by the Latin equivalents used among the Romans. For the assistance of those readers to whom the Greek names may be less familiar, I here annex a table of the one and the other.

Greek.	*Latin.*
Zeus,	Jupiter.
Poseidôn,	Neptune.
Arês,	Mars.
Dionysus,	Bacchus.
Hermês,	Mercury.
Hêlios,	Sol.
Hêphæstus,	Vulkan.
Hadês,	Pluto.
Hêrê,	Juno.
Athênê,	Minerva.
Artemis,	Diana.
Aphroditê,	Venus.
Eôs,	Aurora.
Hestia,	Vesta.
Lêtô,	Latona.
Dêmêtêr,	Ceres.
Hêraklês,	Hercules.
Asklêpius,	Æsculapius.

A few words are here necessary respecting the orthography of Greek names adopted in the above table and generally throughout this history. I have approximated as nearly as I dared to the Greek letters in preference to the Latin; and on this point I venture upon an innovation which I should have little doubt of vindicating before the reason of any candid English student. For the ordinary practice of substituting, in a Greek name, the English C in place of the Greek K is, indeed, so obviously incorrect, that it admits of no rational justification. Our own K precisely and in every point coincides with the Greek K: we have thus the means of reproducing the Greek name to the eye as well as to the ear, yet we gratuitously take the

wrong letter in preference to the right. And the precedent of the Latins is here against us rather than in our favor, for their C really coincided in sound with the Greek K, whereas our C entirely departs from it, and becomes an S, before *e*, *i*, *æ*, *œ*, and *y*. Though our C has so far deviated in sound from the Latin C, yet there is some warrant for our continuing to use it in writing Latin names—because we thus reproduce the name to the eye, though not to the ear. But this is not the case when we employ our C to designate the Greek K, for we depart here not less from the visible than from the audible original; while we mar the unrivaled euphony of the Greek language by that multiplied sibilation which constitutes the least inviting feature in our own. Among German philologists, the K is now universally employed in writing Greek names, and I have adopted it pretty largely in this work, making exceptions for such names as the English reader has been so accustomed to hear with the C, that they may be considered as being almost Anglicized. I have further marked the long *e* and the long *o* (*η*, *ω*) by a circumflex (Hêrê) when they occur in the last syllable or in the penultimate of a name.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART I.

LEGENDARY GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

LEGENDS RESPECTING THE GODS.

THE mythical world of the Greeks opens with the gods, anterior as well as superior to man: it gradually descends, first to heroes, and next to the human race. Along with the gods are found various monstrous natures, ultra-human and extra-human, who cannot with propriety be called gods, but who partake with gods and men in the attributes of volition, conscious agency, and susceptibility of pleasure and pain,—such as the Harpies, the Gorgons, the Grææ, the Sirens, Scylla and Charybdis, Echidna, Sphinx, Chimæra, Chrysaôr, Pegasus, the Cyclôpes, the Centaurs, etc. The first acts of what may be termed the great mythical cycle describe the proceedings of these gigantic agents—the crash and collision of certain terrific and overboiling forces, which are ultimately reduced to obedience, or chained up, or extinguished, under the more orderly government of Zeus, who supplants his less capable predecessors, and acquires presidence and supremacy over gods and men—subject, however, to certain social restraints from the chief gods and goddesses around him, as well as to the custom of occasionally convoking and consulting the divine agora.

I recount these events briefly, but literally, treating them simply as myths springing from the same creative imagination, addressing themselves to analogous tastes and feelings, and depending upon the same authority, as the legends of Thebes and Troy. It is the inspired voice of the Muse which reveals and authenticates both, and from which Homer and Hesiod alike derive their knowledge—the one of the heroic, the other of the divine, foretime. I maintain, moreover, fully, the character of these great divine agents as persons, which is the light in which they presented themselves to the Homeric or Hesiodic audience. Uranos, Nyx, Hypnos, and Oneiros

(Heaven, Night, Sleep, and Dream) are persons, just as much as Zeus and Apollo. To resolve them into mere allegories is unsafe and unprofitable: we then depart from the point of view of the original hearers, without acquiring any consistent or philosophical point of view of our own. For although some of the attributes and actions ascribed to these persons are often explicable by allegory, the whole series and system of them never are so: the theorist who adopts this course of explanation finds that, after one or two simple and obvious steps, the path is no longer open, and he is forced to clear a way for himself by gratuitous refinements and conjectures. The allegorical persons and attributes are always found mingled with other persons and attributes not allegorical; but the two classes cannot be severed without breaking up the whole march of the mythical events, nor can any explanation which drives us to such a necessity be considered as admissible. To suppose, indeed, that these legends could be all traced by means of allegory into a coherent body of physical doctrine, would be inconsistent with all reasonable presumptions respecting the age or society in which they arose. Where the allegorical mark is clearly set upon any particular character, or attribute, or event, to that extent we may recognize it; but we can rarely venture to divine further, still less to alter the legends themselves on the faith of any such surmises. The theogony of the Greeks contains some cosmogonic ideas; but it cannot be considered as a system of cosmogony, or translated into a string of elementary, planetary, or physical changes.

In the order of legendary chronology, Zeus comes after Kronos and Uranos; but in the order of Grecian conception Zeus is the prominent person, and Kronos and Uranos are inferior and introductory precursors, set up in order to be overthrown and to serve as mementos of the prowess of their conqueror. To Homer and Hesiod, as well as to the Greeks universally, Zeus is the great and predominant god, "the father of gods and men," whose power none of the other gods can hope to resist, or even deliberately think of questioning. All the other gods have their specific potency and peculiar sphere of action and duty, with which Zeus does not usually interfere; but it is he who maintains the lineaments of a providential superintendence, as well over the phenomena of Olympus as over those of earth. Zeus and his brothers Poseidôn and Hadês have made a division of power: he has reserved the ether and the atmosphere to himself—Poseidôn has obtained the sea—and Hadês the under-world or infernal regions; while earth, and the events which pass upon earth, are common to all of them, together with free access to Olympus.

Zeus, then, with his brethren and colleagues, constitute the present gods, whom Homer and Hesiod recognize as in full dignity and efficiency. The inmates of this divine world are conceived upon the model, but not upon the scale, of the human. They are actuated by the full play and variety of those appetites, sympathies, passions,

and affections, which divide the soul of man; invested with a far larger and indeterminate measure of power, and an exemption as well from death as (with some rare exceptions) from suffering and infirmity. The rich and diverse types thus conceived, full of energetic movement and contrast, each in his own province, and soaring confessedly above the limits of experience, were of all themes the most suitable for adventure and narrative, and operated with irresistible force upon the Grecian fancy. All nature was then conceived as moving and working through a number of personal agents, amongst whom the gods of Olympus were the most conspicuous; the reverential belief in Zeus and Apollo being only one branch of this omnipresent personifying faith. The attributes of all these agents had a tendency to expand themselves into illustrative legends—especially those of the gods, who were constantly invoked in the public worship. Out of the same mental source sprang both the divine and heroic myths, the former being often the more extravagant and abnormous in their incidents, in proportion as the general type of the gods was more vast and awful than that of the heroes.

As the gods have houses and wives like men, so the present dynasty of gods must have a past to repose upon; and the curious and imaginative Greek, whenever he does not find a recorded past ready to his hand, is uneasy until he has created one. Thus the Hesiodic theogony explains, with a certain degree of system and coherence, first the antecedent circumstances under which Zeus acquired the divine empire, next the number of his colleagues and descendants.

First in order of time (we are told by Hesiod) came Chaos; next Gæa, the broad, firm, and flat Earth, with deep and dark Tartarus at her base. Erôs (Love), the subduer of gods as well as men, came immediately afterwards.

From Chaos sprung Erebos and Nyx; from these latter Æthêr and Hêmera. Gæa also gave birth to Uranos, equal in breadth to herself, in order to serve both as an overarching vault to her, and as a residence for the immortal gods; she further produced the mountains, habitations of the divine nymphs, and Pontus, the barren and billowy sea.

Then Gæa intermarried with Uranos, and from this union came a numerous offspring—twelve Titans and Titanides, three Cyclôpes, and three Hekatoncheires or beings with a hundred hands each. The Titans were Oceanus, Kœos, Krios, Hyperiôn, Iapetos, and Kronos: the Titanides, Theia, Rhea, Themis, Mnêmosynê, Phœbê, and Têthys. The Cyclôpes were Brontês, Steropês, and Argês,—formidable persons, equally distinguished for strength and for manual craft, so that they made the thunder which afterwards formed the irresistible artillery of Zeus. The Hekatoncheires were Kottos, Briareus, and Gygês, of prodigious bodily force.

Uranos contemplated this powerful brood with fear and horror; as

fast as any of them were born, he concealed them in cavities of the earth, and would not permit them to come out. Gæa could find no room for them, and groaned under the pressure: she produced iron, made a sickle, and implored her sons to avenge both her and themselves against the oppressive treatment of their father. But none of them, except Kronos, had courage to undertake the deed: he, the youngest and the most daring, was armed with the sickle and placed in suitable ambush by the contrivance of Gæa. Presently night arrived, and Uranos descended to the embraces of Gæa: Kronos then emerged from his concealment, cut off the genitals of his father, and cast the bleeding member behind him far away into the sea. Much of the blood was spilt upon the earth, and Gæa in consequence gave birth to the irresistible Erinnys, the vast and muscular Gigantes, and the Melian nymphs. Out of the genitals themselves, as they swam and foamed upon the sea, emerged the goddess Aphroditê, deriving her name from the foam out of which she had sprung. She first landed at Kythêra, and then went to Cyprus: the island felt her benign influence, and the green herb started up under her soft and delicate tread. Erôs immediately joined her, and partook with her the function of suggesting and directing the amorous impulses both of gods and men.

Uranos being thus dethroned and disabled, Kronos and the Titans acquired their liberty and became predominant: the Cyclôpes and the Hekatoncheires had been cast by Uranos into Tartarus, and were still allowed to remain there.

Each of the Titans had a numerous offspring: Oceanus, especially, marrying his sister Têthys, begat 3,000 daughters, the oceanic nymphs, and as many sons: the rivers and springs passed for his offspring. Hyperiôn and his sister Theia had for their children Hêlios, Selênê, and Eôs; Kœos with Phœbê begat Lêtô and Asteria: the children of Krios were Astræos, Pallas, and Persês,—from Astræos and Eôs sprang the winds Zephyrus, Boreas, and Notus. Iapetos marrying the Oceanic nymph Klymenê, counted as his progeny the celebrated Promêtheus, Epimêtheus, Menœtius, and Atlas. But the offspring of Kronos were the most powerful and transcendent of all. He married his sister Rhea, and had by her three daughters—Hestia, Dêmêtêr, and Hêrê—and three sons, Hadês, Poseidôn, and Zeus, the latter at once the youngest and the greatest.

But Kronos foreboded to himself destruction from one of his own children, and accordingly, as soon as any of them were born, he immediately swallowed them and retained them in his own belly. In this manner had the five first been treated, and Rhea was on the point of being delivered of Zeus. Grieved and indignant at the loss of her children, she applied for counsel to her father and mother, Uranos and Gæa, who aided her to conceal the birth of Zeus. They conveyed her by night to Lyktus in Crête, hid the new-born child in a woody cavern on Mount Ida, and gave to Kronos, in place of it, a

stone wrapped in swaddling clothes, which he greedily swallowed, believing it to be his child. Thus was the safety of Zeus insured. As he grew up his vast powers fully developed themselves: at the suggestion of Gæa, he induced Kronos by stratagem to vomit up, first the stone which had been given to him,—next the five children whom he had previously devoured. Hestia, Dêmêtêr, Hêrê, Poseidôn and Hadês, were thus allowed to grow up along with Zeus; and the stone to which the latter owed his preservation was placed near the temple of Delphi, where it ever afterwards stood as a conspicuous and venerable memorial to the religious Greek.

We have not yet exhausted the catalogue of beings generated during this early period, anterior to the birth of Zeus. Nyx, alone and without any partner, gave birth to a numerous progeny: Thanatos, Hypnos and Oneiros; Mômus and Oïzys (Grief); Klôthô, Lachesis, and Atropos, the three Fates; the retributive and equalizing Nemesis; Apatê and Philotês (Deceit and amorous Propensity), Geras (Old Age) and Eris (Contention). From Eris proceeded an abundant offspring, all mischievous and maleficent: Ponos (Suffering), Lêthê, Limos (Famine), Phonos and Machê (Slaughter and Battle), Dysnomia and Atê (Lawlessness and reckless Impulse) and Horkos, the everwatchful sanctioner of oaths, as well as the inexorable punisher of voluntary perjury.

Gæa, too, intermarrying with Pontus, gave birth to Nereus, the just and righteous old man of the sea; to Thaumas, Phorkys and Kêtô. From Nereus, and Doris daughter of Oceanus, proceeded the fifty Nereids or Sea-nymphs. Thaumas also married Elektra daughter of Oceanus, and had by her Iris and the two Harpies, Aellô and Okypetê,—winged and swift as the winds. From Phorkys and Kêtô sprung the Dragon of the Hesperides, and the monstrous Grææ, and Gorgons: the blood of Medusa, one of the Gorgons, when killed by Perseus, produced Chrysaôr and the horse Pegasus; Chrysaôr and Kallirhoê gave birth to Geryôn as well as to Echidna, —a creature half nymph and half serpent, unlike both to gods and to men. Other monsters arose from the union of Echidna with Typhaôn,—Orthros, the two-headed dog of Geryôn; Cerberus, the dog of Hadês, with fifty heads, and the Lernæan Hydra. From the latter proceeded the Chimæra, the Sphinx of Thêbes, and the Nemean lion.

A powerful and important progeny, also, was that of Styx, daughter of Oceanus, by Pallas; she had Zêlos and Nikê (Imperiousness and Victory), and Kratos and Bia (Strength and Force). The hearty and early co-operation of Styx and her four sons with Zeus was one of the main causes which enabled him to achieve his victory over the Titans.

Zeus had grown up not less distinguished for mental capacity than for bodily force. He and his brothers now determined to wrest the power from the hands of Kronos and the Titans, and a long and

desperate struggle commenced, in which all the gods and all the goddesses took part. Zeus convoked them to Olympus, and promised to all who would aid him against Kronos, that their functions and privileges should remain undisturbed. The first who responded to the call, came with her four sons, and embraced his cause, was Styx. Zeus took them all four as his constant attendants, and conferred upon Styx the majestic distinction of being the Horkos, or oath-sanctioner of the gods,—what Horkos was to men, Styx was to the gods.

Still further to strengthen himself, Zeus released the other Uranids who had been imprisoned in Tartarus by their father,—the Cyclôpes and the Centimanes,—and prevailed upon them to take part with him against the Titans. The former supplied him with thunder and lightning, and the latter brought into the fight their boundless muscular strength. Ten full years did the combat continue; Zeus and the Kronids occupying Olympus, and the Titans being established on the more southerly mountain-chain of Othrys. All nature was convulsed, and the distant Oceanus, though he took no part in the struggle, felt the boiling, the noise, and the shock, not less than Gæa and Pontus. The thunder of Zeus, combined with the crags and mountains torn up and hurled by the Centimanes, at length prevailed, and the Titans were defeated and thrust down into Tartarus. Iapetos, Kronos, and the remaining Titans (Oceanus excepted) were imprisoned perpetually and irrevocably, in that subterranean dungeon, a wall of brass being built around them by Poseidôn, and the three Centimanes being planted as guards.

Of the two sons of Iapetos, Menœtius was made to share this prison, while Atlas was condemned to stand forever at the extreme west, and to bear upon his shoulders the solid vault of heaven.

Thus were the Titans subdued, and the Kronids with Zeus at their head placed in possession of power. They were not, however, yet quite secure; for Gæa, intermarrying with Tartarus, gave birth to a new and still more formidable monster called Typhôeus, of such tremendous properties and promise, that, had he been allowed to grow into full development, nothing could have prevented him from vanquishing all rivals and becoming supreme. But Zeus foresaw the danger, smote him at once with a thunderbolt from Olympus, and burnt him up: he was cast along with the rest into Tartarus, and no further enemy remained to question the sovereignty of the Kronids.

With Zeus begins a new dynasty and a different order of beings. Zeus, Poseidôn, and Hadês, agree upon the distribution before noticed, of functions and localities: Zeus retaining the Æthêr and the atmosphere, together with the general presiding function; Poseidôn obtaining the sea, and administering subterranean forces generally: and Hadês ruling the under-world, or region in which the half-animated shadows of departed men reside.

It has been already stated, that in Zeus, his brothers and his sisters, and his and their divine progeny, we find the *present* gods; that is, those, for the most part, whom the Homeric and Hesiodic Grecks recognized and worshiped. The wives of Zeus were numerous as well as his offspring. First he married Mêtis, the wisest and most sagacious of the goddesses; but Gæa and Uranos forewarned him that if he permitted himself to have children by her, they would be stronger than himself and dethrone him. Accordingly when Mêtis was on the point of being delivered of Athênê, he swallowed her up, and her wisdom and sagacity thus became permanently identified with his own being. His head was subsequently cut open, in order to make way for the exit and birth of the goddess Athênê. By Themis, Zeus begat the Hôræ; by Eurynomê, the three Charities or Graces; by Mnêmosynê, the Muses; by Lêtô (Latona), Apollo and Artemis; and by Dêmêtêr, Persephonê. Last of all he took for his wife Hêrê, who maintained permanently the dignity of queen of the gods; by her he had Hêbê, Arês, and Eileithyia. Hermês also was born to him by Maia, the daughter of Atlas; Hêphæstos was born to Hêrê, according to some accounts by Zeus; according to others, by her own unaided generative force. He was born lame, and Hêrê was ashamed of him; she wished to secrete him away, but he made his escape into the sea, and found shelter under the maternal care of the Nereids, Thetis, and Eurynomê.

Our enumeration of the divine race, under the presidency of Zeus, will thus give us:

1. The twelve great gods and goddesses of Olympus—Zeus, Poseidôn, Apollo, Arês, Hêphæstos, Hermês, Hêrê, Athênê, Artemis, Aphroditê, Hestia, Dêmêtêr.

2. An indefinite number of other deities, not included among the Olympic, seemingly because the number *twelve* was complete without them, but some of them not inferior in power and dignity to many of the twelve:—Hadês, Hêlios, Hekatê, Dionysos, Lêtô, Diônê, Persephonê, Selênê, Themis, Eôs, Harmonia, the Charities, the Muses, the Eileithyiæ, the Mœræ, the Oceanids and the Nereids, Proteus, Eidothea, the Nymphs, Leukothea, Phorkys, Æolus, Nemesis, etc.

3. Deities who perform special services to the greater gods:—Iris, Hêbê, the Horæ, etc.

4. Deities whose personality is more faintly and unsteadily conceived:—Atê, the Litæ, Eris, Thanatos, Hypnos, Kratos, Bia, Ossa, etc. The same name is here employed sometimes to designate the person, sometimes the attribute or event not personified—an unconscious transition of ideas, which, when consciously performed, is called Allegory.

5. Monsters, offspring of the gods:—the Harpies, the Gorgons, the Grææ, Pegasus, Chrysaôr, Echidna, Chimæra, the Dragon of the Hesperides, Cerberus, Orthros, Geryôn, the Lernæan Hydra, the Nemean lion, Scylla and Charybdis, the Centaurs, the Sphinx, Xanthos and Balios, the immortal horses, etc.

From the gods we slide down insensibly, first to heroes, and then to men; but before we proceed to this new mixture, it is necessary to say a few words on the theogony generally. I have given it briefly as it stands in the Hesiodic Theogonia, because that poem—in spite of great incoherence and confusion, arising seemingly from diversity of authorship as well as diversity of age—presents an ancient and genuine attempt to cast the divine foretime into a systematic sequence. Homer and Hesiod were the grand authorities in the Pagan world respecting theogony. But in the Iliad and Odyssey nothing is found except passing allusions and implications; and even in the hymns (which were commonly believed in antiquity to be the productions of the same author as the Iliad and the Odyssey) there are only isolated, unconnected narratives Accordingly men habitually took their information respecting their theogonic antiquities from the Hesiodic poem, where it was ready laid out before them; and the legends consecrated in that work acquired both an extent of circulation and a firm hold on the national faith, such as independent legends could seldom or never rival. Moreover the scrupulous and sceptical Pagans, as well as the open assailants of Paganism in later times, derived their subjects of attack from the same source; so that it has been absolutely necessary to recount in their naked simplicity the Hesiodic stories, in order to know what it was that Plato deprecated and Xenophanês denounced. The strange proceedings ascribed to Uranos, Kronos, and Zeus, have been more frequently alluded to in the way of ridicule or condemnation than any other portion of the mythical world.

But though the Hesiodic theogony passed as orthodox among the later Pagans, because it stood before them as the only system anciently set forth and easily accessible, it was evidently not the only system received at the date of the poem itself. Homer knows nothing of Uranos, in the sense of an arch-god anterior to Kronos. Uranos and Gæa, like Oceanus, Têthys, and Nyx, are with him great and venerable gods, but neither the one nor the other present the character of predecessors of Kronos and Zeus. The Cylôpes, whom Hesiod ranks as sons of Uranos and fabricators of thunder, are in Homer neither one nor the other: they are not noticed in the Iliad at all, and in the Odyssey they are gross gigantic shepherds and cannibals, having nothing in common with the Hesiodic Cyclôpes except the one round central eye. Of the three Centimanes enumerated by Hesiod, Briareus only is mentioned in Homer, and, to all appearance, not as the son of Uranos, but as the son of Poseidôn; not as aiding Zeus in his combat against the Titans, but as rescuing him at a critical moment from a conspiracy formed against him by Hêrê, Poseidôn, and Athênê. Not only is the Hesiodic Uranos (with the Uranids) omitted in Homer, but the relations between Zeus and Kronos are also presented in a very different light. No mention is made of Kronos swallowing his young children: on the contrary, Zeus is

the eldest of the three brothers, instead of the youngest, and the children of Kronos live with him and Rhea: there the stolen intercourse between Zeus and Hêrê first takes place without the knowledge of their parents. When Zeus puts Kronos down into Tartarus, Rhea consigns her daughter Hêrê to the care of Oceanus: no notice do we find of any terrific battle with the Titans as accompanying that event. Kronos, Iapetos, and the remaining Titans are down in Tartarus, in the lowest depths under the earth, far removed from the genial rays of Hêlios; but they are still powerful and venerable, and Hypnos makes Hêrê swear an oath in their name, as the most inviolable that he can think of.

In Homer, then, we find nothing beyond the simple fact that Zeus thrust his father Kronos, together with the remaining Titans, into Tartarus; an event to which he affords us a tolerable parallel in certain occurrences even under the presidency of Zeus himself. For the other gods make more than one rebellious attempt against Zeus, and are only put down, partly by his unparalleled strength, partly by the presence of his ally, the Centimane Briareus. Kronos, like Laërtes or Pêleus, has become old, and has been supplanted by a force vastly superior to his own. The Homeric epic treats Zeus as present, and like all the interesting heroic characters, a father must be assigned to him: that father has once been the chief of the Titans, but has been superseded and put down into Tartarus along with the latter, so soon as Zeus and the superior breed of the Olympic gods acquired their full development.

That antithesis between Zeus and Kronos—between the Olympic gods and the Titans—which Homer has thus briefly brought to view, Hesiod has amplified into a theogony, with many things new, and some things contradictory to his predecessor; while Eumêlus or Arktinus in the poem called Titanomachia (now lost) also adopted it as their special subject. As Stasinus, Arktinus, Leschês, and others, enlarged the Legend of Troy by composing poems relating to a supposed time anterior to the commencement, or subsequent to the termination of the Iliad,—as other poets recounted adventures of Odysseus subsequent to his landing in Ithaka,—so Hesiod enlarged and systematized, at the same time that he corrupted, the skeleton theogony which we find briefly indicated in Homer. There is violence and rudeness in the Homeric gods, but the great genius of Grecian epic is no way accountable for the stories of Uranos and Kronos,—the standing reproach against Pagan legendary narrative.

How far these stories are the invention of Hesiod himself is impossible to determine. They bring us down to a cast of fancy more coarse and indelicate than the Homeric, and more nearly resembling some of the holy chapters (*ἱεροὶ λόγοι*) of the more recent mysteries, such (for example) as the tale of Dionysos Zagreus. There is evidence in the theogony itself that the author was acquainted with local legends current both at Krête and at Delphi; for he mentions

both the mountain-cave in Krête wherein the new-born Zeus was hidden, and the stone near the Delphian temple—the identical stone which Kronos had swallowed—"placed by Zeus himself as a sign and wonder to mortal men." Both these two monuments, which the poet expressly refers to, and had probably seen, imply a whole train of accessory and explanatory local legends—current probably among the priests of Krête and Delphi, between which places, in ancient times, there was an intimate religious connection. And we may trace further in the poem—that which would be the natural feeling of Krêtan worshipers of Zeus—an effort to make out that Zeus was justified in his aggression on Kronos, by the conduct of Kronos himself both toward his father and toward his children: the treatment of Kronos by Zeus appears in Hesiod as the retribution foretold and threatened by the mutilated Uranos against the son who had outraged him. In fact, the relations of Uranos and Gæa are in almost all their particulars a mere copy and duplication of those between Kronos and Rhea, differing only in the mode whereby the final catastrophe is brought about. Now castration was a practice thoroughly abhorrent both to the feelings and to the customs of Greece; but it was seen with melancholy frequency in the domestic life as well as in the religious worship of Phrygia and other parts of Asia; and it even became the special qualification of a priest of the Great Mother Cybelê, as well as of the Ephesian Artemis. The employment of the sickle ascribed to Kronos seems to be the product of an imagination familiar with the Asiatic worship and legends, which were connected with and partially resembled the Krêtan. And this deduction becomes the more probable when we connect it with the first genesis of iron, which Hesiod mentions to have been produced for the express purpose of fabricating the fatal sickle; for metallurgy finds a place in the early legends both of the Trojan and of the Krêtan Ida, and the three Idæan Dactyls, the legendary inventors of it, are assigned sometimes to one and sometimes to the other.

As Hesiod had extended the Homeric series of gods by prefixing the dynasty of Uranos to that of Kronos, so the Orphic theogony lengthened it still further. First came Chronos, or Time, as a person, after him Æther and Chaos, out of whom Chronos produced the vast mundane egg. Hence emerged in process of time the first-born god Phanês, or Mêtis, or Hêrikapæos, a person of double sex, who first generated the Kosmos, or mundane system, and who carried within him the seed of the gods. He gave birth to Nyx, by whom he begat Uranos and Gæa; as well as to Hêlios and Selênê.

From Uranos and Gæa sprang the three Mœræ, or Fates, the three Centimanes, and the three Cyclôpes: these latter were cast by Uranos into Tartarus, under the foreboding that they would rob him of his dominion. In revenge for this maltreatment of her sons, Gæa produced of herself the fourteen Titans, seven male and seven female: the

former were Kœos, Krios, Phorkys, Kronos, Oceanus, Hyperiôn, and Iapetos; the latter were Themis, Têthys, Mnêmosynê, Theia, Diônê, Phœbê, and Rhea. They received the name of Titans because they avenged upon Uranos the expulsion of their elder brothers. Six of the Titans, headed by Kronos, the most powerful of them all, conspiring against Uranos, castrated and dethroned him: Oceanus alone stood aloof and took no part in the aggression. Kronos assumed the government, and fixed his seat on Olympus; while Oceanus remained apart, master of his own divine stream. The reign of Kronos was a period of tranquillity and happiness, as well as of extraordinary longevity and vigor.

Kronos and Rhea gave birth to Zeus and his brothers and sisters. The concealment and escape of the infant Zeus, and the swallowing of the stone by Kronos, are given in the Orphic theogony substantially in the same manner as by Hesiod, only in a style less simple and more mysticized. Zeus is concealed in the cave of Nyx, the seat of Phanês himself, along with Eidê and Adrasteia, who nurse and preserve him, while the armed dance and sonorous instruments of the Kurêtês prevent his infant cries from reaching the ears of Kronos. When grown up, he lays a snare for his father, intoxicates him with honey, and having surprised him in the depth of sleep, enchains and castrates him. Thus exalted to the supreme mastery, he swallowed and absorbed into himself Mêtis, or Phanês, with all the pre-existing elements of things, and then generated all things anew out of his own being and conformably to his own divine ideas. So scanty are the remains of this system, that we find it difficult to trace individually the gods and goddesses sprung from Zeus beyond Apollo, Dionysos, and Persephonê—the latter being confounded with Artemisê and Hekatê.

But there is one new personage begotten by Zeus, who stands pre-eminently marked in the Orphic theogony, and whose adventures constitute one of its peculiar features. Zagreus, "the horned child," is the son of Zeus by his own daughter Persephonê: he is the favorite of his father, a child of magnificent promise, and predestined, if he grow up, to succeed to supreme dominion, as well as to the handling of the thunderbolt. He is seated, whilst an infant, on the throne beside Zeus, guarded by Apollo and the Kurêtês. But the jealous Hêrê intercepts his career, and incites the Titans against him, who, having first smeared their faces with plaster, approach him on the throne, tempt his childish fancy with playthings, and kill him with a sword while he is contemplating his face in a mirror. They then cut up his body and boil it in a caldron, leaving only the heart, which is picked up by Athênê and carried to Zeus, who in his wrath strikes down the Titans with thunder into Tartarus; whilst Apollo is directed to collect the remains of Zagreus and bury them at the foot of Mount Parnassus. The heart is given to Semelê, and Zagreus is born again from her under the form of Dionysos.

Such is the tissue of violent fancies comprehended under the title of the Orphic theogony, and read as such, it appears, by Plato, Isokratês, and Aristotle. It will be seen that it is based upon the Hesiodic theogony, but, according to the general expansive tendency of Grecian legend, much new matter is added: Zeus has in Homer one predecessor, in Hesiod two, and in Orpheus four.

The Hesiodic theogony, though later in date than the Iliad and Odyssey, was coeval with the earliest period of what may be called Grecian history, and certainly of an age earlier than 700 B.C. It appears to have been widely circulated in Greece, and being at once ancient and short, the general public consulted it as their principal source of information respecting divine antiquity. The Orphic Theogony belongs to a later date, and contains the Hesiodic ideas and persons, enlarged and mystically disguised. Its vein of invention was less popular, adapted more to the contemplation of a sect specially prepared than to the taste of a casual audience. And it appears accordingly to have obtained currency chiefly among purely speculative men. Among the majority of these latter, however, it acquired greater veneration, and above all was supposed to be of greater antiquity than the Hesiodic. The belief in its superior antiquity (disallowed by Herodotus, and seemingly also by Aristotle), as well as the respect for its contents, increased during the Alexandrine age and through the declining centuries of Paganism, reaching its maximum among the New-Platonists of the third and fourth century after Christ. Both the Christian assailants, as well as the defenders of Paganism, treated it as the most ancient and venerable summary of the Grecian faith. Orpheus is celebrated by Pindar as the harper and companion of the Argonautic maritime heroes: Orpheus and Musæus, as well as Pamphos and Olên, the great supposed authors of theogonic, mystical, oracular, and prophetic verses and hymns, were generally considered by literary Greeks as older than either Hesiod or Homer. And such was also the common opinion of modern scholars until a period comparatively recent. But it has now been shown, on sufficient ground, that the compositions which passed under these names emanate for the most part from poets of the Alexandrine age, and subsequent to the Christian era; and that even the earliest among them, which served as the stock on which the latter additions were engrafted, belong to a period far more recent than Hesiod: probably to the century preceding Onomakritus (B.C. 610–510). It seems, however, certain that both Orpheus and Musæus were names of established reputation at the time when Onomakritus flourished; and it is distinctly stated by Pausanias that the latter was himself the author of the most remarkable and characteristic myth of the Orphic theogony—the discerption of Zagreus by the Titans, and his resurrection as Dionysos.

The names of Orpheus and Musæus (as well as that of Pythagoras, looking at one side of his character) represent facts of importance in

the history of the Grecian mind—the gradual influx of Thracian, Phrygian, and Egyptian religious ceremonies and feelings, and the increasing diffusion of special mysteries, schemes for religious purification, and orgies (I venture to anglicize the Greek word, which contains in its original meaning no implication of the ideas of excess to which it was afterwards diverted), in honor of some particular god—distinct both from the public solemnities and from the gentile solemnities of primitive Greece,—celebrated apart from the citizens generally, and approachable only through a certain course of preparation and initiation—sometimes even forbidden to be talked of in the presence of the uninitiated, under the severest threats of divine judgment. Occasionally such voluntary combinations assumed the form of permanent brotherhoods, bound together by periodical solemnities as well as by vows of an ascetic character. Thus the Orphic life (as it was called), or regulation of the Orphic brotherhood, among other injunctions, partly arbitrary and partly abstinent, forbade animal food universally, and, on certain occasions, the use of woolen clothing. The great religious and political fraternity of the Pythagoreans, which acted so powerfully on the condition of the Italian cities, was one of the many manifestations of this general tendency, which stands in striking contrast with the simple, open-hearted, and demonstrative worship of the Homeric Greeks.

Festivals at seed-time and harvest—at the vintage and at the opening of the new wine—were doubtless coeval with the earliest habits of the Greeks; the latter being a period of unusual joviality. Yet in the Homeric poems, Dionysos and Dêmêtêr, the patrons of the vineyard and the cornfield, are seldom mentioned, and decidedly occupy little place in the imagination of the poet as compared with the other gods: nor are they of any conspicuous importance even in the Hesiodic theogony. But during the interval between Hesiod and Onomakritus, the revolution in the religious mind of Greece was such as to place both these deities in the front rank. According to the Orphic doctrine, Zagreus, son of Persephonê, is destined to be the successor of Zeus; and although the violence of the Titans intercepts this lot, yet even when he rises again from his discerption under the name of Dionysos, he is the colleague and coequal of his divine father.

This remarkable change, occurring as it did during the sixth and a part of the seventh century before the Christian era, may be traced to the influence of communication with Egypt (which only became fully open to the Greeks about B.C. 660), as well as with Thrace, Phrygia, and Lydia. From hence new religious ideas and feelings were introduced, which chiefly attached themselves to the characters of Dionysos and Dêmêtêr. The Greeks identified these two deities with the great Egyptian Osiris and Isis, so that what was borrowed from the Egyptian worship of the two latter naturally fell to their equivalents in the Grecian system. Moreover the worship of Dionysos

(under what name cannot be certainly made out) was indigenous in Thrace, as that of the Great Mother was in Phrygia, and in Lydia—together with those violent ecstasies and manifestations of temporary frenzy, and that clashing of noisy instruments which we find afterward characterizing it in Greece. The great masters of the pipe—as well as the dithyramb, and indeed the whole musical system appropriated to the worship of Dionysos, which contrasted so pointedly with the quiet solemnity of the Pæan addressed to Apollo—were all originally Phrygian.

From all these various countries, novelties, unknown to the Homeric men, found their way into the Grecian worship: and there is one among them which deserves to be specially noticed, because it marks the generation of the new class of ideas in their theology. Homer mentions many persons guilty of private or involuntary homicide, and compelled either to go into exile or to make pecuniary satisfaction; but he never once describes any of them to have either received or required purification for the crime. Now in the times subsequent to Homer, purification for homicide comes to be considered as indispensable: the guilty person is regarded as unfit for the society of man or the worship of the gods until he has received it, and special ceremonies are prescribed whereby it is to be administered. Herodotus tells us that the ceremony of purification was the same among the Lydians and among the Greeks: we know that it formed no part of the early religion of the latter, and we may perhaps reasonably suspect that they borrowed it from the former. The oldest instance known to us of expiation for homicide was contained in the epic poem of the Milesian Arktinus, wherein Achillês is purified by Odysseus for the murder of Thersitês: several others occurred in the later or Hesiodic epic—Hêraklês, Pêleus, Bellerophôn, Alkmæôn, Amphiktyôn, Pœmander, Triopas,—from whence they probably passed through the hands of the logographers to Apollodôrus, Diodôrus, and others. The purification of the murderer was originally operated, not by the hands of any priest or specially sanctified man, but by those of a chief or king, who goes through the appropriate ceremonies in the manner recounted by Herodotus in his pathetic narrative respecting Crœsus and Adrastus.

The idea of a special taint of crime, and of the necessity as well as the sufficiency of prescribed religious ceremonies as a means of removing it, appears thus to have got footing in Grecian practice subsequent to the time of Homer. The peculiar rites or orgies, composed or put together by Onomakritus, Methapus, and other men of more than the ordinary piety, were founded upon a similar mode of thinking and adapted to the same mental exigencies. They were voluntarily religious manifestations, superinduced upon the old public sacrifices of the king or chiefs on behalf of the whole society, and of the father on his own family hearth. They marked out the details of divine service proper to appease or gratify the god to whom they

were addressed, and to procure for the believers who went through them his blessings and protection here or hereafter—the exact performance of the divine service in all its specialty was held necessary, and thus the priests or hierophants, who alone were familiar with the ritual, acquired a commanding position. Generally speaking, these peculiar orgies obtained their admission and their influence at periods of distress, disease, public calamity and danger, or religious terror and despondency, which appear to have been but too frequent in their occurrence.

The minds of men were prone to the belief that what they were suffering arose from the displeasure of some of the gods, and as they found that the ordinary sacrifices and worship were insufficient for their protection, so they grasped at new suggestions proposed to them with the view of regaining the divine favor. Such suggestions were more usually copied, either in whole or in part, from the religious rites of some foreign locality, or from some other portion of the Hellenic world; and in this manner many new sects or voluntary religious fraternities, promising to relieve the troubled conscience and to reconcile the sick or suffering with the offended gods, acquired permanent establishment as well as considerable influence. They were generally under the superintendence of hereditary families of priests, who imparted the rites of confirmation and purification to communicants generally; no one who went through the prescribed ceremonies being excluded. In many cases such ceremonies fell into the hands of jugglers, who volunteered their services to wealthy men, and degraded their profession as well by obtrusive venality as by extravagant promises. Sometimes the price was lowered to bring them within reach of the poor and even of slaves. But the wide diffusion, and the number of voluntary communicants of these solemnities, proves how much they fell in with the feeling of the time and how much respect they enjoyed—a respect which the more conspicuous establishments, such as Eleusis and Samothrace, maintained for several centuries. And the visit of the Kretan Epimenidês to Athens—in the time of Solôn, at a season of the most serious disquietude and dread of having offended the gods—illustrates the tranquillizing effect of new orgies and rites of absolution, when enjoined by a man standing high in the favor of the gods and reputed to be the son of a nymph. The supposed Erythræan sibyl, and the earliest collection of sibylline prophecies, afterward so much multiplied and interpolated, and referred (according to Grecian custom) to an age even earlier than Homer, appear to belong to a date not long posterior to Epimenidês. Other oracular verses, such as those of Bakis, were treasured up in Athens and other cities: the sixth century before the Christian era was fertile in these kinds of religious manifestations.

Among the special rites and orgies of the character just described, those which enjoyed the greatest Pan-Hellenic reputation were attached to the Idæan Zeus in Krête, to Dêmêtêr at Eleusis, to the

Kabeiri in Samothrace, and to Dionysos at Delphi and Thebes. That they were all to a great degree analogous is shown by the way in which they unconsciously run together and become confused in the minds of various authors. The ancient inquirers themselves were unable to distinguish one from the other, and we must be content to submit to the like ignorance. But we see enough to satisfy us of the general fact, that during the century and a half which elapsed between the opening of Egypt to the Greeks and the commencement of their struggle with the Persian kings, the old religion was largely adulterated by importations from Egypt, Asia Minor, and Thrace. The rites grew to be more furious and ecstatic, exhibiting the utmost excitement, bodily as well as mental: the legends became at once more coarse, more tragical, and less pathetic. The manifestations of this frenzy were strongest among the women, whose religious susceptibilities were often found extremely unmanageable, and who had everywhere congregative occasional ceremonies of their own, apart from the men—indeed, in the case of the colonists, especially of the Asiatic colonists, the women had been originally women of the country, and as such retained to a great degree their non-Hellenic manners and feelings. The god Dionysos, whom the legends described as clothed in feminine attire, and leading a troop of frenzied women, inspired a temporary ecstasy. Those who resisted the inspiration, being disposed to disobey his will, were punished either by particular judgments, or by mental terrors; while those who gave full loose to the feeling, in the appropriate season and with the received solemnities, satisfied his exigencies, and believed themselves to have procured immunity from such disquietudes for the future. Crowds of women, clothed with fawn-skins and bearing the sanctified thyrsus, flocked to the solitudes of Parnassus, or Kithærôn, or Taygetus, during the consecrated triennial period, passed the night there with torches, and abandoned themselves to demonstrations of frantic excitement, with dancing and clamorous invocation of the god. They were said to tear animals limb from limb, to devour the raw flesh, and to cut themselves without feeling the wound. The men yielded to a similar impulse by noisy revels in the streets, sounding the cymbals and tambourine, and carrying the image of the god in procession. It deserves to be remarked that the Athenian women never practiced these periodical mountain excursions, so common among the rest of the Greeks; they had their feminine solemnities of the Thesmophoria, mournful in their character and accompanied with fasting, and their separate congregations at the temples of Aphroditê, but without any extreme or unseemly demonstrations. The state festival of the Dionysia, in the city of Athens, was celebrated with dramatic entertainments, and the once rich harvest of Athenian tragedy and comedy was thrown up under its auspices. The ceremonies of the Kurêtes in Krête, originally armed dances in honor of the Idæan Zeus, seem also to have borrowed from Asia so much of

fury, of self-infliction, and of mysticism, that they became at last inextricably confounded with the Phrygian Korybantes, or worshipers of the Great Mother; though it appears that Grecian reserve always stopped short of the irreparable self-mutilation of Atys.

The influence of the Thracian religion upon that of the Greeks cannot be traced in detail, but the ceremonies contained in it were of a violent and fierce character, like the Phrygian, and acted upon Hellas in the same general direction as the latter. And the like may be said of the Egyptian religion, which was in this case the more operative, inasmuch as all the intellectual Greeks were naturally attracted to go and visit the wonders on the banks of the Nile: the powerful effect produced upon them is attested by many evidences, but especially by the interesting narrative of Herodotus. Now the Egyptian ceremonies were at once more licentious, and more profuse in the outpouring both of joy and sorrow than the Greek: but a still greater difference sprang from the extraordinary power, separate mode of life, minute observances, and elaborate organization of the priesthood. The ceremonies of Egypt were multitudinous, but the legends concerning them were framed by the priest, and, as a general rule, seemingly, known to the priests alone: at least they were not intended to be publicly talked of, even by pious men. They were "holy stories," which it was sacrilege publicly to mention, and which from this very prohibition only took firmer hold of the minds of the Greek visitors who heard them. And thus the element of secrecy and mystic silence—foreign to Homer and only faintly glanced at in Hesiod—if it was not originally derived from Egypt, at least received from thence its greatest stimulus and diffusion. The character of the legends themselves was naturally affected by this change from publicity to secrecy: the secrets when revealed would be such as to justify by their own tenor the interdict on public divulgation: instead of being adapted, like the Homeric mythe, to the universal sympathies and hearty interest of a crowd of hearers, they would derive their impressiveness from the tragical, mournful, extravagant, or terror-striking character of the incidents. Such a tendency, which appears explicable and probable even on general grounds, was in this particular case rendered still more certain by the coarse taste of the Egyptian priests. That any recondite doctrine, religious or philosophical, was attached to the mysteries or contained in the holy stories, has never been shown, and is improbable, though the affirmative has been asserted by learned men.

Herodotus seems to have believed that the worship and ceremonies of Dionysos generally were derived by the Greeks from Egypt, brought over by Kadmus, and taught by him to Melampus. And the latter appears in the Hesiodic Catalogue as having cured the daughters of Prœtus of the mental distemper, with which they had been smitten by Dionysos for rejecting his ritual. He cured them by introducing the Bacchic dance and fanatical excitement: this

mythical incident is the most ancient mention of the Dionysiac solemnities presented in the same character as they bear in Euripidês. It is the general tendency of Herodotus to apply the theory of derivation from Egypt far too extensively to Grecian institutions: the orgies of Dionysos were not originally borrowed from thence, though they may have been much modified by connection with Egypt as well as with Asia. The remarkable mythe composed by Onomakritus respecting the dismemberment of Zagreus was founded upon an Egyptian tale very similar respecting the body of Osiris, who was supposed to be identical with Dionysos. Nor was it unsuitable to the reckless fury of the Bacchanals during their state of temporary excitement, which found a still more awful expression in the mythe of Pentheus,—torn in pieces by his own mother Agavê at the head of her companions in the ceremony, as an intruder upon the feminine rites, as well as a scoffer at the god. A passage in the Iliad (the authenticity of which has been contested, but even as an interpolation it must be old) also recounts how Lykurgus was struck blind by Zeus, for having chased away with a whip, "the nurses of the mad Dionysos," and for having frightened the god himself into the sea to take refuge in the arms of Thetis: while the fact that Dionysos is so frequently represented in his mythes as encountering opposition and punishing the refractory, seems to indicate that his worship under its ecstatic form was a late phenomenon and introduced not without difficulty. The mythical Thracian Orpheus was attached as Eponymos to a new sect, who seem to have celebrated the ceremonies of Dionysos with peculiar care, minuteness, and fervor, besides observing various rules in respect to food and clothing. It was the opinion of Herodotus, that these rules, as well as the Pythagorean, were borrowed from Egypt. But whether this be the fact or not, the Orphic brotherhood is itself both an evidence, and a cause, of the increased importance of the worship of Dionysos, which indeed is attested by the great dramatic poets of Athens.

The Homeric hymns present to us, however, the religious ideas and legends of the Greeks at an earlier period, when the enthusiastic and mystic tendencies had not yet acquired their full development. Though not referable to the same age or to the same author as either the Iliad or the Odyssey, they do to a certain extent continue the same stream of feeling, and the same mythical tone and coloring, as these poems—manifesting but little evidence of Egyptian, Asiatic, or Thracian adulterations. The difference is striking between the god Dionysos as he appears in the Homeric hymn and in the Bacchæ of Euripides. The hymnographer describes him as standing on the seashore, in the guise of a beautiful and richly clothed youth, when Tyrrhenian pirates suddenly approach: they seize and bind him and drag him on board their vessel. But the bonds which they employ burst spontaneously, and leave the god free. The steersman, perceiving this with affright, points out to his companions that they have

unwittingly laid hands on a god,—perhaps Zeus himself, or Apollo, or Poseidôn. He conjures them to desist, and to replace Dionysos respectfully on the shore, lest in his wrath he should visit the ship with wind and hurricane: but the crew deride his scruples, and Dionysos is carried prisoner out to sea with the ship under full sail. Miraculous circumstances soon attest both his presence and his power. Sweet-scented wine is seen to flow spontaneously about the ship, the sail and mast appear adorned with vine and ivy-leaves, and the oar-pegs with garlands. The terrified crew now too late entreat the helmsman to steer his course for the shore, and crowd round him for protection on the poop. But their destruction is at hand: Dionysos assumes the form of a lion—a bear is seen standing near him—this bear rushes with a loud roar upon the captain, while the crew leap overboard in their agony of fright, and are changed into dolphins. There remains none but the discreet and pious steersman, to whom Dionysos addresses words of affectionate encouragement, revealing his name, parentage, and dignity.

This hymn, perhaps produced at the Naxian festival of Dionysos, and earlier than the time when the dithyrambic chorus became the established mode of singing the praise and glory of that god, is conceived in a spirit totally different from that of the Bacchic Teletæ, or special rites which the Bacchæ of Euripidês so abundantly extol —rites introduced from Asia by Dionysos himself at the head of a thiasus or troop of enthusiastic women—inflaming with temporary frenzy the minds of the women of Thebes—not communicable except to those who approach as pious worshipers—and followed by the most tragical results to all those who fight against the god. The Bacchic Teletæ, and the Bacchic feminine frenzy, were importations from abroad, as Euripidês represents them, engrafted upon the joviality of the primitive Greek Dionysia; they were borrowed, in all probability, from more than one source, and introduced through more than one channel, the Orphic life or brotherhood being one of the varieties. Strabo ascribes to this latter a Thracian original, considering Orpheus, Musæus, and Eumolpus as having been all Thracians. It is curious to observe how, in the Bacchæ of Euripidês, the two distinct and even conflicting ideas of Dionysos come alternately forward; sometimes the old Grecian idea of the jolly and exhilarating god of wine—but more frequently the recent and important idea of the terrific and irresistible god who unseats the reason, and whose *æstrus* can only be appeased by a willing, though temporary obedience. In the fanatical impulse which inspired the votaries of the Asiatic Rhea or Cybelê, or of the Thracian Kotys, there was nothing of spontaneous joy; it was a sacred madness, during which the soul appeared to be surrendered to a stimulus from without, and accompanied by preternatural strength and temporary sense of power—altogether distinct from the unrestrained hilarity of the original Dionysia, as we see them in the rural demes of Attica, or in the gay city

of Tarentum. There was, indeed, a side on which the two bore some analogy, inasmuch as, according to the religious point of view of the Greeks, even the spontaneous joy of the vintage-feast was conferred by the favor and enlivened by the companionship of Dionysos. It was upon this analogy that the framers of the Bacchic orgies proceeded; but they did not the less disfigure the genuine character of the old Grecian Dionysia.

Dionysos is in the conception of Pindar the Paredros or companion in worship of Dêmêtêr. The worship and religious estimate of the latter has by that time undergone as great a change as that of the former, if we take our comparison with the brief description of Homer and Hesiod: she has acquired much of the awful and soul-disturbing attributes of the Phrygian Cybelê. In Homer, Dêmêtêr is the goddess of the corn-field, who becomes attached to the mortal man Jasiôn; an unhappy passion, since Zeus, jealous of the connection between goddesses and men, puts him to death. In the Hesiodic theogony, Dêmêter is the mother of Persephonê by Zeus, who permits Hadês to carry off the latter as his wife; moreover Dêmêtêr has, besides, by Jasiôn, a son called Plutos, born in Krête. Even from Homer to Hesiod, the legend of Dêmêtêr has been expanded and her dignity exalted; according to the usual tendency of Greek legend, the expansion goes on still further. Through Jasiôn, Dêmêtêr becomes connected with the mysteries of Samothrace; through Persephonê, with those of Eleusis. The former connection it is difficult to follow out in detail, but the latter is explained and traced to its origin in the Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr.

Though we find different statements respecting the date as well as the origin of the Eleusinian mysteries, yet the popular belief of the Athenians, and the story which found favor at Eleusis, ascribed them to the presence and dictation of the goddess Dêmêtêr herself; just as the Bacchic rites are, according to the Bacchæ of Euripidês, first communicated and enforced on the Greeks by the personal visit of Dionysos to Thêbes, the metropolis of the Bacchic ceremonies. In the Eleusinian legend, preserved by the author of the Homeric Hymn, she comes voluntarily and identifies herself with Eleusis; her past abode in Krête being briefly indicated. Her visit to Eleusis is connected with the deep sorrow caused by the loss of her daughter Persephonê, who had been seized by Hadês, while gathering flowers in a meadow along with the Oceanic Nymphs, and carried off to become his wife in the under-world. In vain did the reluctant Persephonê shriek and invoke the aid of her father Zeus: he had consented to give her to Hadês, and her cries were heard only by Hekatê and Hêlios. Dêmêtêr was inconsolable at the disappearance of her daughter, but knew not where to look for her: she wandered for nine days and nights with torches in search of the lost maiden without success. At length Hêlios, the "spy of gods and men," revealed to her, in reply to her urgent prayer, the rape of Persephonê, and the permission given to Hadês by Zeus. Dêmêtêr was smitten with anger and despair: she renounced Zeus and the society of Olympus, abstained from nectar and ambrosia, and wandered on earth in grief and fasting until her form could no longer be known. In this condition she came to Eleusis, then governed by the prince Keleos. Sitting down by a well at the wayside in the guise of an old woman, she was found by the daughters of Keleos, who came thither with their pails of brass for water. In reply to their questions, she told them that she had been brought by pirates from Krête to Thorikos, and had made her escape; she then solicited from them succor and employment as a servant or as a nurse. The damsels prevailed upon their mother Metaneira to receive her, and to entrust her with the nursing of the young Dêmophoôn, their late-born brother, the only son of Keleos. Dêmêtêr was received into the house of Metaneira, her dignified form still borne down by grief: she sat long silent, and could not be induced either to smile or to taste food, until the maid-servant Isambê, by jests and playfulness, succeeded in amusing and rendering her cheerful. She would not taste wine, but requested a peculiar mixture of barley-meal with water and the herb mint.

The child Dêmophoôn, nursed by Dêmêtêr, throve and grew up like a god, to the delight and astonishment of his parents: she gave him no food, but anointed him daily with ambrosia, and plunged him at night in the fire like a torch, where he remained unburnt. She would have rendered him immortal had she not been prevented by the indiscreet curiosity and alarm of Metaneira, who secretly looked in at night, and shrieked with horror at the sight of her child in the fire. The indignant goddess, setting the infant on the ground, now revealed her true character to Metaneira: her wan and aged look disappeared, and she stood confest in the genuine majesty of her divine shape, diffusing a dazzling brightness which illuminated the whole house. "Foolish mother," she said, "thy want of faith has robbed thy son of immortal life. I am the exalted Dêmêtêr, the charm and comfort both of gods and men: I was preparing for thy son exemption from death and old age; now it cannot be but he must taste of both. Yet shall he be ever honored, since he has sat upon my knee, and slept in my arms. Let the people of Eleusis erect for me a temple and altar on yonder hill above the fountain: I will myself prescribe to them the orgies which they must religiously perform in order to propitiate my favor."

The terrified Metaneira was incapable even of lifting up her child from the ground: her daughters entered at her cries, and began to embrace and tend their infant brother, but he sorrowed and could not be pacified for the loss of his divine nurse. All night they strove to appease the goddess.

Strictly executing the injunctions of Dêmêtêr, Keleos convoked the people of Eleusis, and erected the temple on the spot which she had pointed out. It was speedily completed, and Dêmêtêr took up

her abode in it, apart from the remaining gods, still pining with grief for the loss of her daughter, and withholding her beneficent aid from mortals. And thus she remained a whole year—a desperate and terrible year: in vain did the oxen draw the plough, and in vain was the barley-seed cast into the furrow—Dêmêtêr suffered it not to emerge from the earth. The human race would have been starved, and the gods would have been deprived of their honors and sacrifice, had not Zeus found means to conciliate her. But this was a hard task; for Dêmêtêr resisted the entreaties of Iris and of all the other goddesses and gods whom Zeus successively sent to her. She would be satisfied with nothing less than the recovery of her daughter. At length Zeus sent Hêrmês to Hadês, to bring Persephonê away: Persephonê joyfully obeyed, but Hadês prevailed upon her before she departed to swallow a grain of pomegranate, which rendered it impossible for her to remain the whole year away from him.

With transport did Dêmêtêr receive back her lost daughter, and the faithful Hekatê sympathized in the delight felt by both at the reunion. It was now an easier undertaking to reconcile her with the gods. Her mother Rhea, sent down expressly by Zeus, descended from Olympus on the fertile Rharian plain, then smitten with barrenness like the rest of the earth: she succeeded in appeasing the indignation of Dêmêtêr, who consented again to put forth her relieving hand. The buried seed came up in abundance, and the earth was covered with fruit and flowers. She would have wished to retain Persephonê constantly with her; but this was impossible, and she was obliged to consent that her daughter should go down for one-third of each year to the house of Hadês, departing from her every spring at the time when the seed is sown. She then revisited Olympus, again to dwell with the gods; but before her departure she communicated to the daughters of Keleos, and to Keleos himself, together with Triptolemus, Dioklês, and Eumolpus, the divine service and the solemnities which she required to be observed in her honor. And thus began the venerable mysteries of Eleusis, at her special command: the lesser mysteries, celebrated in February, in honor of Persephonê; the greater in August, to the honor of Dêmêtêr herself. Both are jointly patronesses of the holy city and temple.

Such is a brief sketch of the temple legend of Eleusis, set forth at length in the Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr. It is interesting not less as a picture of the Mater Dolorosa (in the mouth of an Athenian, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê were always The Mother and Daughter, by excellence), first an agonized sufferer, and then finally glorified—the weal and woe of man being dependent upon her kindly feeling,—than as an illustration of the nature and growth of Grecian legend generally. Though we now read this hymn as pleasing poetry, to the Eleusinians, for whom it was composed, it was genuine and sacred history. They believed in the visit of Dêmêtêr to Eleusis, and in the Mysteries as a revelation from her, as implicitly as they

believed in her existence and power as a goddess. The Eleusinian psalmist shares this belief in common with his countrymen, and embodies it in a continuous narrative, in which the great goddesses of the place, as well as the great heroic families, figure in inseparable conjunction. Keleos is the son of the Eponymous hero, Eleusis, and his daughters, with the old epic simplicity, carry their basins to the well for water. Eumolpus, Triptolemus, Dioklês, heroic ancestors of the privileged families who continued throughout the historical times of Athens to fulfill their special hereditary functions, in the Eleusinian solemnities, are among the immediate recipients of inspiration from the goddess: but chiefly does she favor Metaneira and her infant son Dêmophoôn, for the latter of whom her greatest boon is destined, and intercepted only by the weak faith of the mother. Moreover, every incident in the hymn has a local coloring and a special reference. The well overshadowed by an olive-tree, near which Dêmêtêr had rested, the stream Kallichoros and the temple-hill, were familiar and interesting places in the eyes of every Eleusinian; the peculiar posset prepared from barley-meal with mint was always tasted by the mysts (or communicants) after a prescribed fast, as an article in the ceremony,—while it was also the custom, at a particular spot in the processional march, to permit the free interchange of personal jokes and taunts upon individuals for the general amusement. And these two customs are connected in the hymn with the incidents, that Dêmêtêr herself had chosen the posset as the first interruption of her long and melancholy fast, and that her sorrowful thoughts had been partially diverted by the coarse playfulness of the servant-maid Iambê. In the enlarged representation of the Eleusinian ceremonies, which became established after the incorporation of Eleusis with Athens, the part of Iambê herself was enacted by a woman, or man in woman's attire, of suitable wit and imagination, who was posted on the bridge over the Kephissos, and addressed to the passers-by in the procession, especially the great men of Athens, saucy jeers probably not less piercing than those of Aristophanês on the stage. The torch-bearing Hekatê received a portion of the worship in the nocturnal ceremonies of the Eleusinia: this, too, is traced in the hymn, to her kind and affectionate sympathy with the great goddesses.

Though all these incidents were sincerely believed by the Eleusinians as a true history of the past, and as having been the real initiatory cause of their own solemnities, it is not the less certain that they are simply mythes or legends, and not to be treated as history either actual or exaggerated. They do not take their start from realities of the past, but from realities of the present, combined with retrospective feeling and fancy, which fills up the blank of the aforetime in a manner at once plausible and impressive. What proportion of fact there may be in the legend, or whether there be any at all, it is impossible to ascertain and useless to inquire; for the story

did not acquire belief from its approximation to real fact, but from its perfect harmony with Eleusinian faith and feeling, and from the absence of any standard of historical credibility. The little town of Eleusis derived all its importance from the solemnity of the Dêmêtria, and the hymn which we have been considering (probably at least as old as 600 B.C.) represents the town as it stood before its absorption into the larger unity of Athens, which seems to have produced an alteration of its legends and an increase of dignity in its great festival. In the faith of an Eleusinian, the religious as well as the patriotic antiquities of his native town were connected with this capital solemnity. The divine legend of the sufferings of Dêmêtêr and her visit to Eleusis was to him that which the heroic legend of Adrastus and the siege of Thebes was to a Sikyonian, or that of Erechtheus and Athênê to an Athenian—grouping together in the same scene and story the goddess and the heroic fathers of the town. If our information were fuller, we should probably find abundance of other legends respecting the Dêmêtria: the Gephyræi of Athens, to whom belonged the celebrated Harmodios and Aristogeitôn, and who possessed special Orgies of Dêmêtêr the Sorrowful, to which no man foreign to their gens was ever admitted, would doubtless have told stories not only different but contradictory; and even in other Eleusinian mythes we discover Eumolpus as king of Eleusis, son of Poseidôn, and a Thracian, completely different from the character which he bears in the hymn, before us. Neither discrepancies nor want of evidence, in reference to alleged antiquities, shocked the faith of a non-historical public. What they wanted was a picture of the past, impressive to their feelings and plausible to their imagination: and it is important to the reader to remember, while he reads either the divine legends which we are now illustrating, or the heroic legends to which we shall soon approach, that he is dealing with a past which never was present,—a region essentially mythical, neither approachable by the critic nor measurable by the chronologer.

The tale respecting the visit of Dêmêtêr, which was told by the ancient gens, called the Phytalids, in reference to another temple of Dêmêtêr between Athens and Eleusis, and also by the Megarians in reference to a Dêmêtrion near their city, acquired under the auspices of Athens still further extension. The goddess was reported to have first communicated to Triptolemus at Eleusis the art of sowing corn, which, by his intervention, was disseminated all over the earth. And thus the Athenians took credit to themselves for having been the medium of communication from the gods to man of all the inestimable blessings of agriculture which they affirmed to have been first exhibited on the fertile Rharian plain near Eleusis. Such pretensions are not to be found in the old Homeric hymn. The festival of the Thesmophoria, celebrated in honor of Dêmêtêr Thesmophoros at Athens, was altogether different from the Eleusinia, in this material respect, as well as others, that all males were excluded and women only were allowed to partake in it: the surname Thesmophoros gave occasion to new legends, in which the goddess was glorified as the first authoress of laws and legal sanctions to mankind. This festival for women, apart and alone, was also celebrated at Thebes, at Paros, at Ephesus, and in many other parts of Greece.

Altogether, Dêmêtêr and Dionysos, as the Grecian counterparts of the Egyptian Isis and Osiris, seem to have been the great recipients of the new sacred rites borrowed from Egypt, before the worship of Isis in her own name was introduced into Greece; their solemnities became more frequently recluse and mysterious than those of the other deities. The importance of Dêmêtêr to the collective nationality of Greece may be gathered from the fact that her temple was erected at Thermopylæ, the spot where the Amphiktyonic assemblies were held, close to the temple of the Eponymous hero, Amphiktyôn himself, and under the surname of the Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr.

We now pass to another and not less important celestial personage—Apollo.

The legends of Dêlos and Delphi, embodied in the Homeric hymn to Apollo, indicate, if not a greater dignity, at least a more widely diffused worship of that god than even of Dêmêtêr. The hymn is, in point of fact, an aggregate of two separate compositions, one emanating from an Ionic bard at Dêlos, the other from Delphi. The first details the birth, the second the mature divine efficiency, of Apollo; but both alike present the unaffected charm as well as the characteristic peculiarities of Grecian mythical narrative. The hymnographer sings, and his hearers accept in perfect good faith, a history of the past; but it is a past, imagined partly as an introductory explanation to the present, partly as the means of glorifying the god. The island of Dêlos was the accredited birthplace of Apollo, and is also the place in which he chiefly delights, where the great and brilliant Ionic festival is periodically convened in his honor. Yet it is a rock narrow, barren, and uninviting: how came so glorious a privilege to be awarded to it? This the poet takes upon himself to explain. Lêtô, pregnant with Apollo and persecuted by the jealous Hêrê, could find no spot wherein to give birth to her offspring. In vain did she address herself to numerous places in Greece, the Asiatic coast, and the intermediate islands; all were terrified at the wrath of Herê, and refused to harbor her. As a last resort she approached the rejected and repulsive island of Dêlos, and promised that if shelter were granted to her in her forlorn condition, the island should become the chosen resort of Apollo as well as the site of his temple with its rich accompanying solemnities. Dêlos joyfully consented, but not without many apprehensions that the potent Apollo would despise her unworthiness, and not without

exacting a formal oath from Lêtô,—who was then admitted to the desired protection, and duly accomplished her long and painful labor. Though Diône, Rhea, Themis, and Amphitritê came to soothe and succor her, yet Hêrê kept away the goddess presiding over childbirth, Eileithyia, and thus cruelly prolonged her pangs. At length Eileithyia came, and Apollo was born. Hardly had Apollo tasted, from the hands of Themis, the immortal food, nectar and ambrosia, when he burst at once his infant bands, and displayed himself in full divine form and strength, claiming his characteristic attributes of the bow and the harp, and his privileged function of announcing beforehand to mankind the designs of Zeus. The promise made by Lêtô to Dêlos was faithfully performed: amid the numberless other temples and groves which men provided for him, he ever preferred that island as his permanent residence, and there the Ionians, with their wives and children and all their "bravery," congregated periodically from their different cities to glorify him. Dance and song and athletic contests adorned the solemnity, while the countless ships, wealth and grace of the multitudinous Ionians had the air of an assembly of gods. The Delian maidens, servants of Apollo, sang hymns to the glory of the god, as well as of Artemis and Lêtô, intermingled with adventures of foregone men and women, to the delight of the listening crowd. The blind itinerant bard of Chios (composer of the Homeric hymn, and confounded in antiquity with the author of the Iliad), having found honor and acceptance at this festival, commends himself, in a touching farewell strain, to the remembrance and sympathy of the Delian maidens.

But Dêlos was not an oracular spot: Apollo did not manifest himself there as revealer of the futurities of Zeus. A place must be found where this beneficent function, without which mankind would perish under the innumerable doubts and perplexities of life, may be exercised and rendered available. Apollo himself descends from Olympus to make choice of a suitable site: the hymnographer knows a thousand other adventures of the god which he might sing, but he prefers this memorable incident, the charter and patent of consecration for the Delphian temple. Many different places did Apollo inspect: he surveyed the country of the Magnêtes and the Perrhæbians, came to Iôlkos, and passed over from thence to Eubœa and the plain of Lelanton. But even this fertile spot did not please him: he crossed the Euripus to Bœotia, passed by Teumêssus and Mykalêssus, and the then inaccessible and unoccupied forest on which the city of Thebes afterwards stood. He next proceeded to Onchêstos, but the grove of Poseidôn was already established there; next across the Kêphissus to Okalea, Haliartus, and the agreeable plain and much-frequented fountain of Delphusa, or Tilphusa. Pleased with the place, Apollo prepared to establish his oracle there, but Tilphusa was proud of the beauty of her own site, and did not choose that her glory should be eclipsed by that of the god. She alarmed him with

the apprehension that the chariots which contended in her plain, and the horses and mules which watered at her fountain, would disturb the solemnity of his oracle; and she thus induced him to proceed onward to the southern side of Parnassus, overhanging the harbor of Krissa. Here he established his oracle, in the mountainous site not frequented by chariots and horses, and near to a fountain, which, however, was guarded by a vast and terrific serpent, once the nurse of the monster Typhaôn. This serpent Apollo slew with an arrow, and suffered its body to rot in the sun: hence, the name of the place, Pythô, and the surname of the Pythian Apollo. The plan of his temple being marked out, it was built by Trophônios and Agamêdês, aided by a crowd of forward auxiliaries from the neighborhood. He now discovered with indignation, however, that Tilphusa had cheated him, and went back with swift step to resent it. "Thou shalt not thus," he said, "succeed in thy fraud and retain thy beautiful water: the glory of the place shall be mine, and not thine alone." Thus saying, he tumbled down a crag upon the fountain, and obstructed her limpid current; establishing an altar for himself in a grove hard by near another spring, where men still worship him as Apollo Tilphusios, because of his severe vengeance upon the once beautiful Tilphusa.

Apollo next stood in need of chosen ministers to take care of his temple and sacrifice, and to pronounce his responses at Pythô. Descrying a ship, "containing many and good men," bound on traffic from the Minoian Knossus in Krête, to Pylus in Peloponnêsus, he resolved to make use of the ship and her crew for his purpose. Assuming the shape of a vast dolphin, he splashed about and shook the vessel so as to strike the mariners with terror, while he sent a strong wind which impelled her along the coast of Peloponnêsus into the Corinthian gulf, and finally to the harbor of Krissa, where she ran aground. The affrighted crew did not dare to disembark; but Apollo was seen standing on the shore in the guise of a vigorous youth, and inquired who they were and what was their business. The leader of the Krêtans recounted in reply their miraculous and compulsory voyage, when Apollo revealed himself as the author and contriver of it, announcing to them the honorable function and the dignified post to which he destined them. They followed him by his orders to the rocky Pythô on Parnassus, singing the solemn Io-Paian, such as it is sung in Krête, while the god himself marched at their head, with his fine form and lofty step, playing on the harp. He showed them the temple and site of the oracle, and directed them to worship him as Apollo Delphinios, because they had first seen him in the shape of a dolphin. "But how," they inquired, "are we to live in a spot where there is neither corn, nor vine, nor pasturage?" "Ye silly mortals," answered the god, "who look only for toil and privation, know that an easier lot is yours. Ye shall live by the cattle, which crowds of pious visitors

will bring to the temple: ye shall need only the knife to be constantly ready for sacrifice. Your duty will be to guard my temple, and to officiate as ministers at my feasts: but if ye be guilty of wrong or insolence, either by word or deed, ye shall become the slaves of other men, and shall remain so forever. Take heed of the word and the warning."

Such are the legends of Dêlos and Delphi, according to the Homeric Hymn to Apollo. The specific functions of the god, and the chief localities of his worship, together with the surnames attached to them, are thus historically explained, being connected with his past acts and adventures. Though these are to us only interesting poetry, yet to those who heard them sung they possessed all the requisites of history, and were fully believed as such; not because they were partially founded in reality, but because they ran in complete harmony with the feelings; and, so long as that condition was fulfilled, it was not the fashion of the time to canvass truth or falsehood. The narrative is purely personal, without any discernible symbolized doctrine or allegory, to serve as a supposed ulterior purpose: the particular deeds ascribed to Apollo grow out of the general preconceptions as to his attributes, combined with the present realities of his worship. It is neither history nor allegory, but simple mythe or legend.

The worship of Apollo is among the most ancient, capital, and strongly marked facts of the Grecian world, and widely diffused over every branch of the race. It is older than the Iliad or Odyssey, in the latter of which both Pytho and Dêlos are noted, though Dêlos is not named in the former. But the ancient Apollo is different in more respects than one from the Apollo of later times. He is in a peculiar manner the god of the Trojans, unfriendly to the Greeks, and especially to Achilles; he has, moreover, only two primary attributes, his bow and his prophetic powers, without any distinct connection either with the harp, or with medicine, or with the sun, all which in later times he came to comprehend. He becomes not only, as Apollo Karneius, the chief god of the Doric race, but also (under the surname of Patrôus) the great protecting divinity of the gentile tie among the Ionians: he is, moreover, the guide and stimulus to Grecian colonization, scarcely any colony being ever sent out without encouragement and direction from the oracle at Delphi: Apollo Archêgetês is one of his great surnames. His temple lends sanctity to the meetings of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and he is always in filial subordination and harmony with his father Zeus: Delphi and Olympia are never found in conflict. In the Iliad, the warm and earnest patrons of the Greeks are Hêrê, Athênê, and Poseidôn: here too Zeus and Apollo are seen in harmony, for Zeus is decidedly well-inclined to the Trojans, and reluctantly sacrifices them to the importunity of the two great goddesses. The worship of the Sminthian Apollo, in various parts of the Troad and the

neighboring territory, dates before the earliest periods of Æolic colonization: hence the zealous patronage of Troy ascribed to him in the Iliad. Altogether, however, the distribution and partialities of the gods in that poem are different from what they become in later times,—a difference which our means of information do not enable us satisfactorily to explain. Besides the Delphian temple, Apollo had numerous temples throughout Greece, and oracles at Abæ in Phôkis, on the Mount Ptôon, and at Tegyra in Bœotia, where he was said to have been born, at Branchidæ near Milêtus, at Klarus in Asia Minor, and at Patara in Lykia. He was not the only oracular god: Zeus at Dodona and at Olympia gave responses also: the gods or heroes Trophônius, Amphiaraus, Amphilochus, Mopsus, etc., each at his own sanctuary and in his own prescribed manner, rendered the same service.

The two legends of Delphi and Dêlos, above noticed, form of course a very insignificant fraction of the narratives which once existed respecting the great and venerated Apollo. They serve only as specimens, and as very early specimens, to illustrate what these divine mythes were, and what was the turn of Grecian faith and imagination. The constantly recurring festivals of the gods caused an incessant demand for new mythes respecting them, or at least for varieties and reproductions of the old mythes. Even during the third century of the Christian era, in the time of the rhêtôr Menander, when the old forms of paganism were waning and when the stock of mythes in existence was extremely abundant, we see this demand in great force; but it was incomparably more operative in those earlier times when the creative vein of the Grecian mind yet retained its pristine and unfaded richness. Each god had many different surnames, temples, groves, and solemnities; with each of which was connected more or less of mythical narrative, originally hatched in the prolific and spontaneous fancy of a believing neighborhood, to be afterwards expanded, adorned, and diffused by the song of the poet. The earliest subject of competition at the great Pythian festival was the singing of a hymn in honor of Apollo: other *agones* were subsequently added, but the ode or hymn constituted the fundamental attribute of the solemnity: the Pythia at Sikyon and elsewhere were probably framed on a similar footing. So, too, at the ancient and celebrated Charitêsia, or festival of the Charites, at Orchomenos, the rivalry of the poets in their various modes of composition, both began and continued as the predominant feature: and the inestimable treasures yet remaining to us of Attic tragedy and comedy, are gleanings from the once numerous dramas exhibited at the solemnity of the Dionysia. The Ephesians gave considerable rewards for the best hymns in honor of Artemis, to be sung at her temple. And the early lyric poets of Greece, though their works have not descended to us, devoted their genius largely to similar productions, as may be seen by the titles and fragments yet remaining.

Both the Christian and the Mohammedan religions have begun during the historical age, have been propagated from one common center, and have been erected upon the ruins of a different pre-existing faith. With none of these particulars did Grecian Paganism correspond. It took rise in an age of imagination and feeling simply, without the restraints, as well as without the aid, of writing or records, of history or philosophy. It was, as a general rule, the spontaneous product of many separate tribes and localities, imitation and propagation operating as subordinate causes; it was, moreover, a primordial faith as far as our means of information enable us to discover.

These considerations explain to us two facts in the history of the early pagan mind. First, the divine mythes, the matter of their religion, constituted also the matter of their earliest history; next, these mythes harmonized with each other only in their general types, but differed incurably in respect of particular incidents. The poet who sang a new adventure of Apollo, the trace of which he might have heard in some remote locality, would take care that it should be agreeable to the general conceptions which his hearers entertained respecting the god. He would not ascribe the cestus or amorous influences to Athênê, nor armed interference and the ægis to Aphroditê; but, provided he maintained this general keeping, he might indulge his fancy without restraint in the particular events of the story. The feelings and faith of his hearers went along with him, and there were no critical scruples to hold them back: to scrutinize the alleged proceedings of the gods was repulsive, and to disbelieve them impious. And thus these divine mythes, though they had their root simply in religious feelings, and though they presented great discrepancies of fact, served, nevertheless, as primitive matter of history to an early Greek: they were the only narratives, at once publicly accredited and interesting, which he possessed. To them were aggregated the heroic mythes (to which we shall proceed presently,—indeed, the two are inseparably blended, gods, heroes, and men almost always appearing in the same picture,—analogous, both in their structure and their genesis, and differing chiefly in the circumstance that they sprang from the type of a hero instead of from that of a god.

We are not to be astonished if we find Aphroditê, in the Iliad, born from Zeus and Dionê, and in the Theogony of Hesiod, generated from the foam on the sea after the mutilation of Uranos; nor if in the Odyssey she appears as the wife of Hêphæstos, while in the Theogony the latter is married to Aglaia, and Aphroditê is described as mother of three children by Arês. The Homeric hymn to Aphroditê details the legend of Aphroditê and Anchisês, which is presupposed in the Iliad as the parentage of Æneas: but the author of the hymn, probably sung at one of the festivals of Aphroditê in Cyprus, represents the goddess as ashamed of her passion for a mortal, and as enjoining Anchisês under severe menaces not to

reveal who the mother of Æneas was; while in the Iliad she has no scruple in publicly owning him, and he passes everywhere as her acknowledged son. Aphroditê is described in the hymn as herself cold and unimpressible, but ever active and irresistible in inspiring amorous feelings to gods, to men, and to animals. Three goddesses are recorded as memorable exceptions to her universal empire,—Athênê, Artemis, and Hestia or Vesta. Aphroditê was one of the most important of all the goddesses in the mythical world: for the number of interesting, pathetic, and tragical adventures deducible from misplaced or unhappy passion was, of course, very great; and in most of these cases the intervention of Aphroditê was usually prefixed, with some legend to explain why she manifested herself. Her range of action grows wider in the latter epic and lyric and tragic poets than in Homer.

Athênê, the man-goddess, born from the head of Zeus, without a mother and without feminine sympathies, is the antithesis partly of Aphroditê, partly of the effeminate or womanized god Dionysos—the latter is an importation from Asia, but Athênê is a Greek conception—the type of composed, majestic, and unrelenting force. It appears, however, as if this goddess had been conceived in a different manner in different parts of Greece. For we find ascribed to her in some of the legends, attributes of industry and home-keeping; she is represented as the companion of Hêphæstos, patronizing handicraft, and expert at the loom and the spindle: the Athenian potters worshiped her along with Promêtheus. Such traits of character do not square with the formidable ægis and the massive and crushing spear which Homer and most of the mythes assign to her. There probably were at first at least two different types of Athênê, and their coalescence has partially obliterated the less marked of the two. Athênê is the constant and watchful protectress of Hêraklês: she is also locally identified with the soil and people of Athens, even in the Iliad: Erechtheus, the Athenian, is born of the earth, but Athênê brings him up, nourishes him, and lodges him in her own temple, where the Athenians annually worship him with sacrifice and solemnities. It was altogether impossible to make Erechtheus son of Athênê,—the type of the goddess forbade it; but the Athenian mythe-creators, though they found this barrier impassable, strove to approach to it as near as they could, and the description which they give of the birth of Erichthonios, at once un-Homeric and unseemly, presents something like the phantom of maternity.

The huntress Artemis, in Arcadia and in Greece proper, generally exhibits a well-defined type with which the legends respecting her are tolerably consistent. But the Ephesian as well as the Tauric Artemis partakes more of the Asiatic character, and has borrowed the attributes of the Lydian Great Mother as well as of an indigenous Tauric virgin: this Ephesian Artemis passed to the colonies of Phokæa and Milêtus. The Homeric Artemis shares with her brother

Apollo in the dexterous use of the far-striking bow, and sudden death is described by the poet as inflicted by her gentle arrow. Jealousy of the gods at the withholding of honors and sacrifices, or at the presumption of mortals in contending with them,—a point of character so frequently recurring in the types of the Grecian gods,—manifests itself in the legends of Artemis. The memorable Kalydônian boar is sent by her as a visitation upon Œneus, because he had omitted to sacrifice to her, while he did honor to other gods. The Arcadian heroine Atalanta is, however, a reproduction of Artemis, with little or no difference, and the goddess is sometimes confounded even with her attendant nymphs.

The mighty Poseidôn, the earth-shaker and the ruler of the sea, is second only to Zeus in power, but has no share in those imperial and superintending capacities which the Father of Gods and men exhibits. He numbers a numerous heroic progeny, usually men of great corporeal strength, and many of them belonging to the Æolic race. The great Neleid family of Pylus trace their origin up to him; and he is also the father of Polyphêmus the Cyclôps, whose well-earned suffering he cruelly revenges upon Odysseus. His Dêlos is the island of Kalaureia, wherein there was held an old local Amphiktyony, for the purpose of rendering to him joint honor and sacrifice. The isthmus of Corinth, Helikê in Achaia, and Onchêstos in Bœotia, are also residences which he much affects, and where he is solemnly worshiped. But the abode which he originally and specially selected for himself was the Acropolis of Athens, where, by a blow of his trident, he produced a well of water in the rock: Athênê came afterwards and claimed the spot for herself, planting in token of possession the olive-tree which stood in the sacred grove of Pandrosos: and the decision either of the autochthonous Cecrops, or of Erechtheus, awarded to her the preference, much to the displeasure of Poseidôn. Either on this account, or on account of the death of his son Eumolpus, slain in assisting the Eleusinians against Erechtheus, the Attic mythes ascribed to Poseidôn great enmity against the Erechtheid family, which he is asserted to have ultimately overthrown: Theseus, whose glorious reign and deeds succeeded to that family, is said to have been really his son. In several other places,—in Ægina, Argos, and Naxos,—Poseidôn had disputed the privileges of patron-god with Zeus, Hêrê, and Dionysos: he was worsted in all, but bore his defeat patiently. Poseidôn endured a long slavery, in common with Apollo, gods as they were, under Laomedôn, King of Troy, at the command and condemnation of Zeus: the two gods rebuilt the walls of the city, which had been destroyed by Hêraklês. When their time was expired, the insolent Laomedôn withheld from them the stipulated reward, and even accompanied its refusal with appalling threats; and the subsequent animosity of the god against Troy was greatly determined by the sentiment of this injustice.

Such periods of servitude, inflicted upon individual gods, are among the most remarkable of all the incidents in the divine legends. We find Apollo on another occasion condemned to serve Admêtus, King of Pheræ, as a punishment for having killed the Cyclôpes, and Hêraklês also is sold as a slave to Omphalê. Even the fierce Arês, overpowered and imprisoned for a long time by the two Alôids, is ultimately liberated only by extraneous aid. Such narratives attest the discursive range of Grecian fancy in reference to the gods, as well as the perfect commingling of things and persons, divine and human, in their conceptions of the past. The god who serves is for the time degraded; but the supreme god who commands the servitude is in the like proportion exalted, while the idea of some sort of order and government among these superhuman beings was never lost sight of. Nevertheless, the mythes respecting the servitude of the gods became obnoxious afterwards, along with many others, to severe criticism on the part of philosophers.

The proud, jealous, and bitter Hêrê,—the goddess of the once wealthy Mykênæ, the fax et focus of the Trojan war, and the ever-present protectress of Jasôn in the Argonautic expedition,—occupies an indispensable station in the mythical world. As the daughter of Kronos and wife of Zeus, she fills a throne from whence he cannot dislodge her, and which gives her a right perpetually to grumble and to thwart him. Her unmeasured jealousy of the female favorites of Zeus, and her antipathy against his sons, especially against Hêraklês, has been the suggesting cause of innumerable mythes: the general type of her character stands here clearly marked, as furnishing both stimulus and guide to the mythopœic fancy. The "Sacred Wedding," or marriage of Zeus and Hêrê, was familiar to epithalamic poets long before it became a theme for the spiritualizing ingenuity of critics.

Hêphæstos is the son of Hêrê without a father, and stands to her in the same relation as Athênê to Zeus: her pride and want of sympathy are manifested by her casting him out at once in consequence of his deformity. He is the god of fire—especially of fire in its practical applications to handicraft—and is indispensable as the right-hand and instrument of the gods. His skill and his deformity appear alternately as the source of mythical stories: wherever exquisite and effective fabrication is intended to be designated, Hêphæstos is announced as the maker, although in this function the type of his character is reproduced in Dædalos. In the Attic legends he appears intimately united both with Promêtheus and with Athênê, in conjunction with whom he was worshiped at Kolônus near Athens. Lêmnos was the favorite residence of Hêphæstos; and, if we possessed more knowledge of this island and its town Hêphæstias, we should doubtless find abundant legends detailing his adventures and interventions.

The chaste, still, and home-keeping Hestia, goddess of the family

hearth, is far less fruitful in mythical narratives, in spite of her very superior dignity, than the knavish, smooth-tongued, keen, and acquisitive Hermês. His function of messenger of the gods brings him perpetually on the stage, and affords ample scope for portraying the features of his character. The Homeric hymn to Hermês describes the scene and circumstances of his birth, and the almost instantaneous manifestation, even in infancy, of his peculiar attributes. It explains the friendly footing on which he stood with Apollo,—the interchange of gifts and functions between them,—and lastly, the inviolate security of all the wealth and offerings in the Delphian temple, exposed as they were to thieves without any visible protection. Such was the innate cleverness and talent of Hermês, that on the day he was born he invented the lyre, stringing the seven chords on the shell of a tortoise—and also stole the cattle of Apollo in Pieria, dragging them backwards to his cave in Arcadia, so that their track could not be detected. To the remonstrances of his mother Maia, who points out to him the danger of offending Apollo, Hermês replies, that he aspires to rival the dignity and functions of Apollo among the immortals, and that if his father Zeus refuses to grant them to him, he will employ his powers of thieving in breaking open the sanctuary at Delphi, and in carrying away the gold and the vestments, the precious tripods and vessels. Presently Apollo discovers the loss of his cattle, and after some trouble finds his way to the Kyllênian cavern, where he sees Hermês asleep in his cradle. The child denies the theft with effrontery, and even treats the surmise as a ridiculous impossibility: he persists in such denial even before Zeus, who, however, detects him at once, and compels him to reveal the place where the cattle are concealed. But the lyre was as yet unknown to Apollo, who has heard nothing except the voice of the Muses and the sound of the pipe. So powerfully is he fascinated by hearing the tones of the lyre from Hermês, and so eager to become possessed of it, that he is willing at once to pardon the past theft, and even to conciliate besides the friendship of Hermês. Accordingly a bargain is struck between the two gods and sanctioned by Zeus. Hermês surrenders to Apollo the lyre, inventing for his own use the syrinx or panspipe, and receiving from Apollo in exchange the golden rod of wealth, with empire over flocks and herds, as well as over horses and oxen and the wild animals of the woods. He presses to obtain the gift of prophecy, but Apollo is under a special vow not to impart that privilege to any god whatever. He instructs Hermês, however, how to draw information, to a certain extent, from the Mœræ or Fates themselves; and assigns to him, over and above, the function of messenger of the gods to Hadês.

Although Apollo has acquired the lyre, the particular object of his wishes, he is still under apprehension that Hermês will steal it away from him again, together with his bow, and he exacts a formal oath by Styx as security. Hermês promises solemnly that he will

steal none of the acquisitions, nor ever invade the sanctuary of Apollo; while the latter on his part pledges himself to recognize Hermês as his chosen friend and companion, among all the other sons of Zeus, human or divine.

So came to pass, under the sanction of Zeus, the marked favor shown by Apollo to Hermês. But Hermês (concludes the hymnographer, with frankness unusual in speaking of a god) "does very little good: he avails himself of the darkness of night to cheat without measure the tribes of mortal men."

Here the general types of Hermês and Apollo, coupled with the present fact that no thief ever approached the rich and seemingly accessible treasures of Delphi, engender a string of expository incidents; cast into a quasi-historical form, and detailing how it happened that Hermês had bound himself by especial convention to respect the Delphian temple. The types of Apollo seem to have been different in different times and parts of Greece: in some places he was worshiped as Apollo Nomios, or the patron of pasture and cattle; and this attribute, which elsewhere passed over to his son Aristæus, is by our hymnographer voluntarily surrendered to Hermês, combined with the golden rod of fruitfulness. On the other hand, the lyre did not originally belong to the Far-striking King, nor is he at all an inventor: the hymn explains both its first invention and how it came into his possession. And the value of the incidents is thus partly expository, partly illustrative, as expanding in detail the general preconceived character of the Kyllênian god.

To Zeus more amours are ascribed than to any of the other gods,—probably because the Grecian kings and chieftains were especially anxious to trace their lineage to the highest and most glorious of all,—each of these amours having its representative progeny on earth. Such subjects were among the most promising and agreeable for the interest of mythical narrative, and Zeus as a lover thus became the father of a great many legends, branching out into innumerable interferences, for which his sons, all of them distinguished individuals, and many of them persecuted by Hêrê, furnished the occasion. But besides this, the commanding functions of the Supreme God, judicial and administrative, extending both over gods and men, was a potent stimulus to the mythopœic activity. Zeus has to watch over his own dignity,—the first of all considerations with a god: moreover as Horkios, Xenios, Ktêsios, Meilichios (a small proportion of his thousand surnames), he guaranteed oaths and punished perjurers, he enforced the observance of hospitality, he guarded the family hoard and the crop realized for the year, and he granted expiation to the repentant criminal. All these different functions created a demand for mythes, as the means of translating a dim, but serious presentiment into distinct form, both self-explaining and communicable to others. In enforcing the sanctity of the oath or of the tie of hospitality, the most powerful of all arguments would be

a collections of legends respecting the judgments of Zeus, Horkios or Xenios; the more impressive and terrific such legends were, the greater would be their interest, and the less would any one dare to disbelieve them. They constituted the natural outpourings of a strong and common sentiment, probably without any deliberate ethical intention: the preconceptions of the divine agency, expanded into legend, form a product analogous to the idea of the divine features and symmetry embodied in the bronze or the marble statue.

But it was not alone the general type and attributes of the gods which contributed to put in action the mythopœic propensities. The rites and solemnities forming the worship of each god, as well as the details of his temple and its locality, were a fatal source of mythes, respecting his exploits and sufferings, which to the people who heard them served the purpose of past history. The exegetes, or local guide and interpreter, belonging to each temple, preserved and recounted to curious strangers these traditional narratives, which lent a certain dignity even to the minutiæ of divine service. Out of a stock of materials thus ample, the poets extracted individual collections, such as the "Causes" (*Αἴτια*) of Kallimachus, now lost, and such as the Fasti of Ovid are for the Roman religious antiquities.

It was the practice to offer to the gods in sacrifice the bones of the victim only, inclosed in fat: how did this practice arise? The author of the Hesiodic theogony has a story which explains it: Promêtheus tricked Zeus into an imprudent choice, at the period when the gods and mortal men first came to an arrangement about privileges and duties (in Mekônê). Promêtheus, the tutelary representative of man, divided a large steer into two portions: on the one side he placed the flesh and guts, folded up in the omentum and covered over with the skin; on the other he put the bones enveloped in fat. He then invited Zeus to determine which of the two portions the gods would prefer to receive from mankind. Zeus "with both hands" decided for and took the white fat, but was highly incensed on finding that he had got nothing at the bottom except the bones. Nevertheless the choice of the gods was now irrevocably made: they were not entitled to any portion of the sacrificed animal beyond the bones and the white fat; and the standing practice is thus plausibly explained. I select this as one among a thousand instances to illustrate the genesis of legend out of religious practices. In the belief of the people, the event narrated in the legend was the real producing cause of the practice: but when we come to apply a sound criticism, we are compelled to treat the event as existing only in its narrative legend, and the legend itself as having been in the greater number of cases, engendered by the practice, —thus reversing the supposed order of production.

In dealing with Grecian mythes generally, it is convenient to distribute them into such as belong to the gods and such as belong to the heroes, according as the one or the other are the prominent personages. The former class manifest, more palpably than the latter, their real origin as growing out of the faith and the feelings, without any necessary basis, either of matter of fact or allegory: moreover, they elucidate more directly the religion of the Greeks, so important an item in their character as a people. But in point of fact, most of the mythes present to us gods, heroes, and men, in juxtaposition one with the other. And the richness of Grecian mythical literature arises from the infinite diversity of combinations thus opened out; first by the three class-types, God, hero, and man; next by the strict keeping with which each separate class and character is handled. We shall now follow downward the stream of mythical time, which begins with the gods, to the heroic legends, or those which principally concern the heroes and heroines; for the latter were to the full as important in legend as the former.

CHAPTER II.

LEGENDS RELATING TO HEROES AND MEN.

The Hesiodic theogony gives no account of anything like a creation of man, nor does it seem that such an idea was much entertained in the legendary vein of Grecian imagination; which commonly carried back the present men by successive generations to some primitive ancestor, himself sprung from the soil, or from a neighboring river, or mountain, or from a god, a nymph, etc. But the poet of the Hesiodic "Works and Days" has given us a narrative conceived in a very different spirit respecting the origin of the human race, more in harmony with the sober and melancholy ethical tone which reigns through that poem.

First (he tells us) the Olympic gods made the golden race,—good, perfect, and happy men, who lived from the spontaneous abundance of the earth, in ease and tranquility like the gods themselves: they suffer neither disease nor old age, and their death was like a gentle sleep. After death they became, by the award of Zeus, guardian terrestrial dæmons, who watch unseen over the proceedings of mankind—with the regal privilege of dispensing to them wealth, and taking account of good and bad deeds.

Next, the gods made the silver race,—unlike and greatly inferior, both in mind and body, to the golden. The men of this race were reckless and mischievous toward each other, and disdainful to the immortal gods, to whom they refused to offer either worship or sacrifice. Zeus in his wrath buried them in the earth; but there they still enjoy a secondary honor, as the blest of the under-world.

Thirdly, Zeus made the brazen race, quite different from the silver. They were made of hard ashwood, pugnacious and terrible: they were of immense strength and adamantine soul, neither raising nor touching bread. Their arms, their houses, and their implements were all of brass: there was then no iron. This race, eternally fighting, perished by each other's hands, died out, and descended without name or privilege to Hadês.

Next, Zeus made a fourth race, far juster and better than the last preceding. These were the heroes or demigods, who fought at the sieges of Troy and Thêbes. But this splendid stock also became extinct: some perished in war, others were removed by Zeus to a happier state in the islands of the blest. There they dwell in peace and comfort, under the government of Kronos, reaping thrice in the year the spontaneous produce of the earth.

The fifth race, which succeeds to the heroes, is of iron: it is the race to which the poet himself belongs, and bitterly does he regret it. He finds his contemporaries mischievous, dishonest, unjust, ungrateful, given to perjury, careless both of the ties of consanguinity and of the behests of the gods: Nemesis and Ædôs (Ethical Self-reproach) have left earth and gone back to Olympus. How keenly does he wish that his lot had been cast either earlier or later! This iron race is doomed to continual guilt, care, and suffering, with a small infusion of good; but the time will come when Zeus will put an end to it. The poet does not venture to predict what sort of race will succeed.

Such is the series of distinct races of men, which Hesiod, or the author of the "Works and Days," enumerates as having existed down to his own time. I give it as it stands, without placing much confidence in the various explanations which critics have offered. It stands out in more than one respect from the general tone and sentiment of Grecian legend: moreover the sequence of races is neither natural nor homogeneous,—the heroic race not having any metallic denomination, and not occupying any legitimate place in immediate succession to the brazen. Nor is the conception of the dæmons in harmony either with Homer or with the Hesiodic theogony. In Homer, there is scarcely any distinction between gods and dæmons: farther, the gods are stated to go about and visit the cities of men in various disguises for the purpose of inspecting good and evil proceedings. But in the poem now before us, the distinction between gods and dæmons is generic. The latter are invisible tenants of earth, remnants of the once happy golden race whom the Olympic gods first made: the remnants of the second or silver race are not dæmons, nor are they tenants of earth, but they still enjoy an honorable posthumous existence as the blest of the under-world. Nevertheless the Hesiodic dæmons are in no way authors or abettors of evil; on the contrary, they form the unseen police of the gods, for the purpose of repressing wicked behavior in the world.

We may trace, I think, in this quintuple succession of earthly races, set forth by the author of the "Works and Days," the confluence of two veins of sentiment, not consistent one with the other, yet both co-existing in the author's mind. The drift of his poem is thoroughly didactic and ethical. Though deeply penetrated with the injustice and suffering which darken the face of human life, he nevertheless strives to maintain, both in himself and in others, a conviction that on the whole the just and laborious man will come off well, and he enforces in considerable detail the lessons of practical prudence and virtue. This ethical sentiment, which dictates his appreciation of the present, also guides his imagination as to the past. It is pleasing to him to bridge over the chasm between the gods and degenerate man, by the supposition of previous races,—the first altogether pure, the second worse than the first, and the third still worse than the second; and to show further how the first race passed by gentle death-sleep into glorious immortality; how the second race was sufficiently wicked to drive Zeus to bury them in the under-world, yet still leaving them a certain measure of honor; while the third was so desperately violent as to perish by its own animosities, without either name or honor of any kind. The conception of the golden race passing after death into good guardian dæmons, which some suppose to have been derived from a comparison with oriental angels, presents itself to the poet partly as approximating this race to the gods, partly as a means of constituting a triple gradation of post-obituary existence, proportioned to the character of each race whilst alive. The denominations of gold and silver, given to the two first races, justify themselves, like those given by Simonidês of Amorgos and by Phokylidês to the different characters of women, derived from the dog, the bee, the mare, the ass, and other animals; and the epithet of brazen is specially explained by reference to the material which the pugnacious third race so plentifully employed for their arms and other implements.

So far we trace intelligibly enough the moralizing vein: we find the revolutions of the past so arranged as to serve partly as an ethical lesson, partly as a suitable preface to the present. But fourth in the list comes "the divine race of Heroes;" and here a new vein of thought is opened by the poet. The symmetry of his ethical past is broken up, in order to make way for these cherished beings of the national faith. For though the author of the "Works and Days" was himself of a didactic cast of thought, like Phokylidês, or Solôn, or Theognis, yet he had present to his feelings, in common with his countrymen, the picture of Grecian foretime, as it was set forth in the current mythes, and still more in Homer and those other epical productions which were then the only existing literature and history. It was impossible for him to exclude, from his sketch of the past, either the great persons or the glorious exploits which these poems ennobled; and even if he himself could have consented to such an

exclusion, the sketch would have become repulsive to his hearers. But the chiefs who figured before Thêbes and Troy could not be well identified either with the golden, the silver, or the brazen race: moreover it was essential that they should be placed in immediate contiguity with the present race, because their descendants, real or supposed, were the most prominent and conspicuous of existing men. Hence the poet is obliged to assign to them the fourth place in the series, and to interrupt the descending ethical movement in order to interpolate them between the brazen and the iron race, with neither of which they present any analogy. The iron race, to which the poet himself unhappily belongs, is the legitimate successor, not of the heroic, but of the brazen. Instead of the fierce and self-annihilating pugnacity which characterizes the latter, the iron race manifests an aggregate of smaller and meaner vices and mischiefs. It will not perish by suicidal extinction—but it is growing worse and worse, and is gradually losing its vigor, so that Zeus will not vouchsafe to preserve much longer such a race upon the earth.

I conceive that the series of races imagined by the poet of the "Works and Days" is the product of two distinct and incongruous veins of imagination,—the didactic or ethical blending with the primitive mythical or epical. His poem is remarkable as the most ancient didactic production of the Greeks, and as one of the first symptoms of a new tone of sentiment finding its way into their literature, never afterwards to become extinct. The tendency of the "Works and Days" is antiheroic: far from seeking to inspire admiration for adventurous enterprise, the author inculcates the strictest justice, the most unremitting labor and frugality, and a sober, not to say anxious, estimate of all the minute specialties of the future. Prudence and probity are his means,—practical comfort and happiness his end. But he deeply feels, and keenly exposes, the manifold wickedness and shortcomings of his contemporaries, in reference to this capital standard. He turns with displeasure from the present men, not because they are too feeble to hurl either the spear of Achilles or some vast boundary-stone, but because they are rapacious, knavish, and unprincipled.

The dæmons first introduced into the religious atmosphere of the Grecian world by the author of the "Works and Days"—as generically different from the gods, but essentially good, and forming the intermediate agents and police between gods and men,—are deserving of attention. They are the seed of a doctrine which afterwards underwent many changes, and became of great importance, first as one of the constituent elements of pagan faith, then as one of the helps to its subversion. It will be recollected that the buried remnants of the half-wicked silver race, though they are not recognized as dæmons, are still considered as having a substantive existence, a name, and dignity, in the under-world. The step was easy, to treat them as dæmons also, but as dæmons of a defective and malignant character:

this step was made by Empedoclês and Xenocratês, and to a certain extent countenanced by Plato. There came thus to be admitted among the pagan philosophers dæmons both good and bad, in every degree: and these dæmons were found available as a means of explaining many phenomena for which it was not convenient to admit the agency of the gods. They served to relieve the gods from the odium of physical and moral evils, as well as from the necessity of constantly meddling in small affairs. The objectionable ceremonies of the pagan religion were defended upon the ground that in no other way could the exigencies of such malignant beings be appeased. The dæmons were most frequently noticed as causes of evil, and thus the name came insensibly to convey with it a bad sense,—the idea of an evil being as contrasted with the goodness of a god. So it was found by the Christian writers when they commenced their controversy with paganism. One branch of their argument led them to identify the pagan gods with dæmons in the evil sense, and the insensible change in the received meaning of the word lent them a specious assistance. For they could easily show, that not only in Homer, but in the general language of early pagans, all the gods generally were spoken of as dæmons—and therefore, verbally speaking, Clemens and Tatian seemed to affirm nothing more against Zeus or Apollo than was involved in the language of Paganism itself. Yet the audience of Homer or Sophoklês would have strenuously repudiated the proposition, if it had been put to them in the sense which the word *dæmon* bore in the age and among the circle of these Christian writers.

In the imagination of the author of the "Works and Days," the dæmons occupy an important place, and are regarded as being of serious practical efficiency. When he is remonstrating with the rulers around him upon their gross injustice and corruption, he reminds them of the vast number of these immortal servants of Zeus who are perpetually on guard amid mankind, and through whom the visitations of the gods will descend even upon the most potent evil-doers. His supposition that the dæmons were not gods, but departed men of the golden race, allowed him to multiply their number indefinitely, without too much cheapening the divine dignity.

As this poet, enslaved by the current legends, has introduced the heroic race into a series to which they do not legitimately belong, so he has under the same influence inserted in another part of his poem the mythe of Pandôra and Promêtheus, as a means of explaining the primary diffusion, and actual abundance, of evil among mankind. Yet this mythe can in no way consist with his quintuple scale of distinct races, and is, in fact, a totally distinct theory to explain the same problem,—the transition of mankind from a supposed state of antecedent happiness to one of present toil and suffering. Such an inconsistency is not a sufficient reason for questioning the genuineness of either passage; for the two stories, though one contradicts

the other, both harmonize with that central purpose which governs the author's mind,—a querulous and didactic appreciation of the present. That such was his purpose appears not only from the whole tenor of his poem, but also from the remarkable fact that his own personality, his own adventures and kindred, and his own sufferings figure in it conspicuously. And this introduction of self imparts to it a peculiar interest. The father of Hesiod came over from the Æolic Kymê, with the view of bettering his condition, and settled at Askra, in Bœotia, at the foot of Mount Helicon. After his death his two sons divided the family inheritance: but Hesiod bitterly complains that his brother Persês cheated and went to law with him, and obtained through corrupt judges an unjust decision. He farther reproaches his brother with a preference for the suits and unprofitable bustle of the agora, at a time when he ought to be laboring for his subsistence in the field. Askra, indeed, was a miserable place, repulsive both in summer and winter. Hesiod had never crossed the sea, except once from Aulis to Eubœa, whither he went to attend the funeral-games of Amphidamas, the chief of Chalkis: he sung a hymn, and gained as prize a tripod, which he consecrated to the muses in Helicon.

These particulars, scanty as they are, possess a peculiar value, as the earliest authentic memorandum respecting the doing or suffering of any actual Greek person. There is no external testimony at all worthy of trust respecting the age of the "Works and Days:" Herodotus treats Hesiod and Homer as belonging to the same age, four hundred years before his own time; and there are other statements besides, some placing Hesiod at an earlier date than Homer, some at a later. Looking at the internal evidences, we may observe that the pervading sentiment, tone, and purpose of the poem is widely different from that of the Iliad and Odyssey, and analogous to what we read respecting the compositions of Archilochus and the Amorgian Simonidês. The author of the "Works and Days" is indeed a preacher, and not a satirist: but with this distinction, we find in him the same predominance of the present and the positive, the same disposition to turn the muse into an exponent of his own personal wrongs, the same employment of Æsopic fable by way of illustration, and the same unfavorable estimate of the female sex, all of which may be traced in the two poets above mentioned, placing both of them in contrast with the Homeric epic. Such an internal analogy, in the absence of good testimony, is the best guide which we can follow in determining the date of the "Works and Days," which we should accordingly place shortly after the year 700 B.C. The style of the poem might indeed afford a proof that the ancient and uniform hexameter, though well adapted to continuous legendary narrative or to solemn hymns, was somewhat monotonous when called upon either to serve a polemical purpose or to impress a striking moral lesson. When poets, then the only existing composers, first began to apply their thoughts to the cut and thrust of actual life, aggressive or didactic, the verse would be seen to require a new, livelier, and smarter meter; and out of this want grew the elegiac and the iambic verse, both seemingly contemporaneous, and both intended to supplant the primitive hexameter for the short effusions then coming into vogue.

CHAPTER III.

LEGEND OF THE IAPETIDS.

The sons of the Titan god Iapetus, as described in the Hesiodic theogony, are Atlas, Menœtius, Promêtheus, and Epimêtheus. Of these, Atlas alone is mentioned by Homer in the Odyssey, and even he not as the son of Iapetus. the latter himself is named in the Iliad as existing in Tartarus along with Kronos. The Homeric Atlas "knows the depths of the whole sea, and keeps by himself those tall pillars which hold the heaven apart from the earth."

As the Homeric theogony generally appears much expanded in Hesiod, so also does the family of Iapetus, with their varied adventures. Atlas is here described, not as the keeper of the intermediate pillars between heaven and earth, but as himself condemned by Zeus to support the heaven on his head and hands; while the fierce Menœtius is pushed down to Erebus as a punishment for his ungovernable insolence. But the remaining two brothers, Promêtheus and Epimêtheus, are among the most interesting creations of Grecian legend, and distinguished in more than one respect from all the remainder.

First, the main battle between Zeus and the Titan gods is a contest of force purely and simply—mountains are hurled and thunder is lanched, and the victory remains to the strongest. But the competition between Zeus and Promêtheus is one of craft and stratagem: the victory does, indeed, remain to the former, but the honors of the fight belong to the latter. Secondly, Promêtheus and Epimêtheus (the fore-thinker and the after-thinker) are characters stamped at the same mint and by the same effort, the express contrast and antithesis of each other. Thirdly, mankind are here expressly brought forward, not, indeed, as active partners in the struggle, but as the grand and capital subjects interested—as gainers or sufferers by the result. Promêtheus appears in the exalted character of champion of the human race, even against the formidable superiority of Zeus.

In the primitive or Hesiodic legend, Promêtheus is not the creator or molder of man; it is only the later additions which invest him with this character. The race are supposed as existing, and Promê-

theus, a member of the dispossessed body of Titan gods, comes forward as their representative and defender. The advantageous bargain which he made with Zeus on their behalf, in respect to the partition of the sacrificial animals, has been recounted in a preceding chapter. Zeus felt that he had been outwitted, and was exceeding wroth. In his displeasure he withheld from mankind the inestimable comfort of fire, so that the race would have perished had not Promêtheus stolen fire, in defiance of the Supreme Ruler, and brought it to men in the hollow stem of the plant called giant-fennel.

Zeus was now doubly indignant, and determined to play off a still more ruinous stratagem. Hêphæstos, by his direction, molded the form of a beautiful virgin; Athênê dressed her, Aphroditê and the Charites bestowed upon her both ornament and fascination, while Hermês infused into her the mind of a dog, a deceitful spirit, and treacherous words. The messenger of the gods conducted this "fascinating mischief" to mankind at a time when Promêtheus was not present. Now Epimêtheus had received from his brother peremptory injunctions not to accept from the hands of Zeus any present whatever; but the beauty of Pandôra (so the newly formed female was called) was not to be resisted. She was received and admitted among men, and from that moment their comfort and tranquillity was exchanged for suffering of every kind. The evils to which mankind are liable had been before inclosed in a cask in their own keeping: Pandôra in her malice removed the lid of the cask, and out flew these thousand evils and calamities, to exercise forever their destroying force. Hope alone remained imprisoned, and therefore, without efficacy, as before—the inviolable lid being replaced before she could escape. Before this incident (says the legend) men had lived without disease or suffering; but now both earth and sea are full of mischiefs. Maladies of every description stalk abroad by day as well as by night, without any hope for man of relief to come.

The theogony gives the legend here recounted, with some variations—leaving out the part of Epimêtheus altogether, as well as the cask of evils. Pandôra is the ruin of man, simply as the mother and representative of the female sex. And the variations are thus useful, as they enable us to distinguish the essential from the accessory circumstances of the story.

"Thus," says the poet, at the conclusion of his narrative, "it is not possible to escape from the purposes of Zeus." His mythe, connecting the calamitous condition of man with the malevolence of the supreme god, shows, first, by what cause such an unfriendly feeling was raised; next, by what instrumentality its deadly results were brought about. The human race are not indeed the creation, but the protected flock of Promêtheus, one of the elder or dispossessed Titan gods. When Zeus acquires supremacy, mankind, along with the rest,

become subject to him, and are to make the best bargain they can, respecting worship and service to be yielded. By the stratagem of their advocate Promêtheus, Zeus is cheated into such a partition of the victims as is eminently unprofitable to him; whereby his wrath is so provoked that he tries to subtract from man the use of fire. Here, however, his scheme is frustrated by the theft of Promêtheus: but his second attempt is more successful, and he in his turn cheats the unthinking Epimêtheus into the acceptance of a present (in spite of the peremptory interdict of Promêtheus) by which the whole of man's happiness is wrecked. This legend grows out of two feelings; partly as to the relations of the gods with man, partly as to the relation of the female sex with the male. The present gods are unkind toward man, but the old gods, with whom man's lot was originally cast, were much kinder—and the ablest among them stands forward as the indefatigable protector of the race. Nevertheless, the mere excess of his craft proves the ultimate ruin of the cause which he espouses. He cheats Zeus out of a fair share of the sacrificial victim, so as both to provoke and justify a retaliation which he cannot be always at hand to ward off; the retaliation is, in his absence, consummated by a snare laid for Epimêtheus and voluntarily accepted. And thus, though Hesiod ascribes the calamitous condition of man to the malevolence of Zeus, his piety suggests two exculpatory pleas for the latter; mankind have been the first to defraud Zeus of his legitimate share of the sacrifice—and they have, moreover, been consenting parties to their own ruin. Such are the feelings, as to the relation between the gods and man, which have been one of the generating elements of this legend. The other element, a conviction of the vast mischief arising to man from women, whom yet they cannot dispense with, is frequently and strongly set forth in several of the Greek poets—by Simonidês of Amorgos and Phokylidês, not less than by Euripidês.

But the miseries arising from woman, however great they might be, did not reach Promêtheus himself. For him, the rash champion who had ventured "to compete in sagacity" with Zeus, a different punishment was in store. Bound by heavy chains to a pillar, he remained fast imprisoned for several generations: every day did an eagle prey upon his liver, and every night did the liver grow afresh for the next day's suffering. At length Zeus, eager to enhance the glory of his favorite son, Hêraklês, permitted the latter to kill the eagle and rescue the captive.

Such is the Promêthean mythe as it stands in the Hesiodic poems; its earliest form, as far as we can trace. Upon it was founded the sublime tragedy of Æschylus, "The Enchained Promêtheus," together with at least one more tragedy, now lost, by the same author. Æschylus has made several important alterations; describing the human race, not as having once enjoyed and subsequently lost a state of tranquillity and enjoyment, but as originally feeble and wretched.

He suppresses both the first trick played off by Promêtheus upon Zeus respecting the partition of the victim—and the final formation and sending of Pandôra—which are the two most marked portions of the Hesiodic story; while on the other hand he brings out prominently and enlarges upon the theft of fire, which in Hesiod is but slightly touched. If he has thus relinquished the antique simplicity of the story, he has rendered more than ample compensation by imparting to it a grandeur of *idéal*, a large reach of thought combined with appeals to our earnest and admiring sympathy, and a pregnancy of suggestion in regard to the relations between the gods and man, which soar far above the Hesiodic level—and which render his tragedy the most impressive, though not the most artistically composed, of all Grecian dramatic productions. Promêtheus there appears not only as the heroic champion and sufferer in the cause and for the protection of the human race, but also as the gifted teacher of all the arts, helps, and ornaments of life, amongst which fire is only one: all this against the will and in defiance of the purpose of Zeus, who, on acquiring his empire, wished to destroy the human race and to beget some new breed. Moreover, new relations between Promêtheus and Zeus are superadded by Æschylus. At the commencement of the struggle between Zeus and the Titan gods, Promêtheus had vainly attempted to prevail upon the latter to conduct it with prudence; but when he found that they obstinately declined all wise counsel, and that their ruin was inevitable, he abandoned their cause and joined Zeus. To him and to his advice Zeus owed the victory; yet the monstrous ingratitude and tyranny of the latter is now manifested by nailing him to a rock, for no other crime than because he frustrated the purpose of extinguishing the human race, and furnished to them the means of living with tolerable comfort. The new ruler Zeus, insolent with his victory over the old gods, tramples down all right, and sets at naught sympathy and obligation, as well toward gods as toward man. Yet the prophetic Promêtheus, in the midst of intense suffering, is consoled by the foreknowledge that the time will come when Zeus must again send for him, release him, and invoke his aid, as the sole means of averting from himself dangers otherwise insurmountable. The security and means of continuance for mankind have now been placed beyond the reach of Zeus—whom Promêtheus proudly defies, glorying in his generous and successful championship, despite the terrible price which he is doomed to pay for it.

As the Æschylean Promêtheus, though retaining the old lineaments, has acquired a new coloring, soul, and character, so he has also become identified with a special locality. In Hesiod there is no indication of the place in which he is imprisoned; but Æschylus places it in Scythia, and the general belief of the Greeks supposed it to be on Mount Caucasus. So long and so firmly did this belief continue, that the Roman general Pompey, when in command of an army in Kolchis, made with his companion, the literary Greek Theophanês, a special march to view the spot in Caucasus where Promêtheus had been transfixed.

CHAPTER IV.

HEROIC LEGENDS.—GENEALOGY OF ARGOS.

HAVING briefly enumerated the gods of Greece, with their chief attributes as described in legend, we come to those genealogies which connected them with historical men.

In the retrospective faith of a Greek, the ideas of worship and ancestry coalesced. Every association of men, large or small, in whom there existed a feeling of present union, traced back that union to some common initial progenitor; that progenitor being either the common god whom they worshiped, or some semi-divine person closely allied to him. What the feelings of the community require is, a continuous pedigree to connect them with this respected source of existence, beyond which they do not think of looking back. A series of names, placed in filiation or fraternity, together with a certain number of family or personal adventures ascribed to some of the individuals among them, constitute the ante-historical past through which the Greek looks back to his gods. The names of this genealogy are, to a great degree, gentile or local names familiar to the people,—rivers, mountains, springs, lakes, villages, demes, etc.,—embodied as persons, and introduced as acting or suffering. They are, moreover, called kings or chiefs, but the existence of a body of subjects surrounding them is tacitly implied rather than distinctly set forth; for their own personal exploits or family proceedings constitute, for the most part, the whole matter of narrative. And thus the genealogy was made to satisfy at once the appetite of the Greeks for romantic adventure, and their demand for an unbroken line of filiation between themselves and the gods. The eponymous personage, from whom the community derive their name, is sometimes the begotten son of the local god, sometimes an indigenous man sprung from the earth, which is indeed itself divinized.

It will be seen from the mere description of these genealogies that they included elements human and historical, as well as elements divine and extra-historical. And if we could determine the time at which any genealogy was first framed, we should be able to assure ourselves that the men then represented as present, together with their fathers and grandfathers, were real persons of flesh and blood. But this is a point which can seldom be ascertained; moreover, even if it could be ascertained, we must at once set it aside, if we wish to look at the genealogy in the point of view of the Greeks. For to

them not only all the members were alike real, but the gods and heroes at the commencement were in a certain sense the most real; at least, they were the most esteemed and indispensable of all. The value of the genealogy consisted, not in its length, but in its continuity; not (according to the feeling of modern aristocracy) in the power of setting out a prolonged series of human fathers and grandfathers, but in the sense of ancestral union with the primitive god. And the length of the series is traceable rather to humility, inasmuch as the same person who was gratified with the belief that he was descended from a god in the fifteenth generation, would have accounted it criminal insolence to affirm that a god was his father or grandfather. In presenting to the reader those genealogies which constitute the supposed primitive history of Hellas, I make no pretense to distinguish names real and historical from fictitious creations; partly because I have no evidence upon which to draw the line, and partly because by attempting it I should altogether depart from the genuine Grecian point of view.

Nor is it possible to do more than exhibit a certain selection of such as were most current and interesting; for the total number of them which found place in Grecian faith exceeds computation. As a general rule, every deme, every gens, every aggregate of men accustomed to combined action, religious or political, had its own. The small and unimportant demes into which Attica was divided had each its ancestral god and heroes, just as much as the great Athens herself. Even among the villages of Phokis, which Pausanias will hardly permit himself to call towns, deductions of legendary antiquity were not wanting. And it is important to bear in mind, when we are reading the legendary genealogies of Argos, or Sparta, or Thêbes, that these are merely samples amid an extensive class, all perfectly analogous, and all exhibiting the religious and patriotic retrospect of some fraction of the Hellenic world. They are no more matter of historical tradition than any of the thousand other legendary genealogies which men delighted to recall to memory at the periodical festivals of their gens, their deme, or their village.

With these few prefatory remarks, I proceed to notice the most conspicuous of the Grecian heroic pedigrees, and first, that of Argos.

The earliest name in Argeian antiquity is that of Inachus, the son of Oceanus and Têthys, who gave his name to the river flowing under the walls of the town. According to the chronological computations of those who regarded the mythical genealogies as substantive history, and who allotted a given number of years to each generation, the reign of Inachus was placed 1986 B.C., or about 1100 years prior to the commencement of the recorded Olympiads.

The sons of Inachus were Phorôneus and Ægialeus, both of whom, however, were sometimes represented as autochthonous or indigenous men, the one in the territory of Argos, the other in that of Sikyôn.

Ægialeus gave his name to the north-western region of the Peloponnêsus, on the southern coast of the Corinthian gulf. The name of Phorôneus was of great celebrity in the Argeian mythical genealogies, and furnished both the title and the subject of the ancient poem called Phorônis, in which he is styled "the father of mortal men." He is said to have imparted to mankind, who had before him lived altogether isolated, the first notion and habits of social existence, and even the first knowledge of fire: his dominion extended over the whole Peloponnêsus. His tomb at Argos, and seemingly also the place, called the Phorônic city, in which he formed the first settlement of mankind, were still shown in the days of Pausanias. The offspring of Phorôneus, by the nymph Teledikê, were Apis and Niobê. Apis, a harsh ruler, was put to death by Thelxiôn and Telchin, having given to Peloponnêsus the name of Apia: he was succeeded by Argos, the son of his sister Niobê by the god Zeus. From this sovereign Peloponnêsus was denominated Argos. By his wife Evadnê, daughter of Strymôn, he had four sons, Ekbasus, Peiras, Epidaurus, and Kriasus. Ekbasus was succeeded by his son Agênôr, and he again by his son Argos Panoptês,—a very powerful prince, who is said to have had eyes distributed over all his body, and to have liberated Peloponnêsus from several monsters and wild animals which infested it: Akusilaus and Æschylus make this Argos an earthborn person, while Pherekydês reports him as son of Arestôr. Iasus was the son of Argos Panoptês by Ismênê, daughter of Asôpus. According to the authors whom Apollodôrus and Pausanias prefer, the celebrated Iô was his daughter: but the Hesiodic epic (as well as Akusilaus) represented her as daughter of Peiras, while Æschylus and Kastor the chronologist affirmed the primitive king Inachus to have been her father. A favorite theme, as well for the ancient genealogical poets as for the Attic tragedians, were the adventures of Iô; of whom, while priestess of Hêrê, at the ancient and renowned Hêræon between Mykênæ and Tiryns, Zeus became amorous. When Hêrê discovered the intrigue and taxed him with it, he denied the charge, and metamorphosed Iô into a white cow. Hêrê, requiring that the cow should be surrendered to her, placed her under the keeping of Argos Panoptês; but this guardian was slain by Hermês, at the command of Zeus; and Hêrê then drove the cow Iô away from her native land by means of the incessant stinging of a gad-fly, which compelled her to wander without repose or sustenance over an immeasurable extent of foreign regions. The wandering Iô gave her name to the Ionian gulf, traversed Epirus and Illyria, passed the chain of Mount Hæmus and the lofty summits of Caucasus, and swam across the Thracian or Cimmerian Bosphorus (which also from her derived its appellation) into Asia. She then went through Scythia, Cimmeria, and many Asiatic regions, until she arrived in Egypt, where Zeus at length bestowed upon her rest,

restored her to her original form, and enabled her to give birth to his black son Epaphos.

Such is a general sketch of the adventures which the ancient poets, epic, lyric, and tragic, and the logographers after them, connect with the name of the Argeian Iô—one of the numerous tales which the fancy of the Greeks deduced from the amorous dispositions of Zeus and the jealousy of Hêrê. That the scene should be laid in the Argeian territory appears natural, when we recollect that both Argos and Mykênæ were under the special guardianship of Hêrê, and that the Hêræon near Mykênæ was one of the oldest and most celebrated temples in which she was worshiped. It is useful to compare this amusing fiction with the representation reported to us by Herodotus, and derived by him as well from Phœnician as from Persian antiquarians, of the circumstances which occasioned the transit of Iô from Argos to Egypt,—an event recognized by all of them as historical matter of fact. According to the Persians, a Phœnician vessel had arrived at the port near Argos, freighted with goods intended for sale to the inhabitants of the country. After the vessel had remained a few days, and disposed of most of her cargo, several Argeian women, and among them Iô the king's daughter, coming on board to purchase, were seized and carried off by the crew, who sold Iô in Egypt. The Phœnician antiquarians, however, while they admitted the circumstance that Iô had left her own country in one of their vessels, gave a different color to the whole by affirming that she emigrated voluntarily, having been engaged in an amour with the captain of the vessel, and fearing that her parents might come to the knowledge of her pregnancy. Both Persians and Phœnicians described the abduction of Iô as the first of a series of similar acts between Greeks and Asiatics, committed each in revenge for the preceding. First came the rape of Eurôpê from Phœnicia by Grecian adventurers,—perhaps, as Herodotus supposed, by Krêtans: next, the abduction of Mêdeia from Kolchis by Jasôn, which occasioned the retaliatory act of Paris, when he stole away Helena from Menelaos. Up to this point the seizures of women by Greeks from Asiatics, and by Asiatics from Greeks, had been equivalent both in number and in wrong. But the Greeks now thought fit to equip a vast conjoint expedition to recover Helen, in the course of which they took and sacked Troy. The invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes were intended, according to the Persian antiquarians, as a long-delayed retribution for the injury inflicted on the Asiatics by Agamemnôn and his followers.

The account thus given of the adventures of Iô, when contrasted with the genuine legend, is interesting, as it tends to illustrate the phenomenon which early Grecian history is constantly presenting to us,—the way in which the epical furniture of an unknown past is recast and newly colored so as to meet those changes which take place in the retrospective feelings of the present. The religious and

poetical character of the whole legend disappears: nothing remains except the names of persons and places, and the voyage from Argos to Egypt: we have in exchange a sober, quasi-historical narrative, the value of which consists in its bearing on the grand contemporary conflicts between Persia and Greece, which filled the imagination of Herodotus and his readers.

To proceed with the genealogy of the kings of Argos, Iasus was succeeded by Krotôpus, son of his brother Agênôr; Krotôpus by Sthenelas, and he again by Gelanôr. In the reign of the latter, Danaos came with his fifty daughters from Egypt to Argos; and here we find another of those romantic adventures which so agreeably decorate the barrenness of the mythical genealogies. Danaos and Ægyptos were two brothers descending from Epaphos, son of Iô: Ægyptos had fifty sons, who were eager to marry the fifty daughters of Danaos, in spite of the strongest repugnance of the latter. To escape such a necessity, Danaos placed his fifty daughters on board of a penteconter (or vessel with fifty oars) and sought refuge at Argos; touching in his voyage at the island of Rhodes, where he erected a statue of Athênê at Lindos, which was long exhibited as a memorial of his passage. Ægyptos and his sons followed them to Argos and still pressed their suit, to which Danaos found himself compelled to assent; but on the wedding night he furnished each of his daughters with a dagger, and enjoined them to murder their husbands during the hour of sleep. His orders were obeyed by all, with the single exception of Hypermnêstra, who preserved her husband Lynkeus, incurring displeasure and punishment from her father. He afterward, however, pardoned her; and when by the voluntary abdication of Gelanôr he became king of Argos, Lynkeus was recognized as his son-in-law and ultimately succeeded him. The remaining daughters, having been purified by Athênê and Hermês, were given in marriage to the victors in a gymnic contest publicly proclaimed. From Danaos was derived the name of Danai, applied to the inhabitants of the Argeian territory, and to the Homeric Greeks generally.

From the legend of the Danaïdes we pass to two barren names of kings, Lynkeus and his son Abas. The two sons of Abas were Akrisios and Prœtos, who, after much dissension, divided between them the Argeian territory; Akrisios ruling at Argos, and Prœtos at Tiryns. The families of both formed the theme of romantic stories. To pass over for the present the legend of Bellerophôn, and the unrequited passion which the wife of Prœtos conceived for him, we are told that the daughters of Prœtos, beautiful, and solicited in marriage by suitors from all Greece, were smitten with leprosy and driven mad, wandering in unseemly guise throughout Peloponnêsus. The visitation had overtaken them, according to Hesiod, because they refused to take part in the Bacchic rites; according to Pherekydês and the Argeian Akusilaus, because they had treated scornfully the wooden statue and simple equipments of Hêrê: the religious

character of the old legend here displays itself in a remarkable manner. Unable to cure his daughters, Prœtos invoked the aid of the renowned Pylian prophet and leech, Melampus son of Amythaôn, who undertook to remove the malady on condition of being rewarded with the third part of the kingdom. Prœtos indignantly refused these conditions: but the state of his daughters becoming aggravated and intolerable, he was compelled again to apply to Melampus; who, on the second request, raised his demand still higher, and required another third of the kingdom for his brother Bias. These terms being acceded to, he performed his part of the covenant. He appeased the wrath of Hêrê by prayer and sacrifice; or, according to another account, he approached the deranged women at the head of a troop of young men, with shouting and ecstatic dance,—the ceremonies appropriate to the Bacchic worship of Dionysos,—and in this manner effected their cure. Melampus, a name celebrated in many different Grecian mythes, is the legendary founder and progenitor of a great and long-continued family of prophets. He and his brother Bias became kings of separate portions of the Argeian territory: he is recognized as ruler there even in the Odyssey, and the prophet Theoklymenos, his grandson, is protected and carried to Ithaka by Telemachus. Herodotus also alludes to the cure of the women, and to the double kingdom of Melampus and Bias in the Argeian land: recognizing Melampus as the first person who introduced to the knowledge of the Greeks the name and worship of Dionysos, with its appropriate sacrifices and phallic processions. Here again he historicizes various features of the old legend in a manner not unworthy of notice.

But Danaê, the daughter of Akrisios, with her son Perseus, acquired still greater celebrity than her cousins, the Prœtides. An oracle had apprised Akrisios that his daughter would give birth to a son by whose hand he would himself be slain. To guard against this danger, he imprisoned Danaê in a chamber of brass under ground. But the god Zeus had become amorous of her, and found means to descend through the roof in the form of a shower of gold: the consequence of his visits was the birth of Perseus. When Akrisios discovered that his daughter had given existence to a son, he inclosed both the mother and the child in a coffer, which he cast into the sea. The coffer was carried to the isle of Seriphos, where Diktys, brother of the king Polydektês, fished it up, and rescued both Danaê and Perseus. The exploits of Perseus, when he grew up, against the three Phorkydes or daughters of Phorkys, and the three Gorgons, are among the most marvelous and imaginative in all Grecian legend: they bear a stamp almost oriental. I shall not here repeat the details of those unparalleled hazards which the special favor of Athênê enabled him to overcome, and which ended in his bringing back from Libya the terrific head of the Gorgon Medusa, endued with the property of turning every one who looked upon it

into stone. In his return, he rescued Andromeda, daughter of Kêpheus, who had been exposed to be devoured by a sea monster, and brought her back as his wife. Akrisios trembled to see him after this victorious expedition, and retired into Thessaly to avoid him; but Perseus followed him thither, and, having succeeded in calming his apprehensions, became competitor in a gymnic contest where his grandfather was among the spectators. By an incautious swing of his quoit, he unintentionally struck Akrisios, and caused his death: the predictions of the oracle were thus at last fulfilled. Stung with remorse at the catastrophe, and unwilling to return to Argos, which had been the principality of Akrisios, Perseus made an exchange with Megapenthês, son of Prœtos, king of Tiryns. Megapenthês became king of Argos, and Perseus of Tiryns: moreover, the latter founded, within ten miles of Argos, the far-famed city of Mykênæ. The massive walls of this city, like those of Tiryns, of which a large portion yet remains, were built for him by the Lykian Cyclôpes.

We here reach the commencement of the Perseid dynasty of Mykênæ. It should be noticed, however, that there were among the ancient legends contradictory accounts of the foundation of this city. Both the Odyssey and the great Eoiai enumerated among the heroines, Mykênê, the Eponyma of the city; the former poem classifying her with Tyrô and Alkmênê, the latter describing her as the daughter of Inachus and wife of Arestôr. And Akusilaus mentioned an Eponymus Mykêneus, the son of Spartôn and grandson of Phorôneus.

The prophetic family of Melampus maintained itself in one of the three parts of the divided Argeian kingdom for five generations, down to Amphiaraos and his sons, Alkmæôn and Amphilochos. The dynasty of his brother Bias, and that of Megapenthês, son of Prœtos, continued each for four generations: a list of barren names fills up the interval. The Perseids of Mykênæ boasted a descent long and glorious, heroic as well as historical, continuing down to the last kings of Sparta. The issue of Perseus was numerous: his son Alkæos was father of Alkmênê; a third, Sthenelos, father of Eurysthenes.

After the death of Perseus, Alkæos and Amphitryôn dwelt at Tiryns. The latter became engaged in a quarrel with Elektryôn respecting cattle, and in a fit of passion killed him; moreover, the piratical Taphians from the west coast of Akarnania invaded the country, and slew the sons of Alektryôn, so that Alkmênê alone was left of that family. She was engaged to wed Amphitryôn; but she bound him by oath not to consummate the marriage until he had avenged upon the Têleboæ the death of her brothers. Amphitryôn, compelled to flee the country as the murderer of his uncle, took refuge in Thêbes, whither Alkmênê accompanied him: Sthenelos was left in possession of Tiryns. The Kadmeians of

Thêbes, together with the Lokrians and Phokians, supplied Amphitryôn with troops, which he conducted against the Têleboæ and the Taphians: yet he could not have subdued them without the aid of Komæthô, daughter of the Taphian king, Pterelaus, who conceived a passion for him, and cut off from her father's head the golden lock to which Poseidôn had attached the gift of immortality. Having conquered and expelled his enemies, Amphitryôn returned to Thêbes, impatient to consummate his marriage: but Zeus on the wedding-night assumed his form and visited Alkmênê before him: he had determined to produce from her a son superior to all his prior offspring,—"a specimen of invincible force both to gods and men." At the proper time Alkmênê was delivered of twin sons: Hêraklês, the offspring of Zeus,—the inferior and unhonored Iphiklês, offspring of Amphitryôn.

When Alkmênê was on the point of being delivered at Thêbes, Zeus publicly boasted among the assembled gods, at the instigation of the mischief-making Atê, that there was on that day about to be born on earth, from his breed, a son who should rule over all his neighbors. Hêrê treated this as an empty boast, calling upon him to bind himself by an irremissible oath that the prediction should be realized. Zeus incautiously pledged his solemn word; upon which Hêrê darted swiftly down from Olympus to the Achaic Argos, where the wife of Sthenelos (son of Perseus, and therefore grandson of Zeus) was already seven months gone with child. By the aid of the Eileithyiæ, the special goddesses of parturition, she caused Eurystheus, the son of Sthenelos, to be born before his time on that very day, while she retarded the delivery of Alkmênê. Then returning to Olympus, she announced the fact to Zeus: "The good man Eurystheus, son of the Perseid Sthenelos, is this day born of thy loins: the scepter of the Argeians worthily belongs to him." Zeus was thunderstruck at the consummation which he had improvidently bound himself to acccomplish. He seized Atê, his evil counselor, by the hair, and hurled her forever away from Olympus: but he had no power to avert the ascendency of Eurystheus and the servitude of Hêraklês. "Many a pang did he suffer, when he saw his favorite son going through his degrading toil in the tasks imposed upon him by Eurystheus."

The legend, of unquesiionable antiquity, here transcribed from the Iliad, is one of the most pregnant and characteristic in the Grecian mythology. It explains, according to the religious ideas familiar to the old epic poets, both the distinguishing attributes and the endless toils and endurances of Hêraklês,—the most renowned and most ubiquitous of all the semi-divine personages worshiped by the Hellênes,—a being of irresistible force, and especially beloved by Zeus, yet condemned constantly to labor for others and to obey the commands of a worthless and cowardly persecutor. His recompense is reserved to the close of his career, when his afflicting trials are

brought to a close: he is then admitted to the godhead and receives in marriage Hêbê. The twelve labors, as they are called, too notorious to be here detailed, form a very small fraction of the exploits of this mighty being, which filled the Hêrakleian epics of the ancient poets. He is found not only in most parts of Hellas, but throughout all the other regions then known to the Greeks, from Gadês to the river Thermôdôn in the Euxine and to Scythia, overcoming all difficulties and vanquishing all opponents. Distinguished families are everywhere to be traced who bear his patronymic, and glory in the belief that they are his descendants. Among Achæans, Kadmeians, and Dôrians, Hêraklês is venerated: the latter especially treat him as their principal hero,—the patron hero-god of the race: the Hêrakleids form among all Dôrians a privileged gens, in which at Sparta the special lineage of the two kings was included.

His character lends itself to mythes countless in number as well as disparate in their character. The irresistible force remains constant, but it is sometimes applied with reckless violence against friends as well as enemies, sometimes devoted to the relief of the oppressed. The comic writers often brought him out as a coarse and stupid glutton, while the Keian philosopher Prodikos, without at all distorting the type, extracted from it the simple, impressive, and imperishable apologue still known as the Choice of Hercules.

After the death and apotheosis of Hêraklês, his son Hyllos and his other children were expelled and persecuted by Eurystheus; the fear of whose vengeance deterred both the Trachinian king Kêyx and the Thebans from harboring them. The Athenians alone were generous enough to brave the risk of offering them shelter. Eurystheus invaded Attica, but perished in the attempt by the hand of Hyllos, or by that of Iolaos, the old companion and nephew of Hêraklês. The chivalrous courage which the Athenians had on this occasion displayed on behalf of oppressed innocence was a favorite theme for subsequent eulogy by Attic poets and orators.

All the sons of Eurystheus lost their lives in the battle along with him, so that the Perseid family was now represented only by the Hêrakleids, who collected an army and endeavored to recover the possessions from which they had been expelled. The united forces of Iônians, Achæans, and Arcadians, then inhabiting Peloponnêsus, met the invaders at the isthmus, when Hyllos, the eldest of the sons of Hêraklês, proposed that the contest should be determined by a single combat between himself and any champion of the opposing army. It was agreed that, if Hyllos were victorious, the Hêrakleids should be restored to their possessions; if he were vanquished, that they should forego all claim for the space of a hundred years, or fifty years, or three generations,—for in the specification of the time, accounts differ. Echemos, the hero of Tegea in Arcadia, accepted the challenge, and Hyllos was slain in the encounter; in consequence of which the Hêrakleids retired, and resided along with the Dôrians

under the protection of Ægimios, son of Dôrus. As soon as the stipulated period of truce had expired, they renewed their attempt upon Peloponnêsus conjointly with the Dôrians, and with complete success: the great Dôrian establishments of Argos, Sparta, and Messênia were the result. The details of this victorious invasion will be hereafter recounted.

Sikyôn, Phlios, Epidauros, and Trœzen all boasted of respected eponyms and a genealogy of dignified length, not exempt from the usual discrepancies—but all just as much entitled to a place on the tablet of history as the more renowned Æolids or Hêrakleids. I omit them here because I wish to impress upon the reader's mind the salient features and character of the legendary world,—not to load his memory with a full list of legendary names.

CHAPTER V.

DEUKALIÔN, HELLÊN, AND SONS OF HELLÊN.

In the Hesiodic theogony, as well as in the "Works and Days," the legend of Promêtheus and Epimêtheus presents an import religious, ethical, and social, and in this sense it is carried forward by Æschylus; but to neither of the characters is any genealogical function assigned. The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women brought both of them into the stream of Grecian legendary lineage, representing Deukaliôn as the son of Promêtheus and Pandôra, and seemingly his wife Pyrrha as daughter of Epimêtheus.

Deukaliôn is important in Grecian mythical narrative under two points of view. First, he is the person specially saved at the time of the general deluge: next, he is the father of Hellên, the great eponym of the Hellenic race: at least this was the more current story, though there were other statements which made Hellên the son of Zeus.

The name of Deukaliôn is originally connected with the Lokrian towns of Kynos and Opus, and with the race of the Leleges, but he appears finally as settled in Thessaly, and ruling in the portion of that country called Phthiôtis. According to what seems to have been the old legendary account, it is the deluge which transferred him from the one to the other; but according to another statement, framed in more historicizing times, he conducted a body of Kurêtes and Leleges into Thessaly, and expelled the prior Pelasgian occupants.

The enormous iniquity with which earth was contaminated—as Apollodôrus says, by the then existing brazen race, or, as others say, by the fifty monstrous sons of Lykaôn—provoked Zeus to send a

general deluge. An unremitting and terrible rain laid the whole of Greece under water, except the highest mountain-tops, whereon a few stragglers found refuge. Deukaliôn was saved in a chest or ark, which he had been forewarned by his father Promêtheus to construct. After floating for nine days on the water, he at length landed on the summit of Mount Parnassus. Zeus having sent Hermês to him, promising to grant whatever he asked, he prayed that men and companions might be sent to him in his solitude: accordingly Zeus directed both him and Pyrrha to cast stones over their heads: those cast by Pyrrha became women, those by Deukaliôn men. And thus the "stony race of men" (if we may be allowed to translate an etymology which the Greek language presents exactly, and which has not been disdained by Hesiod, by Pindar, by Epicharmus, and by Virgil) came to tenant the soil of Greece. Deukaliôn on landing from the ark sacrificed a grateful offering to Zeus Phyxios, or the god of escape; he also erected altars in Thessaly to the twelve great gods of Olympus.

The reality of this deluge was firmly believed throughout the historical ages of Greece; the chronologers, reckoning up by genealogies, assigned the exact date of it, and placed it at the same time as the conflagration of the world by the rashness of Phaëthôn, during the reign of Krotôpas, king of Argos, the seventh from Inachus. The meteorological work of Aristotle admits and reasons upon this deluge as an unquestionable fact, though he alters the locality by placing it west of Mount Pindus, near Dôdôna and the river Achelôus. He at the same time treats it as a physical phenomenon, the result of periodical cycles in the atmosphere,—thus departing from the religious character of the old legend, which described it as a judgment inflicted by Zeus upon a wicked race. Statements founded upon this event were in circulation throughout Greece even to a very late date. The Megarians affirmed that Megaros, their hero, son of Zeus by a local nymph, had found safety from the waters on the lofty summit of their mountain Geraneia, which had not been completely submerged. And in the magnificent temple of the Olympian Zeus at Athens a cavity in the earth was shown through which it was affirmed that the waters of the deluge had retired. Even in the time of Pausanias, the priests poured into this cavity holy offerings of meal and honey. In this, as in other parts of Greece, the idea of the Deukalionian deluge was blended with the religious impressions of the people, and commemorated by their sacred ceremonies.

The offspring of Deukaliôn and Pyrrha were two sons, Hellên and Amphiktyôn, and a daughter, Prôtogeneia, whose son by Zeus was Aëthlius: it was, however, maintained by many that Hellên was the son of Zeus and not of Deukaliôn. Hellên had by a nymph three sons, Dôrus, Xuthus, and Æolus. He gave to those who had been before called Greeks the name of Hellênes, and partitioned his territory among his three children. Æolus reigned in Thessaly; Xuthus

received Peloponnêsus, and had by Kreüsa as his sons, Achæus and Iôn; while Dôrus occupied the country lying opposite to the Peloponnêsus, on the northern side of the Corinthian gulf. These three gave to the inhabitants of their respective countries the names of Æolians, Achæans and Iônians, and Dôrians.

Such is the genealogy as we find it in Apollodôrus. In so far as the names and filiation are concerned, many points in it are given differently, or implicitly contradicted, by Euripidês and other writers. Though as literal and personal history it deserves no notice, its import is both intelligible and comprehensive. It expounds and symbolizes the first fraternal aggregation of Hellênic men, together with their territorial distribution and the institutions which they collectively venerated.

There were two great holding-points in common for every section of Greeks. One was the Amphiktyonic assembly, which met half-yearly, alternately at Delphi and at Thermopylæ; originally and chiefly for common religious purposes, but indirectly and occasionally embracing political and social objects along with them. The other was the public festivals or games, of which the Olympic came first in importance; next the Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian,—institutions which combined religious solemnities with recreative effusion and hearty sympathies, in a manner so imposing and so unparalleled. Amphiktyôn represents the first of these institutions, and Aëthlius the second. As the Amphiktyonic assembly was always especially connected with Thermopylæ and Thessaly, Amphiktyôn is made the son of the Thessalian Deukaliôn; but as the Olympic festival was nowise locally connected with Deukaliôn, Aëthlius is represented as having Zeus for his father, and as touching Deukaliôn only through the maternal line. It will be seen presently that the only matter predicated respecting Aëthlius is, that he settled in the territory of Elis, and begat Endymiôn: this brings him into local contact with the Olympic games, and his function is then ended.

Having thus got Hellas as an aggregate with its main cementing forces, we march on to its sub-division into parts, through Æolus, Dôrus, and Xuthus, the three sons of Hellên; a distribution which is far from being exhaustive: nevertheless, the genealogists whom Apollodôrus follows recognize no more than three sons.

The genealogy is essentially post-Homeric; for Homer knows Hellas and the Heilênes only in connexion with a portion of Achaia Phthiôtis. But as it is recognized in the Hesiodic Catalogue—composed probably within the first century after the commencement of recorded Olympiads, or before 676 B.C.—the peculiarities of it, dating from so early a period, deserve much attention. We may remark, first, that it seems to exhibit to us Dôrus and Æolus as the only pure and genuine offspring of Hellên. For their brother Xuthus is not enrolled as an eponymus; he neither founds nor names any people; it is only his sons Achæus and Iôn, after his blood has been mingled

with that of the Erechtheid Kreüsa, who become eponyms and founders, each of his own separate people. Next, as to the territorial distribution, Xuthus receives Peloponnêsus from his father, and unites himself with Attica (which the author of this genealogy seems to have conceived as originally unconnected with Hellên) by his marriage with the daughter of the indigenous hero Erechtheus. The issue of this marriage, Achæus and Iôn, present to us the population of Peloponnêsus and Attica conjointly as related among themselves by the tie of brotherhood, but as one degree more distant both from Dôrians and Æolians. Æolus reigns over the regions about Thessaly, and calls the people in those parts Æolians; while Dôrus occupies "the country over against Peloponnêsus on the opposite side of the Corinthian gulf," and calls the inhabitants after himself, Dôrians. It is at once evident that this designation is in no way applicable to the confined district between Parnassus and Œta, which alone is known by the name of Dôris, and its inhabitants by that of Dôrians, in the historical ages. In the view of the author of this genealogy, the Dôrians are the original occupants of the large range of territory north of the Corinthian Gulf, comprising Ætôlia, Phôkis, and the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. And this farther harmonizes with the other legend noticed by Apollodôrus, when he states that Ætôlus, son of Endymiôn, having been forced to expatriate from Peloponnêsus, crossed into the Kurêtid territory, and was there hospitably received by Dôrus, Laodokus, and Polypœtês, sons of Apollo and Phthia. He slew his hosts, acquired the territory, and gave to it the name of Ætôlia; his son Pleurôn married Xanthippê, daughter of Dôrus; while his other son, Kalydôn, marries Æolia, daughter of Amythaôn. Here again we have the name of Dôrus, or the Dôrians, connected with the tract subsequently termed Ætôlia. That Dôrus should in one place be called the son of Apollo and Phthia, and in another place the son of Hellên by a nymph, will surprise no one accustomed to the fluctuating personal nomenclature of these old legends: moreover the name of Phthia is easy to reconcile with that of Hellên, as both are identified with the same portion of Thessaly, even from the days of the Iliad.

This story that the Dôrians were at one time the occupants, or the chief occupants, of the range of territory between the river Achelôus and the northern shore of the Corinthian gulf, is at least more suitable to the facts attested by historical evidence than the legends given in Herodotus, who represents the Dôrians as originally in the Phthiôtid; then as passing under Dôrus, the son of Hellên, into the Histiæôtid, under the mountains of Ossa and Olympus; next, as driven by the Kadmeians into the regions of Pindus; from thence passing into the Dryopid territory, on Mount Œta; lastly, from thence into Peloponnêsus. The received story was, that the great Dôrian establishments in Peloponnêsus were formed by invasion from the north, and that the invaders crossed the gulf from Nau-

paktus,—a statement which, however disputable with respect to Argos, seems highly probable in regard both to Sparta and Messênia. That the name of Dôrians comprehended far more than the inhabitants of the insignificant tetrapolis of Dôris Proper, must be assumed, if we believe that they conquered Sparta and Messênia: both the magnitude of the conquest itself and the passage of a large portion of them from Naupaktus, harmonize with the legend as given by Apollodôrus, in which the Dôrians are represented as the principal inhabitants of the northern shore of the gulf. The statements which we find in Herodotus, respecting the early migrations of the Dôrians, have been considered as possessing greater historical value than those of the fabulist Apollodôrus. But both are equally matter of legend, while the brief indications of the latter seem to be most in harmony with the facts which we afterward find attested by history.

It has already been mentioned that the genealogy which makes Æolus, Xuthus, and Dôrus sons of Hellên, is as old as the Hesiodic Catalogue; probably also that which makes Hellên son of Deukaliôn. Aëthlius also is an Hesiodic personage: whether Amphiktyôn be so or not, we have no proof. They could not have been introduced into the legendary genealogy until after the Olympic games and the Amphiktyonic council had acquired an established and extensive reverence throughout Greece.

Respecting Dôrus the son of Hellên, we find neither legends nor legendary genealogy; respecting Xuthus, very little beyond the tale of Kreüsa and Iôn, which has its place more naturally among the Attic fables. Achæus, however, who is here represented as the son of Xuthus, appears in other stories with very different parentage and accompaniments. According to the statement which we find in Dionysius of Halikarnassus, Achæus, Phthius, and Pelasgus are sons of Poseidôn and Larissa. They migrate from Peloponnêsus into Thessaly, and distribute the Thessalian territory between them, giving their names to its principal divisions: their descendants in the sixth generation were driven ont of that country by the invasion of Deukaliôn at the head of the Kurêtes and the Leleges. This was the story of those who wanted to provide an eponymus for the Achæans in the southern districts of Thessaly: Pausanias accomplishes the same object by different means, representing Achæus the son of Xuthus as having gone back to Thessaly and occupied the portion of it to which his father were entitled. Then, by way of explaining how it was that there were Achæans at Sparta and at Argos, he tells us that Archander and Architelês, the sons of Achæus, came back from Thessaly to Peloponnêsus, and married two daughters of Danaus: they acquired great influence at Argos and Sparta, and gave to the people the name of Achæans after their father Achæus.

Euripidês also deviates very materially from the Hesiodic genealogy in respect to the eponymous persons. In the drama called Iôn, he describes Iôn as son of Kreüsa by Apollo, but adopted by Xuthus: according to him, the real sons of Xuthus and Kreüsa are Dôrus and Achæus,—eponyms of the Dôrians and Achæans in the interior of Peloponnêsus. And it is a still more capital point of difference that he omits Hellên altogether—making Xuthus an Achæan by race, the son of Æolus, who is the son of Zeus. This is the more remarkable, as in the fragments of two other dramas of Euripidês, the Melanippê and the Æolus, we find Hellên mentioned both as father of Æolus and son of Zeus. To the general public even of the most instructed city of Greece, fluctuations and discrepancies in these mythical genealogies seem to have been neither surprising nor offensive.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ÆOLIDS, OR SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF ÆOLUS

If two of the sons of Hellên, Dôrus and Xuthus, present to us families comparatively unnoticed in mythical narrative, the third son, Æolus, richly makes up for the deficiency. From him we pass to his seven sons and five daughters, amid a great abundance of heroic and poetical incident.

In dealing, however, with these extensive mythical families, it is necessary to observe that the legendary world of Greece, in the manner in which it is presented to us, appears invested with a degree of symmetry and coherence which did not originally belong to it. For the old ballads and stories which were sung or recounted at the multiplied festivals of Greece, each on its own special theme, have been lost: the religious narratives, which the Exegêtês of every temple had present to his memory, explanatory of the peculiar religious ceremonies and local customs in his own town or dême, had passed away. All these primitive elements, originally distinct and unconnected, are removed out of our sight, and we possess only an aggregate result, formed by many confluent streams of fable, and connected together by the agency of subsequent poets and logographers. Even the earliest agents in this work of connecting and systematizing—the Hesiodic poets—have been hardly at all preserved. Our information respecting Grecian mythology is derived chiefly from the prose logographers who followed them, and in whose works, since a continuous narrative was above all things essential to them, the fabulous personages are woven into still more comprehensive pedigrees, and the original isolation of the legends still better disguised. Hekatæus, Pherekydês, Hellanikus, and Akusilaus lived at a time when the idea of Hellas as one great whole, composed of fraternal sections, was deeply rooted in the mind of every Greek; and

when the hypothesis of a few great families, branching out widely from one common stem, was more popular and acceptable than that of a distinct indigenous origin in each of the separate districts. These logographers, indeed, have themselves been lost; but Apollodôrus and the various scholiasts, our great immediate sources of information respecting Grecian mythology, chiefly borrowed from them: so that the legendary world of Greece is, in fact, known to us through them, combined with the dramatic and Alexandrine poets, their Latin imitators, and the still later class of scholiasts—except, indeed, such occasional glimpses as we obtain from the Iliad and the Odyssey, and the remaining Hesiodic fragments which exhibit but too frequently a hopeless diversity when confronted with the narratives of the logographers.

Though Æolus (as has been already stated) is himself called the son of Hellên along with Dôrus and Xuthus, yet the legends concerning the Æolids, far from being dependent upon this genealogy, are not all even coherent with it: moreover, the name of Æolus in the legend is older than that of Hellên, inasmuch as it occurs both in the Iliad and Odyssey. Odysseus sees in the under-world the beautiful Tyrô, daughter of Salmôneus, and wife of Krêtheus, son of Æolus.

Æolus is represented as having reigned in Thessaly: his seven sons were Krêtheus, Sisyphus, Athamas, Salmôneus, Deiôn, Magnês, and Periêrês: his five daughters, Canacê, Alcyonê, Peisidikê, Calycê, and Perimêdê. The fables of this race seem to be distinguished by a constant introduction of the god Poseidôn, as well as by an unusual prevalence of haughty and presumptuous attributes among the Æolid heroes, leading them to affront the gods by pretenses of equality, and sometimes even by defiance. The worship of Poseidôn must probably have been diffused and pre-eminent among a people with whom those legends originated.

Section I.—Sons of Æolus.

Salmôneus is not described in the Odyssey as son of Æolus, but he is so denominated both in the Hesiodic Catalogue, and by the subsequent logographers. His daughter Tyrô became enamored of the river Enipeus, the most beautiful of all streams that traverse the earth; she frequented the banks assiduously, and there the god Poseidôn found means to indulge his passion for her, assuming the character of the river-god himself. The fruit of this alliance were the twin brothers, Pelias and Nêleus: Tyrô afterward was given in marriage to her uncle Krêtheus, another son of Æolus, by whom she had Æsôn, Pherês, and Amythaôn—all names of celebrity in the heroic legends. The adventures of Tyrô formed the subject of an affecting drama of Sophoklês now lost. Her father had married a second wife, named Sidêrô, whose cruel counsels induced him to

punish and torture his daughter on account of her intercourse with Poseidôn. She was shorn of her magnificent hair, beaten and ill used in various ways, and confined in a loathsome dungeon. Unable to take care of her two children, she had been compelled to expose them immediately on their birth in a little boat on the river Enipeus; they were preserved by the kindness of a herdsman, and, when grown up to manhood, rescued their mother, and revenged her wrongs by putting to death the iron-hearted Sidêrô. This pathetic tale respecting the long imprisonment of Tyrô is substituted by Sophoklês in place of the Homeric legend, which represented her to have become the wife of Krêtheus and mother of a numerous offspring.

Her father, the unjust Salmôneus, exhibited in his conduct the most insolent impiety toward the gods. He assumed the name and title even of Zeus, and caused to be offered to himself the sacrifices destined for that god: he also imitated the thunder and lightning, by driving about with brazen caldrons attached to his chariot and casting lighted torches toward heaven. Such wickedness finally drew upon him the wrath of Zeus, who smote him with a thunderbolt, and effaced from the earth the city which he had founded, with all its inhabitants.

Pelias and Nêleus, "both stout vassals of the great Zeus," became engaged in dissension respecting the kingdom of Iôlkos in Thessaly. Pelias got possession of it, and dwelt there in plenty and prosperity, but he had offended the goddess Hêrê by killing Sidêrô upon her altar, and the effects of her wrath were manifested in his relations with his nephew Jasôn.

Nêleus quitted Thessaly, went into Peloponnêsus, and there founded the kingdom of Pylos. He purchased, by immense marriage presents, the privilege of wedding the beautiful Chlôris, daughter of Amphiôn, king of Orchomenos, by whom he had twelve sons and but one daughter—the fair and captivating Pêrô, whom suitors from all the neighborhood courted in marriage. But Nêleus, "the haughtiest of living men," refused to entertain the pretensions of any of them: he would grant his daughter only to that man who should bring to him the oxen of Iphiklos, from Phylakê in Thessaly. These precious animals were carefully guarded, as well by herdsmen as by a dog, whom neither man nor animal could approach. Nevertheless, Bias, the son of Amythaôn, nephew of Nêleus, being desperately enamored of Pêrô, prevailed upon his brother Melampus to undertake for his sake the perilous adventure, in spite of the prophetic knowledge of the latter, which forewarned him that, though he would ultimately succeed, the prize must be purchased by severe captivity and suffering. Melampus, in attempting to steal the oxen, was seized and put in prison; from whence nothing but his prophetic powers rescued him. Being acquainted with the language of worms, he heard these animals communicating to each other, in the roof over his head, that the beams were nearly eaten through and about to fall

in. He communicated this intelligence to his guards, and demanded to be conveyed to another place of confinement, announcing that the roof would presently fall in and bury them. The prediction was fulfilled, and Phylakos, father of Iphiklos, full of wonder at this specimen of prophetic power, immediately caused him to be released. He further consulted him respecting the condition of his son Iphiklos, who was childless; and promised him the possession of the oxen on condition of his suggesting the means whereby offspring might be insured. A vulture having communicated to Melampus the requisite information, Podarkês, the son of Iphiklos, was born shortly afterward. In this manner Melampus obtained possession of the oxen, and conveyed them to Pylos, insuring to his brother Bias the hand of Pêrô. How this great legendary character, by miraculously healing the deranged daughters of Prœtos, procured both for himself and for Bias dominion in Argos has been recounted in a preceding chapter.

Of the twelve sons of Nêleus, one at least, Periklymenos, besides the ever-memorable Nestôr, was distinguished for his exploits as well as for his miraculous gifts. Poseidôn, the divine father of the race, had bestowed upon him the privilege of changing his form at pleasure into that of any bird, beast, reptile, or insect. He had occasion for all these resources, and he employed them for a time with success in defending his family against the terrible indignation of Hêraklês, who, provoked by the refusal of Nêleus to perform for him the ceremony of purification after his murder of Iphitus, attacked the Nêleids at Pylos. Periklymenos, by his extraordinary powers, prolonged the resistance, but the hour of his fate was at length brought upon him by the intervention of Athênê, who pointed him out to Hêraklês while he was perched as a bee upon the hero's chariot. He was killed, and Herakles became completely victorious, overpowering Poseidôn, Hêrê, Arês, and Hadês, and even wounding the three latter, who assisted in the defense. Eleven of the sons of Nêleus perished by his hand, while Nestôr, then a youth, was preserved only by his accidental absence at Gerênа, away from his father's residence.

The proud house of the Nêleids was now reduced to Nestôr; but Nestôr singly sufficed to sustain its eminence. He appears not only as the defender and avenger of Pylos against the insolence and rapacity of his Epeian neighbors in Elis, but also as aiding the Lapithæ in their terrible combat against the Centaurs, and as companion of Thêseus, Peirithöus, and the other great legendary heroes who preceded the Trojan war. In extreme old age his once marvelous power of handling his weapons has, indeed, passed away, but his activity remains unimpaired, and his sagacity, as well as his influence in counsel, is greater than ever. He not only assembles the various Grecian chiefs for the armament against Troy, perambulating the districts of Hellas along with Odysseus, but takes a vigorous part in

the siege itself, and is of pre-eminent service to Agamemnôn. And after the conclusion of the siege, he is one of the few Grecian princes who returns to his original dominions. He is found, in a strenuous and honored old age, in the midst of his children and subjects, sitting with the scepter of authority on the stone bench before his house at Pylos, offering sacrifice to Poseidôn, as his father Nêleus had done before him, and mourning only over the death of his favorite son, Antilochus, who had fallen along with so many brave companions in arms in the Trojan war.

After Nestôr the line of the Nêleids numbers undistinguished names—Bôrus, Penthilus, and Andropompus—three successive generations down to Melanthus, who, on the invasion of Peloponnesus by the Herakleids, quitted Pylos and retired to Athens, where he became king, in a manner which I shall hereafter recount. His son Kodrus was the last Athenian king; and Neleus, one of the sons of Kodrus, is mentioned as the principal conductor of what is called the Ionic emigration from Athens to Asia Minor. It is certain that during the historical age, not merely the princely family of the Kodrids in Miletus, Ephesus, and other Ionic cities, but some of the greatest families, even in Athens itself, traced their heroic lineage through the Neleids up to Poseidôn; and the legends respecting Nestôr and Periklymenos would find especial favor amid Greeks with such feelings and belief. The Kodrids at Ephesus, and probably some other Ionic towns, long retained the title and honorary precedence of kings, even after they had lost the substantial power belonging to the office. They stood in the same relation, embodying both religious worship and supposed ancestry, to the Neleids and Poseidôn, as the chiefs of the Æolic colonies to Agamemnôn and Orestes. The Athenian despot Peisistratus was named after the son of Nestôr in the Odyssey; and we may safely presume that the heroic worship of the Neleids was as carefully cherished at the Ionic Miletus as at the Italian Metapontum.

Having pursued the line of Salmôneus and Neleus to the end of its legendary career, we may now turn back to that of another son of Æolus, Kretheus, a line hardly less celebrated in respect of the heroic names which it presents. Alkestis, the most beautiful of the daughters of Pelias, was promised by her father in marriage to the man who could bring him a lion and a boar tamed to the yoke and drawing together. Admetus, son of Pheres, the eponymus of Pherœ in Thessaly, and thus grandson of Kretheus, was enabled by the aid of Apollo to fulfill this condition, and to win her; for Apollo happened at that time to be in his service as a slave (condemned to this penalty by Zeus for having put to death the Cyclôpes), in which capacity he tended the herds and horses with such success as to equip Eumelus (the son of Admetus) to the Trojan war with the finest horses in the Grecian army. Though menial duties were imposed upon him, even to the drudgery of grinding in the mill, he yet car-

ried away with him a grateful and friendly sentiment toward his mortal master, whom he interfered to rescue from the wrath of the goddess Artemis, when she was indignant at the omission of her name in his wedding sacrifices. Admetus was about to perish by a premature death, when Apollo, by earnest solicitation to the Fates, obtained for him the privilege that his life should be prolonged if he could find any person to die a voluntary death in his place. His father and his mother both refused to make this sacrifice for him; but the devoted attachment of his wife Alkestis disposed her to embrace with cheerfulness the condition of dying to preserve her husband. She had already perished, when Herakles, the ancient guest and friend of Admetus, arrived during the first hour of lamentation; his strength and daring enabled him to rescue the deceased Alkestis, even from the grasp of Thanatos (Death), and to restore her alive to her disconsolate husband.

The son of Pelias, Akastus, had received and sheltered Pêleus when obliged to fly his country in consequence of the involuntary murder of Eurytiôn. Krêthêis, the wife of Akastus, becoming enamored of Pêleus, made to him advances which he repudiated. Exasperated at his refusal and determined to procure his destruction, she persuaded her husband that Pêleus had attempted her chastity: upon which Akastus conducted Pêleus out upon a hunting excursion among the woody regions of Mount Pêlion, contrived to steal from him the sword fabricated and given by Hêphæstos, and then left him, alone and unarmed, to perish by the hands of the Centaurs or by the wild beasts. By the friendly aid of the Centaur Cheirôn, however, Pêleus was preserved, and his sword restored to him: returning to the city, he avenged himself by putting to death both Akastus and his perfidious wife.

But, among all the legends with which the name of Pelias is connected, by far the most memorable is that of Jasôn and the Argonautic expedition. Jasôn was son of Æsôn, grandson of Krêtheus, and thus great-grandson of Æolus. Pelias, having consulted the oracle respecting the security of his dominion at Iôlkos, had received in answer a warning to beware of the man who should appear before him with only one sandal. He was celebrating a festival in honor of Poseidôn when it so happened that Jasôn appeared before him with one of his feet unsandaled: he had lost one sandal in wading through the swollen current of the river Anauros. Pelias immediately understood that this was the enemy against whom the oracle had forewarned him. As a means of averting the danger, he imposed upon Jasôn the desperate task of bringing back to Iôlkos the golden fleece,—the fleece of that ram which had carried Phryxos from Achaia to Kolchis, and which Phryxos had dedicated in the latter country as an offering to the god Arês. The result of this injunction was the memorable expedition—of the ship Argô and her crew called the Argonauts, composed of the bravest and noblest

youths of Greece—which cannot be conveniently included among the legends of the Æolids, and is reserved for a separate chapter.

The voyage of the Argô was long protracted, and Pelias, persuaded that neither the ship nor her crew would ever return, put to death both the father and mother of Jasôn, together with their infant son. Æsôn, the father, being permitted to choose the manner of his own death, drank bull's blood while performing a sacrifice to the gods. At length, however, Jasôn did return, bringing with him not only the golden fleece, but also Mêdea, daughter of Æêtês, king of Kolchis, as his wife,—a woman distinguished for magical skill and cunning, by whose assistance alone the Argonauts had succeeded in their project. Though determined to avenge himself upon Pelias, Jasôn knew that he could only succeed by stratagem. He remained with his companions at a short distance from Iôlkos, while Mêdea, feigning herself a fugitive from his ill-usage, entered the town alone, and procured access to the daughters of Pelias. By exhibitions of her magical powers she soon obtained unqualified ascendency over their minds. For example, she selected from the flocks of Pelias a ram in the extremity of old age, cut him up and boiled him in a caldron with herbs, and brought him out in the shape of a young and vigorous lamb: the daughters of Pelias were made to believe that their old father could in like manner be restored to youth. In this persuasion they cut him up with their own hands and cast his limbs into the caldron, trusting that Mêdea would produce upon him the same magical effect. Mêdea pretended that an invocation to the moon was a necessary part of the ceremony: she went up to the top of the house as if to pronounce it, and there lighting the fire-signal concerted with the Argonauts, Jasôn and his companions burst in and possessed themselves of the town. Satisfied with having thus revenged himself, Jasôn yielded the principality of Iôlkos to Akastus, son of Pelias, and retired with Mêdea to Corinth. Thus did the goddess Hêrê gratify her ancient wrath against Pelias: she had constantly watched over Jasôn, and had carried the "all-notorious" Argô through its innumerable perils, in order that Jasôn might bring home Mêdea to accomplish the ruin of his uncle. The misguided daughters of Pelias departed as voluntary exiles to Arcadia: Akastus, his son, celebrated splendid funeral games in honor of his deceased father.

Jasôn and Mêdea retired from Iôlkos to Corinth, where they resided ten years: their children were—Medeius, whom the Centaur Cheirôn educated in the regions of Mount Pêlion,—and Mermerus and Pherês, born at Corinth. After they had resided there ten years in prosperity, Jasôn set his affections on Glaukê, daughter of Kreôn, king of Corinth; and as her father was willing to give her to him in marriage, he determined to repudiate Mêdea, who received orders forthwith to leave Corinth. Stung with this insult and bent upon revenge, Mêdea prepared a poisoned robe, and sent it as a marriage

present to Glaukê: it was unthinkingly accepted and put on, and the body of the unfortunate bride was burnt up and consumed. Kreôn, her father, who tried to tear from her the burning garment, shared her fate and perished. The exulting Mêdea escaped by means of a chariot with winged serpents furnished to her by her grandfather, Hêlois: she placed herself under the protection of Ægeus at Athens, by whom she had a son named Mêdus. She left her young children in the sacred inclosure of the Akræan Hêrê, relying on the protection of the altar to insure their safety; but the Corinthians were so exasperated against her for the murder of Kreôn and Glaukê that they dragged the children away from the altar and put them to death. The miserable Jasôn perished by a fragment of his own ship Argô, which fell upon him while he was asleep under it, being hauled on shore, according to the habitual practice of the ancients.

The first establishment at Ephyrê, or Corinth, had been founded by Sisyphus, another of the sons of Æolus, brother of Salmôneus and Krêtheus. The Æolid Sisyphus was distinguished as an unexampled master of cunning and deceit. He blocked up the road along the isthmus, and killed the strangers who came along it by rolling down upon them great stones from the mountains above. He was more than a match even for the arch-thief Autolykus, the son of Hermês, who derived from his father the gift of changing the color and shape of stolen goods, so that they could no longer be recognized: Sisyphus, by marking his sheep under the foot, detected Autolykus when he stole them, and obliged him to restore the plunder. His penetration discovered the amour of Zeus with the nymph Ægina, daughter of the river-god Asôpus. Zeus had carried her off to the island of Œnônê (which subsequently bore the name of Ægina); upon which Asôpus, eager to recover her, inquired of Sisyphus whither she was gone; the latter told him what had happened, on condition that he should provide a spring of water on the summit of the Acro-Corinthus. Zeus, indignant with Sisyphus for this revelation, inflicted upon him in Hadês the punishment of perpetually heaving up a hill a great and heavy stone, which, so soon as it attained the summit, rolled back again, in spite of all his efforts, with irresistible force into the plain.

In the application of the Æolid genealogy to Corinth, Sisyphus, the son of Æolus, appears as the first name: but the old Corinthian poet Eumêlus either found or framed an heroic genealogy for his native city, independent both of Æolus and Sisyphus. According to this genealogy, Ephyrê, daughter of Oceanus and Tethys, was the primitive tenant of the Corinthian territory, Asôpus of the Sikyônian: both were assigned to the god Hêlios, adjusting a dispute between him and Poseidôn, by Briareus. Hêlios individed the territory between his two sons, Æêtês and Alôeus: to the former he assigned Corinth, to the latter Sikyôn. Æêtês, obeying the admonition of an oracle, emigrated to Kolchis, leaving his territory under the rule of Bunos,

the son of Hermês, with the stipulation that it should be restored whenever either he or any of his descendants returned. After the death of Bunos, both Corinth and Sikyôn were possessed by Epôpeus, son of Alôeus, a wicked man. His son Marathôn left him in disgust and retired into Attica, but returned after his death and succeeded to his territory, which he in turn divided between his two sons Corinthos and Sikyôn, from whom the names of the two districts were first derived. Corinthos died without issue, and the Corinthians then invited Mêdea from Iôlkos as the representative of Æêtês: she with her husband Jasôn thus obtained the sovereignty of Corinth. This legend of Eumêlus, one of the earliest of the genealogical poets, so different from the story adopted by Neophrôn or Euripidês, was followed certainly by Simonidês, and seemingly by Theopompus. The incidents in it are imagined and arranged with a view to the supremacy of Mêdea; the emigration of Æêtês and the conditions under which he transferred his scepter being so laid out as to confer upon Mêdea an hereditary title to the throne. The Corinthians paid to Mêdea and to her children solemn worship, either divine or heroic, in conjunction with Hêrê Akræa, and this was sufficient to give to Mêdea a prominent place in the genealogy composed by a Corinthian poet accustomed to blend together gods, heroes, and men in the antiquities of his native city. According to the legend of Eumêlus, Jasôn became (through Mêdea) king of Corinth; but she concealed the children of their marriage in the temple of Hêrê, trusting that the goddess would render them immortal. Jasôn, discovering her proceedings, left her and retired in disgust to Iôlkos; Mêdea also, being disappointed in her scheme, quitted the place, leaving the throne in the hands of Sisyphus, to whom, according to the story of Theopompus, she had become attached. Other legends recounted that Zeus had contracted a passion for Mêdea, but that she had rejected his suit from fear of the displeasure of Hêrê; who, as a recompense for such fidelity, rendered her children immortal moreover, Mêdea had erected, by special command of Hêrê, the celebrated temple of Aphroditê at Corinth. The tenor of these fables manifests their connection with the temple of Hêrê: and we may consider the legend of Mêdea as having been originally quite independent of that of Sisyphus, but fitted on to it, in seeming chronological sequence, so as to satisfy the feelings of those Æolids of Corinth who passed for his descendants.

Sisyphus had for his sons Glaukos and Ornytiôn. From Glaukos sprang Bellerophôn, whose romantic adventures commence with the Iliad, and are further expanded by subsequent poets: according to some accounts he was really the son of Poseidôn, the prominent deity of the Æolid family. The youth and beauty of Bellerophôn rendered him the object of a strong passion on the part of Anteia, wife of Prœtos king of Argos. Finding her advances rejected, she contracted a violent hatred toward him, and endeavored by false

accusations to prevail upon her husband to kill him. Prœtos refused to commit the deed under his own roof, but dispatched him to his son-in-law, the king of Lykia, in Asia Minor, putting into his hands a folded tablet full of destructive symbols. Conformably to these suggestions, the most perilous undertakings were imposed upon Bellerophôn. He was directed to attack the monster Chimæra and to conquer the warlike Solymi as well as the Amazons: as he returned victorious from these enterprises, an ambuscade was laid for him by the bravest Lykian warriors, all of whom he slew. At length the Lykian king recognized him "as the genuine son of a god," and gave him his daughter in marriage together with half of his kingdom. The grand-children of Bellerophôn, Glaukos and Sarpêdôn,—the latter a son of his daughter Laodameia by Zeus,—combat as allies of Troy against the host of Agamemnôn.

We now pass from Sisyphus and the Corinthian fables to another son of Æolus, Athamas, whose family history is not less replete with mournful and tragical incidents, abundantly diversified by the poets. Athamas, we are told, was king of Orchomenos; his wife Nephelê was a goddess, and he had by her two children, Phryxus and Hellê. After a certain time he neglected Nephelê, and took to himself as a new wife Inô, the daughter of Kadmus, by whom he had two sons, Learchus and Melikertês. Inô, looking upon Phryxus with the hatred of a stepmother, laid a snare for his life. She persuaded the women to roast the seed-wheat, which, when sown in this condition, yielded no crop, so that famine overspread the land. Athamas, sending to Delphi to implore counsel and a remedy, received for answer, through the machinations of Inô with the oracle, that the barrenness of the fields could not be alleviated except by offering Phryxus as a sacrifice to Zeus. The distress of the people compelled him to execute this injunction, and Phryxus was led as a victim to the altar. But the power of his mother Nephelê snatched him from destruction, and procured for him from Hermês a ram with a fleece of gold, upon which he and his sister Hellê mounted and were carried across the sea. The ram took the direction of the Euxine sea and Kolchis: when they were crossing the Hellespont, Hellê fell off into the narrow strait, which took its name from that incident. Upon this, the ram, who was endued with speech, consoled the terrified Phryxus, and ultimately carried him safe to Kolchis: Æêtês, king of Kolchis, son of the god Hêlios and brother of Circê, received Phryxus kindly, and gave him his daughter Chalkiopê in marriage. Phryxus sacrificed the ram to Zeus Phyxios, suspending the golden fleece in the sacred grove of Arês.

Athamas—according to some both Athamas and Inô—were afterwards driven mad by the anger of the goddess Hêrê; insomuch that the father shot his own son Learchus, and would also have put to death his other son Melikertês, if Inô had not snatched him away. She fled with the boy across the Megarian territory and Mount

Gerancia, to the rock Moluris, overhanging the Sarônic gulf: Athamas pursued her, and in order to escape him she leaped into the sea. She became a sea-goddess under the title of Leukothea; while the body of Melikertês was cast ashore on the neighboring territory of Schœnus, and buried by his uncle Sisyphus, who was directed by the Nereïds to pay to him heroic honors under the name of Palæmôn. The Isthmian games, one of the great periodical festivals of Greece, were celebrated in honor of the god Poseidôn, in conjunction with Palæmôn as a hero. Athamas abandoned his territory, and became the first settler of a neighboring region called from him Athamantia, or the Athamantian plain.

The legend of Athamas connects itself with some sanguinary religious rites and very peculiar family customs, which prevailed at Alos, in Achaia Phthiôtis, down to a time later than the historian Herodotus, and of which some remnant existed at Orchomenos even in the days of Plutarch. Athamas was worshiped at Alos as a hero, having both a chapel and a consecrated grove, attached to the temple of Zeus Laphystios. On the family of which he was the heroic progenitor, a special curse and disability stood affixed. The eldest of the race was forbidden to enter the prytaneion or government-house: if he was found within the doors of the building, the other citizens laid hold of him on his going out, surrounded him with garlands, and led him in solemn procession to be sacrificed as a victim at the altar of Zeus Laphystios. The prohibition carried with it an exclusion from all the public meetings and ceremonies, political as well as religious, and from the sacred fire of the state: many of the individuals marked out had therefore been bold enough to transgress it. Some had been seized on quitting the building and actually sacrificed; others had fled the country for a long time to avoid a similar fate.

The guides who conducted Xerxes and his army through southern Thessaly detailed to him this existing practice, coupled with the local legend, that Athamas, together with Inô, had sought to compass the death of Phryxus, who, however, had escaped to Kolchis; that the Achæans had been enjoined by an oracle to offer up Athamas himself as an expiatory sacrifice to release the country from the anger of the gods; but that Kytissoros, son of Phryxus, coming back from Kolchis, had intercepted the sacrifice of Athamas, whereby the anger of the gods remained still unappeased, and an undying curse rested upon the family.

That such human sacrifices continued to a greater or less extent, even down to a period later than Herodotus, among the family who worshiped Athamas as their heroic ancestor, appears certain: mention is also made of similar customs in parts of Arcadia, and of Thessaly, in honor of Pêleus and Cheirôn. But we may reasonably presume that, in the period of greater humanity which Herodotus witnessed, actual sacrifice had become very rare. The curse and the

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legend still remained, but were not called into practical working, except during periods of intense national suffering or apprehension, during which the religious sensibilities were always greatly aggravated. We cannot at all doubt that, during the alarm created by the presence of the Persian king, with his immense and ill-disciplined host, the minds of the Thessalians must have been keenly alive to all that was terrific in their national stories, and all that was expiatory in their religious solemnities. Moreover, the mind of Xerxes himself was so awe-struck by the tale that he reverenced the dwelling-place consecrated to Athamas. The guides who recounted to him the romantic legend gave it as the historical and generating cause of the existing rule and practice: a critical inquirer is forced (as has been remarked before) to reverse the order of precedence, and to treat the practice as having been the suggesting cause of its own explanatory legend.

The family history of Athamas and the worship of Zeus Laphystios are expressly connected by Herodotus with Alos in Achæa Phthiôtis—one of the towns enumerated in the Iliad as under the command of Achilles. But there was also a mountain called Laphystion, and a temple and worship of Zeus Laphystios between Orchomenos and Korôneia, in the northern portion of the territory known in the historical ages as Bœotia. Here, too, the family story of Athamas is localized, and Athamas is presented to us as king of the districts of Korôneia, Haliartus, and Mount Laphystion: he is thus interwoven with the Orchomenian genealogy. Andreus (we are told), son of the river Pêneios, was the first person who settled in the region: from him it received the name Andrêis. Athamas, coming subsequently to Andreus, received from him the territory of Korôneia and Haliartus with Mount Laphystion: he gave in marriage to Andreus Euippê, daughter of his son Leucôn, and the issue of this marriage was Eteoklês, said to be the son of the river Kêphisos. Korônos and Haliartus, grandsons of the Corinthian Sisyphus, were adopted by Athamas, as he had lost all his children. But when his grandson Presbôn, son of Phryxus, returned to him from Kolchis, he divided his territory in such manner that Korônos and Haliartus became the founders of the towns which bore their names. Almôn, the son of Sisyphus, also received from Eteoklês a portion of territory, where he established the village Almônes.

With Eteoklês began, according to a statement in one of the Hesiodic poems, the worship of the Charites or Graces, so long and so solemnly continued at Orchomenos in the periodical festival of the Charitêsia, to which many neighboring towns and districts seem to have contributed. He also distributed the inhabitants into two tribes —Eteokleia and Kêphisias. He died childless, and was succeeded by Almos, who had only two daughters, Chrysê and Chrysogeneia. The son of Chrysê by the god Arês was Phlegyas, the father and founder of the warlike and predatory Phlegyæ, who despoiled every one

within their reach, and assaulted not only the pilgrims on their road to Delphi, but even the treasures of the temple itself. The offended god punished them by continued thunder, by earthquakes, and by pestilence, which extinguished all this impious race, except a scanty remnant who fled into Phokis.

Chrysogeneia, the other daughter of Almos, had for issue, by the god Poseidôn, Minyas: the son of Minyas was Orchomenos. From these two was derived the name both of Minyæ for the people, and of Orchomenos for the town. During the reign of Orchomenos, Hyêttus came to him from Argos, having become an exile in consequence of the death of Molyros: Orchomenos assigned to him a portion of land, where he founded the village called Hyêttus. Orchomenos, having no issue, was succeeded by Klymenos, son of Presbôn, of the house of Athamas: Klymenos was slain by some Thêbans during the festival of Poseidôn at Onchêstos; and his eldest son, Erginus, to avenge his death, attacked the Thêbans with his utmost force—an attack in which he was so successful that the latter were forced to submit, and to pay him an annual tribute.

The Orchomenian power was now at its height: both Minyas and Orchomenos had been princes of surpassing wealth, and the former had built a spacious and durable edifice which he had filled with gold and silver. But the success of Erginus against Thêbes was soon terminated and reversed by the hand of the irresistible Hêraklês, who rejected with disdain the claim of tribute, and even mutilated the envoys sent to demand it: he not only emancipated Thêbes, but broke down and impoverished Orchomenos. Erginus in his old age married a young wife, from which match sprang the illustrious heroes, or gods, Trophônius and Agamêdês; though many (among whom is Pausanias himself) believed Trophônius to be the son of Apollo. Trophônius, one of the most memorable persons in Grecian mythology, was worshiped as a god in various places, but with especial sanctity as Zeus Trophônius at Lebadeia: in his temple at this town, the prophetic manifestations outlasted those of Delphi itself. Trophônius and Agamêdês, enjoying matchless renown as architects, built the temple of Delphi, the thalamus of Amphitryôn at Thêbes, and also the inaccessible vault of Hyrieus at Hyria, in which they are said to have left one stone removable at pleasure so as to reserve for themselves a secret entrance. They entered so frequently, and stole so much gold and silver, that Hyrieus, astonished at his losses, at length spread a fine net, in which Agamêdês was inextricably caught: Trophônios cut off his brother's head and carried it away, so that the body, which alone remained, was insufficient to identify the thief. Like Amphiaraos, whom he resembles in more than one respect, Trophônius was swallowed up by the earth near Lebadeia.

From Trophônius and Agamêdês the Orchomenian genealogy passes to Askalaphos and Ialmenos, the sons of Arês by Astyochê,

who are named in the Catalogue of the Iliad as leaders of the thirty ships from Orchomenos against Troy. Azeus, the grandfather of Astyochê in the Iliad, is introduced as the brother of Erginus by Pausanias, who does not carry the pedigree lower.

The genealogy here given out of Pausanias is deserving of the more attention because it seems to have been copied from the special history of Orchomenos by the Corinthian Kallippus, who again borrowed from the native Orchomenian poet, Chersias: the works of the latter had never come into the hands of Pausanias. It illustrates forcibly the principle upon which these mythical genealogies were framed, for almost every personage in the series is an Eponymus. Andreus gave his name to the country, Athamas to the Athamantian plain; Minyas, Orchomenos, Korônus, Haliartus, Almos, and Hyêttus are each in like manner connected with some name of people, tribe, town, or village; while Chrysê and Chrysogeneia have their origin in the reputed ancient wealth of Orchomenos. Abundant discrepancies are found, however, in respect to this old genealogy, if we look to other accounts. According to one statement, Orchomenos was the son of Zeus by Isionê, daughter of Danaus; Minyas was the son of Orchomenos (or rather Poseidôn) by Hermippê, daughter of Bœôtos; the sons of Minyas were Presbôn, Orchomenos, Athamas, and Diochthôndas. Others represented Minyas as son of Poseidôn by Kallirrhoê, an Oceanic nymph, while Dionysius called him son of Arês, and Aristodêmus, son of Aleas; lastly, there were not wanting authors who termed both Minyas and Orchomenos sons of Eteoklês. Nor do we find in any one of these genealogies the name of Amphiôn, the son of Iasus, who figures so prominently in the Odyssey as king of Orchomenos, and whose beautiful daughter Chlôris is married to Nêleus. Pausanias mentions him, but not as king, which is the denomination given to him in Homer.

The discrepancies here cited are hardly necessary in order to prove that these Orchomenian genealogies possess no historical value. Yet some probable inferences appear deducible from the general tenor of the legends, whether the facts and persons of which they are composed be real or fictitious.

Throughout all the historical age, Orchomenos is a member of the Bœôtian confederation. But the Bœôtians are said to have been immigrants into the territory which bore their name from Thessaly; and prior to the time of their immigration, Orchomenos and the surrounding territory appear as possessed by the Minyæ, who are recognized in that locality both in the Iliad and in the Odyssey, and from whom the constantly recurring Eponymus, king Minyas, is borrowed by the genealogists. Poetical legend connects the Orchomenian Minyæ, on the one side, with Pylos and Triphylia in Peloponnêsus; on the other side, with Phthiôtis and the town of Iôlkos in Thessaly; also with Corinth, through Sisyphus and his sons. Pherekydês represented Nêleus, king of Pylos, as having also been

king of Orchomenos. In the region of Triphylia, near to or coincident with Pylos, a Minyeian river is mentioned by Homer; and we find traces of residents called Minyæ even in the historical times, though the account given by Herodotus of the way in which they came thither is strange and unsatisfactory.

Before the great changes which took place in the inhabitants of Greece from the immigration of the Thesprôtians into Thessaly, of the Bœôtians into Bœôtia, and of the Dôrians and Ætôlians into Peloponnêsus, at a date which we have no means of determining, the Minyæ and tribes fraternally connected with them seem to have occupied a large portion of the surface of Greece, from Iôlkos in Thessaly to Pylos in the Peloponnêsus. The wealth of Orchomenos is renowned even in the Iliad; and when we study its topography in detail, we are furnished with a probable explanation both of its prosperity and its decay. Orchomenos was situated on the northern bank of the lake Kôpaïs, which receives not only the river Kêphisos from the valleys of Phôkis, but also other rivers from Parnassus and Helicôn. The waters of the lake find more than one subterranean egress—partly through natural rifts and cavities in the limestone mountains, partly through a tunnel pierced artificially more than a mile in length—into the plain on the north-eastern side, from whence they flow into the Eubœan sea near Larymna. And it appears that, so long as these channels were diligently watched and kept clear, a large portion of the lake was in the condition of alluvial land, preeminently rich and fertile. But when the channels came to be either neglected or designedly choked up by an enemy, the water accumulated to such a degree as to occupy the soil of more than one ancient town, to endanger the position of Kôpæ, and to occasion the change of the site of Orchomenos itself from the plain to the declivity of Mount Hyphanteion. An engineer, Kratês, began the clearance of the obstructed water-courses in the reign of Alexander the Great, and by his commission—the destroyer of Thêbes being anxious to re-establish the extinct prosperity of Orchomenos. He succeeded so far as partially to drain and diminish the lake, whereby the site of more than one ancient city was rendered visible; but the revival of Thêbes by Kassander, after the decease of Alexander, arrested the progress of the undertaking, and the lake soon regained its former dimensions, to contract which no further attempt was made.

According to the Thêban legend, Hêraklês, after his defeat of Erginus, had blocked up the exit of the waters, and converted the Orchomenian plain into a lake. The spreading of these waters is thus connected with the humiliation of the Minyæ; and there can be little hesitation in ascribing to these ancient tenants of Orchomenos, before it became Bœotized, the enlargement and preservation of the protective channels. Nor could such an object have been accomplished without combined action and acknowledged ascendency on the part of that city over its neighbors, extending even to the sea at

Larymna, where the river Kêphisos discharges itself. Of its extended influence, as well as of its maritime activity, we find a remarkable evidence in the ancient and venerated Amphiktyony at Kalauria. The little island so named, near the harbor of Trœzên, in Peloponnêsus, was sacred to Poseidôn, and an asylum of inviolable sanctity. At the temple of Poseidôn, in Kalauria, there had existed, from unknown date, a periodical sacrifice, celebrated by seven cities in common—Hermionê, Epidaurus, Ægina, Athens, Prasiæ, Nauplia, and the Minyeian Orchomenos. This ancient religious combination dates from the time when Nauplia was independent of Argos, and Prasiæ of Sparta: Argos and Sparta, according to the usual practice in Greece, continued to fulfill the obligation each on the part of its respective dependent. Six out of the seven states are at once sea-towns, and near enough to Kalauria to account for their participation in this Amphiktyony. But the junction of Orchomenos, from its comparative remoteness, becomes inexplicable, except on the supposition that its territory reached the sea, and that it enjoyed a considerable maritime traffic—a fact which helps to elucidate both its legendary connection with Iôlkos, and its partnership in what is called the Iônic emigration.

The great power of Orchomenos was broken down and the city reduced to a secondary and half-dependent position by the Bœôtians of Thêbes; at what time and under what circumstances, history has not preserved. The story that the Thêban hero, Hêraklês, rescued his native city from servitude and tribute to Orchomenos, since it comes from a Kadmeian and not from an Orchomenian legend, and since the details of it were favorite subjects of commemoration in the Thêban temples, affords a presumption that Thêbes was really once dependent on Orchomenos. Moreover, the savage mutilations inflicted by the hero on the tribute-seeking envoys, so faithfully portrayed in his surname Rhinokoloustês, infuse into the mythe a portion of that bitter feeling which so long prevailed between Thêbes and Orchomenos, and which led the Thêbans, as soon as the battle of Leuktra had placed supremacy in their hands, to destroy and depopulate their rival. The ensuing generation saw the same fate retorted upon Thêbes, combined with the restoration of Orchomenos. The legendary grandeur of this city continued, long after it had ceased to be distinguished for wealth and power, imperishably recorded both in the minds of the nobler citizens and in the compositions of the poets: the emphatic language of Pausanias shows how much he found concerning it in the old epic.

Section II.—Daughters of Æolus.

With several of the daughters of Æolus memorable mythical pedigrees and narratives are connected. Alkyonê married Kêyx, the son of Eôsphoros, but both she and her husband displayed in a high

degree the overweening insolence common in the Æolic race. The wife called her husband Zeus, while he addressed her as Hêrê, for which presumptuous act Zeus punished them by changing both into birds.

Canacê had by the god Poseidôn several children, among whom were Epôpeus and Alôeus. Alôeus married Iphimêdea; who became enamored of the god Poseidôn, and boasted of her intimacy with him. She had by him two sons, Otos and Ephialtês, the huge and formidable Alôids,—Titanic beings, nine fathoms in height and nine cubits in breadth, even in their boyhood, before they had attained their full strength. These Alôids defied and insulted the gods of Olympus. They paid their court to Hêrê and Artemis; moreover, they even seized and bound Arês, confining him in a brazen chamber for thirteen months. No one knew where he was, and the intolerable chain would have worn him to death had not Eribœa, the jealous stepmother of the Alôids, revealed the place of his detention to Hermês, who carried him surreptitiously away when at the last extremity. Arês could obtain no atonement for such an indignity. Otos and Ephialtês even prepared to assault the gods in heaven, piling up Ossa on Olympus and Pelion on Ossa in order to reach them. And this they would have accomplished had they been allowed to grow to their full maturity; but the arrows of Apollo put a timely end to their short-lived career.

The genealogy assigned to Kalykê, another daughter of Æolus, conducts us from Tessaly to Elis and Ætôlia. She married Aëthlius (the son of Zeus by Prôtogeneia, daughter of Deukaliôn and sister of Hellên), who conducted a colony out of Thessaly, and settled in the territory of Elis. He had for his son Endymiôn, respecting whom the Hesiodic Catalogue and the Eoiai related several wonderful things. Zeus granted him the privilege of determining the hour of his own death, and even translated him into heaven, which he forfeited by daring to pay court to Hêrê: his vision in this criminal attempt was cheated by a cloud, and he was cast out into the underworld. According to other stories, his great beauty caused the goddess Sêlênê to become enamored of him, and to visit him by night during his sleep:—the sleep of Endymiôn became a proverbial expression for enviable, undisturbed, and deathless repose. Endymiôn had for issue (Pausanias gives us three different accounts, and Apollodôrus a fourth, of the name of his wife), Epeios, Ætôlus, Pæôn, and a daughter Eurykydê. He caused his three sons to run a race on the stadium at Olympia, and Epeios, being victorious, was rewarded by becoming his successor in the kingdom: it was after him that the people were denominated Epeians.

Epeios had no male issue, and was succeeded by his nephew Eleios, son of Eurykydê by the god Poseidôn: the name of the people was then changed from Epeians to Eleians. Ætôlus, the brother of Epeios, having slain Apis, son of Phorôneus, was compelled to flee

from the country: he crossed the Corinthian gulf and settled in the territory then called Kurêtis, but to which he gave the name of Ætôlia.

The son of Eleios,—or, according to other accounts, of the god Hêlios, of Poseidôn, or of Phorbas,—is Augeas, whom we find mentioned in the Iliad as king of the Epeians or Eleians. Augeas was rich in all sorts of rural wealth, and possessed herds of cattle so numerous that the dung of the animals accumulated in the stable or cattle-inclosures beyond all power of endurance. Eurystheus, as an insult to Hêraklês, imposed upon him the obligation of cleansing this stable: the hero, disdaining to carry off the dung upon his shoulders, turned the course of the river Alpheios through the building, and thus swept the incumbrance away. But Augeas, in spite of so signal a service, refused to Hêraklês the promised reward, though his son Phyleus protested against such treachery, and, when he found that he could not induce his father to keep faith, retired in sorrow and wrath to the island of Dulichion. To avenge the deceit practiced upon him, Hêraklês invaded Elis; but Augeas had powerful auxiliaries, especially his nephews, the two Molionids (sons of Poseidôn by Molionê, the wife of Aktôr), Eurytos and Kteatos. These two miraculous brothers, of transcendent force, grew together,—having one body, but two heads and four arms. Such was their irresistible might that Hêraklês was defeated and repelled from Elis: but presently the Eleians sent the two Molionid brothers as Theôri (sacred envoys) to the Isthmian games, and Hêraklês, placing himself in ambush at Kleônæ, surprised and killed them as they passed through. For this murderous act the Eleians in vain endeavored to obtain redress both at Corinth and at Argos; which is assigned as the reason for the self-ordained exclusion, prevalent throughout all the historical age, that no Eleian athlete would ever present himself as a competitor at the Isthmian games. The Molionids being thus removed, Hêraklês again invaded Elis, and killed Augeas along with his children,—all except Phyleus, whom he brought over from Dulichion, and put in possession of his father's kingdom. According to the more gentle narrative which Pausanias adopts, Augeas was not killed, but pardoned at the request of Phyleus. He was worshiped as a hero even down to the time of that author.

It was on occasion of this conquest of Elis, according to the old mythe which Pindar has ennobled in a magnificent ode, that Hêraklês first consecrated the ground of Olympia and established the Olympic games. Such, at least, was one of the many fables respecting the origin of that memorable institution.

It has already been mentioned that Ætôlus, son of Endymiôn, quitted Peloponnêsus in consequence of having slain Apis. The country on the north of the Corinthian gulf, between the rivers Euênus and Achelôus, received from him the name of Ætôlia, instead of that of Kurêtis: he acquired possession of it after having

slain Dôrus, Laodokus, and Polypœtês, sons of Apollo and Phthia, by whom he had been well received. He had by his wife Pronoê (the daughter of Phorbas) two sons, Pleurôn and Kalydôn, and from them the two chief towns in Ætôlia were named. Pleurôn married Xanthippê, daughter of Dôrus, and had for his son Agênôr, from whom sprang Portheus, or Porthaôn, and Demonikê: Euênos and Thestius were children of the latter by the god Arês.

Portheus had three sons, Agrius, Melas, and Œneus: among the offspring of Thestius were Althæa and Lêda,—names which bring us to a period of interest in the legendary history. Lêda marries Tyndareus and becomes mother of Helena and the Dioskuri: Althæa marries Œneus, and has, among other children, Meleager and Deianeira; the latter being begotten by the god Dionysus, and the former by Arês. Tydeus also is his son, the father of Diomêdês: warlike eminence goes hand in hand with tragic calamity among the members of this memorable family.

We are fortunate enough to find the legend of Althæa and Meleager set forth at considerable length in the Iliad, in the speech addressed by Phœnix to appease the wrath of Achilles. Œneus, king of Kalydôn, in the vintage sacrifices which he offered to the gods, omitted to include Artemis: the misguided man either forgot her or cared not for her; and the goddess, provoked by such an insult, sent against the vineyards of Œneus a wild boar of vast size and strength, who tore up the trees by the root, and laid prostrate all their fruit. So terrible was this boar that nothing less than a numerous body of men could venture to attack him: Meleager, the son of Œneus, however, having got together a considerable number of companions, partly from the Kurêtes of Pleurôn, at length slew him. But the anger of Artemis was not yet appeased. She raised a dispute among the combatants respecting the possession of the boar's head and hide—the trophies of victory. In this dispute Meleager slew the brother of his mother Althæa, prince of the Kurêtes of Pleurôn: these Kurêtes attacked the Ætôlians of Kalydôn in order to avenge their chief. So long as Meleager contended in the field the Ætôlians had the superiority. But he presently refused to come forth, indignant at the curses imprecated upon him by his mother. For Althæa, wrung with sorrow for the death of her brother, flung herself upon the ground in tears, beat the earth violently with her hands, and implored Hadês and Persephonê to inflict death upon Meleager,—a prayer which the unrelenting Erinnyes in Erebus heard but too well. So keenly did the hero resent this behavior of his mother that he kept aloof from the war. Accordingly, the Kurêtes not only drove the Ætôlians from the field, but assailed the walls and gates of Kalydôn, and were on the point of overwhelming its dismayed inhabitants. There was no hope of safety except in the arm of Meleager; but Meleager lay in his chamber by the side of his beautiful wife Kleopatra, the daughter of Idas, and heeded not the

necessity. While the shouts of expected victory were heard from the assailants at the gates, the ancient men of Ætôlia and the priests of the gods earnestly besought Meleager to come forth, offering him his choice of the fattest land in the plain of Kalydôn. His dearest friends, his father Œneus, his sisters, and even his mother herself, added their supplications—but he remained inflexible. At length the Kurêtes penetrated into the town and began to burn it: at this last moment, Kleopatra his wife addressed to him her pathetic appeal, to avert from her and from his family the desperate horrors impending over them all. Meleager could no longer resist: he put on his armor, went forth from his chamber, and repelled the enemy. But, when the danger was over, his countrymen withheld from him the splendid presents which they had promised, because he had rejected their prayers, and had come forth only when his own haughty caprice dictated.

Such is the legend of Meleager in the Iliad: a verse in the second book mentions simply the death of Meleager, without further details, as a reason why Thoas appeared in command of the Ætôlians before Troy.

Later poets both enlarged and altered the fable. The Hesiodic Eoiai, as well as the old poem called the Minyas, represented Meleager as having been slain by Apollo, who aided the Kurêtes in the war; and the incident of the burning brand, though quite at variance with Homer, is at least as old as the tragic poet Phrynichus, earlier than Æschylus. The Mœræ, or Fates, presenting themselves to Althæa shortly after the birth of Meleager, predicted that the child would die so soon as the brand then burning on the fire near at hand should be consumed. Althæa snatched it from the flames and extinguished it, preserving it with the utmost care until she became incensed against Meleager for the death of her brother. She then cast it into the fire, and as soon as it was consumed the life of Meleager was brought to a close.

We know from the censure of Pliny that Sophoklês heightened the pathos of this subject by his account of the mournful death of Meleager's sisters, who perished from excess of grief. They were changed into the birds called Meleagrides, and their never-ceasing tears ran together into amber. But in the hands of Euripidês—whether originally through him or not, we cannot tell—Atalanta became the prominent figure and motive of the piece, while the party convened to hunt the Kalydônian boar was made to comprise all the distinguished heroes from every quarter of Greece. In fact, as Heyne justly remarks, this event is one of the four aggregate dramas of Grecian heroic life, along with the Argonautic expedition, the siege of Thêbes, and the Trojan war.

To accomplish the destruction of the terrific animal which Artemis in her wrath had sent forth, Meleager assembled not merely the choice youth among the Kurêtes and Ætôlians (as we find in the

Iliad), but an illustrious troop, including Kastôr and Pollux, Idas and Lynkeus, Pêleus and Telamôn, Thêseus and Peirithous, Ankæus and Kêpheus, Jasôn, Amphiaraus, Admêtus, Eurytiôn, and others. Nestôr and Phœnix, who appear as old men before the walls of Troy, exhibited their early prowess as auxiliaries to the suffering Kalydônians. Conspicuous amid them all stood the virgin Atalanta, daughter of the Arcadian Schœneus; beautiful and matchless for swiftness of foot, but living in the forest as a huntress and unacceptable to Aphroditê. Several of the heroes were slain by the boar; others escaped by various stratagems: at length Atalanta first shot him in the back, next Amphiaraus in the eye, and, lastly, Meleager killed him. Enamored of the beauty of Atalanta, Meleager made over to her the chief spoils of the animal, on the plea that she had inflicted the first wound. But his uncles, the brothers of Thestius, took them away from her, asserting their rights as next of kin, if Meleager declined to keep the prize for himself: the latter, exasperated at this behavior, slew them. Althæa, in deep sorrow for her brothers and wrath against her son, is impelled to produce the fatal brand which she had so long treasured up, and consign it to the flames. The tragedy concludes with the voluntary death both of Althæa and Kleopatra.

Interesting as the Arcadian huntress Atalanta is in herself, she is an intrusion, and not a very convenient intrusion, into the Homeric story of the Kalydônian boar-hunt, wherein another female, Kleopatra, already occupied the foreground. But the more recent version became accredited throughout Greece, and was sustained by evidence which few persons in those days felt any inclination to controvert. For Atalanta carried away with her the spoils and head of the boar into Arcadia; and there for successive centuries hung the identical hide and the gigantic tusks, of three feet in length, in the temple of Athênê Alea at Tegea. Kallimachus mentions them as being there preserved, in the third century before the Christian era; but the extraordinary value set upon them is best proved by the fact that the emperor Augustus took away the tusks from Tegea, along with the great statue of Athênê Alea, and conveyed them to Rome, to be there preserved among the public curiosities. Even a century and a half afterward, when Pausanias visited Greece, the skin, worn out with age, was shown to him, while the robbery of the tusks had not been forgotten. Nor were these relics of the boar the only memento preserved at Tegea of the heroic enterprise. On the pediment of the temple of Athênê Alea, unparalleled in Peloponnesus for beauty and grandeur, the illustrious statuary Skopas had executed one of his most finished reliefs, representing the Kalydônian hunt. Atalanta and Meleager were placed in the front rank of the assailants; while Ankæus, one of the Tegean heroes, to whom the tusks of the boar had proved fatal, was represented as sinking under his death-wound into the arms of his brother Epochos. And

Pausanias observes that the Tegeans, while they had manifested the same honorable forwardness as other Arcadian communities in the conquest of Troy, the repulse of Xerxes, and the battle of Dipæa against Sparta, might fairly claim to themselves, through Ankæus and Atalanta, that they alone among all Arcadians had participated in the glory of the Kalydônian boar-hunt. So entire and unsuspecting is the faith both of the Tegeans and of Pausanias in the past historical reality of this romantic adventure. Strabo, indeed, tries to transform the romance into something which has the outward semblance of history, by remarking that the quarrel respecting the boar's head and hide cannot have been the real cause of war between the Kurêtes and the Ætôlians; the true ground of dispute (he contends) was probably the possession of a portion of territory. His remarks on this head are analogous to those of Thucydidês and other critics, when they ascribe the Trojan war, not to the rape of Helen, but to views of conquest or political apprehensions. But he treats the general fact of the battle between the Kurêtes and the Ætôlians, mentioned in the Iliad, as something unquestionably real and historical—recapitulating at the same time a variety of discrepancies on the part of different authors, but not giving any decision of his own respecting their truth or falsehood.

In the same manner as Atalanta was intruded into the Kalydônian hunt, so also she seems to have been introduced into the memorable funeral games celebrated after the decease of Pelias at Iôlkos, in which she had no place at the time when the works on the chest of Kypselus were executed. But her native and genuine locality is Arcadia; where her race-course, near to the town of Methydrion, was shown even in the days of Pausanias. This race-course had been the scene of destruction for more than one unsuccessful suitor. For Atalanta, averse to marriage, had proclaimed that her hand should only be won by the competitor who would surpass her in running: all who tried and failed were condemned to die, and many were the persons to whom her beauty and swiftness, alike unparalleled, had proved fatal. At length Meilaniôn, who had vainly tried to win her affections by assiduous services in her hunting excursions, ventured to enter the perilous lists. Aware that he could not hope to outrun her except by stratagem, he had obtained, by the kindness of Aphroditê, three golden apples from the garden of the Hesperides, which he successively let fall near to her while engaged in the race. The maiden could not resist the temptation of picking them up, and was thus overcome: she became the wife of Meilaniôn, and the mother of the Arcadian Parthenopæus, one of the seven chiefs who perished in the siege of Thêbes.

We have yet another female in the family of Œneus whose name the legend has immortalized. His daughter Deianeira was sought in marriage by the river-god Achelôus, who presented himself in various shapes, first as a serpent, and afterward as a bull. From the importunity of this hateful suitor she was rescued by the arrival of Hêraklês, who encountered Achelôus, vanquished him, and broke off one of his horns, which Achelôus ransomed by surrendering to him the horn of Amaltheia, endued with the miraculous property of supplying the possessor with abundance of any food and drink which he desired. Hêraklês, being rewarded for his prowess by the possession of Deianeira, made over the horn of Amaltheia as his marriage-present to Œneus. Compelled to leave the residence of Œneus, in consequence of having in a fit of anger struck the youthful attendant Eunomus, and involuntarily killed him, Hêraklês retired to Trachin, crossing the river Euênus at the place where the Centaur Nessus was accustomed to carry over passengers for hire. Nessus carried over Deianeira, but, when he had arrived on the other side, began to treat her with rudeness, upon which Hêraklês slew him with an arrow tinged by the poison of the Lernæan hydra. The dying Centaur advised Deianeira to preserve the poisoned blood which flowed from his wound, telling her that it would operate as a philter to regain for her the affections of Hêraklês, in case she should ever be threatened by a rival. Some time afterward the hero saw and loved the beautiful Iolê, daughter of Eurytos, king of Œchalia: he stormed the town, killed Eurytos, and made Iolê his captive. The misguided Deianeira now had recourse to her supposed philter: she sent as a present to Hêraklês a splendid tunic, imbued secretly with the poisoned blood of the Centaur. Hêraklês adorned himself with the tunic on the occasion of offering a solemn sacrifice to Zeus on the promontory of Kênæon in Eubœa: but the fatal garment, when once put on, clung to him indissolubly, burnt his skin and flesh, and occasioned an agony of pain from which he was only relieved by death. Deianeira slew herself in despair at this disastrous catastrophe.

We have not yet exhausted the eventful career of Œneus and his family—ennobled among the Ætolians especially, both by religious worship and by poetical eulogy—and favorite themes not merely in some of the Hesiodic poems, but also in other ancient epic productions, the Alkmæônis and the Cyclic Thêbais. By another marriage, Œneus had for his son Tydeus, whose poetical celebrity is attested by the many different accounts given both of the name and condition of his mother. Tydeus, having slain his cousins, the sons of Melas, who were conspiring against Œneus, was forced to become an exile, and took refuge at Argos with Adrastus, whose daughter Deipylê he married. The issue of this marriage was Diomêdês, whose brilliant exploits in the siege of Troy were not less celebrated than those of his father at the siege of Thêbes. After the departure of Tydeus, Œneus was deposed by the sons of Agrios. He fell into extreme poverty and wretchedness, from which he was only rescued by his grandson Diomêdês, after the conquest of Troy. The sufferings of this ancient warrior, and the final restoration and revenge by

Diomêdês, were the subject of a lost tragedy of Euripidês, which even the ridicule of Aristophanês demonstrates to have been eminently pathetic.

Though the genealogy just given of Œneus is in part Homeric, and seems to have been followed generally by the mythographers, yet we find another totally at variance with it in Hekatæus, which he doubtless borrowed from some of the old poets: the simplicity of the story annexed to it seems to attest its antiquity. Orestheus, son of Deukaliôn, first passed into Ætôlia, and acquired the kingdom: he was father of Phytios, who was father of Œneus. Ætôlus was son of Œneus.

The original migration of Ætôlus from Elis to Ætôlia—and the subsequent establishment in Elis of Oxylus, his descendant in the tenth generation, along with the Dôrian invaders of Peloponnêsus—were commemorated by two inscriptions, one in the agora of Elis, the other in that of the Ætôlian chief town, Thermum, engraved upon the statues of Ætôlus and Oxylus respectively.

CHAPTER VII.

THE PELOPIDS.

Among the ancient legendary genealogies there was none which figured with greater splendor, or which attracted to itself a higher degree of poetical interest and pathos, than that of the Pelopids—Tantalus, Pelops, Atreus and Thyestês, Agamemnôn and Menelaus and Ægisthus, Helen and Klytæmnêstra, Orestês and Elektra and Hermionê. Each of these characters is a star of the first magnitude in the Grecian hemisphere: each name suggests the idea of some interesting romance or some harrowing tragedy: the curse, which taints the family from the beginning, inflicts multiplied wounds at every successive generation. So, at least, the story of the Pelopids presents itself, after it had been successively expanded and decorated by epic, lyric, and tragic poets. It will be sufficient to touch briefly upon events with which every reader of Grecian poetry is more or less familiar, and to offer some remarks upon the way in which they were colored and modified by different Grecian authors.

Pelops is the eponym, or name-giver, of the Peloponnêsus: to find an eponym for every conspicuous local name was the invariable turn of Grecian retrospective fancy. The name Peloponnêsus is not to be found either in the Iliad or the Odyssey, nor any other denomination which can be attached distinctly and specially to the entire peninsula. But we meet with the name in one of the most ancient

post-Homeric poems of which any fragments have been preserved—the Cyprian Verses—a poem which many (seemingly most persons) even of the contemporaries of Herodotus ascribed to the author of the Iliad, though Herodotus contradicts the opinion. The attributes by which the Pelopid Agamemnôn and his house are marked out and distinguished from the other heroes of the Iliad are precisely those which Grecian imagination would naturally seek in an eponymus—superior wealth, power, splendor, and regality. Not only Agamemnôn himself, but his brother Menelaus is "more of a king" even than Nestôr or Diomêdês. The gods have not given to the king of the "much-golden" Mykênæ greater courage, or strength, or ability than to various other chiefs; but they have conferred upon him a marked superiority in riches, power, and dignity, and have thus singled him out as the appropriate leader of the forces. He enjoys this pre-eminence as belonging to a privileged family and as inheriting the heaven-descended scepter of Pelops, the transmission of which is described by Homer in a very remarkable way. The scepter was made "by Hêphæstos, who presented it to Zeus; Zeus gave it to Hermês; Hermês to the charioteer Pelops; Pelops gave it to Atreus, the ruler of men; Atreus at his death left it to Thyestês, the rich cattle-owner; Thyestês in his turn left it to his nephew Agamemnôn to carry, that he might hold dominion over many islands and over all Argos."

We have here the unrivaled wealth and power of the "king of men, Agamemnôn," traced up to his descent from Pelops, and accounted for, in harmony with the recognized epical agencies, by the present of the special scepter of Zeus through the hands of Hermês; the latter being the wealth-giving god, whose blessing is most efficacious in furthering the process of acquisition, whether by theft or by accelerated multiplication of flocks and herds. The wealth and princely character of the Atreids were proverbial among the ancient epic poets. Paris not only carries away Helen, but much property along with her: the house of Menelaus, when Têlemachus visits it in the Odyssey, is so resplendent with gold and silver and rare ornament as to strike the beholder with astonishment and admiration. The attributes assigned to Tantalus, the father of Pelops, are in conformity with the general idea of the family—superhuman abundance and enjoyments, and intimate converse with the gods, to such a degree that his head is turned, and he commits inexpiable sin. But though Tantalus himself is mentioned, in one of the most suspicious passages of the Odyssey (as suffering punishment in the under-world), he is not announced, nor is any one else announced, as father of Pelops, unless we are to construe the lines in the Iliad as implying that the latter was son of Hermês. In the conception of the author of the Iliad, the Pelopids are, if not of divine origin, at least a mortal breed specially favored and ennobled by the gods—beginning with Pelops, and localized at Mykênæ. No

allusion is made to any connection of Pelops either with Pisa or with Lydia.

The legend which connected Tantalus and Pelops with Mount Sipylus may probably have grown out of the Æolic settlements at Magnêsia and Kymê. Both the Lydian origin and the Pisatic sovereignty of Pelops are adapted to times later than the Iliad when the Olympic games had acquired to themselves the general reverence of Greece, and had come to serve as the religious and recreative center of the Peloponnêsus, and when the Lydian and Phrygian heroic names, Midas and Gygês, were the types of wealth and luxury, as well as of chariot-driving, in the imagination of a Greek. The inconsiderable villages of the Pisatid derived their whole importance from the vicinity of Olympia: they are not deemed worthy of notice in the Catalogue of Homer. Nor could the genealogy which connected the eponym of the entire peninsula with Pisa have obtained currency in Greece unless it had been sustained by pre-established veneration for the locality of Olympia. But if the sovereign of the humble Pisa was to be recognized as forerunner of the thrice-wealthy princes of Mykênæ, it became necessary to assign some explanatory cause of his riches. Hence the supposition of his being an immigrant, son of a wealthy Lydian named Tantalus, who was the offspring of Zeus and Ploutô. Lydian wealth and Lydian chariot-driving rendered Pelops a fit person to occupy his place in the legend, both as ruler of Pisa and progenitor of the Mykênæan Atreids. Even with the admission of these two circumstances there is considerable difficulty, for those who wish to read the legends as consecutive history, in making the Pelopids pass smoothly and plausibly from Pisa to Mykênæ.

I shall briefly recount the legends of this great heroic family as they came to stand in their full and ultimate growth, after the localization of Pelops at Pisa had been tacked on as a preface to Homer's version of the Pelopid genealogy.

Tantalus, residing near Mount Sipylus in Lydia, had two children, Pelops and Niobê. He was a man of immense possessions and pre-eminent happiness, above the lot of humanity: the gods communicated with him freely, received him at their banquets, and accepted of his hospitality in return. Intoxicated with such prosperity, Tantalus became guilty of gross wickedness. He stole nectar and ambrosia from the table of the gods, and revealed their secrets to mankind: he killed and served up to them at a feast his own son Pelops. The gods were horror-struck when they discovered the meal prepared for them: Zeus restored the mangled youth to life, and as Dêmêtêr, then absorbed in grief for the loss of her daughter Persephonê, had eaten a portion of the shoulder, he supplied an ivory shoulder in place of it. Tantalus expiated his guilt by exemplary punishment. He was placed in the under-world, with fruit and water seemingly close to him, yet eluding his touch as often as

he tried to grasp them, and leaving his hunger and thirst incessant and unappeased. Pindar, in a very remarkable passage, finds this old legend revolting to his feelings: he rejects the tale of the flesh of Pelops having been served up and eaten as altogether unworthy of the gods.

Niobê, the daughter of Tantalus, was married to Amphiôn, and had a numerous and flourishing offspring of seven sons and seven daughters. Though accepted as the intimate friend and companion of Letô, the mother of Apollo and Artemis, she was presumptuous enough to triumph over that goddess, and to place herself on a footing of higher dignity, on account of the superior number of her children. Apollo and Artemis avenged this insult by killing all the sons and all the daughters: Niobê, thus left a childless and disconsolate mother, wept herself to death and was turned into a rock, which the later Greeks continued always to identify on Mount Sipylus.

Some authors represented Pelops as not being a Lydian, but a king of Paphlagônia; by others it was said that Tantalus, having become detested from his impieties, had been expelled from Asia by Ilus, the king of Troy,—an incident which served the double purpose of explaining the transit of Pelops to Greece, and of imparting to the siege of Troy by Agamemnôn the character of retribution for wrongs done to his ancestor. When Pelops came over to Greece, he found Œnomaus, son of the god Arês and Harpinna, in possession of the principality of Pisa, immediately bordering on the district of Olympia. Œnomaus, having been apprised by an oracle that death would overtake him if he permitted his daughter Hippodameia to marry, refused to give her in marriage except to some suitor who should beat him in a chariot race from Olympia to the isthmus of Corinth: the ground here selected for the legendary victory of Pelops deserves attention, inasmuch as it is a line drawn from the assumed center of Peloponnêsus to its extremity, and thus comprises the whole territory with which Pelops is connected as eponym. Any suitor overmatched in the race was doomed to forfeit his life; and the fleetness of the Pisan horses, combined with the skill of the charioteer Myrtilus, had already caused thirteen unsuccessful competitors to perish by the lance of Œnomaus. Pelops entered the lists as a suitor: his prayers moved the god Poseidôn to supply him with a golden chariot and winged horses; or, according to another story, he captivated the affections of Hippodameia herself, who persuaded the charioteer Myrtilus to loosen the wheels of Œnomaus before he started, so that the latter was overturned and perished in the race. Having thus won the hand of Hippodameia, Pelops became prince of Pisa. He put to death the charioteer Myrtilus, either from indignation at his treachery to Œnomaus, or from jealousy on the score of Hippodameia; but Myrtilus was the son of Hermês, and, though Pelops erected a temple in the vain attempt to propitiate that god, he left a

curse upon his race which future calamities were destined painfully to work out.

Pelops had a numerous issue by Hippodameia: Pittheus, Trœzen, and Epidaurus, the eponyms of the two Argolic cities so called, are said to have been among them: Atreus and Thyestês were also his sons, and his daughter Nikippê married Sthenelus of Mykênæ and became the mother of Eurystheus. We hear nothing of the principality of Pisa afterward: the Pisatid villages become absorbed into the larger aggregate of Elis, after a vain struggle to maintain their separate right of presidency over the Olympic festival. But the legend ran that Pelops left his name to the whole peninsula: according to Thucydidês, he was enabled to do this because of the great wealth which he had brought with him from Lydia into a poor territory. The historian leaves out all the romantic interest of the genuine legends—preserving only this one circumstance, which, without being better attested than the rest, carries with it, from its commonplace and prosaic character, a pretended historical plausibility.

Besides his numerous issue by Hippodameia, Pelops had an illegitimate son named Chrysippus, of singular grace and beauty, toward whom he displayed so much affection as to excite the jealousy of Hippodameia and her sons. Atreus and Thyestês conspired together to put Chrysippus to death, for which they were banished by Pelops and retired to Mykênæ,—an event which brings us into the track of the Homeric legend. For Thucydidês, having found in the death of Chrysippus a suitable ground for the secession of Atreus from Pelops, conducts him at once to Mykênæ, and shows a train of plausible circumstances to account for his having mounted the throne. Eurystheus, king of Mykênæ, was the maternal nephew of Atreus: when he engaged in any foreign expedition, he naturally intrusted the regency to his uncle; the people of Mykênæ thus became accustomed to be governed by him, and he on his part made efforts to conciliate them, so that, when Eurystheus was defeated and slain in Attica, the Mykênæan people, apprehensive of an invasion from the Hêrakleids, chose Atreus as at once the most powerful and most acceptable person for his successor. Such was the tale which Thucydidês derived "from those who had learned ancient Peloponnêsian matters most clearly from their forefathers." The introduction of so much sober and quasi-political history, unfortunately unauthenticated, contrasts strikingly with the highly poetical legends of Pelops and Atreus, which precede and follow it.

Atreus and Thyestês are known in the Iliad only as successive possessors of the scepter of Zeus, which Thyestês at his death bequeaths to Agamemnôn. The family dissensions among this fated race commence, in the Odyssey, with Agamemnôn the son of Atreus, and Ægisthus the son of Thyestês. But subsequent poets dwelt upon an implacable quarrel between the two fathers. The cause of the bitterness was differently represented: some alleged that Thyestês had intrigued with the Krêtan Aeropê, the wife of his brother; other narratives mentioned that Thyestês procured for himself surreptitiously the possession of a lamb with a golden fleece, which had been designedly introduced among the flocks of Atreus by the anger of Hermês, as a cause of enmity and ruin to the whole family. Atreus, after a violent burst of indignation, pretended to be reconciled, and invited Thyestês to a banquet, in which he served up to him the limbs of his own son. The father ignorantly partook of the fatal meal. Even the all-seeing Hêlios is said to have turned back his chariot to the east in order that he might escape the shocking spectacle of this Thyestêan banquet: yet the tale of Thyestêan revenge—the murder of Atreus perpetrated by Ægisthus, the incestuous offspring of Thyestês by his daughter Pelopia—is no less replete with horrors.

Homeric legend is never thus revolting. Agamemnôn and Menelaus are known to us chiefly with their Homeric attributes, which have not been so darkly overlaid by subsequent poets as those of Atreus and Thyestês. Agamemnôn and Menelaus are affectionate brothers; they marry two sisters, the daughters of Tyndareus, king of Sparta, Klytæmnêstra and Helen; for Helen, the real offspring of Zeus, passes as the daughter of Tyndareus. The "king of men" reigns at Mykênæ; Menelaus succeeds Tyndareus at Sparta. Of the rape of Helen, and the siege of Troy consequent upon it, I shall speak elsewhere: I now touch only upon the family legends of the Atreids. Menelaus, on his return from Troy with the recovered Helen, is driven by storms far away to the distant regions of Phœnecia and Egypt, and is exposed to a thousand dangers and hardships before he again sets foot in Peloponnêsus. But at length he reaches Sparta, resumes his kingdom, and passes the rest of his days in uninterrupted happiness and splendor: being, moreover, husband of the god-like Helen and son-in-law of Zeus, he is even spared the pangs of death. When the fullness of his days is past, he is transported to the Elysian fields, there to dwell along with "the golden-haired Rhadamanthus" in a delicious climate and in undisturbed repose.

Far different is the fate of the king of men, Agamemnôn. During his absence, the unwarlike Ægisthus, son of Thyestês, had seduced his wife, Klytæmnêstra, in spite of the special warning of the gods, who, watchful over this privileged family, had sent their messenger Hermês expressly to deter him from the attempt. A venerable bard had been left by Agamemnôn as the companion and monitor of his wife, and, so long as that guardian was at hand, Ægisthus pressed his suit in vain. But he got rid of the bard by sending him to perish in a desert island, and then won without difficulty the undefended Klytæmnêstra. Ignorant of what had passed, Agamemnôn returned from Troy victorious and full of hope to his native country; but he had scarcely landed when Ægisthus invited him to a banquet, and there, with the aid of the treacherous Klytæmnêstra, in the very hall

of festivity and congratulation, slaughtered him and his companions "like oxen tied to the manger." His concubine, Kassandra, the prophetic daughter of Priam, perished along with him by the hand of Klytæmnêstra herself. The boy Orestês, the only male offspring of Agamemnôn, was stolen away by his nurse, and placed in safety at the residence of the Phôkian Strophius.

For seven years Ægisthus and Klytæmnêstra reigned in tranquillity at Mykenæ on the throne of the murdered Agamemnôn. But in the eighth year the retribution announced by the gods overtook them: Orestês, grown to manhood, returned and avenged his father, by killing Ægisthus, according to Homer; subsequent poets add, his mother also. He recovered the kingdom of Mykênæ, and succeeded Menelaus in that of Sparta. Hermionê, the only daughter of Menelaus and Helen, was sent into the realm of the Myrmidons in Thessaly as the bride of Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, according to the promise made by her father during the siege of Troy.

Here ends the Homeric legend of the Pelopids, the final act of Orestês being cited as one of unexampled glory. Later poets made many additions: they dwelt upon his remorse and hardly-earned pardon for the murder of his mother, and upon his devoted friendship for Pylades; they wove many interesting tales, too, respecting his sisters Iphigeneia and Elektra and his cousin Hermionê, names which have become naturalized in every climate and incorporated with every form of poetry.

These poets did not at all scruple to depart from Homer, and to give other genealogies of their own with respect to the chief persons of the Pelopid family. In the Iliad and Odyssey Agamemnôn is son of Atreus; in the Hesiodic Eoiai and in Stesichorus, he is son of Pleisthenês, the son of Atreus. In Homer he is specially marked as reigning at Mykênæ; but Stesichorus, Simonidês and Pindar represented him as having both resided and perished at Sparta or at Amyklæ. According to the ancient Cyprian verses, Helen was represented as the daughter of Zeus and Nemesis. In one of the Hesiodic poems she was introduced as an Oceanic nymph, daughter of Oceanus and Têthys. The genealogical discrepancies, even as to the persons of the principal heroes and heroines, are far too numerous to be cited; nor is it necessary to advert to them, except as they bear upon the unavailing attempt to convert such legendary parentage into a basis of historical record or chronological calculation.

The Homeric poems probably represent that form of the legend respecting Agamemnôn and Orestês which was current and popular among the Æolic colonists. Orestês was the great heroic chief of the Æolic emigration; he, or his sons, or his descendants, are supposed to have conducted the Achæans to seek a new home when they were no longer able to make head against the invading Dôrians. The great families at Tenedos and other Æolic cities, even during the historical era, gloried in tracing back their pedigrees to this illustrious

source. The legends connected with the heroic worship of these mythical ancestors form the basis of the character and attributes of Agamemnôn and his family, as depicted in Homer, in which Mykênæ appears as the first place in Peloponnêsus, and Sparta only as the second; the former the special residence of "the king of men;" the latter that of his younger and inferior brother, yet still the seat of a member of the princely Pelopids, and, moreover, the birth-place of the divine Helen. Sparta, Argos, and Mykênæ are all three designated in the Iliad by the goddess Hêrê as her favorite cities, yet the connection of Mykênæ with Argos, though the two towns were only ten miles distant, is far less intimate than the connection of Mykênæ with Sparta. When we reflect upon the very peculiar manner in which Homer identifies Hêrê with the Grecian host and its leader, for she watches over the Greeks with the active solicitude of a mother, and her antipathy against the Trojans is implacable to a degree which Zeus cannot comprehend, and when we combine this with the ancient and venerated Hêræon, or temple of Hêrê, near Mykênæ, we may partly explain to ourselves the pre-eminence conferred upon Mykênæ in the Iliad and Odyssey. The Hêræon was situated between Argos and Mykênæ; in later times its priestesses were named and its affairs administered by the Argeians; but as it was much nearer to Mykênæ than to Argos we may with probability conclude that it originally belonged to the former, and that the increasing power of the latter enabled them to usurp to themselves a religious privilege which was always an object of envy and contention among the Grecian communities. The Æolic colonists doubtless took out with them in their emigration the divine and heroic legends as well as the worship and ceremonial rites of the Hêræon; and in those legends the most exalted rank would be assigned to the close-adjoining and administering city.

Mykênæ maintained its independence even down to the Persian invasion. Eighty of its heavy-armed citizens, in the ranks of Leonidas at Thermopylæ, and a number not inferior at Platæa, upheld the splendid heroic celebrity of their city during a season of peril when the more powerful Argos disgraced itself by a treacherous neutrality. Very shortly afterward Mykênæ was enslaved and its inhabitants expelled by the Argeians. Though this city so long maintained a separate existence, its importance had latterly sunk to nothing, while that of the Dôrian Argos was augmented very much, and that of the Dôrian Sparta still more.

The name of Mykênæ is imperishably enthroned in the Iliad and Odyssey; but all the subsequent fluctuations of the legend tend to exalt the glory of other cities at its expense. The recognition of the Olympic games as the grand religious festival of Peloponnêsus gave vogue to that genealogy which connected Pelops with Pisa or Elis and withdrew him from Mykênæ. Moreover, in the poems of the great Athenian tragedians Mykênæ is constantly confounded and

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treated as one with Argos. If any one of the citizens of the former, expelled at the time of its final subjugation by the Argeians, had witnessed at Athens a drama of Æschylus, Sophoklês, or Euripidês, or the recital of an ode of Pindar, he would have heard with grief and indignation the city of his oppressors made a partner in the heroic glories of his own. But the great political ascendancy acquired by Sparta contributed still farther to degrade Mykênæ, by disposing subsequent poets to treat the chief of the Grecian armament against Troy as having been a Spartan. It has been already mentioned that Stêsichorus, Simonidês, and Pindar adopted this version of the legend. We know that Zeus Agamemnôn, as well as the hero Menelaus, was worshiped at the Dôrian Sparta; and the feeling of intimate identity, as well as of patriotic pride, which had grown up in the minds of the Spartans connected with the name of Agamemnôn, is forcibly evinced by the reply of the Spartan Syagrus to Gelôn of Syracuse at the time of the Persian invasion of Greece. Gelôn was solicited to lend his aid in the imminent danger of Greece before the battle of Salamis. He offered to furnish an immense auxiliary force on condition that the supreme command should be allotted to him. "Loudly, indeed, would the Pelopid Agamemnôn cry out (exclaimed Syagrus in rejecting this application), if he were to learn that the Spartans had been deprived of the headship by Gelôn and the Syracusans." Nearly a century before this event, in obedience to the injunctions of the Delphian oracle, the Spartans had brought back from Tegea to Sparta the bones of "the Lacônian Orestês," as Pindar denominates him. The recovery of these bones was announced to them as the means of reversing a course of ill-fortune, and of procuring victory in their war against Tegea. The value which they set upon this acquisition, and the decisive results ascribed to it, exhibit a precise analogy with the recovery of the bones of Thêseus from Skyros by the Athenian Kimôn shortly after the Persian invasion. The remains sought were those of a hero properly belonging to their own soil, but who had died in a foreign land, and of whose protection and assistance they were for that reason deprived. And the superhuman magnitude of the bones, which were contained in a coffin seven cubits long, is well suited to the legendary grandeur of the son of Agamemnôn.

CHAPTER VIII.

LACÔNIAN AND MESSÊNIAN GENEALOGIES.

THE earliest names in Lacônian genealogy are an indigenous Lelex and a Naiad nymph Kleochareia. From this pair sprung a son Eurôtas, and from him a daughter Sparta, who became the wife of Lacedæmôn, son of Zeus and Taygetê, daughter of Atlas. Amyklas, son of Lacedæmôn, had two sons, Kynortas and Hyakinthus—the latter a beautiful youth, the favorite of Apollo, by whose hand he was accidentally killed while playing at quoits: the festival of the Hyakinthia, which the Lacedæmônians generally, and the Amyklæans with special solemnity, celebrated throughout the historical ages, was traced back to this legend. Kynortas was succeeded by his son Periêrês, who married Gorgophonê, daughter of Perseus, and had a numerous issue—Tyndareus, Ikarius, Aphareus, Leukippus, and Hippokoôn. Some authors gave the genealogy differently, making Periêrês, son of Æolus, to be the father of Kynortas, and Œbalus, son of Kynortas, from whom sprung Tyndareus, Ikarius, and Hippokoôn.

Both Tyndareus and Ikarius, expelled by their brother Hippokoôn, were forced to seek shelter at the residence of Thestius, king of Kalydôn, whose daughter, Lêda, Tyndareus espoused. It is numbered among the exploits of the omnipresent Hêraklês that he slew Hippokoôn and his sons, and restored Tyndareus to his kingdom, thus creating for the subsequent Hêrekleidan kings a mythical title to the throne. Tyndareus, as well as his brothers, are persons of interest in legendary narrative: he is the father of Kastôr—of Timandra, married to Echemus, the hero of Tegea—and of Klytæmnêstra, married to Agamemnôn. Pollux and the ever-memorable Helen are the offspring of Lêda by Zeus. Ikarius is the father of Penelopê, wife of Odysseus: the contrast between her behavior and that of Klytæmnêstra and Helen became the more striking in consequence of their being so nearly related. Aphareus is the father of Idas and Lynkeus, while Leukippus has for his daughters, Phœbê and Ilaëira. According to one of the Hesiodic poems, Kastôr and Pollux were both sons of Zeus by Lêda, while Helen was neither daughter of Zeus nor of Tyndareus, but of Oceanus and Têthys.

The brothers Kastôr and (Polydeukês, or) Pollux are no less celebrated for their fraternal affection than for their great bodily accomplishments: Kastôr, the great charioteer and horse-master; Pollux, the first of pugilists. They are enrolled both among the hunters of the Kalydônian boar and among the heroes of the Argonautic expedition, in which Pollux represses the insolence of Amykus, king of the Bebrykes, on the coast of Asiatic Thrace—the latter, a gigantic

pugilist, from whom no rival has ever escaped, challenges Pollux, but is vanquished and killed in the fight.

The two brothers also undertook an expedition into Attica for the purpose of recovering their sister Helen, who had been carried off by Thêseus in her early youth, and deposited by him at Aphidna, while he accompanied Peirithous to the under-world, in order to assist his friend in carrying off Persephonê. The force of Kastôr and Pollux was irresistible, and, when they re-demanded their sister, the people of Attica were anxious to restore her: but no one knew where Thêseus had deposited his prize. The invaders, not believing in the sincerity of this denial, proceeded to ravage the country, which would have been utterly ruined had not Dekêlus, the eponymus of Dekeleia, been able to indicate Aphidna as the place of concealment. The indigenous Titakus betrayed Aphidna to Kastôr and Pollux, and Helen was recovered: the brothers, in evacuating Attica, carried away into captivity Æthra, the mother of Thêseus. In after-days, when Kastôr and Pollux, under the title of the Dioskuri, had come to be worshiped as powerful gods, and when the Athenians were greatly ashamed of this act of Thêseus—the revelation made by Dekelus was considered as entitling him to the lasting gratitude of his country, as well as to the favorable remembrance of the Lacedæmônians, who maintained the Dekeleians in the constant enjoyment of certain honorary privileges at Sparta, and even spared that dême in all their invasions of Attica. It is not improbable that the existence of this legend had some weight in determining the Lacedæmônians to select Dekeleia as the place of their occupation during the Peloponnêsian war.

The fatal combat between Kastôr and Polydeukês on the one side, and Idas and Lynkeus on the other, for the possession of the daughters of Leukippus, was celebrated by more than one ancient poet, and forms the subject of one of the yet remaining idylls of Theokritus. Leukippus had formally betrothed his daughters to Idas and Lynkeus; but the Tyndarids, becoming enamored of them, outbid their rivals in the value of the customary nuptial gifts, persuaded the father to violate his promise, and carried off Phœbê and Ilaëira as their brides. Idas and Lynkeus pursued them and remonstrated against the injustice: according to Theokritus, this was the cause of the combat. But there was another tale, which seems the older, and which assigns a different cause to the quarrel. The four had jointly made a predatory incursion into Arcadia, and had driven off some cattle, but did not agree about the partition of the booty—Idas carried off into Messênia a portion of it which the Tyndarids claimed as their own. To revenge and reimburse themselves, the Tyndarids invaded Messênia, placing themselves in ambush in the hollow of an ancient oak. But Lynkeus, endued with preternatural powers of vision, mounted to the top of Taygetus, from whence, as he could see over the whole Peloponnêsus, he detected them in their chosen

place of concealment. Such was the narrative of the ancient Cyprian Verses. Kastôr perished by the hand of Idas, Lynkeus by that of Pollux. Idas, seizing a stone pillar from the tomb of his father Aphareus, hurled it at Pollux, knocked him down and stunned him; but Zeus, interposing at the critical moment for the protection of his son, killed Idas with a thunderbolt. Zeus would have conferred upon Pollux the gift of immortality, but the latter could not endure existence without his brother: he entreated permission to share the gift with Kastôr, and both were accordingly permitted to live, but only on every other day.

The Dioskuri, or sons of Zeus—as the two Spartan heroes, Kastôr and Pollux, were denominated—were recognized in the historical days of Greece as gods, and received divine honors. This is even noticed in a passage of the Odyssey, which is at any rate a very old interpolation, as well as in one of the Homeric hymns. What is yet more remarkable is, that they were invoked during storms at sea, as the special and all-powerful protectors of the endangered mariner, although their attributes and their celebrity seem to be of a character so dissimilar. They were worshiped throughout most parts of Greece, but with pre-eminent sanctity at Sparta.

Kastôr and Pollux being removed, the Spartan genealogy passes from Tyndareus to Menelaus, and from him to Orestês.

Originally it appears that Messênê was a name for the western portion of Lacônia, bordering on what is called Pylos: it is so represented in the Odyssey, and Ephorus seems to have included it among the possessions of Orestês and his descendants. Throughout the whole duration of the Messênico-Dôrian kingdom, there never was any town called Messênê; the town was first founded by Epameinôndas after the battle of Leuctra. The heroic genealogy of Messênia starts from the same name as that of Lacônia—from the indigenous Lelex: his younger son Polykaôn marries Messênê, daughter of the Argeian Triopas, and settles the country. Pausanias tells us that the posterity of this pair occupied the country for five generations: but he in vain searched the ancient genealogical poems to find the names of their descendants. To them succeeded Periêrês, son of Æolus; and Aphareus and Leukippus, according to Pausanias, were sons of Periêrês.

Aphareus, after the death of his sons, founded the town of Arênê, and made over most part of his dominions to his kinsman Nêleus, with whom we pass into the Pylian genealogy.

CHAPTER IX.

ARCADIAN GENEALOGY.

THE Arcadian divine or heroic pedigree begins with Pelasgus, whom both Hesiod and Asius considered as an indigenous man, though Akusilaus the Argeian represented him as brother of Argos, the son of Zeus by Niobê, daughter of Phorôneus. Akusilaus wished to establish a community of origin between the Argeians and the Arcadians.

Lykaôn, son of Pelasgus and king of Arcadia, had, by different wives, fifty sons, the most savage, impious, and wicked of mankind: Mænalus was the eldest of them. Zeus, in order that he might himself become a witness of their misdeeds, presented himself to them in disguise. They killed a child and served it up to him for a meal; but the god overturned the table and struck dead with thunder Lykaôn and all his fifty sons, with the single exception of Nyktimus, the youngest, whom he spared at the earnest intercession of the goddess Gæa (the Earth). The town near which the table was overturned received the name of Trapezus (Tabletown).

This singular legend (framed on the same etymological type as that of the ants in Ægina, recounted elsewhere) seems ancient, and may probably belong to the Hesiodic Catalogue. But Pausanias tells us a story in many respects different, which was represented to him in Arcadia as the primitive local account, and which becomes the more interesting as he tells us that he himself fully believes it. Both tales, indeed, go to illustrate the same point—the ferocity of Lykaôn's character as well as the cruel rites which he practiced. Lykaôn was the first who established the worship and solemn games of Zeus Lykæus: he offered up a child to Zeus, and made libations with the blood upon the altar. Immediately after having perpetrated this act, he was changed into a wolf.

"Of the truth of this narrative," observes Pausanias, "I feel persuaded: it has been repeated by the Arcadians from old times, and it carries probability along with it. For the men of that day, from their justice and piety, were guests and companions at table with the gods, who manifested toward them approbation when they were good, and anger if they behaved ill in a palpable manner: indeed, at that time there were some who, having once been men, became gods, and who yet retain their privileges as such—Aristæus, the Krêtan Britomartis, Hêraklês son of Alkmêna, Amphiaraus the son of Oiklês, and Pollux and Kastôr besides. We may therefore believe that Lykaôn became a wild beast, and that Niobê, the daughter of Tantalus, became a stone. But in my time, wickedness having enormously increased, so as to overrun the whole earth and all the cities in it,

there are no further examples of men exalted into gods, except by mere title and from adulation towards the powerful: moreover, the anger of the gods falls tardily upon the wicked, and is reserved for them after their departure from hence."

Pausanias then proceeds to censure those who, by multiplying false miracles in more recent times, tended to rob the old and genuine miracles of their legitimate credit and esteem, The passage illustrates forcibly the views which a religious and instructed pagan took of his past time—how inseparably he blended together in it gods and men, and how little he either recognized or expected to find in it the naked phenomena and historical laws of connection which belonged to the world before him. He treats the past as the province of legend, the present as that of history; and in doing this he is more skeptical than the persons with whom he conversed, who believed not only in the ancient but even in the recent and falsely reported miracles. It is true that Pausanias does not always proceed consistently with this position: he often rationalizes the stories of the past, as if he expected to find historical threads of connection; and sometimes, though more rarely, accepts the miracles of the present. But in the present instance he draws a broad line of distinction between present and past, or rather between what is recent and what is ancient. His criticism is, in the main, analogous to that of Arrian in regard to the Amazons—denying their existence during times of recorded history, but admitting it during the early and unrecorded ages.

In the narrative of Pausanias, the sons of Lykaôn, instead of perishing by thunder from Zeus, become the founders of the various towns in Arcadia. And as that region was subdivided into a great number of small and independent townships, each having its own eponym, so the Arcadian heroic genealogy appears broken up and subdivided. Pallas, Orestheus, Phigalus, Trapezeus, Mænalus, Mantineus, and Tegeatês, are all numbered among the sons of Lykaôn, and are all eponyms of various Arcadian towns.

The legend respecting Kallistô and Arkas, the eponym of Arcadia generally, seems to have been originally quite independent of and distinct from that of Lykaôn. Eumêlus, indeed, and some other poets made Kallistô daughter of Lykaôn; but neither Hesiod nor Asius, nor Pherekydês, acknowledged any relationship between them. The beautiful Kallistô, companion of Artemis in the chase, had bound herself by a vow of chastity: Zeus, either by persuasion or by force, obtained a violation of the vow, to the grievous displeasure both of Hêrê and Artemis. The former changed Kallistô into a bear, the latter, when she was in that shape, killed her with an arrow. Zeus gave to the unfortunate Kallistô a place among the stars, as the constellation of the Bear: he also preserved the child Arkas, of which she was pregnant by him, and gave it to the Atlantid nymph Maia to bring up.

Arkas, when he became king, obtained from Triptolemus and communicated to his people the first rudiments of agriculture; he also taught them to make bread, to spin, and to weave. He had three sons—Azan, Apheidas, and Elatus: the first was the eponym of Azania, the northern region of Arcadia; the second was one of the heroes of Tegea; the third was father of Ischys (rival of Apollo for the affections of Korônis), as well as of Æpytus and Kyllên: the name of Æpytus among the heroes of Arcadia is as old as the Catalogue in the Iliad.

Aleus, son of Apheidas and king of Tegea, was the founder of the celebrated temple and worship of Athênê Alea in that town. Lykurgus and Kêpheus were his sons, Augê his daughter, who was seduced by Hêraklês, and secretly bore to him a child: the father, discovering what had happened, sent Augê to Nauplius to be sold into slavery: Teuthras, king of Mysia in Asia Minor, purchased her and made her his wife: her tomb was shown at Pergamus on the river Kaikus even in the time of Pausanias.

From Lykurgus, the son of Aleus and brother of Augê, we pass to his son Ankæus, numbered among the Argonauts, finally killed in the chase of the Kalydônian boar, and father of Agapenôr, who leads the Arcadian contingent against Troy—(the adventures of his niece, the Tegeatic huntress, Atalanta, have already been touched upon)—then to Echemus, son of Aëropus and grandson of the brother of Lykurgus, Kêpheus. Echemus is the chief heroic ornament of Tegea. When Hyllus, the son of Hêraklês, conducted the Hêrakleids on their first expedition against Peloponnêsus, Echemus commanded the Tegean troops who assembled along with the other Peloponnêsians at the isthmus of Corinth, to repel the invasion: it was agreed that the dispute should be determined by single combat, and Echemus, as the champion of Peloponnêsus, encountered and killed Hyllus. Pursuant to the stipulation by which they had bound themselves, the Hêrakleids retired, and abstained for three generations from pressing their claim upon Peloponnêsus. This valorous exploit of their great martial hero was cited and appealed to by the Tegeates before the battle of Platæa, as the principal evidence of their claim to the second post in the combined army, next in point of honor to that of the Lacedæmônians, and superior to that of the Athenians: the latter replied to them by producing as counter-evidence the splendid heroic deeds of Athens,—the protections of the Hêrakleids against Eurystheus, the victory over the Kadmeians of Thêbes, and the complete defeat of the Amazons in Attica. Nor can there be any doubt that these legendary glories were both recited by the speakers, and heard by the listeners, with profound and undoubting faith, as well as with heart-stirring admiration.

One other person there is—Ischys, son of Elatus and grandson of Arkas—in the fabulous genealogy of Arcadia whom it would be improper to pass over, inasmuch as his name and adventures are

connected with the genesis of the memorable god or hero Æsculapius, or Asklêpius. Korônis, daughter of Phlegyas, and resident near the lake Bœbëis in Thessaly, was beloved by Apollo and became pregnant by him: unfaithful to the god, she listened to the propositions of Ischys, son of Elatus, and consented to wed him: a raven brought to Apollo the fatal news, which so incensed him that he changed the color of the bird from white, as it previously had been, into black. Artemis, to avenge the wounded dignity of her brother, put Korônis to death; but Apollo preserved the male child of which she was about to be delivered, and consigned it to the Centaur Cheirôn to be brought up. The child was named Asklêpius or Æsculapius, and acquired, partly from the teaching of the beneficent leech Cheirôn, partly from inborn and superhuman aptitude, a knowledge of the virtues of herbs and a mastery of medicine and surgery, such as had never before been witnessed. He not only cured the sick, the wounded, and the dying, but even restored the dead to life. Kapaneus, Eriphylê, Hippolytus, Tyndareus, and Glaukus, were all affirmed by different poets and logographers to have been endued by him with a new life. But Zeus now found himself under the necessity of taking precautions lest mankind, thus unexpectedly protected against sickness and death, should no longer stand in need of the immortal gods: he smote Asklêpius with thunder and killed him. Apollo was so exasperated by this slaughter of his highly gifted son that he killed the Cyclôpes who had fabricated the thunder, and Zeus was about to condemn him to Tartarus for doing so; but on the intercession of Latôna he relented, and was satisfied with imposing upon him a temporary servitude in the house of Admêtus at Pheræ.

Asklêpius was worshiped with very great solemnity at Trikka, at Kôs, at Knidus, and in many different parts of Greece, but especially at Epidaurus, so that more than one legend had grown up respecting the details of his birth and adventures: in particular, his mother was by some called Arsinoê. But a formal application had been made on this subject (so the Epidaurians told Pausanias) to the oracle of Delphi, and the god in reply acknowledged that Asklêpius was his son by Korônis. The tale above recounted seems to have been both the oldest and the most current. It is adorned by Pindar in a noble ode, wherein, however, he omits all mention of the raven as messenger—not specifying who or what the spy was from whom Apollo learned the infidelity of Korônis. By many this was considered as an improvement in respect of poetical effect, but it illustrates the mode in which the characteristic details and simplicity of the old fables came to be exchanged for dignified generalities, adapted to the altered taste of society.

Machaôn and Podaleirius, the two sons of Asklêpius, command the contingent from Trikka, in the north-west region of Thessaly, at the siege of Troy by Agamemnôn. They are the leeches of the Grecian

army, highly prized and consulted by all the wounded chiefs. Their medical renown was further prolonged in the subsequent poem of Arktinus, the Iliu-Persis, wherein the one was represented as unrivaled in surgical operations, the other as sagacious in detecting and appreciating morbid symptoms. It was Podaleirius who first noticed the glaring eyes and disturbed deportment which preceded the suicide of Ajax.

Galen appears uncertain whether Asklêpius (as well as Dionysus) was originally a god, or whether he was first a man and then became afterward a god; but Apollodôrus professed to fix the exact date of his apotheosis. Throughout all the historical ages the descendants of Asklêpius were numerous and widely diffused. The many families or gentes called Asklêpiads, who devoted themselves to the study and practice of medicine, and who principally dwelt near the temples of Asklêpius, whither sick and suffering men came to obtain relief—all recognized the god, not merely as the object of their common worship, but also as their actual progenitor. Like Solôn, who reckoned Nêleus and Poseidôn as his ancestors, or the Milêsian Hekatæus, who traced his origin through fifteen successive links to a god—like the privileged gens at Pêlion in Thessaly, who considered the wise Centaur Cheirôn as their progenitor, and who inherited from him their precious secrets respecting the medicinal herbs of which their neighborhood was full,—Asklêpiads, even of the later times, numbered and specified all the intermediate links which separated them from their primitive divine parent. One of these genealogies has been preserved to us, and we may be sure that there were many such, as the Asklêpiads were found in many different places. Among them were enrolled highly instructed and accomplished men, such as the great Hippocratês and the historian Ktêsias, who prided themselves on the divine origin of themselves and their gens—so much did the legendary element pervade even the most philosophical and positive minds of historical Greece. Nor can there be any doubt that their means of medical observation must have been largely extended by their vicinity to a temple so much frequented by the sick, who came in confident hopes of divine relief, and who, while they offered up sacrifice and prayer to Æsculapius, and slept in his temple in order to be favored with healing suggestions in their dreams, might, in case the god withheld his supernatural aid, consult his living descendants. The sick visitors at Kôs, or Trikka, or Epidaurus, were numerous and constant, and the tablets usually hung up to record the particulars of their maladies, the remedies resorted to, and the cures operated by the god, formed both an interesting decoration of the sacred ground and an instructive memorial to the Asklêpiads.

The genealogical descent of Hippocratês and the other Asklêpiads from the god Asklêpius is not only analogous to that of Hekatæus and Solôn from their respective ancestral gods, but also to that of

the Lacedæmônian kings from Hêraklês, upon the basis of which the whole supposed chronology of the ante-historical times has been built, from Eratosthenês and Apollodôrus down to the chronologers of the present century. I shall revert to this hereafter.

CHAPTER X.

ÆAKUS AND HIS DESCENDANTS—ÆGINA, SALAMIS, AND PHTHIA.

The memorable heroic genealogy of the Æakids establishes a fabulous connection between Ægina, Salamis, and Phthia, which we can only recognize as a fact, without being able to trace its origin.

Æakus was the son of Zeus, born of Ægina, daughter of Asôpus, whom the god had carried off and brought into the island to which he gave her name: she was afterward married to Aktôr, and had by him Menœtius, father of Patroclus. As there were two rivers named Asôpus, one between Phlius and Sikyôn, and another between Thêbes and Platæa—so the Æginêtan heroic genealogy was connected both with that of Thêbes and with that of Phlius; and this belief led to practical consequences in the minds of those who accepted the legends as genuine history. For when the Thêbans, in the 68th Olympiad, were hard-pressed in war by Athens, they were directed by the Delphian oracle to ask assistance of their next of kin. Recollecting that Thêbê and Ægina had been sisters, common daughters of Asôpus, they were induced to apply to the Æginêtans as their next of kin, and the Æginêtans gave them aid, first by sending to them their common heroes, the Æakids, next by actual armed force. Pindar dwells emphatically on the heroic brotherhood between Thêbes, his native city, and Ægina.

Æakus was alone in Ægina: to relieve him from this solitude, Zeus changed all the ants in the island into men, and thus provided him with a numerous population, who, from their origin, were called Myrmidons. By his wife Endêis, daughter of Cheirôn, Æakus had for his sons Pêleus and Telamôn: by the Nereid Psamathê, he had Phôkus. A monstrous crime had then recently been committed by Pelops, in killing the Arcadian prince, Stymphulus, under a simulation of friendship and hospitality: for this the gods had smitten all Greece with famine and barrenness. The oracles affirmed that nothing could relieve Greece from this intolerable misery except the prayers of Æakus, the most pious of mankind. Accordingly, envoys from all quarters flocked to Ægina, to prevail upon Æakus to put up prayers for them: on his supplications the gods relented, and the suffering immediately ceased. The grateful Greeks established in

Ægina the temple and worship of Zeus Panhellênius, one of the lasting monuments and institutions of the island, on the spot where Æakus had offered up his prayer. The statues of the envoys who had come to solicit him were yet to be seen in the Æakeion, or sacred edifice of Æakus, in the time of Pausanias: and the Athenian Isokratês, in his eulogy of Evagoras, the despot of Salamis in Cyprus (who traced his descent through Teukrus to Æakus), enlarges upon this signal miracle, recounted and believed by other Greeks as well as by the Æginêtans, as a proof both of the great qualities and of the divine favor and patronage displayed in the career of the Æakids. Æakus was also employed to aid Poseidôn and Apollo in building the walls of Troy.

Pêleus and Telamôn, the sons of Æakus, contracting a jealousy of their bastard brother, Phôkus, in consequence of his eminent skill in gymnastic contests, conspired to put him to death. Telamôn flung his quoit at him while they were playing together, and Pêleus dispatched him by a blow with his hatchet in the back. They then concealed the dead body in a wood, but Æakus, having discovered both the act and the agents, banished the brothers from the island. For both of them eminent destinies were in store.

While we notice the indifference to the moral quality of actions implied in the old Hesiodic legend, when it imputes distinctly and nakedly this proceeding to two of the most admired persons of the heroic world—it is not less instructive to witness the change of feeling which had taken place in the age of Pindar. That warm eulogist of the great Æakid race hangs down his head with shame, and declines to recount, though he is obliged darkly to glance at, the cause which forced the pious Æakus to banish his sons from Ægina. It appears that Kallimachus, if we may judge by a short fragment, manifested the same repugnance to mention it.

Telamôn retired to Salamis, then ruled by Kychreus, the son of Poseidôn and Salamis, who had recently rescued the island from the plague of a terrible serpent. This animal, expelled from Salamis, retired to Eleusis in Attica, where it was received and harbored by the goddess Dêmêtêr in her sacred domicile. Kychreus dying childless left his dominion to Telamôn, who, marrying Peribœa, daughter of Alkathoos, and grand-daughter of Pelops, had for his son the celebrated Ajax. Telamôn took part both in the chase of the Kalydônian boar and in the Argonautic expedition: he was also the intimate friend and companion of Hêraklês, whom he accompanied in his enterprise against the Amazons, and in the attack made with only six ships upon Laomedôn, king of Troy. This last enterprise having proved completely successful, Telamôn was rewarded by Hêraklês with the possession of the daughter of Laomedôn, Hêsionê—who bore to him Teukros, the most distinguished archer amid the host of Agamemnôn, and the founder of Salamis in Cyprus.

Pêleus went to Phthia, where he married the daughter of Eurytiôn,

son of Aktôr, and received from him the third part of his dominions. Taking part in the Kalydônian boar-hunt, he unintentionally killed his father-in-law Eurytiôn, and was obliged to flee to Iôlkos, where he received purification from Akastus, son of Pelias: the danger to which he became exposed, by the calumnious accusations of the enamored wife of Akastus, has already been touched upon in a previous section. Pêleus also was among the Argonauts; the most memorable event in his life, however, was his marriage with the sea-goddess Thetis. Zeus and Poseidôn had both conceived a violent passion for Thetis. But the former having been forewarned by Promêtheus that Thetis was destined to give birth to a son more powerful than his father, compelled her, much against her own will, to marry Pêleus; who, instructed by the intimations of the wise Cheirôn, was enabled to seize her on the coast called Sêpias in the southern region of Thessaly. She changed her form several times, but Pêleus held her fast until she resumed her original appearance, and she was then no longer able to resist. All the gods were present, and brought splendid gifts to these memorable nuptials: Apollo sang with his harp, Poseidôn gave to Pêleus the immortal horses Xanthus and Balius, and Cheirôn presented a formidable spear, cut from an ash-tree on Mount Pêlion. We shall have reason hereafter to recognize the value of both these gifts in the exploits of Achillês.

The prominent part assigned to Thetis in the Iliad is well known, and the post-Homeric poets of the Legend of Troy introduced her as actively concurring first to promote the glory, finally to bewail the death, of her distinguished son. Pêleus, having survived both his son Achillês and his grandson Neoptolemus, is ultimately directed to place himself on the very spot where he had originally seized Thetis, and thither the goddess comes herself to fetch him away, in order that he may exchange the desertion and decrepitude of age for a life of immortality along with the Nêreids. The spot was indicated to Xerxes when he marched into Greece by the Iônians who accompanied him, and his magi offered solemn sacrifices to her as well as to the other Nêreids, as the presiding goddesses and mistresses of the coast.

Neoptolemus or Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles, too young to engage in the commencement of the siege of Troy, comes on the stage after the death of his father as the indispensable and prominent agent in the final capture of the city. He returns victor from Troy, not to Phthia, but to Epirus, bringing with him the captive Andromachê, widow of Hectôr, by whom Molossus is born to him. He himself perishes in the full vigor of life at Delphi by the machinations of Orestês, son of Agamemnôn. But his son Molossus—like Fleance, the son of Banquo, in Macbeth—becomes the father of the powerful race of Molossian kings, who played so conspicuous a part during the declining vigor of the Grecian cities, and to whom the title and parentage of Æakids was a source of peculiar pride, identifying

them by community of heroic origin with genuine and undisputed Hellênes.

The glories of Ajax, the second grandson of Æakus, before Troy, are surpassed only by those of Achillês. He perishes by his own hand, the victim of an insupportable feeling of humiliation, because a less worthy claimant is allowed to carry off from him the arms of the departed Achillês. His son Philæus receives the citizenship of Athens, and the gens or dême called Philaidæ traced up to him its name and its origin: moreover, the distinguished Athenians, Miltiadês and Thucydidês, were regarded as members of this heroic progeny.

Teukrus escaped from the perils of the siege of Troy as well as from those of the voyage homeward, and reached Salamis in safety. But his father Telamôn, indignant at his having returned without Ajax, refused to receive him, and compelled him to expatriate. He conducted his followers to Cyprus, where he founded the city of Salamis: his descendant Evagoras was recognized as a Teukrid and as an Æakid even in the time of Isokratês.

Such was the splendid heroic genealogy of the Æakids,—a family renowned for military excellence. The Æakeion at Ægina, in which prayer and sacrifice were offered to Æakus, remained in undiminished dignity down to the time of Pausanias. This genealogy connects together various eminent gentes in Achaia Phthiôtis, in Ægina, in Salamis, in Cyprus, and among the Epirotic Molossians. Whether we are entitled to infer from it that the island of Ægina was originally peopled by Myrmidones from Achaia Phthiôtis, as O. Müller imagines, I will not pretend to affirm. These mythical pedigrees seem to unite together special clans or gentes, rather than the bulk of any community—just as we know that the Athenians generally had no part in the Æakid genealogy, though certain particular Athenian families laid claim to it. The intimate friendship between Achillês and the Opuntian hero Patroklus—and the community of name and frequent conjunction between the Lokrian Ajax, son of Oïleus, and Ajax, son of Telamôn—connect the Æakids with Opus and the Opuntian Lokrians, in a manner which we have no further means of explaining. Pindar, too, represents Menœtius, father of Patroklus, as son of Aktôr and Ægina, and, therefore, maternal brother of Æakus.

CHAPTER XI.

ATTIC LEGENDS AND GENEALOGIES.

THE most ancient name in Attic archæology, as far as our means of information reach, is that of Erechtheus, who is mentioned both in the Catalogue of the Iliad and in a brief allusion of the Odyssey. Born of the earth, he is brought up by the goddess Athênê, adopted by her as her ward, and installed in her temple at Athens, where the Athenians offer to him annual sacrifices. The Athenians are styled in the Iliad, "the people of Erechtheus." This is the most ancient testimony concerning Erechtheus, exhibiting him as a divine or heroic, certainly a superhuman person, and identifying him with the primitive germination (if I may use a term, the Grecian equivalent of which would have pleased an Athenian ear) of Attic man. And he was recognized in this same character, even at the close of the fourth century before the Christian era, by the Butadæ, one of the most ancient and important gentes at Athens, who boasted of him as their original ancestor: the genealogy of the great Athenian orator Lykurgus, a member of this family, drawn up by his son Abrôn, and painted on a public tablet in the Erechtheion, contained as its first and highest name, Erechtheus, son of Hêphæstos and the Earth. In the Erechtheion, Erechtheus was worshiped conjointly with Athênê: he was identified with the god Poseidôn, and bore the denomination of Poseidôn Erechtheus: one of the family of the Butadæ, chosen among themselves by lot, enjoyed the privilege and performed the functions of hereditary priest. Herodotus also assigns the same earth-born origin to Erechtheus: but Pindar, the old poem called the Danais, Euripidês, and Apollodôrus—all name Erichthonius, son of Hêphæstos and the Earth, as the being who was thus adopted and made the temple-companion of Athênê, while Apollodôrus in another place identifies Erichthonius with Poseidôn. The Homeric scholiast treated Erechtheus and Erichthonius as the same person under two names: and since, in regard to such mythical persons, there exists no other test of identity of the subject except perfect similarity of the attributes, this seems the reasonable conclusion.

We may presume, from the testimony of Homer, that the first and oldest conception of Athens and its sacred acropolis places it under the special protection, and represents it as the settlement and favorite abode of Athênê, jointly with Poseidôn; the latter being the inferior, though the chosen companion of the former, and therefore exchanging his divine appellation for the cognomen of Erechtheus. But the country called Attica, which, during the historical ages, forms one social and political aggregate with Athens, was originally distributed

into many independent dêmes or cantons, and included, besides, various religious clans or hereditary sects (if the expression may be permitted); that is, a multitude of persons not necessarily living together in the same locality, but bound together by an hereditary communion of sacred rites, and claiming privileges as well as performing obligations, founded upon the traditional authority of divine persons for whom they had a common veneration. Even down to the beginning of the Peloponnêsian war, the demots of the various Attic dêmes, though long since embodied in the larger political union of Attica, and having no wish for separation, still retained the recollection of their original political autonomy. They lived in their own separate localities, resorted habitually to their own temples, and visited Athens only occasionally for private or political business, or for the great public festivals. Each of these aggregates, political as well as religious, had its own eponymous god or hero, with a genealogy more or less extended, and a train of mythical incidents more or less copious, attached to his name, according to the fancy of the local exegetes and poets. The eponymous heroes Marathôn, Dekelus, Kolônus, or Phlyus, had each their own title to worship, and their own position as themes of legendary narrative, independent of Erechtheus, or Poseidôn, or Athênê, the patrons of the acropolis common to all of them.

But neither the archæology of Attica, nor that of its various component fractions, was much dwelt upon by the ancient epic poets of Greece. Thêseus is noticed both in the Iliad and Odyssey as having carried off from Krête Ariadnê, the daughter of Minos—thus commencing that connection between the Krêtan and Athenian legends which we afterward find so largely amplified—and the sons of Thêseus take part in the Trojan war. The chief collectors and narrators of the Attic mythes were the prose logographers, authors of the many compositions called Atthides, or works on Attic archæology. These writers—Hellanikus, the contemporary of Herodotus, is the earliest composer of an Atthis expressly named, though Pherekydês also touched upon the Attic fables,—these writers, I say, interwove into one chronological series the legends which either greatly occupied their own fancy, or commanded the most general reverence among their countrymen. In this way the religious and political legends of Eleusis, a town originally independent of Athens, but incorporated with it before the historical age, were worked into one continuous sequence along with those of the Erechtheids. In this way, too, Kekrops, the eponymous hero of the portion of Attica called Kekropia, came to be placed in the mythical chronology at a higher point even than the primitive god or hero Erechtheus.

Ogygês is said to have reigned in Attica 1020 years before the first Olympiad, or 1796 years B.C. In his time happened the deluge of Deukaliôn, which destroyed most of the inhabitants of the country. After a long interval, Kekrops, an indigenous person, half man and half serpent, is given to us by Apollodôrus as the first king of the country; he bestowed upon the land, which had before been called Aktê, the name of Kekropia. In his day there ensued a dispute between Athênê and Poseidôn respecting the possession of the acropolis at Athens, which each of them coveted. First, Poseidôn struck the rock with his trident, and produced the well of salt water which existed in it, called the Erechthêis: next came Athênê, who planted the sacred olive tree ever afterward seen and venerated in the portion of the Erechtheion called the cell of Pandrosus. The twelve gods decided the dispute; and Kekrops having testified before them that Athênê had rendered this inestimable service, they adjudged the spot to her in preference to Poseidôn. Both the ancient olive tree and the well produced by Poseidôn were seen on the acropolis, in the temple consecrated jointly to Athênê and Erechtheus, throughout the historical ages. Poseidôn, as a mark of his wrath for the preference given to Athênê, inundated the Thriasian plain with water.

During the reign of Kekrops, Attica was laid waste by Karian pirates on the coast, and by invasions of the Aônian inhabitants from Bœôtia. Kekrops distributed the inhabitants of Attica into twelve local sections—Kekropia, Tetrapolis, Epakria, Dekeleia, Eleusis, Aphidna, Thorikus, Braurôn, Kythêrus, Sphêttus, Kêphisius, Phalêrus. Wishing to ascertain the number of inhabitants, he commanded each man to cast a single stone into a general heap: the number of stones was counted, and it was found that there were twenty thousand.

Kekrops married the daughter of Aktæus, who (according to Pausanias's version) had been king of the country before him, and had called it by the name of Aktæa. By her he had three daughters, Aglaurus, Ersê, and Pandrosus, and a son, Erysichthôn.

Erysichthôn died without issue, and Kranaus succeeded him,—another indigenous person and another eponymus,—for the name Kranai was an old denomination of the inhabitants of Attica. Kranaus was dethroned by Amphiktyôn, by some called an indigenous man; by others, a son of Deukaliôn: Amphiktyôn in his turn was expelled by Erichthonius, son of Hêphæstos and the Earth,—the same person apparently as Erechtheus, but inserted by Apollodôrus at this point of the series. Erichthonius, the pupil and favored companion of Athênê, placed in the acropolis the original Palladium or wooden statue of that goddess, said to have dropped from heaven: he was, moreover, the first to celebrate the festival of the Panathenæa. He married the nymph Pasithea, and had for his son and successor Pandiôn. Erichthonius was the first person who taught the art of breaking in horses to the yoke, and who drove a chariot and four.

In the time of Pandiôn, who succeeded to Erichthonius, Dionysus and Dêmêtêr both came into Attica; the latter was received by

Kelcos at Eleusis. Pandiôn married the nymph Zeuxippê, and had twin sons, Erechtheus and Butês, and two daughters, Prokné and Philomêla. The two latter are the subjects of a memorable and well-known legend. Pandiôn having received aid in repelling the Thêbans from Têreus, king of Thrace, gave him his daughter Prokné in marriage, by whom he had a son, Itys. The beautiful Philomêla, going to visit her sister, inspired the barbarous Thracian with an irresistible passion; he violated her person, confined her in a distant pastoral hut, and pretended that she was dead, cutting out her tongue to prevent her from revealing the truth. After a long interval, Philomêla found means to inform her sister of the cruel deed which had been perpetrated; she wove into a garment words describing her melancholy condition, and dispatched it by a trusty messenger. Prokné, overwhelmed with sorrow and anger, took advantage of the free egress enjoyed by women during the Bacchanalian festival to go and release her sister: the two sisters then revenged themselves upon Têreus by killing the boy Itys, and serving him up for his father to eat; after the meal had been finished, the horrid truth was revealed to him. Têreus snatched a hatchet to put Prokné to death: she fled, along with Philomêla, and all the three were changed into birds—Prokné became a swallow, Philomêla a nightingale, and Têreus an hoopoe. This tale, so popular with the poets and so illustrative of the general character of Grecian legend, is not less remarkable in another point of view—that the great historian Thucydidês seems to allude to it as an historical fact, not, however, directly mentioning the final metamorphosis.

After the death of Pandiôn, Erechtheus succeeded to the kingdom, and his brother Butês became priest of Poseidôn Erichthonius; a function which his descendants ever afterward exercised, the Butadæ or Eteobutadæ. Erechtheus seems to appear in three characters in the fabulous history of Athens—as a god, Poseidôn Erechtheus; as a hero, Erechtheus, son of the Earth; and now, as a king, son of Pandiôn,—so much did the ideas of divine and human rule become confounded and blended together in the imagination of the Greeks in reviewing their early times.

The daughters of Erechtheus were not less celebrated in Athenian legend than those of Pandiôn. Prokris, one of them, is among the heroines seen by Odysseus in Hadês: she became the wife of Kephalus, son of Deionês, and lived in the Attic dême of Thorikus.

Kreüsa, another daughter of Erechtheus, seduced by Apollo, becomes the mother of Iôn, whom she exposes immediately after his birth in the cave north of the acropolis, concealing the fact from every one. Apollo prevails upon Hermês to convey the new-born child to Delphi, where he is brought up as a servant of the temple, without knowing his parents. Kreüsa marries Xuthus, son of Æolus, but, continuing childless, she goes with Xuthus to the Delphian oracle to inquire for a remedy. The god presents to them

Iôn, and desires them to adopt him as their son: their son Achæus is afterward born to them, and Iôn and Achæus become the eponyms of the Iônians and Achæans.

Oreithyia, the third daughter of Erechtheus, wss stolen away by the god Boreas while amusing herself on the banks of the Ilissus, and carried to his residence in Thrace. The two sons of this marriage, Zêtês and Kalais, were born with wings: they took part in the Argonautic expedition, and engaged in the pursuit of the harpies: they were slain at Tênos by Hêraklês. Kleopatra, the daughter of Boreas and Oreithyia, was married to Phineus, and had two sons, Plexippus and Pandiôn; but Phineus afterward espoused a second wife, Idæa, the daughter of Dardanus, who, detesting the two sons of the former bed, accused them falsely of attempting her chastity, and persuaded Phineus in his wrath to put out the eyes of both. For this cruel proceeding he was punished by the Argonauts in the course of their voyage.

On more than one occasion the Athenians derived, or at least believed themselves to have derived, important benefits from this marriage of Boreas with the daughter of their primeval hero: one inestimable service, rendered at a juncture highly critical for Grecian independence, deserves to be specified. At the time of the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, the Grecian fleet was assembled at Chalkis and Artemision in Eubœa, awaiting the approach of the Persian force, so overwhelming in its numbers as well by sea as on land. The Persian fleet had reached the coast of Magnêsia and the south-eastern corner of Thessaly without any material damage, when the Athenians were instructed by an oracle "to invoke the aid of their son-in-law." Understanding the advice to point to Boreas, they supplicated his aid and that of Oreithyia most earnestly, as well by prayer as by sacrifice, and the event corresponded to their wishes. A furious north-easterly wind immediately arose, and continued for three days to afflict the Persian fleet as it lay on an unprotected coast: the number of ships driven ashore, both vessels of war and of provision, was immense, and the injury done to the armament was never thoroughly repaired. Such was the powerful succour which the Athenians derived, at a time of their utmost need, from their son-in-law Boreas; and their gratitude was shown by consecrating to him a new temple on the banks of the Ilissus.

The three remaining daughters of Erechtheus—he had six in all—were in Athenian legend yet more venerated than their sisters, on account of having voluntarily devoted themselves to death for the safety of their country. Eumolpus of Eleusis was the son of Poseidôn and the eponymous hero of the sacred gens called the Eumolpids, in whom the principal functions appertaining to the mysterious rites of Dêmêtêr at Eleusis, were vested by hereditary privilege. He made war upon Erechtheus and the Athenians, with the aid of a body of Thracian allies; indeed, it appears that the legends of

Athens, originally foreign and unfriendly to those of Eleusis, represented him as having been himself a Thracian born and an immigrant into Attica. Respecting Eumolpus, however, and his parentage, the discrepancies much exceed even the measure of license usual in the legendary genealogies, and some critics, both ancient and modern, have sought to reconcile these contradictions, by the usual stratagem of supposing two or three different persons of the same name. Even Pausanias, so familiar with this class of unsworn witnesses, complains of the want of native Eleusinian genealogists, and of the extreme license of fiction in which other authors had indulged.

In the Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr, the most ancient testimony before us,—composed, to all appearance, earlier than the complete incorporation of Eleusis with Athens,—Eumolpus appears (to repeat briefly what has been stated in a previous chapter) as one of the native chiefs or princes of Eleusis, along with Triptolemus, Dioklês, Polyxeinus, and Dolichus; Keleos is the king or principal among these chiefs, the son or lineal descendant of the eponymous Eleusis himself. To these chiefs, and to the three daughters of Keleos, the goddess Dêmêtêr comes in her sorrow for the loss of her daughter Persephonê: being hospitably entertained by Keleos she reveals her true character, commands that a temple shall be built to her at Eleusis, and prescribes to them the rites according to which they are to worship her. Such seems to have been the ancient story of the Eleusinians respecting their own religious antiquities: Keleos, with Metaneira his wife, and the other chiefs here mentioned, were worshiped at Eleusis, and from thence transferred to Athens as local gods or heroes. Eleusis became incorporated with Athens, apparently not very long before the time of Solôn; and the Eleusinian worship of Dêmêtêr was then received into the great religious solemnities of the Athenian state, to which it owes its remarkable subsequent extension and commanding influence. In the Atticized worship of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, the Eumolpids and the Kêrykes were the principal hereditary functionaries: Eumolpus, the eponym of this great family, came thus to play the principal part in the Athenian legendary version of the war between Athens and Eleusis. An oracle had pronounced that Athens could only be rescued from his attack by the death of the three daughters of Erechtheus; their generous patriotism consented to the sacrifice, and their father put them to death. He then went forth confidently to the battle, totally vanquished the enemy, and killed Eumolpus with his own hand. Erechtheus was worshiped as a god, and his daughters as goddesses, at Athens. Their names and their exalted devotion were cited along with those of the warriors of Marathôn, in the public assembly of Athens, by orators who sought to arouse the languid patriot, or to denounce the cowardly deserter; and the people listened both to one

and the other with analogous feelings of grateful veneration, as well as with equally unsuspecting faith in the matter of fact.

Though Erechtheus gained the victory over Eumolpus, yet the story represents Poseidôn as having put an end to the life and reign of Erechtheus, who was (it seems) slain in the battle. He was succeeded by his son Kekrops II., and the latter again by his son Pandiôn II.,—two names unmarked by any incidents, and which appear to be mere duplication of the former Kekrops and Pandiôn, placed there by the genealogizers for the purpose of filling up what seemed to them a chronological chasm.

Apollodôrus passes at once from Erechtheus to his son Kekrops II., then to Pandiôn II., next to the four sons of the latter, Ægeus, Pallas, Nisus, and Lykus. But the tragedians here insert the story of Xuthus, Kreüsa, and Iôn; the latter being the son of Kreüsa by Apollo, but given by the god to Xuthus, and adopted by the latter as his own. Iôn becomes the successor of Erechtheus, and his sons (Teleon, Hoplês, Argadês, and Aigikorês) become the eponyms of the four ancient tribes of Athens, which subsisted until the revolution of Kleisthenês. Iôn himself is the eponym of the Iônic race both in Asia, in Europe, and in the Ægean islands: Dôrus and Achæus are the sons of Kreüsa by Xuthus, so that Iôn is distinguished from both of them by being of divine parentage. According to the story given by Philochorus, Iôn rendered such essential service in rescuing the Athenians from the attack of the Thracians under Eumolpus, that he was afterwards made king of the country, and distributed all the inhabitants into four tribes or castes, corresponding to different modes of life,—soldiers, husbandmen, goatherds, and artisans. And it seems that the legend explanatory of the origin of the festival Boedromia, originally important enough to furnish a name to one of the Athenian months, was attached to the aid thus rendered by Iôn.

We pass from Iôn to persons of far greater mythical dignity and interest,—Ægeus and his son Thêseus.

Pandiôn had four sons, Ægeus, Nisus, Lykus, and Pallas, between whom he divided his dominions. Nisus received the territory of Megaris, which had been under the sway of Pandiôn, and there founded the seaport of Nisæa. Lykus was made king of the eastern coast, but a dispute afterward ensued, and he quitted the country altogether, to establish himself on the southern coast of Asia Minor, among the Termilæ, to whom he gave the name of Lykians. Ægeus, as the eldest of the four, became king of Athens; but Pallas received a portion both of the south-western coast and the interior, and he as well as his children appear as frequent enemies both to Ægeus and to Thêseus. Pallas is the eponym of the dême Pallênê, and the stories respecting him and his sons seem to be connected with old and standing feuds among the different dêmes of Attica, originally independent communities. These feuds penetrated into the legend. They

explain the story which we find that Ægeus and Thêseus were not genuine Erechtheids, the former being denominated a supposititious child to Pandiôn.

Ægeus has little importance in the mythical history except as the father of Thêseus: it may even be doubted whether his name is anything more than a mere cognomen of the god Poseidôn, who was (as we are told) the real father of this great Attic Hêraklês. As I pretend only to give a very brief outline of the general territory of Grecian legend, I cannot permit myself to recount in detail the chivalrous career of Thêseus, who is found both in the Kalydônian boar-hunt and in the Argonautic expedition—his personal and victorious encounters with the robbers Sinnis, Prokrustês, Periphêtês, Skiron, and others—his valuable service in ridding his country of the Krommyonian sow and the Marathônian bull—his conquest of the Minotaur in Krête, and his escape from the dangers of the labyrinth by the aid of Ariadnê, whom he subsequently carries off and abandons—his many amorous adventures, and his expeditions both against the Amazons and into the under-world along with Peirithous.

Thucydidês delineates the character of Thêseus as a man who combined sagacity with political power, and who conferred upon his country the inestimable benefit of uniting all the separate and self-governing dêmes of Attica into one common political society. From the well-earned reverence attached to the assertion of Thucydidês, it has been customary to reason upon this assertion as historically authentic, and to treat the romantic attributes which we find in Plutarch and Diodôrus as if they were fiction superinduced upon this basis of fact. Such a view of the case is, in my judgment, erroneous. The athletic and amorous knight-errant is the old version of the character—the profound and long-sighted politician is a subsequent correction, introduced indeed by men of superior mind, but destitute of historical warranty, and arising out of their desire to find reasons of their own for concurring in the veneration which the general public paid more easily and heartily to their national hero. Thêseus, in the Iliad and Odyssey, fights with the Lapithæ against the Centaurs: Thêseus, in the Hesiodic poems, is misguided by his passion for the beautiful Æglê, daughter of Panopeus; and the Thêseus described in Plutarch's biography is in great part a continuation and expansion of these same or similar attributes, mingled with many local legends, explaining, like the Fasti of Ovid, or the lost Aitia of Kallimachus, the original genesis of prevalent religious and social customs. Plutarch has doubtless greatly softened down and modified the adventures which he found in the Attic logographers, as well as in the poetical epics called Thêsêis. For in his preface to the life of Thêseus, after having emphatically declared that he is about to transcend the boundary both of the known and the knowable, but that the temptation of comparing the founder of Athens with the founder of Rome is irresistible, he concludes with the following remarkable

words: "I pray that this fabulous matter may be so far obedient to my endeavors as to receive, when purified by reason, the aspect of history: in those cases where it haughtily scorns plausibility and will admit no alliance with what is probable, I shall beg for indulgent hearers, willing to receive antique narrative in a mild spirit." We here see that Plutarch sat down, not to recount the old fables as he found them, but to purify them by reason and to impart to them the aspect of history. We have to thank him for having retained, after this purification, so much of what is romantic and marvelous; but we may be sure that the sources from which he borrowed were more romantic and marvelous still. It was the tendency of the enlightened men of Athens, from the days of Solôn downward, to refine and politicize the character of Thêseus: even Peisistratus expunged from one of the Hesiodic poems the line which described the violent passion of the hero for the fair Æglê: and the tragic poets found it more congenial to the feelings of their audience to exhibit him as a dignified and liberal sovereign rather than as an adventurous single-handed fighter. But the logographers and the Alexandrine poets remained more faithful to the old fables. The story of Hekalê, the hospitable old woman who received and blessed Thêseus when he went against the Marathônian bull, and whom he found dead when he came back to recount the news of his success, was treated by Kallimachus: and Virgil must have had his mind full of the unrefined legends when he numbered this Attic Hêraklês among the unhappy sufferers condemned to endless penance in the under-world.

Two, however, among the Thêseian fables cannot be dismissed without some special notice—the war against the Amazons, and the expedition against Krête. The former strikingly illustrates the facility as well as the tenacity of Grecian legendary faith; the latter embraces the story of Dædalus and Minos, two of the most eminent among Grecian ante-historical personages.

The Amazons, daughters of Arês and Harmonia, are both early creations, and frequent reproductions, of the ancient epic—which was indeed, we may generally remark, largely occupied both with the exploits and sufferings of women, or heroines, the wives and daughters of the Grecian heroes—and which recognized in Pallas Athênê the finished type of an irresistible female warrior. A nation of courageous, hardy, and indefatigable women, dwelling apart from men, permitting only a short temporary intercourse for the purpose of renovating their numbers, and burning out their right breast with a view of enabling themselves to draw the bow freely,—this was at once a general type stimulating to the fancy of the poet, and a theme eminently popular with his hearers. Nor was it at all repugnant to the faith of the latter, who had no recorded facts to guide them, and no other standard of credibility as to the past except such poetical narratives themselves—to conceive communities of Amazons

as having actually existed in anterior time. Accordingly, we find these warlike females constantly reappearing in the ancient poems, and universally accepted as past realities. In the Iliad, when Priam wishes to illustrate emphatically the most numerous host in which he ever found himself included, he tells us that it was assembled in Phrygia, on the banks of the Sangarius, for the purpose of resisting the formidable Amazons. When Bellerophôn is to be employed on a deadly and perilous undertaking, by those who indirectly wish to procure his death, he is dispatched against the Amazons. In the Æthiopis of Arktinus, describing the post-Homeric war of Troy, Penthesileia, queen of the Amazons, appears as the most effective ally of the besieged city, and as the most formidable enemy of the Greeks, succumbing only to the invincible might of Achilles. The Argonautic heroes find the Amazons on the river Thermôdôn, in their expedition along the southern coast of the Euxine. To the same spot Hêraklês goes to attack them, in the performance of the ninth labor imposed upon him by Eurystheus, for the purpose of procuring the girdle of the Amazonian queen Hippolytê; and we are told that they had not yet recovered from the losses sustained in this severe aggression when Thêseus also assaulted and defeated them, carrying off their queen Antiopê. This injury they avenged by invading Attica,—an undertaking (as Plutarch justly observes) "neither trifling nor feminine," especially if, according to the statement of Hellanikus, they crossed the Cimmerian Bosphorus on the winter ice, beginning their march from the Asiatic side of the Palus Mæotis. They overcame all the resistances and difficulties of this prodigious march, and penetrated even into Athens itself; where the final battle, hard-fought and at one time doubtful, by which Thêseus crushed them, was fought—in the very heart of the city. Attic antiquaries confidently pointed out the exact position of the two contending armies: the left wing of the Amazons rested upon the spot occupied by the commemorative monument called the Amazoneion; the right wing touched the Pnyx, the place in which the public assemblies of the Athenian democracy were afterward held. The details and fluctuations of the combat, as well as the final triumph and consequent truce, were recounted by these authors with as complete faith and as much circumstantiality as those of the battle of Platæa by Herodotus. The sepulchral edifice called the Amazoneion, the tomb or pillar of Antiopê near the western gate of the city—the spot called the Horkomosion near the temple of Thêseus—even the hill of Areiopagus itself, and the sacrifices which it was customary to offer to the Amazons at the periodical festival of the Thêseia—were all so many religious mementos of this victory; which was, moreover, a favorite subject of art both with the sculptor and the painter, at Athens as well as in other parts of Greece.

No portion of the ante-historical epic appears to have been more deeply worked into the national mind of Greece than this invasion

and defeat of the Amazons. It was not only a constant theme of the logographers, but was also familiarly appealed to by the popular orators, along with Marathôn and Salamis, among those antique exploits of which their fellow-citizens might justly be proud. It formed a part of the retrospective faith of Herodotus, Lysias, Plato, and Isokratês, and the exact date of the event was settled by the chronologists. Nor did the Athenians stand alone in such a belief. Throughout many other regions of Greece, both European and Asiatic, traditions and memorials of the Amazons were found. At Megara, at Trœzen, in Laconia near Cape Tænarus, at Chæroneia in Bœôtia, and in more than one part of Thessaly, sepulchers or monuments of the Amazons were preserved. The warlike women (it was said), on their way to Attica, had not traversed those countries without leaving some evidences of their passage.

Among the Asiatic Greeks the supposed traces of the Amazons were yet more numerous. Their proper territory was asserted to be the town and plain of Themiskyra, near the Grecian colony of Amisus, on the river Thermôdôn, a region called after their name by Roman historians and geographers. But they were believed to have conquered and occupied in earlier times a much wider range of territory, extending even to the coast of Iônia and Æolis. Ephesus, Smyrna, Kymê, Myrina, Paphos, and Sinopê were affirmed to have been founded and denominated by them. Some authors placed them in Libya or Ethiopia; and when the Pontic Greeks on the northwestern shore of the Euxine had become acquainted with the hardy and daring character of the Sarmatian maidens,—who were obliged to have slain each an enemy in battle as the condition of obtaining a husband, and who artificially prevented the growth of the right breast during childhood,—they could imagine no more satisfactory mode of accounting for such attributes than by deducing the Sarmatians from a colony of vagrant Amazons, expelled by the Grecian heroes from their territory on the Thermôdôn. Pindar ascribed the first establishment of the memorable temple of Artemis at Ephesus to the Amazons. And Pausanias explains in part the pre-eminence which this temple enjoyed over every other in Greece by the widely diffused renown of its female founders, respecting whom he observes (with perfect truth, if we admit the historical character of the old epic) that women possess an unparalleled force of resolution in resisting adverse events, since the Amazons, after having been first roughly handled by Hêraklês, and then completely defeated by Thêseus, could yet find courage to play so conspicuous a part in the defense of Troy against the Grecian besiegers.

It is thus that in what is called early Grecian history, as the Greeks themselves looked back upon it, the Amazons were among the most prominent and undisputed personages. Nor will the circumstance appear wonderful if we reflect that the belief in them was first established at a time when the Grecian mind was fed with nothing

else but religious legend and epic poetry, and that the incidents of the supposed past, as received from these sources, were addressed to their faith and feelings, without being required to adapt themselves to any canons of credibility drawn from present experience. But the time came when the historians of Alexander the Great audaciously abused this ancient credence. Among other tales calculated to exalt the dignity of that monarch, they affirmed that, after his conquest and subjugation of the Persian empire, he had been visited in Hyrcania by Thalestris, queen of the Amazons, who, admiring his warlike prowess, was anxious to be enabled to return into her own country in a condition to produce offspring of a breed so invincible. But the Greeks had now been accustomed for a century and a half to historical and philosophical criticism—and that uninquiring faith, which was readily accorded to the wonders of the past, could no longer be invoked for them when tendered as present reality. For the fable of the Amazons was here reproduced in its naked simplicity, without being rationalized or painted over with historical colors.

Some literary men indeed, among whom were Dêmêtrius of Skepsis, and the Mitylenæan Theophanês, the companion of Pompey in his expeditions, still continued their belief both in Amazons present and Amazons past; and when it became notorious that at least there were none such on the banks of the Thermôdôn, these authors supposed them to have migrated from their original locality, and to have settled in the unvisited regions north of Mount Caucasus. Strabo, on the contrary, feeling that the grounds of disbelief applied with equal force to the ancient stories and to the modern, rejected both the one and the other. But he remarks at the same time, not without some surprise, that it was usual with most persons to adopt a middle course,—to retain the Amazons as historical phenomena of the remote past, but to disallow them as realities of the present, and to maintain that the breed had died out. The accomplished intellect of Julius Cæsar did not scruple to acknowledge them as having once conquered and held in dominion a large portion of Asia. And the compromise between early, traditional, and religious faith on the one hand, and established habits of critical research on the other, adopted by the historian Arrian, deserves to be transcribed in his own words, as illustrating strikingly the powerful sway of the old legends even over the most positive-minded Greeks: "Neither Aristobulus nor Ptolemy" he observes, "nor any other competent witness, has recounted this (visit of the Amazons and their queen to Alexander): nor does it seem to me that the race of the Amazons was preserved down to that time, nor have they been noticed either by any one before Alexander, or by Xenophôn, though he mentions both the Phasians and the Kolchians, and the other barbarous nations which the Greeks saw both before and after their arrival at Trapezus, in which marches they must have met with the Amazons, if the latter had been still in existence. Yet *it is incredible to me* that this race of

women, celebrated as they have been by authors so many and so commanding, *should never have existed at all.* The story tells of Hêraklês, that he set out from Greece and brought back with him the girdle of their queen Hippolytê; also of Thêseus and the Athenians, that they were the first who defeated in battle and repelled these women in their invasion of Europe; and the combat of the Athenians with the Amazons has been painted by Mikôn, not less than that between the Athenians and the Persians. Moreover, Herodotus has spoken in many places of these women; and those Athenian orators who have pronounced panegyrics on the citizens slain in battle, have dwelt upon the victory over the Amazons as among the most memorable of Athenian exploits. If the satrap of Media sent any equestrian women at all to Alexander, I think that they must have come from some of the neighboring barbarous tribes, practiced in riding and equipped in the costume generally called Amazonian."

There cannot be a more striking evidence of the indelible force with which these ancient legends were worked into the national faith and feelings of the Greeks than these remarks of a judicious historian upon the fable of the Amazons. Probably, if any plausible mode of rationalizing it, and of transforming it into a quasi-political event, had been offered to Arrian, he would have been better pleased to adopt such a middle term, and would have rested comfortably in the supposition that he believed the legend in its true meaning, while his less inquiring countrymen were imposed upon by the exaggerations of poets. But as the story was presented to him plain and unvarnished, either for acceptance or rejection, his feelings as a patriot and a religious man prevented him from applying to the past such tests of credibility as his untrammeled reason acknowledged to be paramount in regard to the present. When we see, moreover, how much his belief was strengthened, and all tendency to skepticism shut out, by the familiarity of his eye and memory with sculptured or painted Amazons—we may calculate the irresistible force of this sensible demonstration on the convictions of the unlettered public, at once more deeply retentive of passive impressions, and unaccustomed to the countervailing habit of rational investigation into evidence. Had the march of an army of warlike women, from the Thermôdôn or the Tanais into the heart of Attica, been recounted to Arrian as an incident belonging to the time of Alexander the Great, he would have rejected it no less emphatically than Strabô; but cast back as it was into an undefined past, it took rank among the hallowed traditions of divine or heroic antiquity,—gratifying to extol by rhetoric, but repulsive to scrutinize in argument.

CHAPTER XII.

KRÊTAN LEGENDS.—MINÔS AND HIS FAMILY.

To UNDERSTAND the adventures of Thêseus in Krête, it will be necessary to touch briefly upon Minôs and the Krêtan heroic genealogy.

Minôs and Rhadamanthus, according to Homer, are sons of Zeus, by Europê, daughter of the widely-celebrated Phœnix, born in Krête. Minôs is the father of Deukaliôn, whose son Idomeneus, in conjunction with Mêrionês, conducts the Kretan troops to the host of Agamemnôn before Troy. Minôs is ruler of Knôssus, and familiar companion of the great Zeus. He is spoken of as holding guardianship in Krête—not necessarily meaning the whole of the island: he is farther decorated with a golden scepter, and constituted judge over the dead in the under-world to settle their disputes, in which function Odysseus finds him—this, however, by a passage of comparatively late interpolation into the Odyssey. He also had a daughter named Ariadnê, for whom the artist Dædalus fabricated in the town of Knôssus the representation of a complicated dance, and who was ultimately carried off by Thêseus: she died in the island of Dia, deserted by Thêseus and betrayed by Dionysos to the fatal wrath of Artemis. Rhadamanthus seems to approach to Minôs both in judicial functions and posthumous dignity. He is conveyed expressly to Eubœa, by the semi-divine sea-carriers, the Phæacians, to inspect the gigantic corpse of the earth-born Tityus—the longest voyage they ever undertook. He is, moreover, after death promoted to an abode of undisturbed bliss in the Elysian plain at the extremity of the earth.

According to poets later than Homer, Europê is brought over by Zeus from Phœnicia to Krête, where she bears to him three sons, Minôs, Rhadamanthus, and Sarpêdôn. The latter leaves Krête and settles in Lykia, the population of which, as well as that of many other portions of Asia Minor, is connected by various mythical genealogies with Krête, though the Sarpêdôn of the Iliad has no connection with Krete, and is not the son of Europê. Sarpêdôn, having become king of Lykia, was favored by his father, Zeus, with permission to live for three generations. At the same time the youthful Milêtus, a favorite of Sarpêdôn, quitted Krête, and established the city which bore his name on the coast of Asia Minor. Rhadamanthus became sovereign of and law-giver among the islands in the Ægean: he subsequently went to Bœôtia, where he married the widowed Alkmênê, mother of Hêraklês.

Europê finds in Krête a king Astêrius, who marries her and adopts her children by Zeus; this Astêrius is the son of Krês, the eponym of the island, or (according to another genealogy by which it was attempted to be made out that Minôs was of Dôrian race) he was a son of the daughter of Krês by Tektamus, the son of Dôrus, who had migrated into the island from Greece.

Minôs married Pasiphaê, daughter of the god Hêlios and Perseïs, by whom he had Katreus, Deukaliôn, Glaukus, Androgeos,—names marked in the legendary narrative,—together with several daughters, among whom were Ariadnê and Phædra. He offended Poseidôn by neglecting to fulfill a solemnly made vow, and the displeased god afflicted his wife Pasiphaê with a monstrous passion for a bull. The great artist Dædalus, son of Eupalamus, a fugitive from Athens, became the confidant of this amour, from which sprang the Minôtaur, a creature half-man and half-bull. This Minôtaur was imprisoned by Minôs in the labyrinth, an inextricable inclosure constructed by Dædalus for that express purpose by order of Minôs.

Minôs acquired great nautical power, and expelled the Karian inhabitants from many of the islands of the Ægean, which he placed under the government of his sons on the footing of tributaries. He undertook several expeditions against various places on the coast—one against Nisus, the son of Pandiôn, king of Megara, who had among the hair of his head one peculiar lock of a purple color: an oracle had pronounced that his life and reign would never be in danger so long as he preserved this precious lock. The city would have remained inexpugnable, if Skylla, the daughter of Nisus, had not conceived a violent passion for Minôs. While her father was asleep she cut off the lock on which his safety hung, so that the Kretan king soon became victorious. Instead of performing his promise to carry Skylla away with him to Krête, he cast her from the stern of his vessel into the sea: both Skylla and Nisus were changed into birds.

Androgeos, son of Minôs, having displayed such rare qualities as to vanquish all his competitors at the Panathenaic festival in Athens, was sent by Ægeus, the Athenian king, to contend against the bull of Marathôn,—an enterprise in which he perished, and Minôs made war upon Athens to avenge his death. He was for a long time unable to take the city: at length he prayed to his father, Zeus, to aid him in obtaining redress from the Athenians, and Zeus sent upon them pestilence and famine. In vain did they endeavor to avert these calamities by offering up as propitiatory sacrifices the four daughters of Hyakinthus. Their sufferings still continued and the oracle directed them to submit to any terms which Minôs might exact. He required that they should send to Krête a tribute of seven youths and seven maidens, periodically, to be devoured by the Minôtaur,—offered to him in a labyrinth constructed by Dædalus, including countless different passages, out of which no person could escape.

Every ninth year this offering was to be dispatched. The more common story was that the youths and maidens thus destined to

destruction were selected by lot; but the logographer Hellanikus said that Minôs came to Athens and chose them himself. The third period for dispatching the victims had arrived, and Athens was plunged in the deepest affliction, when Thêseus determined to devote himself as one of them, and either to terminate the sanguinary tribute or to perish. He prayed to Poseidôn for help, while the Delphian god assured him that Aphroditê would sustain and extricate him. On arriving at Knôssus he was fortunate enough to captivate the affections of Ariadnê, the daughter of Minôs, who supplied him with a sword and a clue of thread. With the former he contrived to kill the Minôtaur; the latter served to guide his footsteps in escaping from the labyrinth. Having accomplished this triumph, he left Krête with his ship and companions unhurt, carrying off Ariadnê, whom, however, he soon abandoned on the island of Naxos. On his way home to Athens, he stopped at Delos, where he offered a grateful sacrifice to Apollo for his escape, and danced, along with the young men and maidens whom he had rescued from the Minôtaur, a dance called the Geranus, imitated from the twists and convolutions of the Crêtan labyrinth. It had been concerted with his father Ægeus that, if he succeeded in his enterprise against the Minôtaur, he should on his return hoist white sails in his ship in place of the black canvas which she habitually carried when employed on this mournful embassy. But Thêseus forgot to make the change of sails; so that Ægeus, seeing the ship return with her equipment of mourning unaltered, was impressed with the sorrowful conviction that his son had perished, and cast himself into the sea. The ship which made this voyage was preserved by the Athenians with careful solicitude, being constantly repaired with new timbers, down to the time of the Phalerian Dêmêtrius: every year she was sent from Athens to Delos with a solemn sacrifice and specially nominated envoys. The priest of Apollo decked her stern with garlands before she quitted the port, and during the time which elapsed until her return the city was understood to abstain from all acts carrying with them public impurity, so that it was unlawful to put to death any person even under formal sentence by the dikastery. This accidental circumstance becomes especially memorable from its having postponed for thirty days the death of the lamented Sokratês.

The legend respecting Thêseus, and his heroic rescue of the seven noble youths and maidens from the jaws of the Minôtaur, was thus both commemorated and certified to the Athenian public by the annual holy ceremony and by the unquestioned identity of the vessel employed in it. There were, indeed, many varieties in the mode of narrating the incident; and some of the Attic logographers tried to rationalize the fable by transforming the Minôtaur into a general or a powerful athlete, named Taurus, whom Thêseus vanquished in Krête. But this altered version never overbore the old fanciful

character of the tale as maintained by the poets. A great number of other religious ceremonies and customs, as well as several chapels or sacred inclosures in honor of different heroes, were connected with different acts and special ordinances of Thêseus. To every Athenian who took part in the festivals of the Oschophoria, the Pyanepsia, or the Kybernêsia, the name of this great hero was familiar; while the motives for offering to him solemn worship at his own special festival of the Thêsia became evident and impressive.

The same Athenian legends which ennobled and decorated the character of Thêseus painted in repulsive colors the attributes of Minôs; and the traits of the old Homeric comrade of Zeus were buried under those of the conqueror and oppressor of Athens. His history, like that of the other legendary personages of Greece, consists almost entirely of a string of family romances and tragedies. His son Katreus, father of Aëropê, wife of Atreus, was apprised by an oracle that he would perish by the hand of one of his own children: he accordingly sent them out of the island, and Althæmenês, his son, established himself in Rhodes. Katreus having become old, and fancying that he had outlived the warning of the oracle, went over to Rhodes to see Althæmenês. In an accidental dispute which arose between his attendants and the islanders, Althæmenês inadvertently took part and slew his father without knowing him. Glaukus, the youngest son of Minôs, pursuing a mouse, fell into a reservoir of honey and was drowned. No one knew what had become of him, and his father was inconsolable; at length the Argeian Polyeidus, a prophet wonderfully endowed by the gods, both discovered the boy and restored him to life, to the exceeding joy of Minôs.

The latter at last found his death in an eager attempt to overtake and punish Dædalus. This great artist, the eponymous hero of the Attic gens or dême called the Dædalidæ, and the descendant of Erechtheus through Mêtion, had been tried at the tribunal of Areiopagus and banished for killing his nephew Talos, whose rapidly improving skill excited his envy. He took refuge in Krête, where he acquired the confidence of Minôs, and was employed (as has been already mentioned) in constructing the labyrinth; subsequently, however, he fell under the displeasure of Minôs, and was confined as a close prisoner within the inextricable windings of his own edifice. His unrivaled skill and resource, however, did not forsake him. He manufactured wings both for himself and for his son Ikarus, with which they flew over the sea. The father arrived safely in Sicily at Kamikus, the residence of the Sikanian king Kokalus; but the son, disdaining paternal example and admonition, flew so high that his wings were melted by the sun and he fell into the sea, which from him was called the Ikarian sea.

Dædalus remained for some time in Sicily, leaving in various parts of the island many prodigious evidences of mechanical and architectural skill. At length Minôs, bent upon regaining posses-

sion of his person, undertook an expedition against Kokalus with a numerous fleet and army. Kokalus, affecting readiness to deliver up the fugitive, and receiving Minôs with apparent friendship, ordered a bath to be prepared for him by his three daughters, who, eager to protect Dædalus at any price, drowned the Krêtan king in the bath with hot water. Many of the Krêtans who had accompanied him remained in Sicily and founded the town of Minoa, which they denominated after him. But not long afterward Zeus instigated all the inhabitants of Krête (except the towns of Polichna and Præsus) to undertake with one accord an expedition against Kamikus for the purpose of avenging the death of Minôs. They besieged Kamikus in vain for five years, until at last famine compelled them to return. On their way along the coast of Italy, in the gulf of Tarentum, a terrible storm destroyed their fleet and obliged them to settle permanently in the country: they founded Hyria with other cities, and became Messapian Iapygians. Other settlers, for the most part Greeks, immigrated into Krête to the spots which this movement had left vacant. In the second generation after Minôs occurred the Trojan war. The departed Minôs was exceedingly offended with the Krêtans for co-operating in avenging the injury to Menelaus, since the Greeks generally had lent no aid to the Krêtans in their expedition against the town of Kamikus. He sent upon Krête, after the return of Idomeneus from Troy, such terrible visitations of famine and pestilence that the population again died out or expatriated, and was again renovated by fresh immigrations. The intolerable suffering thus brought upon the Krêtans by the anger of Minôs, for having co-operated in the general Grecian aid to Menelaus, was urged by them to the Greeks as the reason why they could take no part in resisting the invasion of Xerxês; and it is even pretended that they were advised and encouraged to adopt this ground of excuse by the Delphian oracle.

Such is the Minôs of the poets and logographers, with his legendary and romantic attributes: the familiar comrade of the great Zeus,—the judge among the dead in Hadês,—the husband of Pasiphaê, daughter of the god Hêlios,—the father of the goddess Ariadnê, as well as of Androgeos, who perishes and is worshiped at Athens, and of the boy Glaukus, who is miraculously restored to life by a prophet,—the person beloved by Skylla, and the amorous pursuer of the nymph or goddess Britomartis,—the proprietor of the Labyrinth and of the Minôtaur, and the exactor of a periodical tribute of youths and maidens from Athens as food for this monster,—lastly, the follower of the fugitive artist Dædalus to Kamikus, and the victim of the three ill-disposed daughters of Kokalus in a bath. With this strongly marked portrait, the Minôs of Thucydidês and Aristotle has scarcely anything in common except the name. He is the first to acquire *Thalassokraty*, or command of the Ægean sea: he expels the Karian inhabitants from the Cyclades islands,

and sends thither fresh colonists under his own sons; he puts down piracy, in order that he may receive his tribute regularly; lastly, he attempts to conquer Sicily, but fails in the enterprise and perishes. Here we have conjectures, derived from the analogy of the Athenian maritime empire in the historical times, substituted in place of the fabulous incidents, and attached to the name of Minôs.

In the fable a tribute of seven youths and seven maidens is paid to him periodically by the Athenians; in the historicized narrative this character of a tribute-collector is preserved, but the tribute is money collected from dependent islands; and Aristotle points out to us how conveniently Krête is situated to exercise empire over the Ægean. The expedition against Kamikus, instead of being directed to the recovery of the fugitive Dædalus, is an attempt on the part of the great thalassokrat to conquer Sicily. Herodotus gives us generally the same view of the character of Minôs as a great maritime king, but his notice of the expedition against Kamikus includes the mention of Dædalus as the intended object of it. Ephorus, while he described Minôs as a commanding and comprehensive lawgiver imposing his commands under the sanction of Zeus, represented him as the imitator of an earlier lawgiver named Rhadamanthus, and also as an immigrant into Krête from the Æolic Mount Ida, along with the priests or sacred companions of Zeus called the Idæi Dactyli. Aristotle, too, points him out as the author of the Syssitia, or public meals common in Krête as well as at Sparta,—other divergences in a new direction from the spirit of the old fables.

The contradictory attributes ascribed to Minôs, together with the perplexities experienced by those who wished to introduce a regular chronological arrangement into these legendary events, have led both in ancient and in modern times to the supposition of two kings named Minôs, one the grandson of the other,—Minôs I., the son of Zeus, lawgiver and judge,—Minôs II., the thalassokrat,—a gratuitous conjecture, which, without solving the problem required, only adds one to the numerous artifices employed for imparting the semblance of history to the disparate matter of legend. The Krêtans were at all times, from Homer downward, expert and practiced seamen. But that they were ever united under one government, or ever exercised maritime dominion in the Ægean, is a fact which we are neither able to affirm nor to deny. The Odyssey, in so far as it justifies any inference at all, points against such a supposition, since it recognizes a great diversity both of inhabitants and of languages in the island, and designates Minôs as king specially of Knôssus: it refutes still more positively the idea that Minôs put down piracy, which the Homeric Krêtans as well as others continue to practice without scruple.

Herodotus, though he in some places speaks of Minôs as a person historically cognizable, yet in one passage severs him pointedly from the generation of man. The Samian despot "Polykratês," he tells

us, "was the first person who aspired to nautical dominion, excepting Minôs of Knôssus, and others before him (if any such there ever were) who may have ruled the sea; but Polykratês is the first of that which is called *the generation of man* who aspired with much chance of success to govern Iônia and the islands of the Ægean." Here we find it manifestly intimated that Minôs did not belong to the generation of man, and the tale given by the historian respecting the tremendous calamities which the wrath of the departed Minôs inflicted on Krete confirms the impression. The king of Knôssus is a god or a hero, but not a man; he belongs to legend, not to history. He is the son as well as the familiar companion of Zeus; he marries the daughter of Hêlios, and Ariadnê is numbered among his offspring. To this superhuman person are ascribed the oldest and most revered institutions of the island, religious and political, together with a period of supposed ante-historical dominion. That there is much of Krêtan religious ideas and practice embodied in the fables concerning Minôs can hardly be doubted; nor is it improbable that the tale of the youths and maidens sent from Athens may be based in some expiatory offerings rendered to a Kretan divinity. The orgiastic worship of Zeus, solemnized by the armed priests with impassioned motions and violent excitement, was of ancient date in that island, as well as the connection with the worship of Apollo both at Delphi and at Delos. To analyze the fables and to elicit from them any trustworthy particular facts, appears to me a fruitless attempt. The religious recollections, the romantic invention, and the items of matter of fact, if any such there be, must forever remain indissolubly amalgamated as the poet originally blended them, for the amusement or edification of his auditors. Hoeckh, in his instructive and learned collections of facts respecting ancient Krête, construes the mythical genealogy of Minôs to denote a combination of the orgiastic worship of Zeus, indigenous among the Eteokretes, with the worship of the moon imported from Phœnicia, and signified by the names Europe, Pasiphæ, and Ariadnê. This is specious as a conjecture, but I do not venture to speak of it in terms of greater confidence.

From the connection of religious worship and legendary tales between Krete and various parts of Asia Minor,—the Troad, the coast of Milêtus and Lykia, especially between Mount Ida in Krête and Mount Ida in Æolis,—it seems reasonable to infer an ethnographical kindred or relationship between the inhabitants anterior to the period of Hellenic occupation. The tales of Krêtan settlement at Minoa and Engyôn, on the south-western coast of Sicily, and in Iapygia, on the Gulf of Tarentum, conduct us to a similar presumption, though the want of evidence forbids our tracing it farther. In the time of Herodotus, the Eteokrêtes, or aboriginal inhabitants of the island, were confined to Polichna and Præsus; but in earlier times, prior to the encroachments of the Hellênes, they had occupied the larger portion,

if not the whole of the island. Minôs was originally their hero, subsequently adopted by the immigrant Hellênes,—at least Herodotus considers him as barbarian, not Hellenic.

CHAPTER XIII.

ARGONAUTIC EXPEDITION.

The ship Argô was the theme of many songs during the oldest periods of the Grecian epic, even earlier than the Odyssey. The king Æêtês, from whom she is departing, the hero Jasôn, who commands her, and the goddess Hêrê, who watches over him, enabling the Argô to traverse distances and to escape dangers which no ship had ever before encountered, are all circumstances briefly glanced at by Odysseus in his narrative to Alkinous. Moreover, Eunêus, the son of Jasôn and Hypsipylê, governs Lêmnos during the siege of Troy by Agamemnôn, and carries on a friendly traffic with the Grecian camp, purchasing from them their Trojan prisoners.

The legend of Halus in Achaia Phthiôtis, respecting the religious solemnities connected with the family of Athamas and Phryxus (related in a previous chapter), is also interwoven with the voyage of the Argonauts; and both the legend and the solemnities seem evidently of great antiquity. We know, further, that the adventures of the Argô were narrated not only by Hesiod and in the Hesiodic poems, but also by Eumêlus and the author of the Naupaktian verses—by the latter seemingly at considerable length. But these poems are unfortunately lost, nor have we any means of determining what the original story was; for the narrative, as we have it, borrowed from later sources, is enlarged by local tales from the subsequent Greek colonies—Kyzikus, Hêrakleia, Sinopê, and others.

Jasôn, commanded by Pelias to depart in quest of the golden fleece belonging to the speaking ram which had carried away Phryxus and Hellê, was encouraged by the oracle to invite the noblest youth of Greece to his aid, and fifty of the most distinguished among them obeyed the call. Hêraklês, Thêseus, Telamôn and Pêleus, Kastôr and Pollux, Idas, and Lynkeus—Zêtês and Kalaïs, the winged son of Boreas—Meleager, Amphiaraus, Kêpheus, Laertês, Autolykus, Menœtius, Aktor, Erginus, Euphêmus, Ankæus, Pœas, Periklymenus, Augeas, Eurytus, Admêtus, Akastus, Kæneus, Euryalus, Pêneleôs and Lêitus, Askalaphus and Ialmenus, were among them. Argus, the son of Phryxus, directed by the promptings of Athênê, built the ship, inserting in the prow a piece of timber, from

the celebrated oak of Dodona, which was endued with the faculty of speech: Tiphys was the steersman, Idmôn (the son of Apollo) and Mopsus accompanied them as prophets, while Orpheus came to amuse their weariness, and reconcile their quarrels, with his harp.

First, they touched at the island of Lêmnos, in which at that time there were no men; for the women, infuriated by jealous and ill-treatment, had put to death their fathers, husbands, and brothers. The Argonauts, after some difficulty, were received with friendship, and even admitted into the greatest intimacy. They stayed some months, and the subsequent population of the island was the fruit of their visit. Hypsipylê, the queen of the island, bore to Jasôn two sons.

They then proceeded onward along the coast of Thrace, up the Hellespont, to the southern coast of the Propontis inhabited by the Doliones and their king Kyzikus. Here they were kindly entertained, but after their departure were driven back to the same spot by a storm; and, as they landed in the dark, the inhabitants did not know them. A battle took place, in which the chief, Kyzikus, was killed by Jasôn; whereby much grief was occasioned as soon as the real facts became known. After Kyzikus had been interred with every demonstration of mourning and solemnity, the Argonauts proceeded along the coast of Mysia. In this part of the voyage, they left Hêraklês behind. For Hylas, his favorite youthful companion, had been stolen away by the nymphs of a fountain, and Hêraklês, wandering about in search of him, neglected to return. At last he sorrowfully retired, exacting hostages from the inhabitants of the neighboring town of Kius that they would persist in the search.

They next stopped in the country of the Bebrykians, where the boxing contest took place between the king, Amykus, and the Argonaut Pollux: they then proceeded onward to Bithynia, the residence of the blind prophet Phineus. His blindness had been inflicted by Poseidôn as a punishment for having communicated to Phryxus the way to Kolchis. The choice had been allowed to him between death and blindness, and he had preferred the latter. He was also tormented by the harpies, winged monsters who came down from the clouds whenever his table was set, snatched the food from his lips and imparted to it a foul and unapproachable odor. In the midst of this misery he hailed the Argonauts as his deliverers—his prophetic powers having enabled him to foresee their coming. The meal being prepared for him, the harpies approached as usual, but Zêtês and Kalais, the winged sons of Boreas, drove them away and pursued them. They put forth all their speed, and prayed to Zeus to be enabled to overtake the monsters; when Hermês appeared and directed them to desist, the harpies being forbidden further to molest Phineus, and retiring again to their native cavern in Krête.

Phineus, grateful for the relief afforded to him by the Argonauts, forewarned them of the dangers of their voyage and of the precautions necessary for their safety; and through his suggestions they

were enabled to pass through the terrific rocks called Symplêgades. These were two rocks which alternately opened and shut, with a swift and violent collision, so that it was difficult even for a bird to fly through during the short interval. When the Argô arrived at the dangerous spot, Euphêmus let loose a dove, which flew through and just escaped with the loss of a few feathers of her tail. This was a signal to the Argonauts, according to the prediction of Phineus, that they might attempt the passage with confidence. Accordingly, they rowed with all their might, and passed safely through: the closing rocks, held for a moment asunder by the powerful arms of Athênê, just crushed the ornaments at the stern of their vessel. It had been decreed by the gods that, so soon as any ship once got through, the passage should forever afterward be safe and easy to all. The rocks became fixed in their separate places, and never again closed.

After again halting on the coast of the Mariandynians, where their steersman Tiphys died, as well as in the country of the Amazons, and after picking up the sons of Phryxus, who had been cast away by Poseidôn in their attempt to return from Kolchis to Greece, they arrived in safety at the river Phasis and the residence of Æêtês. In passing by Mount Caucasus, they saw the eagle which gnawed the liver of Promêtheus nailed to the rock, and heard the groans of the sufferer himself. The sons of Phryxus were cordially welcomed by their mother Chalkiopê. Application was made to Æêtês that he would grant to the Argonauts, heroes of divine parentage and sent forth by the mandate of the gods, possession of the golden fleece: their aid in return was proffered to him against any or all of his enemies. But the king was wroth, and peremptorily refused, except upon conditions which seemed impracticable. Hêphæstos had given him two ferocious and untamable bulls, with brazen feet, which breathed fire from their nostrils: Jasôn was invited, as a proof both of his illustrious descent and of the sanction of the gods to his voyage, to harness these animals to the yoke, so as to plow a large field and sow it with dragon's teeth. Perilous as the condition was, each one of the heroes volunteered to make the attempt. Idmôn especially encouraged Jasôn to undertake it, and the goddesses Hêrê and Aphroditê made straight the way for him. Mêdea, the daughter of Æêtês and Eidyia, having seen the youthful hero in his interview with her father, had conceived toward him a passion which disposed her to employ every means for his salvation and success. She had received from Hekatê pre-eminent magical powers, and she prepared for Jasôn the powerful Prometheian unguent, extracted from a herb which had grown where the blood of Promêtheus dropped. The body of Jasôn having been thus pre-medicated, became invulnerable either by fire or by warlike weapons. He undertook the enterprise, yoked the bulls without suffering injury, and plowed the field: when he had sown the dragon's teeth, armed men sprung out of the

furrows. But he had been forewarned by Mêdea to cast a vast rock into the midst of them, upon which they began to fight with each other, so that he was easily enabled to subdue them all.

The task prescribed had thus been triumphantly performed. Yet Æêtês not only refused to hand over the golden fleece, but even took measures for secretly destroying the Argonauts and burning their vessel. He designed to murder them during the night after a festal banquet; but Aphroditê, watchful for the safety of Jasôn, inspired the Kolchian king at the critical moment with an irresistible inclination for his nuptial bed. While he slept, the wise Idmôn counseled the Argonauts to make their escape, and Mêdea agreed to accompany them. She lulled to sleep by a magic potion the dragon who guarded the golden fleece, placed that much-desired prize on board the vessel, and accompanied Jasôn with his companions in their flight, carrying along with her the young Apsyrtus, her brother.

Æêtês, profoundly exasperated at the flight of the Argonauts with his daughter, assembled his forces forthwith, and put to sea in pursuit of them. So energetic were his efforts that he shortly overtook the retreating vessel, when the Argonauts again owed their safety to the stratagem of Mêdea. She killed her brother Apsyrtus, cut his body in pieces and strewed the limbs round about in the sea. Æêtês on reaching the spot found these sorrowful traces of his murdered son; but while he tarried to collect the scattered fragments, and bestow upon the body an honorable interment, the Argonauts escaped. The spot on which the unfortunate Apsyrtus was cut up received the name of Tomi. This fratricide of Mêdea, however, so deeply provoked the indignation of Zeus that he condemned the Argô and her crew to a trying voyage, full of hardship and privation, before she was permitted to reach home. The returning heroes traversed an immeasurable length both of sea and of river: first up the river Phasis into the ocean which flows round then earth—the following the course of that circumfluous stream until its junction with the Nile, they came down the Nile into Egypt, from whence they carried the Argô on their shoulders by a fatiguing land-journey to the lake Tritônis in Libya. Here they were rescued from the extremity of want and exhaustion by the kindness of the local god Tritôn, who treated them hospitably, and even presented to Euphêmus a clod of earth as a symbolical promise that his descendants should one day found a city on the Libyan shore. The promise was amply redeemed by the flourishing and powerful city of Kyrênê, whose princes, the Battiads, boasted themselves as lineal descendants of Euphêmus.

Refreshed by the hospitality of Tritôn, the Argonauts found themselves again on the waters of the Mediterranean in their way homeward. But before they arrived at Iôlkos they visited Circê, at the island of Ææa, where Mêdea was purified for the murder of Apsyrtus: they also stopped at Korkyra, then called Drepanê, where Alkinous

received and protected them. The cave in that island where the marriage of Mêdea with Jasôn was consummated was still shown in the time of the historian Timæus, as well as the altars to Apollo which she had erected, and the rites and sacrifices which she had first instituted. After leaving Korkyra, the Argô was overtaken by a perilous storm near the island of Thêra. The heroes were saved from imminent peril by the supernatural aid of Apollo, who, shooting from his golden bow an arrow which pierced the waves like a track of light, caused a new island suddenly to spring up in their track and present to them a port of refuge. The island was called Anaphê; and the grateful Argonauts established upon it an altar and sacrifices in honor of Apollo Æglêtês, which were ever afterward continued, and traced back by the inhabitants to this originating adventure.

On approaching the coast of Krête, the Argonauts were prevented from landing by Talôs, a man of brass, fabricated by Hêphæstos, and presented by him to Minôs for the protection of the island. This vigilant sentinel hurled against the approaching vessel fragments of rock, and menaced the heroes with destruction. But Mêdea deceived him by a stratagem and killed him; detecting and assailing the one vulnerable point in his body. The Argonauts were thus enabled to land and refresh themselves. They next proceeded onward to Ægina, where, however, they again experienced resistance before they could obtain water—then along the coast of Eubœa and Lokris back to Iôlkos in the gulf of Pagasæ, the place from whence they had started. The proceedings of Pelias during their absence, and the signal revenge taken upon him by Mêdea after their return, have already been narrated in a preceding section. The ship Argô herself, in which the chosen heroes of Greece had performed so long a voyage and braved so many dangers, was consecrated by Jasôn to Poseidôn at the isthmus of Corinth. According to another account, she was translated to the stars by Athênê, and became a constellation.

Traces of the presence of the Argonauts were found not only in the regions which lay between Iôlkos and Kolchis, but also in the western portion of the Grecian world—distributed more or less over all the spots visited by Grecian mariners or settled by Grecian colonists, and scarcely less numerous than the wanderings of the dispersed Greeks and Trojans after the capture of Troy. The number of Jasonia, or temples for the heroic worship of Jasôn, was very great from Abdêra in Thrace, eastward along the coast of the Euxine, to Armenia and Media. The Argonauts had left their anchoring-stone on the coast of Bebrykia, near Kyzikus, and there it was preserved during the historical ages in the temple of the Jasonian Athênê. They had founded the great temple of the Idæan mother on the mountain Dindymon, near Kyzikus, and the Hieron of Zeus Urios on the Asiatic point at the mouth of the Euxine, near which

was also the harbor of Phryxus. Idmôn, the prophet of the expedition, who was believed to have died of a wound by a wild boar on the Mariandynian coast, was worshiped by the inhabitants of the Pontic Hêrakleia with great solemnity as their Heros Poliuchus, and that, too, by the special direction of the Delphian god. Autolykus, another companion of Jasôn, was worshiped as Œkist by the inhabitants of Sinopê. Moreover, the historians of Hêrakleia pointed out a temple of Hekatê in the neighboring country of Paphlagonia, first erected by Mêdea; and the important town of Pantikapæon, on the European side of the Cimmerian Bosporus, ascribed its first settlement to a son of Æêtês. When the returning 10,000 Greeks sailed along the coast, called the Jasonian shore, from Sinopê to Hêrakleia, they were told that the grandson of Æêtês was reigning king of the territory at the mouth of the Phasis, and the anchoring-places where the Argô had stopped were specially pointed out to them. In the lofty regions of the Moschi, near Kolchis, stood the temple of Leukothea, founded by Phryxus, which remained both rich and respected down to the times of the kings of Pontus, and where it was an inviolable rule not to offer up a ram. The town of Dioskurias, north of the river Phasis, was believed to have been hallowed by the presence of Kastôr and Pollux in the Argô, and to have received from them its appellation. Even the interior of Media and Armenia was full of memorials of Jasôn and Mêdea, and their son Mêdus, or of Armenus, the son of Jasôn, from whom the Greeks deduced not only the name and foundation of the Medes and Armenians, but also the great operation of cutting a channel through the mountains for the efflux of the river Araxes, which they compared to that of the Peneius in Thessaly. And the Roman general Pompey, after having completed the conquest and expulsion of Mithridatês, made long marches through Kolchis into the regions of Caucasus, for the express purpose of contemplating the spots which had been ennobled by the exploits of the Argonauts, the Dioskuri, and Hêraklês.

In the west, memorials either of the Argonauts or of the pursuing Kolchians were pointed out in Korkyra, in Krête, in Epirus near the Akrokeraunian mountains, in the islands called Apsyrtides near the Illyrian coast, at the bay of Caieta, as well as at Poseidônia on the southern coast of Italy, in the island of Æthalia or Elba, and in Libya.

Such is a brief outline of the Argonautic expedition, one of the most celebrated and widely diffused among the ancient tales of Greece. Since so many able men have treated it as an undisputed reality, and even made it the pivot of systematic chronological calculations, I may here repeat the opinion long ago expressed by Heyne, and even indicated by Burmann, that the process of dissecting the story in search of a basis of fact is one altogether fruitless. Not only are we unable to assign the date, or identify the crew, or decipher the log-book of the Argô, but we have no means of settling

even the preliminary question, whether the voyage be matter of fact badly reported, or legend from the beginning. The widely distant spots in which the monuments of the voyage were shown, no less than the incidents of the voyage itself, suggest no other parentage than epical fancy. The supernatural and the romantic not only constitute an inseparable portion of the narrative, but even embrace all the prominent and characteristic features; if they do not comprise the whole, and if there be intermingled along with them any sprinkling of historical or geographical fact—a question to us indeterminable—there is at least no solvent by which it can be disengaged, and no test by which it can be recognized. Wherever the Grecian mariner sailed he carried his religious and patriotic mythes along with him. His fancy and his faith were alike full of the long wanderings of Jasôn, Odysseus, Perseus, Hêraklês, Dionysus, Triptolemus, or Iô; it was pleasing to him in success, and consoling to him in difficulty, to believe that their journeys had brought them over the ground which he was himself traversing. There was no tale amid the wide range of the Grecian epic more calculated to be popular with the seaman than the history of the primeval ship Argô and her distinguished crew, comprising heroes from all parts of Greece, and especially the Tyndarids Kastôr and Pollux, the heavenly protectors invoked during storm and peril. He localized the legend anew wherever he went, often with some fresh circumstances suggested either by his own adventures or by the scene before him. He took a sort of religious possession of the spot, connecting it by a bond of faith with his native land, and erecting in it a temple or an altar with appropriate commemorative solemnities. The Jasonium thus established, and indeed every visible object called after the name of the hero, not only served to keep alive the legend of the Argô in the minds of future comers or inhabitants, but was accepted as an obvious and satisfactory proof that this marvelous vessel had actually touched there in her voyage.

The epic poets, building both on the general love of fabulous incident and on the easy faith of the people, dealt with distant and unknown space in the same manner as with past and unrecorded time. They created a mythical geography for the former and a mythical history for the latter. But there was this material difference between the two: that while the unrecorded time was beyond the reach of verification, the unknown space gradually became trodden and examined. In proportion as authentic local knowledge was enlarged, it became necessary to modify the geography or shift the scene of action of the old mythes; and this perplexing problem was undertaken by some of the ablest historians and geographers of antiquity—for it was painful to them to abandon any portion of the old epic, as if it were destitute of an ascertainable basis of truth.

Many of these fabulous localities are to be found in Homer and Hesiod, and the other Greek poets and logographers,—Erytheia, the garden of the Hesperides, the garden of Phœbus, to which Boreas

transported the Attic maiden Oreithyia, the delicious country of the Hyperboreans, the Elysian plain, the floating island of Æolus, Thrinakia, the country of the Æthiopians, the Læstrygones, the Kyklôpes, the Lotophagi, the Sirens, the Cimmerians, and the Gorgons, etc. These are places which (to use the expression of Pindar respecting the Hyperboreans) you cannot approach either by sea or by land: the wings of the poet alone can carry you thither. They were not introduced into the Greek mind by incorrect geographical reports, but, on the contrary, had their origin in the legend, and passed from thence into the realities of geography, which they contributed much to pervert and confuse. For the navigator or emigrant, starting with an unsuspicious faith in their real existence, looked out for them in his distant voyages, and constantly fancied that he had seen or heard of them, so as to be able to identify their exact situation. The most contradictory accounts, indeed, as might be expected, were often given respecting the latitude and longitude of such fanciful spots, but this did not put an end to the general belief in their real existence.

In the present advanced state of geographical knowledge, the story of that man who, after reading Gulliver's Travels, went to look in his map for Lilliput, appears an absurdity. But those who fixed the exact locality of the floating island of Æolus or the rocks of the Sirens did much the same; and, with their ignorance of geography and imperfect appreciation of historical evidence, the error was hardly to be avoided. The ancient belief which fixed the Sirens on the islands of Sirenusæ off the coast of Naples; the Kyklôpes, Erytheia, and the Læstrygones in Sicily; the Lotophagi on the island of Mêninx, near the Lesser Syrtis; the Phæakians at Korkyra; and the goddess Circê at the promontory of Circeium,—took its rise at a time when these regions were first Hellenized and comparatively little visited. Once embodied in the local legends and attested by visible monuments and ceremonies, it continued for a long time unassailed; and Thucydidês seems to adopt it in reference to Korkyra and Sicily before the Hellenic colonization, as matter of fact generally unquestionable, though little avouched as to details. But when geographical knowledge became extended, and the criticism upon the ancient epic was more or less systematized by the literary men of Alexandria and Pergamus, it appeared to many of them impossible that Odysseus could have seen so many wonders or undergone such monstrous dangers within limits so narrow, and in the familiar track between the Nile and the Tiber. The scene of his weather-driven course was then shifted farther westward. Many convincing evidences were discovered, especially by Asklepiadês of Myrlea, of his having visited various places in Iberia: several critics imagined that he had wandered about in the Atlantic ocean outside of the strait of Gibraltar, and they recognized a section of Lotophagi on the coast of Mauritania, over and above those who dwelt on the island of Mêninx. On

the other hand, Eratosthenês and Apollodôrus treated the places visited by Odysseus as altogether unreal, for which skepticism they incurred much reproach.

The fabulous island of Erytheia,—the residence of the three-headed Geryôn with his magnificent herd of oxen, under the custody of the two-headed dog Orthrus, described by Hesiod, like the garden of the Hesperides, as extra-terrestrial, on the farther side of the circumfluous ocean,—this island was supposed, by the interpreters of Stesichorus the poet, to be named by him off the south-western region of Spain called Tartêssus, and in the immediate vicinity of Gadês. But the historian Hekatæus, in his anxiety to historicize the old fable, took upon himself to remove Erytheia from Spain nearer home to Epirus. He thought it incredible that Hêraklês should have traversed Europe from east to west for the purpose of bringing the cattle of Geryôn to Eurystheus at Mykênæ, and he pronounced Geryôn to have been a king of Epirus, near the gulf of Ambrakia. The oxen reared in that neighborhood were proverbially magnificent, and to get them even from thence and bring them to Mykênæ (he contended) was no inconsiderable task. Arrian, who cites this passage from Hekatæus, concurs in the same view,—an illustration of the license with which ancient authors fitted on their fabulous geographical names to the real earth, and brought down the ethereal matter of legend to the lower atmosphere of history.

Both the track and the terminus of the Argonautic voyage appear in the most ancient epic as little within the conditions of reality as the speaking timbers or the semi-divine crew of the vessel. In the Odyssey, Æêtês and Circê (Hesiod names Mêdea also) are brother and sister, offspring of Hêlios. The Ææan island, adjoining the circumfluous ocean, "where the house and dancing-ground of Eôs are situated, and where Hêlios rises," is both the residence of Circê and of Æêtês, inasmuch as Odysseus, in returning from the former, follows the same course as the Argô had previously taken in returning from the latter. Even in the conception of Mimnermus, about 600 B.C., Æa still retained its fabulous attributes in conjunction with the ocean and Hêlios, without having been yet identified with any known portion of the solid earth; and it was justly remarked by Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis in antiquity (though Strabo vainly tries to refute him) that neither Homer nor Mimnermus designates Kolchis either as the residence of Æêtês or as the terminus of the Argonautic voyage. Hesiod carried the returning Argonauts through the river Phasis into the ocean. But some of the poems ascribed to Eumêlus were the first which mentioned Æêtês and Kolchis, and interwove both of them into the Corinthian mythical genealogy. These poems seem to have been composed subsequent to the foundation of Sinopê, and to the commencement of Grecian settlement on the Borysthenês, between the years 600 and 500 B.C. The Greek mariners who explored and colonized the southern coast of the Euxine found at the extrem-

ity of their voyage the river Phasis and its barbarous inhabitants: it was the easternmost point which Grecian navigation (previous to the time of Alexander the Great) ever attained, and it was within sight of the impassable barrier of Caucasus. They believed, not unnaturally, that they had here found "the house of Eôs (the morning) and the rising-place of the son," and that the river Phasis, if they could follow it to its unknown beginning, would conduct them to the circumfluous ocean. They gave to the spot the name of Æa, and the fabulous and real title gradually became associated together into one compound appellation,—the Kolchian Æa, or Æa of Kolchis. While Kolchis was thus entered on the map as a fit representative for the Homeric "house of the morning," the narrow strait of the Thracian Bosphorus attracted to itself the poetical fancy of the Symplêgades, or colliding rocks, through which the heaven-protected Argô had been the first to pass. The powerful Greek cities of Kyzikus, Hêrakleia, and Sinopê, each fertile in local legends, still farther contributed to give this direction to the voyage; so that in the time of Hekatæus it had become the established belief that the Argô had started from Iôlkos and gone to Kolchis.

Æêtês thus received his home from the legendary faith and fancy of the eastern Greek navigators: his sister Circê, originally his fellow-resident, was localized by the western. The Hesiodic and other poems, giving expression to the imaginative impulses of the inhabitants of Cumæ and other early Grecian settlers in Italy and Sicily, had referred the wanderings of Odysseus to the western or Tyrrhenian sea, and had planted the Cyclôpes, the Læstrigones, the floating island of Æolus, the Lotophagi, the Phæacians, etc., about the coast of Sicily, Italy, Libya, and Korkyra. In this way the Ææan island—the residence of Circê, and the extreme point of the wanderings of Odysseus, from whence he passes only to the ocean and into Hadês—came to be placed in the far west, while the Æa of Æêtês was in the far east—not unlike our East and West Indies. The Homeric brother and sister were separated and sent to opposite extremities of the Grecian terrestrial horizon.

The track from Iôlkos to Kolchis, however, though plausible as far as it went, did not realize all the conditions of the genuine fabulous voyage: it did not explain the evidences of the visit of these maritime heroes which were to be found in Libya, in Krête, in Anaphê, in Korkyra, in the Adriatic gulf, in Italy, and in Æthalia. It became necessary to devise another route for them in their return, and the Hesiodic narrative was (as I have before observed), that they came back by the circumfluous ocean: first going up the river Phasis into the circumfluous ocean; then following that deep and gentle stream until they entered the Nile, and came down its course to the coast of Libya. This seems also to have been the belief of Hekatæus. But presently several Greeks (and Herodotus among them) began to discard the idea of a circumfluous ocean-stream, which had pervaded

their old geographical and astronomical fables, and which explained the supposed easy communication between one extremity of the earth and another. Another idea was then started for the returning voyage of the Argonauts. It was supposed that the river Ister, or Danube, flowing from the Rhipæan mountains in the north-west of Europe, divided itself into two branches, one of which fell into the Euxine sea, and the other into the Adriatic.

The Argonauts, fleeing from the pursuit of Æêtês, had been obliged to abandon the irregular course homeward, and had gone from the Euxine sea up the Ister; then passing down the other branch of that river, they had entered into the Adriatic, the Kolchian pursuers following them. Such is the story given by Apollônius Rhodius from Timagêtus, and accepted even by so able a geographer as Eratosthenês—who preceded him by one generation, and who, though skeptical in regard to the localities visited by Odysseus, seems to have been a firm believer in the reality of the Argonautic voyage. Other historians again, among whom was Timæus, though they considered the ocean as an outer sea, and no longer admitted the existence of the old Homeric ocean-stream, yet imagined a story for the return-voyage of the Argonauts somewhat resembling the old tale of Hesiod and Hekatæus. They alleged that the Argô, after entering into the Paulus Mæotis, had followed the upward course of the river Tanais; that she had then been carried overland and launched in a river which had its mouth in the ocean or great outer sea. When in the ocean, she had coasted along the north and west of Europe until she reached Gadês and the strait of Gibraltar, where she entered into the Mediterranean, and there visited the many places specified in the fable. Of this long voyage, in the outer sea to the north and west of Europe, many traces were affirmed to exist along the coast of the ocean. There was again a third version, according to which the Argonauts came back as they went, through the Thracian Bosphorus and the Hellespont. In this way geographical plausibility was indeed maintained, but a large portion of the fabulous matter was thrown overboard.

Such were the various attempts made to reconcile the Argonautic legend with enlarged geographical knowledge and improved historical criticism. The problem remained unsolved, but the faith in the legend did not the less continue. It was a faith originally generated at a time when the unassisted narrative of the inspired poet sufficed for the conviction of his hearers; it consecrated one among the capital exploits of that heroic and superhuman race whom the Greek was accustomed at once to look back upon as his ancestors and to worship conjointly with his gods: it lay too deep in his mind either to require historical evidence for his support, or to be overthrown by geographical difficulties as they were then appreciated. Supposed traces of the past event, either preserved in the names of places, or embodied in standing religious customs with their explanatory com-

ments, served as sufficient authentication in the eyes of the curious inquirer. And even men trained in a more severe school of criticism contented themselves with eliminating the palpable contradictions and softening down the supernatural and romantic events, so as to produce an Argonautic expedition of their own invention as the true and accredited history. Strabo, though he can neither overlook nor explain the geographical impossibilities of the narrative, supposes himself to have discovered the basis of actual fact, which the original poets had embellished or exaggerated. The golden fleece was typical of the great wealth of Kolchis, arising from gold-dust washed down by the rivers; and the voyage of Jasôn was in reality an expedition at the head of a considerable army, with which he plundered this wealthy country and made extensive conquests in the interior. Strabo has nowhere laid down what he supposes to have been the exact measure and direction of Jasôn's march, but he must have regarded it as very long, since he classes Jasôn with Dionysus and Hêraklês, and emphatically characterizes all the three as having traversed wider spaces of ground than any moderns could equal. Such was the compromise which a mind like that of Strabo made with the ancient legends. He shaped or cut them down to the level of his own credence, and in this waste of historical criticism, without any positive evidence, he took to himself the credit of greater penetration than the literal believers, while he escaped the necessity of breaking formally with the bygone heroic world.

CHAPTER XIV.

LEGENDS OF THÊBES.

THE Bœotians generally, throughout the historical age, though well endowed with bodily strength and courage, are represented as proverbially deficient in intelligence, taste, and fancy. But the legendary population of Thêbes, the Kadmeians, are rich in mythical antiquities, divine as well as heroic. Both Dionysus and Hêraklês recognize Thêbes as their natal city. Moreover, the two sieges of Thêbes by Adrastus, even taken apart from Kadmus, Antiopê, Amphiôn, and Zêthus, etc., are the most prominent and most characteristic exploits, next to the siege of Troy, of that pre-existing race of heroes who lived in the imagination of the historical Hellênes.

It is not Kadmus, but the brothers Amphiôn and Zêthus, who are given to us in the Odyssey as the first founders of Thêbes and the first builders of its celebrated walls. They are the sons of Zeus by Antiopê, daughter of Asôpus. The scholiasts, who desire to reconcile this tale with the more current account of the foundation of

Thêbes by Kadmus, tell us that, after the death of Amphiôn and Zêthus, Eurymachus, the warlike king of the Phlegyæ, invaded and ruined the newly settled town, so that Kadmus on arriving was obliged to refound it. But Apollodôrus, and seemingly the older logographers before him, placed Kadmus at the top, and inserted the two brothers at a lower point in the series. According to them, Bêlus and Agenôr were the sons of Epaphus (son of the Argeian Iô) by Libya. Agenôr went to Phœnicia and there became king: he had for his offspring Kadmus, Phœnix, Kilix, and a daughter Eurôpa; though in the Iliad Eurôpa is called daughter of Phœnix. Zeus fell in love with Eurôpa, and, assuming the shape of a bull, carried her across the sea upon his back from Egypt to Crête, where she bore to him Minôs, Rhadamanthus, and Sarpêdôn. Two out of the three sons sent out by Agenôr in search of their lost sister, wearied out by a long-protracted as well as fruitless voyage, abandoned the idea of returning home: Kilix settled in Kilikia, and Kadmus in Thrace. Thasus, the brother or nephew of Kadmus, who had accompanied them in the voyage, settled and gave name to the island of Thasus.

Both Herodotus and Euripidês represent Kadmus as an emigrant from Phœnicia, conducting a body of followers in quest of Eurôpa. The account of Apollodôrus describes him as having come originally from Libya or Egypt to Phœnicia: we may presume that this was also the statement of the earlier logographers Pherekydês and Hellanikus. Conôn, who historicizes and politicizes the whole legend, seems to have found two different accounts; one connecting Kadmus with Egypt, another bringing him from Phœnicia. He tries to melt down the two into one, by representing that the Phœnicians, who sent out Kadmus, had acquired great power in Egypt; that the seat of their kingdom was the Egyptian Thêbes; that Kadmus was dispatched, under pretense indeed of finding his lost sister, but really on a project of conquest; and that the name Thêbes, which he gave to his new establishment in Bœotia, was borrowed from Thêbes in Egypt, his ancestoral seat.

Kadmus went from Phœnicia to Thrace and from Thrace to Delphi to procure information respecting his sister Eurôpa, but the god directed him to take no further trouble about her; he was to follow the guidance of a cow, and to found a city on the spot where the animal should lie down. The condition was realized on the site of Thêbes. The neighboring fountain, Areia, was guarded by a fierce dragon, the offspring of Arês, who destroyed all the persons sent to fetch water. Kadmus killed the dragon, and at the suggestion of Athênê sowed the dragon's teeth in the earth: there sprang up at once the armed men called the Sparti, among whom he flung stones, and they immediately began to assault each other until all were slain except five. Arês, indignant at this slaughter, was about to kill Kadmus; but Zeus appeased him, condemning Kadmus to an expiatory servitude of eight years, after which he married Harmonia, the

daughter of Arês and Aphroditê—presenting to her the splendid necklace fabricated by the hand of Hêphæstos, which had been given by Zeus to Eurôpa. All the gods came to the Kadmeia, the citadel of Thêbes, to present congratulations and gifts at these nuptials, which seem to have been hardly less celebrated in the mythical world than those of Pêleus and Thetis. The issue of the marriage was one son, Polydôrus, and four daughters, Autonoê, Inô, Semelê, and Agavê.

From the five who alone survived of the warriors sprung from the dragon's teeth arose five great families or gentes in Thêbes; the oldest and noblest of its inhabitants, coeval with the foundation of the town. They were called Sparti, and their name seems to have given rise, not only to the fable of the sowing of the teeth, but also to other etymological narratives.

All the four daughters of Kadmus are illustrious in fabulous history. Inô, wife of Athamas, the son of Æolus, has already been included among the legends of the Æolids. Semelê became the mistress of Zeus, and inspired Hêrê with jealousy. Misguided by the malicious suggestions of that goddess, she solicited Zeus to visit her with all the solemnity and terrors which surrounded him when he approached Hêrê himself. The god unwillingly consented, and came in his chariot in the midst of thunder and lightning, under which awful accompaniments the mortal frame of Semelê perished. Zeus, taking from her the child of which she was pregnant, sewed it into his own thigh: after the proper interval the child was brought out and born, and became the great god Dionysus, or Bacchus. Hermês took him to Inô and Athamas to receive their protection. Afterward, however, Zeus having transformed him into a kid to conceal him from the persecution of Hêrê, the nymphs of the mountain Nysa became his nurses.

Autonoê, the third daughter of Kadmus, married the pastoral hero or god Aristæus, and was mother of Aktæôn, a devoted hunter and a favorite companion of the goddess Artemis. She, however, became displeased with him—either because he looked into a fountain while she was bathing and saw her naked—or, according to the legend set forth by the poet Stesichorus, because he loved and courted Semelê—or, according to Euripidês, because he presumptuously vaunted himself as her superior in the chase. She transformed him into a stag, so that his own dogs set upon and devoured him. The rock upon which Aktæôn used to sleep when fatigued with the chase, and the spring whose transparent waters had too clearly revealed the form of the goddess, were shown to Pausanias near Platæa, on the road to Megara.

Agavê, the remaining daughter of Kadmus, married Echiôn, one of the Sparti. The issue of these nuptials was Pentheus, who, when Kadmus became old, succeeded him as king of Thêbes. In his reign Dionysus appeared as a god, the author or discoverer of the vine,

with all its blessings. He had wandered over Asia, India, and Thrace at the head of an excited troop of female enthusiasts—communicating and inculcating everywhere the Bacchic ceremonies, and rousing in the minds of women that impassioned religious emotion which led them to ramble in solitary mountains at particular seasons, there to give vent to violent fanatical excitement, apart from the men, clothed in fawn skins and armed with the thyrsus. The obtrusion of a male spectator upon these solemnities was esteemed sacrilegious. Though the rites had been rapidly disseminated and fervently welcomed in many parts of Thrace, yet there were some places in which they had been obstinately resisted and their votaries treated with rudeness; especially by Lykurgus, king of the Edonian Thracians, upon whom a sharp and exemplary punishment was inflicted by Dionysus.

Thêbes was the first city of Greece to which Dionysus came, at the head of his Asiatic troop of females, to obtain divine honors, and to establish his peculiar rites in his native city. The venerable Kadmus, together with his daughters and the prophet Teiresias, at once acknowledged the divinity of the new god, and began to offer their worship and praise to him, along with the solemnities which he enjoined. But Pentheus vehemently opposed the new ceremonies, reproving and maltreating the god who introduced them: nor was his unbelief at all softened by the miracles which Dionysus wrought for his own protection and for that of his followers. His mother Agavê, with her sisters and a large body of other women from Thêbes, had gone out from Thêbes to Mount Kithærôn to celebrate their solemnities under the influence of the Bacchic frenzy. Thither Pentheus followed to watch them, and there the punishment due to his impiety overtook him. The avenging touch of the god having robbed him of his senses, he climbed a tall pine for the purpose of overlooking the feminine multitude, who detected him in this position, pulled down the tree, and tore him in pieces. Agavê, mad and bereft of consciousness, made herself the foremost in this assault, and carried back in triumph to Thêbes the head of her slaughtered son. The aged Kadmus, with his wife Harmonia, retired among the Illyrians, and at the end of their lives were changed into serpents, Zeus permitting them to be transferred to the Elysian fields.

Polydôrus and Labdakus successively became kings of Thêbes: the latter at his death left an infant son, Laius, who was deprived of his throne by Lykus. And here we approach the legend of Antiopê, Zêthus, and Amphiôn, whom the fabulists insert at this point of the Thêban series. Antiopê is here the daughter of Nykteus, the brother of Lykus. She is deflowered by Zeus, and then, while pregnant, flies to Epôpeus, king of Sikyôn: Nykteus dying entreats his brother to avenge the injury, and Lykus accordingly invades Sikyôn, defeats and kills Epôpeus, and brings back Antiopê prisoner to Thêbes. In her way thither, in a cave near Eleutheræ, which was shown to Pausanias, she is delivered of the twin sons of Zeus—Amphiôn and

Zêthus—who, exposed to perish, are taken up and nourished by a shepherd, and pass their youth amid herdsmen, ignorant of their lofty descent.

Antiopê is conveyed to Thêbes, where, after undergoing a long persecution from Lykus and his cruel wife Dirkê, she at length escapes, and takes refuge in the pastoral dwelling of her sons, now grown to manhood. Dirkê pursues and requires her to be delivered up; but the sons recognize and protect their mother, taking an ample revenge upon her persecutors. Lykus is slain, and Dirkê is dragged to death, tied to the horns of a bull. Amphiôn and Zêthus, having banished Laius, become kings of Thêbes. The former, taught by Hermês, and possessing exquisite skill on the lyre, employs it in fortifying the city, the stones of the walls arranging themselves spontaneously in obedience to the rhythm of his song.

Zêthus marries Aêdôn, who, in the dark and under a fatal mistake, kills her son Itylus: she is transformed into a nightingale, while Zêthus dies of grief. Amphiôn becomes the husband of Niobê, daughter of Tantalus, and the father of a numerous offspring, the complete extinction of which, by the hands of Apollo and Artemis, has already been recounted in these pages.

Here ends the legend of the beautiful Antiopê and her twin sons—the rude and unpolished, but energetic Zêthus, and the refined and amiable, but dreamy Amphiôn. For so Euripidês, in the drama of Antiopê, unfortunately lost, presented the two brothers, in affectionate union as well as in striking contrast. It is evident that the whole story stood originally quite apart from the Kadmeian family, and so the rudiments of it yet stand in the Odyssey; but the logographers, by their ordinary connecting artifices, have opened a vacant place for it in the descending series of Thêban mythes. And they have here proceeded in a manner not usual with them. For, whereas they are generally fond of multiplying entities, and supposing different historical personages of the same name in order to introduce an apparent smoothness in the chronology, they have here blended into one person Amphiôn, the son of Antiopê, and Amphiôn the father of Chlôris, who seem clearly distinguished from each other in the Odyssey. They have further assigned to the same person all the circumstances of the legend of Niobê, which seems to have been originally framed quite apart from the sons of Antiopê.

Amphiôn and Zêthus being removed, Laius became king of Thêbes. With him commences the ever-celebrated series of adventures of Œdipus and his family. Laius, forewarned by the oracle that any son whom he might beget would kill him, caused Œdipus as soon as he was born to be exposed on Mount Kithærôn. Here the herdsmen of Polybus, king of Corinth, accidentally found him, and conveyed him to their master, who brought him up as his own child. In spite of the kindest treatment, however, Œdipus, when he grew up, found himself exposed to taunts on the score of his unknown

parentage, and went to Delphi to inquire of the god the name of his real father. He received for answer an admonition not to go back to his country; if he did so, it was his destiny to kill his father, and become the husband of his mother. Knowing no other country but Corinth, he accordingly determined to keep away from that city, and quitted Delphi by the road toward Bœôtia and Phôkis. At the exact spot where the roads leading to these two countries forked, he met Laius in a chariot drawn by mules, when the insolence of one of the attendants brought on an angry quarrel, in which Œdipus killed Laius, not knowing him to be his father.

On the death of Laius, Kreôn, the brother of Jokasta, succeeded to the kingdom of Thêbes. At this time the country was under the displeasure of the gods, and was vexed by a terrible monster, with the face of a woman, the wings of a bird, and the tail of a lion, called the Sphinx, sent by the wrath of Hêrê, and occupying the neighboring mountain of Phikium. The Sphinx had learned from the Muses a riddle, which she proposed to the Thêbans to resolve; on every occasion of failure she took away one of the citizens and ate him up. Still, no person could solve the riddle; and so great was the suffering occasioned that Kreôn was obliged to offer both the crown and the nuptials of his sister Jokasta to any one who could achieve the salvation of the city. At this juncture Œdipus arrived, and solved the riddle: upon which the Sphinx immediately threw herself from the acropolis and disappeared. As a recompense for this service, Œdipus was made king of Thêbes, and married Jokasta, not aware that she was his mother.

These main tragical circumstances—that Œdipus had ignorantly killed his father and married his mother—belong to the oldest form of the legend as it stands in the Odyssey. The gods (it is added in that poem) quickly made the facts known to mankind. Epikasta (so Jokasta is here called) in an agony of sorrow hanged herself: Œdipus remained king of the Kadmeians, but underwent many and great miseries, such as the Erinnyes, who avenge an injured mother, inflict. A passage in the Iliad implies that he died at Thêbes, since it mentions the funeral games which were celebrated there in honor of him. His misfortunes were recounted by Nestôr, in the old Cyprian verses, among the stories of afore-time. A fatal curse hung both upon himself and upon his children, Eteoklês, Polynikês, Antigonê, and Ismênê. According to that narrative, which the Attic tragedians have rendered universally current, they were his children by Jokasta, the disclosure of her true relationship to him having been very long deferred. But the ancient epic called Œdipodia, treading more closely in the footsteps of Homer, represented him as having, after her death, married a second wife, Euryganeia, by whom the four children were born to him: and the painter Onatas adopted this story in preference to that of Sophoklês.

The disputes of Eteoklês and Polynikês for the throne of their

father gave occasion not only to a series of tragical family incidents, but also to one of the great quasi-historical events of legendary Greece—the two sieges of Thêbes by Adrastus, king of Argos. The two ancient epic poems called the Thêbaïs and the Epigoni (if, indeed, both were not parts of one very comprehensive poem) detailed these events at great length, and, as it appears, with distinguished poetical merit; for Pausanias pronounces the Cyclic Thêbaïs (so it was called by the subsequent critics to distinguish it from the more modern Thêbaïs of Antimachus) inferior only to the Iliad and Odyssey; the ancient elegiac poet Kallinus treated it as an Homeric composition. Of this once-valued poem we unfortunately possess nothing but a few scanty fragments. The leading points of the legend are briefly glanced at in the Iliad; but our knowledge of the details is chiefly derived from the Attic tragedians, who transformed the narratives of their predecessors at pleasure, and whose popularity constantly eclipsed and obliterated the ancient version. Antimachus of Kolophôn, contemporary with Euripidês, in his long epic, probably took no less liberties with the old narrative. His Thêbaïd never became generally popular, but it exhibited marks of study and elaboration which recommended it to the esteem of the Alexandrine critics, and probably contributed to discredit in their eyes the old cyclic poem.

The logographers, who gave a continuous history of this siege of Thêbes, had at least three pre-existing epic poems—the Thêbaïs, the Œdipodia, and the Alkmæônis—from which they could borrow. The subject was also handled in some of the Hesiodic poems, but we do not know to what extent. The Thêbaïs was composed more in honor of Argos than of Thêbes, as the first line of it, one of the few fragments still preserved, betokens.

Sieges of Thêbes.

The legend, about to recount fraternal dissension of the most implacable kind, comprehending in its results not only the immediate relations of the infuriated brothers, but many chosen companions of the heroic race along with them, takes its start from the paternal curse of Œdipus, which overhangs and determines all the gloomy sequel.

Œdipus, though king of Thêbes and father of four children by Euryganeia (according to the Œdipodia), has become the devoted victim of the Erinnyes, in consequence of the self-inflicted death of his mother, which he had unconsciously caused, as well as of his unintentional parricide. Though he had long forsworn the use of all the ornaments and luxuries which his father had inherited from his kingly progenitors, yet when through age he had come to be dependent upon his two sons, Polynikês one day broke through this interdict, and set before him the silver table and the splendid wine-

cup of Kadmus, which Laius had always been accustomed to employ. The old king had no sooner seen these precious appendages of the regal life of his father than his mind was overrun by a calamitous frenzy, and he imprecated terrible curses on his sons, predicting that there would be bitter and endless warfare between them. The goddess Erinnys heard and heeded him; and he repeated the curse again on another occasion, when his sons, who had always been accustomed to send to him the shoulder of the victims sacrificed on the altar, caused the buttock to be served to him in place of it. He resented this as an insult, and prayed the gods that they might perish each by the hand of the other. Throughout the tragedians as well as in the old epic, the paternal curse, springing immediately from the misguided Œdipus himself, but remotely from the parricide and incest with which he has tainted his breed, is seen to domineer over the course of events—the Erinnys who executes that curse being the irresistible, though concealed, agent. Æschylus not only preserves the fatal efficiency of the paternal curse, but even briefly glances at the causes assigned for it in the Thêbaïs, without superadding any new motives. In the judgment of Sophoklês, or of his audience, the conception of a father cursing his sons upon such apparently trifling grounds was odious; and that great poet introduced many aggravating circumstances, describing the old blind father as having been barbarously turned out of doors by his sons to wander abroad in exile and poverty. Though by this change he rendered his poem more coherent and self-justifying, yet he departed from the spirit of the old legend, according to which Œdipus has contracted by his unconscious misdeeds an incurable taint destined to pass onward to his progeny. His mind is alienated, and he curses them, not because he has suffered seriously by their guilt, but because he is made the blind instrument of an avenging Erinnys for the ruin of the house of Laius.

After the death of Œdipus and the celebration of his funeral games, at which, among others, Argeia, daughter of Adrastus (afterward the wife of Polynikês), was present, his two sons soon quarreled respecting the succession. The circumstances are differently related; but it appears that, according to the original narrative, the wrong and injustice was on the side of Polynikês; who, however, was obliged to leave Thêbes and to seek shelter with Adrastus, king of Argos. Here he met Tydeus, a fugitive, at the same time, from Ætôlia: it was dark when they arrived, and a broil ensued between the two exiles, but Adrastus came out and parted them. He had been enjoined by an oracle to give his two daughters in marriage to a lion and a boar, and he thought that this occasion had now arrived, inasmuch as one of the combatants carried on his shield a lion, the other a boar. He accordingly gave Deipylê in marriage to Tydeus, and Argeia to Polynikês; moreover, he resolved to restore by armed assistance both his sons-in-law to their respective countries.

On proposing the expedition to the Argeian chiefs around him, he found most of them willing auxiliaries; but Amphiaraüs—formerly his bitter opponent, though now reconciled to him, and husband of his sister Eriphylê—strongly opposed him, denouncing the enterprise as unjust and contrary to the will of the gods. Again, being of a prophetic stock, descended from Melampus, he foretold the certain death both of himself and of the principal leaders, should they involve themselves as accomplices in the mad violence of Tydeus, or the criminal ambition of Polynikês. Amphiaraüs, already distinguished both in the Kalydônian boar-hunt and in the funeral games of Pelias, was in the Thêban war the most conspicuous of all the heroes, and absolutely indispensable to its success. But his reluctance to engage in it was invincible, nor was it possible to prevail upon him except through the influence of his wife Eriphylê. Polynikês, having brought with him from Thêbes the splendid robe and necklace given by the gods to Harmonia on her marriage with Kadmus, offered it as a bribe to Eriphylê, on condition that she would influence the determination of Amphiaraüs. The sordid wife, seduced by so matchless a present, betrayed the lurking place of her husband, and involved him in the fatal expedition. Amphiaraüs, reluctantly dragged forth, and foreknowing the disastrous issue of the expedition both to himself and to his associates, addressed his last injunctions, at the moment of mounting his chariot, to his sons Alkmæôn and Amphilochus, commanding Alkmæôn to avenge his approaching death by killing the venal Eriphylê, and by undertaking a second expedition against Thêbes.

The Attic dramatists describe this expedition as having been conducted by seven chiefs, one to each of the seven celebrated gates of Thêbes. But the Cyclic Thêbaïs gave to it a much more comprehensive character, mentioning auxiliaries from Arcadia, Messênê, and various parts of Peloponnêsus; and the application of Tydeus and Polynikes at Mykênæ in the course of their circuit made to collect allies, is mentioned in the Iliad. They were well received at Mykênæ; but the warning signals given by the gods were so terrible that no Mykenæan could venture to accompany them. The seven principal chiefs, however, were Adrastus, Amphiaraüs, Kapaneus, Hippomedôn, Parthenopæus, Tydeus and Polynikês.

The Kadmeians, assisted by their allies the Phôkians and the Phlegyæ, marched out to resist the invaders, and fought a battle near the Ismênian hill, in which they were defeated and forced to retire within the walls. The prophet Teiresias acquainted them that if Menœkeus, son of Kreôn, would offer himself as a victim to Arês, victory would be assured to Thêbes. The generous youth, as soon as he learned that his life was to be the price of safety to his country, went and slew himself before the gates. The heroes along with Adrastus now commenced a vigorous attack upon the town, each of the seven selecting one of the gates to assault. The contest was long

and strenuously maintained; but the devotion of Menœkeus had procured for the Thêbans the protection of the gods. Parthenopæus was killed with a stone by Periklymenus; and when the furious Kapaneus, having planted a scaling-ladder, had mounted the walls, he was smitten by a thunderbolt from Zeus, and cast down dead upon the earth. This event struck terror into the Argeians, and Adrastus called back his troops from the attack. The Thêbans now sallied forth to pursue them, when Eteoklês, arresting the battle, proposed to decide the controversy by single combat with his brother. The challenge, eagerly accepted by Polynikês, was agreed to by Adrastus; a single combat ensued between the two brothers, in which both were exasperated to fury, and both ultimately slain by each other's hand. This equal termination left the result of the general contest still undetermined, and the bulk of the two armies renewed the fight. In the sanguinary struggle which ensued, the sons of Astakus on the Thêban side displayed the most conspicuous and successful valor. One of them, Melanippus, mortally wounded Tydeus —while two others, Leades and Amphidikus, killed Eteoklus and Hippomedôn. Amphiaraüs avenged Tydeus by killing Melanippus; but unable to arrest the rout of the army, he fled with the rest, closely pursued by Periklymenus. The latter was about to pierce him with his spear, when the beneficence of Zeus rescued him from this disgrace—miraculously opening the earth under him, so that Amphiaraüs with his chariot and horses was received unscathed into her bosom. The exact spot where this memorable incident happened was indicated by a sepulchral building, and shown by the Thêbans down to the days of Pausanias—its sanctity being attested by the fact that no animal would consent to touch the herbage which grew within the sacred inclosure. Amphiaraüs, rendered immortal by Zeus, was worshiped as a god at Argos, at Thêbes, and at Orôpus—and for many centuries gave answers at his oracle to the questions of the pious applicant.

Adrastus, thus deprived of the prophet and warrior whom he regarded as "the eye of his army," and having seen the other chiefs killed in the disastrous fight, was forced to take flight singly, and was preserved by the matchless swiftness of his horse Areiôn, the offspring of Poseidôn. He reached Argos on his return, bringing with him nothing except "his garment of woe and his black-maned steed."

Kreôn, father of the heroic youth Menœkeus, succeeding to the administration of Thêbes after the death of the two hostile brothers and the repulse of Adrastus, caused Eteoklês to be buried with distinguished honor, but cast out ignominiously the body of Polynikês as a traitor to his country, forbidding every one on pain of death to consign it to the tomb. He likewise refused permission to Adrastus to inter the bodies of his fallen comrades. This proceeding, so offensive to Grecian feeling, gave rise to two further tales; one of

them at least of the highest pathos and interest. Antigonê, the sister of Polynikês, heard with indignation the revolting edict consigning her brother's body to the dogs and vultures, and depriving it of those rites which were considered essential to the repose of the dead. Unmoved by the dissuading counsel of an affectionate but timid sister, and unable to procure assistance, she determined to brave the hazard, and to bury the body with her own hands. She was detected in the act; and Kreôn, though forewarned by Teiresias of the consequences, gave orders that she should be buried alive, as having deliberately set at naught the solemn edict of the city. His son Hæmôn, to whom she was engaged to be married, in vain interceded for her life. In an agony of despair he slew himself in the sepulchre to which the living Antigonê had been consigned; and his mother Eurydikê, the wife of Kreôn, inconsolable for his death, perished by her own hand. And thus the new light which seemed to be springing up over the last remaining scion of the devoted family of Œdipus, is extinguished amid gloom and horrors—which overshadowed also the house and dynasty of Kreôn.

The other tale stands more apart from the original legend, and seems to have had its origin in the patriotic pride of the Athenians. Adrastus, unable to obtain permission from the Thêbans to inter the fallen chieftains, presented himself in suppliant guise, accompanied by their disconsolate mothers, to Thêseus at Eleusis. He implored the Athenian warrior to extort from the perverse Thêbans that last melancholy privilege which no decent or pious Greeks ever thought of withholding, and thus to stand forth as the champion of Grecian public morality in one of its most essential points, not less than of the rights of the subterranean gods. The Thêbans obstinately persisting in their refusal, Thêseus undertook an expedition against their city, vanquished them in the field, and compelled them by force of arms to permit the sepulture of their fallen enemies. This chivalrous interposition, celebrated in one of the preserved dramas of Euripidês, formed a subject of glorious recollection to the Athenians throughout the historical age. Their orators dwelt upon it in terms of animated panegyric; and it seems to have been accepted as a real fact of the past time, with not less implicit conviction than the battle of Marathôn. But the Thêbans, though equally persuaded of the truth of the main story, dissented from the Athenian version of it, maintaining that they had given up the bodies for sepulture voluntarily and of their own accord. The tomb of the chieftains was shown near Eleusis even in the days of Pausanias.

The defeat of the seven chiefs before Thêbes was amply avenged by their sons, again under the guidance of Adrastus: Ægialeus of Adrastus, Thersander son of Polynikês, Alkmæôn and Amphilochus, sons of Amphiaraüs, Diomêdês, son of Tydeus, Sthenelus son of Kapaneus, Promachus son of Parthenopæus, and Euryalus son of

Mekistheus, joined in this expedition. Though all these youthful warriors, called the Epigoni, took part in the expedition, the grand and prominent place appears to have been occupied by Alkmæôn, son of Amphiaraüs. Assistance was given to them from Corinth and Megara, as well as from Messênê and Arcadia; while Zeus manifested his favorable dispositions by signals not to be mistaken. At the river Glisas the Epigoni were met by the Thêbans in arms, and a battle took place in which the latter were completely defeated. Laodamas, son of Eteoklês, killed Ægialeus, son of Adrastus; but he and his army were routed and driven within the walls by the valor and energy of Alkmæôn. The defeated Kadmeians consulted the prophet Teiresias, who informed them that the gods had declared for their enemies, and that there was no longer any hope of successful resistance. By his advice they sent a herald to the assailants offering to surrender the town, while they themselves conveyed away their wives and children, and fled under the command of Laodamas to the Illyrians, upon which the Epigoni entered Thêbes, and established Thersander, son of Polynikês, on the throne.

Adrastus, who in the former expedition had been the single survivor among so many fallen companions, now found himself the only exception to the general triumph and joy of the conquerors: he had lost his son Ægialeus, and the violent sorrow arising from the event prematurely cut short his life. His soft voice and persuasive eloquence were proverbial in the ancient epic. He was worshiped as a hero both at Argos and at Sikyôn, but with especial solemnity in the last-mentioned place, where his Herôum stood in the public agora, and where his exploits as well as his sufferings were celebrated periodically in lyric tragedies. Melanippus, son of Astakus, the brave defender of Thêbes, who had slain both Tydeus and Mekistheus, was worshiped with no less solemnity by the Thêbans. The enmity of these two heroes rendered it impossible for both of them to be worshiped close upon the same spot. Accordingly it came to pass during the historical period, shortly after the time of the Solonian legislation at Athens, that Kleisthenês, despot of Sikyôn, wishing to banish the hero Adrastus and abolish the religious solemnities celebrated in honor of the latter by the Sikyonians, first applied to the Delphian oracle for permission to carry this banishment into effect directly and forcibly. That permission being refused, he next sent to Thêbes an intimation that he was anxious to introduce their hero Melanippus into Sikyôn. The Thêbans willingly consented, and he assigned to the new hero a consecrated spot in the the strongest and most commanding portion of the Sikyonian prytaneium. He did this (says the historian) "knowing that Adrastus would forthwith go away of his own accord; since Melanippus was of all persons the most odious to him, as having slain both his son-in-law and his brother." Kleisthenês, moreover, diverted the festivals and sacrifices which had been offered to Adras-

tus, to the newly-established hero Melanippus; and the lyric tragedies from the worship of Adrastus to that of Dionysus. But his dynasty did not long continue after his decease, and the Sikyonians then re-established their ancient solemnities.

Near the Prœtid gate of Thêbes were seen the tombs of two combatants who had hated each other during life even more than Adrastus and Melanippus—the two brothers Eteoklês and Polynikês. Even as heroes and objects of worship, they still continued to manifest their inextinguishable hostility: those who offered sacrifices to them observed that the flame and the smoke from the two adjoining altars abhorred all communion, and flew off in directions exactly opposite. The Thêban exegetes assured Pausanias of this fact. And though he did not himself witness it, yet having seen with his own eyes a miracle not very dissimilar at Pioniæ in Mysia, he had no difficulty in crediting their assertion.

Amphiaraüs, when forced into the first attack of Thêbes—against his own foreknowledge and against the warnings of the gods—had enjoined his sons Alkmæôn and Amphilochus not only to avenge his death upon the Thêbans, but also to punish the treachery of their mother, "Eriphylê, the destroyer of her husband." In obedience to this command, and having obtained the sanction of the Delphian oracle, Alkmæôn slew his mother; but the awful Erinnys, the avenger of matricide, inflicted on him a long and terrible punishment, depriving him of his reason, and chasing him about from place to place without the possibility of repose or peace of mind. He craved protection and cure from the god at Delphi, who required him to dedicate at the temple, as an offering, the precious necklace of Kadmus, that irresistible bribe which had originally corrupted Eriphylê. He further intimated to the unhappy sufferer, that though the whole earth was tainted with his crime, and had become uninhabitable for him, yet there was a spot of ground which was not under the eye of the sun at the time when the matricide was committed, and where therefore Alkmæôn yet might find a tranquil shelter. The promise was realized at the mouth of the river Achelôus, whose turbid stream was perpetually depositing new earth and forming additional islands. Upon one of these, near Œniadæ, Alkmæôn settled, permanently and in peace: he became the primitive hero of Akarnania, to which his son Akarnan gave name. The necklace was found among the treasures of Delphi (together with that which had been given by Aphroditê to Helen), by the Phôkian plunderers who stripped the temple in the time of Philip of Macedôn. The Phôkian women quarreled about these valuable ornaments. We are told that the necklace of Eriphylê was allotted to a woman of gloomy and malignant disposition, who ended by putting her husband to death; that of Helen to a beautiful but volatile wife, who abandoned her husband from preference for a young Epirot.

There were several other legends respecting the distracted Alk-

mæôn, either appropriated or invented by the Attic tragedians. He went to Phêgeus, king of Psôphis in Arcadia, whose daughter Arsinoê he married, giving as a nuptial present the necklace of Eriphylê. Being however unable to remain there, in consequence of the unremitting persecutions of the maternal Erinnys, he sought shelter at the residence of king Achelôus, whose daughter Kallirhoê he made his wife, and on whose soil he obtained repose. But Kallirhoê would not be satisfied without the possession of the necklace of Eriphylê, and Alkmæôn went back to Psôphis to fetch it, where Phêgeus and his sons slew him. He had left twin sons, infants, with Kallirhoê, who prayed fervently to Zeus that they might be preternaturally invested with immediate manhood, in order to revenge the murder of their father. Her prayer was granted, and her sons Amphoterus and Akarnan, having instantaneously sprung up to manhood, proceeded into Arcadia, slew the murderers of their father, and brought away the necklace of Eriphylê, which they carried to Delphi.

Euripidês deviated still more widely from the ancient epic, by making Alkmæôn the husband of Mantô, daughter of Teiresias, and the father of Amphilochus. According to the Cyclic Thêbaïs, Manto was consigned by the victorious Epigoni as a special offering to the Delphian god; and Amphilochus was son of Amphiaraüs, not son of Alkmæôn. He was the eponymous hero of the town called the Amphilochian Argos, in Akarnania, on the shore of the gulf of Ambrakia. Thucydidês tells us that he went thither on his return from the Trojan war, being dissatisfied with the state of affairs which he found at the Peloponnêsian Argos. The Akarnanians were remarkable for the numerous prophets which they supplied to the rest of Greece: their heroes were naturally drawn from the great prophetic race of the Melampodids.

Thus ends the legend of the two sieges of Thêbes; the greatest event, except the siege of Troy, in the ancient epic; the greatest enterprise of war, between Greeks and Greeks, during the time of those who are called the Heroes.

CHAPTER XV.

LEGEND OF TROY.

We now arrive at the capital and culminating point of the Grecian epic,—the two sieges and captures of Troy, with the destinies of the dispersed heroes, Trojan as well as Grecian, after the second and most celebrated capture and destruction of the city.

It would require a large volume to convey any tolerable idea of the vast extent and expansion of this interesting fable, first handled by so many poets, epic, lyric, and tragic, with their endless additions, transformations, and contradictions,—then purged and recast by historical inquirers, who, under color of setting aside the exaggerations of the poets, introduced a new vein of prosaic invention,—lastly, moralized and allegorized by philosophers. In the present brief outline of the general field of Grecian legend, or of that which the Greeks believed to be their antiquities, the Trojan war can be regarded as only one among a large number of incidents upon which Hekatæus and Herodotus looked back as constituting their fore-time. Taken as a special legendary event, it is, indeed, of wider and larger interest than any other, but it is a mistake to single it out from the rest as if it rested upon a different and more trustworthy basis. I must, therefore, confine myself to an abridged narrative of the current and leading facts; and amid the numerous contradictory statements which are to be found respecting every one of them, I know no better ground of preference than comparative antiquity, though even the oldest tales which we possess—those contained in the Iliad—evidently presuppose others of prior date.

The primitive ancestor of the Trojan line of kings is Dardanus, son of Zeus, founder and eponymus of Dardania: in the account of later authors, Dardanus was called the son of Zeus by Elektra, daughter of Atlas, and was further said to have come from Samothrace, or from Arcadia, or from Italy; but of this Homer mentions nothing. The first Dardanian town founded by him was in a lofty position on the descent of Mount Ida; for he was not yet strong enough to establish himself on the plain. But his son Erichthonius, by the favor of Zeus, became the wealthiest of mankind. His flocks and herds having multiplied, he had in his pastures 3,000 mares, the offspring of some of whom, by Boreas, produced horses of preternatural swiftness. Trôs, the son of Erichthonius, and the eponym of the Trojans, had three sons—Ilus, Assaracus, and the beautiful Ganymêdês, whom Zeus stole away to become his cup-bearer in Olympus, giving to his father Trôs, as the price of the youth, a team of immortal horses.

From Ilus and Assaracus the Trojan and Dardanian lines diverge; the former passing from Ilus to Laomedôn, Priam, and Hectôr; the latter from Assaracus to Capys, Anchisês, and Æneas. Ilus founded in the plain of Troy the holy city of Ilium; Assaracus and his descendants remained sovereigns of Dardania.

It was under the proud Laomedôn, son of Ilus, that Poseidôn and Apollo underwent, by command of Zeus, a temporary servitude; the former building the walls of the town, the latter tending the flocks and herds. When their task was completed and the penal period had expired, they claimed the stipulated reward; but Laomedôn angrily repudiated their demand, and even threatened to cut off their ears, to tie them hand and foot, and to sell them in some distant island as slaves. He was punished for this treachery by a sea-monster, whom Poseidôn sent to ravage his fields and to destroy his subjects. Laomedôn publicly offered the immortal horses given by Zeus to his father Trôs, as a reward to any one who would destroy the monster. But an oracle declared that a virgin of noble blood must be surrendered to him, and the lot fell upon Hesionê, daughter of Laomedôn himself. Hêraklês, arriving at this critical moment, killed the monster by the aid of a fort built for him by Athênê and the Trojans, so as to rescue both the exposed maiden and the people; but Laomedôn, by a second act of perfidy, gave him mortal horses in place of the matchless animals which had been promised. Thus defrauded of his due, Hêraklês equipped six ships, attacked and captured Troy and killed Laomedôn, giving Hesionê to his friend and auxiliary Telamôn, to whom she bore the celebrated archer Teukros. A painful sense of this expedition was preserved among the inhabitants of the historical town of Ilium, who offered no worship to Hêraklês.

Among all the sons of Laomedôn, Priam was the only one who had remonstrated against the refusal of the well-earned guerdon of Hêraklês; for which the hero recompensed him by placing him on the throne. Many and distinguished were his sons and daughters, as well by his wife Hekabê, daughter of Kisseus, as by other women. Among the sons were Hectôr, Paris, Dêiphobus, Helenus, Trôilus, Politês, Polydôrus; among the daughters, Laodikê, Kreüsa, Polyxena, and Kassandra.

The birth of Paris was preceded by formidable presage; for Hekabê dreamt that she was delivered of a firebrand, and Priam, on consulting the soothsayers, was informed that the son about to be born would prove fatal to him. Accordingly he directed the child to be exposed on Mount Ida; but the inauspicious kindness of the gods preserved him; and he grew up amid the flocks and herds, active and beautiful, fair of hair and symmetrical in person, and the special favorite of Aphroditê.

It was to this youth, in his solitary shepherd's walk on Mount Ida, that the three goddesses, Hêrê, Athênê, and Aphrodite, were conducted, in order that he might determine the dispute respecting their comparative beauty, which had arisen at the nuptials of Pêleus and Thetis,—a dispute brought about in pursuance of the arrangement, and in accomplishment of the deep-laid designs of Zeus. For Zeus, remarking with pain the immoderate numbers of the then existing heroic race, pitied the earth for the overwhelming burden which she was compelled to bear, and determined to lighten it by exciting a destructive and long-continued war. Paris awarded the palm of beauty to Aphroditê, who promised him in recompense the possession of Helena, wife of the Spartan Menelaus,—the daughter of Zeus and the fairest of living women. At the instance of Aphroditê, ships were built for him, and he embarked on the enterprise so fraught

with eventual disaster to his native city, in spite of the menacing prophecies of his brother Helenus, and the always neglected warnings of Kassandra.

Paris, on arriving at Sparta, was hospitably entertained by Menelaus as well as by Kastôr and Pollux, and was enabled to present the rich gifts which he had brought to Helen. Menelaus then departed to Krête, leaving Helen to entertain his Trojan guest—a favorable moment, which was employed by Aphroditê to bring about the intrigue and the elopement. Paris carried away with him both Helen and a large sum of money belonging to Menelaus, made a prosperous voyage to Troy, and arrived there safely with his prize on the third day.

Menelaus, informed by Iris in Krête of the perfidious return made by Paris for his hospitality, hastened home in grief and indignation to consult with his brother Agamemnôn, as well as with the venerable Nestôr, on the means of avenging the outrage. They made known the event to the Greek chiefs around them, among whom they found universal sympathy; Nestôr, Palamêdês, and others went round to solicit aid in a contemplated attack of Troy, under the command of Agamemnôn, to whom each chief promised both obedience and unwearied exertion until Helen should be recovered. Ten years were spent in equipping the expedition. The goddesses Hêrê and Athênê, incensed at the preference given by Paris to Aphroditê, and animated by steady attachment to Argos, Sparta, and Mykênæ, took an active part in the cause: and the horses of Hêrê were fatigued with her repeated visits to the different parts of Greece.

By such efforts a force was at length assembled at Aulis in Bœôtia, consisting of 1186 ships and more than 100,000 men—a force outnumbering by more than ten to one anything that the Trojans themselves could oppose, and superior to the defenders of Troy even with all her allies included. It comprised heroes with their followers from the extreme points of Greece—from the north-western portions of Thessaly under Mount Olympus, as well as the western islands of Dulichium and Ithaca, and the eastern islands of Krête and Rhodes. Agamemnôn himself contributed 100 ships manned with the subjects of his kingdom Mykênæ, besides furnishing 60 ships to the Arcadians, who possessed none of their own. Menelaus brought with him 60 ships, Nestôr from Pylus 90, Idomeneus from Krête and Diomêdês from Argos, 80 each. Forty ships were manned by the Eleians, under four different chiefs; the like number under Meges from Dulichium and the Echinades, and under Thoas from Kalydôn and the other Ætôlian towns. Odysseus from Ithaca, and Ajax from Salamis, brought 12 ships each. The Abantes from Eubœa, under Elphênôr, filled 40 vessels; the Bœôtians, under Penelcôs and Lêitus, 50; the inhabitants of Orchomenus and Aspledôn, 30; the light-armed Lokrians, under Ajax son of Oileus, 40; the Phôkians as many. The Athenians, under Menestheus, a

chief distinguished for his skill in marshaling an army, mustered 50 ships; the Myrmidons from Phthia and Hellas, under Achilles, assembled in 50 ships; Protesilaus from Phylakê and Pyrasus, and Eurypylus from Ormenium, each came with 40 ships; Machaôn and Podaleirius, from Trikka, with 30; Eumêlus, from Pheræ and the lake Bœbêis, with 11; and Philoktêtês from Melibœa with 7; the Lapithæ, under Polypœtês, son of Peirithous, filled 40 vessels; the Ænianes and Perrhæbians, under Guneus, 22; and the Magnêtês, under Prothous, 40; these last two were from the northernmost parts of Thessaly, near the mountains Pêlion and Olympus. From Rhodes, under Tlêpolemus, son of Hêraklês, appeared 9 ships; from Symê, under the comely but effeminate Nireus, 3; from Kôs, Krapathus, and the neighboring islands, 30, under the orders of Pheidippus and Antiphus, sons of Thessalus and grandsons of Hêraklês.

Among this band of heroes were included the distinguished warriors Ajax and Diomêdês, and the sagacious Nestôr; while Agamemnôn himself, scarcely inferior to either of them in prowess, brought with him a high reputation for prudence in command. But the most marked and conspicuous of all were Achilles and Odysseus; the former a beautiful youth born of a divine mother, swift in the race, of fierce temper and irresistible might; the latter not less efficient as an ally, from his eloquence, his untiring endurance, his inexhaustible resources under difficulty, and the mixture of daring courage with deep-laid cunning which never deserted him: the blood of the arch-deceiver Sisyphus, through an illicit connection with his mother Antikleia, was said to flow in his veins, and he was especially patronized and protected by the goddess Athênê. Odysseus, unwilling at first to take part in the expedition, had even simulated insanity; but Palamêdês, sent to Ithaca to invite him, tested the reality of his madness by placing in the furrow where Odysseus was ploughing, his infant son Telemachus. Thus detected, Odysseus could not refuse to join the Achæan host, but the prophet Halithersês predicted to him that twenty years would elapse before he revisited his native land. To Achilles the gods had promised the full effulgence of heroic glory before the walls of Troy; nor could the place be taken without both his co-operation and that of his son after him. But they had forewarned him that this brilliant career would be rapidly brought to a close; and that if he desired a long life, he must remain tranquil and inglorious in his native land. In spite of the reluctance of his mother Thetis, he preferred few years with bright renown, and joined the Achæan host. When Nestôr and Odysseus came to Phthia to invite him, both he and his intimate friend Patroklus eagerly obeyed the call.

Agamemnôn and his powerful host set sail from Aulis; but being ignorant of the locality and the direction, they landed by mistake in Teuthrania, a part of Mysia near the river Kaïkus, and began to ravage the country under the persuasion that it was the neighbor

hood of Troy. Têlephus, the king of the country, opposed and repelled them, but was ultimately defeated and severely wounded by Achilles. The Greeks, now discovering their mistake, retired; but their fleet was dispersed by a storm and driven back to Greece. Achilles attacked and took Skyrus, and there married Deidamia, the daughter of Lycomêdes. Têlephus, suffering from his wounds, was directed by the oracle to come to Greece and present himself to Achilles to be healed, by applying the scrapings of the spear with which the wound had been given; thus restored, he became the guide of the Greeks when they were prepared to renew their expedition.

The armament was again assembled at Aulis, but the goddess Artemis, displeased with the boastful language of Agamemnôn, prolonged the duration of adverse winds, and the offending chief was compelled to appease her by the well-known sacrifice of his daughter Iphigeneia. They then proceeded to Tenedos, from whence Odysseus and Menelaus were dispatched as envoys to Troy, to redemand Helen and the stolen property. In spite of the prudent counsels of Antenôr, who received the two Grecian chiefs with friendly hospitality, the Trojans rejected the demand, and the attack was resolved upon. It was foredoomed by the gods that the Greek who first landed should perish: Protesilaus was generous enough to put himself upon this forlorn hope, and accordingly fell by the hand of Hectôr.

Meanwhile, the Trojans had assembled a large body of allies from various parts of Asia Minor and Thrace: Dardanians under Æneas, Lykians under Sarpedôn, Mysians, Karians, Mæonians, Alizonians, Phrygians, Thracians, and Pæonians. But vain was the attempt to oppose the landing of the Greeks: the Trojans were routed, and even the invulnerable Kyknus, son of Poseidôn, one of the great bulwarks of the defense, was slain by Achilles. Having driven the Trojans within their walls, Achilles attacked and stormed Lyrnêssus, Pêdasus, Lesbos, and other places in the neighborhood, twelve towns on the sea-coast, and eleven in the interior: he drove off the oxen of Æneas and pursued the hero himself, who narrowly escaped with his life: he surprised and killed the youthful Trôilus, son of Priam, and captured several of the other sons, whom he sold as prisoners into the islands of the Ægean. He acquired as his captive the fair Brisêis, while Chrysêis was awarded to Agamemnôn; he was, moreover, eager to see the divine Helen, the prize and stimulus of this memorable struggle; and Aphroditê and Thetis contrived to bring about an interview between them.

At this period of the war the Grecian army was deprived of Palamêdês, one of its ablest chiefs. Odysseus had not forgiven the artifice by which Palamêdês had detected his simulated insanity, nor was he without jealousy of a rival clever and cunning in a degree equal, if not superior, to himself; one who had enriched the Greeks with

the invention of letters, of dice for amusement, of night-watches, as well as with other useful suggestions. According to the old Cyprian epic, Palamêdês was drowned while fishing by the hands of Odysseus and Diomêdês. Neither in the Iliad nor the Odyssey does the name of Palamêdês occur; the lofty position which Odysseus occupies in both those poems—noticed with some degree of displeasure even by Pindar, who described Palamêdês as the wiser man of the two—is sufficient to explain the omission. But in the more advanced period of the Greek mind, when intellectual superiority came to acquire a higher place in the public esteem as compared with military prowess, the character of Palamêdês, combined with his unhappy fate, rendered him one of the most interesting personages in the Trojan legend. Æschylus, Sophoklês, and Euripidês, each consecrated to him a special tragedy; but the mode of his death as described in the old epic was not suitable to Athenian ideas, and accordingly he was represented as having been falsely accused of treason by Odysseus, who caused gold to be buried in his tent, and persuaded Agamemnôn and the Grecian chiefs that Palamêdês had received it from the Trojans. He thus forfeited his life, a victim to the calumny of Odysseus and to the delusion of the leading Greeks. The philosopher Sokratês, in the last speech made to his Athenian judges, alludes with solemnity and fellow-feeling to the unjust condemnation of Palamêdês as analogous to that which he himself was about to suffer; and his companions seem to have dwelt with satisfaction on the comparison. Palamêdês passed for an instance of the slanderous enmity and misfortune which so often wait upon superior genius.

In these expeditions the Grecian army consumed nine years, during which the subdued Trojans dared not give battle without their walls for fear of Achilles. Ten years was the fixed epical duration of the siege of Troy, just as five years was the duration of the siege of Kamikus by the Krêtan armament which came to avenge the death of Minôs: ten years of preparation, ten years of siege, and ten years of wandering for Odysseus were periods suited to the rough chronological dashes of the ancient epic, and suggesting no doubts nor difficulties with the original hearers. But it was otherwise when the same events came to be contemplated by the historicizing Greeks, who could not be satisfied without either finding or inventing satisfactory bonds of coherence between the separate events. Thucydidês tells us that the Greeks were less numerous than the poets have represented, and that being, moreover, very poor, they were unable to procure adequate and constant provisions: hence they were compelled to disperse their army, and to employ a part of it in cultivating the Chersonese—a part in marauding expeditions over the neighborhood. Could the whole army have been employed against Troy at once (he says), the siege would have been much more speedily and easily concluded. If the great historian could permit himself thus to amend the legend in so many points, we might have imagined that

a simpler course would have been to include the duration of the siege among the list of poetical exaggerations, and to affirm that the real siege had lasted only one year instead of ten. But it seems that the ten years' duration was so capital a feature in the ancient tale that no critic ventured to meddle with it.

A period of comparative intermission, however, was now at hand for the Trojans. The gods brought about the memorable fit of anger of Achilles, under the influence of which he refused to put on his armor, and kept his Myrmidons in camp. According to the Cypria, this was the behest of Zeus, who had compassion on the Trojans: according to the Iliad, Apollo was the originating cause, from anxiety to avenge the injury which his priest Chrysês had endured from Agamemnôn. For a considerable time, the combats of the Greeks against Troy were conducted without their best warrior, and severe, indeed, was the humiliation which they underwent in consequence. How the remaining Grecian chiefs vainly strove to make amends for his absence—how Hectôr and the Trojans defeated and drove them to their ships—how the actual blaze of the destroying flame, applied by Hectôr to the ship of Protesilaus, roused up the anxious and sympathizing Patroklus, and extorted a reluctant consent from Achilles to allow his friend and his followers to go forth and avert the last extremity of ruin—how Achilles, when Patroklus had been killed by Hectôr, forgetting his anger in grief for the death of his friend, re-entered the fight, drove the Trojans within their walls with immense slaughter, and satiated his revenge both upon the living and the dead Hectôr,—all these events have been chronicled, together with those divine dispensations on which most of them are made to depend, in the immortal verse of the Iliad.

Homer breaks off with the burial of Hectôr, whose body has just been ransomed by the disconsolate Priam; while the lost poem of Arktinus, entitled the Æthiopis, so far as we can judge from the argument still remaining of it, handled only the subsequent events of the siege. The poem of Quintus Smyrnæus, composed about the fourth century of the Christian era, seems in its first books to coincide with the Æthiopis, in the subsequent books partly with the Ilias Minor of Leschês.

The Trojans, dismayed by the death of Hectôr, were again animated with hope by the appearance of the warlike and beautiful queen of the Amazons, Penthesileia, daughter of Arês, hitherto invincible in the field, who came to their assistance from Thrace at the head of a band of her country-women. She again led the besieged without the walls to encounter the Greeks in the open field; and under her auspices the latter were at first driven back, until she, too, was slain by the invincible arm of Achilles. The victor, on taking off the helmet of his fair enemy as she lay on the ground, was profoundly affected and captivated by her charms, for which he was scornfully taunted by Thersitês: exasperated by this rash insult, he killed Thersitês on the spot with a blow of his fist. A violent dispute among the Grecian chiefs was the result, for Diomêdês, the kinsman of Thersitês, warmly resented the proceeding; and Achilles was obliged to go to Lesbos, where he was purified from the act of homicide by Odysseus.

Next arrived Memnôn, son of Tithônus and Eôs, the most stately of living men, with a powerful band of black Ethiopians, to the assistance of Troy. Sallying forth against the Greeks, he made great havoc among them: the brave and popular Antilochus perished by his hand, a victim to filial devotion in defense of Nestôr. Achilles at length attacked him, and for a long time the combat was doubtful between them: the prowess of Achilles and the supplication of Thetis with Zeus finally prevailed; while Eôs obtained for her vanquished son the consoling gift of immortality. His tomb, however, was shown near the Propontis, within a few miles of the mouth of the river Æsêpus, and was visited annually by the birds called Memnonides, who swept it and bedewed it with water from the stream. So the traveler Pausanias was told, even in the second century after the Christian era, by the Hellespontine Greeks.

But the fate of Achilles himself was now at hand. After routing the Trojans and chasing them into the town, he was slain near the Skæan gate by an arrow from the quiver of Paris, directed under the unerring auspices of Apollo. The greatest efforts were made by the Trojans to possess themselves of the body, which was, however, rescued and borne off to the Grecian camp by the valor of Ajax and Odysseus. Bitter was the grief of Thetis for the loss of her son: she came into the camp with the Muses and the Nêreids to mourn over him; and when a magnificent funeral-pile had been prepared by the Greeks to burn him with every mark of honor, she stole away the body and conveyed it to a renewed and immortal life in the island of Leukê in the Euxine sea. According to some accounts he was there blest with the nuptials and company of Helen.

Thetis celebrated splendid funeral games in honor of her son, and offered the unrivaled panoply which Hêphæstos had forged and wrought for him as a prize to the most distinguished warrior in the Grecian army. Odysseus and Ajax became rivals for the distinction, when Athênê, together with some Trojan prisoners, who were asked from which of the two their country had sustained greatest injury, decided in favor of the former. The gallant Ajax lost his senses with grief and humiliation: in a fit of frenzy he slew some sheep, mistaking them for the men who had wronged him, and then fell upon his own sword.

Odysseus now learnt from Helenus, son of Priam, whom he had captured in an ambuscade, that Troy could not be taken unless both Philoktêtês and Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, could be prevailed upon to join the besiegers. The former, having been stung in the foot by a serpent, and becoming insupportable to the Greeks from the

stench of his wound, had been left at Lemnus in the commencement of the expedition, and had spent ten years in misery on that desolate island: but he still possessed thepeerless bow and arrows of Hêraklês, which were said to be essential to the capture of Troy. Diomêdês fetched Philoktêtês from Lemus to the Grecian camp, where he was healed by the skill of Machaôn, and took an active part against the Trojans—engaging in single combat with Paris, and killing him with one of the Hêrakleian arrows. The Trojans were allowed to carry away for burial the body of this prince, the fatal cause of all their sufferings; but not until it had been mangled by the hand of Menelaus. Odysseus went to the island of Skyrus to invite Neoptolemus to the army. The untried but impetuous youth, gladly obeying the call, received from Odysseus his father's armor; while, on the other hand, Eurypylus, son of Têlephus, came from Mysia as auxiliary to the Trojans and rendered to them valuable service—turning the tide of fortune for a time against the Greeks, and killing some of their bravest chiefs, among whom were numbered Peneleôs, and the unrivaled leech Machaôn. The exploits of Neoptolemus were numerous, worthy of the glory of his race and the renown of his father. He encountered and slew Eurypylus, together with numbers of the Mysian warriors: he routed the Trojans and drove them within their walls, from whence they never again emerged to give battle: and he was not less distinguished for good sense and persuasive diction than for forward energy in the field.

Troy, however, was still impregnable so long as the Palladium, a statue given by Zeus himself to Dardanus, remained in the citadel; and great care had been taken by the Trojans not only to conceal this valuable present, but to construct other statues so like it as to mislead any intruding robber. Nevertheless, the enterprising Odysseus, having disguised his person with miserable clothing and self-inflicted injuries, found means to penetrate into the city and to convey the Palladium by stealth away. Helen alone recognized him; but she was now anxious to return to Greece, and even assisted Odysseus in concerting means for the capture of the town.

To accomplish this object, one final stratagem was resorted to. By the hands of Epeius of Panopeus, and at the suggestion of Athênê, a capacious hollow wooden horse was constructed, capable of containing one hundred men. In the inside of this horse, the élite of the Grecian heroes, Neoptolemus, Odysseus, Menelaus, and others, concealed themselves while the entire Grecian army sailed away to Tenedos, burning their tents and pretending to have abandoned the siege. The Trojans, overjoyed to find themselves free, issued from the city and contemplated with astonishment the fabric which their enemies had left behind. They long doubted what should be done with it; and the anxious heroes from within heard the surrounding consultations, as well as the voice of Helen when she pronounced their names and counterfeited the accents of their wives. Many

of the Trojans were anxious to dedicate it to the gods in the city as a token of gratitude for their deliverance; but the more cautious spirits inculcated distrust of an enemy's legacy. Laocoôn, the priest of Poseidôn, manifested his aversion by striking the side of the horse with his spear. The sound revealed that the horse was hollow, but the Trojans heeded not this warning of possible fraud. The unfortunate Laocoôn, a victom to his own sagacity and patriotism, miserably perished before the eyes of his countrymen, together with one of his sons: two serpents being sent expressly by the gods out of the sea to destroy him. By this terrific spectacle, together with the perfidious counsels of Simon—a traitor whom the Greeks had left behind for the special purpose of giving false information—the Trojans were induced to make a breach in their own walls, and to drag the fatal fabric with triumph and exultation into their city.

The destruction of Troy, according to the decree of the gods, was now irrevocably sealed. While the Trojans indulged in a night of riotous festivity, Simon kindled the fire-signal to the Greeks at Tenedos, loosening the bolts of the wooden horse, from out of which the inclosed heroes descended. The city, assailed both from within and from without, was thoroughly sacked and destroyed, with the slaughter or captivity of the larger portion of its heroes as well as its people. The venerable Priam perished by the hand of Neoptolemus, having in vain sought shelter at the domestic altar of Zeus Herkeius. But his son Deiphobus, who since the death of Paris had become the husband of Helen, defended his house desperately against Odysseus and Menelaus, and sold his life dearly. After he was slain, his body was fearfully mutilated by the latter.

Thus was Troy utterly destroyed—the city, the altars and temples, and the population. Æneas and Antenôr were permitted to escape, with their families, having been always more favorably regarded by the Greeks than the remaining Trojans. According to one version of the story, they had betrayed the city to the Greeks: a panther's skin had been hung over the door of Antenôr's house as a signal for the victorious besiegers to spare it in general plunder. In the distribution of the principal captives, Astyanax, the infant son of Hectôr, was cast from the top of the wall and killed by Odysseus or Neoptolemus: Polyxena, the daughter of Priam, was immolated on the tomb of Achilles, in compliance with a requisition made by the shade of the deceased hero to his countrymen; while her sister Kassandra was presented as a prize to Agamemnôn. She had sought sanctuary at the altar of Athênê, where Ajax, the son of Oileus, making a guilty attempt to seize her, had drawn both upon himself and upon the army the serious wrath of the goddess, insomuch that the Greeks could hardly be restrained from stoning him to death. Andromachê and Helenus were both given to Neoptolemus, who, according to the Ilias Minor, carried away also Æneas as his captive.

Helen gladly resumed her union with Menelaus: she accompanied

him back to Sparta, and lived with him there many years in comfort and dignity, passing afterward to a happy immortality in the Elysian fields. She was worshiped as a goddess, with her brothers, the Dioskuri, and her husband, having her temple, statue, and altar at Therapnæ and elsewhere. Various examples of her miraculous intervention were cited among the Greeks. The lyric poet Stêsichorus had ventured to denounce her, conjointly with her sister Klytæmnêstra, in a tone of rude and plain-spoken severity, resembling that of Euripidês and Lykophrôn afterward, but strikingly opposite to the delicacy and respect with which she is always handled by Homer, who never admits reproaches against her except from her own lips. He was smitten with blindness, and made sensible of his impiety; but, having repented and composed a special poem formally retracting the calumny, was permitted to recover his sight. In his poem of recantation (the famous palinode now unfortunately lost) he pointedly contradicted the Homeric narrative, affirming that Helen had never been at Troy at all, and that the Trojans had carried thither nothing but her image or eidôlon. It is, probably, to the excited religious feelings of Stêsichorus that we owe the first idea of this glaring deviation from the old legend, which could never have been recommended by any considerations of poetical interest.

Other versions were afterward started, forming a sort of compromise between Homer and Stêsichorus, admitting that Helen had never really been at Troy, without altogether denying her elopement. Such is the story of her having been detained in Egypt during the whole term of the siege. Paris, on his departure from Sparta, had been driven thither by storms, and the Egyptian king Prôteus, hearing of the grievous wrong which he had committed toward Menelaus, had sent him away from the country with severe menaces, detaining Helen until her lawful husband should come to seek her. When the Greeks reclaimed Helen from Troy, the Trojans assured them solemnly that she neither was nor ever had been in the town; but the Greeks, treating this allegation as fraudulent, prosecuted the siege until their ultimate success confirmed the correctness of the statement. Menelaus did not recover Helen until, on his return from Troy, he visited Egypt. Such was the story told by the Egyptian priests to Herodotus, and it appeared satisfactory to his historicizing mind. "For if Helen had really been at Troy," he argues, "she would certainly have been given up, even had she been mistress of Priam himself instead of Paris: the Trojan king, with all his family and all his subjects, would never knowingly have incurred utter and irretrievable destruction for the purpose of retaining her: their misfortune was that, while they did not possess and therefore could not restore her, they yet found it impossible to convince the Greeks that such was the fact." Assuming the historical character of the war of Troy, the remark of Herodotus admits of no reply; nor can we greatly wonder that he acquiesced in the tale of Helen's Egyptian

detention, as a substitute for the "incredible insanity" which the genuine legend imputes to Priam and the Trojans. Pausanias, upon the same ground and by the same mode of reasoning, pronounced that the Trojan horse must have been, in point of fact, a battering-engine, because to admit the literal narrative would be to impute utter childishness to the defenders of the city. And Mr. Payne Knight rejects Helen altogether as the real cause of the Trojan war, though she may have been the pretext of it; for he thinks that neither the Greeks nor the Trojans could have been so mad and silly as to endure calamities of such magnitude "for one little woman." Mr. Knight suggests various political causes as substitutes; these might deserve consideration, either if any evidence could be produced to countenance them, or if the subject on which they are brought to bear could be shown to belong to the domain of history.

The return of the Grecian chiefs from Troy furnished matter to the ancient epic hardly less copious than the siege itself, and the more susceptible of indefinite diversity, inasmuch as those who had before acted in concert were now dispersed and isolated. Moreover, the stormy voyages and compulsory wanderings of the heroes exactly fell in with the common aspirations after an heroic founder, and enabled even the most remote Hellenic settlers to connect the origin of their town with this prominent event of their ante-historical and semi-divine world. And an absence of ten years afforded room for the supposition of many domestic changes in their native abode, and many family misfortunes and misdeeds during the interval. One of these heroic "Returns," that of Odysseus, has been immortalized by the verse of Homer. The hero, after a series of long-protracted suffering and expatriation inflicted on him by the anger of Poseidôn, at last reaches his native island, but finds his wife beset, his youthful son insulted, and his substance plundered by a troop of insolent suitors; he is forced to appear as a wretched beggar, and to endure in his own person their scornful treatment; but finally, by the interference of Athênê coming in aid of his own courage and stratagem, he is enabled to overwhelm his enemies, to resume his family position, and to recover his property. The return of several other Grecian chiefs was the subject of an epic poem by Hagias, which is now lost, but of which a brief abstract or argument still remains: there were in antiquity various other poems of similar title and analogous matter.

As usual with the ancient epic, the multiplied sufferings of this back-voyage are traced to divine wrath, justly provoked by the sins of the Greeks, who, in the fierce exultation of a victory purchased by so many hardships, had neither respected nor even spared the altars of the gods in Troy. Athênê, who had been their most zealous ally during the siege, was so incensed by their final recklessness, more especially by the outrage of Ajax, son of Oïleus, that she actively harassed and embittered their return, in spite of every effort

to appease her. The chiefs began to quarrel among themselves: their formal assembly become a scene of drunkenness; even Agamemnôn and Menelaus lost their fraternal harmony, and each man acted on his own separate resolution. Nevertheless, according to the Odyssey, Nestôr, Diomêdês, Neoptolemus, Idomeneus, and Philoktêtês reached home speedily and safely; Agamemnôn also arrived in Peloponnêsus, to perish by the hand of a treacherous wife; but Menelaus was condemned to long wanderings and to the severest privations in Egypt, Cyprus, and elsewhere before he could set foot in his native land. The Lokrian Ajax perished on the Gyræan rock. Though exposed to a terrible storm, he had already reached this place of safety, when he indulged in the rash boast of having escaped in defiance of the gods. No sooner did Poseidôn hear this language than he struck with his trident the rock which Ajax was grasping and precipitated both into the sea. Kalchas, the soothsayer, together with Leonteus and Polypœtês, proceeded by land from Troy to Kolophon.

In respect, however, to these and other Grecian heroes, tales were told different from those in the Odyssey, assigning to them a long expatriation and a distant home. Nestôr went to Italy, where he founded Metapontum, Pisa, and Hêrakleia: Philoktêtês also went to Italy, founded Petilia and Krimisa, and sent settlers to Egesta in Sicily. Neoptolemus, under the advice of Thetis, marched by land across Thrace, met with Odysseus, who had come by sea, at Maroneia, and then pursued his journey to Epirus, where he became king of the Molossians. Idomeneus came to Italy, and founded Uria in the Salentine peninsula. Diomêdês, after wandering far and wide, went along the Italian coast into the innermost Adriatic gulf, and finally settled in Daunia, founding the cities of Argyrippa, Beneventum, Atria, and Diomêdeia: by the favor of Athênê he became immortal, and was worshiped as a god in many different places. The Lokrian followers of Ajax founded the Epizephyrian Lokri on the southernmost corner of Italy, besides another settlement in Libya. I have spoken in another place of the compulsory exile of Teukros, who besides founding the city of Salamis in Cyprus, is said to have established some settlements in the Iberian peninsula. Menestheus, the Athenian, did the like, and also founded both Elæa in Mysia and Skylletium in Italy. The Arcadian chief Agapenôr founded Paphus in Cyprus. Epeius, of Panopeus in Phôkis, the constructor of the Trojan horse with the aid of the goddess Athênê, settled at Lagaria, near Sybaris, on the coast of Italy; and the very tools which he had employed in that remarkable fabric were shown down to a late date in the temple of Athênê at Metapontum. Temples, altars, and towns were also pointed out in Asia Minor, in Samos, and in Krête, the foundation of Agamemnôn or of his followers. The inhabitants of the Grecian town of Skionê, in the Thracian peninsula called Pallênê or Pellênê, accounted themselves the offspring of the Pellênians from

Achæa in Peloponnêsus, who had served under Agamemnôn before Troy, and who on their return from the siege had been driven on the spot by a storm and there settled. The Pamphylians, on the southern coast of Asia Minor, deduced their origin from the wanderings of Amphilochus and Kalchas after the siege of Troy: the inhabitants of the Amphilochian Argos on the Gulf of Ambrakia revered the same Amphilochus as their founder. The Orchomenians under Iamenus, on quitting the conquered city, wandered or were driven to the eastern extremity of the Euxine Sea; and the barbarous Achæans under Mount Caucasus were supposed to have derived their first establishment from this source. Merionês, with his Krêtan followers, settled at Engyion in Sicily, along with the preceding Krêtans who had remained there after the invasion of Minôs. The Elymians in Sicily also were composed of Trojans and Greeks separately driven to the spot, who, forgetting their previous differences, united in the joint settlements of Eryx and Egesta. We hear of Podaleirius both in Italy and on the coast of Karia; of Akamas, son of Thêseus, at Amphipolus in Thrace, at Soli in Cyprus, and at Synnada in Phrygia; of Guneus, Prothous, and Eurypylus, in Krête as well as in Libya. The obscure poem of Lycophrôn enumerates many of these dispersed and expatriated heroes, whose conquest of Troy was indeed a Kadmeian victory (according to the proverbial phrase of the Greeks), wherein the sufferings of the victor were little inferior to those of the vanquished. It was particularly among the Italian Greeks, where they were worshiped with very special solemnity, that their presence as wanderers from Troy was reported and believed.

I pass over the numerous other tales which circulated among the ancients, illustrating the ubiquity of the Grecian and Trojan heroes as well as that of the Argonauts,—one of the most striking features in the Hellenic legendary world. Among them all, the most interesting, individually, is Odysseus, whose romantic adventures in fabulous places and among fabulous persons have been made familiarly known by Homer. The goddesses Kalypso and Circê; the semi-divine mariners of Phæacia, whose ships are endowed with consciousness and obey without a steersman; the one-eyed Cyclôpes, the gigantic Læstrygones, and the wind-ruler Æolos; the Sirens, who ensnare by their song, as the Lotophagi fascinate by their food,—all these pictures formed integral and interesting portions of the old epic. Homer leaves Odysseus re-established in his house and family. But so marked a personage could never be permitted to remain in the tameness of domestic life: the epic poem called the Telegonia ascribed to him a subsequent series of adventures. Telegonus, his son by Circê, coming to Ithaka in search of his father, ravaged the island and killed Odysseus without knowing who he was. Bitter repentance overtook the son for his undesigned parricide: at his prayer and by the intervention of his mother Circê, both Penelopê

and Têlemachus were made immortal: Telegonus married Penelopê, and Têlemachus married Circê.

We see by this poem that Odysseus was represented as the mythical ancestor of the Thesprotian kings, just as Neoptolemus was of the Molossian.

It has already been mentioned that Antenôr and Æneas stand distinguished from the other Trojans by a dissatisfaction with Priam and a sympathy with the Greeks, which was by Sophoklês and others construed as treacherous collusion,—a suspicion indirectly glanced at, though emphatically repelled, by the Æneas of Virgil. In the old epic of Arktinus, next in age to the Iliad and Odyssey, Æneas abandons Troy and retires to Mount Ida, in terror at the miraculous death of Laocoôn, before the entry of the Greeks into the town and the last night-battle: yet Leschês, in another of the ancient epic poems, represented him as having been carried away captive by Neoptolemus. In a remarkable passage of the Iliad, Poseidôn describes the family of Priam as having incurred the hatred of Zeus, and predicts that Æneas and his descendants shall reign over the Trojans: the race of Dardanus, beloved by Zeus more than all his other sons, would thus be preserved, since Æneas belonged to it. Accordingly, when Æneas is in imminent peril from the hands of Achilles, Poseidôn specially interferes to rescue him, and even the implacable miso-Trojan goddess Hêrê assents to the proceeding. These passages have been construed by various able critics to refer to a family of philo-Hellenic or semi-Hellenic Æneadæ, known even in the time of the early singers of the Iliad as masters of some territory in or near the Trôad, and professing to be descended from, as well as worshiping, Æneas. In the town of Skêpsis, situated in the mountainous range of Ida, about thirty miles eastward of Ilium, there existed two noble and priestly families who professed to be descended, the one from Hectôr, the other from Æneas. The Skêpsian critic Dêmêtrius (in whose time both these families were still to be found) informs us that Skamandrius, son of Hectôr, and Ascanius, son of Æneas, were the archegets or heroic founders of his native city, which had been originally situated on one of the highest ranges of Ida, and was subsequently transferred by them to the less lofty spot on which it stood in his time. In Arisbê and Gentinus there seem to have been families professing the same descent, since the same archegets were acknowledged. In Ophrynium, Hectôr had his consecrated edifice, while in Ilium both he and Æneas were worshiped as gods: and it was the remarkable statement of the Lesbian Menekratês that Æneas, "having been wronged by Paris and stripped of the sacred privileges which belonged to him, avenged himself by betraying the city, and then became one of the Greeks."

One tale thus among many respecting Æneas, and that, too, the most ancient of all, preserved among natives of the Trôad, who worshiped him as their heroic ancestor, was that, after the capture of

Troy, he continued in the country, as king of the remaining Trojans, on friendly terms with the Greeks. But there were other tales respecting him, alike numerous and irreconcilable: the hand of destiny marked him as a wanderer (fato profugus) and his ubiquity is not exceeded even by that of Odysseus. We hear of him at Ænus in Thrace, in Pallênê, at Æneia in the Thermaic gulf, in Delus, at Orchomenus and Mantineia in Arcadia, in the islands of Kythêra and Zakynthus, in Leukas and Ambrakia, at Buthrotum in Epirus, on the Salentine peninsula and various other places in the southern region of Italy; at Drepana and Segesta in Sicily, at Carthage, at Cape Palinurus, Cumæ, Misenum, Caieta, and finally in Latium, where he lays the first humble foundation of the mighty Rome and her empire. And the reason why his wanderings were not continued still further was, that the oracles and the pronounced will of the gods directed him to settle in Latium. In each of these numerous places his visit was commemorated and certified by local monuments or special legends, particularly by temples and permanent ceremonies in honor of his mother Aphroditê, whose worship accompanied him everywhere: there were also many temples and many different tombs of Æneas himself. The vast ascendency acquired by Rome, the ardor with which all the literary Romans espoused the idea of a Trojan origin, and the fact that the Julian family recognized Æneas as their gentile primary ancestor,—all contributed to give to the Roman version of this legend the preponderance over every other. The various other places in which monuments of Æneas were found came thus to be represented as places where he had halted for a time on his way from Troy to Latium. But though the legendary pretensions of these places were thus eclipsed in the eyes of those who constituted the literary public, the local belief was not extinguished; they claimed the hero as their permanent property, and his tomb was to them a proof that he had lived and died among them.

Antenôr, who shares with Æneas the favorable sympathy of the Greeks, is said by Pindar to have gone from Troy along with Menelaus and Helen into the region of Kyrênê in Libya. But according to the more current narrative, he placed himself at the head of a body of Eneti or Veneti from Paphlagonia, who had come as allies of Troy, and went by sea into the inner part of the Adriatic gulf, where he conquered the neighboring barbarians and founded the town of Patavium (the modern Padua); the Veneti in this region were said to owe their origin to his immigration. We learn further from Strabo that Opsikellas, one of the companions of Antenôr, had continued his wanderings even into Ibêria, and that he had there established a settlement bearing his name.

Thus endeth the Trojan war, together with its sequel, the dispersion of the heroes, victors as well as vanquished. The account here given of it has been unavoidably brief and imperfect; for in a work intended to follow consecutively the real history of the Greeks, no

greater space can be allotted even to the most splendid gem of their legendary period. Indeed, although it would be easy to fill a large volume with the separate incidents which have been introduced into the "Trojan cycle," the misfortune is that they are for the most part so contradictory as to exclude all possibility of weaving them into one connected narrative. We are compelled to select one out of the number, generally without any solid ground of preference, and then to note the variations of the rest. No one who has not studied the original documents can imagine the extent to which this discrepancy proceeds: it covers almost every portion and fragment of the tale.

But though much may have been thus omitted of what the reader might expect to find in an account of the Trojan war, its genuine character has been studiously preserved, without either exaggeration or abatement. The real Trojan war is that which was recounted by Homer and the old epic poets, and continued by all the lyric and tragic composers. For the latter, though they took great liberties with the particular incidents, and introduced to some extent a new moral tone, yet worked more or less faithfully on the Homeric scale; and even Euripidês, who departed the most widely from the feelings of the old legend, never lowered down his matter to the analogy of contemporary life. They preserved its well defined object, at once righteous and romantic, the recovery of the daughter of Zeus and sister of the Dioskuri—its mixed agencies, divine, heroic, and human—the colossal force and deeds of its chief actors—its vast magnitude and long duration, as well as the toils which the conquerors underwent, and the Nemesis which followed upon their success. And these were the circumstances which, set forth in the full blaze of epic and tragic poetry, bestowed upon the legend its powerful and imperishable influence over the Hellenic mind. The enterprise was one comprehending all the members of the Hellenic body, of which each individually might be proud, and in which, nevertheless, those feelings of jealous and narrow patriotism, so lamentably prevalent in many of the towns, were as much as possible excluded. It supplied them with a grand and inexhaustible object of common sympathy, common faith, and common admiration; and when occasions arose for bringing together a Panhellenic force against the barbarians, the precedent of the Homeric expedition was one upon which the elevated minds of Greece could dwell with the certainty of rousing an unanimous impulse, if not always of counterworking sinister by-motives, among their audience. And the incidents comprised in the Trojan cycle were familiarized, not only to the public mind, but also to the public eye, by innumerable representations both of the sculptor and the painter,—those which were romantic and chivalrous being better adapted for this purpose, and therefore more constantly employed than any other.

Of such events the genuine Trojan war of the old epic was, for the most part, composed. Though literally believed, reverentially cher-

ished, and numbered among the gigantic phenomena of the past by the Grecian public, it is in the eyes of modern inquiry essentially a legend and nothing more. If we are asked whether it be not a legend embodying portions of historical matter, and raised upon a basis of truth,—whether there may not really have occurred at the foot of the hill of Ilium a war purely human and political, without gods, without heroes, without Helen, without Amazons, without Ethiopians under the beautiful son of Eôs, without the wooden horse, without the characteristic and expressive features of the old epical war,—like the mutilated trunk of Deïphobus in the under-world; if we are asked whether there was not really some such historical Trojan war as this, our answer must be that as the possibility of it cannot be denied, so neither can the reality of it be affirmed. We possess nothing but the ancient epic itself without any independent evidence: had it been an age of records, indeed, the Homeric epic, in its exquisite and unsuspecting simplicity, would probably never have come into existence. Whoever, therefore, ventures to dissect Homer, Arktinus, and Leschês, and to pick out certain portions as matters of fact, while he sets aside the rest as fiction, must do so in full reliance on his own powers of historical divination, without any means either of proving or verifying his conclusions. Among many attempts, ancient as well as modern, to identify real objects in this historical darkness, that of Dio Chrysostom deserves attention for its extraordinary boldness. In his oration addressed to the inhabitants of Ilium, and intended to demonstrate that the Trojans were not only blameless as to the origin of the war, but victorious in its issue, he overthrows all the leading points of the Homeric narrative, and rewrites nearly the whole from beginning to end: Paris is the lawful husband of Helen, Achilles is slain by Hectôr, and the Greeks retire without taking Troy, disgraced as well as baffled. Having shown without difficulty that the Iliad, if it be looked at as a history, is full of gaps, incongruities, and absurdities, he proceeds to compose a more plausible narrative of his own, which he tenders as so much authentic matter of fact. The most important point, however, which his oration brings to view is, the literal and confiding belief with which the Homeric narrative was regarded, as if it were actual history, not only by the inhabitants of Ilium, but also by the general Grecian public.

The small town of Ilium, inhabited by Æolic Greeks, and raised into importance only by the legendary reverence attached to it, stood upon an elevated ridge forming a spur from Mount Ida, rather more than three miles from the town and promontory of Sigeium, and about twelve stadia, or less than two miles, from the sea at its nearest point. From Sigeium and the neighboring town of Achilleium (with its monument and temple of Achilles), to the town of Rhœteium on a hill higher up the Hellespont (with its monument and chapel of Ajax called the Aianteium), was a distance of sixty stadia, or about seven English miles in the straight course by sea: in

the intermediate space was a bay and an adjoining plain, comprehending the embouchure of the Scamander, and extending to the base of the ridge on which Ilium stood. This plain was the celebrated plain of Troy, in which the great Homeric battles were believed to have taken place: the portion of the bay near to Sigeium went by the name of the Naustathmon of the Achæans (i.e., the spot where they dragged their ships ashore), and was accounted to have been the camp of Agamemnôn and his vast army.

Historical Ilium was founded, according to the questionable statement of Strabo, during the last dynasty of the Lydian kings, that is, at some period later than 720 B.C. Until after the days of Alexander the Great—indeed, until the period of Roman preponderance—it always remained a place of inconsiderable power and importance, as we learn not only from the assertion of the geographer, but also from the fact that Achilleium, Sigeium, and Rhœteium were all independent of it. But, inconsiderable as it might be, it was the only place which ever bore the venerable name immortalized by Homer. Like the Homeric Ilium, it had its temple of Athênê, wherein she was worshiped as the presiding goddess of the town: the inhabitants affirmed that Agamemnôn had not altogether destroyed the town, but that it had been reoccupied after his departure, and had never ceased to exist. Their acropolis was called Pergamum, and in it was shown the house of Priam and the altar of Zeus Herkeius, where that unhappy old man had been slain. Moreover, there were exhibited, in the temples, panoplies which had been worn by the Homeric heroes, and doubtless many other relics appreciated by admirers of the Iliad.

These were testimonies which few persons in those ages were inclined to question, when combined with the identity of name and general locality; nor does it seem that any one did question them until the time of Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis. Hellanikus expressly described this Ilium as being the Ilium of Homer, for which assertion Strabo (or probably Dêmêtrius, from whom the narrative seems to be copied) imputes to him very gratuitouly an undue partiality toward the inhabitants of the town. Herodotus relates that Xerxes, in his march into Greece, visited the place, went up to the Pergamum of Priam, inquired with much interest into the details of the Homeric siege, made libations to the fallen heroes, and offered to the Athênê of Ilium his magnificent sacrifice of a thousand oxen: he probably represented and believed himself to be attacking Greece as the avenger of the Priamid family. The Lacedæmonian admiral Mindarus, while his fleet lay at Abydus, went personally to Ilium to offer sacrifice to Athênê, and saw from that elevated spot the battle fought between the squadron of Dorieus and the Athenians off the shore near Rhœteium. During the interval between the Peloponnesian war and the Macedonian invasion of Persia, Ilium was always garrisoned as a strong position: but its domain was still narrow, and

did not extend even to the sea which was so near to it. Alexander, on crossing the Hellespont, sent his army from Sestus to Abydus, under Parmenio, and sailed personally from Elæeus in the Chersonese, after having solemnly sacrified at the Elæuntian shrine of Prôtesilaus, to the harbor of the Achæans between Sigeium and Rhœteium. He then ascended to Ilium, sacrificed to the Ilican Athênê, and consecrated in her temple his own panoply, in exchange for which he took some of the sacred arms there suspended, which were said to have been preserved from the time of the Trojan war. These arms were carried before him when he went to battle by his armor-bearers. It is a fact still more curious, and illustrative of the strong working of the old legend on an impressible and eminently religious mind, that he also sacrificed to Priam himself on the very altar of Zeus Herkeius from which the old king was believed to have been torn by Meoptolemus. As that fierce warrior was his heroic ancestor by the maternal side, he desired to avert from himself the anger of Priam against the Achilleid race.

Alexander made to the inhabitants of Ilium many munificent promises, which he probably would have executed had he not been prevented by untimely death. One of his successors, Antigonus, founded the city of Alexandreia in the Trôad, between Sigeium and the more southerly promontory of Lektum; compressing into it the inhabitants of many of the neighboring Æolic towns in the region of Ida,—Skêpsis, Kebrên, Hamaxitus, Kolônæ, and Neandria,—though the inhabitants of Skêpsis were subsequently permitted by Lysimachus to resume their own city and autonomous government. Ilium, however, remained without any special mark of favor until the arrival of the Romans in Asia and their triumph over Antiochus (about 190 B.C.). Though it retained its walls and its defensible position, Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis, who visited it shortly before that event, described it as being then in a state of neglect and poverty, many of the houses not even having tiled roofs. In this dilapidated condition, however, it was still mythically recognized both by Antiochus and by the Roman consul Livius, who went up thither to sacrifice to the Ilican Athênê. The Romans, proud of their origin from Troy and Æneas, treated Ilium with signal munificence; not only granting to it immunity from tribute, but also adding to its domain the neighboring territories of Gergis, Rhœteium, and Sigeium—and making the Ilieans masters of the whole coast from the Peræa (or continental possessions) of Tenedos (southward of Sigeium) to the boundaries of Dardanus, which had its own title to legendary reverence as the special sovereignty of Æneas. The inhabitants of Sigeium made such resistance to this loss of autonomy that their city was destroyed by the Ilieans.

The dignity and power of Ilium being thus prodigiously enhanced, we cannot doubt that the inhabitants assumed to themselves exaggerated importance as the recognized parents of all-conquering

Rome. Partly, we may naturally suppose, from the jealousies thus aroused on the part of their neighbors at Skêpsis and Alexandreia Trôas—partly from the pronounced tendency of the age (in which Kratês at Pergamus and Aristarchus at Alexandria divided between them the palm of literary celebrity) toward criticism and illustration of the old poets—a blow was now aimed at the mythical legitimacy of Ilium. Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis, one of the most laborious of the Homeric critics, had composed thirty books of comment upon the Catalogue in the Iliad: Hestiæa, an authoress of Alexandreia Trôas, had written on the same subject: both of them, well-acquainted with the locality, remarked that the vast battles described in the Iliad could not be packed into the narrow space between Ilium and the Naustathmon of the Greeks; the more so, as that space, too small even as it then stood, had been considerably enlarged since the date of the Iliad by deposits at the mouth of the Skamander. They found no difficulty in pointing out topographical incongruities and impossibilities as to the incidents in the Iliad, which they professed to remove by the startling theory that the Homeric Ilium had not occupied the site of the city so called. There was a village, called the village of the Ilieans, situated rather less than four miles from the city in the direction of Mount Ida, and further removed from the sea; here, they affirmed, the "holy Troy" had stood.

No positive proof was produced to sustain the conclusion, for Strabo expressly states that not a vestige of the ancient city remained at the village of the Ilieans. But the fundamental supposition was backed by a second accessory supposition, to explain how it happened that all such vestiges had disappeared. Nevertheless, Strabo adopts the unsupported hypothesis of Dêmêtrius as if it were an authenticated fact—distinguishing pointedly between Old and New Ilium, and even censuring Hellanikus for having maintained the received local faith. But I cannot find that Dêmêtrius and Hestiæa have been followed in this respect by any other writer of ancient times, excepting Strabo. Ilium still continued to be talked of and treated by every one as the genuine Homeric Troy: the cruel jests of the Roman rebel Fimbria, when he sacked the town and massacred the inhabitants—the compensation made by Sylla, and the pronounced favor of Julius Cæsar and Augustus,—all prove this continued recognition of identity. Arrian, though a native of Nicomedia, holding a high appointment in Asia Minor, and remarkable for the exactness of his topographical notices, describes the visit of Alexander to Ilium, without any suspicion that the place, with all its relics, was a mere counterfeit: Aristidês, Dio Chrysostom, Pausanias, Appian, and Plutarch hold the same language. But modern writers seem, for the most part, to have taken up the supposition from Strabo as implicitly as he took it from Dêmêtrius. They call Ilium by the disrespectful appellation of *New*

Ilium, while the traveler in the Trôad looks for *Old* Ilium as if it were the unquestionable spot where Priam had lived and moved; the name is even formally enrolled on the best maps recently prepared of the ancient Trôad.

Strabo has here converted into geographical matter of fact an hypothesis purely gratuitous, with a view of saving the accuracy of the Homeric topography; though in all probability the locality of the pretended old Ilium would have been found open to difficulties not less serious than those which it was introduced to obviate. It may be true that Dêmêtrius and he were justified in their negative argument, so as to show that the battles described in the Iliad could not possibly have taken place if the city of Priam had stood on the hill inhabited by the Ilieans. But the legendary faith subsisted before, and continued without abatement afterward, notwithstanding such topographical impossibilities. Hellanikus, Herodotus, Mindarus, the guides of Xerxes and Alexander, had not been shocked by them: the case of the latter is the strongest of all, because he had received the best education of his time under Aristotle—he was a passionate admirer and constant reader of the Iliad—he was, moreover, personally familiar with the movements of armies, and lived at a time when maps, which began with Anaximander, the disciple of Thalês, were at least known to all who sought instruction. Now if, notwithstanding such advantages, Alexander fully believed in the identity of Ilium, unconscious of these many and glaring topographical difficulties, much less would Homer himself, or the Homeric auditors, be likely to pay attention to them, at a period, five centuries earlier, of comparative rudeness and ignorance, when prose records as well as geographical maps were totally unknown. The inspired poet might describe, and his hearers would listen with delight to the tale, how Hectôr, pursued by Achilles, ran thrice round the city of Troy, while the trembling Trojans were all huddled into the city, not one daring to come out even at this last extremity of their beloved prince—and while the Grecian army looked on, restraining unwillingly their uplifted spears at the nod of Achilles, in order that Hectôr might perish by no other hand than his; nor were they, while absorbed by this impressive recital, disposed to measure distances or calculate topographical possibilities with reference to the site of the real Ilium. The mistake consists in applying to Homer and to the Homeric siege of Troy, criticisms which would be perfectly just if brought to bear on the Athenian siege of Syracuse, as described by Thucydidês, in the Peloponnesian war—but which are not more applicable to the epic narrative than they would be to the exploits of Amadis or Orlando.

There is every reason for presuming that the Ilium visited by Xerxês and Alexander was really the "holy Ilium" present to the mind of Homer; and if so, it must have been inhabited, either by Greeks or by some anterior population, at a period earlier than that

which Strabo assigns. History recognizes neither Troy the city, nor Trojans, as actually existing; but the extensive region called Trôas, or the Trôad (more properly Trôïas), is known both to Herodotus and to Thucydidês: it seems to include the territory westward of an imaginary line drawn from the north-east corner of the Adramyttian gulf to the Propontis at Parium, since both Antandrus, Kolônæ, and the district immediately round Ilium, are regarded as belonging to the Trôad. Herodotus further notices the Teukrians of Gergis (a township conterminous with Ilium, and lying to the eastward of the road from Ilium to Abydus), considering them as the remnant of a larger Teukrian population which once resided in the country, and which had in very early times undertaken a vast migration from Asia into Europe. To that Teukrian population he thinks that the Homeric Trojans belonged: and by later writers, especially by Virgil and the other Romans, the names Teukrians and Trojans are employed as equivalents. As the name *Trojans* is not mentioned in any contemporary historical monument, so the name *Teukrians* never once occurs in the old epic. It appears to have been first noticed by the elegiac poet Kallinus, about 660 B.C., who connected it with an alleged immigration of Teukrians from Krête into the region round about Ida. Others again denied this, asserting that the primitive ancestor, Teukrus, had come into the country from Attica, and that he was of indigenous origin, born from Skamander and the nymph Idæa—all various manifestations of that eager thirst after an eponymous hero which never deserted the Greeks. Gergithians occur in more than one spot in Æolis, even so far southward as the neighborhood of Kymê: the name has no place in Homer, but he mentions Gorgythion and Kebriones as illegitimate sons of Priam, thus giving a sort of epical recognition both to Gergis and Kebrên. As Herodotus calls the old epical Trojans by the name Teukrians, so the Attic tragedians call them Phrygians; though the Homeric hymn to Aphroditê represents Phrygians and Trojans as completely distinct, specially noting the diversity of language; and in the Iliad the Phrygians are simply numbered among the allies of Troy from the far Ascania, without indication of any more intimate relationship. Nor do the tales which connect Dardanus with Samothrace and Arcadia find countenance in the Homeric poems, wherein Dardanus is the son of Zeus, having no root anywhere except in Dardania. The mysterious solemnities of Samothrace, afterward so highly venerated throughout the Grecian world, date from a period much later than Homer; and the religious affinities of that island as well as of Krête with the territories of Phrygia and Æolis, were certain, according to the established tendency of the Grecian mind, to beget stories of a common genealogy.

To pass from this legendary world,—an aggregate of streams distinct and heterogeneous, which do not willingly come into confluence, and cannot be forced to intermix,—into the clearer vision

afforded by Herodotus, we learn from him that, in the year 500 B.C., the whole coast-region from Dardanus southward to the promontory of Lektum (including the town of Ilium), and from Lektum eastward to Adramyttium, had been Æolized, or was occupied by Æolic Greeks—likewise the inland towns of Skêpsis and Kebrên. So that if we draw a line northward from Adramyttium to Kyzikus on the Propontis—throughout the whole territory westward from that line, to the Hellespont and the Ægean sea, all the considerable towns would be Hellenic. With the exception of Gergis and the Teukrian population around it, all the towns worthy of note were either Ionic or Æolic. A century earlier, the Teukrian population would have embraced a wider range—perhaps Skêpsis and Kebrên, the latter of which places was colonized by Greeks from Kymê: a century afterward, during the satrapy of Pharnabazus, it appears that Gergis had become Hellenized as well as the rest. The four towns, Ilium, Gergis, Kebrên, and Skêpsis, all in lofty and strong positions, were distinguished each by a solemn worship and temple of Athênê, and by the recognition of that goddess as their special patroness.

The author of the Iliad conceived the whole of this region as occupied by people not Greek,—Trojans, Dardanians, Lykians, Lelegians, Pelasgians, and Kilikians. He recognizes a temple and worship of Athênê in Ilium, though the goddess is bitterly hostile to the Trojans: and Arktinus described the Palladium as the capital protection of the city. But perhaps the most remarkable feature of identity between the Homeric and the historical Æolis is the solemn and diffused worship of the Sminthian Apollo. Chrysê, Killa, and Tenedos, and more than one place called Sminthium, maintain the surname and invoke the protection of that god during later times, just as they are emphatically described to do by Homer.

When it is said that the Post-Homeric Greeks gradually Hellenized this entire region, we are not to understand that the whole previous population either retired or was destroyed. The Greeks settled in the leading and considerable towns, which enabled them both to protect one another and to gratify their predominant tastes. Partly by force—but greatly also by that superior activity and power of assimilating foreign ways of thought to their own which distinguished them from the beginning—they invested all the public features and management of the town with an Hellenic air, distributed all about it their gods, their heroes, and their legends, and rendered their language the medium of public administration, religious songs and addresses to the gods, and generally for communications wherein any number of persons were concerned. But two remarks are here to be made: first, in doing this they could not avoid taking to themselves more or less of that which belonged to the parties with whom they fraternized, so that the result was not pure Hellenism; next, that even this was done only in the towns, without being fully extended to the territorial domain around, or to those smaller town-

ships which stood to the town in a dependent relation. The Æolic and Ionic Greeks borrowed, from the Asiatics whom they had Hellenized, musical instruments and new laws of rhythm and melody, which they knew how to turn to account: they further adopted more or less of those violent and maddening religious rites, manifested occasionally in self-inflicted suffering and mutilation, which were indigenous in Asia Minor in worship of the Great Mother. The religion of the Greeks in the region of Ida, as well as at Kyzikus, was more orgiastic than the native worship of Greece proper, just as that of Lampsacus, Priapus, and Parium was more licentious. From the Teukrian region of Gergis, and from the Gergithes near Kymê, sprang the original Sibylline prophecies, and the legendary Sibyll who plays so important a part in the tale of Æneas. The mythe of the Sibyll, whose prophecies are supposed to be heard in the hollow blast bursting out from obscure caverns and apertures in the rocks, was indigenous among the Gergithian Teukrians, and passed from the Kymæans in Æolis, along with the other circumstances of the tale of Æneas to their brethren, the inhabitants of Cumæ in Italy. The date of the Gergithian Sibyll, or rather of the circulation of her supposed prophecies, is placed during the reign of Crœsus, a period when Gergis was thoroughly Teukrian. Her prophecies, though embodied in Greek verses, had their root in a Teukrian soil and feelings; and the promises of future empire which they so liberally make to the fugitive hero escaping from the flames of Troy into Italy, become interesting from the remarkable way in which they were realized by Rome.

At what time Ilium and Dardanus became Æolized, we have no information. We find the Mitylenæans in possession of Sigeium in the time of the poet Alkæus, about 600 B.C.; and the Athenians, during the reign of Peisistratus, having wrested it from them and trying to maintain their possession, vindicate the proceeding by saying that they had as much right to it as the Mitylenæans, "for the latter had no more claim to it than any of the other Greeks who had aided Menelaus in avenging the abduction of Helen." This is a very remarkable incident as attesting the celebrity of the legend of Troy, and the value of a mythical title in international disputes—yet seemingly implying that the establishment of the Mitylenæans on that spot must have been sufficiently recent. The country near the junction of the Hellespont and the Propontis is represented as originally held by Bebrykian Thracians, while Abydus was first occupied by Milesian colonists in the reign and by the permission of the Lydian king, Gygês—to whom the whole Trôad and the neighboring territory belonged, and upom whom therefore the Teukrians of Ida must have been dependent. This must have been about 700 B.C., a period considerably earlier than the Mitylenæan occupation of Sigeium. Lampsacus and Pæsus, on the neighboring shores of the Propontis, were also Milesian colonies, though we do not know their date: Parium was jointly settled from Milêtus, Erythræ, and Parus.

CHAPTER XVI.

GRECIAN MYTHES, AS UNDERSTOOD, FELT, AND INTERPRETED BY THE GREEKS THEMSELVES.

THE preceding sections have been intended to exhibit a sketch of that narrative matter, so abundant, so characteristic, and so interesting, out of which early Grecian history and chronology have been extracted. Raised originally by hands unseen and from data unassignable, it existed first in the shape of floating talk among the people, from whence a large portion of it passed into the song of the poets, who multiplied, transformed, and adorned it in a thousand various ways.

These mythes or current stories, the spontaneous and earliest growth of the Grecian mind, constituted at the same time the entire intellectual stock of the age to which they belonged. They are the common root of all those different ramifications into which the mental activity of the Greeks subsequently diverged; containing, as it were, the preface and germ of the positive history and philosophy, the dogmatic theology, and the professed romance, which we shall hereafter trace each in its separate development. They furnished aliment to the curiosity, and solution to the vague doubts and aspirations of the age; they explained the origin of those customs and standing peculiarities with which men were familiar; they impressed moral lessons, awakened patriotic sympathies, and exhibited in detail the shadowy, but anxious, presentiments of the vulgar as to the agency of the gods: moreover, they satisfied that craving for adventure and appetite for the marvelous which has in modern times become the province of fiction proper.

It is difficult, we may say impossible, for a man of mature age to carry back his mind to his conceptions such as they stood when he was a child, growing naturally out of his imagination and feelings, working upon a scanty stock of materials, and borrowing from authorities whom he blindly followed but imperfectly apprehended. A similar difficulty occurs when we attempt to place ourselves in the historical and quasi-philosophical point of view which the ancient mythes present to us. We can follow perfectly the imagination and feeling which dictated these tales, and we can admire and sympathize with them as animated, sublime, and affecting poetry; but we are too much accustomed to matter of fact and philosophy of a positive kind to be able to conceive a time when these beautiful fancies were construed literally and accepted as serious reality.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that Grecian mythes cannot be either understood or appreciated except with reference to the system of conceptions and belief of the ages in which they arose. We must suppose a public not reading and writing, but seeing, hearing, and

telling—destitute of all records, and careless as well as ignorant of positive history with its indispensable tests, yet at the same time curious and full of eagerness for new or impressive incidents—strangers even to the rudiments of positive philosophy and to the idea of invariable sequences of nature either in the physical or moral world, yet requiring some connecting theory to interpret and regularize the phenomena before them. Such a theory was supplied by the spontaneous inspirations of an early fancy, which supposed the habitual agency of beings intelligent and voluntary like themselves, but superior in extent of power, and different in peculiarity of attributes. In the geographical ideas of the Homeric period, the earth was flat and round, with the deep and gentle ocean-stream flowing around and returning into itself: chronology, or means of measuring past time, there existed none. Nevertheless, unobserved regions might be described, the forgotten past unfolded, and the unknown future predicted—through particular men specially inspired by the gods, or endowed by them with that peculiar vision which detected and interpreted passing signs and omens.

If even the rudiments of scientific geography and physics, now so universally diffused and so invaluable as a security against error and delusion, were wanting in this early stage of society, their place was abundantly supplied by vivacity of imagination and by personifying sympathy. The unbounded tendency of the Homeric Greeks to multiply fictitious persons, and to construe interesting or formidable phenomena into manifestations of design, is above all things here to be noticed, because the form of personal narrative, universal in their mythes, is one of its many consequences. Their polytheism (comprising some elements of an original fetichism, in which particular objects had themselves been supposed to be endued with life, volition, and design) recognized agencies of unseen beings identified and confounded with the different localities and departments of the physical world. Of such beings there were numerous varieties, and many gradations both in power and attributes; there were differences of age, sex, and local residence, relations both conjugal and filial between them, and tendencies sympathetic as well as repugnant. The gods formed a sort of political community of their own, which had its hierarchy, its distribution of ranks and duties, its contentions for power and occasional revolutions, its public meetings in the agora of Olympus, and its multitudinous banquets or festivals. The great Olympic gods were, in fact, only the most exalted among an aggregate of quasi-human or ultra-human personages,—dæmons, heroes, nymphs, eponymous (or name-giving) genii, identified with each river, mountain, cape, town, village, or known circumscription of territory,—besides horses, bulls, and dogs, of immortal breed and peculiar attributes, and monsters of strange lineaments and combinations, "Gorgons and Harpies and Chimæras dire." As there were in every gens or family special gentile deities and foregone ancestors

who watched over its members, forming in each the characteristic symbol and recognized guarantee of their union, so there seem to have been in each guild or trade peculiar beings whose vocation it was to co-operate or to impede in various stages of the business.

The extensive and multiform personifications here faintly sketched pervaded in every direction the mental system of the Greeks, and were identified intimately both with their conception and with their description of phenomena, present as well as past. That which to us is interesting as the mere creation of an exuberant fancy, was to the Greek genuine and venerated reality. The earth and the solid heaven (Gæa and Uranos) were both conceived and spoken of by him as endowed with appetite, feeling, sex, and most of the various attributes of humanity. Instead of a sun such as we now see, subject to astronomical laws, and forming the center of a system the changes of which we can ascertain and foreknow, he saw the great god Hêlois, mounting his chariot in the morning in the east, reaching at midday the height of the solid heaven, and arriving in the evening at the western horizon, with horses fatigued and desirous of repose. Hêlios, having favorite spots wherein his beautiful cattle grazed, took pleasure in contemplating them during the course of his journey, and was sorely displeased if any man slew or injured them: he had, moreover, sons and daughters on earth, and as his all-seeing eye penetrated everywhere, he was sometimes in a situation to reveal secrets even to the gods themselves—while on other occasions he was constrained to turn aside in order to avoid contemplating scenes of abomination. To us these now appear puerile, though pleasing fancies), but to an Homeric Greek they seemed perfectly natural and plausible. In his view, the description of the sun as given in a modern astronomical treatise would have appeared not merely absurd, but repulsive and impious. Even in later times, when the positive spirit of inquiry had made considerable progress, Anaxagoras and other astronomers incurred the charge of blasphemy for dispersonifying Hêlios, and trying to assign invariable laws to the solar phenomena. Personifying fiction was in this way blended by the Homeric Greeks with their conception of the physical phenomena before them, not simply in the way of poetical ornament, but as a genuine portion of their every-day belief.

The gods and heroes of the land and the tribe, belonged, in the conception of a Greek, alike to the present and to the past: he worshiped in their groves and at their festivals; he invoked their protection, and believed in their superintending guardianship, even in his own day: but their more special, intimate, and sympathizing agency was cast back into the unrecorded past. To give suitable utterance to this general sentiment—to furnish body and movement and detail to these divine and heroic pre-existences, which were conceived only in shadowy outline,—to lighten up the dreams of what the past must have been in the minds of those who knew not what it really

had been—such was the spontaneous aim and inspiration of productive genius in the community, and such were the purposes which the Grecian mythes pre-eminently accomplished.

The love of antiquities, which Tacitus notices as so prevalent among the Greeks of his day, was one of the earliest, most durable, and the most widely diffused of the national propensities. But the antiquities of every state were divine and heroic, reproducing the lineaments, but disregarding the measure and limits, of ordinary humanity. The gods formed the starting-point, beyond which no man thought of looking, though some gods were more ancient than others: their progeny, the heroes, many of them sprung from human mothers, constitute an intermediate link between god and man. The ancient epic usually recognizes the presence of a multitude of nameless men, but they are introduced chiefly for the purpose of filling the scene, and of executing the orders, celebrating the valor, and bringing out the personality, of a few divine or heroic characters. It was the glory of bards and story-tellers to be able to satisfy those religious and patriotic predispositions of the public which caused the primary demand for their tales, and which were of a nature eminently inviting and expansive. For Grecian religion was many-sided and many-colored; it comprised a great multiplicity of persons, together with much diversity in the types of character; it divinized every vein and attribute of humanity, the lofty as well as the mean—the tender as well as the warlike—the self-devoting and adventurous as well as the laughter-loving and sensual. We shall hereafter reach a time when philosophers protested against such identification of the gods with the more vulgar appetites and enjoyments, believing that nothing except the spiritual attributes of man could properly be transferred to superhuman beings, and drawing their predicates respecting the gods exclusively from what was awful, majestic, and terror-striking in human affairs. Such restrictions on the religious fancy were continually on the increase, and the mystic and didactic stamp which marked the last century of paganism in the days of Julian and Libanius, contrasts forcibly with the concrete and vivacious forms, full of vigorous impulse and alive to all the capricious gusts of the human temperament, which people the Homeric Olympus. At present, however, we have only to consider the early, or Homeric and Hesiodic paganism, and its operations in the genesis of the mythical narratives. We cannot doubt that it supplied the most powerful stimulus, and the only one which the times admitted, to the creative faculty of the people; as well from the sociability, the gradations, and the mutual action and reaction of its gods and heroes, as from the amplitude, the variety, and the purely human cast of its fundamental types.

Though we may thus explain the mythopœic fertility of the Greeks, I am far from pretending that we can render any sufficient account of the supreme beauty of their chief epic and artistical productions.

There is something in the first-rate productions of individual genius which lies beyond the compass of philosophical theory: the special breath of the Muse (to speak the language of ancient Greece) must be present in order to give them being. Even among her votaries, many are called, but few are chosen; and the peculiarities of those few remain as yet her own secret.

We shall not, however, forget that Grecian language was also an indispensable requisite to the growth and beauty of Grecian mythes —its richness, its flexibility and capacity of new combinations, its vocalic abundance and metrical pronunciation; and many even among its proper names, by their analogy to words really significant, gave direct occasion to explanatory or illustrative stories. Etymological mythes are found in sensible proportion among the whole number.

To understand properly, then, the Grecian mythes, we must try to identify ourselves with the state of mind of the original mythopœic age; a process not very easy, since it requires us to adopt a string of poetical fancies not simply as realities, but as the governing realities of the mental system: yet a process which would only reproduce something analogous to our own childhood. The age was one destitute both of recorded history and of positive science, but full of imagination and sentiment and religious impressibility. From these sources sprung that multitude of supposed persons around whom all combinations of sensible phenomena were grouped, and toward whom curiosity, sympathies, and reverence were earnestly directed. The adventures of such persons were the only aliment suited at once both to the appetites and to the comprehension of an early Greek; and the mythes which detailed them, while powerfully interesting his emotions, furnished to him at the same time a quasi-history and quasi-philosophy. They filled up the vacuum of the unrecorded past, and explained many of the puzzling incognita of the present. Nor need we wonder that the same plausibility which captivated his imagination and his feelings, was sufficient to engender spontaneous belief; or rather that no question, as to truth or falsehood of the narrative, suggested itself to his mind. His faith is ready, literal and uninquiring, apart from all thought of discriminating fact from fiction, or of detecting hidden and symbolized meaning; it is enough that what he hears be intrinsically plausible and seductive, and that there be no special cause to provoke doubt. And if, indeed, there were, the poet overrules such doubts by the holy and all-sufficient authority of the Muse, whose omniscience is the warrant for his recital, as her inspiration is the cause of his success.

The state of mind, and the relation of speaker to hearers, thus depicted, stand clearly marked in the terms and tenor of the ancient epic, if we only put a plain meaning upon what we read. The poet—like the prophet, whom he so much resembles—sings under heavenly guidance, inspired by the goddess to whom he has prayed for her

assisting impulse. She puts the word into his mouth and the incidents into his mind: he is a privileged man, chosen as her organ and speaking from her revelations. As the Muse grants the gift of song to whom she will, so she sometimes in her anger snatches it away, and the most consummate human genius is then left silent and helpless. It is true that these expressions, of the Muse inspiring and the poet singing a tale of past times, have passed from the ancient epic to compositions produced under very different circumstances, and have now degenerated into unmeaning forms of speech; but they gained currency originally in their genuine and literal acceptation. If poets had from the beginning written or recited, the predicate of singing would never have been ascribed to them; nor would it ever have become customary to employ the name of the Muse as a die to be stamped on licensed fiction, unless the practice had begun when her agency was invoked and hailed in perfect good faith. Belief, the fruit of deliberate inquiry and a rational scrutiny of evidence, is in such an age unknown. The simple faith of the time slides in unconsciously, when the imagination and feeling are exalted; and inspired authority is at once understood, easily admitted, and implicitly confided in.

The word mythe (*μῦθος*, *fabula*, story), in its original meaning, signified simply a statement or current narrative, without any connotative implication either of truth or falsehood. Subsequently the meaning of the word (in Latin and English as well as in Greek) changed, and came to carry with it the idea of an old personal narrative, always uncertified, sometimes untrue or avowedly fictitious. And this change was the result of a silent alteration in the mental state of the society—of a transition on the part of the superior minds (and more or less on the part of all) to a stricter and more elevated canon of credibility, in consequence of familiarity with recorded history and its essential tests, affirmative as well as negative. Among the original hearers of the mythes, all such tests were unknown; they had not yet learned the lesson of critical disbelief; the mythe passed unquestioned from the mere fact of its currency, and from its harmony with existing sentiments and preconceptions. The very circumstances which contributed to rob it of literal belief in after-time, strengthened its hold upon the mind of the Homeric man. He looked for wonders and unusual combinations in the past; he expected to hear of gods, heroes, and men, moving and operating together upon earth; he pictured to himself the fore-time as a theater in which the gods interfered directly, obviously, and frequently, for the protection of their favorites and the punishment of their foes. The rational conception, then only dawning in his mind, of a systematic course of nature, was absorbed by this fervent and lively faith: And if he could have been supplied with as perfect and philosophical a history of his own real past time as we are now enabled to furnish with regard to the last century of England or

France, faithfully recording all the successive events, and accounting for them by known positive laws, but introducing no special interventions of Zeus and Apollo—such a history would have appeared to him not merely unholy and unimpressive, but destitute of all plausibility or title to credence. It would have provoked in him the same feeling of incredulous aversion as a description of the sun (to repeat the previous illustration) in a modern book on scientific astronomy.

To us these mythes are interesting fictions; to the Homeric and Hesiodic audience they were "rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia,"—an aggregate of religious, physical, and historical revelations, rendered more captivating, but not less true and real, by the bright coloring and fantastic shapes in which they were presented. Throughout the whole of "mythe-bearing Hellas" they formed the staple of the uninstructed Greek mind, upon which history and philosophy were by so slow degrees superinduced; and they continued to be the aliment of ordinary thought and conversation, even after history and philosophy had partially supplanted the mythical faith among the leading men, and disturbed it more or less in the ideas of all. The men, the women, and the children of the remote dêmes and villages of Greece, to whom Thucydidês, Hippokratês, Aristotle, or Hipparchus were unknown, still continued to dwell upon the local fables which formed their religious and patriotic antiquity. And Pausanias, even in his time, heard everywhere divine or heroic legends yet alive, precisely of the type of the old epic; he found the conceptions of religious and mythical faith co-existent with those of positive science, and contending against them at more or less of odds, according to the temper of the individual. Now it is the remarkable characteristic of the Homeric age, that no such co-existence or contention had yet begun. The religious and mythical point of view covers, for the most part, all the phenomena of nature; while the conception of invariable sequence exists only in the background, itself personified under the name of the Mœræ, or Fates, and produced generally as an exception to the omnipotence of Zeus for all ordinary purposes. Voluntary agents, visible and invisible, impel and govern everything. Moreover, this point of view is universal throughout the community—adopted with equal fervor, and carried out with equal consistency, by the loftiest minds and by the lowest. The great man of that day is he who, penetrated like others with the general faith, and never once imagining any other system of nature than the agency of these voluntary Beings, can clothe them in suitable circumstances and details, and exhibit in living body and action those types which his hearers dimly prefigure.

History, philosophy, etc., properly so called and conforming to our ideas (of which the subsequent Greeks were the first creators), never belonged to more than a comparatively small number of thinking men, though their influence indirectly affected more or less the

whole national mind. But when positive science and criticism, and the idea of an invariable sequence of events, came to supplant in the more vigorous intellects the old mythical creed of omnipresent personification, an inevitable scission was produced between the instructed few and the remaining community. The opposition between the scientific and the religious point of view was not slow in manifesting itself; in general language, indeed, both might seem to stand together, but in every particular case the admission of one involved the rejection of the other. According to the theory which then became predominant, the course of nature was held to move invariably on, by powers and attributes of its own, unless the gods chose to interfere and reverse it; but they had the power of interfering as often and to as great an extent as they thought fit. Here the question was at once opened, respecting a great variety of particular phenomena, whether they were to be regarded as natural or miraculous. No constant or discernible test could be suggested to discriminate the two: every man was called upon to settle the doubt for himself, and each settled it according to the extent of his knowledge, the force of his logic, the state of his health, his hopes, his fears, and many other considerations affecting his separate conclusion. In a question thus perpetually arising, and full of practical consequences, instructed minds, like Periklês, Thucydidês, and Euripidês, tended more and more to the scientific point of view, in cases where the general public were constantly gravitating toward the religious.

The age immediately prior to this unsettled condition of thought is the really mythopœic age; in which the creative faculties of the society know no other employment, and the mass of the society no other mental demand. The perfect expression of such a period, in its full peculiarity and grandeur, is to be found in the Iliad and Odyssey,—poems of which we cannot determine the exact date, but which seem both to have existed prior to the first Olympiad, 776 B.C., our earliest trustworthy mark of Grecian time. For some time after that event, the mythopœic tendencies continued in vigor (Arktinus, Leschês, Eumêlus, and seemingly most of the Hesiodic poems, fall within or shortly after the first century of recorded Olympiads); but from and after this first century, we may trace the operation of causes which gradually enfeebled and narrowed them, altering the point of view from which the mythes were looked at. What these causes were, it will be necessary briefly to intimate.

The foremost and most general of all is, the expansive force of Grecian intellect itself,—a quality in which this remarkable people stand distinguished from all their neighbors and contemporaries. Most, if not all, nations have had mythes, but no nation except the Greeks have imparted to them immortal charm and universal interest; and the same mental capacities, which raised the great men of the poetic age to this exalted level, also pushed forward their successors

to outgrow the early faith in which the mythes had been generated and accredited.

One great mark, as well as means, of such intellectual expansion was the habit of attending to, recording, and combining, positive and present facts, both domestic and foreign. In the genuine Grecian epic, the theme was an unknown and aoristic past; but even as early as the Works and Days of Hesiod, the present begins to figure. The man who tills the earth appears in his own solitary nakedness, apart from gods and heroes—bound, indeed, by serious obligations to the gods, but contending against many difficulties which are not to be removed by simple reliance on their help. The poet denounces his age in the strongest terms as miserable, degraded, and profligate. He looks back with reverential envy to the extinct heroic races who fought at Troy and Thêbes. Yet bad as the present time is, the Muse condescends to look at it along with him, and to prescribe rules for human life—with the assurance that if a man be industrious, frugal, provident, just and friendly in his dealings, the gods will recompense him with affluence and security. Nor does the Muse disdain, while holding out such promise, to cast herself into the most homely details of present existence, and to give advice thoroughly practical and calculating. Men whose minds were full of the heroes of Homer called Hesiod in contempt the poet of the Helots. The contrast between the two is certainly a remarkable proof of the tendency of Greek poetry toward the present and the positive.

Other manifestations of the same tendency become visible in the age of Archilochus (B.C. 680–660). In an age when metrical composition and the living voice are the only means whereby the productive minds of a community make themselves felt, the invention of a new meter, new forms of song and recitation, or diversified accompaniments, constitute an epoch. The iambic, elegiac, choric, and lyric poetry, from Archilochus downward, all indicate purposes in the poet and impressibilities of the hearers very different from those of the ancient epic. In all of them the personal feeling of the poet and the specialties of present time and place are brought prominently forward; while in the Homeric hexameter the poet is a mere nameless organ of the historical Muse—the hearers are content to learn, believe, and feel, the incidents of a foregone world—and the tale is hardly less suitable to one time and place than to another. The iambic meter (we are told) was first suggested to Archilochus by the bitterness of his own private antipathies; and the moral wounds inflicted by his lampoons upon the individuals against whom they were directed still remain attested, though the verses themselves have perished. It was the meter (according to the well-known judgment of Aristotle) most nearly approaching to common speech, and well-suited both to the coarse vein of sentiment and to the smart and emphatic diction of its inventor. Simonidês of Amorgus, the younger contemporary of Archilochus, employed the same meter, with less

bitterness, but with an anti-heroic tendency not less decided. His remaining fragments present a mixture of teaching and sarcasm, having a distinct bearing upon actual life, and carrying out the spirit which partially appears in the Hesiodic Works and Days. Of Alkæus and Sapphô, though unfortunately we are compelled to speak of them upon hearsay only, we know enough to satisfy us that their own personal sentiments and sufferings, their relations private or public with the contemporary world, constituted the soul of those short effusions which gave them so much celebrity. Again, in the few remains of the elegiac poets preserved to us—Kallinus, Mimnermus, Tyrtæus—the impulse of some present motive or circumstance is no less conspicuous. The same may also be said of Solôn, Theognis, and Phokylidês, who preach, encourage, censure, or complain, but do not recount, and in whom a profound ethical sensibility, unknown to the Homeric poems, manifests itself. The form of poetry (to use the words of Solôn himself) is made the substitute for the public speaking of the agora.

Doubtless, all these poets made abundant use of the ancient mythes, but it was by turning them to present account, in the way of illustration, or flattery, or contrast,—a tendency which we may usually detect even in the compositions of Pindar, in spite of the lofty and heroic strain which they breathe throughout. That narrative or legendary poetry still continued to be composed during the seventh and sixth centuries before the Christian era, is a fact not to be questioned. But it exhibited the old epical character without the old epical genius; both the inspiration of the composer and the sympathies of the audience had become more deeply enlisted in the world before them, and disposed to fasten on incidents of their own actual experience. From Solôn and Theognis we pass to the abandonment of all metrical restrictions and to the introduction of prose writing,—a fact, the importance of which it is needless to dwell upon,—marking as well the increased familiarity with written records as the commencement of a separate branch of literature for the intellect, apart from the imagination and emotions wherein the old legends had their exclusive root.

Egypt was first unreservedly opened to the Greeks during the reign of Psammetichus, about B.C. 660; gradually it became much frequented by them for military or commercial purposes, or for simple curiosity. It enlarged the range of their thoughts and observations, while it also imparted to them that vein of mysticism which overgrew the primitive simplicity of the Homeric religion, and of which I have spoken in a former chapter. They found in it a long-established civilization, colossal wonders of architecture, and a certain knowledge of astronomy and geometry, elementary, indeed, but in advance of their own. Moreover, it was a portion of their present world and it contributed to form in them an interest foi noting and describing the actual realities before them. A sensible

progress is made in the Greek mind during the two centuries from B.C. 700 to B.C. 500, in the record and arrangement of historical facts: an *historical sense* arises in the superior intellects, and some idea of evidence as a discriminating test between fact and fiction. And this progressive tendency was further stimulated by increased communication and by more settled and peaceful social relations between the various members of the Hellenic world; to which may be added material improvements, purchased at the expense of a period of turbulence and revolution, in the internal administration of each separate state. The Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian games became frequented by visitors from the most distant parts of Greece: the great periodical festival in the island of Dêlos brought together the citizens of every Ionic community, with their wives and children, and an ample display of wealth and ornaments. Numerous and flourishing colonies were founded in Sicily, the south of Italy, the coasts of Epirus, and of the Euxine sea: the Phokæans explored the whole of the Adriatic, established Massalia, and penetrated even as far as the south of Ibêria, with which they carried on a lucrative commerce. The geographical ideas of the Greeks were thus both expanded and rectified: the first preparation of a map by Anaximander, the disciple of Thalês, is an epoch in the history of science. We may note the ridicule bestowed by Herodotus both upon the supposed people called Hyperboreans and upon the idea of a circumfluous ocean-stream as demonstrating the progess of the age in this department of inquiry. And, even earlier than Herodotus, Xanthus and Xenophanês had noticed the occurrence of fossil marine productions in the interior of Asia Minor and elsewhere, which led them to reflections on the changes of the earth's surface with respect to land and water.

If, then, we look down the three centuries and a half which elapsed between the commencement of the Olympic era and the age of Herodotus and Thucydidês, we shall discern a striking advance in the Greeks—ethical, social, and intellectual. Positive history and chronology has not only been created, but, in the case of Thucydidês, the qualities necessary to the historiographer, in their application to recent events, have been developed with a degree of perfection never since surpassed. Men's minds have assumed a gentler as well as a juster cast; and acts come to be criticised with reference to their bearing on the internal happiness of a well-regulated community as well as upon the standing harmony of fraternal states. While Thucydidês treats the habitual and licensed piracy, so coolly alluded to in the Homeric poems, as an obsolete enormity, many of the acts described in the old heroic and theogonic legends were found not less repugnant to this improved tone of feeling. The battles of the gods with the Giants and Titans,—the castration of Uranus by his son Kronus,—the cruelty, deceit, and licentiousness, often supposed both in the gods and heroes, provoked strong disapprobation.

And the language of the philosopher Xenophanês, who composed both elegiac and iambic poems for the express purpose of denouncing such tales, is as vehement and unsparing as that of the Christian writers, who eight centuries afterward, attacked the whole scheme of paganism.

It was not merely as an ethical and social critic that Xenophanês stood distinguished. He was one of a great and eminent triad—Thalês and Pythagoras being the others—who, in the sixth century before the Christian era, first opened up those veins of speculative philosophy which occupied afterward so large a portion of Grecian intellectual energy. Of the material differences between the three I do not here speak; I regard them only in reference to the Homeric and Hesiodic philosophy which preceded them, and from which all three deviated by a step, perhaps the most remarkable in all the history of philosophy.

They were the first who attempted to disenthrall the philosophic intellect from all personifying religious faith, and to constitute a method of interpreting nature distinct from the spontaneous inspirations of untaught minds. It is in them that we first find the idea of Person tacitly set aside or limited, and an impersonal Nature conceived as the object of study. The divine husband and wife, Oceanus and Têthys, parents of many gods and of the Oceanic nymphs, together with the avenging goddess Styx, are translated into the material substance *water*, or, as we ought rather to say, the Fluid: and Thalês set himself to prove that water was the primitive element, out of which all the different natural substances had been formed. He, as well as Xenophanês and Pythagoras, started the problem of physical philosophy, with its objective character and invariable laws, to be discoverable by a proper and methodical application of the human intellect. The Greek word *Φυσις*, denoting *nature*, and its derivatives *physics* and *physiology*, unknown in that large sense of Homer or Hesiod, as well as the word *Kosmos* to denote the mundane system, first appears with these philosophers. The elemental analysis of Thalês—the one unchangeable cosmic substance, varying only in appearance, but not in reality, as suggested by Xenophanês,—and the geometrical combinations of Pythagoras,—all these were different ways of approaching the explanation of physicial *phenomena*, and each gave rise to a distinct school or succession of philosophers. But they all agreed in departing from the primitive method, and in recognizing determinate properties, a material substratum, and objective truth, in nature—either independent of willing or designing agents, or serving to these latter at once as an indispensable subject-matter and as a limiting condition. Xenophanês disclaimed openly all knowledge respecting the gods, and pronounced that no man could have any means of ascertaining when he was right and when he was wrong in affirmations respecting them: while Pythagoras represents in part the scientific tendencies of his age, in part also the

spirit of mysticism and of special fraternities for religious and ascetic observance, which became diffused throughout Greece in the sixth century before the Christian era. This was another point which placed him in antipathy with the simple, unconscious, and demonstrative faith of the old poets, as well as with the current legend.

If these distinguished men, when they ceased to follow the primitive instinct of tracing the phenomena of nature to personal and designing agents, passed over, not at once to induction and observation, but to a misemployment of abstract words substituting metaphysical eidôla in the place of polytheism, and to an exaggerated application of certain narrow physical theories—we must remember that nothing else could be expected from the scanty stock of facts then accessible, and that the most profound study of the human mind points out such transition as an inevitable law of intellectual progress. At present we have to compare them only with that state of the Greek mind which they partially superseded, and with which they were in decided opposition. The rudiments of physical science were conceived and developed among superior men; but the religious feeling of the mass was averse to them; and the aversion, though gradually mitigated, never wholly died away. Some of the philosophers were not backward in charging others with irreligion, while the multitude seems to have felt the same sentiment more or less toward all—or toward that postulate of constant sequences, with determinate conditions of occurrence, which scientific study implies, and which they could not reconcile with their belief in the agency of the gods, to whom they were constantly praying for special succor and blessings.

The discrepancy between the scientific and the religious point of view was dealt with differently by different philosophers. Thus, Sokratês openly admitted it, and assigned to each a distinct and independent province. He distributed phenomena into two classes—one wherein the connection of antecedent and consequent was invariable and ascertainable by human study, and therefore future results accessible to a well-instructed foresight; the other, and those, too, the most comprehensive and important, which the gods had reserved for themselves and their own unconditional agency, wherein there was no invariable or ascertainable sequence, and where the result could only be foreknown by some omen, prophecy, or other special inspired communication from themselves. Each of these classes was essentially distinct, and required to be looked at and dealt with in a manner radically incompatible with the other. Sokratês held it wrong to apply the scientific interpretation to the latter, or the theological interpretation to the former. Physics and astronomy, in his opinion, belonged to the divine class of phenomena, in which human research was insane, fruitless, and impious.

On the other hand, Hippokratês, the contemporary of Sokratês,

denied the discrepancy, and merged into one those two classes of phenomena—the divine and the scientifically determinable—which the latter had put asunder. Hippokratês treated all phenomena as at once both divine and scientifically determinable. In discussing certain peculiar bodily disorders found among the Scythians, he observes, "The Scythians themselves ascribe the cause of this to God, and reverence and bow down to such sufferers, each man fearing that he may suffer the like; and I myself think too that these affections, as well as all others, are divine: no one among them is either more divine or more human than another, but all are on the same footing, and all divine; nevertheless each of them has its own physical conditions, and not one occurs without such physical conditions.

A third distinguished philosopher of the same day, Anaxagoras, allegorizing Zeus and the other personal gods, proclaimed the doctrine of one common pervading mind, as having first originated movement in the primeval chaos, the heterogeneous constituents of which were so confused together that none of them could manifest themselves, each was neutralized by the rest, and all remained in rest and nullity. The movement originated by mind disengaged them from this imprisonment, so that each kind of particle was enabled to manifest its properties with some degree of distinctness. This general doctrine obtained much admiration from Plato and Aristotle; but they at the same time remarked with surprise that Anaxagoras never made any use at all of his own general doctrine for the explanation of the phenomena of nature—that he looked for nothing but physical causes and connecting laws—so that in fact the spirit of his particular researches was not materially different from those of Demokritus or Leukippus, whatever might be the difference in their general theories. His investigations in meteorology and astronomy, treating the heavenly bodies as subjects for calculation, have been already noticed as offensive, not only to the general public of Greece, but even to Sokratês himself among them. He was tried at Athens, and seems to have escaped condemnation only by voluntary exile.

The three eminent men just named, all essentially different from each other, may be taken as illustrations of the philosophical mind of Greece during the last half of the fifth century B.C. Scientific pursuits had acquired a powerful hold, and adjusted themselves in various ways with the prevalent religious feelings of the age. Both Hippokratês and Anaxagoras modified their ideas of the divine agency, so as to suit their thirst for scientific research. According to the former, the gods were the really efficient agents in the production of all phenomena,—the mean and indifferent not less than the terrific or tutelary. Being thus alike connected with all phenomena, they were specially associated with none—and the proper task of the inquirer was to find out those rules and conditions by which (he

assumed) their agency was always determined, and according to which it might be foretold. Now, such a view of the divine agency could never be reconciled with the religious feelings of the ordinary Grecian believer, even as they stood in the time of Anaxagoras: still less could it have been reconciled with those of the Homeric man, more than three centuries earlier. By him Zeus and Athênê were conceived as definite Persons, objects of special reverence, hopes, and fears, and animated with peculiar feelings, sometimes of favor, sometimes of wrath, toward himself or his family or country. They were propitiated by his prayers, and prevailed upon to lend him succor in danger—but offended and disposed to bring evil upon him if he omitted to render thanks or sacrifice. This sense of individual communion with them, and dependence upon them, was the essence of his faith. While he prayed with sincerity for special blessings or protection from the gods, he could not acquiesce in the doctrine of Hippokratês that their agency was governed by constant laws and physical conditions.

That radical discord between the mental impulses of science and religion, which manifests itself so decisively during the most cultivated ages of Greece, and which harassed more or less so many of the philosophers, produced its most afflicting result in the condemnation of Sokratês by the Athenians. According to the remarkable passage recently cited from Xenophôn, it will appear that Sokratês agreed with his countrymen in denouncing physical speculations as impious,—that he recognized the religious process of discovery as a peculiar branch, co-ordinate with the scientific,—and that he laid down a theory, of which the basis was the confessed divergence of these two processes from the beginning—thereby seemingly satisfying the exigencies of religious hopes and fears on the one hand, and those of reason, in her ardor for ascertaining the invariable laws of phenomena, on the other. We may remark that the theory of this religious and extra scientific process of discovery was at that time sufficiently complete; for Sokratês could point out that those anomalous phenomena which the gods had reserved for themselves, and into which science was forbidden to pry, were yet accessible to the seekings of the pious man, through oracles, omens, and other exceptional means of communication which divine benevolence vouchsafed to keep open.

Now the scission thus produced between the superior minds and the multitude, in consequence of the development of science and the scientific point of view, is a fact of great moment in the history of Greek progress, and forms an important contrast between the age of Homer and Hesiod and that of Thucydidês: though, in point of fact, even the multitude, during this later age, were partially modified by those very scientific views which they regarded with disfavor. And we must keep in view the primitive religious faith, once universal and unobstructed, but subsequently disturbed by the intrusions of

science; we must follow the great change, as well in respect to enlarged intelligence as to refinement of social and ethical feeling, among the Greeks, from the Hesiodic times downward, in order to render some account of the altered manner in which the ancient mythes came to be dealt with. These mythes, the spontaneous growth of a creative and personifying interpretation of nature, had struck root in Grecian associations at a time when the national faith required no support from what we call evidence. They were *now* submitted not simply to a feeling, imagining, and believing public, but also to special classes of instructed men,—philosophers, historians, ethical teachers, and critics,—and to a public partially modified by their ideas as well as improved by a wider practical experience. They were not intended for such an audience; they had ceased to be in complete harmony even with the lower strata of intellect and sentiment,—much more so with the higher. But they were the cherished inheritance of a past time; they were interwoven in a thousand ways with the religious faith, the patriotic retrospect, and the national worship, of every Grecian community; the general type of the mythe was the ancient, familiar, and universal form of Grecian thought, which even the most cultivated men had imbibed in their childhood from the poets, and by which they were to a certain degree unconsciously enslaved. Taken as a whole, the mythes had acquired prescriptive and ineffaceable possession. To attack, call in question, or repudiate them, was a task painful even to undertake, and far beyond the power of any one to accomplish.

For these reasons, the anti-mythic vein of criticism was of little effect as a destroying force. But, nevertheless, its dissolving, decomposing, and transforming influence was very considerable. To accommodate the ancient mythes to an improved tone of sentiment and a newly created canon of credibility, was a function which even the wisest Greeks did not disdain, and which occupied no small proportion of the whole intellectual activity of the nation. The mythes were looked at from a point of view completely foreign to the reverential curiosity and literal imaginative faith of the Homeric man. They were broken up and recast in order to force them into new molds such as their authors had never conceived. We may distinguish four distinct classes of minds, in the literary age now under examination, as having taken them in hand—the poets, the logographers, the philosophers, and the historians.

With the poets and logographers, the mythical persons are real predecessors, and the mythical world an antecedent fact. But it is divine and heroic reality, not human; the present is only half-brother of the past (to borrow an illustration from Pindar in his allusion to gods and men) remotely and generically, but not closely and specifically, analogous to it. As a general habit, the old feelings and the old unconscious faith, apart from all proof or evidence, still remain in their minds; but recent feelings have grown up which compel

them to omit, to alter, sometimes even to reject and condemn, particular narratives.

Pindar repudiates some stories and transforms others, because they are inconsistent with his conceptions of the gods. Thus, he formally protests against the tale that Pelops had been killed and served up at table by his father for the immortal gods to eat. Pindar shrinks from the idea of imputing to them so horrid an appetite; he pronounces the tale to have been originally fabricated by a slanderous neighbor. Nor can he bring himself to recount the quarrels between different gods. The amours of Zeus and Apollo are noway displeasing to him; but he occasionally suppresses some of the simple details of the old mythe, as deficient in dignity. Thus, according to the Hesiodic narrative, Apollo was informed by a raven of the infidelity of the nymph Koronis; but the mention of the raven did not appear to Pindar consistent with the majesty of the god, and he therefore wraps up the mode of detection in vague and mysterious language. He feels considerable repugnance to the character of Odysseus, and intimates more than once that Homer has unduly exalted him by force of poetical artifice. With the character of the Æakid Ajax, on the other hand, he has the deepest sympathy, as well as with his untimely and inglorious death, occasioned by the undeserved preference of a less worthy rival. He appeals for his authority usually to the Muse, but sometimes to "ancient sayings of men," accompanied with a general allusion to story-tellers and bards,—admitting, however, that these stories present great discrepancy, and sometimes that they are false. Yet the marvelous and the supernatural afford no ground whatever for rejecting a story: Pindar makes an express declaration to this effect in reference to the romantic adventures of Perseus and the Gorgon's head. He treats even those mythical characters which conflict the most palpably with positive experience as connected by a real genealogical thread with the world before him. Not merely the heroes of Troy and Thebes, and the demigod seamen of Jason in the ship Argo, but also the Centaur Cheiron, the hundred-headed Typhos, the giant Alkyoneus, Antæus, Bellerophon and Pegasus, the Chimæra, the Amazons and the Hyperboreans—all appear painted on the same canvas, and touched with the same colors, as the men of the recent and recorded past, Phalaris and Krœsus: only they are thrown back to a greater distance in the perspective. The heroic ancestors of those great Æginetan, Thessalian, Theban, Argeian, etc., families, whose present members the poet celebrates for their agonistic victories, sympathize with the exploits and second the efforts of their descendants: the inestimable value of a privileged breed and of the stamp of nature is powerfully contrasted with the impotence of unassisted teaching and practice. The power and skill of the Argeian Theæus and his relatives as wrestlers are ascribed partly to the fact that their ancestor Pamphaes in aforetime had hospitably entertained the Tyndarids Kastor

and Pollux. Perhaps, however, the strongest proof of the sincerity of Pindar's mythical faith is afforded when he notices a guilty incident with shame and repugnance, but with an unwilling confession of its truth, as in the case of the fratricide committed on Phokus by his brothers Peleus and Telamon.

Æschylus and Sophokles exhibit the same spontaneous and uninquiring faith as Pindar in the legendary antiquities of Greece, taken as a whole; but they allow themselves greater license as to the details. It was indispensable to the success of their compositions that they should recast and group anew the legendary events, preserving the names and general understood relation of those characters whom they introduced. The demand for novelty of combination increased with the multiplication of tragic spectacles at Athens: moreover, the feelings of the Athenians, ethical as well as political, had become too critical to tolerate the literal reproduction of many among the ancient stories.

Both of these poets exalted rather than lowered the dignity of the mythical world, as something divine and heroic rather than human. The Prometheus of Æschylus is a far more exalted conception than his keen-witted namesake in Hesiod, and the more homely details of the ancient Thebais and Œdipodia were modified in the like spirit by Sophokles. The religious agencies of the old epic are constantly kept prominent by both. The paternal curse,—the wrath of deceased persons against those from whom they have sustained wrong,—the judgments of the Erinnys against guilty or foredoomed persons, sometimes inflicted directly, sometimes brought about through dementation of the sufferer himself (like the Homeric Ate),—are frequent in their tragedies.

Æschylus in two of his remaining pieces brings forward the gods as the chief personages. Far from sharing the objection of Pindar to dwell upon dissensions of the gods, he introduces Prometheus and Zeus in the one, Apollo and the Eumenides in the other, in marked opposition. The dialogue, first superinduced by him upon the primitive chorus, gradually became the most important portion of the drama, and is more elaborated in Sophokles than in Æschylus. Even in Sophokles, however, it still generally retains its ideal majesty as contrasted with the rhetorical and forensic tone which afterward crept in: it grows out of the piece, and addresses itself to the emotions more than to the reason of the audience. Nevertheless, the effect of Athenian political discussion and democratical feeling is visible in both these dramatists. The idea of rights and legitimate privileges as opposed to usurping force is applied by Æschylus even to the society of the gods. The Eumenides accuse Apollo of having, with the insolence of youthful ambition, "ridden down" their old prerogatives—while the Titan Prometheus, the champion of suffering humanity against the unfriendly dispositions of Zeus, ventures to depict the latter as a recent usurper reigning

only by his superior strength, exalted by one successful revolution, and destined at some future time to be overthrown by another,—a fate which cannot be averted except through warnings communicable only by Prometheus himself.

Though Æschylus incurred reproaches of impiety from Plato, and seemingly also from the Athenian public, for particular speeches and incidents in his tragedies, and though he does not adhere to the received vein of religious tradition with the same strictness as Sophoklês—yet the ascendency and interference of the gods are never out of sight, and the solemnity with which they are represented, set off by a bold, figurative, and elliptical style of expression (often but imperfectly intelligible to modern readers), reaches its maximum in his tragedies. As he throws round the gods a kind of airy grandeur, so neither do his men or heroes appear like tenants of the common earth. The mythical world from which he borrows his characters, is peopled only with "the immediate seed of the gods, in close contact with Zeus, in whom the divine blood has not yet had time to degenerate:" his individuals are taken, not from the iron race whom Hesiod acknowledges with shame as his contemporaries, but from the extinct heroic race which had fought at Troy and Thêbes. It is to them that his conceptions aspire, and he is even chargeable with frequent straining, beyond the limits of poetical taste, to realize his picture. If he does not consistently succeed in it, the reason is because consistency in such a matter is unattainable, since, after all, the analogies of common humanity, the only materials which the most creative imagination has to work upon, obtrude themselves involuntarily, and the lineaments of the man are thus seen even under a dress which promises superhuman proportions.

Sophoklês, the most illustrious ornament of Grecian tragedy, dwells upon the same heroic characters, and maintains their grandeur, on the whole, with little abatement; combining with it a far better dramatic structure, and a wider appeal to human sympathies. Even in Sophoklês, however, we find indications that an altered ethical feeling, and a more predominant sense of artistic perfection, are allowed to modify the harsher religious agencies of the old epic. Occasional misplaced effusions of rhetoric, as well as of didactic prolixity, may also be detected. It is Æschylus, not Sophoklês, who forms the marked antithesis to Euripidês: it is Æschylus, not Sophoklês, to whom Aristophanês awards the prize of tragedy, as the poet who assigns most perfectly to the heroes of the past those weighty words, imposing equipments, simplicity of great deeds with little talk, and masculine energy superior to the corruptions of Aphroditê, which beseem the comrades of Agamemnôn and Adrastus.

How deeply this feeling, of the heroic character of the mythical world, possessed the Athenian mind, may be judged by the bitter criticisms made on Euripidês, whose compositions were pervaded, partly by ideas of physical philosophy learned under Anaxagoras,

partly by the altered tone of education and the wide diffusion of practical eloquence forensic as well as political at Athens. While Aristophanês assails Euripidês as the representative of this "young Athens" with the utmost keenness of sarcasm,—other critics also concur in designating him as having vulgarized the mythical heroes, and transformed them into mere characters of common life,—loquacious, subtle, and savoring of the market-place. In some of his plays, skeptical expressions and sentiments were introduced, derived from his philosophical studies, sometimes confounding two or three distinct gods into one, sometimes translating the personal Zeus into a substantial Æther with determinate attributes. He put into the mouths of some of his unprincipled dramatic characters apologetic speeches which were denounced as ostentatious sophistry, and as setting out a triumphant case for the criminal. His thoughts, his words, and the rhythm of his choric songs, were all accused of being deficient in dignity and elevation. The mean attire and miserable attitude in which he exhibited Œneus, Têlephus, Thyestês, Inô, and other heroic characters, were unmercifully derided, though it seems that their position and circumstances had always been painfully melancholy; but the effeminate pathos which Euripidês brought so nakedly into the foreground was accounted unworthy of the majesty of a legendary hero. And he incurred still greater obloquy on another point, on which he is allowed even by his enemies to have only reproduced in substance the pre-existing tales,—the illicit and fatal passion depicted in several of his female characters, such as Phædra and Sthenobœa. His opponents admitted that these stories were true, but contended that they ought to be kept back, and not produced upon the stage,—a proof both of the continued mythical faith and of the more sensitive ethical criticism of his age. The marriage of the six daughters to the six sons of Æolus is of Homeric origin, and stands now, though briefly, stated, in the Odyssey; but the incestuous passion of Makareus and Kanakê, embodied by Euripidês in the lost tragedy called "Æolus," drew upon him severe censure. Moreover, he often disconnected the horrors of the old legends with those religious agencies by which they had been originally forced on, prefacing them by motives of a more refined character, such as carried no sense of awful compulsion. Thus, the considerations by which the Euripidean Alkmæôn was reduced to the necessity of killing his mother appeared to Aristotle ridiculous. After the time of this great poet, his successors seem to have followed him in breathing into their characters the spirit of common life. But the names and plot were still borrowed from the stricken mythical families of Tantalus, Kadmus, etc.: and the heroic exaltation of all the individual personages introduced, as contrasted with the purely human character of the chorus, is still numbered by Aristotle among the essential points of the theory of tragedy.

The tendency, then, of Athenian tragedy—powerfully manifested in Æschylus and never wholly lost—was to uphold an unquestioning faith and a reverential estimate of the general mythical world and its personages, but to treat the particular narratives rather as matter for the emotions than as recitals of actual fact. The logographers worked along with them to the first of these two ends, but not to the second. Their grand object was, to cast the mythes into a continuous readable series, and they were in consequence compelled to make selection between inconsistent or contradictory narratives; to reject some narratives as false, and to receive others as true. But their preference was determined more by their sentiments as to what was appropriate, than by any pretended historical test. Pherekydês, Akusilaus, and Hellanikus did not seek to banish miraculous or fantastic incidents from the mythical world. They regarded it as peopled with loftier beings, and expected to find in it phenomena not paralleled in their own degenerate days. They reproduced the fables as they found them in the poets, rejecting little except the discrepancies, and producing ultimately what they believed to be not only a continuous, but an exact and trustworthy history of the past—wherein they carry, indeed, their precision to such a length that Hellanikus gives the year, and even the day, of the capture of Troy.

Hekatæus of Milêtus (500 B.C.), anterior to Pherekydês and Hellanikus, is the earliest writer in whom we can detect any disposition to disallow the prerogative and specialty of the mythes, and to soften down their characteristic prodigies, some of which, however, still find favor in his eyes, as in the case of the speaking ram who carried Phryxus over the Hellespont. He pronounced the Grecian fables to be "many and ridiculous;" whether from their discrepancies or from their intrinsic improbabilities we do not know. And we owe to him the first attempt to force them within the limits of historical credibility; as where he transforms the three-headed Cerberus, the dog of Hadês, into a serpent inhabiting a cavern on Cape Tænarus—and Geryon of Erytheia into a king of Epirus rich in herds of oxen. Hekatæus traced the genealogy of himself and the gens to which he belonged through a line of fifteen progenitors up to an initial god,—the clearest proof both of his profound faith in the reality of the mythical world, and of his religious attachment to it as the point of junction between the human and the divine personality.

We have next to consider the historians, especially Herodotus and Thucydidês. Like Hekatæus, Thucydidês belonged to a gens which traced its descent from Ajax, and through Ajax to Æakus and Zeus. Herodotus modestly implies that he himself had no such privilege to boast of. The curiosity of these two historians respecting the past had no other materials to work upon except the mythes, which they found already cast by the logographers into a continuous series, and presented as an aggregate of antecedent history, chronologically deduced from the times of the gods. In common with the body of

the Greeks, both Herodotus and Thucydidês had imbibed that complete and unsuspecting belief in the general reality of mythical antiquity which was interwoven with the religion and the patriotism, and all the public demonstrations, of the Hellenic world. To acquaint themselves with the genuine details of this foretime, was an inquiry highly interesting to them. But the increased positive tendencies of their age, as well as their own habits of personal investigation, had created in them an *historical sense* in regard to the past as well as to the present. Having acquired a habit of appreciating the intrinsic tests of historical credibility and probability, they found the particular narratives of the poets and logographers, inadmissible as a whole even in the eyes of Hekatæus, still more at variance with their stricter canons of criticism. And we thus observe in them the constant struggle, as well as the resulting compromise, between these two opposite tendencies; on one hand a firm belief in the reality of the mythical world, on the other hand an inability to accept the details which their only witnesses, the poets and logographers, told them respecting it.

Each of them, however, performed the process in his own way. Herodotus is a man of deep and anxious religious feeling. He often recognizes the special judgments of the gods as determining historical events: his piety is also partly tinged with that mystical vein which the last two centuries had gradually infused into the religion of the Greeks—for he is apprehensive of giving offense to the gods by reciting publicly what he has heard respecting them. He frequently stops short in his narrative, and intimates that there *is* a sacred legend, but that he will not tell it. In other cases, where he feels compelled to speak out, he entreats forgiveness for doing so from the gods and heroes. Sometimes he will not even mention the name of a god, though he generally thinks himself authorized to do so, the names being matter of public notoriety. Such pious reserve, which the open-hearted Herodotus avowedly proclaims as chaining up his tongue, affords a striking contrast with the plain-spoken and unsuspecting tone of the ancient epic, as well as of the popular legends, wherein the gods and their proceedings were the familiar and interesting subjects of common talk as well as of common sympathy, without ceasing to inspire both fear and reverence.

Herodotus expressly distinguishes, in the comparison of Polykratês with Minos, the human race to which the former belonged from the divine or heroic race which comprised the latter. But he has a firm belief in the authentic personality and parentage of all the names in the mythes, divine, heroic, and human, as well as in the trustworthiness of their chronology computed by generations. He counts back 1600 years from his own day to that of Semelê, mother of Dionysus; 900 years to Hêraklês, and 800 years to Penelopê, the Trojan war being a little earlier in date. Indeed, even the longest of these periods must have seemed to him comparatively short, seeing that

he apparently accepts the prodigious series of years which the Egyptians professed to draw from a recorded chronology—17,000 years from their god Hêraklês, and 15,000 years from their god Osiris or Dionysus, down to their king Amasis (550 B.C.). So much was his imagination familiarized with these long chronological computations barren of events that he treats Homer and Hesiod as "men of yesterday," though separated from his own age by an interval which he reckons as 400 years.

Herodotus had been profoundly impressed with what he saw and heard in Egypt. The wonderful monuments, the evident antiquity, and the peculiar civilization of that country, acquired such preponderance in his mind over his own native legends that he is disposed to trace even the oldest religious names or institutions of Greece to Egyptian or Phœnician original, setting aside in favor of this hypothesis the Grecian legends of Dionysus and Pan. The oldest Grecian mythical genealogies are thus made ultimately to lose themselves in Egyptian or Phœnician antiquity, and in the full extent of these genealogies Herodotus firmly believes. It does not seem that any doubt had ever crossed his mind as to the real personality of those who were named or described in the popular mythes: all of them have once had reality, either as men, as heroes, or as gods. The eponyms of cities, demes, and tribes, are all comprehended in this affirmative category; the supposition of fictitious personages being apparently never entertained. Deukalion, Hellen, Dorus,—Ion, with his four sons, the eponyms of the old Athenian tribes,—the autochthonous Titakus and Dekelus,—Danaus, Lynkeus, Perseus, Amphitryôn, Alkmena, and Herakles—Talthybius, the heroic progenitor of the privileged heraldic gens at Sparta,—the Tyndarids and Helena,—Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Orestes,—Nestor and his son Peisistratus,—Asopus, Thebe, and Ægina,—Inachus and Io, Œetes and Medea,—Melanippus, Adrastus, and Amphiaraüs, as well as Jason and the Argo—all these are occupants of the real past time, and predecessors of himself and his contemporaries. In the veins of the Lacedæmonian kings flowed the blood both of Kadmus and of Danaus, their splendid pedigree being traceable to both of these great mythical names: Herodotus carries the lineage up through Herakles first to Perseus and Danae, then through Danae to Akrisius and the Egyptian Danaus; but he drops the paternal lineage when he comes to Perseus (inasmuch as Perseus is the son of Zeus by Danae, without any reputed human father, such as Amphitryon was to Herakles), and then follow the higher members of the series through Danae alone. He also pursues the same regal genealogy, through the mother of Eurysthenes and Prokles, up to Polynikes, Œdipus, Laius, Labdakus, Polydorus, and Kadmus: and he assigns various ancient inscriptions which he saw in the temple of the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes to the ages of Laius and Œdipus. Moreover, the sieges of Thebes and Troy,—the Argonautic expedition,—the

invasion of Attica by the Amazons,—the protection of the Herakleids, and the defeat and death of Eurystheus, by the Athenians,—the death of Mekisteus and Tydeus before Thebes by the hands of Melanippus, and the touching calamities of Adrastus and Amphiaraüs connected with the same enterprise,—the sailing of Kastor and Pollux in the Argo,—the abductions of Io, Eurpoa, Medea, and Helena,—the emigration of Kadmus in quest of Eurôpa, and his coming to Bœotia, as well as the attack of the Greeks upon Troy to recover Helen,—all these events seem to him portions of past history, not less unquestionably certain, though more clouded over by distance and misrepresentation, than the battles of Salamis and Mykalê.

But though Herodotus is thus easy of faith in regard both to persons and to the general facts of Grecian mythes, yet when he comes to discuss particular facts taken separately, we find him applying to them stricter tests of historical credibility, and often disposed to reject as well the miraculous as the extravagant. Thus, even with respect to Herakles, he censures the levity of the Greeks in ascribing to him absurd and incredible exploits. He tries their assertion by the philosophical standard of nature, or of determinate powers and conditions governing the course of events. "How is it consonant to *nature*," he asks, "that Herakles, being, as he was, according to the statement of the Greeks, *still a man* (i.e., having not yet been received among the gods), should kill many thousand persons? I pray that indulgence may be shown to me both by gods and heroes for saying so much as this." The religious feelings of Herodotus here told him that he was trenching upon the utmost limits of admissible skepticism.

Another striking instance of the disposition of Herodotus to rationalize the miraculous narratives of the current mythes is to be found in his account of the oracle of Dodona and its alleged Egyptian origin. Here, if in any case, a miracle was not only in full keeping, but apparently indispensable to satisfy the exigences of the religious sentiment; anything less than a miracle would have appeared tame and unimpressive to the visitors of so revered a spot, much more to the residents themselves. Accordingly, Herodotus heard both from the three priestesses and from the Dodonæans generally that two black doves had started at the same time from Thebes in Egypt: one of them went to Libya, where it directed the Libyanes to establish the oracle of Zeus Ammon; the other came to the grove of Dodona, and perched on one of the venerable oaks, proclaiming with a human voice that an oracle of Zeus must be founded on that very spot. The injunction of the speaking dove was respectfully obeyed.

Such was the tale related and believed at Dodona. But Herodotus had also heard, from the priests at Thebes in Egypt, a different tale, ascribing the origin of all the prophetic establishments, in Greece as well as in Libya, to two sacerdotal women, who had been carried away from Thebes by some Phœnician merchants and sold, the one

in Greece, the other in Libya. The Theban priests boldly assured Herodotus that much pains had been taken to discover what had become of these women so exported, and that the fact of their having been taken to Greece and Libya had been accordingly verified.

The historian of Halicarnassus cannot for a moment think of admitting the miracle which harmonized so well with the feelings of the priestesses and the Dodonæans. "How," he asks, "could a dove speak with human voice?" But the narrative of the priests at Thebes, though its prodigious improbability hardly requires to be stated, yet involved no positive departure from the laws of nature and possibility, and therefore Herodotus makes no difficulty in accepting it. The curious circumstance is, that he turns the native Dodonæan legend into a figurative representation, or rather a misrepresentation, of the supposed true story told by the Theban priests. According to his interpretation, the woman who came from Thebes to Dodona was called a dove, and affirmed to utter sounds like a bird because she was non-Hellenic and spoke a foreign tongue; when she learned to speak the language of the country, it was then said that the dove spoke with a human voice. And the dove was, moreover, called black because of the woman's Egyptian color.

That Herodotus should thus bluntly reject a miracle, recounted to him by the prophetic women themselves as the prime circumstance in the origines of this holy place, is a proof of the hold which habits of dealing with historical evidence had acquired over his mind; and the awkwardness of his explanatory mediation between the dove and the woman, marks not less his anxiety, while discarding the legend, to let it softly down into a story quasi-historical and not intrinsically incredible.

We may observe another example of the unconscious tendency of Herodotus to eliminate from the mythes the idea of special aid from the gods, in his remarks upon Melampus. He designates Melampus as "a clever man, who had acquired for himself the art of prophecy;" and had procured through Kadmus much information about the religious rites and customs of Egypt, many of which he introduced into Greece—especially the name, the sacrifices, and the phallic processions of Dionysus: he adds, "that Melampus himself did not accurately comprehend or bring out the whole doctrine, but wise men who came after him made the necessary additions." Though the name of Melampus is here maintained, the character described is something in the vein of Pythagoras—totally different from the great seer and leech of the old epic mythes—the founder of the gifted family of the Amythaonids, and the grandfather of Amphiaraüs. But that which is most of all at variance with the genuine legendary spirit, is the opinion expressed by Herodotus (and delivered with some emphasis as *his own*), that Melampus "was a clever man who had acquired for himself prophetic powers." Such a supposition would have appeared inadmissible to Homer or Hesiod, or indeed to

Solôn in the preceding century, in whose view even inferior arts come from the gods, while Zeus or Apollo bestows the power of prophesying. The intimation of such an opinion by Herodotus, himself a thoroughly pious man, marks the sensibly diminished omnipresence of the gods, and the increasing tendency to look for the explanation of phenomena among more visible and determinate agencies.

We may make a similar remark on the dictum of the historian respecting the narrow defile of Tempê, forming the embouchure of the Pêneus and the efflux of all the waters from the Thessalian basin. The Thessalians alleged that this whole basin of Thessaly had once been a lake, but that Poseidôn had split the chain of mountains and opened the efflux; upon which primitive belief, thoroughly conformable to the genius of Homer and Hesiod, Herodotus comments as follows: "The Thessalian statement is reasonable. For whoever thinks that Poseidôn shakes the earth, and that the rifts of an earthquake are the work of that god, will, on seeing the defile in question, say that Poseidôn has caused it. For the rift of the mountains is, as appeared to me (when I saw it), the work of an earthquake." Herodotus admits the reference to Poseidôn, when pointed out to him, but it stands only in the background: what is present to his mind is the phenomenon of the earthquake, not as a special act, but as part of a system of habitual operations.

Herodotus adopts the Egyptian version of the legend of Troy, founded on that capital variation which seems to have originated with Stesichorus, and according to which Helen never left Sparta at all—her eidôlon had been taken to Troy in her place. Upon this basis a new story had been framed, midway between Homer and Stesichorus, representing Paris to have really carried off Helen from Sparta, but to have been driven by storms to Egypt, where she remained during the whole siege of Troy, having been detained by Proteus, the king of the country, until Menelaus came to reclaim her after his triumph. The Egyptian priests, with their usual boldness of assertion, professed to have heard the whole story from Menelaus himself—the Greeks had besieged Troy, in the full persuasion that Helen and the stolen treasures were within the walls, nor would they ever believe the repeated denials of the Trojans as to the fact of her presence. In intimating his preference for the Egyptian narrative, Herodotus betrays at once his perfect and unsuspecting confidence that he is dealing with genuine matter of history, and his entire distrust of the epic poets, even including Homer, upon whose authority that supposed history rested. His reason for rejecting the Homeric version is that it teems with historical improbabilities. If Helen had been really in Troy (he says), Priam and the Trojans would never have been so insane as to retain her to their own utter ruin; but it was the divine judgment which drove them into the miserable alternative of neither being able to surrender Helen nor to satisfy the

Greeks of the real fact that they never had possession of her—in order that mankind might plainly read, in the utter destruction of Troy, the great punishments with which the gods visit great misdeeds. Homer (Herodotus thinks) had heard this story, but designedly departed from it, because it was not so suitable a subject for epic poetry.

Enough has been said to show how wide is the difference between Herodotus and the logographers with their literal transcript of the ancient legends. Though he agrees with them in admitting the full series of persons and generations, he tries the circumstances narrated by a new standard. Scruples have arisen in his mind respecting violations of the laws of nature; the poets are unworthy of trust, and their narratives must be brought into conformity with historical and ethical conditions before they can be admitted as truth. To accomplish this conformity, Herodotus is willing to mutilate the old legend in one of its most vital points. He sacrifices the personal presence of Helena in Troy, which ran through every one of the ancient epic poems belonging to the Trojan cycle, and is, indeed, under the gods, the great and present moving force throughout.

Thucydides places himself generally in the same point of view as Herodotus with regard to mythical antiquity; yet with some considerable differences. Though manifesting no belief in present miracles or prodigies, he seems to accept without reserve the pre-existent reality of all the persons mentioned in the mythes, and of the long series of generations extending back through so many supposed centuries. In this category, too, are included the eponymous personages, Hellen, Kekrops, Eumolpus, Pandion, Amphilochus the son of Amphiaraus, and Akarnan. But on the other hand, we find no trace of that distinction between a human and an heroic ante human race, which Herodotus still admitted,—nor any respect for Egyptian legends. Thucydides, regarding the personages of the mythes as men of the same breed and stature with his own contemporaries, not only tests the acts imputed to them by the same limits of credibility, but presumes in them the same political views and feelings as he was accustomed to trace in the proceedings of Peisistratus or Perikles. He treats the Trojan war as a great political enterprise, undertaken by all Greece; brought into combination through the imposing power of Agamemnon, not (according to the legendary narrative) through the influence of the oath exacted by Tyndareus. Then he explains how the predecessors of Agamemnon arrived at so vast a dominion —beginning with Pelops, who came over (as he says) from Asia with great wealth among the poor Peloponnesians, and by means of this wealth so aggrandized himself, though a foreigner, as to become the eponym of the peninsula. Next followed his son Atreus, who acquired after the death of Eurystheus the dominion of Mykenæ, which had before been possessed by the descendants of Perseus: here the old legendary tale, which described Atreus as having been banished

by his father Pelops in consequence of the murder of his elder brother Chrysippus, is invested with a political bearing, as explaining the reason why Atreus retired to Mykenæ. Another legendary tale—the defeat and death of Eurystheus by the fugitive Herakleids in Attica, so celebrated in Attic tragedy as having given occasion to the generous protecting intervention of Athens—is also introduced as furnishing the cause why Atreus succeeded to the deceased Eurystheus: "for Atreus, the maternal uncle of Eurystheus, had been intrusted by the latter with his government during the expedition into Attica, and had effectually courted the people, who were moreover in great fear of being attacked by the Herakleids." Thus the Pelopids acquired the supremacy in Peloponnesus, and Agamemnon was enabled to get together his 1200 ships and 100,000 men for the expedition against Troy. Considering that contingents were furnished from every portion of Greece, Thucydides regards this as a small number, treating the Homeric catalogue as an authentic muster-roll, perhaps rather exaggerated than otherwise. He then proceeds to tell us why the armament was not larger. Many more men could have been furnished, but there was not sufficient money to purchase provisions for their subsistence; hence they were compelled, after landing and gaining a victory, to fortify their camp, to divide their army, and to send away one portion for the purpose of cultivating the Chersonese, and another portion to sack the adjacent towns. This was the grand reason why the siege lasted so long as ten years. For if it had been possible to keep the whole army together, and to act with an undivided force, Troy would have been taken both earlier and at smaller cost.

Such is the general sketch of the war of Troy, as given by Thucydides. So different is it from the genuine epical narrative that we seem hardly to be reading a description of the same event; still less should we imagine that the event was known, to him as well as to us, only through the epic poets themselves. The men, the numbers, and the duration of the siege do indeed remain the same; but the cast and juncture of events, the determining forces, and the characteristic features are altogether heterogeneous. But, like Herodotus, and still more than Herodotus, Thucydides was under the pressure of two conflicting impulses. He shared the general faith in the mythical antiquity, yet at the same time he could not believe in any facts which contradicted the laws of historical credibility or probability. He was thus under the necessity of torturing the matter of the old mythes into conformity with the subjective exigences of his own mind. He left out, altered, recombined, and supplied new connecting principles and supposed purposes, until the story became such as no one could have any positive reason for calling in question. Though it lost the impressive mixture of religion, romance, and individual adventure, which constituted its original charm, it acquired a smoothness and plausibility, and a political ensemble, which the

critics were satisfied to accept as historical truth. And historical truth it would doubtless have been if any independent evidence could have been found to sustain it. Had Thucydides been able to produce such new testimony, we should have been pleased to satisfy ourselves that the war of Troy, as he recounted it, was the real event; of which the war of Troy, as sung by the epic poets, was a misreported, exaggerated, and ornamented recital. But in this case the poets are the only real witnesses, and the narrative of Thucydides is a mere extract and distillation from their incredibilities.

A few other instances may be mentioned to illustrate the views of Thucydides respecting various mythical incidents. 1. He treats the residence of the Homeric Phæakians at Korkyra as an undisputed fact, and employs it partly to explain the efficiency of the Korkyrean navy in times preceding the Peloponnesian war. 2. He notices with equal confidence the story of Tereus and Prokne, daughter of Pandion, and the murder of the child Itys by Prokne his mother and Philomela; and he produces this ancient mythe with especial reference to the alliance between the Athenians and Teres, king of the Odrysian Thracians, during the time of the Peloponnesian war, intimating that the Odrysian Teres was neither of the same family nor of the same country as Tereus, the husband of Prokne. The conduct of Pandion, in giving his daughter Prokne in marriage to Tereus, is in his view dictated by political motives and interests. 3. He mentions the Strait of Messina as the place through which Odysseus is said to have sailed. 4. The Cyclopes and the Læstrygones (he says) were the most ancient reported inhabitants of Sicily; but he cannot tell to what race they belonged, nor whence they came. 5. Italy derived its name from Italus, king of the Sikels. 6. Eryx and Egesta in Sicily were founded by fugitive Trojans after the capture of Troy; also Skione, in the Thracian peninsula of Pallene, by Grecks from the Achæan town of Pellene, stopping thither in their return from the siege of Troy: the Amphilochian Argos in the Gulf of Ambrakia was in like manner founded by Amphilochus, son of Amphiaraus, in his return from the same enterprise. The remorse and mental derangement of the matricidal Alkmæon, son of Amphiaraus, is also mentioned by Thucydides, as well as the settlement of his son Akarnan in the country called after him Akarnania.

Such are the special allusions made by this illustrious author in the course of his history to mythical events. From the tenor of his language we may see that he accounted all that could be known about them to be uncertain and unsatisfactory; but he has it much at heart to show that even the greatest were inferior in magnitude and importance to the Peloponnesian war. In this respect his opinion seems to have been at variance with that which was popular among his contemporaries.

To touch a little upon the later historians by whom these mythes were handled, we find that Anaximenes of Lampsacus composed a

consecutive history of events, beginning from the theogony down to the battle of Mantineia. But Ephorus professed to omit all the mythical narratives which are referred to times anterior to the return of the Herakleids (such restriction would of course have banished the siege of Troy), and even reproved those who introduced mythes into historical writing; adding, that everywhere truth was the object to be aimed at. Yet in practice he seems often to have departed from his own rule. Theopompus, on the other hand, openly proclaimed that he could narrate fables in his history better than Herodotus, or Ktesias, or Hellanicus. The fragments which remain to us exhibit some proof that this promise was performed as to quantity; though as to his style of narration the judgment of Dionysius is unfavorable. Xenophon ennobled his favorite amusement of the chase by numerous examples, chosen from the heroic world, tracing their portraits with all the simplicity of an undiminished faith. Kallisthenes, like Ephorus, professed to omit all mythes which referred to a time anterior to the return of the Herakleids; yet we know that he devoted a separate book or portion of his history to the Trojan war. Philistus introduced some mythes in the earlier portions of his Sicilian history; but Timæus was distinguished above all others by the copious and indiscriminate way in which he collected and repeated such legends. Some of these writers employed their ingenuity in transforming the mythical circumstances into plausible matter of history: Ephorus, in particular, converted the serpent Pytho, slain by Apollo, into a tyrannical king.

But the author who pushed this transmutation of legend into history to the greatest length was the Messenian Euemerus, contemporary of Kassander of Macedon. He melted down in this way the divine persons and legends, as well as the heroic—representing both gods and heroes as having been mere earth-born men, though superior to the ordinary level in respect of force and capacity, and deified or heroified after death as a recompense for services or striking exploits. In the course of a voyage into the Indian sea, undertaken by command of Kassander, Euemerus professed to have discovered a fabulous country called Panchaia, in which was a temple of the Triphylian Zeus: he there described a golden column with an inscription purporting to have been put up by Zeus himself, and detailing his exploits while on earth. Some eminent men, among whom may be numbered Polybius, followed the views of Euemerus, and the Roman poet Ennius translated his Historia Sacra: but, on the whole, he never acquired favor, and the unblushing inventions which he put into circulation were of themselves sufficient to disgrace both the author and his opinions. The doctrine that all the gods had once existed as mere men offended the religious pagans, and drew upon Euemerus the imputation of atheism; but, on the other hand, it came to be warmly espoused by several of the Christian assailants of paganism—by Minucius Felix, Lactantius, and St.

Augustin, who found the ground ready prepared for them in their efforts to strip Zeus and the other pagan gods of the attributes of deity. They believed not only in the main theory, but also in the copious details of Euemerus; and the same man whom Strabo casts aside as almost a proverb for mendacity was extolled by them as an excellent specimen of careful historical inquiry.

But though the pagan world repudiated that "lowering tone of explanation" which effaced the superhuman personality of Zeus and the great gods of Olympus—the mythical persons and narratives generally came to be surveyed more and more from the point of view of history, and subjected to such alterations as might make them look more like plausible matter of fact. Polybius, Strabo, Diodorus, and Pausanias, cast the mythes into historical statements —with more or less of transformation, as the case may require, assuming always that there is a basis of truth, which may be discovered by removing poetical exaggerations and allowing for mistakes. Strabo, in particular, lays down that principle broadly and unequivocally in his remarks upon Homer. To give pure fiction, without any foundation of fact, was in his judgement utterly unworthy of so great a genius; and he comments with considerable acrimony on the geographer Erastosthenes, who maintains the opposite opinion. Again Polybius tells us that the Homeric Æolus, the dispenser of the winds by appointment from Zeus, was in reality a man eminently skilled in navigation, and exact in predicting the weather; that the Cyclopes and Lætrygones were wild and savage real men in Sicily; and that Scylla and Charybdis were a figurative representation of dangers arising from pirates in the Strait of Messina. Strabo speaks of the amazing expeditions of Dionysus and Herakles, and of the long wanderings of Jason, Menelaus, and Odysseus, in the same category with the extended commercial range of the Phœnician merchant-ships. He explains the report of Theseus and Peirithous having descended to Hades, by their dangerous earthly pilgrimages, —and the invocation of the Dioskuri as the protectors of the imperiled mariner, by the celebrity which they had acquired as real men and navigators.

Diodorus gave at considerable length versions of the current fables respecting the most illustrious names in the Grecian mythical world, compiled confusedly out of distinct and incongruous authors. Sometimes the mythe is reproduced in its primitive simplicity, but for the most part it is partially and sometimes wholly historicized. Amid this jumble of dissentient authorities, we can trace little of a systematic view, except the general conviction that there was at the bottom of the mythes a real chronological sequence of persons, and real matter of fact, historical or ultra-historical. Nevertheless there are some few occasions on which Diodorus brings us back a step nearer to the point of view of the old logographers. For, in reference to Herakles, he protests against the scheme of cutting down

the mythes to the level of present reality. He contends that a special standard of ultra-historical credibility ought to be constituted, so as to include the mythe in its native dimensions, and do fitting honor to the grand, beneficent, and superhuman personality of Herakles and other heroes or demigods. To apply to such persons the common measure of humanity (he says), and to cavil at the glorious picture which grateful man has drawn of them, is at once ungracious and irrational. All nice criticism into the truth of the legendary narratives is out of place: we show our reverence to the god by acquiescing in the incredibilities of his history, and we must be content with the best guesses which we can make, amid the inextricable confusion and numberless discrepancies which they present. Yet, though Diodorus here exhibits a preponderance of the religious sentiment over the purely historical point of view, and thus reminds us of a period earlier than Thucydides—he in another place inserts a series of stories which seem to be derived from Euemerus, and in which Uranus, Kronus, and Zeus appear reduced to the character of human kings celebrated for their exploits and benefactions. Many of the authors whom Diodorus copies, have so entangled together Grecian, Asiatic, Egyptian, and Libyan fables, that it becomes impossible to ascertain how much of this heterogeneous mass can be considered as at all connected with the genuine Hellenic mind.

Pausanias is far more strictly Hellenic in his view of the Grecian mythes than Diodorus; his sincere piety makes him inclined to faith generally with regard to the mythical narratives, but subject nevertheless to the frequent necessity of historicizing or allegorizing them. His belief in the general reality of the mythical history and chronology is complete, in spite of the many discrepancies which he finds in it, and which he is unable to reconcile.

Another author who seems to have conceived clearly, and applied consistently, the semi-historical theory of the Grecian mythes, is Palæphatus, of whose work what appears to be a short abstract has been preserved. In the short preface of this treatise "concerning incredible tales," he remarks that some men, from want of instruction, believe all the current narratives; while others, more searching and cautious, disbelieve them altogether. Each of these extremes he is anxious to avoid. On the one hand, he thinks that no narrative could ever have acquired credence unless it had been founded in truth; on the other, it is impossible for him to accept so much of the existing narratives as conflicts with the analogies of present natural phenomena. If such things ever had been, they would still continue to be—but they never have so occurred; and the extra-analogical features of the stories are to be ascribed to the license of the poets. Palæphatus wishes to adopt a middle course, neither accepting all nor rejecting all; accordingly, he had taken great pains to separate the true from the false in many of the narratives; he had visited the localities wherein they had taken place, and made careful inquiries

from old men and others. The results of his researches are presented in a new version of fifty legends, among the most celebrated and the most fabulous, comprising the Centaurs, Pasiphae, Aktæon, Kadmus and the Sparti, the Sphinx, Cycnus, Dædalus, the Trojan horse, Æolus, Scylla, Geryon, Bellerophon, etc.

It must be confessed that Palæphatus has performed his promise of transforming the "incredibilia" into narratives in themselves plausible and unobjectionable, and that in doing so he always follows some thread of analogy, real or verbal. The Centaurs (he tells us) were a body of young men from the village of Nephele in Thessaly, who first trained and mounted horses for the purpose of repelling a herd of bulls belonging to Ixion, king of the Lapithæ, which had run wild and done great damage: they pursued these wild bulls on horseback, and pierced them with their spears, thus acquiring both the name of *Prickers* (*κέντορες*) and the imputed attribute of joint body with the horse. Aktæon was an Arcadian, who neglected the cultivation of his land for the pleasures of hunting, and was thus eaten up by the expense of his hounds. The dragon whom Kadmus killed at Thebes, was in reality Drako king of Thebes; and the dragon's teeth which he was said to have sown, and from whence sprung a crop of armed men, were in point of fact elephants' teeth, which Kadmus as a rich Phœnician had brought over with him: the sons of Drako sold these elephants' teeth and employed the proceeds to levy troops against Kadmus. Dædalus, instead of flying across the sea on wings, had escaped from Krete in a swift sailing-boat under a violent storm: Kottus, Briareus, and Gyges were not persons with 100 hands, but inhabitants of the village of Hekatoncheiria in Upper Macedonia, who warred with the inhabitants of Mount Olympus against the Titans: Scylla, whom Odysseus so narrowly escaped, was a fast-sailing piratical vessel, as was also Pegasus, the alleged winged horse of Bellerophon.

By such ingenious conjectures, Palæphatus eliminates all the incredible circumstances, and leaves to us a string of tales perfectly credible and commonplace, which we should readily believe, provided a very moderate amount of testimony could be produced in their favor. If his treatment not only disenchants the original mythes, but even effaces their generic and essential character, we ought to remember that this is not more than what is done by Thucydides in his sketch of the Trojan war. Palæphatus handles the mythes consistently, according to the semi-historical theory, and his results exhibit the maximum which that theory can ever present. By aid of conjecture we get out of the impossible, and arrive at matters intrinsically plausible but totally uncertified; beyond this point we cannot penetrate without the light of extrinsic evidence, since there is no intrinsic mark to distinguish truth from plausible fiction.

It remains that we should notice the manner in which the ancient

mythes were received and dealt with by the philosophers. The earliest expression which we hear, on the part of philosophy, is the severe censure bestowed upon them on ethical grounds by Xenophanes of Kolophon, and seemingly by some others of his contemporaries. It was apparently in reply to such charges, which did not admit of being directly rebutted, that Theagenes of Rhegium (about 520 B.C.) first started the idea of a double meaning in the Homeric and Hesiodic narratives, —an interior sense, different from that which the words in their obvious meaning bore, yet to a certain extent analagous, and discoverable by sagacious divination. Upon this principle he allegorized especially the battle of the gods in the Iliad. In the succeeding century, Anaxagoras and Metrodorus carried out the allegorical explanation more comprehensively and systematically; the former representing the mythical personages as mere mental conceptions invested with name and gender, and illustrative of ethical precepts, the latter connecting them with physical principles and phenomena. Metrodorus resolved not only the persons of Zeus, Here, and Athene, but also those of Agamemnon, Achilles, and Hector, into various elemental combinations and physical agencies, and treated the adventures ascribed to them as natural facts concealed under the veil of allegory. Empedokles, Prodikus, Antisthenes, Parmenides, Herakleides of Pontus, and in a later age, Chrysippus and the Stoic philosophers generally, followed more or less the same principle of treating the popular gods as allegorical personages; while the expositors of Homer (such as Stesimbrotus, Glaukon, and others, even down to the Alexandrine age), though none of them proceeded to the same extreme length as Metrodorus, employed allegory among other media of explanation for the purpose of solving difficulties or eluding reproaches against the poet.

In the days of Plato and Xenophon, this allegorizing interpretation was one of the received methods of softening down the obnoxious mythes—though Plato himself treated it as an insufficient defense, seeing that the bulk of youthful hearers could not see through the allegory, but embraced the story literally as it was set forth. Pausanias tells us that when he first began to write his work he treated many of the Greek legends as silly and undeserving of serious attention; but as he proceeded he gradually arrived at the full conviction that the ancient sages had designedly spoken in enigmatical language, and that there was valuable truth wrapped up in their narratives: it was the duty of a pious man, therefore, to study and interpret, but not to reject, stories current and accredited respecting the gods. And others—arguing from the analogy of the religious mysteries, which could not be divulged without impiety to any except such as had been specially admitted and initiated—maintained that it would be a profanation to reveal directly to the vulgar the genuine scheme of nature and the divine administration: the ancient poets and philosophers had taken the only proper course, of talking to the many in

types and parables, and reserving the naked truth for privileged and qualified intelligences. The allegorical mode of explaining the ancient fables became more and more popular in the third and fourth centuries after the Christian era, especially among the new Platonic philosophers; being both congenial to their orientalized turn of thought, and useful as a shield against the attacks of the Christians.

It was from the same strong necessity of accommodating the old mythes to a new standard, both of belief and of appreciation, that both the historical and the allegorical schemes of transforming them arose; the literal narrative being decomposed for the purpose of arriving at a base, either of particular matter of fact or of general physical or moral truth. Instructed men were commonly disposed to historicize only the heroic legends, and to allegorize more or less of the divine legends: the attempt of Euemerus to historicize the latter was for the most part denounced as irreligious, while that of Metrodorus to allegorize the former met with no success. In allegorizing, moreover, even the divine legends, it was usual to apply the scheme of allegory only to the inferior gods, though some of the great Stoic philosophers carried it farther and allegorized all the separate personal gods, leaving only an all-pervading cosmic Mind, essential as a co-efficient along with matter, yet not separable from matter. But many pious pagans seem to have perceived that allegory pushed to this extent was fatal to all living religious faith, inasmuch as it divested the gods of their character of persons, sympathizing with mankind and modifiable in their dispositions according to the conduct and prayers of the believer; and hence they permitted themselves to employ allegorical interpretation only to some of the obnoxious legends connected with the superior gods, leaving the personality of the latter unimpeached.

One novelty, however, introduced seemingly by the philosopher Empedokles, and afterward expanded by others, deserves notice, inasmuch as it modified considerably the old religious creed by drawing a pointed contrast between gods and dæmons,—a distinction hardly at all manifested in Homer, but recognized in the works and days of Hesiod. Empedokles widened the gap between the two, and founded upon it important consequences. The gods were good, immortal, and powerful agents, having volition and intelligence, but without appetite, passion, or infirmity; the dæmons were of a mixed nature, between gods and men, ministers and interpreters from the former to the latter, but invested also with an agency and dispositions of their own. Though not immortal, they were still long lived, and subject to the passions and propensities of men, so that there were among them beneficent and maleficent dæmons with every shade of intermediate difference. It had been the mistake (according to these philosophers) of the old mythes to ascribe to the gods proceedings really belonging to the dæmons, who were always the immediate communicants with mortal nature, inspiring prophetic power

to the priestesses of the oracles, sending dreams and omens, and perpetually interfering either for good or for evil. The wicked and violent dæmons, having committed many enormities, had thus sometimes incurred punishment from the gods; besides which, their bad dispositions had imposed upon men the necessity of appeasing them by religious ceremonies of a kind acceptable to such beings; hence the human sacrifices, the violent, cruel, and obscene exhibitions, the wailings and fastings, the tearing and eating of raw flesh, which it had become customary to practice on various consecrated occasions, and especially in the Dionysiac solemnities. Moreover, the discreditable actions imputed to the gods—the terrific combats, the Typhonic and Titanic convulsions, the rapes, abductions, flight, servitude, and concealment—all these were really the doings and sufferings of bad dæmons, placed far below the sovereign agency—equable, undisturbed, and unpolluted—of the immortal gods. The action of such dæmons upon mankind was fitful and intermittent; they sometimes perished or changed their local abode, so that oracles which had once been inspired became, after a time, forsaken and disfranchised.

This distinction between gods and dæmons appeared to save, in a great degree, both the truth of the old legends and the dignity of the gods; it obviated the necessity of pronouncing either that the gods were unworthy or the legends untrue. Yet, although devised for the purpose of satisfying a more scrupulous religious sensibility, it was found inconvenient afterward when assailants arose against paganism generally. For, while it abandoned as indefensible a large portion of what had once been genuine faith, it still retained the same word *dæmons* with an entirely altered signification. The Christian writers in their controversies found ample warrant among the *earlier* pagan authors for treating all the gods as dæmons —and not less ample warrant among the *later* pagans for denouncing the dæmons generally as evil beings.

Such were the different modes in which the ancient mythes were treated, during the literary life of Greece, by the four classes above named—poets, logographers, historians, and philosophers.

Literal acceptance, and unconscious, uninquiring faith, such as they had obtained from the original auditors to whom they were addressed, they now found only among the multitude—alike retentive of traditional feeling and fearful of criticising the proceedings of the gods. But with instructed men they became rather subjects of respectful and curious analysis—all agreeing that the work as tendered to them was inadmissible, yet all equally convinced that it contained important meaning, though hidden yet not undiscoverable. A very large proportion of the force of Grecian intellect was engaged in searching after this unknown base, by guesses, in which sometimes the principle of semi-historical interpretation was assumed, sometimes that of allegorical, without any collateral evidence in

either case, and without possibility of verification. Out of the one assumption grew a string of allegorized phenomenal truths, out of the other a long series of seeming historical events and chronological persons—both elicited from the transformed mythes and from nothing else.

The utmost which we accomplish by means of the semi-historical theory, even in its most successful applications, is, that after leaving out from the mythical narrative all that is miraculous or high-colored or extravagant, we arrive at a series of credible incidents—incidents which *may*, *perhaps*, have really occurred, and against which no intrinsic presumption can be raised. This is exactly the character of a well-written modern novel (as, for example, several among the compositions of Defoe), the whole story of which is such as may well have occurred in real life; it is plausible fiction and nothing beyond. To raise plausible fiction up to the superior dignity of truth, some positive testimony or positive ground of inference must be shown; even the highest measure of intrinsic probability is not alone sufficient. A man who tells us that on the day of the battle of Platæa, rain fell on the spot of ground where the city of New York now stands, will neither deserve nor obtain credit, because he can have had no means of positive knowledge; though the statement is not in the slightest degree improbable. On the other hand, statements in themselves very improbable may well deserve belief, provided they be supported by sufficient positive evidence. Thus, the canal dug by order of Xerxes across the promontory of Mount Athos, and the sailing of the Persian fleet through it, is a fact which I believe, because it is well attested—notwithstanding its remarkable improbability, which so far misled Juvenal as to induce him to single out the narrative as a glaring example of Grecian mendacity. Again, many critics have observed that the general tale of the Trojan war (apart from the superhuman agencies) is not more improbable than that of the crusades, which every one admits to be an historical fact. But (even if we grant this position, which is only true to a small extent), it is not sufficient to show an analogy between the two cases in respect to negative presumptions alone; the analogy ought to be shown to hold between them in respect to positive certificate also. The crusades are a curious phenomenon in history, but we accept them, nevertheless, as an unquestionable fact, because the antecedent improbability is surmounted by adequate contemporary testimony. When the like testimony, both in amount and kind, is produced to establish the historical reality of the Trojan war, we shall not hesitate to deal with the two events on the same footing.

In applying the semi-historical theory to Grecian mythical narrative, it has been often forgotten that a certain strength of testimony, or positive ground of belief, must first be tendered, before we can be called upon to discuss the antecedent probability or improbability of the incidents alleged. The belief of the Greeks them-

selves, without the smallest aid of special or contemporary witnesses, has been tacitly assumed as sufficient to support the case, provided only sufficient deduction be made from the mythical narratives to remove all antecedent improbabilities. It has been taken for granted that the faith of the people must have rested originally upon some particular historical event, involving the identical persons, things, and places which the original mythes exhibit, or at least the most prominent among them. But when we examine the psychagogic influences predominant in the society among whom this belief originally grew up, we shall see that their belief is of little or no evidentiary value, and that the growth and diffusion of it may be satisfactorily explained without supposing any special basis of matters of fact. The popular faith, so far as it counts for anything, testifies in favor of the entire and literal mythes, which are now universally rejected as incredible. We have thus the very minimum of positive proof, and the maximum of negative presumption: we may diminish the latter by conjectural omissions and interpolations, but we cannot by any artifice increase the former; the narrative ceases to be incredible, but it still remains uncertified—a mere commonplace possibility. Nor is fiction always, or essentially, extravagant and incredible. It is often not only plausible and coherent, but even more like truth (if a paradoxical phrase may be allowed) than truth itself. Nor can we, in the absence of any extrinsic test, reckon upon any intrinsic mark to discriminate the one from the other.

In the semi-historical theory, respecting Grecian mythical narrative, the critic unconsciously transports into the Homeric age those habits of classification and distinction, and that standard of acceptance or rejection, which he finds current in his own. Among us the distinction between historical fact and fiction is highly valued as well as familiarly understood; we have a long history of the past, deduced from a study of contemporary evidences; and we have a body of fictitious literature, stamped with its own mark and interesting in its own way. But this *historical sense*, now so deeply rooted in the modern mind that we find a difficulty in conceiving any people to be without it, is the fruit of records and inquiries, first applied to the present, and then preserved and studied by subsequent generations; while in the society which has not yet formed the habit of recording its present, the real facts of the past can never be known; the difference between attested matter of fact and plausible fiction—between truth and that which is like truth—can neither be discerned nor sought for. Yet it is precisely upon the supposition that this distinction is present to men's habitual thoughts, that the semi-historical theory of the mythes is grounded.

It is perfectly true, as has often been stated, that the Grecian epic contains what are called traditions respecting the past—the larger portion of it, indeed, consists of nothing else. But what are these traditions? They are the matter of those songs and stories which

have acquired hold on the public mind; they are the creations of the poets and story-tellers themselves, each of whom finds some pre-existing, and adds others of his own, new and previously untold, under the impulse and authority of the inspiring Muse. Homer doubtless found many songs and stories current with respect to the siege of Troy; he received and transmitted some of these traditions, recast and transformed others, and enlarged the whole mass by new creations of his own. To the subsequent poets, such as Arktinus and Lesches, these Homeric creations formed portions of pre-existing tradition, with which they dealt in the same manner; so that the whole mass of traditions constituting the tale of Troy became larger and larger with each successive contributor. To assume a generic difference between the older and the newer strata of tradition—to treat the former as morsels of history, and the latter as appendages of fiction—is an hypothesis gratuitous at the least, not to say inadmissible. For the farther we travel back into the past, the more do we recede from the clear day of positive history, and the deeper do we plunge into the unsteady twilight and gorgeous clouds of fancy and feeling. It was one of the agreeable dreams of the Grecian epic, that the man who traveled far enough northward beyond the Rhipæan mountains would in time reach the delicious country and genial climate of the virtuous Hyperboreans—the votaries and favorites of Apollo, who dwelt in the extreme north beyond the chilling blasts of Boreas. Now the hope that we may, by carrying our researches up the stream of time, exhaust the limits of fiction, and land ultimately upon some points of solid truth, appears to me no less illusory than this northward journey in quest of the Hyperborean elysium.

The general disposition to adopt the semi-historical theory as to the genesis of Grecian mythes, arises in part from reluctance in critics to impute to the mythopœic ages extreme credulity or fraud; together with the usual presumption, that where much is believed some portion of it must be true. There would be some weight in these grounds of reasoning, if the ages under discussion had been supplied with records and accustomed to critical inquiry. But amongst a people unprovided with the former and strangers to the latter, credulity is naturally at its maximum, as well in the narrator himself as in his hearers. The idea of deliberate fraud is moreover inapplicable, for if the hearers are disposed to accept what is related to them as a revelation from the Muse, the *æstrus* of composition is quite sufficient to impart a similar persuasion to the poet whose mind is penetrated with it. The belief of that day can hardly be said to stand apart by itself as an act of reason. It becomes confounded with vivacious imagination and earnest emotion; and in every case where these mental excitabilities are powerfully acted upon, faith ensues unconsciously and as a matter of course. How active and prominent such tendencies were among the early Greeks, the ex-

traordinary beauty and originality of their epic poetry may teach us.

It is, besides, a presumption far too largely and indiscriminately applied, even in our own advanced age, that where much is believed, something must necessarily be true—that accredited fiction is always traceable to some basis of historical truth. The influence of imagination and feeling is not confined simply to the process of retouching, transforming, or magnifying narratives originally founded on fact; it will often create new narratives of its own, without any such preliminary basis. Where there is any general body of sentiment pervading men living in society, whether it be religious or political—love, admiration, or antipathy—all incidents tending to illustrate that sentiment are eagerly welcomed, rapidly circulated and (as a general rule) easily accredited. If real incidents are not at hand, impressive fictions will be provided to satisfy the demand. The perfect harmony of such fictions with the prevalent feeling stands in the place of certifying testimony, and causes men to hear them not merely with credence, but even with delight. To call them in question and require proof, is a task which cannot be undertaken without incurring obloquy. Of such tendencies in the human mind abundant evidence is furnished by the innumerable religious legends which have acquired currency in various parts of the world, and of which no country was more fertile than Greece—legends which derived their origin, not from special facts misreported and exaggerated, but from pious feelings pervading the society, and translated into narrative by forward and imaginative minds—legends, in which not merely the incidents, but often even the personages are unreal, yet in which the generating sentiment is conspicuously discernible, providing its own matter as well as its own form. Other sentiments also, as well as the religious, provided they be fervent and widely diffused, will find expression in current narrative, and become portions of the general public belief. Every celebrated and notorious character is the source of a thousand fictions exemplifying his peculiarities. And if it be true, as I think present observation may show us, that such creative agencies are even now visible and effective, when the materials of genuine history are copious and critically studied—much more are we warranted in concluding that in ages destitute of records, strangers to historical testimony, and full of belief in divine inspiration both as to the future and as to the past, narratives purely fictitious will acquire ready and uninquiring credence, provided only they be plausible and in harmony with the preconceptions of the auditors.

The allegorical interpretation of the mythes has been by several learned investigators, especially by Creuzer, connected with the hypothesis of an ancient and highly instructed body of priests, having their origin either in Egypt or in the East, and communicating to the rude and barbarous Greeks religious, physical, and historical knowledge under the veil of symbols. At a time (we are told) when language was yet in its infancy, visible symbols were the most vivid means of acting upon the minds of ignorant hearers; the next step was to pass to symbolical language and expressions—for a plain and literal exposition, even if understood at all, would at least have been listened to with indifference, as not corresponding with any mental demand. In such allegorizing way, then, the early priests set forth their doctrines respecting God, nature and humanity—a refined monotheism and a theological philosophy—and to this purpose the earliest mythes were turned. But another class of mythes, more popular and more captivating, grew up under the hands of the poets—mythes purely epical, and descriptive of real or supposed past events. The allegorical mythes, being taken up by the poets, insensibly became confounded in the same category with the purely narrative mythes—the matter symbolized was no longer thought of, while the symbolizing words came to be construed in their own literal meaning—and the basis of the early allegory, thus lost among the general public, was only preserved as a secret among various religious fraternities, composed of members allied together by initiation in certain mystical ceremonies, and administered by hereditary families of presiding priests. In the Orphic and Bacchic sects, in the Eleusinian and Samothracian mysteries, was thus treasured up the secret doctrine of the old theological and philosophical mythes, which had once constituted the primitive legendary stock of Greece, in the hands of the original priesthood and in ages anterior to Homer. Persons who had gone through the preliminary ceremonies of initiation, were permitted at length to hear, though under strict obligation of secrecy, this ancient religious and cosmogonic doctrine, revealing the destination of men and the certainty of posthumous rewards and punishments—all disengaged from the corruptions of poets, as well as from the symbols and allegories under which they still remained buried in the eyes of the vulgar. The mysteries of Greece were thus traced up to the earliest ages, and represented as the only faithful depositary channels of that purer theology and physics which had originally been communicated, though under the unavoidable inconvenience of a symbolical expression, by an enlightened priesthood coming from abroad to the then rude barbarians of the country.

But this theory, though advocated by several learned men, has been shown to be unsupported and erroneous. It implies a mistaken view both of the antiquity and the purport of the mysteries, which cannot be safely carried up even to the age of Hesiod, and which, though imposing and venerable as religious ceremonies, included no recondite or esoteric teaching.

The doctrine supposed to have been originally symbolized and subsequently overclouded, in the Greek mythes, was in reality first intruded into them by the unconscious fancies of later interpreters,

It was one of the various roads which instructed men took to escape from the literal admission of the ancient mythes, and to arrive at some new form of belief, more consonant with their ideas of what the attributes and character of the gods ought to be. It was one of the ways of constituting, by help of the mysteries, a philosophical religion apart from the general public, and of connecting that distinction with the earliest periods of Grecian society. Such a distinction was both avowed and justified among the superior men of the later pagan world. Varro and Scævola distributed theology into three distinct departments,—the mythical or fabulous, the civil, and the physical. The first had its place in the theater, and was left without any interference to the poets; the second belonged to the city or political community as such,—it comprised the regulation of all the public worship and religious rites, and was consigned altogether to the direction of the magistrate; the third was the privilege of philosophers, but was reserved altogether for private discussion in the schools apart from the general public. As a member of the city, the philosopher sympathized with the audience in the theater, and took a devout share in the established ceremonies, nor was he justified in trying what he heard in the one or saw in the other by his own ethical standard. But in the private assemblies of instructed or inquisitive men, he enjoyed the fullest liberty of canvassing every received tenet, and of broaching his own theories unreservedly, respecting the existence and nature of the gods. By these discussions the activity of the philosophical mind was maintained and truth elicited; but it was such truth as the body of the people ought not to hear, lest their faith in their own established religious worship should be overthrown. In thus distinguishing the civil theology from the fabulous, Varro was enabled to cast upon the poets all the blame of the objectionable points in the popular theology, and to avoid the necessity of pronouncing censure on the magistrates; who (he contended) had made as good a compromise with the settled prejudices of the public as the case permitted.

The same conflicting sentiments which led the philosophers to decompose the divine mythes into allegory, impelled the historians to melt down the heroic mythes into something like continuous political history, with a long series of chronology calculated upon the heroic pedigrees. The one process as well as the other was interpretative guesswork, proceeding upon unauthorized assumptions, and without any verifying test or evidence. While it frittered away the characteristic beauty of the mythe into something essentially anti-mythical, it sought to arrive both at history and philosophy by impracticable roads. That the superior men of antiquity should have striven hard to save the dignity of legends which constituted the charm of their literature as well as the substance of the popular religion, we cannot be at all surprised; but it is gratifying to find Plato discussing the subject in a more philosophical spirit.

The Platonic Sokrates being asked whether he believes the current Attic fable respecting the abduction of Oreithyia (daughter of Erechtheus) by Boreas, replies, in substance,—"It would not be strange if I disbelieved it, as the clever men do; I might then show my cleverness by saying that a gust of Boreas blew her down from the rocks above while she was at play, and that having been killed in this manner she was reported to have been carried off by Boreas. Such speculations are amusing enough, but they belong to men ingenious and busy-minded over-much, and not greatly to be envied, if it be only for this reason, *that after having set right one fable, they are under the necessity of applying the same process to a host of others*—Hippocentaurs, Chimæras, Gorgons, Pegasus, and numberless other monsters and incredibilities. A man, who, disbelieving these stories, shall try to find a probable basis for each of them, will display an ill-placed acuteness and take upon himself an endless burden, for which I at least have no leisure: accordingly I forego such researches, and believe in the current version of the stories."

These remarks of Plato are valuable, not simply because they point out the uselessness of digging for a supposed basis of truth in the mythes, but because they at the same time suggest the true reason for mistrusting all such tentatives. The mythes form a class apart, abundant as well as peculiar. To remove any individual mythe from its own class into that of history or philosophy, by simple conjecture and without any collateral evidence, is of no advantage, unless you can perform a similar process on the remainder. If the process be trustworthy, it ought to be applied to all; and *e converso*, if it be not applicable to all, it is not trustworthy as applied to any one specially; always assuming no special evidence to be accessible. To detach any individual mythe from the class to which it belongs, is to present it in an erroneous point of view: we have no choice except to admit them as they stand, by putting ourselves approximatively into the frame of mind of those for whom they were destined and to whom they appeared worthy of credit.

If Plato thus discountenances all attempts to transform the mythes by interpretation into history or philosophy, indirectly recognizing the generic difference between them—we find substantially the same view pervading the elaborate precepts in his treatise on the Republic. He there regards the mythes, not as embodying either matter of fact or philosophical principle, but as portions of religious and patriotic faith, and instruments of ethical tuition. Instead of allowing the poets to frame them according to the impulses of their own genius and with a view to immediate popularity, he directs the legislator to provide types of his own for the characters of the gods and heroes, and to suppress all such divine and heroic legends as are not in harmony with these pre-established canons. In the Platonic system, the mythes are not to be matters of history, nor yet of spontaneous or casual fiction, but of prescribed faith: he supposes that

the people will believe, as a thing of course, what the poets circulate, and he therefore directs that the latter shall circulate nothing which does not tend to ennoble and improve the feelings. He conceives the mythes as stories composed to illustrate the general sentiments of the poets and the community, respecting the character and attributes of the gods and heroes, or respecting the social relations, and ethical duties as well as motives of mankind: hence the obligation upon the legislator to prescribe beforehand the types of character which shall be illustrated, and to restrain the poets from following out any opposing fancies. "Let us neither believe ourselves (he exclaims), nor permit any one to circulate, that Theseus son of Poseidon, and Peirithous son of Zeus, or any other hero or son of a god, could ever have brought themselves to commit abductions or other enormities such as are now falsely ascribed to them. We must compel the poets to say, either that such persons were not the sons of gods, or that they were not the perpetrators of such misdeeds."

Most of the mythes which the youth hear and repeat (according to Plato) are false, but some of them are true: the great and prominent mythes which appear in Homer and Hesiod are no less fictions than the rest. But fiction constitutes one of the indispensable instruments of mental training as well as truth; only the legislator must take care that the fictions so employed shall be beneficent and not mischievous. As the mischievous fictions (he says) take their rise from wrong preconceptions respecting the character of the gods and heroes, so the way to correct them is to enforce, by authorized compositions, the adoption of a more correct standard.

The comments which Plato has delivered with so much force in his Republic, and the enactments which he deduces from them, are in the main an expansion of that sentiment of condemnation, which he shared with so many other philosophers, towards a large portion of the Homeric and Hesiodic stories. But the manner in which he has set forth this opinion unfolds to us more clearly the real character of the mythical narrative. They are creations of the productive minds in the community, deduced from the supposed attributes of the gods and heroes: so Plato views them, and in such character he proposed to amend them. The legislator would cause to be prepared a better and truer picture of the foretime, because he would start from truer (that is to say more creditable) conceptions of the gods and heroes. For Plato rejects the mythes respecting Zeus and Here, or Theseus and Peirithous, not from any want of evidence, but because they are unworthy of gods and heroes: he proposes to call forth new mythes, which, though he admits them at the outset to be fiction, he knows will soon be received as true, and supply more valuable lessons of conduct.

We may consider then that Plato disapproves of the attempt to identify the old mythes either with exaggerated history or with disguised philosophy. He shares in the current faith, without any suspicion or criticism, as to Orpheus, Palamedes, Dædalus, Amphion, Theseus, Achilles, Cheiron, and other mythical personages; but what chiefly fills his mind is, the inherited sentiment of deep reverence for these superhuman characters and for the age to which they belonged,—a sentiment sufficiently strong to render him not only an unbeliever in such legends as conflict with it, but also a deliberate creator of new legends for the purpose of expanding and gratifying it. The more we examine this sentiment, both in the mind of Plato as well as in that of the Greeks generally, the more shall we be convinced that it formed essentially and inseparably a portion of Hellenic religious faith. The mythe both presupposes, and springs out of, a settled basis and a strong expansive force of religious, social, and patriotic feeling, operating upon a past which is little better than a blank as to positive knowledge. It resembles history, in so far as its form is narrative: it resembles philosophy, in so far as it is occasionally illustrative; but in its essence and substance, in the mental tendencies by which it is created as well as in those by which it is judged and upheld, it is a popularized expression of the divine and heroic faith of the people.

Grecian antiquity cannot be at all understood except in connection with Grecian religion. It begins with gods and it ends with historical men, the former being recognized not simply as gods, but as primitive ancestors, and connected with the latter by a long mythical genealogy, partly heroic and partly human. Now the whole value of such genealogies arises from their being taken entire: the god or hero at the top is in point of fact the most important member of the whole; for the length and continuity of the series arises from anxiety on the part of historical men to join themselves by a thread of descent with the being whom they worshiped in their gentile sacrifices. Without the ancestorial god, the whole pedigree would have become not only acephalous, but worthless and uninteresting. The pride of the Herakleids, Asklepiads, Æakids, Neleids, Dædalids, etc., was attached to the primitive eponymous hero and to the god from whom they sprung, not to the line of names, generally long and barren, through which the divine or heroic dignity gradually dwindled down into common manhood. Indeed, the length of the genealogy (as I have before remarked) was an evidence of the humility of the historical man, which led him to place himself at a respectful distance from the gods or heroes; for Hekatæus of Miletus, who ranked himself as the fifteenth descendant of a god, might perhaps have accounted it an overweening impiety in any living man to claim a god for his immediate father.

The whole chronology of Greece, anterior to 776 B.C., consists of calculations founded upon these mythical genealogies. especially upon that of the Spartan kings and their descent from Herakles,—thirty years being commonly taken as the equivalent of a generation,

or about three generations to a century. This process of computation was altogether illusory, as applying historical and chronological conditions to a case on which they had no bearing. Though the domain of history was seemingly enlarged, the religious element was tacitly set aside: when the heroes and gods were chronologized, they became insensibly approximated to the limits of humanity, and the process indirectly gave encouragement to the theory of Euemerus. Personages originally legendary and poetical were erected into definite landmarks for measuring the duration of the foretime, thus gaining in respect to historical distinctness, but not without loss on the score of religious association. Both Euemerus and the subsequent Christian writers, who denied the original and inherent divinity of the pagan gods, had a great advantage in carrying their chronological researches strictly and consistently upwards—for all chronology fails as soon as we suppose a race superior to common humanity.

Moreover, it is to be remarked that the pedigree of the Spartan kings, which Apollodorus and Eratosthenes selected as the basis of their estimate of time, is nowise superior in credibility and trustworthiness to the thousand other gentile and family pedigrees with which Greece abounded; it is rather indeed to be numbered among the most incredible of all, seeing that Herakles as a progenitor is placed at the head of perhaps more pedigrees than any other Grecian god or hero. The descent of the Spartan king Leonidas from Herakles rests upon no better evidence than that of Aristotle or Hippokrates from Asklepius,—of Evagoras or Thucydides from Æakus,—of Sokrates from Dædalus,—of the Spartan heraldic family from Talthybius,—of the prophetic Iamid family in Elis from Iamus,—of the root-gatherers in Pelion from Cheiron,—and of Hekatæus and his gens from some god in the sixteenth ascending line of the series. There is little exaggeration in saying, indeed, that no permanent combination of men in Greece, religious, social, or professional, was without a similar pedigree; all arising out of the same exigencies of the feelings and imagination, to personify as well as to sanctify the bond of union among the members. Every one of these *gentes* began with a religious and ended with an historical person. At some point or other in the upward series, entities of history were exchanged for entities of religion; but where that point is to be found we are unable to say, nor had the wisest of the ancient Greeks any means of determining. Thus much, however, we know, that the series, taken as a whole, though dear and precious to the believing Greek, possesses no value as chronological evidence to the historian.

When Hekatæus visited Thebes in Egypt, he mentioned to the Egyptian priests, doubtless with a feeling of satisfaction and pride, the imposing pedigree of the gens to which he belonged,—with fifteen ancestors in ascending line, and a god as the initial progenitor. But he found himself immeasurably outdone by the priests "who genealogized against him." They showed to him 341 wooden colossal statues, representing the succession of chief priests in the temple in uninterrupted series from father to son, through a space of 11,300 years. Prior to the commencement of this long period (they said), the gods dwelling along with men, had exercised sway in Egypt; but they repudiated altogether the idea of men begotten by gods or of heroes.

Both these counter-genealogies are, in respect to trustworthiness and evidence, on the same footing. Each represents partly the religious faith, partly the retrospective imagination of the persons from whom it emanated. In each the lower members of the series (to what an extent we cannot tell) are real, the upper members fabulous; but in each also the series derived all its interest and all its imposing effect from being conceived unbroken and entire. Herodotus is much perplexed by the capital discrepancy between the Grecian and Egyptian chronologies, and vainly employs his ingenuity in reconciling them. There is no standard of objective evidence by which either the one or the other of them can be tried. Each has its own subjective value, in conjunction with the faith and feelings of Egyptians and Greeks, and each presupposes in the believer certain mental prepossessions which are not to be found beyond its own local limits. Nor is the greater or less extent of duration at all important, when we once pass the limits of evidence and verifiable reality. One century of recorded time, adequately studded with authentic and orderly events, presents a greater mass and a greater difficulty of transition to the imagination than a hundred centuries of barren genealogy. Herodotus, in discussing the age of Homer and Hesiod, treats an anterior point of 400 years as if it were only yesterday; the reign of Henry VI. is separated from us by an equal interval, and the reader will not require to be reminded how long that interval now appears.

The mythical age was peopled with a mingled aggregate of gods, heroes, and men, so confounded together that it was often impossible to distinguish to which class any individual name belonged. In regard to the Thracian god Zalmoxis, the Hellespontic Greeks interpreted his character and attributes according to the scheme of Euemerism. They affirmed that he had been a man, the slave of the philosopher Pythagoras at Samos, and that he had by abilities and artifice established a religious ascendency over the minds of the Thracians, and obtained from them divine honors. Herodotus cannot bring himself to believe this story, but he frankly avows his inability to determine whether Zalmoxis was a god or a man, nor can he extricate himself from a similar embarrassment in respect to Dionysus and Pan. Amidst the confusion of the Homeric fight, the goddess Athere confers upon Diomedes the miraculous favor of dispelling the mist from his eyes, so as to enable him to discriminate gods from men; and nothing less than a similar miracle could enable a critical

reader of the mythical narratives to draw an ascertained boundary-line between the two. But the original hearers of the mythes felt neither surprise nor displeasure from this confusion of the divine with the human individual. They looked at the past with a film of faith over their eyes—neither knowing the value, nor desiring the attainment of an unclouded vision. The intimate companionship, and the occasional mistake of identity between gods and men, were in full harmony with their reverential retrospect. And we accordingly see the poet Ovid in his Fasti, when he undertakes the task of unfolding the legendary antiquities of early Rome, re-acquiring, by the inspiration of Juno, the power of seeing gods and men in immediate vicinity and conjunct action, such as it existed before the development of the critical and historical sense.

To resume, in brief, what has been laid down in this and the preceding chapters respecting the Grecian mythes:

1. They are a special product of the imagination and feelings, radically distinct both from history and philosophy: they cannot be broken down and decomposed into the one, nor allegorized into the other. There are, indeed, some particular and even assignable mythes, which raise intrinsic presumption of an allegorizing tendency; and there are doubtless some others, though not specially assignable, which contain portions of matter of fact, or names of real persons, embodied in them. But such matter of fact cannot be verified by any intrinsic mark, nor are we entitled to presume its existence in any given case unless some collateral evidence can be produced.

2. We are not warranted in applying to the mythical world the rules either of historical credibility or chronological sequence. Its personages are gods, heroes, and men, in constant juxtaposition and reciprocal sympathy; men, too, of whom we know a large proportion to be fictitious, and of whom we can never ascertain how many may have been real. No series of such personages can serve as materials for chronological calculation.

3. The mythes were originally produced in an age which had no records, no philosophy, no criticism, no canon of belief, and scarcely any tincture either of astronomy or geography,—but which, on the other hand, was full of religious faith, distinguished for quick and susceptible imagination, seeing personal agents where we look only for objects and connecting laws;—an age, moreover, eager for new narrative, accepting with the unconscious impressibility of children (the question of truth or falsehood being never formally raised) all which ran in harmony with its pre-existing feelings, and penetrable by inspired prophets and poets in the same proportion that it was indifferent to positive evidence. To such hearers did the primitive poet or story-teller address himself. It was the glory of his productive genius to provide suitable narrative expression for the faith and emotions which he shared in common with them, and the rich stock of Grecian mythes attests how admirably he performed his

task. As the gods and the heroes formed the conspicuous object of national reverence, so the mythes were partly divine, partly heroic, partly both in one. The adventures of Achilles, Helen, and Diomedes, of Œdipus and Adrastus, of Meleager and Althæa, of Jason and the Argo, were recounted by the same tongues and accepted with the same unsuspecting confidence as those of Apollo and Artemis, of Ares and Aphrodite, of Poseidon and Herakles.

4. The time, however, came when this plausibility ceased to be complete. The Grecian mind made an important advance, socially, ethically, and intellectually. Philosophy and history were constituted, prose writing and chronological records became familiar; a canon of belief more or less critical came to be tacitly recognized. Moreover, superior men profited more largely by the stimulus, and contracted habits of judging different from the vulgar: the god Elenchus (to use a personification of Menander), the giver and prover of truth, descended into their minds. Into the new intellectual medium, thus altered in its elements and no longer uniform in its quality, the mythes descended by inheritance; but they were found, to a certain extent, out of harmony even with the feelings of the people, and altogether dissonant with those of instructed men. Yet the most superior Greek was still a Greek, cherishing the common reverential sentiment toward the fore-time of his country. Though he could neither believe nor respect the mythes as they stood, he was under an imperious mental necessity to transform them into a state worthy of his belief and respect. While the literal mythe still continued to float among the poets and the people, critical men interpreted, altered, decomposed, and added, until they found something which satisfied their minds as a supposed real basis. They manufactured some dogmas of supposed original philosophy, and a long series of fancied history and chronology, retaining the mythical names and generations, even when they were obliged to discard or recast the mythical events. The interpreted mythe was thus promoted into a reality, while the literal mythe was degraded into a fiction.

The habit of distinguishing the interpreted from the literal mythe has passed from the literary men of antiquity to those of the modern world, who have for the most part construed the divine mythes as allegorized philosophy, and the heroic mythes as exaggerated, adorned, and over-colored history. The early ages of Greece have thus been peopled with quasi-historical persons and quasi-historical events, all extracted from the mythes after making certain allowances for poetical ornament. But we must not treat this extracted product as if it were the original substance. We cannot properly understand it except by viewing it in connection with the literal mythes out of which it was obtained, in their primitive age and appropriate medium, before the superior minds had yet outgrown the common faith in an all-personified Nature, and learned to restrict the divine free-agency by the supposition of invariable physical laws. It is in this point of

view that the mythes are important for any one who would correctly appreciate the general tone of Grecian thought and feeling; for they were the universal mental stock of the Hellenic world—common to men and women, rich and poor, instructed and ignorant; they were in every one's memory and in every one's mouth, while science and history were confined to comparatively few. We know from Thucydides how erroneously and carelessly the Athenian public of his day retained the history of Peisistratus, only one century past; but the adventures of the gods and heroes, the numberless explanatory legends attached to visible objects and periodical ceremonies, were the theme of general talk, and any man unacquainted with them would have found himself partially excluded from the sympathy of his neighbors. The theatrical representation, exhibited to the entire city population and listened to with enthusiastic interest, both presupposed and perpetuated acquaintance with the great lines of heroic fable. Indeed, in later times even the pantomimic dancers embraced in their representation the whole field of mythical incident, and their immense success proves at once how popular and how well known such subjects were. The names and attributes of the heroes were incessantly alluded to in the way of illustration, to point out a consoling, admonitory, or repressive moral: the simple mention of any of them sufficed to call up in every one's mind the principal events of his life, and the poet or rhapsode could thus calculate on touching chords not less familiar than susceptible.

A similar effect was produced by the multiplied religious festivals and processions, as well as by the oracles and prophecies which circulated in every city. The annual departure of the Theoric ship from Athens to the sacred island of Delos kept alive, in the minds of Athenians generally, the legend of Theseus and his adventurous enterprise in Krete: and in like manner most of the other public rites and ceremonies were of a commemorative character, deduced from some mythical person or incident familiarly known to natives, and forming to strangers a portion of the curiosities of the place. During the period of Grecian subjection under the Romans, these curiosities, together with their works of art and their legends, were especially clung to as a set-off against present degradation. The Theban citizen who found himself restrained from the liberty enjoyed by all other Greeks, of consulting Amphiaraus as a prophet, though the sanctuary and chapel of the hero stood in his own city, could not be satisfied without a knowledge of the story which explained the origin of such prohibition, and which conducted him back to the originally hostile relations between Amphiaraus and Thebes. Nor can we suppose among the citizens of Sikyon anything less than a perfect and reverential conception of the legend of Thebes, when we read the account given by Herodotus of the conduct of the despot Kleisthenes in regard to Adrastus and Melanippus. The Trœzenian youths and maidens, who universally, when on the eve of marriage,

consecrated an offering of their hair at the Heroon of Hippolytus, maintained a lively recollection of the legend of that unhappy recusant whom Aphrodite had so cruelly punished. Abundant relics preserved in many Grecian cities and temples served both as mementos and attestations of other legendary events; and the tombs of the heroes counted among the most powerful stimulants of mythical reminiscence. The scepter of Pelops and Agamemnon, still preserved in the days of Pausanias at Chæroneia in Bœotia, was the work of the god Hephæstos. While many other alleged productions of the same divine hand were preserved in different cities of Greece, this is the only one which Pausanias himself believed to be genuine: it had been carried by Elektra, daughter of Agamemnon, to Phokis, and received divine honors from the citizens of Chæroneia. The spears of Meriones and Odysseus were treasured up at Engyium in Sicily, that of Achilles at Phaselis; the sword of Memnon adorned the temple of Asklepius at Nicomedia; and Pausanias, with unsuspecting confidence, adduces the two latter as proofs that the arms of the heroes were made of brass. The hide of the Kalydonian boar was guarded and shown by the Tegeates as a precious possession; the shield of Euphorbus was in like manner suspended in the temple of Branchidæ near Miletus, as well as in the temple of Here in Argos. Visible relics of Epeius and Philoktetes were not wanting; moreover, Strabo raises his voice with indignation against the numerous Palladia which were shown in different cities, each pretending to be the genuine image from Troy. It would be impossible to specify the number of chapels, sanctuaries, solemnities, foundations of one sort or another, said to have been first commenced by heroic or mythical personages,—by Herakles, Jason, Medea, Alkmæon, Diomedes, Odysseus, Danaus and his daughters, etc. Perhaps in some of these cases particular critics might raise objections, but the great bulk of the people entertained a firm and undoubted belief in the current legend.

If we analyze the intellectual acquisitions of a common Grecian townsman from the rude communities of Arcadia or Phokis even up to the enlightened Athens, we shall find that, over and above the rules of art or capacities requisite for his daily wants, they consisted chiefly of the various mythes connected with his gens, his city, his religious festivals and the mysteries in which he might have chosen to initiate himself, as well as with the works of art and the more striking natural objects which he might see around him—the whole set off and decorated by some knowledge of the epic and dramatic poets. Such was the intellectual and imaginative reach of an ordinary Greek, considered apart from the instructed few: it was an aggregate of religion, of social and patriotic retrospect, and of romantic fancy, blended into one indivisible faith. And thus the subjective value of the mythes, looking at them purely as elements of Grecian thought and feeling, will appear indisputably great, how-

ever little there may be of objective reality, either historical or philosophical, discoverable under them.

We must not omit the incalculable importance of the mythes as stimulants to the imagination of the Grecian artist in sculpture, in painting, in carving, and in architecture. From the divine and heroic legends and personages were borrowed those paintings, statues, and reliefs which rendered the temples, porticoes, and public buildings, at Athens and elsewhere, objects of surpassing admiration. Such visible reproduction contributed again to fix the types of the gods and heroes familiarly and indelibly on the public mind. The figures delineated on cups and vases as well as on the walls of private houses were chiefly drawn from the same source—the mythes being the great storehouse of artistic scenes and composition.

To enlarge on the characteristic excellence of Grecian art would here be out of place: I regard it only in so far as, having originally drawn its materials from the mythes, it reacted upon the mythical faith and imagination—the reaction imparting strength to the former as well as distinctness to the latter. To one who saw constantly before him representations of the battles of the Centaurs or the Amazons, of the exploits performed by Perseus and Bellerophon, of the incidents composing the Trojan war or the Kalydonian boar-hunt—the process of belief, even in the more fantastic of these conceptions, became easy in proportion as the conception was familiarized. And if any person had been slow to believe in the efficacy of the prayers of Æakus, whereby that devout hero once obtained special relief from Zeus, at a moment when Greece was perishing from long-continued sterility—his doubts would probably vanish, when, on visiting the Æakeium at Ægina, there were exhibited to him the statues of the very envoys who had come on the behalf of the distressed Greeks to solicit that Æakus would pray for them. A Grecian temple was not simply a place of worship, but the actual dwelling-place of a god, who was believed to be introduced by the solemn dedicatory ceremony, and whom the imagination of the people identified in the most intimate manner with his statue. The presence or removal of the statue was conceived as identical with that of the being represented—and while the statue was solemnly washed, dressed, and tended with all the respectful solicitude which would have been bestowed upon a real person, miraculous tales were often rife respecting the manifestation of real internal feeling in the wood and the marble. At perilous or critical moments, the statue was affirmed to have sweated, to have wept, to have closed its eyes, or brandished the spear in its hands, in token of sympathy or indignation. Such legends, springing up usually in times of suffering and danger, and finding few men bold enough openly to contradict them, ran in complete harmony with the general mythical faith, and tended to strengthen it in all its various ramifications. The renewed activity

of the god or hero both brought to mind and accredited the pre-existing mythes connected with his name. When Boreas, during the invasion of Greece by Xerxes and in compliance with the fervent prayer of the Athenians, had sent forth a providential storm to the irreparable damage of the Persian armada, the skeptical minority (alluded to by Plato) who doubted the mythe of Boreas and Oreithyia, and his close connection thus acquired with Erechtheus and the Erechtheids generally, must for the time have been reduced to absolute silence.

CHAPTER XVII

THE GRECIAN MYTHICAL VEIN COMPARED WITH THAT OF MODERN EUROPE.

I HAVE already remarked that the existence of that popular narrative talk, which the Germans express by the significant word *Sage* or *Volks-Sage*, in a greater or less degree of perfection or development, is a phenomenon common to almost all stages of society and to almost all quarters of the globe. It is the natural effusion of the unlettered, imaginative, and believing man, and its maximum of influence belongs to an early stage of the human mind: for the multiplication of recorded facts, the diffusion of positive science, and the formation of a critical standard of belief, tend to discredit its dignity and to repress its easy and abundant flow. It supplies to the poet both materials to recombine and adorn, and a basis as well as a stimulus for further inventions of his own; and this at a time when the poet is religious teacher, historian, and philosopher, all in one—not, as he becomes at a more advanced period, the mere purveyor of avowed, though interesting, fiction.

Such popular stories, and such historical songs (meaning by historical simply that which is accepted as history) are found in most quarters of the globe, and especially among the Teutonic and Celtic populations of early Europe. The old Gothic songs were cast into a continuous history by the historian Ablavius; and the poems of the Germans respecting Tuisto, the earth-born god, his son Mannus, and his descendants, the eponyms of the various German tribes, as they are briefly described by Tacitus, remind us of Hesiod, or Eumelus, or the Homeric hymns. Jacob Grimm, in his learned and valuable "Deutsche Mythologie," has exhibited copious evidence of the great fundamental analogy, along with many special differences, between the German, Scandinavian, and Grecian mythical world; and the dissertation of Mr. Price (prefixed to his edition of Wharton's "His-

tory of English Poetry") sustains and illustrates Grimm's view. The same personifying imagination—the same ever-present conception of the will, sympathies, and antipathies of the gods as the producing causes of phenomena, and as distinguished from a course of nature with its invariable sequence—the same relations between gods, heroes, and men, with the like difficulty of discriminating the one from the other in many individual names—a similar wholesale transfer of human attributes to the gods, with the absence of human limits and liabilities—a like belief in Nymphs, Giants, and other beings neither gods nor men—the same coalescence of the religious with the patriotic feeling and faith,—these are positive features common to the early Greeks with the early Germans: and the negative conditions of the two are not less analogous—the absence of prose writing, positive records, and scientific culture. The preliminary basis and encouragements for the mythopœic faculty were thus extremely similar.

But though the prolific forces were the same in kind, the results were very different in degree, and the developing circumstances were more different still.

First, the abundance, the beauty, and the long continuance of early Grecian poetry, in the purely poetical age, is a phenomenon which has no parallel elsewhere.

Secondly, the transition of the Greek mind from its poetical to its comparatively positive state was self-operated, accomplished by its own inherent and expansive force—aided, indeed, but by no means either impressed or provoked, from without. From the poetry of Homer to the history of Thucydides and the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, was a prodigious step, but it was the native growth of the Hellenic youth into an Hellenic man; and what is of still greater moment, it was brought about without breaking the thread either of religious or patriotic tradition—without any coercive innovation or violent change in the mental feelings. The legendary world, though the ethical judgments and rational criticisms of superior men had outgrown it, still retained its hold upon their feelings as an object of affectionate and reverential retrospect.

Far different from this was the development of the early Germans. We know little about their early poetry, but we shall run no risk of error in affirming that they had nothing to compare with either Iliad or Odyssey. Whether, if left to themselves, they would have possessed sufficient progressive power to make a step similar to that of the Greeks, is a question which we cannot answer. Their condition, mental as well as political, was violently changed by a foreign action from without. The influence of the Roman empire introduced artificially among them new institutions, new opinions, habits, and luxuries, and, above all, a new religion; the Romanized Germans becoming themselves successively the instruments of this revolution with regard to such of their brethren as still remained

heathens. It was a revolution often brought about by penal and coercive means: the old gods Thor and Woden were formally deposed and renounced, their images were crumbled into dust, and the sacred oaks of worship and prophecy hewn down. But even where conversion was the fruit of preaching and persuasion, it did not the less break up all the associations of a German with respect to that mythical world which he called his past, and of which the ancient gods constituted both the charm and the sanctity: he had now only the alternative of treating them either as men or as dæmons. That mixed religious and patriotic retrospect, formed by the coalescence of piety with ancestral feeling, which constituted the appropriate sentiment both of Greeks and of German toward their unrecorded antiquity, was among the latter banished by Christianity: and while the root of the old mythes was thus cankered, the commemorative ceremonies and customs with which they were connected either lost their consecrated character or disappeared altogether. Moreover, new influences of great importance were at the same time brought to bear. The Latin language, together with some tinge of Latin literature—the habit of writing and of recording present events—the idea of a systematic law and pacific adjudication of disputes,—all these formed a part of the general working of Roman civilization, even after the decline of the Roman empire, upon the Teutonic and the Celtic tribes. A class of specially educated men was formed upon a Latin basis and upon Christian principles, consisting almost entirely of priests, who were opposed, as well by motives of rivalry as by religious feeling, to the ancient bards and story-tellers of the community. The "lettered men" were constituted apart from "the men of story," and Latin literature contributed along with religion to sink the mythes of untaught heathenism. Charlemagne, indeed, at the same time that he employed aggressive and violent proceedings to introduce Christianity among the Saxons, also took special care to commit to writing and preserve the old heathen songs. But there can be little doubt that this step was the suggestion of a large and enlightened understanding peculiar to himself. The disposition general among lettered Christians of that age is more accurately represented by his son, Louis le Débonnaire, who, having learnt these songs as a boy, came to abhor them when he arrived at mature years, and could never be induced either to repeat or tolerate them.

According to the old heathen faith, the pedigree of the Saxon, Anglian, Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish kings—probably also those of the German and Scandinavian kings generally—was traced to Odin, or to some of his immediate companions or heroic sons. I have already observed that the value of these genealogies consisted not so much in their length as in the reverence attached to the name serving as primitive source. After the worship attached to Odin had been extinguished, the genealogical line was lengthened up to

Japhet or Noah—and Odin, no longer accounted worthy to stand at the top, was degraded into one of the simple human members of it. And we find this alteration of the original mythical genealogies to have taken place even among the Scandinavians, although the introduction of Christianity was in those parts both longer deferred, so as to leave time for a more ample development of the heathen poetical vein—and seems to have created a less decided feeling of antipathy (especially in Iceland) toward the extinct faith. The poems and tales composing the Edda, though first committed to writing after the period of Christianity, do not present the ancient gods in a point of view intentionally odious or degrading.

The transposition above alluded to, of the genealogical root from Odin to Noah, is the more worthy of notice as it illustrates the genuine character of these genealogies, and shows that they sprung, not from any erroneous historical data, but from the turn of the religious feeling; also that their true value is derived from their being taken entire, as connecting the existing race of men with a divine original. If we could imagine that Grecian paganism had been superseded by Christianity in the year 500 B.C., the great and venerated gentile genealogies of Greece would have undergone the like modification; the Herakleids, Pelopids, Æakids, Asklepiads, etc., would have been merged in some larger aggregate branching out from the archæology of the Old Testament. The old heroic legends connected with these ancestral names would either have been forgotten, or so transformed as to suit the new vein of thought; for the altered worship, ceremonies, and customs would have been altogether at variance with them, and the mythical feeling would have ceased to dwell upon those to whom prayers were no longer offered. If the oak of Dodona had been cut down, or the Theoric ship had ceased to be sent from Athens to Delos, the mythes of Theseus and of the two black doves would have lost their pertinence and died away. As it was, the change from Homer to Thucydides and Aristotle took place internally, gradually, and imperceptibly. Philosophy and history were superinduced in the minds of the superior few, but the feelings of the general public continued unshaken—the sacred objects remained the same both to the eye and to the heart—and the worship of the ancient gods was even adorned by new architects and sculptors who greatly strengthened its imposing effect.

While, then, in Greece the mythopœic stream continued in the same course, only with abated current and influence, in modern Europe its ancient bed was blocked up and it was turned into new and divided channels. The old religion—though as an ascendent faith, unanimously and publicly manifested, it became extinct—still continued in detached scraps and fragments, and under various alterations of name and form. The heathen gods and goddesses, deprived as they were of divinity, did not pass out of the recollection and fears of their former worshipers, but were sometimes represented (on principles like those of Euemerus) as having been eminent and glorious men—sometimes degraded into dæmons, magicians, elfs, fairies, and other supernatural agents, of an inferior grade and generally mischievous cast. Christian writers such as Saxo Grammaticus and Snorro Sturleson committed to writing the ancient oral songs of the Scandinavian Scalds, and digested the events contained in them into continuous narrative—performing in this respect a task similar to that of the Grecian logographers Pherekydes and Hellanikus, in reference to Hesiod and the Cyclic poets. But while Pherekydes and Hellanikus compiled under the influence of feelings substantially the same as those of the poets on whom they bestowed their care, the Christian logographers felt it their duty to point out the Odin and Thor of the old Scalds as evil dæmons, or cunning enchanters, who had fascinated the minds of men into a false belief in their divinity. In some cases the heathen recitals and ideas were modified so as to suit Christian feeling. But when preserved without such a change, they exhibited themselves palpably, and were designated by their compilers as at variance with the religious belief of the people, and as associated either with imposture or with evil spirits.

A new vein of sentiment has arisen in Europe, unsuitable, indeed, to the old mythes, yet leaving still in force the demand for mythical narrative generally. And this demand was satisfied, speaking generally, by two classes of narratives—the legends of the Catholic saints and the romances of chivalry, corresponding to two types of character, both perfectly accomodated to the feelings of the time—the saintly ideal and the chivalrous ideal.

Both these two classes of narrative correspond, in character as well as in general purpose, to the Grecian mythes—being stories accepted as realities, from their full conformity with the predispositions and deep-seated faith of an uncritical audience, and prepared beforehand by their authors, not with any reference to the conditions of historical proof, but for the purpose of calling forth sympathy, emotion, or reverence. The type of the saintly character belongs to Christianity, being the history of Jesus Christ as described in the Gospels, and that of the prophets in the Old Testament; while the lives of holy men, who acquired a religious reputation from the 4th to the 14th century of the Christian era, were invested with attributes, and illustrated with ample details, tending to assimilate them to this revered model. The numerous miracles, the cure of diseases, the expulsion of dæmons, the temptations and sufferings, the teaching and commands, with which the biography of Catholic saints abounds, grew chiefly out of this pious feeling, common to the writer and to his readers. Many of the other incidents, recounted in the same performances, take their rise from misinterpreted allegories, from ceremonies and customs of which it was pleasing to find a consecrated

origin, or from the disposition to convert the etymology of a name into matter of history: many have also been suggested by local peculiarities, and by the desire of stimulating or justifying the devotional emotions of pilgrims who visited some consecrated chapel or image. The dove was connected, in the faith of the age, with the Holy Ghost, the serpent with Satan; lions, wolves, stags, unicorns, etc., were the subjects of other emblematic associations; and such modes of belief found expression for themselves in many narratives which brought the saints into conflict or conjoint action with these various animals. Legends of this kind, indefinitely multiplied and pre-eminently popular and affecting, in the Middle Ages, are not exaggerations of particular matters of fact, but emanations in detail of some current faith or feeling, which they served to satisfy, and by which they were in turn amply sustained and accredited.

Readers of Pausanias will recognize the great general analogy between the stories recounted to him at the temples which he visited, and these legends of the Middle Ages. Though the type of character which the latter illustrate is indeed materially different, yet the source as well as the circulation, the generating as well as the sustaining forces, were in both cases the same. Such legends were the natural growth of a religious faith, earnest, unexamining, and interwoven with the feelings at a time when the reason does not need to be cheated. The lives of the saints bring us even back to the simple and ever-operative theology of the Homeric age; so constantly is the hand of God exhibited even in the minutest details, for the succor of a favored individual—so completely is the scientific point of view, respecting the phenomena of nature absorbed into the religious. During the intellectual vigor of Greece and Rome, a sense of the invariable course of nature and of the scientific explanation of phenomena had been created among the superior minds, and through them indirectly among the remaining community; thus limiting to a certain extent the ground open to be occupied by a religious legend. With the decline of the pagan literature and philosophy, before the sixth century of the Christian era, this scientific conception gradually passed out of sight, and left the mind free to a religious interpretation of nature not less simple and naif than that which had prevailed under the Homeric paganism. The great religious movement of the Reformation, and the gradual formation of critical and philosophical habits in the modern mind, have caused these legends of the saints—once the charm and cherished creed of a numerous public—to pass altogether out of credit, without even being regarded, among Protestants at least, as worthy of a formal scrutiny into the evidence—a proof of the transitory value of public belief, however sincere and fervent, as a certificate of historical truth, if it be blended with religious predispositions.

The same mythopœic vein, and the same susceptibility and facility of belief, which had created both supply and demand for the legends

of the saints, also provided the abundant stock of romantic narrative poetry, in amplification and illustration of the chivalrous ideal. What the legends of Troy, of Thebes, of the Kalydonian boar, of Œdipus, Theseus, etc., were to an early Greek, the tales of Arthur, of Charlemange, of the Niebelungen, were to an Englishman, or Frenchman, or German, of the twelfth or thirteenth century. They were neither recognized fiction nor authenticated history; they were history, as it is felt and welcomed by minds unaccustomed to investigate evidence and unconscious of the necessity of doing so. That the Chronicle of Turpin, a mere compilation of poetical legends respecting Charlemange, was accepted as genuine history, and even pronounced to be such by papal authority, is well known; and the authors of the romances announce themselves, not less than those of the old Grecian epic, as being about to recount real matter of fact. It is certain that Charlemange is a great historical name, and it is possible, though not certain, that the name of Arthur may be historical also. But the Charlemange of history and the Charlemange of romance, have little except the name in common; nor could we ever determine except by independent evidence (which in this case we happen to possess), whether Charlemange was a real or a fictitious person. That illustrious name, as well as the more problematical Arthur, is taken up by the romancers, not with a view to celebrate realities previously verified, but for the purpose of setting forth or amplifying an ideal of their own, in such manner as both to rouse the feelings and captivate the faith of their hearers.

To inquire which of the personages of the Carlovingian epic were real and which were fictitious, to examine whether the expedition ascribed to Charlemange against Jerusalem had ever taken place or not, to separate truth from exaggeration in the exploits of the Knights of the Round table—these were problems which an audience of that day had neither disposition to undertake nor means to resolve. They accepted the narrative as they heard it, without suspicion or reserve; the incidents related, as well as the connecting links between them, were in full harmony with their feelings, and gratifying as well to their sympathies as to their curiosity: nor was anything farther wanting to induce them to believe it, though the historical basis might be ever so slight or even non-existent.

The romances of chivalry represented, to those who heard them, real deeds of the foretime, "glories of the foregone men," to use the Hesiodic expression at the same time that they embodied and filled up the details of an heroic ideal, such as that age could conceive and admire—a fervent piety, combined with strength, bravery, and the love of adventurous aggression directed sometimes against infidels, sometimes against enchanters or monsters, sometimes in defense of the fair sex. Such characteristics were naturally popular, in a century of feudal struggles and universal insecurity, when the grand subjects of common respect and interest were the church and

the crusades, and when the latter especially were embraced with an enthusiasm truly astonishing.

The long German poem of the Niebelungen Lied, as well as the Volsunga Saga and a portion of the songs of the Edda, relate to a common fund of mythical, superhuman personages, and of fabulous adventure, identified with the earliest antiquity of the Teutonic and Scandinavian race, and representing their primitive sentiment toward ancestors of divine origin. Sigurd, Brynhilde, Gudrun, and Atle are mythical characters celebrated as well by the Scandinavian Scalds as by the German epic poets, but with many varieties and separate additions to distinguish the one from the other. The German epic, later and more elaborated, includes various persons not known to the songs in the Edda, in particular the prominent name of Dieterich of Bern—presenting, moreover, the principal characters and circumstances as Christian, while in the Edda there is no trace of anything but heathenism. There is, indeed, in this the old and heathen version, a remarkable analogy with many points of Grecian mythical narrative. As in the case of the short life of Achilles, and of the miserable Labdakids of Thebes, so in the family of the Volsungs, through sprung from and protected by the gods, a curse of destiny hangs upon them and brings on their ruin, in spite of pre-eminent personal qualities. The more thoroughly this old Teutonic story has been traced and compared, in its various transformations and accompaniments, the less can any well-established connection be made out for it with authentic historical names or events. We must acquiesce in its personages as distinct in original conception from common humanity, and as belonging to the subjective mythical world of the race by whom they were sung.

Such were the compositions which not only interested the emotions, but also satisfied the undistinguishing historical curiosity, of the ordinary public in the Middle Ages. The exploits of many of these romantic heroes resemble in several points those of the Grecian: the adventures of Perseus, Achilles, Odysseus, Atalanta, Bellerophon, Jason, and the Trojan war or Argonautic expedition generally, would have fitted in perfectly to the Carlovingian or other epics of the period. That of the Middle Ages, like the Grecian, was eminently expansive in its nature. New stories were successively attached to the names and companions of Charlemagne and Arthur, just as the legend of Troy was enlarged by Arktinus, Lesches, and Stesichorus; that of Thebes by fresh miseries entailed on the fated head of Œdipus, and that of the Kalydonian boar by the addition of Atalanta. Altogether, the state of mind of the hearers seems in both cases to have been much the same—eager for emotion and sympathy, and receiving any narrative attuned to their feeling, not merely with hearty welcome, but also with unsuspecting belief.

Nevertheless, there were distinctions deserving of notice, which render the foregoing proposition more absolutely exact with regard

to Greece than with regard to the Middle Ages. The tales of the epic, and the mythes in their most popular and extended signification, were the only intellectual nourishment with which the Grecian public was supplied, until the sixth century before the Christian era: there was no prose writing, no history, no philosophy. But such was not exactly the case at the time when the epic of the Middle Ages appeared. At that time, a portion of society possessed the Latin language, the habit of writing, and some tinge both of history and philosophy: there were a series of chronicles, scanty indeed, and imperfect, but referring to contemporary events and preventing the real history of the past from passing into oblivion; there were even individual scholars, in the twelfth century, whose acquaintance with Latin literature was sufficiently considerable to enlarge their minds and to improve their judgments. Moreover, the epic of the Middle Ages, though deeply imbued with religious ideas, was not directly amalgamated with the religion of the people, and did not always find favor with the clergy; while the heroes of the Grecian epic were not only linked in a thousand ways with existing worship, practices, and sacred localities, but Homer and Hesiod pass with Herodotus for the constructors of Grecian theology. We thus see that the ancient epic was both exempt from certain distracting influences by which that of the Middle Ages was surrounded, and more closely identified with the veins of thought and feeling prevalent in the Grecian public. Yet these counteracting influences did not prevent Pope Calixtus II. from declaring the Chronicle of Turpin to be a genuine history.

If we take the history of our own country as it was conceived and written from the twelfth to the seventeenth century by Hardyng, Fabyan, Grafton, Hollinshed, and others, we shall find that it was supposed to begin with Brute, the Trojan, and was carried down from thence, for many ages and through a long succession of kings, to the times of Julius Cæsar. A similar belief of descent from Troy, arising seemingly from a reverential imitation of the Romans and of their Trojan origin, was cherished in the fancy of other European nations. With regard to the English, the chief circulator of it was Geoffrey of Monmouth. It passed with little resistance or dispute into the national faith—the kings from Brute downward being enrolled in regular chronological series with their respective dates annexed. In a dispute which took place during the reign of Edward I. (A.D. 1301) between England and Scotland, the descent of the kings of England from Brute, the Trojan, was solemnly embodied in a document put forth to sustain the rights of the crown of England, as an argument bearing on the case then in discussion; and it passed without attack from the opposing party—an incident which reminds us of the appeal made by Æschines, in the contention between the Athenians and Philip of Macedon respecting Amphipolis, to the primitive dotal rights of Akamas, son of Theseus; and also of the defense urged by the Athenians to sustain their conquest of Sigeium,

against the reclamations of the Mityleneans, wherein the former alleged that they had as much right to the place as any of the other Greeks who had formed part of the victorious armament of Agamemnon.

The tenacity with which this early series of British kings was defended is no less remarkable than the facility with which it was admitted. The chroniclers at the beginning of the seventeenth century warmly protested against the intrusive skepticism which would cashier so many venerable sovereigns and efface so many noble deeds. They appealed to the patriotic feelings of their hearers, represented the enormity of thus setting up a presumptuous criticism against the belief of ages, and insisted on the danger of the precedent as regarded history generally. How this controversy stood, at the time and in the view of the illustrious author of "Paradise Lost," I shall give in his own words as they appear in the second page of his "History of England." After having briefly touched upon the stories of Samothes, son of Japhet, Albion, son of Neptune, etc., he proceeds:

"But now of Brutus and his line, with the whole progeny of kings, to the entrance of Julius Cæsar, we cannot so easily be discharged; descents of ancestry long continued, law and exploits not plainly seeming to be borrowed or devised, which on the common belief have wrought no small impression; *defended by many, denied utterly by few.* For what though Brutus and the whole Trojan pretense were yielded up, seeing they, who first devised to bring us some noble ancestor, were content at first with Brutus the consul, till better invention, though not willing to forgo the name, taught them to remove it higher into a more fabulous age, and by the same remove lighting on the Trojan tales, in affectation to make the Briton of one original with the Roman, pitched there: *Yet those old and inborn kings, never any to have been real persons, or done in their lives at least some part of what so long hath been remembered, cannot be thought without too strict incredulity.* For these, and those causes above-mentioned, that which hath received approbation from so many, I have chosen not to omit. Certain or uncertain, be that upon the credit of those whom I must follow; *so far as keeps aloof from impossible or absurd,* attested by ancient writers from books more ancient, I refuse not as the due and proper subject of story."

Yet in spite of the general belief of so many centuries, in spite of the concurrent persuasion of historians and poets, in spite of the declaration of Milton, extorted from his feelings rather than from his reason, that this long line of quasi-historical kings and exploits could not be *all* unworthy of belief—in spite of so large a body of authority and precedent, the historians of the nineteenth century begin the history of England with Julius Cæsar. They do not attempt either to settle the date of King Bladud's accession, or to determine what may be the basis of truth in the affecting narrative of Lear. The

standard of historical credibility, especially with regard to modern events, has indeed been greatly and sensibly raised within the last hundred years.

But in regard to ancient Grecian history, the rules of evidence still continue relaxed. The dictum of Milton, regarding the ante-Cæsarian history of England, still represents pretty exactly the feeling now prevalent respecting the mythical history of Greece: "Yet those old and inborn kings," Agamemnon, Achilles, Odysseus, Jason, Adrastus, Amphiaraüs, Meleager, etc., "never any to have been real persons, or done in their lives at least some part of what so long has been remembered, cannot be thought without too strict incredulity." Amid much fiction (we are still told), there must be some truth; but how is such truth to be singled out? Milton does not even attempt to make the severance; he contents himself with "keeping aloof from the impossible and the absurd," and ends in a narrative which has indeed the merit of being sober-colored, but which he never for a moment thinks of recommending to his readers as true. So in regard to the legends of Greece—Troy, Thebes, the Argonauts, the Boar of Kalydon, Herakles, Theseus, Œdipus—the conviction still holds in men's minds that there must be something true at the bottom; and many readers of this work may be displeased, I fear, not to see conjured up before them the eidolon of an authentic history, even though the vital spark of evidence be altogether wanting.

I presume to think that our great poet has proceeded upon mistaken views with respect to the old British fables, not less in that which he leaves out than in that which he retains. To omit the miraculous and the fantastic (it is that which he really means by "the impossible and the absurd"), is to suck the life-blood out of these once popular narratives—to divest them at once both of their genuine distinguishing mark, and of the charm by which they acted on the feelings of believers. Still less ought we to consent to break up and disenchant in a similar manner the mythes of ancient Greece—partly because they possess the mythical beauties and characteristics in far higher perfection, partly because they sank deeper into the mind of a Greek, and pervaded both the public and private sentiment of the country to a much greater degree than the British fables in England.

Two courses, and two only, are open; either to pass over the mythes altogether, which is the way in which modern historians treat the old British fables, or else to give an account of them as mythes; to recognize and respect their specific nature, and to abstain from confounding them with ordinary and certifiable history. There are good reasons for pursuing this second method in reference to the Grecian mythes; and when so considered, they constitute an important chapter in the history of the Grecian mind, and indeed, in that of the human race generally. The historical faith of the Greeks, as

well as that of other people, in reference to early and unrecorded times, is as much subjective and peculiar to themselves as their religious faith; among the Greeks, especially, the two are confounded with an intimacy which nothing less than great violence can disjoin. Gods, heroes, and men—religion and patriotism, matters divine, heroic, and human—were all woven together by the Greeks into one indivisible web, in which the threads of truth and reality, whatever they might originally have been, were neither intended to be, nor were actually, distinguishable. Composed of such materials, and animated by the electric spark of genius, the mythical antiquities of Greece formed a whole at once trustworthy and captivating to the faith and feelings of the people; but neither trustworthy nor captivating, when we sever it from these subjective conditions, and expose its naked elements to the scrutiny of an objective criticism. Moreover, the separate portions of Grecian mythical foretime ought to be considered with reference to that aggregate of which they form a part; to detach the divine from the heroic legends, or some one of the heroic legends from the remainder, as if there were an essential and generic difference between them, is to present the whole under an erroneous point of view. The mythes of Troy and Thebes are no more to be handled objectively, with a view to detect an historical base, than those of Zeus in Krete, of Apollo and Artemis in Delos, of Hermes, or of Prometheus. To single out the siege of Troy from the other mythes, as if it were entitled to pre-eminence as an ascertained historical and chronological event, is a proceeding which destroys the true character and coherence of the mythical world: we only transfer the story (as has been remarked in the preceding chapter) from a class with which it is connected by every tie both of common origin and fraternal affinity, to another with which it has no relationship, except such as violent and gratuitous criticism may enforce.

By drawing this marked distinction between the mythical and the historical world—between matter appropriate only for subjective history, and matter in which objective evidence is attainable—we shall only carry out to its proper length the just and well-known position long ago laid down by Varro. That learned man recognized three distinguishable periods in the time preceding his own age: "First, the time from the beginning of mankind down to the first deluge; a time wholly unknown. Secondly, the period from the first deluge down to the first Olympiad, which is called *the mythical period*, because many fabulous things are recounted in it. Thirdly, the time from the first Olympaid down to ourselves, which is called *the historical period*, because the things done in it are comprised in true histories."

Taking the commencement of true or objective history at the point indicated by Varro, I still consider the mythical and historical periods to be separated by a wider gap than he would have admitted. To

select any one year as an absolute point of commencement, is of course not to be understood literally; but in point of fact, this is of very little importance in reference to the present question, seeing that the great mythical events—the sieges of Thebes and Troy, the Argonautic expedition, the Kalydonian boar-hunt, the return of the Herakleids, etc.—are all placed long anterior to the first Olympiad, by those who have applied chronological boundaries to the mythical narratives. The period immediately preceding the first Olympiad is one exceedingly barren of events; the received chronology recognizes 400 years and Herodotus admitted 500 years from that date back to the Trojan war.

CHAPTER XVIII.

CLOSING EVENTS OF LEGENDARY GREECE.—PERIOD OF INTERMEDIATE DARKNESS, BEFORE THE DAWN OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

SECTION I.—RETURN OF THE HERAKLEIDS INTO PELOPONNESUS.

IN one of the preceding chapters, we have traced the descending series of the two most distinguished mythical families in Peloponnesus—the Perseids and the Pelopids. We have followed the former down to Herakles and his son Hyllus, and the latter down to Orestes son of Agamemnon, who is left in possession of that ascendency in the peninsula which had procured for his father the chief command in the Trojan war. The Herakleids, or sons of Herakles, on the other hand, are expelled fugitives, dependent upon foreign aid or protection: Hyllus had perished in single combat with Echemus of Tegea (connected with the Pelopids by marriage with Timandra sister of Klytæmnestra), and a solemn compact had been made, as the preliminary condition of this duel, that no similar attempt at an invasion of the peninsula should be undertaken by his family for the space of 100 years. At the end of the stipulated period the attempt was renewed; and with complete success; but its success was owing, not so much to the valor of the invaders, as to a powerful body of new allies. The Herakleids reappear as leaders and companions of the Dorians,—a northerly section of the Greek name, who now first come into importance,—poor, indeed, in mythical renown, since they are never noticed in the Iliad, and only once casually mentioned in the Odyssey, as a fraction among the many-tongued inhabitants of Krete—but destined to form one of the grand and predominant elements throughout all the career of historical Hellas.

The son of Hyllus—Kleodæus—as well as his grandson Aristomachus, were now dead, and the lineage of Herakles was represented

by the three sons of the latter—Temenus, Kresphontes, and Aristodemus. Under their conduct the Dorians penetrated into the peninsula. The mythical account traced back this intimate union between the Herakleids and the Dorians to a prior war, in which Herakles himself had rendered inestimable aid to the Dorian king Ægimius, when the latter was hard pressed in a contest with the Lapithæ. Herakles defeated the Lapithæ, and slew their King Koronus; in return for which Ægimius assigned to his deliverer one-third part of his whole territory, and adopted Hyllus as his son. Herakles desired that the territory thus made over might be held in reserve until a time should come when his descendants might stand in need of it; and that time did come, after the death of Hyllus (see Chap. V.). Some of the Herakleids then found shelter at Trikorythus in Attica, but the remainder, turning their steps toward Ægimius, solicited from him the allotment of land which had been promised to their valiant progenitor. Ægimius received them according to his engagement and assigned to them the stipulated third portion of his territory. From this moment the Herakleids and Dorians became intimately united together into one social communion. Pamphylus and Dymas, sons of Ægimius, accompanied Temenus and his two brothers in their invasion of Peloponnesus.

Such is the mythical incident which professes to explain the origin of those three tribes into which all the Dorian communities were usually divided—the Hylleis, the Pamphyli, and the Dymanes—the first of the three including certain particular families, such as that of the kings of Sparta, who bore the special name of Herakleids. Hyllus, Pamphylus, and Dymas are the eponymous heroes of the three Dorian tribes.

Temenus and his two brothers resolved to attack Peloponnesus, not by a land-march along the isthmus, such as that in which Hyllus had been previously slain, but by sea across the narrow inlet between the promotories of Rhium and Antirrhium, with which the Gulf of Corinth commences. According to one story, indeed—which, however, does not seem to have been known to Herodotus—they are said to have selected this line of march by the express direction of the Delphian god, who vouchsafed to expound to them an oracle which had been delivered to Hyllus in the ordinary equivocal phraseology. Both the Ozolian Lokrians, and the Ætolians, inhabitants of the northern coast of the Gulf of Corinth, were favorable to the enterprise, and the former granted to them a port for building their ships, from which memorable circumstance the port ever afterward bore the name of Naupaktus. Aristodemus was here struck with lightning and died, leaving twin sons, Eurysthenes and Prokles; but his remaining brothers continued to press the expedition with alacrity.

At this juncture, an Akarnanian prophet named Karnus, presented himself in the camp under the inspiration of Apollo, and uttered

various predictions: he was, however, so much suspected of treacherous collusion with the Peloponnesians, that Hippotes, great grandson of Herakles, through Phylas and Antiochus, slew him. His death drew upon the army the wrath of Apollo, who destroyed their vessels and punished them with famine. Temenus in his distress, again applying to the Delphian god for succor and counsel, was made acquainted with the cause of so much suffering, and was directed to banish Hippotes for 10 years, to offer expiatory sacrifice for the death of Karnus, and to seek as the guide of the army a man with three eyes. On coming back to Naupaktus, he met the Ætolian Oxylus, son of Andræmon, returning to his country after a temporary exile in Elis incurred for homicide: Oxylus had lost one eye, but as he was seated on a horse, the man and the horse together made up the three eyes required, and he was adopted as the guide prescribed by the oracle. Conducted by him, they refitted their ships, landed on the opposite coast of Achaia, and marched to attack Tisamenus son of Orestes, then the great potentate of the peninsula. A decisive battle was fought, in which the latter was vanquished and slain, and in which Pamphylus and Dymas also perished. This battle made the Dorians so completely masters of the Peloponnesus, that they proceeded to distribute the territory among themselves. The fertile land of Elis had been by previous stipulation reserved for Oxylus, as a recompense for his services as conductor: and it was agreed that the three Herakleids—Temenus, Kresphontes, and the infant sons of Aristodemus—should draw lots for Argos, Sparta, and Messene. Argos fell to Temenus, Sparta to the sons of Aristodemus, and Messene to Kresphontes; the latter having secured for himself this prize, the most fertile territory of the three, by the fraud of putting into the vessel out of which the lots were drawn a lump of clay instead of a stone, whereby the lots of his brothers were drawn out while his own remained inside. Solemn sacrifices were offered by each upon this partition; but as they proceeded to the ceremony, a miraculous sign was seen upon the altar of each of the brothers—a toad corresponding to Argos, a serpent to Sparta, and a fox to Messene. The prophets, on being consulted, delivered the import of these mysterious indications: the toad, as an animal slow and stationary, was an evidence that the possessor of Argos would not succeed in enterprises beyond the limits of his own city; the serpent denoted the aggressive and formidable future reserved to Sparta; the fox prognosticated a career of wile and deceit to the Messenian.

Such is the brief account given by Apollodorus of the return of the Herakleids, at which point we pass, as if touched by the wand of a magician, from mythical to historical Greece. The story bears on the face of it the stamp, not of history, but of legend—abridged from one or more of the genealogical poets, and presenting such an account as they thought satisfactory, of the first formation of the great Dorian establishments in Peloponnesus, as well as of the semi-

Ætolian Elis. Its incidents are so conceived as to have an explanatory bearing on Dorian institutions—upon the triple division of tribes, characteristic of the Dorians—upon the origin of the great festival of the Karneia at Sparta and other Dorian cities, alleged to be celebrated in expiation of the murder of Karnus—upon the different temper and character of the Dorian states among themselves—upon the early alliance of the Dorians with Elis, which contributed to give ascendency and vogue to the Olympic games—upon the reverential dependence of Dorians toward the Delphian oracle—and lastly upon the etymology of the name Naupaktus. If we possessed the narrative more in detail, we should probably find many more examples of coloring of the legendary past suitable to the circumstances of the historical present.

Above all, this legend makes out in favor of the Dorians and their kings a mythical title to their Peloponnesian establishments; Argos, Sparta, and Messene, are presented as rightfully belonging, and restored by just retribution, to the children of Herakles. It was to them that Zeus had specially given the territory of Sparta; the Dorians came in as their subjects and auxiliaries. Plato gives a very different version of the legend, but we find that he too turns the story in such a manner as to embody a claim of right on the part of the conquerors. According to him, the Achæans who returned from the capture of Troy, found among their fellow-citizens at home —the race which had grown up during their absence—an aversion to re-admit them: after a fruitless endeavor to make good their rights, they were at expelled, but not without much contest and bloodshed. A leader named Dorieus collected all these exiles into one body, and from him they received the name of Dorians instead of Achæans; then marching back under the conduct of the Herakleids into Peloponnesus, they recovered by force the possessions from which they had been shut out, and constituted the three Dorian establishments under the separate Herakleid brothers, at Argos, Sparta, and Messene. These three fraternal dynasties were founded upon a scheme of intimate union and sworn alliance one with the other, for the purpose of resisting any attack which might be made upon them from Asia, either by the remaining Trojans or by their allies. Such is the story as Plato believed it; materially different in the incidents related, yet analogous in mythical feeling, and embodying alike the idea of a rightful reconquest. Moreover, the two accounts agree in representing both the entire conquest and the triple division of Dorian Peloponnesus as begun and completed in one and the same enterprise,—so as to constitute one single event, which Plato would probably have called the return of the Achæans, but which was commonly known as the return of the Herakleids. Though this is both inadmissible and inconsistent with other statements which approach close to the historical times, yet it bears every mark of being the primitive view originally presented by the genealogical

poets. The broad way in which the incidents are grouped together, was at once easy for the imagination to follow and impressive to the feelings.

The existence of one legendary account must never be understood as excluding the probability of other accounts, current at the same time, but inconsistent with it; and many such there were as to the first establishment of the Peloponnesian Dorians. In the narrative which I have given from Apollodorus, conceived apparently under the influence of Dorian feeling, Tisamenus is stated to have been slain in the invasion. But according to another narrative, which seems to have found favor with the historical Achæans on the north coast of Peloponnesus, Tisamenus, though expelled by the invaders from his kingdom of Sparta or Argos, was not slain: he was allowed to retire under agreement, together with a certain portion of his subjects, and he directed his steps toward the coast of Peloponnesus, south of the Corinthian gulf, then occupied by the Ionians. As there were relations, not only of friendship, but of kindred origin, between Ionians and Achæans (the eponymous heroes Ion and Achæus pass for brothers, both sons of Xuthus), Tisamenus solicited from the Ionians admission for himself and his fellow-fugitives into their territory. The leading Ionians declining this request, under the apprehension that Tisamenus might be chosen as sovereign over the whole, the latter accomplished his object by force. After a vehement struggle, the Ionians were vanquished and put to flight, and Tisamenus thus acquired possession of Helike, as well as of the northern coast of the peninsula, westward from Sikyon; which coast continued to be occupied by the Achæans, and received its name from them, throughout all the historical times. The Ionians retired to Attica, many of them taking part in what is called the Ionic emigration to the coast of Asia Minor, which followed shortly after. Pausanias, indeed, tells us that Tisamenus, having gained a decisive victory over the Ionians, fell in the engagement, and did not himself live to occupy the country of which his troops remained masters. But this story of the death of Tisamenus seems to arise from a desire on the part of Pausanias to blend together into one narrative two discrepant legends; at least, the historical Achæans, in latter times, continued to regard Tisamenus himself as having lived and reigned in their territory, and as having left a regal dynasty which lasted down to Ogyges, after whom it was exchanged for a popular government.

The conquest of Temenus, the eldest of the three Herakleids, originally comprehended only Argos and its neighborhood: it was from thence that Trœzen, Epidaurus, Ægina, Sikyon, and Phlius, were successively occupied by Dorians, the sons and son-in-law of Temenus—Deiphontes, Phalkes, and Keisus—being the leaders under whom this was accomplished. At Sparta the success of the Dorians was furthered by the treason of a man named Philonomus, who received as recompense the neighboring town and territory of Amyklæ.

Messenia is said to have submitted without resistance to the dominion of the Herakleid Kresphontes, who established his residence at Stenyklarus: the Pylian Melanthus, then ruler of the country and representative of the great mythical lineage of Neleus and Nestor, withdrew with his household gods and with a portion of his subjects to Attica.

The only Dorian establishment in the peninsula not directly connected with the triple partition is Corinth, which is said to have been Dorized somewhat later and under another leader, though still a Herakleid. Hippotes—descendant of Herakles in the fourth generation, but not through Hyllus—had been guilty (as already mentioned) of the murder of Karnus the prophet at the camp of Naupaktus, for which he had been banished and remained in exile for ten years; his son deriving the name of Aletes from the long wanderings endured by the father. At the head of a body of Dorians, Aletes attacked Corinth: he pitched his camp on the Solygeian eminence near the city, and harassed the inhabitants with constant warfare until he compelled them to surrender. Even in the time of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians professed to identify the hill on which the camp of these assailants had been placed. The great mythical dynasty of the Sisyphids was expelled, and Aletes became ruler and Œkist of the Dorian-city; many of the inhabitants, however, Æolic or Ionic, departed.

The settlement of Oxylus and his Ætolians in Elis is said by some to have been accomplished with very little opposition; the leader professing himself to be descended from Ætolus, who had been in a previous age banished from Elis into Ætolia, and the two people, Epeians and Ætolians, acknowledging a kindred origin one with the other. At first, indeed, according to Ephorus, the Epeians appeared in arms, determined to repel the intruders, but at length it was agreed on both sides to abide the issue of a single combat. Degmenus, the champion of the Epeians, confided in the long shot of his bow and arrow; but the Ætolian Pyræchmes came provided with his sling,—a weapon then unknown and recently invented by the Ætolians,—the range of which was yet longer than that of the bow of his enemy: he thus killed Degmenus, and secured the victory to Oxylus and his followers. According to one statement the Epeians were expelled; according to another they fraternized amicably with the new-comers. Whatever may be the truth as to this matter, it is certain that their name is from this moment lost, and that they never reappear among the historical elements of Greece: we hear from this time forward only of Eleians, said to be of Ætolian descent.

One most important privilege was connected with the possession of the Eleian territory by Oxylus, coupled with his claim on the gratitude of the Dorian kings. The Eleians acquired the administration of the temple at Olympia, which the Achæans are said to have possessed before them; and in consideration of this sacred

function which subsequently ripened into the celebration of the great Olympic games, their territory was solemnly pronounced to be inviolable. Such was the statement of Ephorus: we find, in this case as in so many others, that the return of the Herakleids is made to supply a legendary basis for the historical state of things in Peloponnesus.

It was the practice of the great Attic tragedians, with rare exceptions, to select the subjects of their composition from the heroic or legendary world. Euripides had composed three dramas, now lost, on the adventures of Temenus with his daughter Hyrnetho and his son-in-law Deiphontes—on the family misfortunes of Kresphontes and Merope—and on the successful valor of Archelaus the son of Temenus in Macedonia, where he was alleged to have first begun the dynasty of the Temenid kings. Of these subjects the first and second were eminently tragical, and the third, relating to Archelaus, appears to have been undertaken by Euripides in compliment to his contemporary sovereign and patron, Archelaus king of Macedonia: we are even told that those exploits which the usual version of the legend ascribed to Temenus, were reported in the drama of Euripides to have been performed by Archelaus his son. Of all the heroes, touched upon by the three Attic tragedians, these Dorian Herakleids stand lowest in the descending genealogical series—one mark among others that we are approaching the ground of genuine history.

Though the name Achæans, as denoting a people, is henceforward confined to the North-Peloponnesian territory specially called Achaia, and to the inhabitants of Achæa Phthiotis, north of Mount Œta—and though the great Peloponnesian states always seem to have prided themselves on the title of Dorians—yet we find the kings of Sparta, even in the historical age, taking pains to appropriate to themselves the mythical glories of the Achæans, and to set themselves forth as the representatives of Agamemnon and Orestes. The Spartan king Kleomenes even went so far as to disavow formally any Dorian parentage; for when the priestess at Athens refused to permit him to sacrifice in the temple of Athene, on the plea that it was peremptorily closed to all Dorians, he replied, "I am no Dorian, but an Achæan." Not only did the Spartan envoy, before Gelon of Syracuse, connect the indefeasible title of his country to the supreme command of the Grecian military force, with the ancient name and lofty prerogatives of Agamemnon—but in farther pursuance of the same feeling, the Spartans are said to have carried to Sparta both the bones of Orestes from Tegea, and those of Tisamenus from Helike, at the injunction of the Delphian oracle. There is also a story that Oxylus in Elis was directed by the same oracle to invite into his country an Achæan, as Œkist, conjointly with himself; and that he called in Agorius, the great-grandson of Orestes, from Helike, with a small number of Achæans who joined him. The Dorians themselves, being singularly poor in

native legends, endeavored, not unnaturally, to decorate themselves with those legendary ornaments which the Achæans possessed in abundance.

As a consequence of the Dorian establishments in Peloponnesus, several migrations of the pre-existing inhabitants are represented as taking place. 1. The Epeians of Elis are either expelled, or merged in the new-comers under Oxylus, and lose their separate name. 2. The Pylians, together with the great heroic family of Neleus and his son Nestor, who preside over them, give place to the Dorian establishment of Messenia, and retire to Athens, where their leader Melanthus becomes king: a large portion of them take part in the subsequent Ionic emigration. 3. A portion of the Achæans, under Penthilus, and other descendants of Orestes, leave Peloponnesus, and form what is called the Æolic emigration, to Lesbos, the Troad, and the Gulf of Adramyttium: the name *Æolians*, unknown to Homer and seemingly never applied to any separate tribe at all, being introduced to designate a large section of the Hellenic name, partly in Greece Proper and partly in Asia. 4. Another portion of Achæans expel the Ionians from Achaia properly so called, in the north of Peloponnesus; the Ionians retiring to Attica.

The Homeric poems describe Achæans, Pylians, and Epeians, in Peloponnesus, but take no notice of Ionians in the northern district of Achaia: on the contrary, the Catalogue in the Iliad distinctly included this territory under the dominions of Agamemnon. Though the Catalogue of Homer is not to be regarded as an historical document, fit to be called as evidence for the actual state of Peloponnesus at any prior time, it certainly seems a better authority than the statements advanced by Herodotus and others respecting the occupation of northern Peloponnesus by the Ionians, and their expulsion from it by Tisamenus. In so far as the Catalogue is to be trusted, it negatives the idea of Ionians at Helike, and countenances what seems in itself a more natural supposition—that the historical Achæans in the north part of Peloponnesus are a small undisturbed remnant of the powerful Achæan population once distributed throughout the peninsula, until it was broken up and partially expelled by the Dorians.

The Homeric legends, unquestionably the oldest which we possess, are adapted to a population of Achæans, Danaans, and Argeians, seemingly without any special and recognized names, either aggregate or divisional, other than the name of each separate tribe or kingdom. The post-Homeric legends are adapted to a population classified quite differently — Hellens, distributed into Dorians, Ionians, and Æolians. If we knew more of the time and circumstances in which these different legends grew up, we should probably be able to explain their discrepancy; but in our present ignorance we can only note the fact.

Whatever difficulty modern criticism may find in regard to the event called "The Return of the Herakleids," no doubt is expressed about it even by the best historians of antiquity. Thucydides accepts it as a single and literal event, having its assignable date, and carrying at one blow the acquisition of Peloponnesus. The date of it he fixes as eighty years after the capture of Troy. Whether he was the original determiner of this epoch, or copied it from some previous author, we do not know. It must have been fixed according to some computation of generations, for there were no other means accessible—probably by means of the lineage of the Herakleids, which, as belonging to the kings of Sparta, constituted the most public and conspicuous thread of connection between the Grecian real and mythical world, and measured the interval between the siege of Troy itself and the first recorded Olympiad. Herakles himself represents the generation before the siege, and his son Tlepolemus fights in the besieging army. If we suppose the first generation after Herakles to commence with the beginning of the siege, the fourth generation after him will coincide with the ninetieth year after the same epoch; and therefore, deducting ten years for the duration of the struggle, it will coincide with the eightieth year after the capture of the city; thirty years being reckoned for a generation. The date assigned by Thucydides will thus agree with the distance in which Temenus, Kresphontes, and Aristodemus stand removed from Herakles. The interval of eighty years, between the capture of Troy and the return of the Herakleids, appears to have been admitted by Apollodorus and Eratosthenes, and some other professed chronologists of antiquity: but there were different reckonings which also found more or less of support.

Section II.—Migration of Thessalians and Bœotians.

In the same passage in which Thucydides speaks of the return of the Herakleids, he also marks out the date of another event a little antecedent, which is alleged to have powerfully affected the condition of Northern Greece. "Sixty years after the capture of Troy (he tells us) the Bœotians were driven by the Thessalians from Arne, and migrated into the land then called Kadmeïs, but now Bœotia, wherein there had previously dwelt a section of their race, who had contributed the contingent to the Trojan war."

The expulsion here mentioned, of the Bœotians from Arne "by the Thessalians," has been construed, with probability, to allude to the immigration of the Thessalians, properly so called, from the Thesprotid in Epirus into Thessaly. That the Thessalians had migrated into Thessaly from the Thesprotid territory, is stated by Herodotus, though he says nothing about time or circumstances. Antiphus and Pheidippus appear in the Homeric Catalogue as commander of the Grecian contingent from the islands of Kos and Karpathus, on the south-east coast of Asia Minor: they are sons of

Thessalus, who is himself the son of Herakles. A legend ran, that these two chiefs, in the dispersion which ensued after the victory, had been driven by storms into the Ionian gulf, and cast upon the coast of Epirus, where they landed and settled at Ephyre in the Thesprotid. It was Thessalus, grandson of Pheidippus, who was reported to have conducted the Thesprotians across the passes of Pindus into Thessaly, to have conquered the fertile central plain of that country, and to have imposed upon it his own name instead of its previous denomination Æolis.

Whatever we may think of this legend as it stands, the state of Thessaly during the historical ages renders it highly probable that the Thessalians, properly so called, were a body of immigrant conquerors. They appear always as a rude, warlike, violent, and uncivilized race, distinct from their neighbors the Achæans, the Magnetes, and the Perrhæbians, and holding all the three in tributary dependence. These three tribes stand to them in a relation analogous to that of the Lacedæmonian Periœki toward Sparta, while the Penestæ, who cultivated their lands, are almost an exact parallel of the Helots. Moreover, the low level of taste and intelligence among the Thessalians, as well as certain points of their costume, assimilates them more to Macedonians or Epirots than to Hellens. Their position in Thessaly is in many respects analogous to that of the Spartan Dorians in Peloponnesus, and there seems good reason for concluding that the former, as well as the latter, were originally victorious invaders, though we cannot pretend to determine the time at which the invasion took place. The great family of the Aleuads, and probably other Thessalian families besides, were descendants of Herakles, like the kings of Sparta.

There are no similar historical grounds, in the case of the alleged migration of the Bœotians from Thessaly to Bœotia, to justify a belief in the main fact of the legend, nor were the different legendary stories in harmony one with the other. While the Homeric epic recognizes the Bœotians in Bœotia, but not in Thessaly, Thucydides records a statement which he had found of their migration from the latter into the former. But in order to escape the necessity of flatly contradicting Homer, he inserts the parenthesis that there had been previously an outlying fraction of Bœotians in Bœotia at the time of the Trojan war, from whom the troops who served with Agamemnon were drawn. Nevertheless, the discrepancy with the Iliad, though less strikingly obvious, is not removed, inasmuch as the Catalogue is unusually copious in enumerating the contingents from Thessaly, without once mentioning Bœotians. Homer distinguishes Orchomenus from Bœotia, and he does not specially notice Thebes in the Catalogue: in other respects his enumeration of the towns coincides pretty well with the ground historically known afterward under the name of Bœotia.

Pausanias gives us a short sketch of the events which he supposes to

have intervened in this section of Greece between the siege of Troy and the return of the Herakleids. Peneleos, the leader of the Bœotians at the siege, having been slain by Eurypylus the son of Telephus, Tisamenus, son of Thersander and grandson of Polynikes, acted as their commander both during the remainder of the siege and after their return. Autesion, his son and successor, became subject to the wrath of the avenging Erinnyes of Laius and Œdipus: the oracle directed him to expatriate, and he joined the Dorians. In his place Damasichthon, son of Opheltas and grandson of Peneleos, became king of the Bœotians; he was succeeded by Ptolemæus, who was himself followed by Xanthus. A war having broken out at that time between the Athenians and Bœotians, Xanthus engaged in single combat with Melanthus son of Andropompus, the champion of Attica, and perished by the cunning of his opponent. After the death of Xanthus, the Bœotians passed from kingship to popular government. As Melanthus was of the lineage of the Neleids, and and had migrated from Pylus to Athens in consequence of the successful establishment of the Dorians in Messenia, the duel with Xanthus must have been of course subsequent to the return of the Herakleids.

Here then we have a summary of alleged Bœotian history between the siege of Troy and the return of the Herakleids, in which no mention is made of the immigration of the mass of Bœotians from Thessaly, and seemingly no possibility left of fitting in so great and capital an incident. The legends followed by Pausanias are at variance with those adopted by Thucydides, but they harmonize much better with Homer.

So deservedly high is the authority of Thucydides, that the migration here distinctly announced by him is commonly set down as an ascertained datum, historically as well as chronologically. But on this occasion it can be shown that he only followed one among a variety of discrepant legends, none of which there were any means of verifying.

Pausanias recognized a migration of the Bœotians from Thessaly, in early times anterior to the Trojan war; and the account of Ephorus, as given by Strabo, professed to record a series of changes in the occupants of the country: first, the non-Hellenic Aones and Temmikes, Leleges and Hyantes; next, the Kadmeians, who, after the second siege of Thebes by the Epigoni, were expelled by the Thracians and Pelasgians, and retired into Thessaly, where they joined in communion with the inhabitants of Arne,—the whole aggregate being called Bœotians. After the Trojan war, and about the time of the Æolic emigration, these Bœotians returned from Thessaly and reconquered Bœotia, driving out the Thracians and Pelasgians,—the former retiring to Parnassus, the latter to Attica. It was on this occasion (he says) that the Minyæ of Orchomenus were subdued, and forcibly incorporated with the Bœotians. Ephorus

seems to have followed in the main the same narrative as Thucydides, about the movement of the Bœotians out of Thessaly; coupling it, however, with several details current as explanatory of proverbs and customs.

The only fact which we make out, independent of these legends, is, that there existed certain homonymies and certain affinities of religious worship, between parts of Bœotia and parts of Thessaly, which appear to indicate a kindred race. A town named Arnè, similar in name to the Thessalian, was enumerated in the Bœotian Catalogue of Homer, and antiquaries identified it sometimes with the historical town Chæroneia, sometimes with Akræphium. Moreover there was near the Bœotian Koroneia a river named Kuarius or Koralius, and a venerable temple dedicated to the Itonian Athene, in the sacred ground of which the Pambœotia, or public council of the Bœotian name, was held; there was also a temple and a river of similar denomination in Thessaly, near to a town called Iton or Itonus. We may from these circumstances presume a certain ancient kindred between the population of these regions, and such a circumstance is sufficient to explain the generation of legends describing migrations backward and forward, whether true or not in point of fact.

What is most important to remark is, that the stories of Thucydides and Ephorus bring us out of the mythical into the historical Bœotia. Orchomenus is Bœotized, and we hear no more of the once-powerful Minyæ: there are no more Kadmeiâns at Thebes, nor Bœotians in Thessaly. The Minyæ and the Kadmeians disappear in the Ionic emigration, which will be presently adverted to. Historical Bœotia is now constituted, apparently in its federative league under the presidency of Thebes, just as we find it in the time of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

Section III.—Emigrations from Greece to Asia and the Islands of the Ægean.

1. *Æolic.*—2. *Ionic.*—3. *Doric.*

To complete the transition of Greece from its mythical to its historical condition, the secession of the races belonging to the former must follow upon the introduction of those belonging to the latter. This is accomplished by means of the Æolic and Ionic migrations.

The presiding chiefs of the Æolic emigration are the representatives of the heroic lineage of the Pelopids: those of the Ionic emigration belong to the Neleids; and even in what is called the Doric emigration to Thera, the Œkist Theras is not a Dorian but a Kadmeian, the legitimate descendant of Œdipus and Kadmus.

The Æolic, Ionic, and Doric colonies were planted along the western coast of Asia Minor, from the coast of the Propontis southward down to Lykia (I shall in a future chapter speak more exactly of their boundaries); the Æolic occupying the northern portion together with the islands of Lesbos and Tenedos; the Doric occupying the southernmost, together with the neighboring islands of Rhodes and Kos; and the Ionic being planted between them, comprehending Chios, Samos, and the Cyclades islands.

1. *Æolic Emigration.*

The Æolic emigration was conducted by the Pelopids: the original story seems to have been that Orestes himself was at the head of the first batch of colonists, and this version of the event is still preserved by Pindar and by Hellanikus. But the more current narratives represented the descendants of Orestes as chiefs of the expeditions to Æolis,—his illegitimate son Penthilus, by Erigone daughter of Ægisthus, together with Echelatus and Gras, the son and grandson of Penthilus—also Kleues and Malaus, descendants of Agamemnon through another lineage. According to the account given by Strabo, Orestes began the emigration, but died on his route in Arcadia; his son Penthilus, taking the guidance of the emigrants, conducted them by the long land-journey through Bœotia and Thessaly to Thrace; from whence Archelaus, son of Penthilus, led them across the Hellespont, and settled at Daskylium on the Propontis. Gras, son of Archelaus, crossed over to Lesbos and possessed himself of the island. Kleues and Malaus, conducting another body of Achæans, were longer on their journey, and lingered a considerable time near Mount Phrikium in the territory of Lokris; ultimately, however, they passed over by sea to Asia and took possession of Kyme, south of the Gulf of Adramyttium, the most considerable of all the Æolic cities on the continent. From Lesbos and Kyme, the other less considerable Æolic towns, spreading over the region of Ida as well as the Troad, and comprehending the island of Tenedos, are said to have derived their origin.

Though there are many differences in the details, the accounts agree in representing these Æolic settlements as formed by the Achæans expatriated from Laconia under the guidance of the dispossessed Pelopids. We are told that in their journey through Bœotia they received considerable reinforcements, and Strabo adds that the emigrants started from Aulis, the port from whence Agamemnon departed in the expedition against Troy. He also informs us that they missed their course and experienced many losses from nautical ignorance, but we do not know to what particular incidents he alludes.

2. *Ionic Emigration.*

The Ionic emigration is described as emanating from and directed by the Athenians, and connects itself with the previous legendary history of Athens, which must therefore be here briefly recapitulated.

The great mythical hero, Theseus, of whose military prowess and errant exploits we have spoken in a previous chapter, was still more memorable in the eyes of the Athenians as an internal political reformer. He was supposed to have performed for them the inestimable service of transforming Attica out of many states into one. Each deme, or at least a great many out of the whole number, had before his time enjoyed political independence under its own magistrates and assemblies, acknowledging only a federal union with the rest under the presidency of Athens. By a mixture of conciliation and force, Theseus succeeded in putting down all these separate governments, and bringing them to unite in one political system centralized at Athens. He is said to have established a constitutional government, retaining for himself a defined power as king or president, and distributing the people into three classes: Eupatridæ, a sort of sacerdotal noblesse; Geomori and Demiurgi, husbandmen and artisans. Having brought these important changes into efficient working, he commemorated them for his posterity by introducing solemn and appropriate festivals. In confirmation of the dominion of Athens over the Megarid territory, he is said farther to have erected a pillar at the extremity of the latter toward the isthmus, marking the boundary between Peloponnesus and Ionia.

But a revolution so extensive was not consummated without creating much discontent. Menestheus, the rival of Theseus,—the first specimen, as we are told, of an artful demagogue,—took advantage of this feeling to assail and undermine him. Theseus had quitted Attica to accompany and assist his friend Peirithous in his journey down to the under-world, in order to carry off the goddess Persephone,—or (as those who were critical in legendary story preferred recounting) in a journey to the residence of Aidoneus, king of the Molossians in Epirus, to carry off his daughter. In this enterprise Peirithous perished, while Theseus was cast into prison, from whence he was only liberated by the intercession of Herakles. It was during his temporary absence that the Tyndarids, Castor and Pollux, invaded Attica for the purpose of recovering their sister Helen, whom Theseus had, at a former period, taken away from Sparta and deposited at Aphidnæ; and the partisans of Menestheus took advantage both of the absence of Theseus and of the calamity which his licentiousness had brought upon the country, to ruin his popularity with the people. When he returned he found them no longer disposed to endure his dominion, or to continue to him the honors which their previous feelings of gratitude had conferred. Having, therefore, placed his sons under the protection of Elephenor in Eubœa, he sought an asylum with Lykomedes, prince of Scyros, from whom, however, he received nothing but an insidious welcome and a traitorous death.

Menestheus, succeeding to the honors of the expatriated hero, commanded the Athenian troops at the siege of Troy. But, though

he survived the capture, he never returned to Athens—different stories being related of the place where he and his companions settled. During this interval, the feelings of the Athenians having changed, they restored the sons of Theseus, who had served at Troy under Elephenor, and had returned unhurt, to the station and functions of their father. The Theseids Demophoon, Oxyntas, Apheidas, and Thymœtes, had successively filled this post for the space of about sixty years, when the Dorian invaders of Peloponnesus (as has been before related) compelled Melanthus and the Neleid family to abandon their kingdom of Pylus. The refugees found shelter at Athens, where a fortunate adventure soon raised Melanthus to the throne. A war breaking out between the Athenians and Bœotians respecting the boundary tract of Œnoe, the Bœotian king, Xanthus, challenged Thymœtes to single combat: the latter declining to accept it, Melanthus not only stood forward in his place, but practiced a cunning stratagem with such success as to kill his adversary. He was forthwith chosen king, Thymœtes being constrained to resign.

Melanthus and his son, Kodrus, reigned for nearly sixty years, during which their large bodies of fugitives, escaping from the recent invaders throughout Greece, were harbored by the Athenians: so that Attica became populous enough to excite the alarm and jealousy of the Peloponnesian Dorians. A powerful Dorian force, under the command of Aletes from Corinth and Althæmenes from Argos, were accordingly despatched to invade the Athenian territory, in which the Delphian oracle promised them success, provided they abstained from injuring the person of Kodrus. Strict orders were given to the Dorian army that Kodrus should be preserved unhurt; but the oracle had become known among the Athenians, and the generous prince determined to bring death upon himself as a means of salvation to his country. Assuming the disguise of a peasant, he intentionally provoked a quarrel with some of the Dorian troops, who slew him without suspecting his real character. No sooner was this event known than the Dorian leaders, despairing of success, abandoned their enterprise, and evacuated the country. In retiring, however, they retained possession of Megara, where they established permanent settlers; and which became from this moment Dorian,—seemingly at first a dependency of Corinth, though it afterward acquired its freedom and became an autonomous community. This memorable act of devoted patriotism, analogous to that of the daughters of Erechtheus at Athens, and of Menœkeus at Thebes, entitled Kodrus to be ranked among the most splendid characters in Grecian legend.

Kodrus is numbered as the last king of Athens: his descendants were styled Archons, but they held that dignity for life—a practice which prevailed during a long course of years afterward. Medon and Neileus, his two sons, having quarreled about the succession, the Delphian oracle decided in favor of the former; upon which the

latter, affronted at the preference, resolved upon seeking a new home. There were at this moment many dispossessed sections of Greeks, and an adventitious population accumulated in Attica, who were anxious for settlements beyond sea. The expeditions which now set forth to cross the Ægean, chiefly under the conduct of members of the Kodrid family, composed collectively the memorable Ionic emigration, of which the Ionians, recently expelled from Peloponnesus, formed a part, but, as it would seem, only a small part; for we hear of many quite distinct races, some renowned in legend, who withdraw from Greece amidst this assemblage of colonists. The Kadmeians, the Minyæ of Orchomenus, the Abantes of Eubœa, the Dryopes; the Molossi, the Phokians, the Bœotians, the Arcadian Pelasgians, and even the Dorians of Epidaurus—are represented as furnishing each a proportion of the crews of these emigrant vessels. Nor were the results unworthy of so mighty a confluence of different races. Not only the Cyclades islands in the Ægean, but the great islands of Samos and Chios, near the Asiatic coast, and ten different cities on the coast of Asia Minor, from Miletus on the south to Phokæa in the north, were founded, and all adopted the Ionic name. Athens was the metropolis or mother-city of all of them: Androklus and Neileus, the Œkists of Ephesus and Miletus, and probably other Œkists also started from the Prytaneium at Athens, with those solemnities, religious and political, which usually marked the departure of a swarm of Grecian colonists.

Other mythical families, besides the heroic lineage of Neleus and Nestor, as represented by the sons of Kodrus, took a leading part in the expedition. Herodotus mentions Lykian chiefs, descendants from Glaukus son of Hippolochus, and Pausanias tells us of Philotas descendant of Peneleos, who went at the head of a body of Thebans: both Glaukus and Peneleos are commemorated in the Iliad. And it is a remarkable fact mentioned by Pausanias (though we do not know on what authority), that the inhabitants of Phokæa—which was the northernmost city of Ionia on the borders of Æolis, and one of the last founded—consisting mostly of Phokian colonists under the conduct of the Athenians Philogenes and Dæmon, were not admitted into the pan-Ionic Amphiktyony until they consented to choose for themselves chiefs of the Kodrid family. Prokles, the chief who conducted the Ionic emigrants from Epidaurus to Samos, was said to be of the lineage of Ion, son of Xuthus.

Of the twelve Ionic states constituting the pan-Ionic Amphiktyony —some of them among the greatest cities in Hellas—I shall say no more at present, as I have to treat of them again when I come upon historical ground.

3. *Doric Emigrations.*

The Æolic and Ionic emigrations are thus both presented to us as direct consequences of the event called the return of the Herakleids: and, in like manner, the formation of the Dorian Hexapolis in the south-western corner of Asia Minor: Kos, Knidus, Halicarnassus, and Rhodes, with its three separate cities, as well as the Dorian establishments in Krete, Melos, and Thera, are all traced more or less directly to the same great revolution.

Thera, more especially, has its root in the legendary world. Its Œkist was Theras, a descendant of the heroic lineage of Œdipus and Kadmus, and maternal uncle of the young kings of Sparta, Eurysthenes and Prokles, during whose minority he had exercised the regency. On their coming of age his functions were at an end; but being unable to endure a private station, he determined to put himself at the head of a body of emigrants. Many came forward to join him, and the expedition was further reinforced by a body of interlopers, belonging to the Minyæ, of whom the Lacedæmonians were anxious to get rid. These Minyæ had arrived in Laconia, not long before, from the island of Lemnos, out of which they had been expelled by the Pelasgian fugitives from Attica. They landed without asking permission, took up their abode and began to "light their fires" on Mount Taygetus. When the Lacedæmonians sent to ask who they were and wherefore they had come, the Minyæ replied that they were sons of the Argonauts who had landed at Lemnos, and that, being expelled from their own homes, they thought themselves entitled to solicit an asylum in the territory of their fathers; they asked, withal, to be admitted to share both the lands and the honors of the state. The Lacedæmonians granted the request, chiefly on the ground of a common ancestry—their own great heroes, the Tyndarids, having been enrolled in the crew of the Argo: the Minyæ were then introduced as citizens into the tribes, received lots of land, and began to intermarry with the pre-existing families. It was not long, however, before they became insolent: they demanded a share in the kingdom (which was the venerated privilege of the Herakleids), and so grossly misconducted themselves in other ways that the Lacedæmonians resolved to put them to death, and began by casting them into prison. While the Minyæ were thus confined, their wives, Spartans by birth, and many of them daughters of the principal men, solicited permission to go in and see them: leave being granted, they made use of the interview to change clothes with their husbands, who thus escaped and fled again to Mount Taygetus. The greater number of them quitted Laconia, and marched to Triphylia in the western regions of Peloponnesus, from whence they expelled the Paroreatæ and the Kaukones, and founded six towns of their own, of which Lepreum was the chief. A certain proportion, however, by permission of the Lacedæmonians, joined Theras and departed

with him to the island of Kalliste, then possessed by Phœnician inhabitants who were descended from the kinsmen and companions of Kadmus, and who had been left there by that prince, when he came forth in search of Europa, eight generations preceding. Arriving thus among men of kindred lineage with himself, Theras met with a fraternal reception, and the island derived from him the name, under which it is historically known, of Thera.

Such is the foundation-legend of Thera, believed both by the Lacedæmonians and by the Theræans, and interesting as it brings before us, characteristically as well as vividly, the persons and feelings of the mythical world,—the Argonauts, with the Tyndarids as their children. In Lepreum, as in the other towns of Triphylia, the descent from the Minyæ of old seems to have been believed in the historical times, and the mention of the river Minyeius in those regions by Homer tended to confirm it. But people were not unanimous as to the legend by which that descent should be made out; while some adopted the story just cited from Herodotus, others imagined that Chloris, who had come from the Minyeian town of Orchomenus as the wife of Neleus to Pylus, had brought with her a body of her countrymen.

These Minyæ, from Lemnos and Imbros, appear again as portions of another narrative respecting the settlement of the colony of Melos. It has already been mentioned that, when the Herakleids and the Dorians invaded Laconia, Philonomus, an Achæan, treacherously betrayed to them the country, for which he received as his recompense the territory of Amyklæ. He is said to have peopled this territory by introducing detachments of Minyæ from Lemnos and Imbros, who, in the third generation after the return of the Herakleids, became so discontented and mutinous, that the Lacedæmonians resolved to send them out of the country as emigrants, under their chiefs, Polis and Delphus. Taking the direction of Krete, they stopped in their way to land a portion of their colonists on the island of Melos, which remained throughout the historical times a faithful and attached colony of Lacedæmon. On arriving in Krete, they are said to have settled at the town of Gortyn. We find, moreover, that other Dorian establishments, either from Lacedæmon or Argos, were formed in Krete, and Lyktos in particular is noticed, not only as a colony of Sparta, but as distinguished for the analogy of its laws and customs. It is even said that Krete, immediately after the Trojan war, had been visited by the wrath of the gods, and depopulated by famine and pestilence, and that, in the third generation afterwards, so great was the influx of immigrants, that the entire population of the island was renewed with the exception of the Eteokretes at Polichnæ and Præsus.

There were Dorians in Krete in the time of the Odyssey: Homer mentions different languages and different races of men; Eteokretes, Kydones, Dorians, Achæans, and Pelasgians, as all co-existing in

the island, which he describes to be populous, and to contain ninety cities. A legend given by Andron, based seemingly upon the statement of Herodotus, that Dorus the son of Hellen had settled in Histiæotis, ascribed the first introduction of the three last races to Tektaphus son of Dorus—who had led forth from that country a colony of Dorians, Achæans, and Pelasgians, and had landed in Krete during the reign of the indigenous king Kres. This story of Andron so exactly fits on to the Homeric Catalogue of Kretan inhabitants, that we may reasonably presume it to have been designedly arranged with reference to that Catalogue, so as to afford some plausible account, consistently with the received legendary chronology, how there came to be Dorians in Krete before the Trojan war—the Dorian colonies, after the return of the Herakles, being, of course, long posterior in supposed order of time. To find a leader sufficiently early for his hypothesis, Andron ascends to the primitive Eponymus Dorus, to whose son, Tektaphus, he ascribes the introduction of a mixed colony of Dorians, Achæans, and Pelasgians into Krete. These are the exact three races enumerated in the Odyssey, and the king Kres, whom Andron affirms to have been then reigning in the island, represents the Eteokretes and Kydones in the list of Homer. The story seems to have found favor among native Kretan historians, as it doubtless serves to obviate what would otherwise be a contradiction in the legendary chronology.

Another Dorian emigration from Peloponnesus to Krete, which extended also to Rhodes and Kos, is further said to have been conducted by Althæmenes, who had been one of the chiefs in the expedition against Attica in which Kodrus perished. This prince, a Herakleid and third in descent from Temenus, was induced to expatriate by a family quarrel, and conducted a body of Dorian colonists from Argos first to Krete, where some of them remained; but the greater number accompanied him to Rhodes, in which island, after expelling the Karian possessors, he founded the three cities of Lindus, Ialysus, and Kamairus.

It is proper here to add that the legend of the Rhodian archæologists respecting their Œkist Althæmenes, who was worshiped in the island with heroic honors, was something totally different from the preceding. Althæmenes was a Kretan, son of the king Katreus, and grandson of Minos. An oracle predicted to him that he would one day kill his father: eager to escape so terrible a destiny, he quitted Krete, and conducted a colony to Rhodes, where the famous temple of the Atabyrian Zeus, on the lofty summit of Mount Atabyrum, was ascribed to his foundation, built so as to command a view of Krete. He had been settled on the island for some time, when his father Katreus, anxious again to embrace his only son, followed him from Krete: he landed in Rhodes during the night without being known, and a casual collision took place between his attendants and the islanders. Althæmenes hastened to the shore to assist in repelling

the supposed enemies, and in the fray had the misfortune to kill his aged father.

Either the emigrants who accompanied Althæmenes, or some other Dorian colonists afterward, are reported to have settled at Kos, Knidus, Karpathus, and Halikarnassus. To the last-mentioned city, however, Anthes of Trœzen is assigned as the œkist: the emigrants who accompanied him were said to have belonged to the Dymanian tribe, one of the three tribes always found in a Doric state: and the city seems to have been characterized as a colony sometimes of Trœzen, sometimes of Argos.

We thus have the Æolic, the Ionic, and the Doric colonial establishments in Asia, all springing out of the legendary age, and all set forth as consequences, direct or indirect, of what is called the return of the Herakleids, or the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus. According to the received chronology, they are succeeded by a period, supposed to comprise nearly three centuries, which is almost an entire blank, before we reach authentic chronology and the first recorded Olympiad—and they thus form the concluding events of the mythical world, out of which we now pass into historical Greece, such as it stands at the last-mentioned epoch. It is by these migrations that the parts of the Hellenic aggregate are distributed into the places which they occupy at the dawn of historical daylight—Dorians, Arcadians, Ætolo-Eleians, and Achæans, sharing Peloponnesus unequally among them—Æolians, Ionians, and Dorians, settled both in the islands of the Ægean and the coast of Asia Minor. The return of the Herakleids, as well as the three emigrations, Æolic, Ionic, and Doric, present the legendary explanation, suitable to the feelings and belief of the people, showing how Greece passed from the heroic races who besieged Troy and Thebes, piloted the adventurous Argo, and slew the monstrous boar of Kalydon—to the historical races, differently named and classified, who furnished victors to the Olympic and Pythian games.

A patient and learned French writer, M. Raoul Rochette—who construes all the events of the heroic age, generally speaking, as so much real history, only making allowance for the mistakes and exaggerations of poets,—is greatly perplexed by the blank and interruption which this supposed continuous series of history presents, from the return of the Herakleids down to the beginning of the Olympiads. He cannot explain to himself so long a period of absolute quiescence, after the important incidents and striking adventures of the heroic age. If there happened nothing worthy of record during this long period—as he presumes from the fact that nothing has been transmitted—he concludes that this must have arisen from the state of suffering and exhaustion in which previous wars and revolution had left the Greeks; a long interval of complete inaction being required to heal such wounds.

Assuming M. Rochette's view of the heroic ages to be correct,

and reasoning upon the supposition that the adventures ascribed to the Grecian heroes are matters of historical reality, transmitted by tradition from a period of time four centuries before the recorded Olympiads, and only embellished by describing poets—the blank which he here dwells upon is, to say the least of it, embarrassing and unaccountable. It is strange that the stream of tradition, if it had once begun to flow, should (like several of the rivers in Greece) be submerged for two or three centuries and then reappear. But when we make what appears to me the proper distinction between legend and history, it will be seen that a period of blank time between the two is perfectly conformable to the conditions under which the former is generated. It is not the immediate past, but a supposed remote past, which forms the suitable atmosphere of mythical narrative,—a past originally quite undetermined in respect to distance from the present, as we see in the Iliad and Odyssey. And even when we come down to the genealogical poets, who affect to give a certain measure of bygone time, and a succession of person as well as events, still the names whom they most delight to honor and upon whose exploits they chiefly expatiate, are those of the ancestral gods and heroes of the tribe and their supposed contemporaries; ancestors separated by a long lineage from the present hearer. The gods and heroes were conceived as removed from him by several generations, and the legendary matter which was grouped around them appeared only the more imposing when exhibited at a respectful distance, beyond the days of father and grandfather and of all known predecessors. The Odes of Pindar strikingly illustrate this tendency. We thus see how it happened that between the times assigned to heroic adventure and those of historical record, there existed an intermediate blank, filled with inglorious names; and how among the same society, which cared not to remember proceedings of fathers and grandfathers, there circulated much popular and accredited narrative respecting real or supposed ancestors long past and gone. The obscure and barren centuries which immediately precede the first recorded Olympiad, form the natural separation between the legendary return of the Herakleids and the historical wars of Sparta against Messene;—between the province of legend wherein matter of fact (if any there be) is so intimately combined with its accompaniments of fiction, as to be undistinguishable without the aid of extrinsic evidence—and that of history, where some matters of fact can be ascertained, and where a sagacious criticism may be usefully employed in trying to add to their number.

CHAPTER XIX.

APPLICATION OF CHRONOLOGY TO GRECIAN LEGEND.

I NEED not repeat what has already been sufficiently set forth in the preceding pages, that the mass of Grecian incident anterior to 776 B.C. appears to me not reducible either to history or to chronology, and that any chronological systems which may be applied to it must be essentially uncertified and illusory. It was, however, chronologized in ancient times, and has continued to be so in modern; and the various schemes employed for this purpose may be found stated and compared in the first volume (the last published) of Mr. Fynes Clinton's Fasti Hellenici. There were among the Greeks, and there still are among modern scholars, important differences as to the dates of the principal events: Eratosthenes dissented both from Herodotus and from Phanias and Kallimachus, while Larcher and Raoul Rochette (who follow Herodotus) stand opposed to O. Müller and to Mr. Clinton. That the reader may have a general conception of the order in which these legendary events were disposed, I transcribe from the Fasti Hellenici a double chronological table, contained in p. 139, in which the dates are placed in series from Phoroneus to the Olympiad of Corœbus in B.C. 776—in the first column according to the system of Eratosthenes, in the second according to that of Kallimachus.

"The following table (says Mr. Clinton) offers a summary view of the leading periods from Phoroneus to the Olympiad of Corœbus, and exhibits a double series of dates; the one proceeding from the date of Eratosthenes, the other from a date founded on the reduced calculations of Phanias and Kallimachus, which strike out fifty-six years from the amount of Eratosthenes. Phanias, as we have seen, omitted fifty-five years between the return and the registered Olympiads; for so we may understand the account: Kallimachus, fifty-six years between the Olympiad in which Corœbus won. The first column of this table exhibits the *current* years before and after the fall of Troy: in the second column of dates the *complete* intervals are expressed."

Wherever chronology is possible, researches such as those of Mr. Clinton, which have conduced so much to the better understanding of the later times of Greece, deserve respectful attention. But the ablest chronologist can accomplish nothing unless he is supplied with a certain basis of matters of fact, pure and distinguishable from fiction, and authenticated by witnesses, both knowing the truth and willing to declare it. Possessing this preliminary stock, he may reason from it to refute distinct falsehoods and to correct partial mistakes: but if all the original statements submitted to him contain truth (at least wherever there *is* truth), in a sort of chemical combi-

Years before the Fall of Troy.		Years intervening between the different events.	B.C. Eratosth.	B.C. Kallimach.
(570)*	*Phoroneus*, p. 19	287	(1753)	(1697)
(283)	*Danaus*, p. 73	33	(1466)	(1410)
(283)	*Pelasgus V.* p. 13, 88			
(250)	*Deukalion*, p. 42	50	(1433)	(1377)
(200)	*Erechtheus*	50	(1383)	(1327)
(200)	*Dardanus*, p. 88			
(150)	*Azan, Aphidas, Elatus*	20	(1333)	(1277)
130	*Kadmus*, p. 85	30	1313	1257
(100)	*Pelops*	22	(1283)	(1227)
78	Birth of *Hercules*	36	1261	1205
(42)	Argonauts	12	(1225)	(1169)
30	First Theban war, p. 51, h	4	1213	1157
26	Death of *Hercules*	2	1209	1153
24	Death of *Eurystheus*, p. 106, x	4	1207	1151
20	Death of *Hyllus*	2y 9m	1203	1147
18	Accession of *Agamemnon*	2	1206	1144
16	Second Theban war, p. 87, 1	6	1198	1142
10	Trojan expedition (9y 1m)	9	1192	1136
Years after the Fall of Troy.				
	Troy taken	7	1183	1127
8	*Orestes* reigns at Argos in the 8th year	52	1176	1120
60	The *Thessali* occupy Thessaly	20	1124	1068
60	The *Bœoti* return to Bœotia in the 60th year			
60	Æolic migration under *Penthilus*			
80	Return of the *Heraclidæ* in the 80th year	29	1104	1048
109	*Aletes* reigns at Corinth, p. 130, m	1	1075	1019
110	Migration of *Theras*	29	1074	1018
131	Lesbos occupied 130 years after the era	8	1053	997
139	Death of *Codrus*	1	1045	989
140	Ionic migration 60 years after the return	11	1044	988
151	Cyme founded 150 years after the era	18	1033	977
169	Smyrna, 168 years after the era, p. 105, t	131	1015	959
		229		
300	Olympiad of *Iphitus*	108	684	828
300		52		
408	Olympiad of *Corœbus*	..	776	776
352				

* These dates, distinguished from the rest by brackets, are proposed as mere conjectures, founded upon the probable length of generations.

nation with fiction, which he has no means of decomposing,—he is in the condition of one who tries to solve a problem without data: he is first obliged to construct his own data, and from them to extract his conclusions. The statements of the epic poets, our only original witnesses in this case, correspond to the description here given. Whether the proportion of truth contained in them be smaller or greater, it is at all events unassignable,—and the constant and intimate admixture of fiction is both indisputable in itself, and indeed essential to the purpose and profession of those from whom the tales proceed. Of such a character are all the deposing witnesses, even where their tales agree; and it is out of a heap of such tales, not agreeing, but discrepant in a thousand ways, and without a morsel of pure authenticated truth,—that the critic is called upon to draw out a methodical series of historical events adorned with chronological dates.

If we could imagine a modern critical scholar transported into Greece at the time of the Persian war—endued with his present habits of appreciating historical evidence, without sharing in the religious or patriotic feelings of the country—and invited to prepare, out of the great body of Grecian epic which then existed, a history and chronology of Greece anterior to 776 B.C., assigning reasons as well for what he admitted as for what he rejected—I feel persuaded that he would have judged the undertaking to be little better than a process of guess-work. But the modern critic finds that not only Pherekydes and Hellanikus, but also Herodotus and Thucydides have either attempted the task or sanctioned the belief that it was practicable,—a matter not at all surprising, when we consider both their narrow experience of historical evidence and the powerful ascendency of religion and patriotism in predisposing them to antiquarian belief,—and he therefore accepts the problem as they have bequeathed it, adding his own efforts to bring it to a satisfactory solution. Nevertheless, he not only follows them with some degree of reserve and uneasiness, but even admits important distinctions quite foreign to their habits of thought. Thucydides talks of the deeds of Hellen and his sons with as much confidence as we now speak of William the Conqueror: Mr. Clinton recognizes Hellen with his sons Dorus, Æolus, and Xuthus, as fictitious persons. Herodotus recites the great heroic genealogies down from Kadmus and Danaus with a belief not less complete in the higher members of the series than in the lower: but Mr. Clinton admits a radical distinction in the evidence of events before and after the first recorded Olympiad, or 776 B.C.—"the first date in Grecian chronology (he remarks, p. 123) which can be fixed upon *authentic evidence*"—the highest point to which Grecian chronology, *reckoning upward*, can be carried. Of this important epoch in Grecian development,—the commencement of authentic chronological life,—Herodotus and Thucydides had no knowledge or took no account: the later chronologists, from Timæus

downward, noted it, and made it serve as the basis of their chronological comparisons, so far as it went: but neither Eratosthenes nor Apollodorus seem to have recognized (though Varro and Africanus did recognize) a marked difference in respect of certainty or authenticity between the period before and the period after.

In further illustration of Mr. Clinton's opinion that the first recorded Olympiad is the earliest date which can be fixed upon authentic evidence, we have in p. 138 the following just remarks in reference to the dissentient views of Eratosthenes, Phanias and Kallimachus, about the date of the Trojan war: "The chronology of Eratosthenes (he says), founded on a careful comparison of circumstances, and approved by those to whom the same stores of information were open, is entitled to our respect. But we must remember that a conjectural date can never rise to the authority of evidence; that what is accepted as a substitute for testimony, is not an equivalent: witnesses only can prove a date, and in the want of these, the knowledge of it is plainly beyond our reach. If, in the absence of a better light, we seek for what is probable, we are not to forget the distinction between conjecture and proof; between what is probable and what is certain. The computation, then, of Eratosthenes for the war of Troy is open to inquiry; and if we find it adverse to the opinions of many preceding writers, who fixed a lower date, and adverse to the acknowledged length of generation in the most authentic dynasties, we are allowed to follow other guides, who give us a lower epoch."

Here Mr. Clinton again plainly acknowledges the want of evidence and the irremediable uncertainty of Grecian chronology before the Olympiads. Now, the reasonable conclusion from his argument is, not simply that "the computation of Eratosthenes was open to inquiry" (which few would be found to deny), but that both Eratosthenes and Phanias had delivered positive opinions upon a point on which no sufficient evidence was accessible, and therefore that neither the one nor the other was a guide to be followed. Mr. Clinton does indeed speak of authentic dynasties prior to the first recorded Olympiad, but if there be any such, reaching up from that period to a supposed point coeval with or anterior to the war of Troy—I see no good reason for the marked distinction which he draws between chronology before and chronology after the Olympiad of Korœbus, or for the necessity which he feels of suspending his upward reckoning at the last-mentioned epoch, and beginning a different process, called "a downward reckoning," from the higher epoch (supposed to be somehow ascertained without any upward reckoning) of the first patriarch from whom such authentic dynasty emanates. Herodotus and Thucydides might well, upon this supposition, ask of Mr. Clinton why he called upon them to alter their method of proceeding at the year 776 B.C., and why they might not be allowed to pursue their "upward chronological reckoning" without inter-

ruption from Leonidas up to Danaus, or from Peisistratus up to Hellen and Deukalion, without any alteration in the point of view. Authentic dynasties from the Olympiads, up to an epoch above the Trojan war, would enable us to obtain chronological proof of the latter date, instead of being reduced (as Mr. Clinton affirms that we are) to "conjecture" instead of proof.

The whole question, as to the value of the reckoning from the Olympiads up to Phoroneus, does in truth turn upon this one point: Are those genealogies which profess to cover the space between the two, authentic and trustworthy or not? Mr. Clinton appears to feel that they are not so, when he admits the essential difference in the character of the evidence, and the necessity of altering the method of computation before and after the first recorded Olympiad; yet in his preface he labors to prove that they possess historical worth and are in the main correctly set forth: moreover, that the fictitious persons, wherever any such are intermingled, may be detected and eliminated. The evidence upon which he relies are: 1. Inscriptions; 2. The early poets.

1. An inscription, being nothing but a piece of writing on marble, carries evidentiary value under the same conditions as a published writing on paper. If the inscriber reports a contemporary fact which he had the means of knowing, and if there be no reason to suspect misrepresentation, we believe this assertion: if, on the other hand, he records facts belonging to a long period before his own time, his authority counts for little, except in so far as we can verify and appreciate his means of knowledge.

In estimating, therefore, the probative force of any inscription the first and most indispensable point is to assure ourselves of its date. Among all the public registers and inscriptions alluded to by Mr. Clinton there is not one which can be positively referred to a date anterior to 776 B.C. The quoit of Iphitus—the public registers at Sparta, Corinth, and Elis—the list of the priestesses of Juno at Argos—are all of a date completely uncertified. O. Müller does, indeed, agree with Mr. Clinton (though in my opinion without any sufficient proof) in assigning the quoit of Iphitus to the age ascribed to that prince: and if we even grant thus much, we shall have an inscription as old (adopting Mr. Clinton's determination of the age of Iphitus) as 828 B.C. But when Mr. Clinton quotes O. Müller as admitting the registers of Sparta, Corinth, and Elis, it is right to add that the latter does not profess to guarantee the authenticity of these documents, or the age at which such registers began to be kept. It is not to be doubted that there were registers of the kings of Sparta carrying them up to Herakles, and of the kings of Elis from Oxylus to Iphitus: but the question is, at what time did these lists begin to be kept continuously? This is a point which we have no means of deciding, nor can we accept Mr Clinton's unsupported conjecture, when he tells us—"*Perhaps* these were begun to be

written as early as B.C. 1048, the probable time of the Dorian conquest." Again he tells us—"At Argos a register was preserved of the priestesses of Juno, which *might be* more ancient than the catalogues of the kings of Sparta or Corinth. That register, from which Hellanikus composed his work, contained the priestesses from the earliest times down to the age of Hellanikus himself. . . . But this catalogue *might have* been commenced as early as the Trojan war itself, and even at a still earlier date." (Pp. x., xi.) Again, respecting the inscriptions quoted by Herodotus from the temple of the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, in which Amphitryon and Laodamas are named, Mr. Clinton says—"They were ancient in the time of Herodotus, which *may* perhaps carry them back 400 years before his time: and in that case they *might* approach within 300 years of Laodamas and within 400 years of the probable time of Kadmus himself."—"It is granted," he adds in a note, "that these inscriptions were *not genuine*, that is, not of the date to which they were assigned by Herodotus himself. But that they were ancient cannot be doubted," etc.

The time when Herodotus saw the temple of the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes can hardly have been earlier than 450 B.C.: reckoning upward from hence to 776 B.C., we have an interval of 326 years: the inscriptions which Herodotus saw may well, therefore, have been *ancient*, without being earlier than the first recorded Olympiad. Mr. Clinton does, indeed, tell us that *ancient* "may perhaps" be construed as 400 years earlier than Herodotus. But no careful reader can permit himself to convert such bare possibility into a ground of inference, and to make it available, in conjunction with other similar possibilities before enumerated, for the purpose of showing that there really existed inscriptions in Greece of a date anterior to 776 B.C. Unless Mr. Clinton can make out this he can derive no benefit from inscriptions, in his attempt to substantiate the reality of the mythical persons or of the mythical events.

The truth is that the Herakleid pedigree of the Spartan kings (as has been observed in a former chapter) is only one out of the numerous divine and heroic genealogies with which the Hellenic world abounded,—a class of documents which become historical evidence only so high in the descending series as the names composing them are authenticated by contemporary, or nearly contemporary, enrollment. At what period this enrollment began, we have no information. Two remarks, however, may be made, in reference to any approximate guess as to the time when actual registration commenced: First, that the number of names in the pedigree, or the length of past time which it professes to embrace, affords no presumption of any superior antiquity in the time of registration. Secondly, that looking to the acknowledged paucity and rudeness of Grecian writing, even down to the 60th Olympiad (540 B.C.), and to the absence of the habit of writing, as well as the low estimate of its

value which such a state of things argues, the presumption is that written enrollment of family genealogies did not commence until a long time after 776 B.C., and the obligation of proof falls upon him who maintains that it commenced earlier. And this second remark is farther borne out when we observe that there is no registered list, except that of the Olympic victors, which goes up even so high as 776 B.C. The next list which O. Müller and Mr. Clinton produce is that of the Karneonikæ or victors at the Karneian festival, which reaches only up to 676 B.C.

If Mr. Clinton, then, makes little out of inscriptions to sustain his view of Grecian history and chronology anterior to the recorded Olympiads, let us examine the inferences which he draws from his other source of evidence—the early poets. And here it will be found: First, that, in order to maintain the credibility of these witnesses, he lays down positions respecting historical evidence both indefensible in themselves, and especially inapplicable to the early times of Greece; secondly, that his reasoning is at the same time inconsistent—inasmuch as it includes admissions which, if properly understood and followed out, exhibit these very witnesses as habitually, indiscriminately, and unconsciously mingling truth and fiction, and, therefore, little fit to be believed upon their solitary and unsupported testimony.

To take the second point first, he says (Introduction, pp. ii., iii.): "The authority even of the genealogies has been called in question by many able and learned persons, who reject Danaus, Kadmus, Hercules, Theseus, and many others, as fictitious persons. It is evident that any fact would come from the hands of the poets embellished with many fabulous additions: and fictitious genealogies were undoubtedly composed. Because, however, some genealogies were fictitious, we are not justified in concluding that all were fabulous . . . . . In estimating, then, the historical value of the genealogies transmitted by the early poets, we may take a middle course; not rejecting them as wholly false, nor yet implicitly receiving all as true. The genealogies *contain many real persons*, but these are *incorporated with many fictitious names*. The fictions, however, will have a basis of truth: the genealogical expression may be false, but the connection which it describes is real. Even to those who reject the whole as fabulous, the exhibition of the early times, which is presented in this volume, may still be not unacceptable: because it is necessary to the right understanding of antiquity that the opinions of the Greeks concerning their own origin should be set before us, even if these are erroneous opinions, and that their story should be told as they have told it themselves. The names preserved by the ancient genealogies may be considered of three kinds: either they were the name of a race or clan converted into the name of an individual, or they were altogether fictitious, or, lastly, they were real historical names. An attempt is made in the four genealogical tables inserted below to distinguish these three classes of names. . . . Of those who are left in the third class (i.e., the real) all are not entitled to remain there. But I have only placed in the third class those names concerning which there seemed to be little doubt. The rest are left to the judgment of the reader."

Pursuant to this principle of division, Mr. Clinton furnishes four genealogical tables, in which the names of persons representing races are printed in capital letters and those of purely fictitious persons in italics. And these tables exhibit a curious sample of the intimate commixture of fiction with that which he calls truth: real son and mythical father, real husband and mythical wife, or vice versa.

Upon Mr. Clinton's tables we may remark:

1. The names singled out as fictitious are distinguished by no common character, nor any mark either assignable or defensible, from those which are left as real. To take an example (p. 40), why is Itonus the first pointed out as a fiction, while Itonus the second, together with Physcus, Cynus, Salmoneus, Ormenus, etc., in the same page, are preserved as real, all of them being eponyms of towns just as much as Itonus?

2. If we are to discard Hellen, Dorus, Æolus, Ion, etc., as not being real individual persons, but expressions for personified races, why are we to retain Kadmus, Danaus, Hyllus, and several others, who are just as much eponyms of races and tribes as the four abovementioned? Hyllus, Pamphylus, and Dymas are the eponyms of the three Dorian tribes, just as Hoples and the other three sons of Ion were of the four Attic tribes; Kadmus and Danaus stand in the same relation to the Kadmeians and Danaans as Argus and Achæus to the Argeians and Achæans. Besides, there are many other names really eponymous, which we cannot now recognize to be so, in consequence of our imperfect acquaintance with the subdivisions of the Hellenic population, each of which, speaking generally, had its god or hero, to whom the original of the name was referred. If, then, eponymous manes are to be excluded from the category of reality, we shall find that the ranks of the real men will be thinned to a far greater extent than is indicated by Mr. Clinton's tables.

3. Though Mr. Clinton does not carry out consistently either of his disfranchizing qualifications among the names and persons of the old mythes, he nevertheless, presses them far enough to strike out a sensible proportion of the whole. By conceding thus much to modern skepticism, he has departed from the point of view of Hellanikus and Herodotus, and the ancient historians generally; and it is singular that the names, which he has been the most forward to sacrifice, are exactly those to which they were most attached and which it would have been most painful to their faith to part with—I mean the eponymous heroes. Neither Herodotus, nor Hellanikus, nor Eratosthenes, nor any one of the chronological reckoners of antiquity, would have admitted the distinction which Mr. Clinton draws between persons

real and persons fictitious in the old mythical world, though they might perhaps occasionally, on special grounds, call in question the existence of some individual characters among the mythical ancestry of Greece; but they never dreamt of that general severance into real and fictitious persons which forms the principle of Mr. Clinton's "middle course." Their chronological computations for Grecian antiquity assumed that the mythical characters in their full and entire sequence were all real persons. Setting up the entire list as real, they calculated so many generations to a century, and thus determined the number of centuries which separated themselves from the gods, the heroes, and the autochthonous men who formed in their view the historical starting-point. But as soon as it is admitted that the personages in the mythical world are divisible into two classes, partly real and partly fictitious, the integrity of the series is broken up, and it can be no longer employed as a basis for chronological calculation. In the estimate of the ancient chronologers, three succeeding persons of the same lineage—grandfather, father, and son—counted for a century; and this may pass in a rough way, so long as you are thoroughly satisfied that they are all real persons; but if, in the succession of persons A, B, C, you strike out B as a fiction, the continuity of data necessary for chronological computation disappears. Now, Mr. Clinton is inconsistent with himself in this—that, while he abandons the unsuspecting historical faith of the Grecian chronologers, he nevertheless continues his chronological computations upon the data of that ancient faith—upon the assumed reality of all the persons constituting his ante-historical generations. What becomes, for example, of the Herakleid genealogy of the Spartan kings, when it is admitted that eponymous persons are to be canceled as fictions; seeing that Hyllus, through whom those kings traced their origin to Herakles, comes in the most distinct manner under that category, as much so as Hoples, the son of Ion? It will be found that, when we once cease to believe in the mythical world as an uninterrupted and unalloyed succession of real individuals, it becomes unfit to serve as a basis for chronological computations, and that Mr. Clinton, when he mutilated the data of the ancient chronologists, ought at the same time to have abandoned their problems as insoluble. Genealogies of real persons, such as Herodotus and Eratosthenes believed in, afford a tolerable basis for calculations of time, within certain limits of error; "genealogies containing many real persons, but incorporated with many fictitious names" (to use the language just cited from Mr. Clinton), are essentially unavailable for such a purpose.

It is right here to add that I agree in Mr. Clinton's view of these eponymous persons: I admit with him that "the genealogical expression may often be false, when the connection which it describes is real." Thus, for example, the adoption of Hyllus by Ægimius, the father of Pamphylus and Dymas, to the privileges of a son and to a

third fraction of his territories, may reasonably be construed as a mythical expression of the fraternal union of the three Dorian tribes, Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes: so about the relationship of Ion and Achæus, of Dorus and Æolus. But if we put this construction on the name of Hyllus, or Ion, or Achæus, we cannot at the same time employ either of these persons as units in chronological reckoning; nor is it consistent to recognize them in the lump as members of a distinct class and yet to enlist them as real individuals in measuring the duration of past time.

4. Mr. Clinton, while professing a wish to tell the story of the Greeks as they have told it themselves, seems unconscious how capitally his point of view differs from theirs. The distinction which he draws between real and fictitious persons would have appeared unreasonable, not to say offensive, to Herodotus or Eratosthenes. It is undoubtedly right that the early history (if so it is to be called) of the Greeks should be told as they have told it themselves, and with that view I have endeavored in the previous narrative, as far as I could, to present the primitive legends in their original color and character—pointing out at the same time the manner in which they were transformed and distilled into history by passing through the retort of later annalists. It is the legend as thus transformed which Mr. Clinton seems to understand as the story told by the Greeks themselves—which cannot be admitted to be true, unless the meaning of the expression be specially explained. In his general distinction, however, between the real and fictitious persons of the mythical world, he departs essentially from the point of view even of the later Greeks. And if he had consistently followed out that distinction in his particular criticisms, he would have found the ground slipping under his feet in his upward march even to Troy—not to mention the series of eighteen generations farther up to Phoroneus; but he does *not* consistently follow it out, and therefore in practice he deviates little from the footsteps of the ancients.

Enough has been said to show that the witnesses upon whom Mr. Clinton relies blend truth and fiction habitually, indiscriminately and unconsciously, even upon his own admission. Let us now consider the positions which he lays down respecting historical evidence He says (Introduction, pp. vi., vii.):

"We may acknowledge as real persons all those whom there is no reason for rejecting. The presumption is in favor of the early tradition, if no argument can be brought to overthrow it. The persons may be considered real, when the description of them is consonant with the state of the country at that time; when no national prejudice or vanity could be concerned in inventing them; when the tradition is consistent and general; when rival or hostile tribes concur in the leading facts: when the acts ascribed to the person (divested of their poetical ornament) enter into the political system of the age, or form the basis of other transactions which fall within

known historical times. Kadmus and Danaus appear to be real persons; for it is conformable to the state of mankind and perfectly credible that Phœnician and Egyptian adventurers, in the ages to which these persons are ascribed, should have found their way to the coasts of Greece: and the Greeks (as already observed) had no motive from any national vanity to feign these settlements. Hercules was a real person. His acts were recorded by those who were not friendly to the Dorians; by Achæans and Æolians and Ionians, who had no vanity to gratify in celebrating the hero of a hostile and rival people. His descendants in many branches remained in many states down to the historical times. His son Tlepolemus and his grandson and great-grandson Cleodæus and Aristomachus are acknowledged (i.e., by O. Müller) to be real persons; and there is no reason that can be assigned for receiving these which will not be equally valid for establishing the reality both of Hercules and Hyllus. Above all, Hercules is authenticated by the testimonies both of the Iliad and Odyssey."

These positions appear to me inconsistent with sound views of the conditions of historical testimony. According to what is here laid down, we are bound to accept as real all the persons mentioned by Homer, Arktinus, Lesches, the Hesiodic poets, Eumelus, Asius, etc., unless we can adduce some positive ground in each particular case to prove the contrary. If this position be a true one, the greater part of the history of England, from Brute the Trojan down to Julius Cæsar, ought at once to be admitted as valid and worthy of credence. What Mr. Clinton here calls the *early tradition* is, in point of fact, the narrative of these early poets. The word *tradition* is an equivocal word, and begs the whole question; for while in its obvious and literal meaning it implies only something handed down, whether truth or fiction, it is tacitly understood to imply a tale descriptive of some real matter of fact, taking its rise at the time when that fact happened, and originally accurate, but corrupted by subsequent oral transmission. Understanding, therefore, by Mr. Clinton's words *early tradition*, the tales of the old poets, we shall find his position totally inadmissible—that we are bound to admit the persons or statements of Homer and Hesiod as real, unless where we can produce reasons to the contrary. To allow this would be to put them upon a par with good contemporary witnesses; for no greater privilege can be claimed in favor even of Thucydides than the title of his testimony to be believed unless where it can be contradicted on special grounds. The presumption in favor of an asserting witness is either strong, or weak, or positively nothing according to the compound ratio of his means of knowledge, his moral and intellectual habits, and his motive to speak the truth. Thus, for instance, when Hesiod tells us that his father quitted the Æolic Kyme and came to Askra in Bœotia, we may fully believe him; but when he describes to us the battles between the Olympic gods and the Titans, or between Herakles and Kyknus—or when Homer depicts the efforts of Hector, aided by Apollo, for the defense of Troy, and the struggles of Achilles and Odysseus, with the assistance of Here and Poseidon, for the destruction of that city, events professedly long past and gone—we cannot presume either of them to be in any way worthy of belief. It cannot be shown that they possessed any means of knowledge, while it is certain that they could have no motive to consider historical truth: their object was to satisfy an uncritical appetite for narrative, and to interest the emotions of their hearers. Mr. Clinton says that "the persons may be considered real when the description of them is consistent with the state of the country at that time." But he has forgotten, first, that we know nothing of the state of the country except what these very poets tell us; next, that fictitious persons may be just as consonant to the state of the country as real persons. While, therefore, on the one hand, we have no independent evidence either to affirm or to deny that Achilles or Agamemnon are consistent with the state of Greece or Asia Minor at a certain supposed date, 1183 B.C.,—so on the other hand, even assuming such consistency to be made out, this of itself would not prove them to be real persons.

Mr. Clinton's reasoning altogether overlooks the existence of *plausible fiction*—fictitious stories which harmonize perfectly well with the general course of facts, and which are distinguished from matters of fact not by any internal character, but by the circumstance that matter of fact has some competent and well-informed witness to authenticate it, either directly or through legitimate inference. Fiction may be, and often is, extravagant and incredible; but it may also be plausible and specious, and in that case there is nothing but the want of an attesting certificate to distinguish it from truth. Now, all the tests which Mr. Clinton proposes as guarantees of the reality of the Homeric persons will be just as well satisfied by plausible fiction as by actual matter of fact; the plausibility of the fiction consists in its satisfying those and other similar conditions. In most cases, the tales of the poets *did* fall in with the existing current of feelings in their audience. "prejudice and vanity" are not the only feelings, but, doubtless, prejudice and vanity were often appealed to, and it was from such harmony of sentiment that they acquired their hold on men's belief. Without any doubt the Iliad appealed most powerfully to the reverence for ancestral gods and heroes among the Asiatic colonists who first heard it: the temptation of putting forth an interesting tale is quite a sufficient stimulus to the invention of the poet, and the plausibility of the tale a sufficient passport to the belief of the hearers. Mr. Clinton talks of "consistent and general tradition." But that the tale of a poet, when once told with effect and beauty, acquired general belief is no proof that it was founded on fact: otherwise, what are we to say to the divine legends, and to the large portion of the Homeric narrative which Mr. Clinton him-

self sets aside as untrue under the designation of "poetical ornament?" When a mythical incident is recorded as "forming the basis" of some known historical fact or institution—as, for instance, the successful stratagem by which Malanthus killed Xanthus in the battle on the boundary, as recounted in my last chapter—we may adopt one of two views: we may either treat the incident as real, and as having actually given occasion to what is described as its effect—or we may treat the incident as a legend imagined in order to assign some plausible origin of the reality—"Aut ex re nomen, aut ex vocabulo fabula." In cases where the legendary incident is referred to a time long anterior to any records—as it commonly is—the second mode of proceeding appears to me far more consonant to reason and probability than the first. It is to be recollected that all the persons and facts, here defended as matter of real history by Mr. Clinton, are referred to an age long preceding the first beginning of records.

I have already remarked that Mr. Clinton shrinks from his own rule in treating Kadmus and Danaus as real persons, since they are as much eponyms of tribes or races as Dorus and Hellen. And if he can admit Herakles to be a real man, I do not see upon what reason he can consistently disallow any one of the mythical personages, for there is not one whose exploits are more strikingly at variance with the standard of historical probability. Mr. Clinton reasons upon the supposition that "Hercules was a *Dorian* hero:" but he was Achæan and Kadmeian as well as Dorian, though the legends respecting him are different in all the three characters. Whether his son Tlepolemus and his grandson Kleodæus belong to the category of historical men, I will not take upon me to say, though O. Müller (in my opinion without any warranty) appears to admit it; but Hyllus certainly is not a real man, if the canon of Mr. Clinton himself respecting the eponyms is to be trusted. "The descendants of Hercules," observes Mr. Clinton, "remained in many states down to the historical times." So did those of Zeus and Apollo, and of that god whom the historian Hekatæus recognized as his progenitor in the sixteenth generation: the titular kings of Ephesus, in the historical times, as well as Peisistratus, the despot of Athens, traced their origin up to Æolus and Hellen, yet Mr. Clinton does not hesitate to reject Æolus and Hellen as fictitious persons. I dispute the propriety of quoting the Iliad and Odyssey (as Mr. Clinton does) in evidence of the historic personality of Hercules. For even with regard to the ordinary men who figure in those poems, we have no means of discriminating the real from the fictitious; while the Homeric Herakles is unquestionably more than an ordinary man,—he is the favorite son of Zeus, from his birth predestined to a life of labor and servitude, as preparation for a glorious immortality. Without doubt the poet himself believed in the reality of Hercules, but it was a reality clothed with superhuman attributes.

Mr. Clinton observes (Introd. p. ii.) that, "because some genealogies were fictitious, we are not justified in concluding that all were fabulous." It is no way necessary that we should maintain so extensive a position: it is sufficient that all are fabulous so far as concerns gods and heroes—*some* fabulous throughout—and none ascertainably true, for the period anterior to the recorded Olympiads. How much, or what particular portions, may be true, no one can pronounce. The gods and heroes are, from our point of view, essentially fictitious; but from the Grecian point of view they were the most real (if the expression may be permitted, i.e., clung to with the strongest faith) of all the members of the series. They not only formed parts of the genealogy as originally conceived, but were in themselves the grand reason why it was conceived,—as a golden chain to connect the living man with a divine ancestor. The genealogy, therefore, taken as a whole (and its value consists in its being taken as a whole) was from the beginning a fiction; but the names of the father and grandfather of the living man, in whose day it first came forth, were doubtless those of real men. Wherever, therefore, we can verify the date of a genealogy, as applied to some living person, we may reasonably presume the two lowest members of it to be also those of real persons: but this has no application to the time anterior to the Olympiads—still less to the pretended times of the Trojan war, the Kalydonian boar-hunt, or the deluge of Deukalion. To reason (as Mr. Clinton does, Introd. p. vi.),—"Because Aristomachus was a real man, therefore his father Cleodæus, his grandfather Hyllus, and so farther upward, etc., must have been real men,"—is an inadmissible conclusion. The historian Hekatæus was a real man, and doubtless his father, Hegesander, also; but it would be unsafe to march up his genealogical ladder fifteen steps to the presence of the ancestral god of whom he boasted: the upper steps of the ladder will be found broken and unreal. Not to mention that the inference, from real son to real father, is inconsistent with the admissions in Mr. Clinton's own genealogical tables; for he there inserts the names of several mythical fathers as having begotten real historical sons.

The general authority of Mr. Clinton's book, and the sincere respect which I entertain for his elucidations of the later chronology, have imposed upon me the duty of assigning those grounds on which I dissent from his conclusions prior to the first recorded Olympiad. The reader who desires to see the numerous and contradictory guesses (they deserve no better name) of the Greeks themselves in the attempt to chronologize their mythical narratives, will find them in the copious notes annexed to the first half of his first volume. As I consider all such researches not merely as fruitless in regard to any trustworthy result, but as serving to divert attention from the genuine form and really illustrative character of Grecian legend, I have not thought it right to go over the same ground in the present work.

Differing as I do, however, from Mr. Clinton's views on this subject, I concur with him in deprecating the application of etymology (Introd. pp. xi., xii.) as a general scheme of explanation to the characters and events of Greek legend. Among the many causes which operated as suggestives and stimulants to Greek fancy in the creation of these interesting tales, doubtless etymology has had its share; but it cannot be applied (as Hermann, above all others, has sought to apply it) for the purpose of imparting supposed sense and system to the general body of mythical narrative. I have already remarked on this topic in a former chapter.

It would be curious to ascertain at what time, or by whom, the earliest continuous genealogies, connecting existing persons with the supposed antecedent age of legend, were formed and preserved. Neither Homer nor Hesiod mention any verifiable *present* persons or circumstances: had they done so, the age of one or other of them could have been determined upon good evidence, which we may fairly presume to have been impossible, from the endless controversies upon this topic among ancient writers. In the Hesiodic Works and Days, the heroes of Troy and Thebes are even presented as an extinct race, radically different from the poet's own contemporaries, who are a new race, far too depraved to be conceived as sprung from the loins of the heroes; so that we can hardly suppose Hesiod (though his father was a native of the Æolic Kyme) to have admitted the pedigree of the Æolic chiefs, as reputed descendants of Agamemnon. Certain it is that the earliest poets did not attempt to measure or bridge over the supposed interval, between their own age and the war of Troy, by any definite series of fathers and sons: whether Eumelus or Asius made any such attempt, we cannot tell, but the earliest continuous backward genealogies which we find mentioned are those of Pherekydes, Hellanikus, and Herodotus. It is well known that Herodotus, in his manner of computing the upward genealogy of the Spartan kings, assigns the date of the Trojan war to a period 800 years earlier than himself, equivalent about to B.C. 1270–1250; while the subsequent Alexandrine chronologists, Eratosthenes and Apollodorus, place that event in 1184 and 1183 B.C.; and the Parian marble refers it to an intermediate date different from either—1209 B.C. Ephorus, Phanias, Timæus, Kleitarchus, and Durius had each his own conjectural date; but the computation of the Alexandrine chronologists was the most generally followed by those who succeeded them, and seems to have passed to modern times as the received date of this great legendary event—though some distinguished inquirers have adopted the epoch of Herodotus, which Larcher has attempted to vindicate in an elaborate, but feeble, dissertation. It is unnecessary to state that in my view the inquiry has no other value except to illustrate the ideas which guided the Greek mind, and to exhibit its progress from the days of Homer to those of Herodotus. For it argues a considerable

mental progress when men begin to methodize the past, even though they do so on fictitious principles, being as yet unprovided with those records which alone could put them on a better course. The Homeric man was satisfied with feeling, imagining, and believing particular incidents of a supposed past, without any attempt to graduate the line of connection between them and himself: to introduce fictitious hypotheses and media of connection is the business of a succeeding age, when the stimulus of rational curiosity is first felt, without any authentic materials to supply it. We have then the form of history operating upon the matter of legend—the transition-state between legend and history; less interesting, indeed, than either separately, yet necessary as a step between the two.

CHAPTER XX.

STATE OF SOCIETY AND MANNERS AS EXHIBITED IN GRECIAN LEGEND.

THOUGH the particular persons and events chronicled in the legendary poems of Greece are not to be regarded as belonging to the province of real history, those poems are nevertheless full of instruction as pictures of life and manners; and the very same circumstances which divest their composers of all credibility as historians render them so much the more valuable as unconscious expositors of their own contemporary society. While professedly describing an uncertified past, their combinations are involuntarily borrowed from the surrounding present. For among communities such as those of the primitive Greeks, without books, without means of extended travel, without acquaintance with foreign languages and habits, the imagination even of highly gifted men was naturally enslaved by the circumstances around them to a far greater degree than in the later days of Solon or Herodotus; insomuch that the characters which they conceived and the scenes which they described would, for that reason, bear a stronger generic resemblance to the realities of their own time and locality. Nor was the poetry of that age addressed to lettered and critical authors, watchful to detect plagiarism, sated with simple imagery, and requiring something of novelty or peculiarity in every fresh production. To captivate their emotions, it was sufficient to depict with genius and fervor the more obvious manifestations of human adventure or suffering, and to idealize that type of society, both private and public, with which the hearers around were familiar. Even in describing the gods, where a great degree of latitude and deviation might have been expected, we see that Homer introduces

into Olympus the passions, the caprices, the love of power and patronage, the alternation of dignity and weakness, which animated the bosom of an ordinary Grecian chief; and this tendency, to reproduce in substance the social relations to which he had been accustomed, would operate still more powerfully when he had to describe simply human characters—the chief and his people, the warrior and his comrades, the husband, wife, father, and son—or the imperfect rudiments of judicial and administrative proceeding. That his narrative on all these points, even with fictitious characters and events, presents a close approximation to general reality there can be no reason to doubt. The necessity under which he lay of drawing from a store, then happily unexhausted, of personal experience and observation, is one of the causes of that freshness and vivacity of description for which he stands unrivaled, and which constituted the imperishable charm of the Iliad and Odyssey from the beginning to the end of Grecian literature.

While, therefore, we renounce the idea of chronologizing or historicizing the events of Grecian legend, we may turn them to profit as valuable memorials of that state of society, feeling, and intelligence which must be to us the starting-point of the history of the people. Of course, the legendary age, like all those which succeeded it, had its antecedent causes and determining conditions; but of these we know nothing, and we are compelled to assume it as a primary fact for the purpose of following out its subsequent changes. To conceive absolute beginning or origin (as Niebuhr has justly remarked) is beyond the reach of our faculties: we can neither apprehend nor verify anything beyond progress, or development, or decay—change from one set of circumstances to another, operated by some definite combination of physical or moral laws. In the case of the Greeks, the legendary age, as the earliest in any way known to us, must be taken as the initial state from which this series of changes commences. We must depict its prominent characteristics as well as we can, and show—partly how it serves to prepare, partly how it forms a contrast to set off—the subsequent ages of Solon, of Perikles, and of Demosthenes.

1. The political condition which Grecian legend everywhere presents to us is, in its principal features, strikingly different from that which had become universally prevalent among the Greeks in the time of the Peloponnesian war. Historical oligarchy, as well as democracy, agreed in requiring a certain established system of government, comprising these three elements—specialized functions, temporary functionaries, and ultimate responsibility (under some forms or other) to the mass of qualified citizens—either a senate or an ecclesia, or both. There were, of course, many and capital distinctions between one government and another, in respect to the qualification of the citizen, the attributes and efficiency of the general assembly, the admissibility to power, etc.; and men might often be

dissatisfied with the way in which these questions were determined in their own city. But in the mind of every man, some determining rule or system—something like what in modern times is called a *constitution*—was indispensable to any government entitled to be called legitimate, or capable of creating in the mind of a Greek a feeling of moral obligation to obey it. The functionaries who exercised authority under it might be more or less competent or popular; but his personal feelings toward them were commonly lost in his attachment or aversion to the general system. If any energetic man could by audacity or craft break down the constitution and render himself permanent ruler according to his own will and pleasure—even though he might govern well, he could never inspire the people with any sentiment of duty toward him. His scepter was illegitimate from the beginning; and even the taking of his life, far from being interdicted by that moral feeling which condemned the shedding of blood in other cases, was considered meritorious. Nor could he be mentioned in the language except by a name (*τύραννος*, *despot*) which branded him as an object of mingled fear and dislike.

If we carry our eyes back from historical to legendary Greece, we find a picture the reverse of what has been here sketched. We discern a government in which there is little or no scheme or system,—still less any idea of responsibility to the governed,—but in which the main-spring of obedience on the part of the people consists in their personal feeling and reverence toward the chief. We remark, first and foremost, the King; next, a limited number of subordinate kings or chiefs; afterward, the mass of armed freemen, husbandmen, artisans, freebooters, etc.; lowest of all, the free laborers for hire and the bought slaves. The king is not distinguished by any broad or impassable boundary from the other chiefs, to each of whom the title *basileus* is applicable as well as to himself; his supremacy has been inherited from his ancestors, and passes by descent, as a general rule, to his eldest son, having been conferred upon the family as a privilege by the favor of Zeus. In war, he is the leader, foremost in personal prowess, and directing all military movements; in peace, he is the general protector of the injured and oppressed; he farther offers up those public prayers and sacrifices which are intended to obtain for the whole people the favor of the gods. An ample domain is assigned to him as an appurtenance of his lofty position, while the produce of his fields and his cattle is consecrated in part to an abundant, though rude, hospitality. Moreover, he receives frequent presents, to avert his enmity, to conciliate his favor, or to buy off his exactions; and when plunder is taken from the enemy, a large previous share, comprising probably the most alluring female captive, is reserved for him apart from the general distribution.

Such is the position of the king in the heroic times of Greece,—the only person (if we except the heralds and priests, each both special and subordinate) who is then presented to us as clothed with

any individual authority,—the person by whom all the executive functions, then few in number, which the society requires, are either performed or directed. His personal ascendency—derived from divine countenance bestowed both upon himself individually and upon his race, and probably from accredited divine descent—is the salient feature in the picture. The people hearken to his voice, embrace his propositions, and obey his orders: not merely resistance but even criticism upon his acts, is generally exhibited in an odious point of view, and is, indeed, never heard of except from some one or more of the subordinate princes. To keep alive and justify such feelings in the public mind, however, the king must himself possess various accomplishments, bodily and mental, and that, too, in a superior degree. He must be brave in the field, wise in the council, and eloquent in the agora; he must be endued with bodily strength and activity above other men, and must be an adept, not only in the use of his arms, but also in those athletic exercises which the crowd delight to witness. Even the more homely varieties of manual acquirements are an addition to his character,—such as the craft of the carpenter or shipwright, the straight furrowing of the plowman, or the indefatigable persistence of the mower without repose or refreshment throughout the longest day. The conditions of voluntary obedience, during the Grecian heroic times, are family descent with personal force and superiority, mental as well as bodily, in the chief, coupled with the favor of the gods: an old chief, such as Peleus and Laërtes, cannot retain his position. But, on the other hand, where these elements of force are present, a good deal of violence, caprice, and rapacity is tolerated: the ethical judgment is not exact in scrutinizing the conduct of individuals so pre-eminently endowed. As in the case of the gods, the general epithets of *good*, *just*, etc., are applied to them as euphemisms arising from submission and fear, being not only not suggested, but often pointedly belied, by their particular acts. These words signify the man of birth, wealth, influence, and daring, whose arm is strong to destroy or to protect, whatever may be the turn of his moral sentiments; while the opposite epithet, *bad*, designates the poor, lowly, and weak, from whose dispositions, be they ever so virtuous, society has little either to hope or to fear.

Aristotle, in his general theory of government, lays down the position that the earliest sources of obedience and authority among mankind are personal, exhibiting themselves most perfectly in the type of paternal supremacy; and that, therefore, the kingly government, as most conformable to this stage of social sentiment, became probably the first established everywhere. And in fact it still continued in his time to be generally prevalent among the non-Hellenic nations immediately around; though the Phœnician cities and Carthage, the most civilized of all non-Hellenic states, were republics. Nevertheless, so completely were the feelings about kingship reversed among

his contemporary Greeks that he finds it difficult to enter into the voluntary obedience paid by his ancestors to their early heroic chiefs. He cannot explain to his own satisfaction how any one man should have been so much superior to the companions around him as to maintain such immense personal ascendency: he suspects that in such small communities great merit was very rare, so that the chief had few competitors. Such remarks illustrate strongly the revolution which the Greek mind had undergone during the preceding centuries, in regard to the internal grounds of political submission. But the connecting link between the Homeric and the republican schemes of government is to be found in two adjuncts of the Homeric royalty, which are now to be mentioned—the Boule, or council of chiefs, and the Agora, or general assembly of freemen.

These two meetings, more or less frequently convoked and interwoven with the earliest habits of the primitive Grecian communities, are exhibited in the monuments of the legendary age as opportunities for advising the king, and media for promulgating his intentions to the people, rather than as restraints upon his authority. Unquestionably they must have conduced in practice to the latter result as well as to the former; but this is not the light in which the Homeric poems describe them. The chiefs, kings, princes, or gerontes—for the same word in Greek designates both an old man and a man of conspicuous rank and position—compose the council, in which, according to the representations in the Iliad, the resolutions of Agamemnon, on the one side, and of Hector, on the other, appear uniformly to prevail. The harshness and even contempt with which Hector treats respectful opposition from his ancient companion Polydamas—the desponding tone and conscious inferiority of the latter, and the unanimous assent which the former obtains, even when quite in the wrong—all this is clearly set forth in the poem; while in the Grecian camp we see Nestor tendering his advice in the most submissive and delicate manner to Agamemnon, to be adopted or rejected as the "king of men" might determine. The council is a purely consultative body, assembled not with any power of peremptorily arresting mischievous resolves of the king, but solely for his information and guidance. He himself is the presiding (boulephorus or) member of council; the rest, collectively as well as individually, are his subordinates.

We proceed from the council to the agora. According to what seems the received custom, the king, after having talked over his intentions with the former, proceeds to announce them to the people. The heralds make the crowd sit down in order, and enforce silence: any one of the chiefs or councilors—but as it seems, no one else—is allowed to address them: the king first promulgates his intentions, which are then open to be commented upon by others. But in the Homeric agora no division of affirmative or negative voices ever takes place, nor is any formal resolution ever adopted. The nullity

of positive function strikes us even more in the agora than in the council. It is an assembly for talk, communication, and discussion to a certain extent by the chiefs, in presence of the people as listeners and sympathizers—often for eloquence, and sometimes for quarrel—but here its ostensible purposes end.

The agora in Ithaka, in the second book of the Odyssey, is convened by the youthful Telemachus, at the instigation of Athene, not for the purpose of submitting any proposition, but in order to give formal and public notice to the suitors to desist from their iniquitous intrusion and pillage of his substance, and to absolve himself further, before gods and men, from all obligations toward them, if they refuse to comply. For the slaughter of the suitors in all the security of the festive hall and banquet (which forms the catastrophe of the Odyssey) was a proceeding involving much that was shocking to Grecian feeling, and therefore required to be preceded by such ample formalities as would leave both the delinquents themselves without the shadow of excuse, and their surviving relatives without any claim to the customary satisfaction. For this special purpose Telemachus directs the heralds to summon an agora; but what seems most of all surprising is, that none had ever been summoned or held since the departure of Odysseus himself, an interval of twenty years. "No agora or session has taken place among us," says the gray-headed Ægyptius, who opens the proceedings, "since Odysseus went on shipboard: and now who is he that has called us together? what man, young or old, has felt such a strong necessity? Has he received intelligence from our absent warriors, or has he other public news to communicate? He is our good friend for doing this: whatever his projects may be, I pray Zeus to grant him success." Telemachus, answering the appeal forthwith, proceeds to tell the assembled Ithakans that he has no public news to communicate, but that he has convoked them upon his own private necessities. Next, he sets forth pathetically the wickedness of the suitors, calls upon them personally to desist, and upon the people to restrain them, and concludes by solemnly warning them that, being henceforward free from all obligation toward them, he will invoke the avenging aid of Zeus, so "that they may be slain in the interior of his own house, without bringing upon him any subsequent penalty."

We are not, of course, to construe the Homeric description as anything more than an *ideal*, approximating to actual reality. But, allowing all that can be required for such a limitation, it exhibits the agora more as a special medium of publicity and intercommunication, from the king to the body of the people, than as including any idea of responsibility on the part of the former or restraining force on the part of the latter, however such consequences may indirectly grow out of it. The primitive Grecian government is essentially monarchical, reposing on personal feeling and divine right: the memorable dictum in the Iliad is borne out by all that we hear of the

actual practice: "The rule of many is not a good thing: let us have one ruler only—one king,—him to whom Zeus has given the scepter and the tutelary sanctions."

The second book of the Iliad, full as it is of beauty and vivacity, not only confirms our idea of the passive, recipient, and listening character of the agora, but even presents a repulsive picture of the degradation of the mass of the people before the chiefs. Agamemnon convokes the agora for the purpose of immediately arming the Grecian host, under a full impression that the gods have at last determined forthwith to crown his arms with complete victory. Such impression has been created by a special visit of Oneirus (the Dream-god), sent by Zeus during his sleep—being, indeed, an intentional fraud on the part of Zeus, though Agamemnon does not suspect its deceitful character. At this precise moment, when he may be conceived to be more than usually anxious to get his army into the field and snatch the prize, an unaccountable fancy seizes him that, instead of inviting the troops to do what he really wishes, and encouraging their spirits for this one last effort, he will adopt a course directly contrary; he will try their courage by professing to believe that the siege had become desperate, and that there was no choice except to go on shipboard and flee. Announcing to Nestor and Odysseus, in preliminary council, his intention to hold this strange language, he at the same time tells them that he relies upon them to oppose it and counteract its effect upon the multitude. The agora is presently assembled, and the king of men pours forth a speech full of dismay and despair, concluding by a distinct exhortation to all present to go aboard and return home at once. Immediately, the whole army, chiefs as well as people, break up and proceed to execute his orders: every one rushes off to get his ship afloat, except Odysseus, who looks on in mournful silence and astonishment. The army would have been quickly on its voyage home had not the goddesses Here and Athene stimulated Odysseus to an instantaneous interference. He hastens among the dispersing crowd and diverts them from their purpose of retreat: to the chiefs he addresses flattering words, trying to shame them by gentle expostulation: but the people he visits with harsh reprimand and blows from his scepter, thus driving them back to their seats in the agora.

Amid the dissatisfied crowd thus unwillingly brought back, the voice of Thersites is heard the longest and the loudest,—a man ugly, deformed, and unwarlike, but fluent in speech, and especially severe and unsparing in his censure of the chiefs, Agamemnon, Achilles, and Odysseus. Upon this occasion, he addresses to the people a speech denouncing Agamemnon for selfish and greedy exaction generally, but particularly for his recent ill-treatment of Achilles—and he endeavors, moreover, to induce them to persist in their scheme of departure. In reply, Odysseus not only rebukes Thersites sharply for his impudence in abusing the commander-in-chief, but threatens

that, if ever such behavior is repeated, he will strip him naked, and thrash him out of the assembly with disgraceful blows; as an earnest of which he administers to him at once a smart stroke with the studded scepter, imprinting its painful mark in a bloody weal across his back. Thersites, terrified and subdued, sits down weeping, while the surrounding crowd deride him, and express the warmest approbation of Odysseus for having thus by force put the reviler to silence.

Both Odysseus and Nestor then address the agora, sympathizing with Agamemnon for the shame which the retreat of the Greeks is about to inflict upon him, and urging emphatically upon every one present the obligation of persevering until the siege shall be successfully consummated. Neither of them animadverts at all upon Agamemnon, either for his conduct toward Achilles, or for his childish freak of trying the temper of the army.

There cannot be a clearer indication than this description—so graphic in the original poem—of the true character of the Homeric agora. The multitude who compose it are listening and acquiescent, not often hesitating, and never refractory to the chief. The fate which awaits a presumptuous critic, even where his virulent reproaches are substantially well founded, is plainly set forth in the treatment of Thersites; while the unpopularity of such a character is attested even more by the excessive pains which Homer takes to heap upon him repulsive personal deformities than by the chastisement of Odysseus—he is lame, bald, crook-backed, of misshapen head, and squinting vision.

But we cease to wonder at the submissive character of the agora when we read the proceedings of Odysseus toward the people themselves,—his fine words and flattery addressed to the chiefs, and his contemptuous reproof and manual violence toward the common men, at a moment when both were doing exactly the same thing,—fulfilling the express wish of Agamemnon, upon whom Odysseus does not offer a single comment. This scene, which excited a sentiment of strong displeasure among the democrats of historical Athens, affords a proof that the feeling of personal dignity, of which philosophic observers in Greece—Herodotus, Xenophon, Hippokrates, and Aristotle—boasted as distinguishing the free Greek citizen from the slavish Asiatic, was yet undeveloped in the time of Homer. The ancient epic is commonly so filled with the personal adventures of the chiefs, and the people are so commonly depicted as simple appendages attached to them, that we rarely obtain a glimpse of the treatment of the one apart from the other, such as this memorable Homeric agora affords.

There remains one other point of view in which we are to regard the agora of primitive Greece—as the scene in which justice was ministered. The king is spoken of as constituted by Zeus, the great judge of society. He has received from Zeus the scepter, and along

with it the powers of command and sanction: the people obey these commands and enforce these sanctions under him, enriching him at the same time with lucrative presents and payments. Sometimes the king separately, sometimes the kings or chiefs or gerontes in the plural number, are named as deciding disputes, and awarding satisfaction to complainants; always, however, in public, in the midst of the assembled agora. In one of the compartments of the shield of Achilles, the details of a judicial scene are described. While the agora is full of an eager and excited crowd, two men are disputing about the fine of satisfaction for the death of a murdered man—one averring, the other denying, that the fine had already been paid, and both demanding an inquest. The gerontes are ranged on stone seats, in the holy circle, with two talents of gold lying before them, to be awarded to such of the litigants as shall make out his case to their satisfaction. The heralds with their scepters, repressing the warm sympathies of the crowd in favor of one or other of the parties, secure an alternate hearing to both. This interesting picture completely harmonizes with the brief allusion of Hesiod to the judicial trial—doubtless a real trial—between himself and his brother Perses. The two brothers disputed about their paternal inheritance, and the cause was carried to be tried by the chiefs in agora; but Perses bribed them, and obtained an unjust verdict for the whole. So at least Hesiod affirms in the bitterness of his heart; earnestly exhorting his brother not to waste a precious time, required for necessary labors, in the unprofitable occupation of witnessing and abetting litigants in the agora—for which (he adds) no man has proper leisure, unless his subsistence for the year beforehand be safely treasured up in his garners. He repeats more than once his complaints of the crooked and corrupt judgments of which the kings were habitually guilty; dwelling upon abuse of justice as the crying evil of his day, and predicting as well as invoking the vengeance of Zeus to repress it. And Homer ascribes the tremendous violence of the autumnal storms to the wrath of Zeus against those judges who disgrace the agora with their wicked verdicts.

Though it is certain that in every state of society the feelings of men when assembled in multitude will command a certain measure of attention, yet we thus find the Agora, in judicial matters still more than in political, serving merely the purpose of publicity. It is the king who is the grand personal mover of Grecian heroic society. He is on earth the equivalent of Zeus in the agora of the gods: the supreme god of Olympus is in the habit of carrying on his government with frequent publicity, of hearing some dissentient opinions, and of allowing himself occasionally to be wheedled by Aphrodite or worried into compliance by Here; but his determination is at last conclusive, subject only to the overruling interference of the Mœræ or Fates. Both the society of gods and the various societies of men are, according to the conceptions of Grecian legend,

carried on by the personal rule of a legitimate sovereign, who does not derive his title from the special appointment of his subjects, though he governs with their full consent. In fact, Grecian legend presents to us hardly anything else, except these great individual personalities. The race, or nation, is, as it were absorbed into the prince: eponymous persons, especially, are not merely princes, but fathers and representative unities, each the equivalent of that greater or less aggregate to which he gives name.

But though in the primitive Grecian government the king is the legitimate as well as the real sovereign, he is always conceived as acting through the council and agora. Both the one and the other are established and essential media through which his ascendency is brought to bear upon the society; the absence of such assemblies is the test and mark of savage men, as in the case of the Cyclopes. Accordingly he must possess qualities fit to act with effect upon those two assemblies; wise reason for the council, unctuous eloquence for the agora. Such is the *ideal* of the heroic government—a king not merely full of valor and resource as a soldier, but also sufficiently superior to those around him to insure both the deliberate concurrence of the chiefs and the hearty adhesion of the masses. That this picture is not, in all individual cases, realized, is unquestionable; but the endowments so often predicated of good kings show it to have been the type present to the mind of the describer. Xenophon, in his Cyropædia, depicts Cyrus as an improved edition of the Homeric Agamemnon—"a good king and a powerful soldier," thus idealizing the perfection of personal government.

It is important to point out these fundamental conceptions of government, discernible even before the dawn of Grecian history, and identified with the social life of the people. It shows us that the Greeks, in their subsequent revolutions and in the political experiments which their countless autonomous communities presented, worked upon pre-existing materials—developing and exalting elements which had been at first subordinate, and suppressing or remodeling on a totally new principle that which had been originally predominant. When we approach historical Greece, we find that (with the exception of Sparta) the primitive, hereditary, unresponsible monarch, uniting in himself all the functions of government, has ceased to reign—while the feeling of legitimacy, which originally induced his people to obey him willingly, has been exchanged for one of aversion toward the character and title generally. The multifarious functions which he once exercised have been parceled out among temporary nominees. On the other hand, the council or senate, and the agora, originally simple media through which the king acted, are elevated into standing and independent sources of authority, controlling and holding in responsibility the various special officers to whom executive duties of one kind or another are confided. The general principle here indicated is common both to the oligarchies and the democracies which grew up in historical Greece. Much as these two governments differed from each other, and many as were the varieties even between one oligarchy or democracy and another, they all stood in equal contrast with the principle of the heroic government. Even in Sparta, where the hereditary kingship lasted, it was preserved with luster and influence exceedingly diminished, and such timely diminution of its power seems to have been one of the essential conditions of its preservation. Though the Spartan kings had the hereditary command of the military forces, yet even in all foreign expeditions they habitually acted in obedience to orders from home; while in affairs of the interior, the superior power of the ephors sensibly overshadowed them. So that, unless possessed of more than ordinary force of character, they seem to have exercised their chief influence as presiding members of the senate.

There is yet another point of view in which it behooves us to take notice of the council and the agora as integral portions of the legendary government of the Grecian communities. We are thus enabled to trace the employment of public speaking, as the standing engine of government, and the proximate cause of obedience, to the social infancy of the nation. The power of speech in the direction of public affairs becomes more and more obvious, developed, and irresistible, as we advance toward the culminating period of Grecian history, the century preceding the battle of Chæroneia. That its development was greatest among the most enlightened sections of the Grecian name, and smallest among the more obtuse and stationary, is matter of notorious fact; and it is not less true that the prevalence of this habit was one of the chief causes of the intellectual eminence of the nation generally. At a time when all the countries around were plunged comparatively in mental torpor, there was no motive sufficiently present and powerful to multiply so wonderfully the productive minds of Greece, except such as arose from the rewards of public speaking. The susceptibility of the multitude to this sort of guidance, their habit of requiring and enjoying the stimulus which it supplied, and the open discussion, combining regular forms with free opposition, of practical matters political as well as judicial—are the creative causes which formed such conspicuous adepts in the art of persuasion. Nor was it only professed orators who were thus produced; didactic aptitude was formed in the background, and the speculative tendencies were supplied with interesting phenomena for observation and combination, at a time when the truths of physical science were almost inaccessible. If the primary effect was to quicken the powers of expression, the secondary, but not less certain result, was to develop the habits of scientific thought. Not only the oratory of Demosthenes, and Perikles, and the colloquial magic of Sokrates, but also the philosophical speculation of Plato, and the systematic politics, rhetoric, and logic

of Aristotle, are traceable to the same general tendencies in the minds of the Grecian people. We find the germ of these expansive forces in the senate and agora of their legendary government. The poets, first epic and then lyric, were the precursors of the orators in their power of moving the feelings of an assembled crowd; while the Homeric poems—the general training-book of educated Greeks—constituted a treasury of direct and animated expression, full of concrete forms and rare in the use of abstractions, and thence better suited to the workings of oratory. The subsequent critics had no difficulty in selecting from the Iliad and Odyssey samples of eloquence in all its phases and varieties.

On the whole, then, the society depicted in the old Greek poems is loose and unsettled, presenting very little of legal restraint, and still less of legal protection—but concentrating such political power as does exist in the hands of a legitimate hereditary king, whose ascendency over the other chiefs is more or less complete according to his personal force and character. Whether that ascendency be greater or less, however, the mass of the people is in either case politically passive, and of little account. Though the Grecian freeman of the heroic age is above the degraded level of the Gallic plebs as described by Cæsar, he is far from rivaling the fierce independence and sense of dignity combined with individual force, which characterize the Germanic tribes before their establishment in the Roman empire. Still less does his condition, or the society in which he moves, correspond to those pleasing dreams of spontaneous rectitude and innocence, in which Tacitus and Seneca indulge with regard to primitive man.

2. The state of moral and social feeling prevalent in legendary Greece exhibits a scene in harmony with the rudimentary political fabrics just described. Throughout the long stream of legendary narrative on which the Greeks looked back as their past history, the larger social motives hardly ever come into play; either individual valor and cruelty, or the personal attachments and quarrels of relatives and war-companions, or the feuds of private enemies, are ever before us. There is no sense of obligation, then, existing between man and man as such, and very little between each man and the entire community of which he is a member; such sentiments are neither operative in the real world, nor present to the imaginations of the poets. Personal feelings, either toward the gods, the king, or some near and known individual, fill the whole of a man's bosom: out of them arise all the motives to beneficence, and all the internal restraints upon violence, antipathy, or rapacity: and special communion, as well as special solemnities, are essential to their existence. The ceremony of an oath, so imposing, so paramount, and so indispensable in those days, illustrates strikingly this principle. And even in the case of the stranger suppliant—in which an apparently spontaneous sympathy manifests itself—the succor and kindness

shown to him arise mainly from his having gone through the consecrated formalities of supplication, such as that of sitting down in the ashes by the sacred hearth, thus obtaining a sort of privilege of sanctuary. That ceremony exalts him into something more than a mere suffering man—it places him in express fellowship with the master of the house, under the tutelary sanctions of Zeus Hiketesios. There is great difference between one form of supplication and another; the suppliant, however, in any form becomes more or less the object of a particular sympathy.

The sense of obligation toward the gods manifests itself separately in habitual acts of worship, sacrifice, and libations, or by votive presents, such as that of the hair of Achilles, which he has pledged to the river god Spercheius, and such as the constant dedicated offerings, which men who stand in urgent need of the divine aid first promise and afterward fulfill. But the feeling toward the gods also appears, and that not less frequently, as mingling itself with and enforcing obligations toward some particular human person. The tie which binds a man to his father, his kinsman, his guest, or any special promise respecting which he has taken the engagement of an oath, is conceived in conjunction with the idea of Zeus, as witness and guarantee; and the intimacy of the association is attested by some surname or special appellation of the god. Such personal feelings composed all the moral influences of which a Greek of that day was susceptible—a state of mind which we can best appreciate by contrasting it with that of the subsequent citizen of historical Athens. In the view of the latter, the great impersonal authority called "The Laws" stood out separately both as guide and sanction, distinct from religious duty or private sympathies; but of this discriminated conception of positive law and positive morality, the germ only can be detected in the Homeric poems. The appropriate Greek word for human laws never occurs. Amid a very wavering phraseology we can detect a gradual transition from the primitive idea of a personal goddess Themis, attached to Zeus, first to his sentence or orders called Themistes, and next by a still farther remove to various established customs, which those sentences were believed to sanctify—the authority of religion and that of custom coalescing into one indivisible obligation.

The family relations, as we might expect, are set forth in our pictures of the legendary world as the grand sources of lasting union and devoted attachment. The paternal authority is highly reverenced; the son who lives to years of maturity repays by affection to his parents the charge of his maintenance in infancy, which the language notes by a special word; while, on the other hand, the Erinnys, whose avenging hand is put in motion by the curse of a father or mother, is an object of deep dread.

In regard to marriage, we find the wife occupying a station of great dignity and influence, though it was the practice for the

husband to purchase her by valuable presents to her parents—a practice extensively prevalent among early communities, and treated by Aristotle as an evidence of barbarism. She even seems to live less secluded and to enjoy a wider sphere of action than was allotted to her in historical Greece. Concubines are frequent with the chiefs, and occasionally the jealousy of the wife breaks out in reckless excess against her husband, as may be seen in the tragical history of Phœnix. The continence of Laertes, from fear of displeasing his wife Antikleia, is especially noticed. A large portion of the romantic interest which Grecian legend inspires is derived from the women: Penelope, Andromache, Helen, Klytæmnestra, Eriphyle, Iokasta, Hekabe, etc., all stand in the foreground of the picture, either from their virtues, their beauty, their crimes, or their sufferings.

Not only brothers, but also cousins, and the more distant blood-relations and clansmen, appear connected together by a strong feeling of attachment, sharing among them universally the obligation of mutual self-defense and revenge in the event of injury to any individual of the race. The legitimate brothers divide between them by lot the paternal inheritance—a bastard brother receiving only a small share; he is, however, commonly very well treated, though the murder of Phokus by Telamon and Peleus constitutes a flagrant exception. The furtive pregnancy of young women, often by a god, is one of the most frequently recurring incidents in the legendary narratives; and the severity with which such a fact, when discovered, is visited by the father, is generally extreme. As an extension of the family connection, we read of larger unions called the phratry and the tribe, which are respectfully but not frequently mentioned.

The generous readiness with which hospitality is afforded to the stranger who asks for it, the facility with which he is allowed to contract the peculiar connection of guest with his host, and the permanence with which that connection, when created by partaking of the same food and exchanging presents, is maintained even through a long period of separation, and even transmitted from father to son—these are among the most captivating features of the heroic society. The Homeric chief welcomes the stranger who comes to ask shelter in his house, first gives him refreshment, and then inquires his name and the purpose of his voyage. Though not inclined to invite strangers to his house, he cannot repel them when they spontaneously enter it craving a lodging. The suppliant is also commonly a stranger, but a stranger under peculiar circumstances; who proclaims his own calamitous and abject condition, and seeks to place himself in a relation to the chief whom he solicits something like that in which men stand to the gods. Onerous as such special tie may become to him, the chief cannot decline it, if solicited in the proper form: the ceremony of supplication has a binding effect, and the Erinnyes punish the hard-hearted person who disallows it. A conquered enemy may sometimes throw himself at the feet of his conqueror, and solicit mercy, but he cannot by doing so acquire the character and claims of a suppliant properly so called: the conqueror has free discretion either to kill him, or to spare him and accept a ransom.

There are in the legendary narratives abundant examples of individuals who transgress in particular acts even the holiest of these personal ties, but the savage Cyclops is the only person described as professedly indifferent to them, and careless of that sanction of the gods which in Grecian belief accompanied them all. In fact, the tragical horror which pervades the lineage of Athamas or Kadmus, and which attaches to many of the acts of Herakles, of Peleus, and Telamon, of Jason and Medea, of Atreus and Thyestes, etc., is founded upon a deep feeling and sympathy with those special obligations which conspicuous individuals, under the temporary stimulus of the maddening Ate, are driven to violate. In such conflict of sen timents, between the obligation generally reverenced and the exceptional deviation in an individual otherwise admired, consists the pathos of the story.

These feelings—of mutual devotion between kinsmen and companions in arms—of generous hospitality to the stranger, and of helping protection to the suppliant—constitute the bright spots in a dark age. We find them very generally prevalent among communities essentially rude and barbarous—among the ancient Germans as described by Tacitus, the Druses in Lebanon, the Arabian tribes in the desert, and even the North American Indians.

They are the instinctive manifestations of human sociality, standing at first alone, and for that reason appearing to possess a greater tutelary force than really belongs to them—beneficent, indeed, in a high degree, with reference to their own appropriate period, but serving as a very imperfect compensation for the impotence of the magistrate, and for the absence of any all-pervading sympathy or sense of obligation between man and man. We best appreciate their importance when we compare the Homeric society with that of barbarians like the Thracians, who tattooed their bodies, as the mark of a generous lineage—sold their children for export as slaves—considered robbery, not merely as one admissible occupation among others, but as the only honorable mode of life; agriculture being held contemptible—and, above all, delighted in the shedding of blood as a luxury. Such were the Thracians in the days of Herodotus and Thucydides; and the Homeric society forms a mean term between that which these two historians yet saw in Thrace, and that which they witnessed among their own civilized countrymen.

When, however, among the Homeric men we pass beyond the influence of the private ties above enumerated, we find scarcely any other moralizing forces in operation. The acts and adventures commemorated imply a community wherein neither the protection nor the restraints of law are practically felt, and wherein ferocity, rapine,

and the aggressive propensities generally, seem restrained by no internal counterbalancing scruples. Homicide, especially, is of frequent occurrence, sometimes by open violence, sometimes by fraud: expatriation for homicide is among the most constantly recurring acts of the Homeric poems: and savage brutalities are often ascribed, even to admired heroes, with apparent indifference. Achilles sacrifices twelve Trojan prisoners on the tomb of Patroklus, while his son, Neoptolemus, not only slaughters the aged Priam, but also seizes by the leg the child Astyanax (son of the slain Hector) and hurls him from one of the lofty towers of Troy. Moreover, the celebrity of Autolykus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, in the career of wholesale robbery and perjury, and the wealth which it enabled him to acquire, are described with the same unaffected admiration as the wisdom of Nestor or the strength of Ajax. Achilles, Menelaus, Odysseus, pillage in person whenever they can find an opportunity, employing both force and stratagem to surmount resistance. The vocation of a pirate is recognized as honorable, so that a host, when he asks his guest what is the purpose of his voyage, enumerates enrichment by indiscriminate maritime plunder as among those projects which may naturally enter into his contemplation. Abduction of cattle, and expeditions for unprovoked ravage as well as for retaliation, between neighboring tribes, appear ordinary phenomena: and the established inviolability of heralds seems the only evidence of any settled feeling of obligation between one community and another. While the house and property of Odysseus, during his long absence, enjoys no public protection, those unprincipled chiefs, who consume his substance, find sympathy rather than disapprobation among the people of Ithaka. As a general rule, he who cannot protect himself finds no protection from society: his own kinsmen and immediate companions are the only parties to whom he can look with confidence for support. And, in this respect, the representation given by Hesiod makes the picture even worse. In his emphatic denunciation of the fifth age, that poet deplores not only the absence of all social justice and sense of obligation among his contemporaries, but also the relaxation of the ties of family and hospitality. There are marks of querulous exaggeration in the poem of the Works and Days; yet the author professes to describe the real state of things around him, and the features of his picture, soften them as we may, will still appear dark and calamitous. It is, however, to be remarked that he contemplates a state of peace—thus forming a contrast with the Homeric poems. His copious catalogue of social evils scarcely mentions liability to plunder by a foreign enemy, nor does he compute the chances of predatory aggression as a source of profit.

There are two special veins of estimable sentiment on which it may be interesting to contrast heroic and historical Greece, and which exhibit the latter as an improvement on the former, not less in the affections than in the intellect.

The law of Athens was peculiarly watchful and provident with respect both to the persons and the property of orphan minors; but the description given in the Iliad of the utter and hopeless destitution of the orphan boy, despoiled of his paternal inheritance and abandoned by all the friends of his father, whom he urgently supplicates and who all harshly cast him off, is one of the most pathetic morsels in the whole poem. In reference, again, to the treatment of the dead body of an enemy, we find all the Greek chiefs who come near (not to mention the conduct of Achilles himself) piercing with their spears the corpse of the slain Hector, while some of them even pass disgusting taunts upon it. We may add, from the lost epics, the mutilation of the dead bodies of Paris and Deiphobus by the hand of Menelaus. But at the time of the Persian invasion it was regarded as unworthy of a right-minded Greek to maltreat, in any way, the dead body of an enemy, even where such a deed might seem to be justified on the plea of retaliation. After the battle of Platæa, a proposition was made to the Spartan king Pausanias to retaliate upon the dead body of Mardonius the insults which Xerxes had heaped upon that of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. He indignantly spurned the suggestion, not without a severe rebuke, or rather a half-suppressed menace, toward the proposer: and the feeling of Herodotus himself goes heartily along with him.

The different manner of dealing with homicide presents a third test, perhaps more striking yet, of the change in Grecian feelings and manners during the three centuries preceding the Persian invasion. That which the murderer in the Homeric times had to dread, was, not public prosecution and punishment, but the personal vengeance of the kinsmen and friends of the deceased, who were stimulated by the keenest impulses of honor and obligation to avenge the deed, and were considered by the public as specially privileged to do so. To escape from this danger, he is obliged to flee the country, unless he can prevail upon the incensed kinsmen to accept of a valuable payment (we must not speak of coined money in the days of Homer) as satisfaction for their slain comrade. They may, if they please, decline the offer, and persist in their right of revenge; but if they accept, they are bound to leave the offender unmolested, and he accordingly remains at home without further consequences. The chiefs in agora do not seem to interfere, except to insure payment of the stipulated sum.

Here we recognize once more the characteristic attribute of the Grecian heroic age—the omnipotence of private force tempered and guided by family sympathies, and the practical nullity of that collective sovereign afterward called *The City*—who, in historical Greece, becomes the central and paramount source of obligation, but who appears yet only in the background as a germ of promise for the future. And the manner in which, in the case of homicide, that

germ was developed into a powerful reality, presents an interesting field of comparison with other nations.

For the practice here designated, of leaving the party guilty of homicide to compromise by valuable payment with the relatives of the deceased, and also of allowing to the latter a free choice whether they would accept such compromise or enforce their right of personal revenge—has been remarked in many rude communities, and is particularly memorable among the early German tribes. Among the many separate Teutonic establishments which rose upon the ruins of the western empire of Rome, the right as well as duty of private revenge for personal injury or insult offered to any member of a family—and the endeavor to avert its effects by means of a pecuniary composition levied upon the offender, chiefly as satisfaction to the party injured, but partly also as perquisite to the king—was adopted as the basis of their legislation. This fundamental idea was worked out in elaborate detail as to the valuation of the injury inflicted, wherein one main circumstance was the rank, condition, and power of the sufferer. The object of the legislator was to preserve the society from standing feuds, but at the same time to accord such full satisfaction as would induce the injured person to waive his acknowledged right of personal revenge—the full luxury of which, as it presented itself to the mind of an Homeric Greek, may be read in more than one passage of the Iliad. The German codes begin by trying to bring about the acceptance of a fixed pecuniary composition as a constant voluntary custom, and proceed ultimately to enforce it as a peremptory necessity: the idea of society is at first altogether subordinate, and its influence passes only by slow degrees from amicable arbitration into imperative control.

The Homeric society, in regard to this capital point in human progression, is on a level with that of the German tribes as described by Tacitus. But the subsequent course of Grecian legislation takes a direction completely different from that of the German codes. The primitive and acknowledged right of private revenge (unless where bought off by pecuniary payment), instead of being developed into practical working, is superseded by more comprehensive views of a public wrong requiring public intervention, or by religious fears respecting the posthumous wrath of the murdered person. In historical Athens, the right of private revenge was discountenanced and put out of sight, even so early as the Drakonian legislation, and at last restricted to a few extreme and special cases; while the murderer came to be considered, first as having sinned against the gods, next as having deeply injured the society, and thus at once as requiring absolution and deserving punishment. On the first of these two grounds, he is interdicted from the agora and from all holy places, as well as from public functions, even while yet untried and simply a suspected person; for if this were not done, the wrath of the gods would manifest itself in bad crops and other national calamities. On

the second ground, he is tried before the council of areiopagus, and, if found guilty, is condemned to death, or perhaps to disfranchisement and banishment. The idea of a propitiatory payment to the relatives of the deceased has ceased altogether to be admitted: it is the protection of society which dictates, and the force of society which inflicts, a measure of punishment calculated to deter for the future.

3. The society of legendary Greece includes, besides the chiefs, the general mass of freemen (λαοί), among whom stand out by special names certain professional men, such as the carpenter, the smith, the leather-dresser, the leech, the prophet, the bard, and the fisherman. We have no means of appreciating their condition. Though lots of arable land were assigned in special property to individuals, with boundaries both carefully marked and jealously watched, yet the larger proportion of surface was devoted to pasture. Cattle formed both the chief item in the substance of a wealthy man, the chief means of making payments, and the common ground of quarrels—bread and meat, in large quantities, being the constant food of every one. The estates of the owners were tilled, and their cattle tended mostly by bought slaves, but to a certain degree also by poor freemen called thetes, working for hire and for stated periods. The principal slaves, who were intrusted with the care of large herds of oxen, swine, or goats, were of necessity men worthy of confidence, their duties placing them away from their master's immediate eye. They had other slaves subordinate to them, and appear to have been well treated: the deep and unshaken attachment of Eumæus, the swineherd, and Philœtius, the neatherd, to the family and affairs of the absent Odysseus, is among the most interesting points in the ancient epic. Slavery was a calamity which, in that period of insecurity, might befall any one. The chief who conducted a freebooting expedition, if he succeeded, brought back with him a numerous troop of slaves, as many as he could seize—if he failed, became very likely a slave himself: so that the slave was often by birth of equal dignity with his master—Eumæus was himself the son of a chief, conveyed away when a child by his nurse, and sold by Phœnician kidnappers to Laertes. A slave of this character, if he conducted himself well, might often expect to be enfranchised by his master, and placed in an independent holding.

On the whole, the slavery of legendary Greece does not present itself as existing under a peculiarly harsh form, especially if we consider that all the classes of society were then very much upon a level in point of taste, sentiment, and instruction. In the absence of legal security or an effective social sanction, it is probable that the condition of a slave under an average master may have been as good as that of the free thete. The class of slaves whose lot appears to have been the most pitiable were the females—more numerous than the males, and performing the principal work in the interior of the

house. Not only do they seem to have been more harshly treated than the males, but they were charged with the hardest and most exhausting labor which the establishment of a Greek chief required —they brought in water from the spring, and turned by hand the house-mills, which ground the large quantity of flour consumed in his family. This oppressive task was performed generally by female slaves, in historical as well as in legendary Greece. Spinning and weaving was the constant occupation of women, whether free or slave, of every rank and station: all the garments worn both by men and women were fashioned at home, and Helen as well as Penelope is expert and assiduous at the occupation. The daughters of Keleos at Eleusis go to the well with their basins for water, and Nausikaa, daughter of Alkinous, joins her female slaves in the business of washing her garments in the river. If we are obliged to point out the fierceness and insecurity of an early society, we may at the same time note with pleasure its characteristic simplicity of manners: Rebecca, Rachel, and the daughters of Jethro in the early Mosaic narrative, as well as the wife of the native Macedonian chief (with whom the Temenid Perdiccas, ancestor of Philip and Alexander, first took service on retiring from Argos), baking her own cakes on the hearth, exhibit a parallel in this respect to the Homeric pictures.

We obtain no particulars respecting either the common freemen generally, or the particular class of them called thetes. These latter, engaged for special jobs, or at the harvest and other busy seasons of field labor, seem to have given their labor in exchange for board and clothing: they are mentioned in the same line with the slaves, and were (as has been just observed), probably on the whole little better off. The condition of a poor freeman in those days, without a lot of land of his own, going about from one temporary job to another, and having no powerful family and no social authority to look up to for protection, must have been sufficiently miserable. When Eumæus indulged his expectation of being manumitted by his masters, he thought at the same time that they would give him a wife, a house, and a lot of land near to themselves; without which collateral advantages, simple manumission might perhaps have been no improvement in his condition. To be thete in the service of a very poor farmer is selected by Achilles as the maximum of human hardship: such a person could not give to his thete the same ample food, and good shoes and clothing, as the wealthy chief Eurymachus, while he would exact more severe labor. It was probably among such smaller occupants, who could not advance the price necessary to purchase slaves, and were glad to save the cost of keep when they did not need service, that the thetes found employment: though we may conclude that the brave and strong among these poor freemen found it preferable to accompany some freebooting chief, and to live by the plunder acquired. The exact Hesiod advises his farmer, whose work is chiefly performed by slaves, to employ and maintain

the thete during summer-time, but to dismiss him as soon as the harvest is completely got in, and then to take into his house for the winter a woman "without any child;" who would, of course, be more useful than the thete for the indoor occupations of that season.

In a state of society such as that which we have been describing, Grecian commerce was necessarily trifling and restricted. The Homeric poems mark either total ignorance or great vagueness of apprehension respecting all that lies beyond the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor and the islands between or adjoining them. Libya and Egypt are supposed so distant as to be known only by name and hearsay: indeed, when the city of Kyrene was founded, a century and a half after the first Olympiad, it was difficult to find anywhere a Greek navigator who had ever visited the coast of Libya, or was fit to serve as guide to the colonists. The mention of the Sikels in the Odyssey leads us to conclude that Korkyra, Italy, and Sicily were not wholly unknown to the poet. Among seafaring Greeks, the knowledge of the latter implied the knowledge of the two former—since the habitual track, even of a well-equipped Athenian trireme during the Peloponnesian war, from Peloponnesus to Sicily, was by Korkyra and the gulf of Tarentum. The Phokæans, long afterward, were the first Greeks who explored either the Adriatic or Tyrrhenian sea. Of the Euxine sea no knowledge is manifested in Homer, who, as a general rule, presents to us the names of distant regions only in connection with romantic or monstrous accompaniments. The Kretans, and still more the Taphians (who are supposed to have occupied the western islands off the coast of Akarnania), are mentioned as skillful mariners, and the Taphian Mentes professes to be conveying iron to Temesa to be there exchanged for copper; but both Taphians and Kretans are more corsairs than traders. The strong sense of the dangers of the sea, expressed by the poet Hesiod, and the imperfect structure of the early Grecian ship, attested by Thucydides (who points out the more recent date of that improved ship-building which prevailed in his time), concur to demonstrate the then narrow range of nautical enterprise.

Such was the state of the Greeks as traders, at a time when Babylon combined a crowded and industrious population with extensive commerce, and when the Phœnician merchant-ships visited in one direction the southern coast of Arabia, perhaps even the island of Ceylon—in another direction, the British islands.

The Phœnician, the kinsman of the ancient Jew, exhibits the type of character belonging to the latter—with greater enterprise and ingenuity, and less of religious exclusiveness, yet still different from, and even antipathetic to, the character of the Greeks. In the Homeric poems, he appears somewhat like the Jew of the Middle Ages, a crafty trader turning to profit the violence and rapacity of others—bringing them ornaments, decorations, the finest and brightest products of the loom, gold, silver, electrum, ivory, tin, etc., in exchange for which

he received landed produce, skins, wool, and slaves, the only commodities which even a wealthy Greek chief of those early times had to offer—prepared at the same time for dishonest gain, in any manner which chance might throw in his way. He is, however, really a trader, not undertaking expeditions with the deliberate purpose of surprise and plunder, and standing distinguished in this respect from the Tyrrhenian, Kretan, or Taphian pirate. Tin, ivory, and electrum, all of which are acknowledged in the Homeric poems, were the fruit of Phœnician trade with the West as well as with the East.

Thucydides tells us that the Phœnicians and Karians, in very early periods, occupied many of the islands of the Ægean, and we know, from the striking remnant of their mining works which Herodotus himself saw in Thasus, off the coast of Thrace, that they had once extracted gold from the mountains of that island—at a period indeed very far back, since their occupation must have been abandoned prior to the settlement of the poet Archilochus. Yet few of the islands in the Ægean were rich in such valuable products, nor was it in the usual course of Phœnician proceeding to occupy islands, except where there was an adjoining mainland with which trade could be carried on. The traffic of these active mariners required no permanent settlement. But as occasional visitors they were convenient, in enabling a Greek chief to turn his captives to account,—to get rid of slaves, or friendless thetes who were troublesome—and to supply himself with the metals, precious as well as useful. The halls of Alkinous and Menelaus glitter with gold, copper, and electrum. Large stocks of yet unemployed metal—gold, copper, and iron—are stored up in the treasure-chamber of Odysseus and other chiefs. Coined money is unknown to the Homeric age—the trade carried on being one of barter. In reference also to the metals, it deserves to be remarked that the Homeric descriptions universally suppose copper, and not iron, to be employed for arms, both offensive and defensive. By what process the copper was tempered and hardened, so as to serve the purposes of the warrior, we do not know; but the use of iron for these objects belongs to a later age, though the works and days of Hesiod suppose this change to have been already introduced.

The mode of fighting among the Homeric heroes is not less different from the historical times than the material of which their arms were composed. In historical Greece, the Hoplites, or heavy-armed infantry, maintained a close order and well-dressed line, charging the enemy with their spears protended at even distance, and coming thus to close conflict without breaking their rank: there were special troops, bowmen, slingers, etc., armed with missiles, but the hoplite had no weapon to employ in this manner. The heroes of the Iliad and Odyssey, on the contrary, habitually employ the spear as a missile, which they lanch with tremendous force: each of them is mounted in his war-chariot drawn by two horses and calculated to contain the warrior and his charioteer; in which latter capacity a

friend or comrade will sometimes consent to serve. Advancing in his chariot at full speed, in front of his own soldiers, he hurls his spear against the enemy: sometimes, indeed, he will fight on foot and hand to hand, but the chariot is usually near to receive him if he choses, or to insure his retreat. The mass of the Greeks and Trojans coming forward to the charge, without any regular step or evenly maintained line, make their attack in the same way by hurling their spears. Each chief wears habitually a long sword and a short dagger, besides his two spears to be lanched forward—the spear being also used, if occasion serves, as a weapon for thrust. Every man is protected by shield, helmet, breastplate, and greaves: but the armor of the chiefs is greatly superior to that of the common men, while they themselves are both stronger and more expert in the use of their weapons. There are a few bowmen, as rare exceptions, but the general equipment and proceeding is as here described.

Such loose array, immortalized as it is in the Iliad, is familiar to every one; and the contrast which it presents, with those inflexible ranks and that irresistible simultaneous charge which bore down the Persian throng at Platæa and Kunaxa, is such as to illustrate forcibly the general difference between heroic and historical Greece. While in the former, a few splendid figures stand forward in prominent relief, the remainder being a mere unorganized and ineffective mass—in the latter, these units have been combined into a system, in which every man, officer, and soldier has his assigned place and duty, and the victory, when gained, is the joint work of all. Preeminent individual prowess is, indeed, materially abridged, if not wholly excluded—no man can do more than maintain his station in the line. But, on the other hand, the grand purposes, aggressive or defensive, for which alone arms are taken up, become more assured and easy; while long-sighted combinations of the general are rendered for the first time practicable, when he has a disciplined body of men to obey him. In tracing the picture of civil society, we have to remark a similar transition—we pass from Herakles, Theseus, Jason, Achilles, to Solon, Pythagoras, and Perikles—from "the shepherd of his people" (to use the phrase in which Homer depicts the good side of the heroic king), to the legislator who introduces, and the statesman who maintains, a preconcerted system by which willing citizens consent to bind themselves. If commanding individual talent is not always to be found, the whole community is so trained as to be able to maintain its course under inferior leaders; the rights as well as the duties of each citizen being predetermined in the social order, according to principles more or less wisely laid down. The contrast is similar, and the transition equally remarkable, in the civil as in the military picture. In fact, the military organization of the Grecian republics is an element of the greatest importance in respect to the conspicuous part which they have played in human affairs—their superiority over other contemporary

nations in this respect being hardly less striking than it is in many others, as we shall have occasion to see in a subsequent stage of this history.

Even at the most advanced point of their tactics, the Greeks could effect little against a walled city. Still less effective were the heroic weapons and array for such an undertaking as a siege. Fortifications are a feature of the age deserving considerable notice. There was a time, we are told, in which the primitive Greek towns or villages derived a precarious security, not from their walls, but merely from sites lofty and difficult of access. They were not built immediately upon the shore, or close upon any convenient landing-place, but at some distance inland, on a rock or elevation which could not be approached without notice or scaled without difficulty. It was thought sufficient at that time to guard against piratical or marauding surprise: but as the state of society became assured—as the chance of sudden assault comparatively diminished and industry increased—these uninviting abodes were exchanged for more convenient sites on the plain or declivity beneath; or a portion of the latter was inclosed within larger boundaries and joined on to the original foundation, which thus became the acropolis of the new town. Thebes, Athens, Argos, etc., belonged to the latter class of cities; but there were in many parts of Greece deserted sites on hill-tops, still retaining even in historical times the traces of former habitation, and some of them still bearing the name of the old towns. Among the mountainous parts of Krete, in Ægina and Rhodes, in portions of Mount Ida and Parnassus, similar remnants might be perceived.

Probably in such primitive hill villages, a continuous circle of wall would hardly be required as an additional means of defense, and would often be rendered very difficult by the rugged nature of the ground. But Thucydides represents the earliest Greeks—those whom he conceives anterior to the Trojan war—as living thus universally in unfortified villages chiefly on account of their poverty, rudeness, and thorough carelessness for the morrow. Oppressed and held apart from each other by perpetual fear, they had not yet contracted the sentiment of fixed abodes—they were unwilling even to plant fruit-trees because of the uncertainty of gathering the produce—and were always ready to dislodge, because there was nothing to gain by staying, and a bare subsistence might be had anywhere. He compares them to the mountaineers of Ætolia and of the Ozolian Lokris in his own time, who dwelt in their unfortified hill villages with little or no intercommunication, always armed and fighting, and subsisting on the produce of their cattle and their woods—clothed in undressed hides, and eating raw meat.

The picture given by Thucydides of these very early and unrecorded times can only be taken as conjectural—the conjectures, indeed, of a statesman and a philosopher,—generalized too, in part,

from the many particular instances of contention and expulsion of chiefs which he found in the old legendary poems. The Homeric poems, however, present to us a different picture. They recognize walled towns; fixed abodes, strong local attachments, hereditary individual property in land, vineyards planted and carefully cultivated, established temples of the gods, and splendid palaces of the chiefs. The description of Thucydides belongs to a lower form of society, and bears more analogy to that which the poet himself conceives as antiquated and barbarous—to the savages, Cyclopes, who dwell on the tops of mountains, in hollow caves, without the plow, without vine or fruit culture, without arts or instruments—or to the primitive settlement of Dardanus, son of Zeus, on the higher ground of Ida, while it was reserved for his descendants and successors to found the holy Ilium on the plain. Ilium, or Troy, represents the perfection of Homeric society. It is a consecrated spot, containing temples of the gods as well as the palace of Priam, and surrounded by walls which are the fabric of the gods; while the antecedent form of ruder society, which the poet briefly glances at, is the parallel of that which the theory of Thucydides ascribes to his own early semi-barbarous ancestors.

Walled towns serve thus as one of the evidences that a large part of the population of Greece had, even in the Homeric times, reached a level higher than that of the Ætolians and Lokrians of the days of Thucydides. The remains of Mykenæ and Tiryns demonstrate the massy and Cyclopian style of architecture employed in those early days; but we may remark that, while modern observers seem inclined to treat the remains of the former as very imposing and significant of a great princely family, Thucydides, on the contrary, speaks of it as a small place, and labors to elude the inference, which might be deduced from its insignificant size, in disproof of the grandeur of Agamemnon. Such fortifications supplied a means of defense incomparably superior to those of attack. Indeed, even in historical Greece, and after the invention of battering engines, no city could be taken except by surprise or blockade, or by ruining the country around, and thus depriving the inhabitants of their means of subsistence. And in the two great sieges of the legendary time, Troy and Thebes, the former is captured by the stratagem of the wooden horse, while the latter is evacuated by its citizens under the warning of the gods after their defeat in the field.

This decided superiority of the means of defense over those of attack, in rude ages, has been one of the grand promotive causes both of the growth of civic life and of the general march of human improvement. It has enabled the progressive portions of mankind not only to maintain their acquisitions against the predatory instincts of the ruder and poorer, and to surmount the difficulties of incipient organization,—but ultimately, when their organization has been matured, both to acquire predominance and to uphold it until their

own disciplined habits have in part passed to their enemies. The important truth here stated is illustrated not less by the history of ancient Greece than by that of modern Europe during the Middle Ages. The Homeric chief, combining superior rank with superior force, and ready to rob at every convenient opportunity, greatly resembles the feudal baron of the Middle Ages; but circumstances absorb him more easily into a city life, and convert the independent potentate into the member of a governing aristocracy. Traffic by sea continued to be beset with danger from pirates long after it had become tolerably assured by land: the "wet ways" have always been the last resort of lawlessness and violence, and the Ægean in particular has in all times suffered more than other waters under this calamity.

Aggressions of the sort here described were, of course, most numerous in those earliest times when the Ægean was not yet an Hellenic sea, and when many of the Cyclades were occupied, not by Greeks, but by Karians—perhaps by Phœnicians: the number of Karian sepulchers discovered in the sacred island of Delus seems to attest such occupation as an historical fact. According to the legendary account, espoused both by Herodotus and by Thucydides, it was the Kretan Minos who subdued these islands and established his sons as rulers in them; either expelling the Karians or reducing them to servitude and tribute. Thucydides presumes that he must, of course, have put down piracy, in order to enable his tribute to be remitted in safety, like the Athenians during the time of their hegemony. Upon the legendary thalassocraty of Minos I have already remarked in another place: it is sufficient here to repeat that, in the Homeric poems (long subsequent to Minos in the current chronology), we find piracy both frequent and held in honorable estimation, as Thucydides himself emphatically tells us—remarking, moreover, that the vessels of those early days were only half-decked, built and equipped after the piratical fashion, in a manner upon which the nautical men of his time looked back with disdain. Improved and enlarged ship-building, and the trireme, or ship with three banks of oars, common for warlike purposes during the Persian invasion, began only with the growing skill, activity, and importance of the Corinthians, three-quarters of a century after the first Olympiad. Corinth, even in the Homeric poems, is distinguished by the epithet of wealthy, which it acquired principally from its remarkable situation on the isthmus, and from its two harbors of Lechæum and Kenchreæ, the one on the Corinthian, the other on the Saronic gulf. It thus supplied a convenient connection between Epirus and Italy on the one side, and the Ægean sea on the other, without imposing upon the unskillful and timid navigator of those days the necessity of circumnavigating Peloponnesus.

The extension of Grecian traffic and shipping is manifested by a comparison of the Homeric with the Hesiodic poems; in respect to knowledge of places and countries—the latter being probably referable to dates between 740 B.C. and 640 B.C. In Homer, acquaintance is shown (the accuracy of such acquaintance, however, being exaggerated by Strabo and other friendly critics) with continental Greece and its neighboring islands, with Krete and the principal islands of the Ægean, and with Thrace, the Troad, the Hellespont, and Asia Minor between Paphlagonia northward and Lykia southward. The Sikels are mentioned in the Odyssey, and Sikania in the last book of that poem, but nothing is said to evince a knowledge of Italy or the realities of the western world. Libya, Egypt, and Phœnike are known by name and by vague hearsay, but the Nile is only mentioned as "the river Egypt;" while the Euxine sea is not mentioned at all. In the Hesiodic poems, on the other hand, the Nile, the Ister, the Phasis, and the Eridanus are all specified by name; Mount Ætna, and the island of Ortygia near to Syracuse, the Tyrrhenians and Ligurians in the west, and the Scythians in the north, were also noticed. Indeed, within forty years after the first Olympiad, the cities of Korkyra and Syracuse were founded from Corinth—the first of a numerous and powerful series of colonies, destined to impart a new character both to the south of Italy and to Sicily.

In reference to the astronomy and physics of the Homeric Greek, it has already been remarked that he connected together the sensible phenomena which form the subject-matter of these sciences by threads of religious and personifying fancy, to which the real analogies among them were made subordinate; and that these analogies did not begin to be studied by themselves, apart from the religious element by which they had been at first overlaid, until the age of Thales, coinciding as that period did with the increased opportunities for visiting Egypt and the interior of Asia. The Greeks obtained access in both of these countries to an enlarged stock of astronomical observations, to the use of the gnomon or sun-dial, and to a more exact determination of the length of the solar year than that which served as the basis of their various lunar periods. It is pretended that Thales was the first who predicted an eclipse of the sun—not indeed accurately, but with large limits of error as to the time of its occurrence—and that he also possessed so profound an acquaintance with meteorological phenomena and probabilities as to be able to foretell an abundant crop of olives for the coming year and to realize a large sum of money by an olive speculation. From Thales downward we trace a succession of astronomical and physical theories, more or less successful, into which I do not intend here to enter. It is sufficient at present to contrast the father of the Ionic philosophy with the times preceding him, and to mark the first commencement of scientific prediction among the Greeks, however imperfect at the outset, as distinguished from the inspired dicta of prophets, or oracles, and from those special signs of the purposes of the gods which formed the habitual reliance of the Homeric man. We shall see these two modes of anticipating the future—one based upon the

philosophical, the other upon the religious appreciation of nature—running simultaneously on throughout Grecian history, and sharing between them in unequal portions the empire of the Greek mind; the former acquiring both greater predominance and wider application among the intellectual men, and partially restricting, but never abolishing, the spontaneous employment of the latter among the vulgar.

Neither coined money, nor the art of writing, nor painting, nor sculpture, nor imaginative architecture, belong to the Homeric and Hesiodic times. Such rudiments of arts, destined ultimately to acquire great development in Greece, as may have existed in these early days, served only as a sort of nucleus to the fancy of the poet, to shape out for himself the fabulous creations ascribed to Hephæstus or Dædalus. No statues of the gods, not even of wood, are mentioned in the Homeric poems. All the many varieties, in Grecian music, poetry, and dancing—the former chiefly borrowed from Lydia and Phrygia—date from a period considerably later than the first Olympaid. Terpander, the earliest musician whose date is assigned—and the inventor of the harp with seven strings instead of that with four strings—does not come until the 26th Olympiad, or 676 B.C.; the poet Archilochus is nearly of the same date. The iambic and elegiac meters—the first deviations from the primitive epic strain and subject—do not reach up to the year 700 B.C.

It is this epic poetry which forms at once both the undoubted prerogative and the solitary jewel of the earliest era of Greece. Of the many epic poems which existed in Greece during the eighth century before the Christian era, none have been preserved except the Iliad and Odyssey: the Æthiopis of Arktinus, the Ilias Minor of Lesches, the Cyprian verses, the Capture of Œchalia, the Returns of the Heroes from Troy, the Thebais and the Epigoni—several of them passing in antiquity under the name of Homer—have all been lost. But the two which remain are quite sufficient to demonstrate in the primitive Greeks, a mental organization unparalleled in any other people, and powers of invention and expression which prepared, as well as foreboded, the future eminence of the nation in all the various departments to which thought and language can be applied. Great as the power of thought afterward became among the Greeks, their power of expression was still greater; in the former, other nations have built upon their foundations and surpassed them—in the latter they still remain unrivaled. It is not too much to say that this flexible, emphatic, and transparent character of the language as an instrument of communication—its perfect aptitude for narrative and discussion, as well as for stirring all the veins of human emotion without ever forfeiting that character of simplicity which adapts it to all men and all times—may be traced mainly to the existence and the wide-spread influence of the Iliad and Odyssey. To us these compositions are interesting as beautiful poems, depicting life and manners, and

unfolding certain types of character, with the utmost vivacity and artlessness; to their original hearer, they possessed all these sources of attraction, together with others more powerful still, to which we are now strangers. Upon him they bore with the full weight and solemnity of history and religion combined, while the charm of the poetry was only secondary and instrumental. The poet was then the teacher and preacher of the community, not simply the amuser of their leisure hours; they looked to him for revelations of the unknown past and for expositions of the attributes and dispensations of the gods, just as they consulted the prophet for his privileged insight into the future. The ancient epic comprised many different poets and poetical compositions, which fulfilled this purpose with more or less completeness. But it is the exclusive prerogative of the Iliad and Odyssey that, after the minds of men had ceased to be in full harmony with their original design, they yet retained their empire by the mere force of secondary excellences; while the remaining epics—though serving as food for the curious, and as storehouses for logographers, tragedians, and artists—never seem to have acquired very wide popularity even among intellectual Greeks.

I shall, in the succeeding chapter, give some account of the epic cycle, of its relation to the Homeric poems, and of the general evidences respecting the latter, both as to antiquity and authorship.

CHAPTER XXI

GRECIAN EPIC.—HOMERIC POEMS.

At the head of the once abundant epical compositions of Greece, most of them unfortunately lost, stand the Iliad and Odyssey, with the immortal name of Homer attached to each of them, embracing separate portions of the comprehensive legend of Troy. They form the type of what may be called the heroic epic of the Greeks, as distinguished from the genealogical, in which latter species some of the Hesiodic poems—the Catalogue of Women, the Eoiai, and the Naupaktia—stood conspicuous. Poems of the Homeric character (if so it may be called, though the expression is very indefinite)—being confined to one of the great events or great personages of Grecian legendary antiquity, and comprising a limited number of characters all contemporaneous—made some approach, more or less successful, to a certain poetical unity; while the Hesiodic poems, tamer in their spirit and unconfined both as to time and as to persons, strung together distinct events without any obvious view to concentration of interest—without legitimate beginning or end. Between these two

extremes there were many gradations. Biographical poems, such as the Herakleia or Theseis, recounting all the principal exploits performed by one single hero, present a character intermediate between the two, but bordering more closely on the Hesiodic. Even the hymns to the gods, which pass under the name of Homer, are epical fragments, narrating particular exploits or adventures of the god commemorated.

Both the didactic and the mystico-religious poetry of Greece began in hexameter verse—the characteristic and consecrated measure of the epic: but they belong to a different species, and burst out from a different vein in the Grecian mind. It seems to have been the more common belief among the historical Greeks that such mystic effusions were more ancient than their narrative poems; and that Orpheus, Musæus, Linus, Olen, Pamphus, and even Hesiod, etc., etc., the reputed composers of the former, were of earlier date than Homer. But there is no evidence to sustain this opinion, and the presumptions are all against it. Those compositions, which in the sixth century before the Christian era passed under the name of Orpheus and Musæus, seem to have been unquestionably post-Homeric. We cannot even admit the modified conclusion of Hermann, Ulrici, and others, that the mystic poetry as a genus (putting aside the particular compositions falsely ascribed to Orpheus and others) preceded in order of time the narrative.

Besides the Iliad and Odyssey, we make out the titles of about thirty lost epic poems, sometimes with a brief hint of their contents.

Concerning the legend of Troy there were five—the Cyprian verses, the Æthiopis and the Capture of Troy, both ascribed to Arktinus; the Lesser Iliad, ascribed to Lesches; the Returns (of the heroes from Troy), to which the name of Hagias of Trœzen is attached; and the Telegonia, by Eugammon, a continuation of the Odyssey. Two poems—the Thebais and the Epigoni (perhaps two parts of one and the same poem) were devoted to the legend of Thebes—the two sieges of that city by the Argeians. Another poem, called Œdipodia, had for its subject the tragical destiny of Œdipus and his family; and perhaps that which is cited as Europia, or verses on Europa, may have comprehended the tale of her brother Kadmus, the mythical founder of Thebes.

The exploits of Herakles were celebrated in two compositions, each called Herakleia, by Kinæthon and Pisander—probably also in many others of which the memory has not been preserved. The capture of Œchalia by Herakles formed the subject of a separate epic. Two other poems, the Ægimius and the Minyas, are supposed to have been founded on other achievements of this hero—the effective aid which he lent to the Dorian king Ægimius against the Lapithæ, his descent to the under-world for the purpose of rescuing the imprisoned Theseus, and his conquest of the city of the Minyæ, the powerful Orchomenus.

Other epic poems—the Phoronis, the Danais, the Alkmæonis, the Atthis, the Amazonia—we only know by name. We can just guess obscurely at their contents so far as the name indicates. The Titanomachia, the Gigantomachia, and the Corinthiaca, three compositions all ascribed to Eumelus, afford by means of their titles an idea somewhat clearer of the matter which they comprised. The Theogony ascribed to Hesiod still exists, though partially corrupt and mutilated: but there seem to have been other poems, now lost, of the like import and title.

Of the poems composed in the Hesiodic style, diffusive and full of genealogical detail, the principal were, the Catalogue of Women and the Great Eoiai; the latter of which, indeed, seems to have been a continuation of the former. A large number of the celebrated women of heroic Greece were commemorated in these poems, one after the other, without any other than an arbitrary bond of connection. The Marriage of Keyx—the Melampodia—and a string of fables called Astronomia, are further ascribed to Hesiod: and the poem above mentioned, called Ægimius, is also sometimes connected with his name, sometimes with that of Kerkops. The Naupaktian verses (so called probably from the birthplace of their author), and the genealogies of Kinæthon and Asius, were compositions of the same rambling character, as far as we can judge from the scanty fragments remaining. The Orchomenian epic poet Chersias, of whom two lines only are preserved to us by Pausanias, may reasonably be referred to the same category.

The oldest of the epic poets, to whom any date, carrying with it the semblance of authority, is assigned, is Arktinus of Miletus, who is placed by Eusebius in the first Olympiad, and by Suidas in the ninth. Eugammon, the author of the Telegonia, and the latest of the catalogue, is placed in the fifty-third Olympiad, B.C. 566. Between these two we find Asius and Lesches, about the thirtieth Olympiad,—a time when the vein of the ancient epic was drying up, and when other forms of poetry—elegiac, iambic, lyric, and choric—had either already arisen, or were on the point of arising, to compete with it.

It has already been stated in a former chapter that, in the early commencements of prose-writing, Hekatæus, Pherekydes, and other logographers, made it their business to extract from the ancient fables something like a continuous narrative chronologically arranged. It was upon a principal somewhat analogous that the Alexandrine literati, about the second century before the Christian era, arranged the multitude of old epic poets into a series founded on the supposed order of time in the events narrated—beginning with the intermarriage of Uranus and Gæa, and the theogony—and concluding with the death of Odysseus by the hands of his son Telegonus. This collection passed by the name of the epic cycle, and the poets, whose compositions were embodied in it, were termed

cyclic poets. Doubtless, the epical treasures of the Alexandrine library were larger than had ever before been brought together and submitted to men both of learning and leisure; so that multiplication of such compositions in the same museum rendered it advisable to establish some fixed order of perusal, and to copy them in one corrected and uniform edition. It pleased the critics to determine precedence neither by antiquity nor by excellence of the compositions themselves, but by the supposed sequence of narrative, so that the whole taken together constituted a readable aggregate of epical antiquity.

Much obscurity exists, and many different opinions have been expressed, respecting this epic cycle: I view it, not as an exclusive canon, but simply as an all-comprehensive classification, with a new edition founded thereupon. It would include all the epic poems in the library older than the Telegonia, and apt for continuous narrative: it would exclude only two classes—first, the recent epic poets, such as Panyasis and Antimachus; next, the genealogical and desultory poems, such as the Catalogue of Women, the Eoiai, and others, which could not be made to fit into any chronological sequence of events. Both the Iliad and the Odyssey were comprised in the cycle, so that the denomination of cyclic poet did not originally or designedly carry with it any association of contempt. But as the great and capital poems were chiefly spoken of by themselves, or by the title of their own separate authors, so the general name of *poets of the cycle* came gradually to be applied only to the worst, and thus to imply vulgarity or commonplace; the more so as many of the inferior compositions included in the collection seem to have been anonymous, and their authors in consequence describable only under some such common designation as that of the cyclic poets. It is in this manner that we are to explain the disparaging sentiment connected by Horace and others with the idea of a cyclic writer, though no such sentiment was implied in the original meaning of the epic cycle.

The poems of the cycle were thus mentioned in contrast and antithesis with Homer, though originally the Iliad and Odyssey had both been included among them: and this alteration of the meaning of the word has given birth to a mistake as to the primary purpose of the classification, as if it had been designed especially to part off the inferior epic productions from Homer. But, while some critics are disposed to distinguish the cyclic poets too pointedly from Homer, I conceive that Welcker goes too much into the other extreme, and identifies the cycle too closely with that poet. He construes it as a classification deliberately framed to comprise all the various productions of the Homeric epic, with its unity of action and comparative paucity both of persons and adventures—as opposed to the Hesiodic epic, crowded with separate persons and pedigrees, and destitute of central action as well as of closing catastrophe. This opinion does, indeed, coincide to a great degree with the fact, inasmuch as few of

the Hesiodic epics appear to have been included in the cycle. To say that *none* were included would be too much, for we cannot venture to set aside either the Theogony or the Ægimius; but we may account for their absence perfectly well without supposing any design to exclude them, for it is obvious that their rambling character (like that of the Metamorphoses of Ovid) forbade the possibility of interweaving them in any continuous series. Continuity in the series of narrated events, coupled with a certain degree of antiquity in the poems, being the principle on which the arrangement called the epic cycle was based, the Hesiodic poems generally were excluded, not from any preconceived intention, but because they could not be brought into harmony with such orderly reading.

What were the particular poems which it comprised we cannot now determine with exactness. Welcker arranges them as follows: Titanomachia, Danais, Amazonia (or Atthis), Œdipodia, Thebais (or expedition of Amphiaraus), Epigoni (or Alkmæonis), Minyas (or Phokais), Capture of Œchalia, Cyprian verses, Iliad, Æthiopis, Lesser Iliad, Iliupersis or the taking of Troy, Returns of the Heroes, Odyssey, and Telegonia. Wuellner, Lange, and Mr. Fynes Clinton enlarge the list of cyclic poems still further. But all such reconstructions of the cycle are conjectural and destitute of authority. The only poems which we can affirm on positive grounds to have been comprehended in it, are, first, the series respecting the heroes of Troy, from the Cypria to the Telegonia, of which Proclus has preserved the arguments, and which includes the Iliad and Odyssey—next, the old Thebais, which is expressly termed cyclic in order to distinguish it from the poem of the same name composed by Antimachus. In regard to other particular compositions, we have no evidence to guide us, either for admission or exclusion, except our general views as to the scheme upon which the cycle was framed. If my idea of that scheme be correct, the Alexandrine critics arranged therein *all* their old epical treasures down to the Telegonia—the good as well as the bad; gold, silver, and iron—provided only they could be pieced in with the narrative series. But I cannot venture to include, as Mr. Clinton does, the Europia, the Phoronis, and other poems of which we know only the names, because it is uncertain whether their contents were such as to fulfill that primary condition. Nor can I concur with him in thinking that, where there were two or more poems of the same title and subject, one of them must necessarily have been adopted into the cycle to the exclusion of the others. There may have been two Theogonies, or two Herakleias, both comprehended in the cycle; the purpose being (as I before remarked), not to sift the better from the worse, but to determine some fixed order, convenient for reading and reference, amid a multiplicity of scattered compositions, as the basis of a new, entire, and corrected edition.

Whatever may have been the principle on which the cyclic poems were originally strung together, they are all now lost, except those two unrivaled diamonds, whose brightness, dimming all the rest, has alone sufficed to confer imperishable glory even upon the earliest phase of Grecian life. It has been the natural privilege of the Iliad and Odyssey, from the rise of Grecian philology down to the present day, to provoke an intense curiosity, which, even in the historical and literary days of Greece, there were no assured facts to satisfy. These compositions are the monuments of an age essentially religious and poetical, but essentially also unphilosophical, unreflecting, and unrecording. The nature of the case forbids our having any authentic transmitted knowledge respecting such a period; and the lesson must be learned, hard and painful though it be, that no imaginable reach of critical acumen will, of itself, enable us to discriminate fancy from reality, in the absence of a tolerable stock of evidence. After the numberless comments and acrimonious controversies to which the Homeric poems have given rise, it can hardly be said that any of the points originally doubtful have obtained a solution such as to command universal acquiescence. To glance at all these controversies, however briefly, would far transcend the limits of the present work. But the most abridged Grecian history would be incomplete without some inquiry respecting *the poet* (so the Greek critics in their veneration denominated Homer), and the productions which pass now, or have heretofore passed, under his name.

Who or what was Homer? What date is to be assigned to him? What were his compositions?

A person putting these questions to Greeks of different towns and ages would have obtained answers widely discrepant and contradictory. Since the invaluable labors of Aristarchus and the other Alexandrine critics on the text of the Iliad and Odyssey, it has indeed been customary to regard those two (putting aside the hymns and a few other minor poems) as being the only genuine Homeric compositions; and the literary men called Chorizontes, or the separators, at the head of whom were Xenon and Hellanikus, endeavored still farther to reduce the number by disconnecting the Iliad and Odyssey, and pointing out that both could not be the work of the same author. Throughout the whole course of Grecian antiquity, the Iliad and the Odyssey and the hymns have been received as Homeric. But if we go back to the time of Herodotus, or still earlier, we find that several other epics also were ascribed to Homer, and there were not wanting critics earlier than the Alexandrine age, who regarded the whole epic cycle, together with the satirical poem called Margites, the Batrachomyomachia, and other smaller pieces, as Homeric works. The cyclic Thebais and the Epigoni (whether they be two separate poems, or the latter a second part of the former) were in early days currently ascribed to Homer. The same was the case with the Cyprian verses. Some even attributed to

him several other poems—the Capture of Œchalia, the Lesser Iliad, the Phokais, and the Amazonia. The title of the poem called Thebais to be styled Homeric depends upon evidence more ancient than any which can be produced to authenticate the Iliad and the Odyssey; for Kallinus, the ancient elegiac poet (B.C. 640), mentioned Homer as the author of it; and his opinion was shared by many other competent judges. From the remarkable description given by Herodotus of the expulsion of the rhapsodes from Sikyon, by the despot Kleisthenes, in the time of Solon (about B.C. 580), we may form a probable judgment that the Thebais and the Epigoni were then rhapsodized at Sikyon as Homeric productions. And it is clear from the language of Herodotus that in his time the general opinion ascribed to Homer both the Cyprian verses and the Epigoni, though he himself dissents. In spite of such dissent, however, that historian must have conceived the names of Homer and Hesiod to be nearly co-extensive with the whole of the ancient epic, otherwise he would hardly have delivered his memorable judgment that they two were the framers of Grecian theogony.

That many different cities laid claim to the birth of Homer (seven is rather below the truth, and Smyrna and Chios are the most prominent among them) is well known, and most of them had legends to tell respecting his romantic parentage, his alleged blindness, and his life of an itinerant bard acquainted with poverty and sorrow. The discrepancies of statement respecting the date of his reputed existence are no less worthy of remark; for out of the eight different epochs assigned to him, the oldest differs from the most recent by a period of 460 years .

Thus conflicting would have been the answers returned in different portions of the Grecian world to any questions respecting the person of Homer. But there were a poetical gens (fraternity or guild) in the Ionic island of Chios, who, if the question had been put to them, would have answered in another manner. To them Homer was not a mere antecedent man, of kindred nature with themselves, but a divine or semi-divine eponymus and progenitor, whom they worshiped in their gentile sacrifices, and in whose ascendent name and glory the individuality of every member of the gens was merged. The compositions of each separate Homerid, or the combined efforts of many of them in conjunction, were the works of Homer: the name of the individual bard perishes and his authorship is forgotten, but the common gentile father lives and grows in renown, from generation to generation, by the genius of his self-renewing sons.

Such was the conception entertained of Homer by the poetical gens called Homeridæ or Homerids; and in the general obscurity of the whole case, I lean toward it as the most plausible conception. Homer is not only the reputed author of the various compositions emanating from the gentile members, but also the recipient of the many different legends and of the divine genealogy, which it pleases

their imagination to confer upon him. Such manufacture of fictitious personality, and such perfect incorporation of the entities of religion and fancy with the real world, is a process familiar and even habitual in the retrospective vision of the Greeks.

It is to be remarked that the poetical gens here brought to view, the Homerids, are of indisputable authenticity. Their existence and their considerations were maintained down to the historical times in the island of Chios. If the Homerids were still conspicuous even in the days of Akusilaus, Pindar, Hellanikus, and Plato, when their productive invention had ceased, and when they had become only guardians and distributors, in common with others, of the treasures bequeathed by their predecessors—far more exalted must their position have been three centuries before, while they were still inspired creators of epic novelty, and when the absence of writing assured to them the undisputed monopoly of their own compositions.

Homer, then, is no individual man, but the divine or heroic father (the ideas of worship and ancestry coalescing, as they constantly did in the Grecian mind) of the gentile Homerids, and he is the author of the Thebais, the Epigoni, the Cyprian verses, the Proœms or Hymns, and other poems in the same sense in which he is the author of the Iliad and Odyssey—assuming that these various compositions emanate, as perhaps they may, from different individuals numbered among the Homerids. But this disallowance of the historical personality of Homer is quite distinct from the question, with which it has been often confounded, whether the Iliad and Odyssey are originally entire poems, and whether by one author or otherwise. To us, the name of Homer means these two poems, and little else: we desire to know as much as can be learnt respecting their date, their original composition, their preservation, and their mode of communication to the public. All these questions are more or less complicated one with the other.

Concerning the date of the poems, we have no other information except the various affirmations, respecting the age of Homer, which differ among themselves (as I have before observed) by an interval of 460 years, and which for the most part determine the date of Homer by reference to some other event, itself fabulous and unauthenticated—such as the Trojan war, the return of the Herakleids, or the Ionic migration. Krates placed Homer earlier than the return of the Herakleids and less than eighty years after the Trojan war; Eratostheness put him 100 years after the Trojan war: Aristotle, Aristarchus, and Castor made his birth contemporary with the Ionic migration, while Apollodorus brings him down to 100 years after that event, or 240 years after the taking of Troy. Thucydides assigns to him a date much subsequent to the Trojan war. On the other hand, Theopompus and Euphorion refer his age to the far more recent period of the Lydian kingG yges (Ol. 18–23, B.C. 708–688), and put him 500 years after the Trojan epoch. What were the

grounds of these various conjectures, we do not know, though, in the statements of Krates and Eratosthenes, we may pretty well divine. But the oldest dictum preserved to us respecting the date of Homer—meaning thereby the date of the Iliad and Odyssey—appears to me at the same time the most credible, and the most consistent with the general history of the ancient epic. Herodotus places Homer 400 years before himself; taking his departure, not from any fabulous event, but from a point of real and authentic time. Four centuries anterior to Herodotus would be a period commencing with 800 B.C.; so that the composition of the Homeric poems would thus fall in a space between 850 and 800 B.C. We may gather from the language of Herodotus that this was his own judgment, opposed to a current opinion which assigned the poet to an earlier epoch.

To place the Iliad and Odyssey at some periods between 850 B.C. and 776 B.C., appears to me more probable than any other date, anterior or posterior—more probable than the latter, because we are justified in believing these two poems to be older than Arktinus, who comes shortly after the first Olympiad—more probable than the former, because the farther we push the poems back, the more do we enhance the wonder of their preservation, already sufficiently great, down from such an age and society to the historical times.

The mode in which these poems, and indeed all poems, epic as well as lyric, down to the age (probably) of Peisistratus, were circulated and brought to bear upon the public, deserves particular attention. They were not read by individuals alone and apart, but sung or recited at festivals or to assembled companies. This seems to be one of the few undisputed facts with regard to the great poet: for even those who maintain that the Iliad and Odyssey were preserved by means of writing, seldom contend that they were read.

In appreciating the effect of the poems, we must always take account of this great difference between early Greece and our own times—between the congregation mustered at a solemn festival, stimulated by community of sympathy, listening to a measured and musical recital from the lips of trained bards or rhapsodes, whose matter was supposed to have been inspired by the Muse—and the solitary reader with a manuscript before him; such manuscript being, down to a very late period in Greek literature, indifferently written, without division into parts and without marks of punctuation. As in the case of dramatic performances in all ages, so in that of the early Grecian epic—a very large proportion of its impressive effect was derived from the talent of the reciter and the force of the general accompaniments, and would have disappeared altogether in solitary reading. Originally the bard sung his own epical narrative commencing with a proœmium or hymn to one of the gods: his profession was separate and special, like that of the carpenter, the leech, or the prophet: his manner and enunciation must have required particular training no less than his imaginative faculty. His character presents

itself in the Odyssey as one highly esteemed; and in the Iliad, even Achilles does not disdain to touch the lyre with his own hands, and to sing heroic deeds. Not only did the Iliad and Odyssey, and the poems embodied in the epic cycle, produce all their impression and gain all their renown by this process of oral delivery, but even the lyric and choric poets who succeeded them were known and felt in the same way by the general public, even after the full establishment of habits of reading among lettered men. While in the case of the epic, the recitation or singing had been extremely simple and the measure comparatively little diversified, with no other accompaniment than that of the four-stringed harp—all the variations superinduced upon the original hexameter, beginning with the pentameter and iambus, and proceeding step by step to the complicated strophes of Pindar and the tragic writers, still left the general effect of the poetry greatly dependent upon voice and accompaniments and pointedly distinguished from mere solitary reading of the words. And in the dramatic poetry, the last in order of time, the declamation and gesture of the speaking actor alternated with the song and dance of the chorus, and with the instruments of musicians, the whole being set off by imposing visible decorations. Now both dramatic effect and song are familiar in modern times, so that every man knows the difference between reading the words and hearing them under the appropriate circumstances: but poetry, as such, is, and has now long been, so exclusively enjoyed by reading, that it requires an especial memento to bring us back to the time when the Iliad and Odyssey were addressed only to the ear and feelings of a promiscuous and sympathizing multitude. Readers there were none, at least until the century preceding Solon and Peisistratus: from that time forward, they gradually increased both in number and influence; though doubtless small, even in the most literary period of Greece, as compared with modern European society. So far as the production of beautiful epic poetry was concerned, however, the select body of instructed readers furnished a less potent stimulus than the unlettered and listening crowd of the earlier periods. The poems of Chœrilus and Antimachus, toward the close of the Peloponnesian war, though admired by erudite men, never acquired popularity; and the Emperor Hadrian failed in his attempt to bring the latter poet into fashion at the expense of Homer.

It will be seen by what has been here stated, that that class of men, who formed the medium of communication between the verse and the ear, were of the highest importance in the ancient world, and especially in the earlier periods of its career—the bards and rhapsodes for the epic, the singers for the lyric, the actors and singers jointly with the dancers for the chorus and drama. The lyric and dramatic poets taught with their own lips the delivery of their compositions, and so prominently did this business of teaching present itself to the view of the public, that the name Didaskalia, by which

the dramatic exhibition was commonly designated, derived from thence its origin.

Among the number of rhapsodes who frequented the festivals at a time when Grecian cities were multiplied and easy of access, for the recitation of the ancient epic, there must have been of course great differences of excellence; but that the more considerable individuals of the class were elaborately trained and highly accomplished in the exercise of their profession, we may assume as certain. But it happens that Sokrates with his two pupils Plato and Xenophon speak contemptuously of their merits, and many persons have been disposed, somewhat too readily, to admit this sentence of condemnation as conclusive, without taking account of the point of view from which it was delivered. These philosophers considered Homer and other poets with a view to instruction, ethical doctrine, and virtuous practice: they analyzed the characters whom the poet described, sifted the value of the lessons conveyed, and often struggled to discover a hidden meaning, where they disapproved that which was apparent. When they found a man like the rhapsode, who professed to impress the Homeric narrative upon an audience, and yet either never meddled at all, or meddled unsuccessfully, with the business of exposition, they treated him with contempt; indeed Sokrates depreciates the poets themselves much upon the principle, as dealing with matters of which they could render no rational account. It was also the habit of Plato and Xenophon to disparage generally professional exertion of talent for the purpose of gaining a livelihood, contrasting it often in an indelicate manner with the gratuitous teaching and ostentatious poverty of their master. But we are not warranted in judging the rhapsodes by such a standard. Though they were not philosophers or moralists, it was their province—and it had been so, long before the philosophical point of view was opened—to bring their poet home to the bosoms and emotions of an assembled crowd, and to penetrate themselves with his meaning so far as was suitable for that purpose, adapting to it the appropriate graces of action and intonation. In this their genuine task they were valuable members of the Grecian community, and seemed to have possessed all the qualities necessary for success.

These rhapsodes, the successors of the primitive Aœdi or Bards, seem to have been distinguished from them by the discontinuance of all musical accompaniment. Originally the bard sung, enlivening the song with occasional touches of the simple four-stringed harp: his successor the rhapsode, recited, holding in his hand nothing but a branch of laurel, and depending for effect upon voice and manner, —a species of musical and rhythmical declamation, which gradually increased in vehement emphasis and gesticulation until it approached to that of the dramatic actor. At what time this change took place, or whether the two different modes of enunciating the ancient epic may for a certain period have gone on simultaneously, we have no

means of determining. Hesiod receives from the muses a branch of laurel, as a token of his ordination into their service, which marks him for a rhapsode; while the ancient bard with his harp is still recognized in the Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo, as efficient and popular at the Panionic festivals in the island of Delos. Perhaps the improvements made in the harps, to which three strings, in addition to the original four, were attached by Terpander (B.C. 660), and the growing complication of instrumental music generally, may have contributed to discredit the primitive accompaniment, and thus to promote the practice of recital: the story, that Terpander himself composed music not only for hexameter poems of his own, but also for those of Homer, seems to indicate that the music which preceded him was ceasing to find favor. By whatever steps the change from the bard to the rhapsode took place, certain it is that before the time of Solon, the latter was the recognized and exclusive organ of the old epic; sometimes in short fragments before private companies, by single rhapsodes—sometimes several rhapsodes in continuous succession at a public festival.

Respecting the mode in which the Homeric poems were preserved, during the two centuries (or, as some think, longer interval) between their original composition and the period shortly preceding Solon—and respecting their original composition and subsequent changes—there are wide differences of opinion among able critics. Were they preserved with, or without, being written? Was the Iliad originally composed as one poem, and the Odyssey in like manner, or is each of them an aggregation of parts originally self-existent and unconnected? Was the authorship of each poem single-headed or many-headed?

Either tacitly or explicitly, these questions have been generally coupled together and discussed with reference to each other, by inquiries into the Homeric poems; though Mr. Payne Knight's Prolegomena have the merit of keeping them distinct. Half a century ago, the acute and valuable Prolegomena of F. A. Wolf, turning to account the Venetian Scholia which had then been recently published, first opened philosophical discussion as to the history of the Homeric text. A considerable part of that dissertation (though by no means the whole) is employed in vindicating the position, previously announced by Bentley among others, that the separate constituent portions of the Iliad and Odyssey had not been cemented together into any compact body and unchangeable order until the days of Peisistratus, in the sixth century before Christ. As a step toward that conclusion, Wolf maintained that no written copies of either poem could be shown to have existed during the earlier times to which their composition is referred—and that without writing, neither the perfect symmetry of so complicated a work could have been originally conceived by any poet, nor, if realized by him, transmitted with assurance to posterity. The absence of easy and convenient writing, such as must be indispensably supposed for long

manuscripts, among the early Greeks, was thus one of the points in Wolf's case against the primitive integrity of the Iliad and Odyssey. By Nitzsch and other leading opponents of Wolf, the connection of the one with the other seems to have been accepted as he originally put it, and it has been considered incumbent on those, who defended the ancient aggregate character of the Iliad and Odyssey, to maintain that they were written poems from the beginning.

To me it appears that the architectonic functions ascribed by Wolf to Peisistratus and his associates in reference to the Homeric poems, are nowise admissible. But much would undoubtedly be gained toward that view of the question, if it could be shown that in order to controvert it, we were driven to the necessity of admitting long written poems in the ninth century before the Christian era. Few things, in my opinion, can be more improbable: and Mr. Payne Knight, opposed as he is to the Wolfian hypothesis, admits this no less than Wolf himself. The traces of writing in Greece, even in the seventh century before the Christian era, are exceedingly trifling. We have no remaining inscription earlier than the 40th Olympiad, and the early inscriptions are rude and unskillfully executed: nor can we even assure ourselves whether Archilochus, Simonides of Amorgus, Kallinus, Tyrtæus, Xanthus, and the other early elegiac and lyric poets, committed their compositions to writing, or at what time the practice of doing so became familiar. The first positive ground, which authorizes us to presume the existence of a manuscript of Homer, is in the famous ordinance of Solon with regard to the rhapsodes at the Panathenæa; but for what length of time, previously, manuscripts had existed, we are unable to say.

Those who maintain the Homeric poems to have been written from the beginning, rest their case, not upon positive proofs—nor yet upon the existing habits of society with regard to poetry, for they admit generally that the Iliad and Odyssey were not read, but recited and heard—but upon the supposed necessity that there must have been manuscripts, to insure the preservation of the poems,—the unassisted memory of reciters being neither sufficient nor trustworthy. But here we only escape a smaller difficulty by running into a greater; for the existence of trained bards, gifted with extraordinary memory, is far less astonishing than that of long manuscripts in an age essentially non-reading and non-writing, and when even suitable instruments and materials for the process are not obvious. Moreover, there is a strong positive reason for believing that the bard was under no necessity of refreshing his memory by consulting a manuscript. For if such had been the fact, blindness would have been a disqualification for the profession, which we know that it was not: as well from the example of Demodokus in the Odyssey, as from that of the blind bard of Chios, in the Hymn to the Delian Apollo, whom Thucydides, as well as the general tenor of Grecian legend, identifies with Homer himself. The author

of that hymn, be he who he may, could never have described a blind man as attaining the utmost perfection in his art, if he had been conscious that the memory of the bard was only maintained by constant reference to the manuscript in his chest.

Nor will it be found, after all, that the effort of memory required either from bards or rhapsodes, even for the longest of these old epic poems,—though doubtless great,—was at all superhuman. Taking the case with reference to the entire Iliad and Odyssey, we know that there were educated gentlemen at Athens who could repeat both poems by heart: but in the professional recitations, we are not to imagine that the same person did go through the whole: the recitation was essentially a joint undertaking, and the rhapsodes who visited a festival would naturally understand among themselves which part of the poem should devolve upon each particular individual. Under such circumstances, and with such means of preparation beforehand, the quantity of verse which a rhapsode could deliver would be measured, not so much by the exhaustion of his memory, as by the physical sufficiency of his voice, having reference to the sonorous, emphatic, and rhythmical pronunciation required from him.

But what guarantee have we for the exact transmission of the text for a space of two centuries by simply oral means? It may be replied that oral transmission would hand down the text as exactly as in point of fact it was handed down. The great lines of each poem—the order of parts—the vein of Homeric feeling and the general style of locution, and for the most part, the true words—would be maintained: for the professional training of the rhapsode, over and above the precision of his actual memory, would tend to Homerize his mind (if the expression may be permitted), and to restrain him within this magic circle. On the other hand, in respect to the details of the text, we should expect that there would be wide differences and numerous inaccuracies: and so there really were, as the records contained in the Scholia, together with the passages cited in ancient authors, but not found in our Homeric text, abundantly testify.

Moreover the state of the Iliad and Odyssey in respect to the letter called the Digamma affords a proof that they were recited for a considerable period before they were committed to writing, insomuch that the oral pronunciation underwent during the interval a sensible change. At the time when these poems were composed, the digamma was an effective consonant, and figured as such in the structure of the verse: at the time when they were committed to writing, it had ceased to be pronounced, and therefore never found a place in any of the manuscripts—insomuch that the Alexandrine critics, though they knew of its existence in the much later poems of Alkæus and Sappho, never recognized it in Homer. The hiatus, and the various perplexities of meter, occasioned by the loss of the digamma, were corrected by different grammatical stratagems. But the whole history of this lost letter is very curious, and is rendered intelligible only by the supposition that the Iliad and Odyssey belonged for a wide space of time to the memory, the voice and the ear, exclusively.

At what period these poems, or indeed any other Greek poems, first began to be written, must be matter of conjecture, though there is ground for assurance that it was before the time of Solon. If in the absence of evidence we may venture upon naming any more determinate period, the question at once suggests itself, what were the purposes which in that stage of society, a manuscript at its first commencement must have been intended to answer? For whom was a written Iliad necessary? Not for the rhapsodes; for with them it was not only planted in the memory, but also interwoven with the feelings, and conceived in conjunction with all those flexions and intonations of voice, pauses and other oral artifices, which were required for emphatic delivery, and which the naked manuscript could never reproduce. Not for the general public—*they* were accustomed to receive it with its rhapsodic delivery, and with its accompaniments of a solemn and crowded festival. The only persons for whom the written Iliad would be suitable, would be a select few; studious and curious men—a class of readers, capable of analyzing the complicated emotions which they had experienced as hearers in the crowd, and who would on perusing the written words realize in their imaginations a sensible portion of the impression communicated by the reciter.

Incredible as the statement may seem in an age like the present, there is in all early societies, and there was in early Greece, a time when no such reading class existed. If we could discover at what time such a class first began to be formed, we should be able to make a guess at the time when the old epic poems were first committed to writing. Now the period which may with the greatest probability be fixed upon as having first witnessed the formation even of the narrowest reading class in Greece, is the middle of the seventh century before the Christian era (B.C. 660 to B.C. 630),—the age of Terpander, Kallinus, Archilochus, Simonides of Amorgus, etc. I ground this supposition on the change then operated in the character and tendencies of Grecian poetry and music,—the elegiac and iambic measures having been introduced as rivals to the primitive hexameter, and poetical compositions having been transferred from the epical past to the affairs of present and real life. Such a change was important at a time when poetry was the only known mode of publication (to use a modern phrase not altogether suitable, yet the nearest approaching to the sense). It argued a new way of looking at the old epical treasures of the people, as well as a thirst for new poetical effect; and the men who stood forward in it may well be considered as desirous to study, and competent to criticise, from

their own individual point of view, the written words of the Homeric rhapsodes, just as we are told that Kallinus both noticed and eulogized the Thebais as the production of Homer. There seems, therefore, ground for conjecturing that (for the use of this newly-formed and important but very narrow class) manuscripts of the Homeric poems and other old epics—the Thebais and the Cypria as well as the Iliad and the Odyssey—began to be compiled toward the middle of the seventh century B.C.: and the opening of Egypt to Grecian commerce, which took place about the same period, would furnish increased facilities for obtaining the requisite papyrus to write upon. A reading class, when once formed, would doubtless slowly increase, and the number of manuscripts along with it; so that before the time of Solon, fifty years afterward, both readers and manuscripts, though still comparatively few, might have attained a certain recognized authority, and formed a tribunal of reference, against the carelessness of individual rhapsodes.

We may, I think, consider the Iliad and Odyssey to have been preserved without the aid of writing for a period near upon two centuries. But is it true, as Wolf imagined, and as other able critics have imagined also, that the separate portions of which these two poems are composed were originally distinct epical ballads, each constituting a separate whole and intended for separate recitation? Is it true that they had not only no common author, but originally neither common purpose nor fixed order, and that their first permanent arrangement and integration was delayed for three centuries, and accomplished at last only by the taste of Peisistratus conjoined with various lettered friends?

This hypothesis—to which the genius of Wolf first gave celebrity, but which has been since enforced more in detail by others, especially by William Müller and Lachmann—appears to me not only unsupported by any sufficient testimony, but also opposed to other testimony as well as to a strong force of internal probability. The authorities quoted by Wolf are Josephus, Cicero, and Pausanias: Josephus mentions nothing about Peisistratus, but merely states (what we may accept as the probable fact) that the Homeric poems were originally unwritten, and preserved only in songs or recitations, from which they were at a subsequent period put into writing: hence many of the discrepancies in the text. On the other hand, Cicero and Pausanias go farther, and affirm that Peisistratus both collected and arranged in the existing order the rhapsodies of the Iliad and Odyssey (implied as poems originally entire and subsequently broken into pieces), which he found partly confused and partly isolated from each other—each part being then remembered only in its own portion of the Grecian world. Respecting Hipparchus, the son of Peisistratus, too, we are told in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue which bears his name, that he was the first to introduce into Attica the

poetry of Homer, and that he prescribed to the rhapsodes to recite the parts at the Panathenaic festival in regular sequence.

Wolf and William Müller occasionally speak as if they admitted something like an Iliad and Odyssey as established aggregates prior to Peisistratus; but for the most part they represent him or his associates as having been the first to put together Homeric poems which were before distinct and self-existent compositions. And Lachmann, the recent expositor of the same theory, ascribes to Peisistratus still more unequivocally this original integration of parts in reference to the Iliad—distributing the first twenty-two books of the poem into sixteen separate songs, and treating it as ridiculous to imagine that the fusion of these songs into an order such as we now read, belongs to any date earlier than Peisistratus.

Upon this theory we may remark, first, that it stands opposed to the testimony existing respecting the regulations of Solon; who, before the time of Peisistratus, had enforced a fixed order of recitation on the rhapsodes of the Iliad at the Panathenaic festival: not only directing that they should go through the rhapsodies *seriatim* and without omission or corruption, but also establishing a prompter or censorial authority to insure obedience,—which implies the existence (at the same time that it proclaims the occasional infringement) of an orderly aggregate, as well as of manuscripts professedly complete. Next, the theory ascribes to Peisistratus a character not only materially different from what is indicated by Cicero and Pausanias —who represent him, not as having put together atoms originally distinct, but as the renovator of an ancient order subsequently lost—but also in itself unintelligible and inconsistent with Grecian habit and feeling. That Peisistratus should take pains to repress the license, or make up for the unfaithful memory, of individual rhapsodes, and to ennoble the Panathenaic festival by the most correct recital of a great and venerable poem, according to the standard received among the best judges in Greece—this is a task both suitable to his position, and requiring nothing more than an improved recension, together with exact adherence to it on the part of the rhapsodes. But what motive had he to string together several poems, previously known only as separate, into one new whole? What feeling could he gratify by introducing the extensive changes and transpositions surmised by Lachmann, for the purpose of binding together sixteen songs which the rhapsodes are assumed to have been accustomed to recite, and the people to hear, each by itself apart? Peisistratus was not a poet, seeking to interest the public mind, by new creations and combinations, but a ruler desirous to impart solemnity to a great religious festival in his native city. Now such a purpose would be answered by selecting, amidst the divergences of rhapsodes in different parts of Greece, that order of text which intelligent men could approve as a return to the pure and pristine Iliad; but it would be defeated if he attempted large innova-

tions of his own, and brought out for the first time a new Iliad by blending together, altering, and transposing, many old and well-known songs. A novelty so bold would have been more likely to offend than to please both the critics and the multitude. And if it were even enforced, by authority, at Athens, no probable reason can be given why all the other towns and all the rhapsodes throughout Greece should abnegate their previous habits in favor of it, since Athens at that time enjoyed no political ascendency such as she acquired during the following century. On the whole, it will appear that the character and position of Peisistratus himself go far to negative the function which Wolf and Lachmann put upon him. His interference presupposes a certain foreknown and ancient aggregate, the main lineaments of which were familiar to the Grecian public, although many of the rhapsodes in their practice may have deviated from it both by omission and interpolation. In correcting the Athenian recitations conformably with such understood general type, he might hope both to procure respect for Athens and to constitute a fashion for the rest of Greece. But this step of "collecting the torn body of sacred Homer" is something generically different from the composition of a new Iliad out of pre-existing songs: the former is as easy, suitable, and promising, as the latter is violent and gratuitous.

To sustain the inference, that Peisistratus was the first architect of the Iliad and Odyssey, it ought at least to be shown that no other long continuous poems existed during the earlier centuries. But the contrary of this is known to be the fact. The Æthiopis of Arktinus, which contained 9100 verses, dates from a period more than two centuries earlier than Peisistratus: several other of the lost cyclic epics, some among them of considerable length, appear during the century succeeding Arktinus; and it is important to notice that three or four at least of these poems passed currently under the name of Homer. There is no greater intrinsic difficulty in supposing long epics to have begun with the Iliad and Odyssey than with the Æthiopis: the ascendency of the name of Homer, and the subordinate position of Arktinus, in the history of early Grecian poetry, tend to prove the former in preference to the latter.

Moreover, we find particular portions of the Iliad, which expressly pronounce themselves, by their own internal evidence, as belonging to a large whole, and not as separate integers. We can hardly conceive the catalogue in the second book except as a fractional composition, and with reference to a series of approaching exploits; for taken apart by itself, such a barren enumeration of names could have stimulated neither the fancy of the poet nor the attention of the listeners. But the Homeric Catalogue had acquired a sort of canonical authority even in the time of Solon, insomuch that he interpolated a line into it, or was accused of doing so, for the purpose of gaining a disputed point against the Megarians, who on their side set forth another version. No such established reverence could have been felt for this document, unless there had existed, for a long time prior to Peisistratus, the habit of regarding and listening to the Iliad as a continuous poem. And when the philosopher Xenophanes, contemporary with Peisistratus, noticed Homer as the universal teacher, and denounced him as an unworthy describer of the gods, he must have connected this great mental sway, not with a number of unconnected rhapsodies, but with an aggregate Iliad and Odyssey; probably with other poems also, ascribed to the same author, such as the Cipria, Epigoni, and Thebais.

We find, it is true, references in various authors to portions of the Iliad each by its own separate name, such as the Teichomachy, the Aristeia (pre-eminent exploits) of Diomedes or of Agamemnon, the Doloneia or Night-expedition (of Dolon as well as of Odysseus and Diomedes), etc., and hence it has been concluded that these portions originally existed as separate poems, before they were cemented together into an Iliad. But such references prove nothing to the point; for until the Iliad was divided by Aristarchus and his colleagues into a given number of books or rhapsodies, designated by the series of letters in the alphabet, there was no method of calling attention to any particular portion of the poem except by special indication of its subject-matter. Authors subsequent to Peisistratus, such as Herodotus and Plato, who unquestionably conceived the Iliad as a whole, cite the separate fractions of it by designations of this sort.

The foregoing remarks on the Wolfian hypothesis respecting the text of the Iliad, tend to separate two points which are by no means necessarily connected, though that hypothesis, as set forth by Wolf himself, by W. Müller, and by Lachmann, presents the two in conjunction. First, was the Iliad originally projected and composed by one author and as one poem, or were the different parts composed separately and by unconnected authors, and subsequently strung together into an aggregate? Secondly, assuming that the internal evidences of the poem negative the former supposition, and drive us upon the latter, was the construction of the whole poem deferred, and did the parts exist only in their separate state, until a period so late as the reign of Peisistratus? It is obvious that these two questions are essentially separate, and that a man may believe the Iliad to have been put together out of pre-existing songs, without recognizing the age of Peisistratus as the period of its first compilation. Now whatever may be the steps through which the poem passed to its ultimate integrity, there is sufficient reason for believing that they had been accomplished long before that period: the friends of Peisistratus found an Iliad already existing, and already ancient in their time, even granting that the poem had not been originally born in a state of unity. Moreover, the Alexandrine critics, whose remarks are preserved in the Scholia, do not even notice the Peisis-

tratic recension among the many manuscripts which they had before them: and Mr. Payne Knight justly infers from their silence that either they did not possess it, or it was in their eyes of no great authority; which could never have been the case if it had been the prime originator of Homeric unity.

The line of argument, by which the advocates of Wolf's hypothesis negative the primitive unity of the poem, consists in exposing gaps, incongruities, contradictions, etc., between the separate parts. Now, if in spite of all these incoherencies, standing mementos of an antecedent state of separation, the component poems were made to coalesce so intimately as to appear as if they had been one from the beginning, we can better understand the complete success of the proceeding and the universal prevalence of the illusion, by supposing such coalescence to have taken place at a very early period, during the productive days of epical genius, and before the growth of reading and criticism. The longer the aggregation of the separate poems was deferred, the harder it would be to obliterate in men's minds the previous state of separation, and to make them accept the new aggregate as an original unity. The bards or rhapsodes might have found comparatively little difficulty in thus piecing together distinct songs, during the ninth or eighth century before Christ; but if we suppose the process to be deferred until the latter half of the sixth century—if we imagine that Solon, with all his contemporaries and predecessors, knew nothing about any aggregate Iliad, but was accustomed to read and hear only those sixteen distinct epical pieces into which Lachmann would dissect the Iliad, each of the sixteen bearing a separate name of its own—no compilation then for the first time made by the friends of Peisistratus could have effaced the established habit, and planted itself in the general convictions of Greece as that primitive Homeric production. Had the sixteen pieces remained disunited and individualized down to the time of Peisistratus, they would in all probability have continued so ever afterward; nor could the extensive changes and transpositions which (according to Lachmann's theory) were required to melt them down into our present Iliad, have obtained at that late period universal acceptance. Assuming it to be true that such changes and transpositions did really take place, they must at least be referred to a period greatly earlier than Peisistratus or Solon.

The whole tenor of the poems themselves confirms what is here remarked. There is nothing either in the Iliad or Odyssey which savors of *modernism*, applying that term to the age of Peisistratus; nothing which brings to our view the alterations, brought about by two centuries, in the Greek language, the coined money, the habits of writing and reading, the despotisms and republican governments, the close military array, the improved construction of ships, the amphiktyonic convocations, the mutual frequentation of religious festivals, the Oriental and Egyptian veins of religion, etc., familiar

to the latter epoch. These alterations Onomakritus and the other literary friends of Peisistratus could hardly have failed to notice even without design, had they then for the first time undertaken the task of piecing together many self-existent epics into one large aggregate. Everything in the two great Homeric poems, both in substance and in language, belongs to an age two or three centuries earlier than Peisistratus. Indeed even the interpolations (or those passages which on the best grounds are pronounced to be such) betray no trace of the sixth century before Christ, and may well have been heard by Archilochus and Kallinus—in some cases even by Arktinus and Hesiod—as genuine Homeric matter. As far as the evidences on the case, as well internal as external, enable us to judge, we seem warranted in believing that the Iliad and Odyssey were recited substantially as they now stand (always allowing for partial divergences of text and interpolations) in 776 B.C., our first trustworthy mark of Grecian time. And this ancient date—let it be added—as it is the best authenticated fact, so it is also the most important attribute of the Homeric poems, considered in reference to Grecian history. For they thus afford us an insight into the antehistorical character of the Greeks—enabling us to trace the subsequent forward march of the nation, and to seize instructive contrasts between their former and their later condition.

Rejecting therefore the idea of compilation by Peisistratus, and referring the present state of the Iliad and Odyssey to a period more than two centuries earlier, the question still remains, by what process, or through whose agency, they reached that state? Is each poem the work of one author, or of several? If the latter, do all the parts belong to the same age? What ground is there for believing, that any or all of these parts existed before as separate poems, and have been accommodated to the place in which they now appear by more or less systematic alteration?

The acute and valuable Prolegomena of Wolf, half a century ago, powerfully turned the attention of scholars to the necessity of considering the Iliad and Odyssey with reference to the age and society in which they arose, and to the material differences in this respect between Homer and more recent epic poets. Since that time an elaborate study has been bestowed upon the early manifestations of poetry (Sagenpoesie) among other nations; and the German critics especially, among whom this description of literature has been most cultivated, have selected it as the only appropriate analogy for the Homeric poems. Such poetry, consisting for the most part of short, artless effusions, with little of deliberate or far-sighted combination, has been assumed by many critics as a fit standard to apply for measuring the capacities of the Homeric age; an age exclusively of speakers, singers, and hearers, not of readers or writers. In place of the unbounded admiration which was felt for Homer, not merely as a poet of detail, but as constructor of a long epic, at the time when

Wolf wrote his Prolegomena, the tone of criticism passed to the opposite extreme, and attention was fixed entirely upon the defects in the arrangement of the Iliad and Odyssey. Whatever was to be found in them of symmetry or pervading system, was pronounced to be decidedly post-Homeric. Under such preconceived anticipations Homer seems to have been generally studied in Germany, during the generation succeeding Wolf, the negative portion of whose theory was usually admitted, though as to the positive substitute—what explanation was to be given of the history and present constitution of the Homeric poems—there was by no means the like agreement. During the last ten years, however, a contrary tendency has manifested itself; the Wolfian theory has been re-examined and shaken by Nitzsch, who, as well as O. Müller, Welcker, and other scholars, have revived the idea of original Homeric unity, under certain modifications. The change in Goethe's opinion, coincident with this new direction, is recorded in one of his latest works. On the other hand, the original opinion of Wolf has also been reproduced within the last five years, and fortified with several new observations on the text, of the Iliad, by Lachmann.

The point is thus still under controversy among able scholars, and is probably destined to remain so. For in truth our means of knowledge are so limited, that no man can produce arguments sufficiently cogent to contend against opposing preconceptions; and it creates a painful sentiment of diffidence when we read the expressions of equal and absolute persuasion with which the two opposite conclusions have both been advanced. We have nothing to teach us the history of these poems except the poems themselves. Not only do we possess no collateral information respecting them or their authors, but we have no one to describe to us the people or the age in which they originated: our knowledge respecting contemporary Homeric society is collected exclusively from the Homeric compositions themselves. We are ignorant whether any other, or what other, poems preceded them or divided with them the public favor, nor have we anything better than conjecture to determine either the circumstances under which they were brought before the hearers, or the conditions which a bard of that day was required to satisfy. On all these points, moreover, the age of Thucydides and Plato seems to have been no better informed than we are, except in so far as they could profit by the analogies of the cyclic and other epic poems, which would doubtless in many cases have afforded valuable aid.

Nevertheless no classical scholar can be easy without *some* opinion respecting the authorship of these immortal poems. And the more defective the evidence we possess, the more essential is it that all that evidence should be marshaled in the clearest order, and its bearing upon the points in controversy distinctly understood beforehand. Both these conditions seem to have been often neglected, throughout the long-continued Homeric discussion.

To illustrate the first point:—Since two poems are comprehended in the problem to be solved, the natural process would be, first to study the easier of the two, and then to apply the conclusions thence deduced as a means of explaining the other. Now the Odyssey, looking at its aggregate character, is incomparably more easy to comprehend than the Iliad. Yet most Homeric critics apply the microscope at once, and in the first instance, to the Iliad.

To illustrate the second point:—What evidence is sufficient to negative the supposition that the Iliad or the Odyssey is a poem originally and intentionally one? Not simply particular gaps and contradictions, though they be even gross and numerous; but the preponderance of these proofs of mere unprepared coalescence over the other proofs of designed adaptation scattered throughout the whole poem. For the poet (or the co-operating poets, if more than one) may have intended to compose an harmonious whole, but may have realized their intention incompletely, and left partial faults; or perhaps the contradictory lines may have crept in through a corrupt text. A survey of the whole poem is necessary to determine the question; and this necessity, too, has not always been attended to.

If it had happened that the Odyssey had been preserved to us alone, without the Iliad, I think the dispute respecting Homeric unity would never have been raised. For the former is, in my judgment, pervaded almost from beginning to end by marks of designed adaptation; and the special faults which Wolf, W. Müller, and B. Thiersch, have singled out for the purpose of disproving such unity of intention, are so few and of so little importance, that they would have been universally regarded as mere instances of haste or unskillfulness on the part of the poet, had they not been seconded by the far more powerful battery opened against the Iliad. These critics, having laid down their general presumptions against the antiquity of the long epopee, illustrate their principles by exposing the many flaws and fissures in the Iliad, and then think it sufficient if they can show a few similar defects in the Odyssey—as if the breaking up of Homeric unity in the former naturally entailed a similar necessity with regard to the latter; and their method of proceeding, contrary to the rule above laid down, puts the more difficult problem in the foreground, as a means of solution for the easier. We can hardly wonder, however, that they have applied their observations in the first instance to the Iliad, because it is in every man's esteem the more marked, striking, and impressive poem of the two—and the character of Homer is more intimately identified with it than with the Odyssey. This may serve as an explanation of the course pursued; but be the case as it may in respect to comparative poetical merit, it is not the less true, that as an aggregate, the Odyssey is more simple and easily understood, and therefore ought to come first in the order of analysis.

Now, looking at the Odyssey by itself, the proofs of a unity of

design seem unequivocal and everywhere to be found. A premeditated structure, and a concentration of interest upon one prime hero under well-defined circumstances, may be traced from the first book to the twenty-third. Odysseus is always either directly or indirectly kept before the reader, as a warrior returning from the fullness of glory at Troy, exposed to manifold and protracted calamities during his return home, on which his whole soul is so bent that he refuses even the immortality offered by Calypso;—a victim, moreover, even after his return, to mingled injury and insult from the suitors, who have long been plundering his property and dishonoring his house; but at length obtaining, by valor and cunning united, a signal revenge which restores him to all that he had lost. All the persons and all the events in the poem are subsidiary to this main plot: and the divine agency, necessary to satisfy the feeling of the Homeric man, is put forth by Poseidon and Athene, in both cases from dispositions directly bearing upon Odysseus. To appreciate the unity of the Odyssey, we have only to read the objections taken against that of the Iliad—especially in regard to the long withdrawal of Achilles, not only from the scene, but from the memory—together with the independent prominence of Ajax, Diomedes, and other heroes. How far we are entitled from hence to infer the want of premeditated unity in the Iliad, will be presently considered; but it is certain that the constitution of the Odyssey in this respect everywhere demonstrates the presence of such unity. Whatever may be the interest attached to Penelope, Telemachus, or Eumæus, we never disconnect them from their association with Odysseus. The present is not the place for collecting the many marks of artistical structure dispersed throughout this poem: but it may be worth while to remark, that the final catastrophe realized in the twenty-second book —the slaughter of the suitors in the very house which they were profaning—is distinctly and prominently marked out in the first and second books, promised by Teiresias in the eleventh, by Athene in the thirteenth, and by Helen in the fifteenth, and gradually matured by a series of suitable preliminaries, throughout the eight books preceding its occurrence. Indeed what is principally evident, and what has been often noticed, in the Odyssey, is, the equable flow both of the narrative and the events; the absence of that rise and fall of interest which is sufficiently conspicuous in the Iliad.

To set against these evidences of unity, there ought at least to be some strong cases produced of occasional incoherence or contradiction. But it is remarkable how little of such counter-evidence is to be found, although the arguments of Wolf, W. Müller, and B. Thiersch, stand so much in need of it. They have discovered only one instance of undeniable inconsistency in the parts—the number of days occupied by the absence of Telemachus at Pylus and Sparta. That young prince, though represented as in great haste to depart, and refusing pressing invitations to prolong his stay, must, nevertheless, be supposed to have continued for thirty days the guest of Menelaus, in order to bring his proceedings into chronological harmony with those of Odysseus, and to explain the first meeting of father and son in the swine-fold of Eumæus. Here is undoubtedly an inaccuracy (so Nitzsch treats it, and I think justly) on the part of the poet, who did not anticipate, and did not experience in ancient times, so strict a scrutiny; an inaccuracy certainly not at all wonderful; the matter of real wonder is, that it stands almost alone, and that there are no others in the poem.

Now this is one of the main points on which W. Müller and B. Thiersch rest their theory—explaining the chronological confusion by supposing that the journey of Telemachus to Pylus and Sparta constituted the subject of an epic originally separate (comprising the first four books and a portion of the fifteenth), and incorporated at second-hand with the remaining poem. And they conceive this view to be farther confirmed by the double assembly of the gods (at the beginning of the first book as well as of the fifth), which they treat as an awkward repetition, such as could not have formed part of the primary scheme of any epic poet. But here they only escape a small difficulty by running into another and a greater. For it is impossible to comprehend how the first four books and part of the fifteenth can ever have constituted a distinct epic; since the adventures of Telemachus have no satisfactory termination, except at the point of confluence with those of his father, when the unexpected meeting and recognition takes place under the roof of Eumæus—nor can any epic poem ever have described that meeting and recognition without giving some account how Odysseus came thither. Moreover, the first two books of the Odyssey distinctly lay the ground, and carry expectation forward, to the final catastrophe of the poem—treating Telemachus as a subordinate person, and his expedition as merely provisional toward an ulterior result. Nor can I agree with W. Müller, that the real Odyssey might well be supposed to begin with the fifth book. On the contrary, the exhibition of the suitors and the Ithakesian agora, presented to us in the second book, is absolutely essential to the full comprehension of the books subsequent to the thirteenth. The suitors are far too important personages in the poem to allow of their being first introduced in so informal a manner as we read in the sixteenth book; indeed the passing allusions of Athene (xiii. 310, 375) and Eumæus (xiv. 41, 81) to the suitors, presuppose cognizance of them on the part of the hearer.

Lastly, the twofold discussion of the gods, at the beginning of the first and fifth books, and the double interference of Athene, far from being a needless repetition, may be shown to suit perfectly both the genuine epical conditions and the unity of the poem. For although the final consummation, and the organization of measures against the suitors, was to be accomplished by Odysseus and Telem-

achus jointly, yet the march and adventures of the two, until the moment of their meeting in the dwelling of Eumæus, were essentially distinct. But according to the religious ideas of the old epic, the presiding direction of Athene was necessary for the safety and success of both of them. Her first interference arouses and inspires the son, her second produces the liberation of the father—constituting a point of union and common origination for two lines of adventures, in both of which she takes earnest interest, but which are necessarily for a time kept apart in order to coincide at the proper moment.

It will thus appear that the twice-repeated agora of the gods in the Odyssey, bringing home as it does to one and the same divine agent that double start which is essential to the scheme of the poem, consists better with the supposition of premeditated unity than with that of distinct self-existent parts. And assuredly the manner in which Telemachus and Odysseus, both by different roads, are brought into meeting and conjunction, at the dwelling of Eumæus, is something not only contrived, but very skillfully contrived. It is needless to advert to the highly interesting character of Eumæus, rendered available as a rallying point, though in different ways both to the father and the son, over and above the sympathy which he himself inspires.

If the Odyssey be not an original unity, of what self-existent parts can we imagine it to have consisted? To this question it is difficult to imagine a satisfactory reply: for the supposition that Telemachus and his adventures may once have formed the subject of a separate epos, apart from Odysseus, appears inconsistent with the whole character of that youth as it stands in the poem, and with the events in which he is made to take part. We could better imagine the distribution of the adventures of Odysseus himself into two parts—one containing his wanderings and return, the other handling his ill-treatment by the suitors and his final triumph. But, though either of these two subjects might have been adequate to furnish out a separate poem, it is nevertheless certain, that as they are presented in the Odyssey, the former cannot be divorced from the latter. The simple return of Odysseus, as it now stands in the poem, could satisfy no one as a final close, so long as the suitors remain in possession of his house and forbid his reunion with his wife. Any poem which treated his wanderings and return separately, must have represented his reunion with Penelope and restoration to his house as following naturally upon his arrival in Ithaka—thus taking little or no notice of the suitors. But this would be a capital mutilation of the actual epical narrative, which considers the suitors at home as an essential portion of the destiny of the much-suffering hero, not less than his shipwrecks and trials at sea. His return (separately taken) is foredoomed, according to the curse of Polyphemus executed by Poseidon, to be long-deferred, miserable, solitary, and ending with destruction in his house to greet him; and the ground is thus laid, in the very

recital of his wanderings, for a new series of events which are to happen to him after his arrival in Ithaka. There is no tenable halting-place between the departure of Odysseus from Troy and the final restoration to his house and his wife. The distance between these two events may indeed be widened, by accumulating new distresses and impediments, but any separate portion of it cannot be otherwise treated than as a fraction of the whole. The beginning and end are here the data in respect to epical genesis, though the intermediate events admit of being conceived as variables, more or less numerous: so that the conception of the whole may be said without impropriety both to precede and to govern that of the constituent parts.

The general result of a study of the Odyssey may be set down as follows:—1. The poem as it now stands exhibits unequivocally adaptation of parts and continuity of structure, whether by one or by several consentient hands: it may, perhaps, be a secondary formation, out of a pre-existing Odyssey of smaller dimensions; but if so, the parts of the smaller whole must have been so far recast as to make them suitable members of the larger, and are noway recognizable by us. 2. The subject-matter of the poem not only does not favor, but goes far to exclude, the possibility of the Wolfian hypothesis. Its events cannot be so arranged as to have composed several antecedent substantive epics, afterward put together into the present aggregate. Its authors cannot have been mere compilers of pre-existing materials, such as Peisistratus and his friends: they must have been poets, competent to work such matter as they found into a new and enlarged design of their own. Nor can the age in which this long poem, of so many thousand lines, was turned out as a continuous aggregate, be separated from the ancient, productive, inspired age of Grecian epic.

Arriving at such conclusions from the internal evidence of the Odyssey, we can apply them by analogy to the Iliad. We learn something respecting the character and capacities of that early age which has left no other mementos except these two poems. Long continuous epics (it is observed by those who support the views of Wolf), with an artistical structure, are inconsistent with the capacities of a rude and non-writing age. Such epics (we may reply) are *not inconsistent* with the early age of the Greeks, and the Odyssey is a proof of it; for in that poem the integration of the whole, and the composition of the parts, must have been simultaneous. The analogy of the Odyssey enables us to rebut that preconception under which many ingenious critics sit down to the study of the Iliad, and which induces them to explain all the incoherences of the latter by breaking it up into smaller unities, as if short epics were the only manifestation of poetical power which the age admitted. There ought to be no reluctance in admitting a presiding scheme and premeditated

unity of parts, in so far as the parts themselves point to such a conclusion.

That the Iliad is not so essentially one piece as the Odyssey, every man agrees. It includes a much greater multiplicity of events, and, what is yet more important, a greater multiplicity of prominent personages: the very indefinite title which it bears, as contrasted with the speciality of the name *Odyssey*, marks the difference at once. The parts stand out more conspicuously from the whole, and admit more readily of being felt and appreciated in detached recitation. We may also add, that it is of more unequal execution than the Odyssey—often rising to a far higher pitch of grandeur, but also occasionally tamer: the story does not move on continuously; incidents occur without plausible motive, nor can we shut our eyes to evidences of incoherence and contradiction.

To a certain extent the Iliad is open to all these remarks, though Wolf and William Müller, and above all Lachmann, exaggerate the case in degree. And from hence has been deduced the hypothesis which treats the parts in their original state as separate integers, independent of and unconnected with each other, and forced into unity only by the after-thought of a subsequent age; or sometimes not even themselves as integers, but as aggregates grouped together out of fragments still smaller—short epics formed by the coalescence of still shorter songs. Now there is some plausibility in these reasonings, so long as the discrepancies are looked upon as the whole of the case. But in point of fact they are not the whole of the case: for it is not less true, that there are large portions of the Iliad which present positive and undeniable evidences of coherence as antecedent and consequent, though we are occasionally perplexed by inconsistencies of detail. To deal with these latter, is a portion of the duties of a critic. But he is not to treat the Iliad as if inconsistency prevailed everywhere throughout its parts; for coherence of parts—symmetrical antecedence and consequence—is discernible throughout the larger half of the poem.

Now the Wolfian theory explains the gaps and contradictions throughout the narrative, but it explains nothing else. If (as Lachmann thinks) the Iliad originally consisted of sixteen songs or little substantive epics (Lachmann's sixteen songs cover the space only as far as the twenty-second book or the death of Hector, and two more songs would have to be admitted for the twenty-third and twenty-fourth books)—not only composed by different authors, but by each without any view to conjunction with the rest—we have then no right to expect any intrinsic continuity between them; and all that continuity which we now find must be of extraneous origin. Where are we to look for the origin? Lachmann follows Wolf in ascribing the whole constructive process to Peisistratus and his associates, at a period when the creative epical faculty is admitted to have died out. But upon this supposition Peisistratus (or his associates) must

have done much more than omit, transpose, and interpolate, here and there; he must have gone far to rewrite the whole poem. A great poet might have recast pre-existing separate songs into one comprehensive whole, but no mere arrangers or compilers would be competent to do so: and we are thus left without any means of accounting for that degree of continuity and consistence which runs through so large a portion of the Iliad, though not through the whole. The idea that the poem as we read it grew out of atoms not originally designed for the places which they now occupy, involves us in new and inextricable difficulties when we seek to elucidate either the mode of coalescence or the degree of existing unity.

Admitting, then, premeditated adaptation of parts to a certain extent as essential to the Iliad, we may yet inquire whether it was produced all at once or gradually enlarged—whether by one author or by several; and if the parts be of different age, which is the primitive kernel, and which are the additions.

Welcker, Lange, and Nitzsch treat the Homeric poems as representing a second step in advance, in the progress of popular poetry. First comes the age of short narrative songs; next, when these have become numerous, there arise constructive minds who recast and blend together many of them into a larger aggregate conceived upon some scheme of their own. The age of the epos is followed by that of the epopee—short spontaneous effusions preparing the way, and furnishing materials, for the architectonic genius of the poet. It is farther presumed by the above-mentioned authors that the pre-Homeric epic included a great abundance of such smaller songs,—a fact which admits of no proof, but which seems countenanced by some passages in Homer, and is in itself noway improbable. But the transition from such songs, assuming them to be ever so numerous, to a combined and continuous poem, forms an epoch in the intellectual history of the nation, implying mental qualities of a higher order than those upon which the songs themselves depend. Nor is it to be imagined that the materials pass unaltered from their first state of isolation into their second state of combination. They must of necessity be recast, and undergo an adapting process, in which the genius of the organizing poet consists; nor can we hope, by simply knowing them as they exist in the second stage, ever to divine how they stood in the first. Such, in my judgment, is the right conception of the Homeric epoch,—an organizing poetical mind, still preserving that freshness of observation and vivacity of details which constitutes the charm of the ballad.

Nothing is gained by studying the Iliad as a congeries of fragments once independent of each other: no portion of the poem can be shown to have ever been so, and the supposition introduces difficulties greater than those which it removes. But it is not necessary to affirm that the whole poem as we now read it belonged to the original and preconceived plan. In this respect the Iliad produces upon my

mind an impression totally different from the Odyssey. In the latter poem, the characters and incidents are fewer, and the whole plot appears of one projection, from the beginning to the death of the suitors: none of the parts look as if they had been composed separately and inserted by way of addition into a pre-existing smaller poem. But the Iliad, on the contrary, presents the appearance of a house built upon a plan comparatively narrow and subsequently enlarged by successive additions. The first book, together with the eighth, and the books from the eleventh to the twenty-second inclusive, seem to form the primary organization of the poem, then properly an Achilleis: the twenty-third and twenty-fourth books are, perhaps, additions at the tail of this primitive poem, which still leave it nothing more than an enlarged Achilleis. But the books from the second to the seventh inclusive, together with the tenth, are of a wider and more comprehensive character, and convert the poem from an Achilleis into an Iliad. The primitive frontispiece, inscribed with the anger of Achilles and its direct consequences, yet remains after it has ceased to be coextensive with the poem. The parts added, however, are not necessarily inferior in merit to the original poem: so far is this from being the case, that among them are comprehended some of the noblest efforts of the Grecian epic. Nor are they more recent in date than the original; strictly speaking, they must be a little more recent, but they belong to the same generation and state of society as the primitive Achilleis. These qualifications are necessary to keep apart different questions which, in discussions of Homeric criticism, are but too often confounded.

If we take those portions of the poem which I imagine to have constituted the original Achilleis, it will be found that the sequence of events contained in them is more rapid, more unbroken, and more intimately knit together in the way of cause and effect, than in the other books. Heyne and Lachmann indeed, with other objecting critics, complain of the action in them as being too much crowded and hurried, since one day lasts from the beginning of the eleventh book to the middle of the eighteenth, without any sensible halt in the march throughout so large a portion of the journey. Lachmann likewise admits that those separate songs, into which he imagines that the whole Iliad may be dissected, cannot be severed with the same sharpness, in the books subsequent te the eleventh, as in those before it. There is only one real halting-place from the eleventh book to the twenty-second—the death of Patroclus; and this can never be conceived as the end of a separate poem, though it is a capital step in the development of the Achilleis, and brings about that entire revolution in the temper of Achilles which was essential for the purpose of the poet. It would be a mistake to imagine that there ever could have existed a separate poem called Patrocleia, though a part of the Iliad was designated by that name. For Patroclus has no substantive position: he is the attached friend and second of Achilles,

but nothing else,—standing to the latter in a relation of dependence resembling that of Telemachus to Odysseus. And the way in which Patroclus is dealt with in the Iliad is (in my judgment) the most dexterous and artistical contrivance in the poem—that which approaches nearest to the neat tissue of the Odyssey.

The great and capital misfortune which prostrates the strength of the Greeks and renders them incapable of defending themselves without Achilles, is the disablement by wounds of Agamemnon, Diomedes, and Odysseus: so that the defense of the wall and of the ships is left only to heroes of the second magnitude (Ajax alone excepted), such as Idomeneus, Leonteus, Polypœtes, Meriones, Menelaus, etc. Now it is remarkable that all these three first-rate chiefs are in full force at the beginning of the eleventh book: all three are wounded in the battle which that book describes, and at the commencement of which Agamemnon is full of spirits and courage.

Nothing can be more striking than the manner in which Homer concentrates our attention in the first book upon Achilles as the hero, his quarrel with Agamemnon, and the calamities to the Greeks which are held out as about to ensue from it, through the intercession of Thetis with Zeus. But the incidents dwelt upon from the beginning of the second book down to the combat between Hector and Ajax in the seventh, animated and interesting as they are, do nothing to realize this promise. They are a splendid picture of the Trojan war generally, and eminently suitable to that larger title under which the poem has been immortalized—but the consequences of the anger of Achilles do not appear until the eighth book. The tenth book, or Doloneia, is also a portion of the Iliad, but not of the Achilleis; while the ninth book appears to me a subsequent addition, nowise harmonizing with that main stream of the Achilleis which flows from the eleventh book to the twenty-second. The eighth book ought to be read in immediate connection with the eleventh, in order to see the structure of what seems the primitive Achilleis; for there are several passages in the eleventh and the following books, which prove that the poet who composed them could not have had present to his mind the main event of the ninth book—the outpouring of profound humiliation by the Greeks, and from Agamemnon especially, before Achilles, coupled with formal offers to restore Briseis and pay the amplest compensation for past wrong. The words of Achilles (not less than those of Patroclus and Nestor) in the eleventh and in the following books, plainly imply that the humiliation of the Greeks before him, for which he thirsts, is as yet future and contingent; that no plenary apology has yet been tendered, nor any offer made of restoring Briseis; while both Nestor and Patroclus, with all their wish to induce him to take arms, never take notice of the offered atonement and restitution, but view him as one whose ground for quarrel stands still the same as it did at the beginning. Moreover, if we look at the first book—the opening of the Achilleis

—we shall see that this prostration of Agamemnon and the chief Grecian heroes before Achilles would really be the termination of the whole poem; for Achilles asks nothing more from Thetis, nor Thetis anything more from Zeus, than that Agamemnon and the Greeks may be brought to know the wrong that they have done to their capital warrior, and humbled in the dust in expiation of it. We may add, that the abject terror in which Agamemnon appears in the ninth book when he sends the supplicatory message to Achilles, as it is not adequately accounted for by the degree of calamity which the Greeks have experienced in the preceding (eighth) book, so it is inconsistent with the gallantry and high spirit with which he shines at the beginning of the eleventh. The situation of the Greeks only becomes desperate when the three great chiefs, Agamemnon, Odysseus, and Diomedes, are disabled by wounds; this is the irreparable calamity which works upon Patroclus, and through him upon Achilles. The ninth book, as it now stands, seems to me an addition, by a different hand, to the original Achilleis, framed so as both to forestall and to spoil the nineteenth book, which is the real reconciliation of the two inimical heroes: I will venture to add that it carries the pride and egotism of Achilles beyond even the largest exigencies of insulted honor, and is shocking to that sentiment of Nemesis which was so deeply seated in the Grecian mind. We forgive any excess of fury against the Trojans and Hector, after the death of Patroclus; but that he should remain unmoved by restitution, by abject supplications, and by the richest atoning presents, tendered from the Greeks, indicates an implacability such as neither the first book, nor the books between the eleventh and the seventeenth, convey.

It is with the Grecian agora in the beginning of the second book that the Iliad (as distinguished from the Achilleis) commences,—continued through the Catalogue, the muster of the two armies, the single combat between Menelaus and Paris, the renewed promiscuous battle caused by the arrow of Pandarus, the (Epipolesis or) personal circuit of Agamemnon round the army, the Aristeia or brilliant exploits of Diomedes, the visit of Hector to Troy for purposes of sacrifice, his interview with Andromache, and his combat with Ajax —down to the seventh book. All these are beautiful poetry, presenting to us the general Trojan war and its conspicuous individuals under different points of view, but leaving no room in the reader's mind for the thought of Achilles. Now the difficulty for an enlarging poet was, to pass from the Achilleis in the first book to the Iliad in the second, and it will accordingly be found that here is an awkwardness in the structure of the poem which counsel on the poet's behalf (ancient or modern) do not satisfactorily explain.

In the first book, Zeus has promised Thetis that he will punish the Greeks for the wrong done to Achilles: in the beginning of the second book, he deliberates how he shall fulfill the promise, and sends down for that purpose "mischievous Oneirus" (the Dream-god)

to visit Agamemnon in his sleep, to assure him that the gods have now with one accord consented to put Troy into his hands, and to exhort him forthwith to the assembling of his army for the attack. The ancient commentators were here perplexed by the circumstance that Zeus puts a falsehood into the mouth of Oneirus. But there seems no more difficulty in explaining this than in the narrative of the book of 1 Kings (chap. xxii. 20), where Jehovah is mentioned to have put a lying spirit into the mouth of Ahab's prophets—the real awkwardness is, that Oneirus and his falsehood produce no effect. For in the first place Agamemnon takes a step very different from that which his dream recommends—and in the next place, when the Grecian army is at length armed and goes forth to battle, it does not experience defeat (which would be the case if the exhortation of Oneirus really proved mischievous), but carries on a successful day's battle, chiefly through the heroism of Diomedes. Instead of arming the Greeks forthwith, Agamemnon convokes first a council of chiefs, and next an agora of the host. And though himself in a temper of mind highly elate with the deceitful assurances of Oneirus, he deliberately assumes the language of despair in addressing the troops, having previously prepared Nestor and Odysseus for his doing so—merely in order to try the courage of the men, and with formal instructions given to these two other chiefs that they are to speak in opposition to him. Now this intervention of Zeus and Oneirus, eminently unsatisfactory when coupled with the incidents which now follow it, and making Zeus appear, but only appear, to realize his promise of honoring Achilles as well as of hurting the Greeks,—forms exactly the point of junction between the Achilleis and the Iliad.

The freak which Agamemnon plays off upon the temper of his army, though in itself childish, serves a sufficient purpose, not only because it provides a special matter of interest to be submitted to the Greeks, but also because it calls forth the splendid description, so teeming with vivacious detail, of the sudden breaking up of the assembly after Agamemnon's harangue, and of the decisive interference of Odysseus to bring the men back, as well as to put down Thersites. This picture of the Greeks in agora, bringing out the two chief speaking and counseling heroes, was so important a part of the general Trojan war, that the poet has permitted himself to introduce it by assuming an inexplicable folly on the part of Agamemnon; just as he has ushered in another fine scene in the third book—the Teichoskopy or conversation between Priam and Helen on the walls of Troy—by admitting the supposition that the old king in the tenth year of the war did not know the persons of Agamemnon and the other Grecian chiefs. This may serve as an explanation of the delusion practiced by Agamemnon toward his assembled host; but it does not at all explain the tame and empty intervention of Oneirus.

If the initial incident of the second book, whereby we pass out of

the Achilleis into the Iliad, is awkward, so also the final incident of the seventh book, immediately before we come back into the Achilleis, is not less unsatisfactory—I mean the construction of the wall and ditch round the Greek camp. As the poem now stands, no plausible reason is assigned why this should be done. Nestor proposes it without any constraining necessity: for the Greeks are in a career of victory, and the Trojans are making offers of compromise which imply conscious weakness—while Diomedes is so confident of the approaching ruin of Troy, that he dissuades his comrades from receiving even Helen herself if the surrender should be tendered. "Many Greeks have been slain," it is true, as Nestor observes; but an equal or greater number of Trojans have been slain, and all the Grecian heroes are yet in full force: the absence of Achilles is not even adverted to.

Now this account of the building of the fortification seems to be an after-thought, arising out of the enlargement of the poem beyond its original scheme. The original Achilleis, passing at once from the first to the eighth, and from thence to the eleventh book, might well assume the fortification—and talk of it as a thing existing, without adducing any special reason why it was erected. The hearer would naturally comprehend and follow the existence of a ditch and wall round the ships as a matter of course, provided there was nothing in the previous narrative to make him believe that the Greeks had originally been without these bulwarks. And since the Achilleis, immediately after the promise of Zeus to Thetis at the close of the first book, went on to describe the fulfillment of that promise and the ensuing disasters of the Greeks, there was nothing to surprise any one in hearing that their camp was fortified. But the case was altered when the first and the eighth books were parted asunder in order to make room for descriptions of temporary success and glory on the part of the besieging army. The brilliant scenes sketched in the books from the second to the seventh mention no fortification, and even imply its non-existence; yet since notice of it occurs amid the first description of Grecian disasters in the eighth book, the hearer who had the earlier books present to his memory might be surprised to find a fortification mentioned immediately afterwards, unless the construction of it were specially announced to have intervened. But it will at once appear that there was some difficulty in finding a good reason why the Greeks should begin to fortify at this juncture, and that the poet who discovered the gap might not be enabled to fill it up with success. As the Greeks have got on up to this moment without the wall, and as we have heard nothing but tales of their success, why should they now think farther laborious precautions for security necessary? we will not ask why the Trojans should stand quietly by and permit a wall to be built, since the truce was concluded expressly for burying the dead.

The tenth book (or Doloneia) was considered by some of the ancient scholiasts, and has been confidently set forth by the modern Wolfian critics, as originally a separate poem, inserted by Peisistratus in the Iliad. How it can ever have been a separate poem, I do not understand. It is framed with great specialty for the antecedent circumstances under which it occurs, and would suit for no other place; though capable of being separately recited, inasmuch as it has a definite beginning and end, like the story of Nisus and Euryalus in the Æneid. But while distinctly presupposing and resting upon the incidents in the eighth book, and in line 88 of the ninth (probably, the appointment of sentinels on the part of the Greeks as well as of the Trojans formed the close of the battle described in the eighth book), it has not the slightest bearing upon the events of the eleventh or the following books: it goes to make up the general picture of the Trojan war, but lies quite apart from the Achilleis. And this is one mark of a portion subsequently inserted—that though fitted on to the parts which precede, it has no influence on those which follow.

If the proceedings of the combatants on the plain of Troy, between the first and the eighth book, have no reference either to Achilles or to an Achilleis, we find Zeus in Olympus still more completely putting that hero out of the question, at the beginning of the fourth book. He is in this last-mentioned passage the Zeus of the Iliad, not of the Achilleis. Forgetful of his promise to Thetis in the first book, he discusses nothing but the question of continuance or termination of the war, and manifests anxiety only for the salvation of Troy, in opposition to the miso-Trojan goddesses, who prevent him from giving effect to the victory of Menelaus over Paris and the stipulated restitution of Helen—in which case of course the wrong offered to Achilles would remain unexpiated. An attentive comparison will render it evident that the poet who composed the discussion among the gods, at the beginning of the fourth book, has not been careful to put himself in harmony either with the Zeus of the first book or with the Zeus of the eighth.

So soon as we enter upon the eleventh book, the march of the poem becomes quite different. We are then in a series of events, each paving the way for that which follows, and all conducing to the result promised in the first book—the reappearance of Achilles as the only means of saving the Greeks from ruin—preceded by ample atonement, and followed by the maximum both of glory and revenge. The intermediate career of Patroclus introduces new elements, which however are admirably woven into the scheme of the poem as disclosed in the first book. I shall not deny that there are perplexities in the detail of events, as described in the battles at the Grecian wall and before the ships, from the eleventh to the sixteenth books, but they appear only cases of partial confusion, such as may be reasonably ascribed to imperfections of text: the main sequence remains coherent and intelligible. We find no considerable events which

could be left out without breaking the thread, nor any incongruity between one considerable event and another. There is nothing between the eleventh and twenty-second books which is at all comparable to the incongruity between the Zeus of the fourth book and the Zeus of the first and eighth. It may perhaps be true that the shield of Achilles is a superadded amplification of that which was originally announced in general terms—because the poet, from the eleventh to the twenty-second books, has observed such good economy of his materials, that he is hardly likely to have introduced one particular description of such disproportionate length, and having so little connection with the series of events. But I see no reason for believing that it is an addition materially later than the rest of the poem.

It must be confessed that the supposition here advanced, in reference to the structure of the Iliad, is not altogether free from difficulties, because the parts constituting the original Achilleis have been more or less altered or interpolated to suit the additions made to it, particularly in the eighth book. But it presents fewer difficulties than any other supposition, and it is the only means, so far as I know, of explaining the difference between one part of the Iliad and another; both the continuity of structure, and the conformity to the opening promise, which are manifest when we read the books in the order i., viii., xi. to xxii., as contrasted with the absence of these two qualities in books ii. to vii., ix. and x. An entire organization, preconceived from the beginning, would not be likely to produce any such disparity, nor is any such visible in the Odyssey; still less would the result be explained by supposing integers originally separate and brought together without any designed organization. And it is between these three suppositions that our choice has to be made. A scheme, and a large scheme too, must unquestionably be admitted as the basis of any sufficient hypothesis. But the Achilleis would have been a long poem, half the length of the present Iliad, and probably not less compact in its structure than the Odyssey. Moreover being parted off only by an imaginary line from the boundless range of the Trojan war, it would admit of enlargement more easily, and with greater relish to hearers, than the adventures of one single hero; while the expansion would naturally take place by adding new Grecian victory—since the original poem arrived at the exaltation of Achilles only through a painful series of Grecian disasters. That the poem under these circumstances should have received additions, is no very violent hypothesis: in fact, when we recollect that the integrity both of the Achilleis and of the Odyssey was neither guarded by printing nor writing, we shall perhaps think it less wonderful that the former was enlarged, than that the latter was not. Any relaxation of the laws of epical unity is a small price to pay for that splendid poetry, of which we find so much between the first and the eighth books of our Iliad.

The question respecting unity of authorship is different, and more difficult to determine, than that respecting consistency of parts, and sequence in the narrative. A poem conceived on a comparatively narrow scale may be enlarged afterward by its original author, with a greater or less coherence and success: the Faust of Goethe affords an example even in our own generation. On the other hand, a systematic poem may well have been conceived and executed by prearranged concert between several poets; among whom probably one will be the governing mind, though the rest may be effective, and perhaps equally effective, in respect to execution of the parts. And the age of the early Grecian epic was favorable to such fraternization of poets, of which the Gens called Homerids probably exhibited many specimens. In the recital or singing of a long unwritten poem, many bards must have conspired together, and in the earliest times the composer and the singer were one and the same person. Now the individuals comprised in the Homeric Gens, though doubtless very different among themselves in respect of mental capacity, were yet homogeneous in respect of training, means of observation and instruction, social experience, religious feelings and theories, etc., to a degree much greater than individuals in modern times. Fallible as our inferences are on this point, where we have only internal evidence to guide us, without any contemporary points of comparison, or any species of collateral information respecting the age, the society, the poets, the hearers, or the language—we must nevertheless in the present case take coherence of structure, together with consistency in the tone of thought, feeling, language, customs, etc., as presumptions of one author; and the contrary as presumptions of severalty; allowing as well as we can for that inequality of excellence which the same author may at different times present.

Now the case made out against single-headed authorship of the Odyssey appears to me very weak; and those who dispute it are guided more by their à priori rejection of ancient epical unity than by any positive evidence which the poem itself affords. It is otherwise with regard to the Iliad. Whatever presumptions a disjointed structure, several apparent inconsistencies of parts, and large excrescence of actual matter beyond the opening promise, can sanction—may reasonably be indulged against the supposition that this poem all proceeds from a single author. There is a difference of opinion on the subject among the best critics which is probably not destined to be adjusted, since so much depends partly upon critical feeling, partly upon the general reasonings, in respect to ancient epical unity, with which a man sits down to the study. For the champions of unity, such as Mr. Payne Knight, are very ready to strike out numerous and often considerable passages as interpolations, thus meeting the objections raised against unity of authorship on the ground of special inconsistencies. Hermann and Boeckh, though not going the length of Lachmann in maintaining the original theory

of Wolf, agree with the latter in recognizing diversity of authors in the poem, to an extent overpassing the limit of what can fairly be called interpolation. Payne Knight and Nitzsch are equally persuaded of the contrary. Here, then, is a decided contradiction among critics, all of whom have minutely studied the poems since the Wolfian question was raised. And it is such critics alone who can be said to constitute authority; for the cursory reader, who dwells upon the parts simply long enough to relish their poetical beauty, is struck only by that general sameness of coloring which Wolf himself admits to pervade the poem.

Having already intimated that, in my judgment, no theory of the structure of the poem is admissible which does not admit an original and preconcerted Achilleis—a stream which begins at the first book and ends with the death of Hector in the twenty-second, although the higher parts of it now remain only in the condition of two detached lakes, the first book and the eighth—I reason upon the same basis with respect to the authorship. Assuming continuity of structure as a presumptive proof, the whole of this Achilleis must be treated as composed by one author. Wolf indeed affirmed, that he never read the poem continuously through without being painfully impressed with the inferiority and altered style of the last six books —and Lachmann carried this feeling further back, so as to commence with the seventeenth book. If I could enter fully into this sentiment, I should then be compelled, not to deny the existence of a preconceived scheme, but to imagine that the books from the eighteenth to the twenty-second, though forming part of that scheme or Achilleis, had yet been executed by another and an inferior poet. But it is to be remarked, first, that inferiority of poetical merit to a certain extent is quite reconcilable with unity of authorship; and secondly, that the very circumstances upon which Wolf's unfavorable judgment is built, seem to arise out of increased difficulty in the poet's task, when he came to the crowning cantos of his designed Achilleis. For that which chiefly distinguishes these books is, the direct, incessant, and manual intervention of the gods and goddesses, formally permitted by Zeus—and the repetition of vast and fantastic conceptions to which such superhuman agency gives occasion; not omitting the battle of Achilles against Skamander and Simois, and the burning up of these rivers by Hephæstus. Now looking at this vein of ideas with the eyes of a modern reader, or even with those of a Grecian critic of the literary ages, it is certain that the effect is unpleasing: the gods, sublime elements of poetry when kept in due proportion, are here somewhat vulgarized. But though the poet here has not succeeded, and probably success was impossible, in the task which he has prescribed to himself—yet the mere fact of his undertaking it, and the manifest distinction between his employment of divine agency in these latter cantos as compared with the preceding, seems explicable only on the supposition that they *are* the latter

cantos and come in designed sequence, as the continuance of a previous plan. The poet wishes to surround the coming forth of Achilles with the maximum of glorious and terrific circumstance: no Trojan enemy can for a moment hold out against him: the gods must descend to the plain of Troy and fight in person, while Zeus, who at the beginning of the eighth book had forbidden them to take part, expressly encourages them to do so at the beginning of the twentieth. If then the nineteenth book (which contains the reconciliation between Achilles and Agamemnon, a subject naturally somewhat tame) and the three following books (where we have before us only the gods, Achilles, and the Trojans without hope or courage) are inferior in execution and interest to the seven preceding books (which describe the long-disputed and often doubtful death-struggle between the Greeks and Trojans without Achilles), as Wolf and other critics affirm—we may explain the difference without supposing a new poet as composer: for the conditions of the poem had become essentially more difficult, and the subject more unpromising. The necessity of keeping Achilles above the level, even of heroic prowess, restricted the poet's means of acting upon the sympathy of his hearers.

The last two books of the Iliad may have formed part of the original Achilleis. But the probability rather is, that they are additions; for the death of Hector satisfies the exigencies of a coherent scheme, and we are not entitled to extend the oldest poem beyond the limit which such necessity prescribes. It has been argued on one side by Nitzsch and O. Müller that the mine could not leave off with satisfaction at the moment in which Achilles sates his revenge, and while the bodies of Patroclus and Hector are lying unburied—also, that the more merciful temper which he exhibits in the twenty-fourth book must always have been an indispensable sequel, in order to create proper sympathy with his triumph. Other critics, on the contrary, have taken special grounds of exception against the last book, and have endeavored to set it aside as different from the other books both in tone and language. To a certain extent the peculiarities of the last book appear to me undeniable, though it is plainly a designed continuance and not a substantive poem. Some weight also is due to the remark about the twenty-third book, that Odysseus and Diomedes, who have been wounded and disabled during the fight, now reappear in perfect force, and contend in the games: here is no case of miraculous healing, and the inconsistency is more likely to have been admitted by a separate enlarging poet than by the schemer of the Achilleis.

The splendid books from the second to v. 322 of the seventh are equal in most parts to any portions of the Achilleis, and are pointedly distinguished from the latter by the broad view which they exhibit of the general Trojan war, with all its principal personages, localities, and causes—yet without advancing the result promised in the first

book, or indeed any final purpose whatever. Even the desperate wound inflicted by Tlepolemus on Sarpedon is forgotten, when the latter hero is called forth in the subsequent Achilleis. The arguments of Lachmann, who dissects these six books into three or four separate songs, carry no conviction to my mind; and I see no reason why we should not consider all of them to be by the same author, bound together by the common purpose of giving a great collective picture which may properly be termed an Iliad. The tenth book, or Doloneia, though adapted specially to the place in which it stands, agrees with the books between the first and eighth in belonging only to the general picture of the war, without helping forward the march of the Achilleis; yet it seems conceived in a lower vein, in so far as we can trust our modern ethical sentiment. One is unwilling to believe that the author of the fifth book (or Aristeia of Diomedes) would condescend to employ the hero whom he there so brightly glorifies—the victor even over Ares himself—in slaughtering newly arrived Thracian sleepers, without any large purpose or necessity. The ninth book, of which I have already spoken at length, belongs to a different vein of conception, and seems to me more likely to have emanated from a separate composer.

While intimating these views respecting the authorship of the Iliad as being in my judgment the most probable, I must repeat that, though the study of the poem carries to my mind a sufficient conviction respecting its structure, the question between unity and plurality of authors is essentially less determinable. The poem consists of a part original and other parts superadded; yet it is certainly not impossible that the author of the former may himself have composed the latter: and such would be my belief, if I regarded plurality of composers as an inadmissible idea. On this supposition we must conclude that the poet, while anxious for the addition of new and for the most part highly interesting matter, has not thought fit to recast the parts and events in such manner as to impart to the whole a pervading thread of consensus and organization, such as we see in the Odyssey.

That the Odyssey is of later date than the Iliad, and by a different author, seems to be now the opinion of most critics, especially of Payne Knight and Nitzsch; though O. Müller leans to a contrary conclusion, at the same time adding that he thinks the arguments either way not very decisive. There are considerable differences of statement in the two poems in regard to some of the gods: Iris is messenger of the gods in the Iliad, and Hermes in the Odyssey; Æolus, the dispenser of the winds in the Odyssey, is not noticed in the twenty-third book of the Iliad, but on the contrary, Iris invites the winds as independent gods to come and kindle the funeral pile of Patroclus; and unless we are to expunge the song of Demodokus in the eighth book of the Odyssey as spurious, Aphrodite there appears as the wife of Hephæstus—a relationship not known to the

Iliad. There are also some other points of difference enumerated by Mr. Knight and others, which tend to justify the presumption that the author of the Odyssey is not identical either with the author of the Achilleis or his enlargers, which G. Hermann considers to be a point unquestionable. Indeed, the difficulty of supposing a long coherent poem to have been conceived, composed, and retained, without any aid of writing, appears to many critics even now insurmountable, though the evidences on the other side are in my view sufficient to outweigh any negative presumption thus suggested. But it is improbable that the same person should have powers of memorial combination sufficient for composing two such poems, nor is there any proof to force upon us such a supposition.

Presuming a difference of authorship between the two poems, I feel less convinced about the supposed juniority of the Odyssey. The discrepancies in manners and language in the one and the other are so little important that two different persons, in the same age and society, might well be imagined to exhibit as great or even greater. It is to be recollected that the subjects of the two are heterogeneous, so as to conduct the poet, even were he the same man, into totally different veins of imagination and illustration. The pictures of the Odyssey seem to delineate the same heroic life as the Iliad, though looked at from a distinct point of view: and the circumstances surrounding the residence of Odysseus in Ithaka are just such as we may suppose him to have left in order to attack Troy. If the scenes presented to us are for the most part pacific, as contrasted with the incessant fighting of the Iliad, this is not to be ascribed to any greater sociality or civilization in the real hearers of the Odyssey, but to the circumstances of the hero whom the poet undertakes to adorn: nor can we doubt that the poems of Arktinus and Lesches, of a later date than the Odyssey, would have given us as much combat and bloodshed as the Iliad. I am not struck by those proofs of improved civilization which some critics affirm the Odyssey to present: Mr. Knight, who is of this opinion, nevertheless admits that the mutilation of Melanthius, and the hanging up of the female slaves by Odysseus, in that poem, indicate greater barbarity than any incidents in the fights before Troy. The more skillful and compact structure of the Odyssey has been often considered as a proof of its juniority in age. and in the case of two poems by the same author, we might plausibly contend that practice would bring with it improvement in the combining faculty. But in reference to the poems before us, we must recollect, first, that in all probability the Iliad (with which the comparison is taken) is not a primitive but an enlarged poem, and that the primitive Achilleis might well have been quite as coherent as the Odyssey;—secondly, that between different authors, superiority in structure is not a proof of subsequent composition, inasmuch as on that hyothesis we should be compelled to admit that the later poem of Arktinus would be an

improvement upon the Odyssey;—thirdly, that even if it were so, we could only infer that the author of the Odyssey had *heard* the Achilleis or the Iliad; we could not infer that he lived one or two generations afterward.

On the whole, the balance of probabilities seems in favor of distinct authorship of the two poems, but the same age—and that age a very early one, anterior to the first Olympiad. And they may thus be used as evidences, and contemporary evidences, for the phenomena of primitive Greek civilization; while they also show that the power of constructing long premeditated epics, without the aid of writing, is to be taken as a characteristic of the earliest known Greek mind. This was the point controverted by Wolf, which a full review of the case (in my judgment) decides against him; it is, moreover, a valuable resort for the historian of the Greeks, inasmuch as it marks out to him the ground from which he is to start in appreciating their ulterior progress.

Whatever there may be of truth in the different conjectures of critics respecting the authorship and structure of these unrivaled poems, we are not to imagine that it is the perfection of their epical symmetry which has given them their indissoluble hold upon the human mind, as well modern as ancient. There is some tendency in critics, from Aristotle downward, to invert the order of attributes in respect to the Homeric poems, so as to dwell most on recondite excellences which escape the unaided reader, and which are even to a great degree disputable. But it is given to few minds (as Goethe has remarked) to appreciate fully the mechanism of a long poem, and many feel the beauty of the separate parts who have no sentiment for the aggregate perfection of the whole.

Nor were the Homeric poems originally addressed to minds of the rarer stamp. They are intended for those feelings which the critic has in common with the unlettered mass, not for that enlarged range of vision and peculiar standard which he has acquired to himself. They are of all poems the most absolutely and unreservedly popular: had they been otherwise they could not have lived so long in the mouth of the rhapsodes, and the ear and memory of the people: and it was *then* that their influence was first acquired, never afterward to be shaken. Their beauties belong to the parts taken separately, which revealed themselves spontaneously to the listening crowd at the festival—far more than to the whole poem taken together, which could hardly be appreciated unless the parts were dwelt upon and suffered to expand in the mind. The most unlettered hearer of those times could readily seize, while the most instructed reader can still recognize, the characteristic excellence of Homeric narrative—its straightforward, unconscious, unstudied simplicity—its concrete forms of speech and happy alternation of action with dialogue—its vivid pictures of living agents, always clearly and sharply individualized, whether in the commanding proportions of Achilles and

Odysseus, in the graceful presence of Helen and Penelope, or in the more humble contrast of Eumæus and Melanthius; and always, moreover, animated by the frankness with which his heroes give utterance to all their transient emotions and even all their infirmities—its constant reference to those coarser veins of feeling and palpable motives which belong to all men in common—its fullness of graphic details, freshly drawn from the visible and audible world, and though often homely, never tame nor trenching upon that limit of satiety to which the Greek mind was so keenly alive—lastly, its perpetual junction of gods and men in the same picture, and familiar appeal to ever-present divine agency, in harmony with the interpretation of nature at that time universal.

It is undoubtedly easier to feel than to describe the impressive influence of Homeric narrative: but the time and circumstances under which that influence was first, and most powerfully felt, preclude the possibility of explaining it by comprehensive and elaborate comparisons, such as are implied in Aristotle's remarks upon the structure of the poems. The critic who seeks the explanation in the right place will not depart widely from the point of view of those rude auditors to whom the poems were originally addressed, or from the susceptibilities and capacities common to the human bosom in every stage of progressive culture. And though the refinements and delicacies of the poems, as well as their general structure, are a subject of highly interesting criticisms—yet it is not to these that Homer owes his wide-spread and imperishable popularity. Still less is it true, as the well-known observations of Horace would lead us to believe, that Homer is a teacher of ethical wisdom akin and superior to Chrysippus or Crantor. No didactic purpose is to be found in the Iliad and Odyssey: a philosopher may doubtless extract, from the incidents and strongly marked characters which it contains, much illustrative matter for his exhortations—but the ethical doctrine which he applies must emanate from his own reflection. The Homeric hero manifests virtues or infirmities, fierceness or compassion, with the same straightforward and simple-minded vivacity, unconscious of any ideal standard by which his conduct is to be tried; nor can we trace in the poet any ulterior function beyond that of the inspired organ of the Muse, and the nameless, but eloquent, herald of lost adventures out of the darkness of the past.

PART II.

HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL GEOGRAPHY AND LIMITS OF GREECE.

GREECE proper lies between the 36th and 40th parallels of north latitude, and between the 21st and 26th degrees of east longitude. Its greatest length from Mount Olympus to Cape Tænarus may be stated at 250 English miles; its greatest breadth, from the western coast of Akarnania to Marathon in Attica, at 180 miles; and the distance eastward from Ambrakia across Pindus to the Magnesian mountain Homole and the mouth of the Peneius is about 120 miles. Altogether its area is somewhat less than that of Portugal. In regard, however, to all attempts at determining the exact limits of Greece proper, we may remark, first, that these limits seem not to have been very precisely defined even among the Greeks themselves; and next, that so large a proportion of the Hellens were distributed among islands and colonies, and so much of their influence upon the world in general produced through their colonies, as to render the extent of their original domicile a matter of comparatively little moment to verify.

The chain called Olympus and the Cambunian mountains, ranging east and west and commencing with the Ægean sea or the Gulf of Therma near the fortieth degree of north latitude, is prolonged under the name of Mount Lingon, until it touches the Adriatic at the Akrokeraunian promontory. The country south of this chain comprehended all that in ancient times was regarded as Greece or Hellas proper, but it also comprehended something more. Hellas proper (or continuous Hellas, to use the language of Skylax and Dikæarchus) was understood to begin with the town and Gulf of Ambrakia: from thence northward to the Akrokeraunian promontory lay the land called by the Greeks Epirus—occupied by the Chaonians, Molossians, and Thesprotians, who were termed Epirots and were not esteemed to belong to the Hellenic aggregate. This at least was the general understanding, though Ætolians and Akarnanians in their more

distant sections seem to have been not less widely removed from the full type of Hellenism than the Epirots were; while Herodotus is inclined to treat even Molossians and Thesprotians as Hellens.

At a point about midway between the Ægean and Ionian seas, Olympus and Lingon are traversed nearly at right angles by the still longer and vaster chain called Pindus, which stretches in a line rather west of north from the northern side of the range of Olympus. The system to which these mountains belong seems to begin with the lofty masses of greenstone comprised under the name of Mount Scardus or Scordus (Schardagh), which is divided only by the narrow cleft containing the river Drin from the limestone of the Albanian Alps. From the southern face of Olympus, Pindus strikes off nearly southward, forming the boundary between Thessaly and Epirus, and sending forth about the 39th degree of latitude the lateral chain of Othrys—which latter takes an easterly course, reaching the sea between Thessaly and the northern coast of Eubœa. Southward of Othrys, the chain of Pindus under the name of Tymphrestus still continues, until another lateral chain, called Œta, projects from it again toward the east,—forming the lofty coast immediately south of the Maliac gulf, with the narrow road of Thermopylæ between the two—and terminating at the Eubœan strait. At the point of junction with Œta, the chain of Pindus forks into two branches; one striking to the westward of south, and reaching across Ætolia, under the names of Arakynthus, Kurius, Korax and Taphiassus, to the promontory called Antirrhion, situated on the northern side of the narrow entrance of the Corinthian gulf, over against the corresponding promontory of Rhion in Peloponnesus—the other tending south-east, and forming Parnassus, Helicon, and Kithæron; indeed Ægaleus and Hymettus, even down to the southernmost cape of Attica, Sunium, may be treated as a continuance of this chain. From the eastern extremity of Œta, also, a range of hills, inferior in height to the preceding, takes its departure in a south-easterly direction, under the various names of Knemis, Ptoon, and Teumessus. It is joined with Kithæron by the lateral communication, ranging from west to east, called Parnes; while the celebrated Pentelikus, abundant in marble quarries, constitutes its connecting link, to the south of Parnes, with the chain from Kithæron to Sunium.

From the promontory of Antirrhion the line of mountains crosses into Peloponnesus, and stretches in a southerly direction down to the extremity of the peninsula called Tænarus, now Cape Matapan. Forming the boundary between Elis with Messenia on one side, and Arcadia with Laconia on the other, it bears the successive names of Olenus, Panachaikus, Pholoe, Erymanthus, Lykæus, Parrhasius, and Taygetus. Another series of mountains strikes off from Kithæron toward the south-west, constituting under the names of Geraneia and Oneia the high ground which first sinks down into the depression

forming the Isthmus of Corinth, and then rises again to spread itself in Peloponnesus. One of its branches tends westward along the north of Arkadia, comprising the Akrokorinthus or citadel of Corinth, the high peak of Kyllene, the mountains of Aroanii and Lampeia, and ultimately joining Erymanthus and Pholoe—while the other branch strikes southward toward the south-eastern cape of Peloponnesus, the formidable Cape Malea or St. Angelo,—and exhibits itself under the successive names of Apesas, Artemisium, Parthenium, Parnon, Thornax, and Zarex.

From the eastern extremity of Olympus, in a direction rather to the eastward of south, stretches the range of mountains first called Ossa and afterward Pelion, down to the south-eastern corner of Thessaly. The long, lofty, and naked backbone of the island of Eubœa may be viewed as a continuance both of this chain and of the chain of Othrys: the line is farther prolonged by a series of islands in the archipelago, Andros, Tenos, Mykonos, and Naxos, belonging to the group called the Cyclades or islands encircling the sacred center of Delos. Of these Cyclades others are in like manner a continuance of the chain which reaches to Cape Sunium—Keos, Kythnos, Seriphos, and Siphnos join on to Attica, as Andros does to Eubœa. And we might even consider the great island of Krete as a prolongation of the system of mountains which breasts the winds and waves at Cape Malea, the island of Kythera forming the intermediate link between them. Skiathus, Skopelus, and Skyrus, to the north-east of Eubœa, also mark themselves out as outlying peaks of the range comprehending Pelion and Eubœa.

By this brief sketch, which the reader will naturally compare with one of the recent maps of the country, it will be seen that Greece proper is among the most mountainous territories in Europe. For although it is convenient, in giving a systematic view of the face of the country, to group the multiplicity of mountains into certain chains or ranges, founded upon approximative uniformity of direction; yet in point of fact there are so many ramifications and dispersed peaks—so vast a number of hills and crags of different magnitude and elevation—that a comparatively small proportion of the surface is left for level ground. Not only few continuous plains, but even few continuous valleys, exist throughout all Greece proper. The largest spaces of level ground are seen in Thessaly, in Ætolia in the western portion of Peloponnesus, and in Bœotia; but irregular mountains, valleys, frequent but isolated, landlocked basins and declivities, which often occur but seldom last long, form the character of the country.

The islands of the Cyclades, Eubœa, Attica, and Laconia, consist, for the most part, of micaceous schist, combined with and often covered by crystalline granular limestone. The center and west of Peloponnesus, as well as the country north of the Corinthian gulf from the Gulf of Ambrakia to the strait of Eubœa, present a calcareous formation, varying in different localities as to color, consistency, and hardness, but generally belonging or approximating to the chalk it is often very compact, but is distinguished in a marked manner from the crystalline limestone above-mentioned. The two loftiest summits in Greece (both, however, lower than Olympus, estimated at 9,700 feet) exhibit this formation—Parnassus, which attains 8,000 feet, and the point of St. Elias in Taygetus, which is not less than 7,800 feet. Clay-slate and conglomerates of sand, lime, and clay are found in many parts: a close and firm conglomerate of lime composes the Isthmus of Corinth: loose deposits of pebbles and calcareous breccia occupy also some portions of the territory. But the most important and essential elements of the Grecian soil consist of the diluvial and alluvial formations, with which the troughs and basins are filled up, resulting from the decomposition of the older adjoining rocks. In these reside the productive powers of the country, and upon these the grain and vegetables for the subsistence of the people depend. The mountain regions are to a great degree barren, destitute at present of wood or any useful vegetation, though there is reason to believe that they were better wooded in antiquity: in many parts, however, and especially in Ætolia and Akarnania, they afford plenty of timber, and in all parts pasture for the cattle during summer, at a time when the plains are thoroughly burnt up. For other articles of food, dependence must be had on the valleys, which are occasionally of singular fertility. The low grounds of Thessaly, the valley of the Kephisus, and the borders of the lake Kopais in Bœotia, the western portion of Elis, the plains of Stratus, on the confines of Akarnania and Ætolia, and those near the river Pamisus in Messenia, both are now, and were in ancient times, remarkable for their abundant produce.

Besides the scarcity of wood for fuel, there is another serious inconvenience to which the low grounds of Greece are exposed,—the want of a supply of water at once adequate and regular. Abundance of rain falls during the autumnal and winter months, little or none during the summer; while the naked limestone of the numerous hills neither absorbs nor retains moisture, so that the rain runs off as rapidly as it falls. Springs are not numerous. Most rivers are torrents in early spring, and dry before the end of summer: the copious combinations of the ancient language designated the winter torrent by a special and separate word. The most considerable rivers in the country are the Peneius, which carries off all the waters of Thessaly, finding an exit into the Ægean through the narrow defile which parts Ossa from Olympus; and the Achelous, which flows from Pindus in a south-westerly direction, separating Ætolia from Akarnania, and emptying itself into the Ionian sea: the Euenus also takes its rise at a more southerly part of the same mountain-chain, and falls into the same sea more to the eastward. The rivers more to the southward are unequal and inferior. Kephisus and Asopus

in Bœotia, Pamisus in Messenia, maintain each a languid stream throughout the summer; while the Inachus near Argos, and the Kephisus and Ilissus near Athens, present a scanty reality, which falls short still more of their great poetical celebrity. The Alpheius and the Spercheius are considerable streams—the Achelous is still more important. The quantity of mud which its turbid stream brought down and deposited occasioned a sensible increase of the land at its embouchure within the observation of Thucydides.

But the disposition and properties of the Grecian territory, though not maintaining permanent rivers, are favorable to the multiplication of lakes and marshes. There are numerous hollows and inclosed basins, out of which the water can find no superficial escape, and where, unless it makes for itself a subterranean passage through rifts in the mountains, it remains either as a marsh or a lake, according to the time of year. In Thessaly we find the lakes Nessonis and Bœbeis; in Ætolia, between the Achelous and Euenus, Strabo mentions the lake of Trichonis, besides several other lakes, which it is difficult to identify individually, though the quantity of ground covered by lake and marsh is, as a whole, very considerable. In Bœotia are situated the lakes Kopais, Hylike, and Harma; the first of the three formed chiefly by the river Kephisus, flowing from Parnassus on the north-west, and shaping for itself a sinuous course through the mountains of Phokis. On the north-east and east, the lake Kopais is bounded by the high land of Mount Ptoon, which intercepts its communication with the strait of Eubœa. Through the limestone of this mountain the water has either found or forced several subterraneous cavities, by which it obtains a partial egress on the other side of the rocky hill, and then flows into the strait. The Katabothra, as they were termed in antiquity, yet exist, but in an imperfect and half-obstructed condition. Even in antiquity, however, they never fully sufficed to carry off the surplus waters of the Kephisus; for the remains are still found of an artificial tunnel, pierced through the whole breadth of the rock, and with perpendicular apertures at proper intervals to let in the air from above. This tunnel—one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, since it must date from the prosperous days of the old Orchomenus, anterior to its absorption into the Bœotian league, as well as to the preponderance of Thebes—is now choked up and rendered useless. It may, perhaps, have been designedly obstructed by the hand of an enemy. The scheme of Alexander the Great, who commissioned an engineer from Chalkis to reopen it, was defeated first by discontents in Bœotia, and ultimately by his early death.

The Katabothra of the lake Kopais are a specimen of the phenomenon so frequent in Greece—lakes and rivers finding for themselves subterranean passages through the cavities in the limestone rocks, and even pursuing their unseen course for a considerable distance before they emerge to the light of day. In Arcadia, especially,

several remarkable examples of subterranean water-communication occur: this central region of Peloponnesus presents a cluster of such completely inclosed valleys or basins.

It will be seen from these circumstances, that Greece, considering its limited total extent, offers but little motive and still less of convenient means, for internal communication among its various inhabitants. Each village or township occupying its plain with the enclosing mountains, supplied its own main wants, while the transport of commodities by land was sufficiently difficult to discourage greatly any regular commerce with neighbors. In so far as the face of the interior country was concerned, it seemed as if nature had been disposed from the beginning to keep the population of Greece socially and politically disunited—by providing so many hedges of separation, and so many boundaries, generally hard, sometimes impossible, to overleap. One special motive to intercourse, however, arose out of this very geographical constitution of the country, and its endless alternation of mountain and valley. The difference of climate and temperature between the high and low grounds is very great; the harvest is secured in one place before it is ripe in another, and the cattle find during the heat of summer shelter and pasture on the hills, at a time when the plains are burnt up. The practice of transferring them from the mountains to the plain according to the change of season, which subsists still as it did in ancient times, is intimately connected with the structure of the country, and must from the earliest period have brought about communication among the otherwise disunited villages.

Such difficulties, however, in the internal transit by land were to a great extent counteracted by the large proportion of coast and the accessibility of the country by sea. The prominences and indentations in the line of Grecian coast are hardly less remarkable than the multiplicity of elevations and depressions which everywhere mark the surface. The shape of Peloponnesus, with its three southern gulfs (the Argolic, Laconian, and Messenian), was compared by the ancient geographers to the leaf of a plane-tree: the Pagasæan gulf on the eastern side of Greece, and the Ambrakian gulf on the western, with their narrow entrances and considerable area, are equivalent to internal lakes: Xenophon boasts of the double sea which embraces so large a proportion of Attica, Ephorus of the triple sea by which Bœotia was accessible from west, north, and south—the Eubœan strait opening a long line of country on both sides to coasting navigation. But the most important of all Grecian gulfs are the Corinthian and the Saronic, washing the northern and north-eastern shores of Peloponnesus and separated by the narrow barrier of the Isthmus of Corinth. The former, especially, lays open Ætolia, Phokis, and Bœotia, as well as the whole northern coast of Peloponnesus, to water approach. Corinth in ancient times served as an entrepot for the trade between Italy and Asia Minor—goods being

unshipped at Lechæum, the port on the Corinthian gulf, and carried by land across to Kenchreæ, the port on the Saronic: indeed even the merchant vessels themselves, when not very large, were conveyed across by the same route. It was accounted a prodigious advantage to escape the necessity of sailing round Cape Malea: and the violent winds and currents which modern experience attests to prevail around that formidable promontory, are quite sufficient to justify the apprehensions of the ancient Greek merchant, with his imperfect apparatus for navigation.

It will thus appear that there was no part of Greece proper which could be considered as out of reach of the sea, while most parts of it were convenient and easy of access: in fact, the Arcadians were the only large section of the Hellenic name (we may add the Doric Tetrapolis and the mountaineers along the chain of Pindus and Tymphrestus) who were altogether without a seaport. But Greece proper constituted only a fraction of the entire Hellenic world, during the historical age; there were the numerous islands, and still more numerous continental colonies, all located as independent intruders on distinct points of the coast, in the Euxine, the Ægean, the Mediterranean, and the Adriatic; and distant from each other by the space which separates Trebizond from Marseilles. All these various cities were comprised in the name Hellas, which implied no geographical continuity: all prided themselves on Hellenic blood, name, religion, and mythical ancestry. As the only communication between them was maritime, so the sea, important even if we look to Greece proper exclusively, was the sole channel for transmitting ideas and improvements, as well as for maintaining sympathies, social, political, religious, and literary, throughout these outlying members of the Hellenic aggregate.

The ancient philosophers and legislators were deeply impressed with the contrast between an inland and a maritime city: in the former, simplicity and uniformity of life, tenacity of ancient habits and dislike of what is new or foreign, great force of exclusive sympathy and narrow range both of objects and ideas; in the latter, variety and novelty of sensations, expansive imagination, toleration, and occasional preference for extraneous customs, greater activity of the individual and corresponding mutability of the state. This distinction stands prominent in the many comparisons instituted between the Athens of Perikles and the Athens of the earlier times down to Solon. Both Plato and Aristotle dwell upon it emphatically —and the former especially, whose genius conceived the comprehensive scheme of prescribing beforehand and insuring in practice the whole course of individual thought and feeling in his imaginary community, treats maritime communication, if pushed beyond the narrowest limits, as fatal to the success and permanence of any wise scheme of education. Certain it is that a great difference of character existed between those Greeks who mingled much in maritime

affairs, and those who did not. The Arcadian may stand as a type of the pure Grecian landsman, with his rustic and illiterate habits—his diet of sweet chestnuts, barley cakes, and pork (as contrasted with the fish which formed the chief seasoning for the bread of an Athenian)—his superior courage and endurance—his reverence for Lacedæmonian headship as an old and customary influence—his sterility of intellect and imagination as well as his slackness in enterprise—his unchangeable rudeness of relations with the gods, which led him to scourge and prick Pan if he came back empty-handed from the chase; while the inhabitant of Phokæa or Miletus exemplifies the Grecian mariner, eager in search of gain—active, skillful, and daring at sea, but inferior in steadfast bravery on land—more excitable in imagination as well as more mutable in character—full of pomp and expense in religious manifestations toward the Ephesian Artemis or the Apollo of Branchidæ: with a mind more open to the varieties of Grecian energy and to the refining influences of Grecian civilization. The Peloponnesians generally, and the Lacedæmonians in particular, approached to the Arcadian type—while the Athenians of the fifth century B.C. stood foremost in the other; superadding to it, however, a delicacy of taste and a predominance of intellectual sympathy and enjoyments which seem to have been peculiar to themselves.

The configuration of the Grecian territory, so like in many respects to that of Switzerland, produced two effects of great moment upon the character and history of the people. In the first place, it materially strengthened their powers of defense: it shut up the country against those invasions from the interior which successively subjugated all their continental colonies; and it at the same time rendered each fraction more difficult to be attacked by the rest, so as to exercise a certain conservative influence in assuring the tenure of actual possessors: for the pass of Thermopylæ between Thessaly and Phokis, that of Kithæron between Bœotia and Attica, or the mountainous range of Oneion and Geraneia along the Isthmus of Corinth, were positions which an inferior number of brave men could hold against a much greater force of assailants. But, in the next place, while it tended to protect each section of Greeks from being conquered, it also kept them politically disunited and perpetuated their separate autonomy. It fostered that powerful principle of repulsion, which disposed even the smallest township to constitute itself a political unit apart from the rest, and to resist all idea of coalescence with others, either amicable or compulsory. To a modern reader, accustomed to large political aggregations, and securities for good government through the representative system, it requires a certain mental effort to transport himself back to a time when even the smallest town clung so tenaciously to its right of self-legislation. Nevertheless, such was the general habit and feeling of the ancient world, throughout Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Gaul. Among the Hellenes it stands out more conspicuously, for several reasons—first, because

they seem to have pushed the multiplication of autonomous units to an extreme point, seeing that even islands not larger than Peparethos and Amorgos had two or three separate city communities: secondly, because they produced, for the first time in the history of mankind, acute systematic thinkers on matters of government, among all of whom the idea of the autonomous city was accepted as the indispensable basis of political speculation; thirdly, because this incurable subdivision proved finally the cause of their ruin, in spite of pronounced intellectual superiority over their conquerors; and lastly, because incapacity of political coalescence did not preclude a powerful and extensive sympathy between the inhabitants of all the separate cities, with a constant tendency to fraternize for numerous purposes, social, religious, recreative, intellectual, and æsthetical. For these reasons, the indefinite multiplication of self-governing towns, though in truth a phenomenon common to ancient Europe as contrasted with the large monarchies of Asia, appears more marked among the ancient Greeks than elsewhere: and there cannot be any doubt that they owe it, in a considerable degree, to the multitude of insulating boundaries which the configuration of their country presented.

Nor is it rash to suppose that the same causes may have tended to promote that unborrowed intellectual development for which they stand so conspicuous. General propositions respecting the working of climate and physical agencies upon character are indeed treacherous; for our knowledge of the globe is now sufficient to teach us that heat and cold, mountain and plain, sea and land, moist and dry atmosphere, are all consistent with the greatest diversities of resident men: moreover, the contrast between the population of Greece itself, for the seven centuries preceding the Christian era, and the Greeks of more modern times, is alone enough to inculcate reserve in such speculations. Nevertheless, we may venture to note certain improving influences, connected with their geographical position, at a time when they had no books to study, and no more advanced predecessors to imitate. We may remark, first, that their position made them at once mountaineers and mariners, thus supplying them with great variety of objects, sensations, and adventures; next, that each petty community, nestled apart amid its own rocks, was sufficiently severed from the rest to possess an individual life and attributes of its own, yet not so far as to subtract it from the sympathies of the remainder; so that an observant Greek, commercing with a great diversity of half-countrymen, whose language he understood, and whose idiosyncrasies he could appreciate, had access to a larger mass of social and political experience than any other man in so unadvanced an age could personally obtain. The Phœnician, superior to the Greek on ship-board, traversed wider distances and saw a greater number of strangers, but had not the same means of intimate communion with a multiplicity of fellows in blood and language.

His relations, confined to purchase and sale, did not comprise that mutuality of action and reaction which pervaded the crowd at a Grecian festival. The scene which here presented itself was a mixture of uniformity and variety highly stimulating to the observant faculties of a man of genius,—who, at the same time, if he sought to communicate his own impressions, or to act upon this mingled and diverse audience, was forced to shake off what was peculiar to his own town or community, and to put forth matter in harmony with the feelings of all. It is thus that we may explain in part that penetrating apprehension of human life and character, and that power of touching sympathies common to all ages and nations, which surprises us so much in the unlettered authors of the old epic. Such periodical intercommunion, of brethren habitually isolated from each other, was the only means then open of procuring for the bard a diversified range of experience and a many-colored audience; and it was to a great degree the result of geographical causes. Perhaps among other nations such facilitating causes might have been found, yet without producing any result comparable to the Iliad and Odyssey. But Homer was nevertheless dependent upon the conditions of his age, and we can at least point out those peculiarities in early Grecian society without which Homeric excellence would never have existed,—the geographical position is one, the language another.

In mineral and metallic wealth Greece was not distinguished. Gold was obtained in considerable abundance in the island of Siphnos, which, throughout the sixth century B.C., was among the richest communities of Greece, and possessed a treasure-chamber at Delphi distinguished for the richness of its votive offerings. At that time gold was so rare in Greece, that the Lacedæmonians were obliged to send to the Lydian Crœsus in order to provide enough of it for the gilding of a statue. It appears to have been more abundant in Asia Minor, and the quantity of it in Greece was much multiplied by the opening of mines in Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, and even some parts of Thessaly. In the island of Thasos, too, some mines were re-opened with profitable result, which had been originally begun, and subsequently abandoned, by Phœnician settlers of an earlier century. From these same districts also was procured a considerable amount of silver: while about the beginning of the fifth century B.C., the first effective commencement seems to have been made of turning to account the rich southern district of Attica, called Laureion. Copper was obtained in various parts of Greece, especially in Cyprus and Eubœa—in which latter island was also found the earth called Cadmia, employed for the purification of the ore. Bronze was used among the Greeks for many purposes in which iron is now employed: and even the arms of the Homeric heroes (different in this respect from the later historical Greeks) are composed of copper, tempered in such a way as to impart to it an astonishing hardness. Iron was

found in Eubœa, Bœotia, and Melos—but still more abundantly in the mountainous region of the Laconian Taygetus. There is, however, no part of Greece where the remains of ancient metallurgy appear now so conspicuous, as the island of Seriphos. The excellence and varieties of marble, from Pentelikus, Hymettus, Paros, Karystus, etc., and other parts of the country—so essential for purposes of sculpture and architecture—are well known.

Situated under the same parallels of latitude as the coast of Asia Minor, and the southernmost regions of Italy and Spain, Greece produced wheat, barley, flax, wine, and oil, in the earliest times of which we have any knowledge; though the currants, Indian corn, silk, and tobacco which the country now exhibits, are an addition of more recent times. Theophrastus and other authors amply attest the observant and industrious agriculture prevalent among the ancient Greeks, as well as the care with which its various natural productions, comprehending a great diversity of plants, herbs, and trees, were turned to account. The cultivation of the vine and the olive—the latter indispensable to ancient life not merely for the purposes which it serves at present, but also from the constant habit then prevalent of anointing the body—appears to have been particularly elaborate; and the many different accidents of soil, level, and exposure, which were to be found, not only in Hellas proper, but also among the scattered Greek settlements, afforded to observant planters materials for study and comparison. The barley-cake seems to have been more generally eaten than the wheaten loaf: but one or other of them, together with vegetables and fish (sometimes fresh, but more frequently salt), was the common food of the population; the Arcadians fed much upon pork, and the Spartans also consumed animal food, but by the Greeks generally fresh meat seems to have been little eaten, except at festivals and sacrifices. The Athenians, the most commercial people in Greece proper, though their light, dry, and comparatively poor soil produced excellent barley, nevertheless did not grow enough corn for their own consumption: they imported considerable supplies of corn from Sicily, from the coasts of the Euxine, and the Tauric Chersonese, and salt fish both from the Propontis and even from Gades: the distance from whence these supplies came, when we take into consideration the extent of fine corn-land in Bœotia and Thessaly, proves how little internal trade existed between the various regions of Greece proper. The exports of Athens consisted in her figs and other fruit, olives, oil—for all of which she was distinguished—together with pottery, ornamental manufactures, and the silver from her mines at Laureion. Salt-fish doubtless found its way more or less throughout all Greece; but the population of other states in Greece lived more exclusively upon their own produce than the Athenians, with less of purchase and sale—a mode of life assisted by the simple domestic economy universally prevalent, in which the

women not only carded and spun all the wool, but also wove out of it the clothing and bedding employed in the family. Weaving was then considered as much a woman's business as spinning, and the same feeling and habits still prevail to the present day in modern Greece, where the loom is constantly seen in the peasants' cottages, and always worked by women.

The climate of Greece appears to be generally described by modern travelers in more favorable terms than it was by the ancients, which is easily explicable from the classical interest, picturesque beauties, and transparent atmosphere, so vividly appreciated by an English or a German eye. Herodotus, Hippokrates, and Aristotle, treat the climate of Asia as far more genial and favorable both to animal and vegetable life, but at the same time more enervating than that of Greece: the latter they speak of chiefly in reference to its changeful character and diversities of local temperature, which they consider as highly stimulant to the energies of the inhabitants. There is reason to conclude that ancient Greece was much more healthy than the same territory is at present, inasmuch as it was more industriously cultivated, and the towns both more carefully administered and better supplied with water. But the differences in respect of healthiness, between one portion of Greece and another, appear always to have been considerable, and this, as well as the diversities of climate, affected the local habits and character of the particular sections. Not merely were there great differences between the mountaineers and the inhabitants of the plains—between Lokrian, Ætolians, Phokians, Dorians, Œtæans, and Arcadians, on one hand, and the inhabitants of Attica, Bœotia, and Elis, on the other—but each of the various tribes which went to compose these categories had its peculiarities; and the marked contrast between Athenians and Bœotians was supposed to be represented by the light and heavy atmosphere which they respectively breathed. Nor was this all: for even among the Bœotian aggregate, every town had its own separate attributes, physical as well as moral and political: Oropus, Tanagra, Thespiæ, Thebes, Anthedon, Haliartus, Koroneia, Onchestus, and Platæa, were known to Bœotians each by its own characteristic epithet: and Dikæarchus even notices a marked distinction between the inhabitants of the city of Athens and those in the country of Attica. Sparta, Argos, Corinth, and Sikyon, though all called Doric, had each its own dialect and peculiarities. All these differences, depending in part upon climate, site, and other physical considerations, contributed to nourish antipathies, and to perpetuate that imperfect cohesion, which has already been noticed as an indelible feature in Hellas.

The Epirotic tribes, neighbors of the Ætolians and Akarnanians, filled the space between Pindus and the Ionian sea until they joined to the northward the territory inhabited by the powerful and barbarous Illyrians. Of these Illyrians the native Macedonian tribes appear to

have been an outlying section, dwelling northward of Thessaly and Mount Olympus, eastward of the chain by which Pindus is continued, and westward of the river Axius. The Epirots were comprehended under the various denominations of Chaonians, Molossians, Thesprotians, Kassopæans, Amphilochians, Athamānes, the Æthīkes, Tymphæi, Orestæ, Paroræi, and Atintānes—most of the latter being small communities dispersed about the mountainous region of Pindus. There was, however, much confusion in the application of the comprehensive name *Epirot*, which was a title given altogether by the Greeks, and given purely upon geographical, not upon ethnical considerations. Epirus seems at first to have stood opposed to Peloponnesus, and to have signified the general region northward of the Gulf of Corinth; and in this primitive sense it comprehended the Ætolians and Akarnanians, portions of whom spoke a dialect difficult to understand, and were not less widely removed than the Epirots from Hellenic habits. The oracle of Dodona forms the point of ancient union between Greeks and Epirots, which was superseded by Delphi as the civilization of Hellas developed itself. Nor is it less difficult to distinguish Epirots from Macedonians on the one hand than from Hellenes on the other; the language, the dress, and the fashion of wearing the hair being often analogous, while the boundaries, amid rude men and untraveled tracts, were very inaccurately understood.

In describing the limits occupied by the Hellenes in 776 B.C., we cannot yet take account of the important colonies of Leukas and Ambrakia, established by the Corinthians subsequently on the western coast of Epirus. The Greeks of that early time seem to comprise the islands of Kephallenia, Zakynthus, Ithaka, and Dulichium, but no settlement, either inland or insular, farther northward.

They include farther, confining ourselves to 776 B.C., the great mass of islands between the coast of Greece and that of Asia Minor, from Tenedos on the north, to Rhodes, Krete, and Kythera southward; and the great islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Eubœa, as well as the groups called the Sporades, and the Cyclades. Respecting the four considerable islands nearer to the coasts of Macedonia and Thrace—Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, and Thasos—it may be doubted whether they were at that time hellenized. The Catalogue of the Iliad includes under Agamemnon contingents from Ægina, Eubœa, Krete, Karpathus, Kasus, Kos, and Rhodes; in the oldest epical testimony which we possess, these islands thus appear inhabited by Greeks; but the others do not occur in the Catalogue, and are never mentioned in such manner as to enable us to draw any inference. Eubœa ought perhaps rather to be looked upon as a portion of Grecian mainland (from which it was only separated by a strait narrow enough to be bridged over) than as an island. But the last five islands named in the Catalogue are all either wholly or partially Doric; no Ionic or Æolic island appears in it: these latter,

though it was among them that the poet sung, appear to be represented by their ancestral heroes who come from Greece proper.

The last element to be included, as going to make up the Greece of 776 B.C., is the long string of Doric, Ionic, and Æolic settlements on the coast of Asia Minor—occupying a space bounded on the north by the Troad and the region of Ida, and extending southward as far as the peninsula of Knidus. Twelve continental cities, over and above the islands of Lesbos and Tenedos, are reckoned by Herodotus as ancient Æolic foundations—Smyrna, Kyme, Larissa, Neon-Teichos, Temnos, Killa, Notium, Ægirœssa, Pitana, Ægæ, Myrina, and Gryneia. Smyrna, having been at first Æolic, was afterward acquired through a stratagem by Ionic inhabitants, and remained permanently Ionic. Phokæa, the northernmost of the Ionic settlements, bordered upon Æolis: Klazomenæ, Erythræ, Teos, Lebedos, Kolophon, Priene, Myus, and Miletus, continued the Ionic name to the southward. These, together with Samos and Chios, formed the pan-Ionic federation. To the south of Miletus, after a considerable interval, lay the Doric establishments of Myndus, Halikarnassus, and Knidus: the two latter, together with the island of Kos and the three townships in Rhodes, constituted the Doric Hexapolis, or communion of six cities, concerted primarily with a view to religious purposes, but producing a secondary effect analogous to political federation.

Such then is the extent of Hellas, as it stood at the commencement of the recorded Olympiads. To draw a picture even for this date, we possess no authentic materials, and are obliged to antedate statements which belong to a later age: and this consideration might alone suffice to show how uncertified are all delineations of the Greece of 1183 B.C., the supposed epoch of the Trojan war, four centuries earlier.

CHAPTER II.

THE HELLENIC PEOPLE GENERALLY, IN THE EARLY HISTORICAL TIMES.

THE territory indicated in the last chapter—south of Mount Olympus, and south of the line which connects the city of Ambrakia with Mount Pindus,—was occupied during the historical period by the central stock of the Hellens or Greeks, from which their numerous outlying colonies were planted out.

Both metropolitans and colonists styled themselves Hellens, and were recognized as such by each other: all glorying in the name as the prominent symbol of fraternity,—all describing non-Hellenic

men or cities by a word which involved associations of repugnance. Our term *barbarian*, borrowed from this latter word, does not express the same idea; for the Greeks spoke thus indiscriminately of the extra-Hellenic world with all its inhabitants, whatever might be the gentleness of their character, and whatever might be their degree of civilization. The rulers and people of Egyptian Thebes with their ancient and gigantic monuments, the wealthy Tyrians and Carthaginians, the phil-Hellene Arganthonius of Tartessus, and the well-disciplined patricians of Rome (to the indignation of old Cato), were all comprized in it. At first it seemed to have expressed more of repugnance than of contempt, and repugnance especially toward the sound of a foreign language. Afterward a feeling of their own superior intelligence (in part well-justified) arose among the Greeks, and their term *barbarian* was used so as to imply a low state of the temper and intelligence: in which sense it was retained by the semi-hellenized Romans, as the proper antithesis to their state of civilization. The want of a suitable word, corresponding to *barbarian* as the Greeks originally used it, is so inconvenient in the description of Grecian phenomena and sentiments, that I may be obliged occasionally to use the word in its primitive sense.

The Hellens were all of common blood and parentage,—were all descendants of the common patriarch Hellen. In treating of the historical Greeks, we have to accept this as a datum: it represents the sentiment under the influence of which they moved and acted. It is placed by Herodotus in the front rank, as the chief of those four ties which bound together the Hellenic aggregate: 1. Fellowship of blood; 2. Fellowship of language; 3. Fixed domiciles of gods, and sacrifices, common to all; 4. Like manners and dispositions.

These (say the Athenians in their reply to the Spartan envoys, in the very crisis of the Persian invasion) "Athens will never disgrace herself by betraying." And Zeus Hellenius was recognized as the god watching over and enforcing the fraternity thus constituted.

Hekatæus, Herodotus, and Thucydides, all believed that there had been an ante-Hellenic period, when different languages, mutually unintelligible, were spoken between Mount Olympus and Cape Malea. However this may be, during the historical times the Greek language was universal throughout these limits—branching out, however, into a great variety of dialects, which were roughly classified by later literary men into Ionic, Doric, Æolic, and Attic. But the classification presents a semblance of irregularity, which in point of fact does not seem to have been realized; each town, each smaller subdivision of the Hellenic name, having peculiarities of dialect belonging to itself. Now the lettered men who framed the quadruple division took notice chiefly, if not exclusively, of the written dialects,—those which had been ennobled by poets or other authors; the mere spoken idioms were for the most part neglected. That there was no such thing as one Ionic dialect in the speech of the people called Ionic

Greeks, we know from the indisputable testimony of Herodotus, who tells us that there were four capital varieties of speech among the twelve Asiatic towns especially known as Ionic. Of coarse the varieties would have been much more numerous if he had given us the impressions of his ear in Eubœa, the Cyclades, Massalia, Rhegium, and Olbia,—all numbered as Greeks and as Ionians. The Ionic dialect of the grammarians was an extract from Homer, Hekatæus, Herodotus, Hippokrates, etc.; to what living speech it made the nearest approach, amid those divergencies which the historian has made known to us, we cannot tell. Sappho and Alkæus in Lesbos, Myrtis and Korinna in Bœotia, were the great sources of reference for the Lesbian and Bœotian varieties of the Æolic dialect—of which there was a third variety, untouched by the poets, in Thessaly. The analogy between the different manifestations of Doric and Æolic, as well as that between the Doric generally and the Æolic generally, contrasted with the Attic, is only to be taken as rough and approximative.

But all these different dialects are nothing more than dialects, distinguished as modifications of one and the same language, and exhibiting evidence of certain laws and principles pervading them all. They seem capable of being traced back to a certain ideal mother-language, peculiar in itself and distinguishable from, though cognate with, the Latin; a substantive member of what has been called the Indo-European family of languages. This truth has been brought out in recent times by the comparative examination applied to the Sanscrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, German, and Lithuanian languages, as well as by the more accurate analysis of the Greek language itself to which such studies have given rise, in a manner much more clear than could have been imagined by the ancients themselves. It is needless to dwell upon the importance of this uniformity of language in holding together the race, and in rendering the genius of its most favored members available to the civilization of all. Except in the rarest cases, the divergencies of dialect were not such as to prevent every Greek from understanding, and being understood by, every other Greek,—a fact remarkable when we consider how many of their outlying colonists, not having taken out women in their emigration, intermarried with non-Hellenic wives. And the perfection and popularity of their early epic poems was here of inestimable value for the diffusion of a common type of language, and for thus keeping together the sympathies of the Hellenic world. The Homeric dialect became the standard followed by all Greek poets for the hexameter, as may be seen particularly from the example of Hesiod—who adheres to it in the main, though his father was a native of the Æolic Kyme, and he himself resident at Askra, in Æolic Bœotia—and the early iambic and elegiac compositions are framed on the same model. Intellectual Greeks in all cities, even the most distant outcasts from the central hearth, became

early accustomed to one type of literary speech, and possessors of a common stock of legends, maxims, and metaphors.

That community of religious sentiments, localities, and sacrifices, which Herodotus names as the third bond of union among the Greeks, was a phenomenon not (like the race and the language) interwoven with their primitive constitution, but of gradual growth. In the time of Herodotus, and even a century earlier, it was at its full maturity, but there had been a period when no religious meetings common to the whole Hellenic body existed. What are called the Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian games (the four most conspicuous amid many others analogous) were in reality great religious festivals—for the gods then gave their special sanction, name, and presence, to recreative meetings—the closest association then prevailed between the feelings of common worship and the sympathy in common amusement. Though this association is now no longer recognized, it is nevertheless essential that we should keep it fully before us, if we desire to understand the life and proceedings of the Greek. To Herodotus and his contemporaries, these great festivals, then frequented by crowds from every part of Greece, were of overwhelming importance and interest; yet they had once been purely local, attracting no visitors except from a very narrow neighborhood. In the Homeric poems much is said about the common gods, and about special places consecrated to and occupied by several of them; the chiefs celebrate funeral games in honor of a deceased father, which are visited by competitors from different parts of Greece, but nothing appears to manifest public or town festivals open to Grecian visitors generally. And though the rocky Pytho with its temple stands out in the Iliad as a place both venerated and rich—the Pythian games, under the superintendence of the Amphiktyons, with continuous enrollment of victors and a pan-Hellenic reputation, do not begin until after the Sacred War, in the 48th Olympiad, or 586 B.C.

The Olympic games, more conspicuous than the Pythian as well as considerably older, are also remarkable on another ground, inasmuch as they supplied historical computers with the oldest backward record of continuous time. It was in the year 776 B.C. that the Eleians inscribed the name of their countryman Korœbus as victor in the competition of runners, and that they began the practice of inscribing in like manner, in each Olympic or fifth recurring year, the name of the runner who won the prize. Even for a long time after this, however, the Olympic games seem to have remained a local festival; the prize being uniformly carried off, at the first twelve Olympiads, by some competitor either of Elis or its immediate neighborhood. The Nemean and Isthmian games did not become notorious or frequented until later even than the Pythian. Solon in his legislation proclaimed the large reward of 500 drams for every Athenian who gained an Olympic prize, and the lower sum of 100 drams for an

Isthmiac prize. He counts the former as pan-Hellenic rank and renown, an ornament even to the city of which the victor was a member—the latter as partial and confined to the neighborhood.

Of the beginnings of these great solemnities we cannot presume to speak, except in mythical language: we know them only in their comparative maturity. But the habit of common sacrifice, on a small scale and between near neighbors, is a part of the earliest habits of Greece. The sentiment of fraternity, between two tribes or villages, first manifested itself by sending a sacred legation or Theoria to offer sacrifices at each other's festivals and to partake in the recreations which followed; thus establishing a truce with solemn guarantee, and bringing themselves into direct connexion each with the god of the other under his appropriate local surname. The pacific communion so fostered, and the increased assurance of intercourse, as Greece gradually emerged from the turbulence and pugnacity of the heroic age, operated especially in extending the range of this ancient habit: the village festivals became town festivals, largely frequented by the citizens of other towns, and sometimes with special invitations sent round to attract Theors from every Hellenic community—and thus these once humble assemblages gradually swelled into the pomp and immense confluence of the Olympic and Pythian games. The city administering such holy ceremonies enjoyed inviolability of territory during the month of their occurrence, being itself under obligation at that time to refrain from all aggression, as well as to notify by heralds the commencement of the truce to all other cities not in avowed hostility with it. Elis imposed heavy fines upon other towns—even on the powerful Lacedæmon—for violation of the Olympic truce, on pain of exclusion from the festival in case of non-payment.

Sometimes this tendency to religious fraternity took a form called an Amphiktyony, different from the common festival. A certain number of towns entered into an exclusive religious partnership for the celebration of sacrifices periodically to the god of a particular temple, which was supposed to be the common property and under the common protection of all, though one of the number was often named as permanent administrator; while all other Greeks were excluded. That there were many religious partnerships of this sort, which have never acquired a place in history, among the early Grecian villages, we may perhaps gather from the etymology of the word (Amphiktyons designates residents around, or neighbors, considered in the point of view of fellow-religionists), as well as from the indications preserved to us in reference to various parts of the country. Thus there was an Amphikytony of seven cities at the holy island of Kaluria, close to the harbor of Trœzen. Hermione, Epidaurus, Ægina, Athens, Prasiæ, Nauplia, and Orchomenus, jointly maintained the temple and sanctuary of Poseidon in that island (with which it would seem that the city of Trœzen, though close at hand,

had no connection), meeting there at stated periods, to offer formal sacrifices. These seven cities indeed were not immediate neighbors, but the speciality and exclusiveness of their interest in the temple is seen from the fact, that when the Argeians took Nauplia, they adopted and fulfilled these religious obligations on behalf of the prior inhabitants: so also did the Lacedæmonians when they had captured Prasiæ. Again in Triphylia, situated between the Pisatid and Messenia in the western part of Peloponnesus, there was a similar religious meeting and partnership of the Triphylians on Cape Samikon, at the temple of the Samian Poseidon. Here the inhabitants of Makiston were intrusted with the details of superintendence, as well as with the duty of notifying beforehand the exact time of meeting (a precaution essential amidst the diversities and irregularities of the Greek calendar), and also of proclaiming what was called the Samian truce—a temporary abstinence from hostilities which bound all Triphylians during the holy period. This latter custom discloses the salutary influence of such institutions in presenting to men's minds a common object of reverence, common duties, and common enjoyments; thus generating sympathies and feelings of mutual obligation amid petty communities not less fierce than suspicious. So too, the twelve chief Ionic cities in and near Asia-Minor had their pan-Ionic Amphiktyony peculiar to themselves: the six Doric cities, in and near the southern corner of that peninsula, combined for the like purpose at the temple of the Triopian Apollo; and the feeling of special partnership is here particularly illustrated by the fact, that Halikarnassus, one of the six, was formally extruded by the remaining five in consequence of a violation of the rules. There was also an Amphiktyonic union at Onchestus in Bœotia, in the venerated grove and temple at Poseidon: of whom it consisted we are not informed. There are some specimens of the sort of special religious conventions and assemblies which seem to have been frequent throughout Greece. Nor ought we to omit those religious meetings and sacrifices which were common to all the members of one Hellenic subdivision, such as the Pam-Bœotia to all the Bœotians, celebrated at the temple of the Itonian Athene near Koroneia—the common observances, rendered to the temple of Apollo Pythaeus at Argos, by all those neighboring towns which had once been attached by this religious thread to the Argeians—the similar periodical ceremonies, frequented by all who bore the Achæan or Ætolian name—and the splendid and exhilarating festivals, so favorable to the diffusion of the early Grecian poetry, which brought all Ionians at stated intervals to the sacred island of Delos. This latter class of festivals agreed with the Amphiktyony in being of a special and exclusive character, not open to all Greeks.

But there was one among these many Amphiktyonies, which, though starting from the smallest beginnings, gradually expanded into so comprehensive a character, and acquired so marked a pre-

dominance over the rest, as to be called the Amphiktyonic assembly, and even to have been mistaken by some authors for a sort of federal Hellenic diet. Twelve sub-races, out of the number which made up entire Hellas, belonged to this ancient Amphiktyony, the meetings of which were held twice in every year: in spring at the temple of Apollo at Delphi; in autumn at Thermopylæ, in the sacred precinct of Demeter Amphiktyonis. Sacred deputies, including a chief called the Hieromnemon and subordinates called the Pylagoræ, attended at these meetings from each of the twelve races: a crowd of volunteers seem to have accompanied them, for purposes of sacrifice, trade, or enjoyment. Their special, and most important function, consisted in watching over the Delphian temple, in which all the twelve sub-races had a joint interest, and it was the immense wealth and national ascendency of this temple which enhanced to so great a pitch the dignity of its acknowledged administrators.

The twelve constituent members were as follows: Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Lokrians, Œtæans, Achæans, Phokians, Dolopes, and Malians. All are counted as *races* (if we treat the Hellenes as a race, we must call these *sub-races*), no mention being made of cities: all count equally in respect to voting, two votes being given by the deputies from each of the twelve: moreover, we are told that in determining the deputies to be sent or the manner in which the votes of each race should be given, the powerful Athens, Sparta, and Thebes had no more influence than the humblest Ionian, Dorian, or Bœotian city. This latter fact is distinctly stated by Æschines, himself a Pylagore sent to Delphi by Athens. And so, doubtless, the theory of the case stood: the votes of the Ionic races counted for neither more nor less than two, whether given by deputies from Athens, or from the small towns of Erythræ and Priene; and in like manner the Dorian votes were as good in the division, when given by deputies from Bœon and Kytinion in the little territory of Doris, as if the men delivering them had been Spartans. But there can be as little question that in practice the little Ionic cities and the little Doric cities pretended to no share in the Amphiktyonic deliberations. As the Ionic vote came to be substantially the vote of Athens, so, if Sparta was ever obstructed in the management of the Doric vote, it must have been by powerful Doric cities like Argos or Corinth, not by the insignificant towns of Doris. But the theory of Amphiktyonic suffrage as laid down by Æschines, however little realized in practice during his day, is important inasmuch as it shows in full evidence the primitive and original constitution. The first establishment of the Amphiktyonic convocation dates from a time when all the twelve members were on a footing of equal independence, and when there were no overwhelming cities (such as Sparta and Athens) to cast in the shade the humbler members—when Sparta was only one Doric city, and Athens

only one Ionic city, among various others of consideration not much inferior.

There are also other proofs which show the high antiquity of this Amphiktyonic convocation, Æschines gives us an extract from the oath which had been taken by the sacred deputies who attended on behalf of their respective races, ever since its first establishment, and which still apparently continued to be taken in his day. The antique simplicity of this oath, and of the conditions to which the members bind themselves, betrays the early age in which it originated, as well as the humble resources of those towns to which it was applied. "We will not destroy any Amphiktyonic town—we will not cut off any Amphiktyonic town from running water"—such are the two prominent obligations which Æschines specifies out of the old oath. The second of the two carries us back to the simplest state of society, and to towns of the smallest size, when the maidens went out with their basins to fetch water from the spring, like the daughters of Keleos at Eleusis, or those of Athens from the fountain Kallirrhoe. We may even conceive that the special mention of this detail, in the covenant between the twelve races, is borrowed literally from agreements still earlier, among the villages or little towns in which the members of each race were distributed. At any rate, it proves satisfactorily the very ancient date to which the commencement of the Amphiktyonic convocation must be referred. The belief of Æschines (perhaps also the belief general in his time) was, that it commenced simultaneously with the first foundation of the Delphian temple—an event of which we have no historical knowledge; but there seems reason to suppose that its original establishment is connected with Thermopylæ and Demeter Amphiktyonis, rather than with Delphi and Apollo. The special surname by which Demeter and her temple at Thermopylæ was known—the temple of the hero Amphiktyon which stood at its side—the word Pylæa, which obtained footing in the language to designate the half-yearly meeting of the deputies both at Thermopylæ and at Delphi—these indications point to Thermopylæ (the real central point for all the twelve) as the primary place of meeting, and to the Delphian half-year as something secondary and superadded. On such a matter, however, we cannot go beyond a conjecture.

The hero Amphiktyon, whose temple stood at Thermopylæ, passed in mythical genealogy for the brother of Hellen. And it may be affirmed, with truth, that the habit of forming Amphiktyonic unions, and of frequenting each other's religious festivals, was the great means of creating and fostering the primitive feeling of brotherhood among the children of Hellen, in those early times when rudeness, insecurity, and pugnacity did so much to isolate them. A certain number of salutary habits and sentiments, such as that which the Amphiktyonic oath embodies, in regard to abstinence from injury as well as to mutual protection, gradually found their way into men's

minds: the obligations thus brought into play acquired a substantive efficacy of their own, and the religious feeling which always remained connected with them, came afterward to be only one out of many complex agencies by which the later historical Greek was moved. Athens and Sparta in the days of their might, and the inferior cities in relation to them, played each their own political game, in which religious considerations will be found to bear only a subordinate part.

The special function of the Amphiktyonic council, so far as we know it, consisted in watching over the safety, the interests, and the treasures of the Delphian temple. "If any one shall plunder the property of the god, or shall be cognizant thereof, or shall take treacherous counsel against the things in the temple, we will punish him with foot, and hand, and voice, and by every means in our power." So ran the old Amphiktyonic oath, with an energetic imprecation attached to it. And there are some examples in which the council construes its functions so largely as to receive and adjudicate upon complaints against entire cities, for offenses against the religious and patriotic sentiment of the Greeks generally. But for the most part its interference relates directly to the Delphian temple. The earliest case in which it is brought to our view is the Sacred War against Kirrha, in the 46th Olympiad or 595 B.C., conducted by Eurylochus the Thessalian, and Kleisthenes of Sikyon, and proposed by Solon of Athens: we find the Amphiktyons also about half a century afterward undertaking the duty of collecting subscriptions throughout the Hellenic world, and making the contract with the Alkmæonids for rebuilding the temple after a conflagration. But the influence of this council is essentially of a fluctuating and intermittent character. Sometimes it appears forward to decide, and its decisions command respect; but such occasions are rare, taking the general course of known Grecian history; while there are other occasions, and those too especially affecting the Delphian temple, on which we are surprised to find nothing said about it. In the long and perturbed period which Thucydides describes, he never once mentions the Amphiktyons though the temple and the safety of its treasures form the repeated subject as well of dispute as of express stipulation between Athens and Sparta. Moreover, among the twelve constituent members of the council, we find three—the Perrhæbians, the Magnetes, and the Achæans of Phthia—who were not even independent, but subject to the Thessalians; so that its meetings, when they were not matters of mere form, probably expressed only the feelings of the three or four leading members. When one or more of these great powers had a party purpose to accomplish against others—when Philip of Macedon wished to extrude one of the members in order to procure admission for himself—it became convenient to turn this ancient form into a serious reality: and we shall see the Athenian Æschines providing a pretext

for Philip to meddle in favor of the minor Bœotian cities against Thebes, by alleging that these cities were under the protection of the old Amphiktyonic oath.

It is thus that we have to consider the council as an element in Grecian affairs—an ancient institution, one amongst many instances of the primitive habit of religious fraternization, but wider and more comprehensive than the rest—at first purely religious, then religious and political at once, lastly more the latter than the former—highly valuable in the infancy, but unsuited to the maturity of Greece, and called into real working only on rare occasions, when its efficiency happened to fall in with the views of Athens, Thebes, or the king of Macedon. In such special moments it shines with a transient light which affords a partial pretense for the imposing title bestowed on it by Cicero—"commune Græciæ concilium;" but we should completely misinterpret Grecian history if we regarded it as a federal council habitually directing or habitually obeyed. Had there existed any such "commune concilium" of tolerable wisdom and patriotism, and had the tendencies of the Hellenic mind been capable of adapting themselves to it, the whole course of later Grecian history would probably have been altered; the Macedonian kings would have remained only as respectable neighbors, borrowing civilization from Greece and expending their military energies upon Thracians and Illyrians; while united Hellas might even have maintained her own territory against the conquering legions of Rome.

The twelve constituent Amphiktyonic races remained unchanged until the Sacred War against the Phokians (B.C. 355), after which, though the number twelve was continued, the Phokians were disfranchised, and their votes transferred to Philip of Macedon. It has been already mentioned that these twelve did not exhaust the whole of Hellas. Arcadians, Eleans, Pisans, Minyæ, Dryopes, Ætolians, all genuine Hellens, are not comprehended in it; but all of them had a right to make use of the temple of Delphi, and to contend in the Pythian and Olympic games. The Pythian games, celebrated near Delphi, were under the superintendence of the Amphiktyons, or of some acting magistrate chosen by and presumed to represent them. Like the Olympic games, they came round every four years (the interval between one celebration and another being four complete years, which the Greeks called a Pentaeteris): the Isthmian and Nemean games recurred every two years. In its first humble form of a competition among bards to sing a hymn in praise of Apollo, this festival was doubtless of immemorial antiquity; but the first extension of it into pan-Hellenic notoriety (as I have already remarked), the first multiplication of the subjects of competition, and the first introduction of a continuous record of the conquerors, date only from the time when it came under the presidency of the Amphiktyons, at the close of the Sacred War against Kirrha.

What is called the first Pythian contest coincides with the third year of the 48th Olympiad, or 585 B.C. From that period forward the games become crowded and celebrated: but the date just named, nearly two centuries after the first Olympiad, is a proof that the habit of periodical frequentation of festivals, by numbers and from distant parts, grew up but slowly in the Grecian world.

The foundation of the temple of Delphi itself reaches far beyond all historical knowledge, forming one of the aboriginal institutions of Hellas. It is a sanctified and wealthy place even in the Iliad: the legislation of Lykurgus at Sparta is introduced under its auspices, and the earliest Grecian colonies, those of Sicily and Italy in the eighth century B.C., are established in consonance with its mandate. Delphi and Dodona appear, in the most ancient circumstances of Greece, as universally venerated oracles and sanctuaries: and Delphi not only receives honors and donations, but also answers questions from Lydians, Phrygians, Etruscans, Romans, etc.: it is not exclusively Hellenic. One of the valuable services which a Greek looked for from this and other great religious establishments was, that it should resolve his doubts in cases of perplexity; that it should advise him whether to begin a new, or to persist in an old project; that it should foretell what would be his fate under given circumstances, and inform him, if suffering under distress, on what conditions the gods would grant him relief. The three priestesses of Dodona with their venerable oak, and the priestess of Delphi sitting on her tripod under the influence of a certain gas or vapor exhaling from the rock, were alike competent to determine these difficult points: and we shall have constant occasion to notice in this history with what complete faith both the question was put and the answer treasured up—what serious influence it often exercised both upon public and private proceeding. The hexameter verses in which the Pythian priestess delivered herself were, indeed, often so equivocal or unintelligible, that the most serious believer, with all anxiety to interpret and obey them, often found himself ruined by the result. Yet the general faith in the oracle was no way shaken by such painful experience. For as the unfortunate issue always admitted of being explained upon two hypotheses—either that the god had spoken falsely, or that his meaning had not been correctly understood—no man of genuine piety ever hesitated to adopt the latter. There were many other oracles throughout Greece besides Delphi and Dodona: Apollo was open to the inquiries of the faithful at Ptoon in Bœotia, at Abæ in Phokis, at Branchidæ near Miletus, at Patara in Lykia, and other places: in like manner, Zeus gave answers at Olympia, Poseidon at Tænarus, Amphiaraus at Thebes, Amphilochus at Mallus, etc. And this habit of consulting the oracle formed part of the still more general tendency of the Greek mind to undertake no enterprise without having first ascertained how the gods viewed it, and what measures they were likely to take. Sacrifices were offered,

and the interior of the victim carefully examined, with the same intent: omens, prodigies, unlooked-for coincidences, casual expressions, etc., were all construed as significant of the divine will. To sacrifice with a view to this or that undertaking, or to consult the oracle with the same view, are familiar expressions embodied in the language. Nor could any man set about a scheme with comfort until he had satisfied himself in some manner or other that the gods were favorable to it.

The disposition here adverted to is one of those mental analogies pervading the whole Hellenic nation, which Herodotus indicates. And the common habit among all Greeks of respectfully listening to the oracle of Delphi will be found on many occasions useful in maintaining unanimity among men not accustomed to obey the same political superior. In the numerous colonies especially, founded by mixed multitudes from distant parts of Greece, the minds of the emigrants were greatly determined toward cordial co-operation by their knowledge that the expedition had been directed, the Œkist indicated, and the spot either chosen or approved by Apollo of Delphi. Such in most cases was the fact: that god, according to the conception of the Greeks, "takes delight always in the foundation of new cities, and himself in person lays the first stone."

These are the elements of union—over and above the common territory, described in the last chapter—with which the historical Hellens take their start: community of blood, language, religious point of view, legends, sacrifices, festivals, and also (with certain allowances) of manners and character. The analogy of manners and character between the rude inhabitants of the Arcadian Kynætha and the polite Athens, was, indeed, accompanied with wide differences: yet if we compare the two with foreign contemporaries, we shall find certain negative characteristics, of much importance common to both. In no city of historical Greece did there prevail either human sacrifices; or deliberate mutilation, such as cutting off the nose, ears, hands, feet, etc.; or castration; or selling of children into slavery; or polygamy; or the feeling of unlimited obedience toward one man: all customs which might be pointed out as existing among the contemporary Carthaginians, Egyptians, Persians, Thracians, etc. The habit of running, wrestling, boxing, etc., in gymnastic contests, with the body perfectly naked, was common to all Greeks, having been first adopted as a Lacedæmonian fashion in the fourteenth Olympiad: Thucydides and Herodotus remark, that it was not only not practiced, but even regarded as unseemly, among non-Hellens. Of such customs, indeed, at once common to all the Greeks, and peculiar to them as distinguished from others, we cannot specify a great number; but we may see enough to convince ourselves that there did really exist, in spite of local differences, a general Hellenic sentiment and character, which counted among the cementing causes of a union apparently so little assured.

For we must recollect, that in respect to political sovereignty, complete disunion was among their most cherished principles. The only source of supreme authority to which a Greek felt respect and attachment, was to be sought within the walls of his own city. Authority seated in another city might operate upon his fears—might procure for him increased security and advantages, as we shall have occasion hereafter to show with regard to Athens and her subject allies—might even be mildly exercised, and inspire no special aversion; but still the principle of it was repugnant to the rooted sentiment of his mind, and he is always found gravitating toward the distinct sovereignty of his own boule or ekklesia. This is a disposition common both to democracies and oligarchies, and operative even among the different towns belonging to the same subdivision of the Hellenic name—Achæans, Phokians, Bœotians, etc. The twelve Achæan cities are harmonious allies, with a periodical festival, which partakes of the character of a congress,—but equal and independent political communities. The Bœotian towns, under the presidency of Thebes, their reputed metropolis, recognize certain common obligations, and obey, on various particular matters, chosen officers named Bœotarchs,—but we shall see, in this as in other cases, the centrifugal tendencies constantly manifesting themselves, and resisted chiefly by the interests and power of Thebes. That great, successful, and fortunate revolution wh ch merged the several independent political communities of Attica into the single unity of Athens, took place before the time of authentic history: it is connected with the name of the hero Theseus, but we know not how it was effected, while its comparatively large size and extent render it a signal exception to Hellenic tendencies generally.

Political disunion—sovereign authority within the city-walls—thus formed a settled maxim in the Greek mind. The relation between one city and another was an international relation, not a relation subsisting between members of a common political aggregate. Within a few miles from his own city-walls, an Athenian found himself in the territory of another city, wherein he was nothing more than an alien,—where he could not acquire property in house or land, nor contract a legal marriage with any native woman, nor sue for legal protection against injury except through the mediation of some friendly citizen. The right of intermarriage and of acquiring landed property was occasionally granted by a city to some individual non-freeman, as matter of special favor, and sometimes (though very rarely) reciprocated generally between two separate cities. But the obligations between one city and another, or between the citizen of the one and the citizen of the other, are all matters of special covenant, agreed to by the sovereign authority in each. Such coexistence of entire political severance with so much fellowship in other ways, is perplexing in modern ideas; and modern language is not well furnished with expressions to describe Greek political phe-

nomena. We may say that an Athenian citizen was an *alien* when he arrived as a visitor in Corinth, but we can hardly say that he was a *foreigner;* and though the relations between Corinth and Athens were in principle *international*, yet that word would be obviously unsuitable to the numerous petty autonomies of Hellas, besides that we require it for describing the relations of Hellenes generally with Persians or Carthaginians. We are compelled to use a word such as *interpolitical* to describe the transactions between separate Greek cities, so numerous in the course of this history.

As, on the one hand, a Greek will not consent to look for sovereign authority beyond the limits of his own city, so, on the other hand, he must have a city to look to: scattered villages will not satisfy in his mind the exigences of social order, security, and dignity. Though the coalescence of smaller towns into a larger is repugnant to his feelings, that of villages into a town appears to him a manifest advance in the scale of civilization. Such at least is the governing sentiment of Greece throughout the historical period; for there was always a certain portion of the Hellenic aggregate—the rudest and least advanced among them—who dwelt in unfortified villages, and upon whom the citizen of Athens, Corinth, or Thebes looked down as inferiors. Such village residence was the character of the Epirots universally, and prevailed throughout Hellas itself in those very early and even ante-Homeric times upon which Thucydides looked back as deplorably barbarous;—times of universal poverty and insecurity, —absence of pacific intercourse,—petty warfare and plunder, compelling every man to pass his life armed,—endless migration without any local attachments. Many of the considerable cities of Greece are mentioned as aggregations of pre-existing villages, some of them in times comparatively recent. Tegea and Mantineia in Arcadia represent in this way the confluence of eight villages and five villages respectively; Dyme in Achaia was brought together out of eight villages, and Elis in the same manner, at a period even later than the Persian invasion; the like seems to have happened with Megara and Tanagra. A large proportion of the Arcadians continued their village life down to the time of the battle of Leuktra, and it suited the purposes of Sparta to keep them thus disunited; a policy which we shall see hereafter illustrated by the dismemberment of Mantineia (into its primitive component villages) which the Spartan contemporaries of Agesilaus carried into effect, but which was reversed as soon as the power of Sparta was no longer paramount,—as well as by the foundation of Megalopolis out of a large number of petty Arcadian towns and villages, one of the capital measures of Epameinondas. As this measure was an elevation of Arcadian importance, so the reverse proceeding—the breaking up of a city into its elementary villages—was not only a sentence of privation and suffering, but also a complete extinction of Grecian rank and dignity.

The Ozolian Lokrians, the Ætolians, and the Akarnanians maintained their separate village residence down to a still later period, preserving along with it their primitive rudeness and disorderly pugnacity. Their villages were unfortified, and defended only by comparative inaccessibility; in case of need they fled for safety with their cattle into the woods and mountains. Amid such inauspicious circumstances there was no room for that expansion of the social and political feelings to which protected intra-mural residence and increased numbers gave birth; there was no consecrated acropolis or agora—no ornamented temples and porticoes, exhibiting the continued offerings of successive generations—no theater for music or recitation, no gymnasium for athletic exercises—none of those fixed arrangements for transacting public business with regularity and decorum which the Greek citizen, with his powerful sentiment of locality, deemed essential to a dignified existence. The village was nothing more than a fraction and a subordinate, appertaining as a limb to the organized body called the city. But the city and the state are in his mind and in his language one and the same. While no organization less than the city can satisfy the exigences of an intelligent freeman, the city is itself a perfect and self-sufficient whole, admitting no incorporation into any higher political unity. It deserves notice that Sparta even in the days of her greatest power was not (properly speaking) a city, but a mere agglutination of five adjacent villages, retaining unchanged its old-fashioned trim: for the extreme defensibility of its frontier and the military prowess of its inhabitants supplied the absence of walls, while the discipline imposed upon the Spartan exceeded in rigor and minuteness anything known in Greece. And thus Sparta, though less than a city in respect to external appearance, was more than a city in respect to perfection of drilling and fixity of political routine. The contrast between the humble appearance and the mighty reality is pointed out by Thucydides. The inhabitants of the small territory of Pisa, wherein Olympia is situated, had once enjoyed the honorable privilege of administering the Olympic festival. Having been robbed of it and subjected by the more powerful Eleians, they took advantage of various movements and tendencies among the larger Grecian powers to try and regain it; and on one of these occasions we find their claim repudiated because they were villagers, and unworthy of so great a distinction. There was nothing to be called a city in the Pisatid territory.

In going through historical Greece, we are compelled to accept the Hellenic aggregate with its constituent elements as a primary fact to start from, because the state of our information does not enable us to ascend any higher. By what circumstances, or out of what pre-exisiting elements, this aggregate was brought together and modified, we find no evidence entitled to credit. There are indeed various names which are affirmed to designate ante-Hellenic inhabitants of many parts of Greece,—the Pelasgi, the Leleges, the Ku-

retes, the Kaukones, the Aones, the Temmikes, the Hyantes, the Telchines, the Bœotian Thracians, the Teleboæ, the Ephyri, the Phlegyæ, etc. These are names belonging to legendary, not to historical Greece—extracted out of a variety of conflicting legends by the logographers and subsequent historians, who strung together out of them a supposed history of the past, at a time when the conditions of historical evidence were very little understood. That these names designated real nations, may be true, but here our knowledge ends. We have no well-informed witness to tell us their times, their limits of residence, their acts, or their character; nor do we know how far they are identical with or diverse from historical Hellens—whom we are warranted in calling, not indeed, the first inhabitants of the country, but the first known to us upon any tolerable evidence. If any man is inclined to call the unknown ante-Hellenic period of Greece by the name of Pelasgic, it is open to him to do so. But this is a name carrying with it no assured predicates, noway enlarging our insight into real history, nor enabling us to explain—what would be the real historical problem—how or from whom the Hellens acquired that stock of dispositions, aptitudes, arts, etc., with which they begin their career. Whoever has examined the many conflicting systems respecting the Pelasgi,—from the literal belief of Clavier, Larcher, and Raoul Rochette (which appears to me at least the most consistent way of proceeding), to the interpretative and half-incredulous processes applied by abler men, such as Niebuhr, or O. Müller, or Dr. Thirlwall—will not be displeased with my resolution to decline so insoluble a problem. No attested facts are now present to us—none were present to Herodotus and Thucydides even in their age—on which to build trustworthy affirmations repecting the ante-Hellenic Pelasgians. And where such is the case, we may without impropriety apply the remark of Herodotus respecting one of the theories which he had heard for explaning the inundation of the Nile by a supposed connection with the circumfluous ocean—that "the man who carries up his story into the invisible world, passes out of the range of criticism."

As far as our knowledge extends, there were no towns or villages called Pelasgian, in Greece proper, since 776 B.C. But there still existed in two different places, even in the age of Herodotus, people whom he believed to be Pelasgians. One portion of these occupied the towns of Plakia and Skylake near Kyzikus, on the Propontis; another dwelt in a town called Kreston, near the Thermaic gulf. There were, moreover, certain other Pelasgian townships which he does not specify—it seems, indeed, from Thucydides, that there were some little Pelasgian townships on the peninsula of Athos. Now Herodotus acquaints us with the remarkable fact, that the people of Kreston, those of Plakia and Skylake, and those of the other unnamed Pelasgian townships, all spoke the same language, and each of them respectively, a different language from their neighbors around them. He informs us, moreover, that their language was a barbarous (i.e., a non-Hellenic) language; and this fact he quotes as an evidence to prove that the ancient Pelasgian language was a barbarous language, or distinct from the Hellenic. He at the same time states expressly that he has no positive knowledge what language the ancient Pelasgians spoke—one proof, among others, that no memorials nor means of distinct information concerning that people could have been open to him.

This is the one single fact, amid so many conjectures concerning the Pelasgians, which we can be said to know upon the testimony of a competent and contemporary witness: the few townships—scattered and inconsiderable, but all that Herodotus in his day knew as Pelasgian—spoke a barbarous language. And upon such a point he must be regarded as an excellent judge. If then (infers the historian) all the early Pelasgians spoke the same language as those of Kreston and Plakia, they must have changed their language at the time when they passed into the Hellenic aggregate, or became Hellens. Now Herodotus conceives that aggregate to have been gradually enlarged to its great actual size by incorporating with itself not only the Pelasgians, but several other nations once barbarians; the Hellens having been originally an inconsiderable people. Among those other nations once barbarian whom Herodotus supposes to have become Hellenized, we may probably number the Leleges; and with respect to them as well as to the Pelasgians, we have contemporary testimony proving the existence of barbarian Leleges in later times. Philippus the Karian historian attested the present existence, and believed in the past existence, of Leleges in his country as serfs or dependent cultivators under the Karians, analogous to the Helots in Laconia or the Penestæ in Thessaly. We may be very sure that there were no Hellens—no men speaking the Hellenic tongue—standing in such a relation to the Karians. Among those many barbaric-speaking nations whom Herodotus believed to have changed their language and passed into Hellens, we may therefore fairly consider the Leleges to have been included. For next to the Pelasgians and Pelasgus, the Leleges and Lelex figure most conspicuously in the legendary genealogies; and both together cover the larger portion of the Hellenic soil.

Confining myself to historical evidence and believing that no assured results can be derived from the attempt to transform legend into history, I accept the statement of Herodotus with confidence as to the barbaric language spoken by the Pelasgians of his day, and I believe the same with regard to the historical Leleges—but without presuming to determine anything in regard to the legendary Pelasgians and Leleges, the supposed ante-Hellenic inhabitants of Greece. And I think this course more consonant to the laws of historical inquiry than that which comes recommended by the high authority of Dr. Thirlwall, who softens and explans away the statement of

Herodotus until it is made to mean only that the Pelasgians of Plakia and Kreston spoke a very bad Greek. The affirmation of Herodotus is distinct, and twice repeated, that the Pelasgians of these towns and of his own time spoke a barbaric language; and that word appears to me to admit of but one interpretation. To suppose that a man who, like Herodotus, had heard almost every variety of Greek in the course of his long travels, as well as Egyptian, Phœnician, Assyria, Lydian, and other languages, did not know how to distinguish bad Hellenic from non-Hellenic, is in my judgment inadmissible; at any rate the supposition is not to be adopted without more cogent evidence than any which is here found.

As I do not presume to determine what were the antecedent internal elements out of which the Hellenic aggregate was formed, so I confess myself equally uninformed with regard to its external constituents. Kadmus, Danaus, Kekrops—the eponyms of the Kadmeians, of the Danaans, and of the Attic Kekropia—present themselves to my vision as creatures of legend, and in that character I have already adverted to them. That there may have been very early settlements in continental Greece from Phœnicia and Egypt, is nowise impossible; but I see neither positive proof, nor ground for probable inference, that there were any such, though traces of Phœnician settlements in some of the islands may doubtless be pointed out. And if we examine the character and aptitude of Greeks, as compared either with Egyptians or Phœnicians, it will appear that there is not only no analogy, but an obvious and fundamental contrast: the Greek may occasionally be found as a borrower from these ultramarine contemporaries, but he cannot be looked upon as their offspring or derivative. Nor can I bring myself to accept an hypothesis which implies (unless we are to regard the supposed foreign immigrants as very few in number, in which case the question loses most of its importance) that the Hellenic language—the noblest among the many varieties of human speech, and possessing within itself a pervading symmetry and organization—is a mere confluence of two foreign barbaric languages (Phœnician and Egyptian) with two or more internal barbaric languages—Pelasgian, Lelegian, etc. In the mode of investigation pursued by different historians into this question of early foreign colonies, there is great difference (as in the case of the Pelasgi) between different authors—from the acquiescent Euemerism of Raoul Rochette to the refined distillation of Dr. Thirlwall in the third chapter of his history. It will be found that the amount of positive knowledge which Dr. Thirlwall guarantees to his readers in that chapter is extremely inconsiderable; for though he proceeds upon the general theory (different from that which I hold) that historical matter may be distinguished and elicited from the legends, yet when the question arises respecting any definite historical result, his canon of credibility is too just to permit him to overlook the absence of positive evidence, even when all intrinsic

incredibility is removed. That which I note as Terra Incognita, is in his view a land which may be known up to a certain point; but the map which he draws of it contains so few ascertained places as to differ very little from absolute vacuity.

The most ancient district called Hellas is affirmed by Aristotle to have been near Dodona and the river Achelous—a description which would have been unintelligible (since the river does not flow near Dodona), if it had not been qualified by the remark, that the river had often in former times changed its course. He states, moreover, that the deluge of Deukalion took place chiefly in this district, which was in those early days inhabited by the Selli, and by the people then called Græci, but now Hellenes. The Selli (called by Pindar Helli) are mentioned in the Iliad as the ministers of the Dodonæan Zeus—"men who slept on the ground and never washed their feet," and Hesiod in one of the lost poems (the Eoiai) speaks of the fat land and rich pastures of the land called Hellopia wherein Dodona was situated. On what authority Aristotle made his statement, we do not know; but the general feeling of the Greeks was different, connecting Deukalion, Hellen, and the Hellenes, primarily and specially with the territory called Achaia Phthiotis, between Mount Othrys and Œta. We can neither affirm nor deny his assertion that the people in the neighborhood of Dodona were called Græci before they were called Hellenes. There is no ascertained instance of the mention of a people called Græci in any author earlier than this Aristotelian treatise; for the allusions to Alkman and Sophokles prove nothing to the point. Nor can we explain how it came to pass that the Hellenes were known to the Romans only under the name of Græci or Graii. But the name by which a people is known to foreigners is often completely different from its own domestic name, and we are not less at a loss to assign the reason, how the Rasena of Etruria came to be known to the Romans by the name of Tuscans or Etruscans.

CHAPTER III.

MEMBERS OF THE HELLENIC AGGREGATE, SEPARATELY TAKEN.—GREEKS NORTH OF PELOPONNESUS.

HAVING in the preceding chapter touched upon the Greeks in their aggregate capacity, I now come to describe separately the portions of which this aggregate consisted, as they present themselves at the first discernible period of history.

It has already been mentioned that the twelve races or subdivisions, members of what is called the Amphiktyonic convocation, were as follows:

North of the pass of Thermopylæ,—Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Achæans, Melians, Ænianes, Dolopes.

South of the pass of Thermopylæ,—Dorians, Ionians, Bœotians, Lokrians, Phokians.

Other Hellenic races, not comprised among the Amphiktyons, were:

The Ætolians and Akarnanians, north of the Gulf of Corinth.

The Arcadians, Eleians, Pisatans, and Triphylians, in the central and western portion of Peloponnesus: I do not here name the Achæans, who occupied the southern or Peloponnesian coast of the Corinthian gulf, because they may be presumed to have been originally of the same race as the Phthiot Achæans, and therefore participant in the Amphiktyonic constituency, though their actual connection with it may have been disused.

The Dryopes, an inconsiderable, but seemingly peculiar subdivision, who occupied some scattered points on the sea-coast—Hermione on the Argolic peninsula; Styrus and Karystus in Eubœa; the island of Kythnus, etc.

Though it may be said, in a general way, that our historical discernment of the Hellenic aggregate, apart from the illusions of legend, commences with 776 B.C., yet with regard to the larger number of its subdivisions just enumerated, we can hardly be said to possess any specific facts anterior to the invasion of Xerxes in 480 B.C. Until the year 560 B.C. (the epoch of Crœsus in Asia Minor, and of Peisistratus at Athens), the history of the Greeks presents hardly anything of a collective character: the movements of each portion of the Hellenic world begin and end apart from the rest. The destruction of Kirrha by the Amphiktyons is the first historical incident which brings into play, in defense of the Delphian temple, a common Hellenic feeling of active obligation.

But about 560 B.C., two important changes are seen to come into operation which alter the character of Grecian history—extricating it out of its former chaos of detail, and centralizing its isolated phenomena: 1. The subjugation of the Asiatic Greeks by Lydia and by Persia, followed by their struggles for emancipation—wherein the European Greeks became implicated, first as accessories, and afterward as principals. 2. The combined action of the large mass of Greeks under Sparta, as their most powerful state and acknowledged chief, succeeded by the rapid and extraordinary growth of Athens, the complete development of Grecian maritime power, and the struggle between Athens and Sparta for the headship. These two causes, though distinct in themselves, must nevertheless be regarded as working together to a certain degree—or rather the second grew out of the first. For it was the Persian invasion of Greece which first gave birth to a wide-spread alarm and antipathy among the leading Greeks (we must not call it Pan-Hellenic, since more than half of the Amphiktyonic constituency gave earth and water to Xerxes)

against the barbarians of the East, and impressed them with the necessity of joint active operations under a leader. The idea of a leadership or hegemony of collective Hellas, as a privilege necessarily vested in some one state for common security against the barbarians, thus became current—an idea foreign to the mind of Solon, or any one of the same age. Next came the miraculous development of Athens, and the violent contest between her and Sparta which should be the leader; the larger portion of Hellas taking side with one or the other, and the common quarrel against the Persian being for the time put out of sight. Athens is put down, Sparta acquires the undisputed hegemony, and again the antibarbaric feeling manifests itself, though faintly, in the Asiatic expeditions of Agesilaus. But the Spartans, too incompetent either to deserve or maintain this exalted position, are overthrown by the Thebans—themselves not less incompetent, with the single exception of Epameinondas. The death of that single man extinguishes the pretensions of Thebes to the hegemony. Hellas is left, like the deserted Penelope in the Odyssey, worried by the competition of several suitors, none of whom is strong enough to stretch the bow on which the prize depends. Such a manifestation of force, as well as the trampling down of the competing suitors, is reserved, not for any legitimate Hellenic arm, but for a semi-hellenized Macedonian, "brought up at Pella," and making good his encroachments gradually from the north of Olympus. The hegemony of Greece thus passes forever out of Grecian hands; but the conqueror finds his interest in reviving as a name and pretext, the old miso-Persian banner, after it had ceased to represent any real or earnest feeling, and had given place to other impulses of more recent growth. The desolation and sacrilege once committed by Xerxes at Athens is avenged by annihilation of the Persian empire. And this victorious consummation of the once powerful Pan-Hellenic antipathy—the dream of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa—the hope of Jason of Pheræ—the exhortation of Isokrates—the project of Philip and the achievement of Alexander,—while it manifests the irresistible might of Hellenic and Macedonian arms in the then existing state of the world, is at the same time the closing scene of substantive Grecian life. The citizen-feelings of Greece become afterward merely secondary forces, subordinate to the preponderance of Greek mercenaries under Macedonian order, and to the rudest of all native Hellens—the Ætolian mountaineers. Some few individuals are indeed found, even in the third century B.C., worthy of the best times of Hellas, and the Achæan confederation of that century is an honorable attempt to contend against irresistible difficulties: but on the whole, that free, social, and political march, which gives so much interest to the earlier centuries, is irrevocably banished from Greece after the generation of Alexander the Great.

The foregoing brief sketch will show that, taking the period from

Crœsus and Peisistratus down to the generation of Alexander (560–300 B.C.), the phenomena of Hellas generally, and her relations, both foreign and interpolitical, admit of being grouped together in masses with continued dependence on one or a few predominant circumstances. They may be said to constitute a sort of historical epopee, analogous to that which Herodotus has constructed out of the wars between Greeks and barbarians from the legends of Io and Europa down to the repulse of Xerxes. But when we are called back to the period between 776 and 560 B.C., the phenomena brought to our knowledge are scanty in number—exhibiting few common feelings or interests, and no tendency toward any one assignable purpose. To impart attraction to this first period so obscure and unpromising, we shall be compelled to consider it in its relation with the second; partly as a preparation, partly as a contrast.

Of the extra-Peloponnesian Greeks north of Attica, during these two centuries, we know absolutely nothing; but it will be possible to furnish some information respecting the early condition and struggles of the great Dorian states in Peloponnesus, and respecting the rise of Sparta from the second to the first place in the comparative scale of Grecian powers. Athens becomes first known to us at the legislation of Drako and the attempt of Kylon (620 B.C.) to make himself despot; and we gather some facts concerning the Ionic cities in Eubœa and Asia Minor during the century of their chief prosperity, prior to the reign and conquests of Crœsus. In this way we shall form to ourselves some idea of the growth of Sparta and Athens, —of the short-lived and energetic development of the Ionic Greeks —and of the slow working of those causes which tended to bring about increased Hellenic intercommunication—as contrasted with the enlarged range of ambition, the grand pan-Hellenic ideas, the systematized party-antipathies, and the intensified action both abroad and at home, which grew out of the contest with Persia.

There are also two or three remarkable manifestations which will require special notice during this first period of Grecian history: 1. The great multiplicity of colonies sent forth by individual cities, and the rise and progress of these several colonies; 2. The number of despots who arose in the various Grecian cities; 3. The lyric poetry; 4. The rudiments of that which afterward ripened into moral philosophy, as manifested in gnomes or aphorisms—or the age of the Seven Wise Men.

But before I proceed to relate those earliest proceedings (unfortunately too few) of the Dorians and Ionians during the historical period, together with the other matters just alluded to, it will be convenient to go over the names and positions of those other Grecian states respecting which we have no information during these first two centuries. Some idea will thus be formed of the less important members of the Hellenic aggregate, previous to the time when they

will be called into action. We begin by the territory north of the pass of Thermopylæ.

Of the different races who dwelt between this celebrated pass and the mouth of the river Peneius, by far the most powerful and important were the Thessalians. Sometimes, indeed, the whole of this area passes under the name of Thessaly—since nominally, though not always really, the power of the Thessalians extended over the whole. We know that the Trachinian Herakleia, founded by the Lacedæmonians in the early years of the Peloponnesian war close at the pass of Thermopylæ, was planted upon the territory of the Thessalians. But there were also within these limits other races, inferior and dependent on the Thessalians, yet said to be of more ancient date, and certainly not less genuine subdivisions of the Hellenic name. The Perrhæbi occupied the northern portion of the territory between the lower course of the river Peneius and Mount Olympus. The Magnetes dwelt along the eastern coast, between Mount Ossa and Pelion on one side and the Ægean on the other, comprising the south-eastern cape and the eastern coast of the Gulf of Pagasæ as far as Iolkos. The Achæans occupied the territory called Phthiotis, extending from near Mount Pindus on the west to the Gulf of Pagasæ on the east—along the mountain chain of Othrys with its lateral projections northerly into the Thessalian plain, and southerly even to its junction with Œta. The three tribes of the Malians dwelt between Achæa Phthiotis and Thermopylæ, including both Trachin and Herakleia. Westward of Achæa Phthiotis, the lofty region of Pindus or Tymphrestus, with its declivities both westward and eastward, was occupied by the Dolopes.

All these five tribes or subdivisions—Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Achæans of Phthiotis, Malians, and Dolopes, together with certain Epirotic and Macedonian tribes besides, beyond the boundaries of Pindus and Olympus—were in a state of irregular dependence upon the Thessalians, who occupied the central plain or basin drained by the Peneius. That river receives the streams from Olympus, from Pindus, and from Othrys—flowing through a region which was supposed by its inhabitants to have been once a lake, until Poseidon cut open the defile of Tempe, through which the waters found an efflux. In traveling northward from Thermopylæ, the commencement of this fertile region—the amplest space of land continuously productive which Hellas presents—is strikingly marked by the steep rock and ancient fortress of Thaumaki; from whence the traveler, passing over the mountains of Achæa Phthiotis and Othrys, sees before him the plains and low declivities which reach northward across Thessaly to Olympus. A narrow strip of coast—in the interior of the Gulf of Pagasæ, between the Magnetes and the Achæans, and containing the towns of Amphanæum and Pagasæ—belonged to this proper territory of Thessaly, but its great expansion was inland:

within it were situated the cities of Pheræ, Pharsalus, Skotussa, Larissa, Krannon, Atrax, Pharkadon, Trikka, Metropolis, Pelinna, etc.

The abundance of corn and cattle from the neighboring plains sustained in these cities a numerous population, and above all a a proud and disorderly noblesse, whose manners bore much resemblance to those of the heroic times. They were violent in their behavior, eager in armed feud, but unaccustomed to political discussion or compromise; faithless as to obligations, yet at the same time generous in their hospitalities, and much given to the enjoyments of the table. Breeding the finest horses in Greece, they were distinguished for their excellence as cavalry; but their infantry is little noticed, nor do the Thessalian cities seem to have possessed that congregation of free and tolerably equal citizens, each master of his own arms, out of whom the ranks of the hoplites were constituted. The warlike nobles, such as the Aleudæ at Larissa, the Skopadæ at Krannon, despising everything but equestrian service for themselves, furnished from their extensive herds on the plain, horses for the poorer soldiers. These Thessalian cities exhibit the extreme of turbulent oligarchy, occasionally trampled down by some one man of great vigor, but little tempered by that sense of political communion and reverence for established law, which was found among the better cities of Hellas. Both in Athens and Sparta, so different in many respects from each other, this feeling will be found, if not indeed constantly predominant, yet constantly present and operative. Both of them exhibit a contrast with Larissa or Pheræ not unlike that between Rome and Capua—the former with her endless civil disputes constitutionally conducted, admitting the joint action of parties against a common foe; the latter with her abundant soil enriching a luxurious oligarchy, and impelled according to the feuds of her great proprietors, the Magii, Blossii, and Jubellii.

The Thessalians are indeed in their character and capacity as much Epirotic or Macedonian as Hellenic, forming a sort of link between the two. For the Macedonians, though trained in aftertimes upon Grecian principles by the genius of Philip and Alexander, so as to constitute the celebrated heavy armed phalanx, were originally (even in the Peloponnesian war) distinguished chiefly for the excellence of their cavalry, like the Thessalian; while the broad-brimmed hat or kausia, and the short spreading mantle or chlamys, were common to both.

We are told that the Thessalians were originally immigrants from Thesprotia in Epirus, and conquerors of the plain of the Peneius, which (according to Herodotus) was then called Æolis, and which they found occupied by the Pelasgi. It may be doubted whether the great Thessalian families—such as the Aleuadæ of Larissa, descendants from Herakles, and placed by Pindar on the same level as

the Lacedæmonian kings—would have admitted this Thesprotian origin; nor does it coincide with the tenor of those legends which make the eponym, Thessalus, son of Herakles. Moreover, it is to be remarked that the language of the Thessalians was Hellenic, a variety of the Æolic dialect; the same (so far as we can make out) as that of the people whom they must have found settled in the country at their first conquest. If then it be true, that at some period anterior to the commencement of authentic history, a body of Thesprotian warriors crossed the passes of Pindus, and established themselves as conquerors in Thessaly, we must suppose them to have been more warlike than numerous, and to have gradually dropped their primitive language.

In other respects, the condition of the population of Thessaly, such as we find it during the historical period, favors the supposition of an original mixture of conquerors and conquered: for it seems that there was among the Thessalians and their dependents a triple gradation, somewhat analogous to that of Laconia. First, a class of rich proprietors distributed throughout the principal cities, possessing most of the soil, and constituting separate oligarchies loosely hanging together. Next the subject Achæans, Magnetes, Perrhæbi, different from the Laconian Periœki in this point, that they retained their ancient tribe-name and separate Amphiktyonic franchise. Thirdly, a class of serfs or dependent cultivators, corresponding to the Laconian Helots, who tilling the lands of the wealthy oligarchs, paid over a proportion of its produce, furnished the retainers by which these great families were surrounded, served as their followers in the cavalry, and were in a condition of villenage,—yet with the important reserve that they could not be sold out of the country, that they had a permanent tenure in the soil, and that they maintained among one another the relations of family and village. This last-mentioned order of men, in Thessaly called the Penestæ, is assimilated by all ancient authors to the Helots of Laconia, and in both cases the danger attending such a social arrangement is noticed by Plato and Aristotle. For the Helots as well as the Penestæ had their own common language and mutual sympathies, a separate residence, arms, and courage; to a certain extent, also, they possessed the means of acquiring property, since we are told that some of the Penestæ were richer than their masters. So many means of action, combined with a degraded social position, gave rise to frequent revolt and incessant apprehensions. As a general rule, indeed, the cultivation of the soil by slaves or dependents, for the benefit of proprietors in the cities, prevailed throughout most parts of Greece. The rich men of Thebes, Argos, Athens, or Elis, must have derived their incomes in the same manner; but it seems that there was often in other places a larger intermixture of bought foreign slaves, and also that the number, fellow-feeling, and courage of the degraded village population was nowhere so great as in Thessaly and Laconia. Now

the origin of the Penestæ in Thessaly is ascribed to the conquest of the territory by the Thesprotians, as that of the Helots in Laconia is traced to the Dorian conquest. The victors in both countries are said to have entered into a convention with the vanquished population, whereby the latter became serfs and tillers of the land for the benefit of the former, but were at the same time protected in their holdings, constituted subjects of the state, and secured against being sold away as slaves. Even in the Thessalian cities, though inhabited in common by Thessalian proprietors and their Penestæ, the quarters assigned to each were to a great degree separated: what was called the free agora could not be trodden by any Penest except when specially summoned.

Who the people were, whom the conquest of Thessaly by the Thesprotians reduced to this predial villenage, we find differently stated. According to Theopompus, they were Perrhæbians and Magnetes; according to others, Pelasgians; while Archemachus alleged them to have been Bœotians of the territory of Arne—some emigrating to escape the conquerors, others remaining and accepting the condition of serfs. But the conquest, assuming it as a fact, occurred at far too early a day to allow of our making out either the manner in which it came to pass or the state of things which preceded it. The Pelasgians whom Herodotus saw at Kreston are affirmed by him to have been the descendants of those who quitted Thessaly to escape the invading Thesprotians; though others held that the Bœotians, driven on this occasion from their habitations on the gulf of Pagasæ near the Achæans of Phthiotis, precipitated themselves on Orchomenus and Bœotia, and settled in it, expelling the Minyæ and the Pelasgians.

Passing over the legends on this subject, and confining ourselves to historical time, we find an established quadruple division of Thessaly, said to have been introduced in the time of Aleuas, the ancestor (real or mythical) of the powerful Aleuadæ,—Thessaliotis, Pelasgiotis, Histiæotis, Phthiotis. In Phthiotis were comprehended the Achæans, whose chief towns were Melitæa, Itonus, Thebæ Phthiotides, Alos, Larissa Kremaste and Pteleon, on or near the western coast of the Gulf of Pagasæ. Histiæotis, to the north of the Peneius, comprised the Perrhæbians with numerous towns strong in situation, but of no great size or importance; they occupied the passes of Olympus and are sometimes considered as extending westward across Pindus. Pelasgiotis included the Magnetes, together with that which was called the Pelasgic plain bordering on the western side of Pelion and Ossa. Thessaliotis comprised the central plain of Thessaly and the upper course of the river Peneius. This was the political classification of the Thessalian power, framed to suit a time when the separate cities were maintained in harmonious action by favorable circumstances or by some energetic individual ascendency; for their union was in general

interrupted and disorderly, and we find certain cities standing aloof while the rest went to war. Though a certain political junction, and obligations of some kind toward a common authority, were recognized in theory by all, and a chief or tagus was nominated to enforce obedience,—yet it frequently happened that the disputes of the cities among themselves prevented the choice of a tagus, or drove him out of the country, and left the alliance little more than nominal. Larissa, Pharsalus, and Pheræ—each with its cluster of dependent towns as adjuncts—seem to have been nearly on a par in strength, and each torn by intestine faction, so that not only was the supremacy over common dependents relaxed, but even the means of repelling invaders greatly enfeebled. The dependence of the Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Achæans, and Malians might under these circumstances be often loose and easy. But the condition of the Penestæ—who occupied the villages belonging to these great cities, in the central plain of Pelasgiotis and Thessaliotis, and from whom the Aleuadæ and Skopadæ derived their exuberance of landed produce—was noway mitigated, if it was not even aggravated, by such constant factions. Nor were there wanting cases in which the discontent of this subject class was employed by members of the native oligarchy, or even by foreign states, for the purpose of bringing about political revolutions.

"When Thessaly is under her tagus, all the neighboring people pay tribute to her; she can send into the field 6,000 cavalry and 10,000 hoplites or heavy-armed infantry," observed Jason, despot of Pheræ, to Polydamas of Pharsalus, in endeavoring to prevail on the latter to second his pretensions to that dignity. The impost due from the tributaries, seemingly considerable, was then realized with arrears, and the duties upon imports at the harbors of the Pagasæan gulf, imposed for the benefit of the confederacy, were then enforced with strictness; but the observation shows that while unanimous Thessaly was very powerful, her periods of unanimity were only occasional. Among the nations which thus paid tribute to the fullness of Thessalian power, we may number not merely the Perrhæbi, Magnetes, and Achæans of Phthiotis, but also the Malians and Dolopes, and various tribes of Epirots extending to the westward of Pindus. We may remark that they were all (except the Malians) javelin-men or light-armed troops, not serving in rank with the full panoply; a fact which in Greece counts as presumptive evidence of a lower civilization; the Magnetes, too, had a peculiar close-fitting mode of dress, probably suited to movements in a mountainous country. There was even a time when the Thessalian power threatened to extend southward of Thermopylæ, and subjugate the Phokians, Dorians, and Lokrians. So much were the Phokians alarmed at this danger, that they had built a wall across the pass of Thermopylæ for the purpose of more easily defending it against Thessalian invaders, who are reported to have penetrated more than once

into the Phokian valleys, and to have sustained some severe defeats. At what precise time these events happened, we find no information; but it must have been considerably earlier than the invasion of Xerxes, since the defensive wall which had been built at Thermopylæ by the Phokians was found by Leonidas in a state of ruin. But the Phokians, though they no longer felt the necessity of keeping up this wall, had not ceased to fear and hate the Thessalians—an antipathy which will be found to manifest itself palpably in connection with the Persian invasion. On the whole, the resistance of the Phokians was successful, for the power of the Thessalians never reached southward of the pass.

It will be recollected that these different ancient races—Perrhæbi, Magnetes, Achæans, Malians, Dolopes—though tributaries of the Thessalians, still retained their Amphiktyonic franchise, and were considered as legitimate Hellenes; all except the Malians are indeed mentioned in the Iliad. We shall rarely have occasion to speak much of them in the course of this history: they are found siding with Xerxes (chiefly by constraint) in his attack of Greece, and almost indifferent in the struggle between Sparta and Athens. That the Achæans of Phthiotis are a portion of the same race as the Achæans of Peloponnesus it seems reasonable to believe, though we trace no historical evidence to authenticate it. Achæa Phthiotis is the seat of Hellen, the patriarch of the entire race,—of the primitive Hellas, by some treated as a town, by others as a district of some breadth,—and of the great national hero Achilles. Its connection with the Peloponnesian Achæans is not unlike that of Doris with the Peloponnesian Dorians.

We have also to notice another ethnical kindred, the date and circumstances of which are given to us only in a mythical form, but which seems nevertheless to be in itself a reality,—that of the Magnetes on Pelion and Ossa, with the two divisions of Asiatic Magnetes, or Magnesia on Mount Sipylus and Magnesia on the river Mæander. It is said that these two Asiatic homonymous towns were founded by migrations of the Thessalian Magnetes, a body of whom became consecrated to the Delphian god, and chose a new abode under his directions. According to one story, these emigrants were warriors returning from the siege of Troy; according to another, they sought fresh seats to escape from the Thesprotian conquerors of Thessaly. There was a third story, according to which the Thessalian Magnetes themselves were represented as colonists from Delphi. Though we can elicit no distinct matter of fact from these legends, we may nevertheless admit the connection of race between the Thessalian and the Asiatic Magnetes as well as the reverential dependence of both, manifested in this supposed filiation, on the temple of Delphi. Of the Magnetes in Krete, noticed by Plato as long extinct in his time, we cannot absolutely verify even the existence.

Of the Malians, Thucydides notices three tribes (*γένη*) as existing in his time—the Paralii, the Hieres (priests), and the Trachinii, or men of Trachin: it is possible that the second of the two may have been possessors of the sacred spot on which the Amphiktyonic meetings were held. The prevalence of the hoplites or heavy-armed infantry among the Malians indicates that we are stepping from Thessalian to more southerly Hellenic habits: the Malians recognized every man as a qualified citizen who either had served, or was serving, in the ranks with his full panoply. Yet the panoply was probably not perfectly suitable to the mountainous regions by which they were surrounded; for at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the aggressive mountaineers of the neighboring region of Œta had so harassed and overwhelmed them in war, that they were forced to throw themselves on the protection of Sparta, and the establishment of the Spartan colony of Herakleia near Trachin was the result of their urgent application. Of these mountaineers, described under the general name of Œtæans, the principal were the Ænianes (or Enienes, as they are termed in the Homeric Catalogue as well as by Herodotus),—an ancient Hellenic Amphiktyonic race, who are said to have passed through several successive migrations in Thessaly and Epirus, but who in the historical times had their settlement and their chief town Hypata in the upper valley of the Spercheius, on the northern declivity of Mount Œta. But other tribes were probably also included in the name, such as those Ætolian tribes, the Bomians and Kallians, whose high and cold abodes approached near to the Maliac gulf. It is in this sense that we are to understand the name, as comprehending all the predatory tribes along this extensive mountain range, when we are told of the damage done by the Œtæans both to the Malians on the east, and to the Dorians on the south: but there are some cases in which the name Œtæans seems to designate expressly the Ænianes, especially when they are mentioned as exercising the Amphiktyonic franchise.

The fine soil, abundant moisture, and genial exposure of the southerly declivities of Othrys—especially the valley of the Spercheius, through which river all these waters pass away, and which annually gives forth a fertilizing inundation—present a marked contrast with the barren, craggy, and naked masses of Mount Œta, which forms one side of the pass of Thermopylæ. Southward of the pass, the Lokrians, Phokians, and Dorians occupied the mountains and passes between Thessaly and Bœotia. The coast opposite to the western side of Eubœa, from the neighborhood of Thermopylæ as far as the Bœotian frontier of Anthedon, was possessed by the Lokrians, whose northern frontier town, Alpeni, was conterminous with the Malians. There was, however, one narrow strip of Phokis—the town of Daphnus, where the Phokians also touched the Eubœan sea—which broke this continuity and divided the Lokrians into two sections—Lokrians of Mount Knemis, or Epiknemidian Lokrians, and Lokrians of Opus, or Opuntian Lokrians.

The mountain called Knemis, running southward parallel to the coast from the end of Œta, divided the former section from the inland Phokians and the upper valley of the Kephisus: farther southward, joining continuously with Mount Ptoon by means of an intervening mountain which is now called Chlomo, it separated the Lokrians of Opus from the territories of Orchomenus, Thebes, and Anthedon, the north-eastern portions of Bœotia. Besides these two sections of the Lokrian name, there was also a third, completely separate, and said to have been colonized out from Opus,—the Lokrians surnamed Ozolæ,—who dwelt apart on the western side of Phokis, along the northern coast of the Corinthian gulf. They reached from Amphissa—which overhung the plain of Krissa, and stood within seven miles of Delphi—to Naupaktus, near the narrow entrance of the gulf; which latter town was taken from these Lokrians by the Athenians a little before the Peloponnesian war. Opus prided itself on being the mother-city of the Lokrian name, and the legends of Deukalion and Pyrrha found a home there as well as in Phthiotis. Alpeni, Nikæa, Thronium, and Skarpheia were towns, ancient but unimportant, of the Epiknemidian Lokrians; but the whole length of this Lokrian coast is celebrated for its beauty and fertility, both by ancient and modern observers.

The Phokians were bounded on the north by the little territories called Doris and Dryopis, which separated them from the Malians, —on the north-east, east, and south-west by the different branches of Lokrians,—and on the south-east by the Bœotians. They touched the Eubœan sea (as has been mentioned) at Daphnus, the point where it approaches nearest to their chief town Elateia; their territory also comprised most part of the lofty and bleak range of Parnassus as far as its southerly termination, where a lower portion of it, called Kirphis, projects into the Corinthian gulf, between the two bays of Antikyra and Krissa; the latter, with its once fertile plain, was in proximity to the sacred rock of the Delphian Apollo. Both Delphi and Krissa originally belonged to the Phokian race. But the sanctity of the temple, together with Lacedæmonian aid, enabled the Delphians to set up for themselves, disavowing their connection with the Phokian brotherhood. Territorially speaking, the most valuable part of Phokis consisted in the valley of the river Kephisus, which takes its rise from Parnassus not far from the Phokian town of Lilæa, passes between Œta and Knemis on one side and Parnassus on the other, and enters Bœotia near Chæroneia, discharging itself into the lake Kopais. It was on the projecting mountain ledges and rocks on each side of this river that the numerous little Phokian towns were situated. Twenty-two of them were destroyed and broken up into villages by the Amphiktyonic order after the second Sacred war; Abæ (one of the few, if not the only one, that was spared) being protected by the sanctity of its temple and oracle. Of these cities the most important was Elateia, situated

on the left bank of the Kephisus, and on the road from Lokris into Phokis, in the natural march of an army from Thermopylæ into Bœotia. The Phokian towns were embodied in an ancient confederacy, which held its periodical meetings at a temple between Daulis and Delphi.

The little territory called Doris and Dryopis occupied the southern declivity of Mount Œta, dividing Phokis on the north and north-west from the Ætolians, Ænianes, and Malians. That which was called Doris in the historical times, and which reached, in the time of Herodotus, nearly as far eastward as the Maliac gulf, is said to have formed a part of what had been once called Dryopis; a territory which had comprised the summit of Œta as far as the Spercheius northward, and which had been inhabited by an old Hellenic tribe called Dryopes. The Dorians acquired their settlement in Dryopis by gift from Herakles, who, along with the Malians (so ran the legend), had expelled the Dryopes, and compelled them to find for themselves new seats at Hermione and Asine, in the Argolic peninsula of Peloponnesus—at Styra and Karystus in Eubœa—and in the island of Kythnus; it is only in these five last-mentioned places that history recognizes them. The territory of Doris was distributed into four little townships—Pindus or Akyphas, Bœon, Kytinion, and Erineon—each of which seems to have occupied a separate valley belonging to one of the feeders of the river Kephisus—the only narrow spaces of cultivated ground which this "small and sad" region presented. In itself this tetrapolis is so insignificant, that we shall rarely find occasion to mention it: but it acquired a factitious consequence by being regarded as the metropolis of the great Dorian cities in Peloponnesus, and receiving on that ground special protection from Sparta. I do not here touch upon that string of ante-historical migrations—stated by Herodotus and illustrated by the ingenuity as well as decorated by the fancy of O. Müller—through which the Dorians are affiliated with the patriarch of the Hellenic race—moving originally out of Phthiotis to Histiæotis, then to Pindus, and lastly to Doris. The residence of Dorians in Doris is a fact which meets us at the commencement of history, like that of the Phokians and Lokrians in their respective territories.

We next pass to the Ætolians, whose extreme tribes covered the bleak heights of Œta and Korax, reaching almost within sight of the Maliac Gulf, where they bordered on the Dorians and Malians—while their central and western tribes stretched along the frontier of the Ozolian Lokrians to the flat plain, abundant in marsh and lake, near the mouth of the Euenus. In the time of Herodotus and Thucydides they do not seem to have extended so far westward as the Achelous; but in later times this latter river, throughout the greater part of its lower course, divided them from the Akarnanians: on the north they touched upon the Dolopians and upon a parallel of latitude nearly as far north as Ambrakia. There were three great divisions of the

Ætolian name—the Apodoti, Ophioneis, and Eurytanes—each of which was subdivided into several different village tribes. The northern and eastern portion of the territory consisted of very high mountain ranges, and even in the southern portion, the mountains Arakynthus, Kurion, Chalkis, Taphiassus, are found at no great distance from the sea; while the chief towns in Ætolia—Kalydon, Pleuron, Chalkis—seem to have been situated eastward of the Euenus, between the last-mentioned mountains and the sea. The first two towns have been greatly ennobled in legend, but are little named in history; while on the contrary, Thermus, the chief town of the historical Ætolians, and the place where the aggregate meeting and festival of the Ætolian name, for the choice of a Pan-Ætolic general, was convoked, is not noticed by any one earlier than Ephorus. It was partly legendary renown, partly ethnical kindred (publicly acknowledged on both sides) with the Eleans in Peloponnesus, which authenticated the title of the Ætolians to rank as Hellens. But the great mass of the Apodoti, Eurytanes, and Ophioneis, in the inland mountains, were so rude in their manners and so unintelligible in their speech (which, however, was not barbaric, but very bad Hellenic), that this title might well seem disputable—in point of fact it was disputed in later times, when the Ætolian power and depredations had become obnoxious nearly to all Greece. And it is probably to this difference of manners between the Ætolians on the sea-coast and those in the interior; that we are to trace a geographical division mentioned by Strabo into Ancient Ætolia, and Ætolia Epiktetus (or acquired). When or by whom this division was introduced, we do not know. It cannot be founded upon any conquest, for the inland Ætolians were the most unconquerable of mankind; and the affirmation which Ephorus applied to the whole Ætolian race—that it had never been reduced to subjection by any one—is most of all beyond dispute concerning the inland portion of it.

Adjoining the Ætolians were the Akarnanians, the westernmost of extra-Peloponnesian Greeks. They extended to the Ionian Sea, and seem, in the time of Thucydides, to have occupied both banks of the river Achelous in the lower part of its course—though the left bank appears afterward as belonging to the Ætolians, so that the river came to constitute the boundary, often disputed and decided by arms, between them. The principal Akarnanian towns, Stratus and Œniadæ, were both on the right bank; the latter on the marshy and overflowed land near its mouth. Near the Akarnanians, toward the Gulf of Ambrakia, were found barbarian or non-Hellenic nations —the Agræans and the Amphilochians: in the midst of the latter, on the shores of the Ambrakian gulf, the Greek colony called Argos Amphilochicum was established.

Of the five Hellenic subdivisions now enumerated—Lokrians, Phokians, Dorians (of Doris), Ætolians, and Akarnanians (of whom Lokrians, Phokians and Ætolians are comprised in the Homeric

Catalogue)—we have to say the same as of those north of Thermopylæ: there is no information respecting them from the commencement of the historical period down to the Persian war. Even that important event brings into action only the Lokrians of the Eubœan Sea, the Phokians, and the Dorians: we have to wait until near the Peloponnesian war before we require information respecting the Ozolian Lokrians, the Ætolians, and the Akarnanians. These last three were unquestionably the most backward members of the Hellenic aggregate. Though not absolutely without a central town, they lived dispersed in villages, retiring when attacked, to inaccessible heights, perpetually armed and in readiness for aggression and plunder wherever they found an opportunity. Very different was the condition of the Lokrians opposite Eubœa, the Phokians, and the Dorians. These were all orderly town communities, small indeed and poor, but not less well-administered than the average of Grecian townships, and perhaps exempt from those individual violences which so frequently troubled the Bœotian Thebes or the great cities of Thessaly. Timæus affirmed (contrary, as it seems, to the supposition of Aristotle) that in early times there were no slaves either among the Lokrians or Phokians, and that the work required to be done for proprietors was performed by poor freemen; a habit which is alleged to have been continued until the temporary prosperity of the Sacred war, when the plunder of the Delphian temple so greatly enriched the Phokian leaders. But this statement is too briefly given, and too imperfectly authenticated, to justify any inferences.

We find in the poet Alkman (about 610 B.C.) the Erysichæan or Kalydonian shepherd named as a type of rude rusticity—the antithesis of Sardis, where the poet was born. And among the suitors who are represented as coming forward to claim the daughter of the Sikyonian Kleisthenes in marriage, there appears both the Thessalian Diaktorides from Krannon—a member of the Skopad family—and the Ætolian Males, brother of that Titormus who in muscular strength surpassed all his contemporary Greeks, and who had seceded from mankind into the inmost recesses of Ætolia: this Ætolian seems to be set forth as a sort of antithesis to the delicate Smindyrides of Sybaris, the most luxurious of mankind. Herodotus introduces these characters into his dramatic picture of this memorable wedding.

Between Phokis and Lokris on one side, and Attica (from which it is divided by the mountains Kithæron and Parnes) on the other, we find the important territory called Bœotia, with its ten or twelve autonomous cities, forming a sort of confederacy under the presidency of Thebes, the most powerful among them. Even of this territory, destined during the second period of this history to play a part so conspicuous and effective, we know nothing during the first two centuries after 776 B.C. We first acquire some insight into it on occasion of the disputes between Thebes and Platæa about the year

520 B.C. Orchomenus, on the north-west of the lake Kopais, forms throughout the historical times one of the cities of the Bœotian league, seemingly the second after Thebes. But I have already stated that the Orchomenian legends, the Catalogue and other allusions in Homer, and the traces of vast power and importance yet visible in the historical age, attest the early political existence of Orchomenus and its neighborhood apart from Bœotia. The Amphiktyony in which Orchomenus participated at the holy island of Kalauria near the Argolic peninsula, seems to show that it must once have possessed a naval force and commerce, and that its territory must have touched the sea at Halæ and the lower town of Larymna, near the southern frontier of Lokris; this sea is separated by a very narrow space from the range of mountains which join Knemis and Ptoon, and which inclose on the east both the basin of Orchomenus, Aspledon and Kopæ, and the lake Kopais. The migration of the Bœotians out of Thessaly into Bœotia (which is represented as a consequence of the conquest of the former country by the Thesprotians) is commonly assigned as the compulsory force which Bœotized Orchomenus. By whatever cause or at whatever time (whether before or after 776 B.C.) the transition may have been effected, we find Orchomenus completely Bœotian throughout the known historical age—yet still retaining its local Minyeian legends, and subject to the jealous rivalry of Thebes, as being the second city in the Bœotian league. The direct road from the passes of Phokis southward into Bœotia went through Chæroneia, leaving Lebadeia on the right and Orchomenus on the left hand, and passed the south-western edge of the lake Kopais near the towns of Koroneia, Alalkomenæ, and Haliartus. Here stood, between Mount Helikon and the lake, on the road from Phokis to Thebes, the important military post called Tilphossion. The territory of this latter city occupied the greater part of central Bœotia south of the lake Kopais; it comprehended Akræphia and Mount Ptoon, and probably touched the Eubœan Sea at the village of Salganeus south of Anthedon. Southwest of Thebes, bordering on the south-eastern extremity of Phokis with the Phokian town of Bulis, stood the city of Thespiæ. Southward of the Asopus, but northward of Kithæron and Parnes, were Platæa and Tanagra: in the south-eastern corner of Bœotia stood Oropus, the frequent subject of contention between Thebes and Athens; and in the road between the Eubœan Chalkis and Thebes, the town of Mykalessus.

From our first view of historical Bœotia downward, there appears a confederation which embraces the whole territory; and during the Peloponnesian war the Thebans invoke "the ancient constitutional maxims of the Bœotians" as a justification of extreme rigor, as well as of treacherous breach of the peace, against the recusant Platæans. Of this confederation the greater cities were primary members, while the lesser were attached to one or other of them in a kind of dependent union. Neither the names nor the number of these primary members can be certainly known: there seem grounds for including Thebes, Orchomenus, Lebadeia, Koroneia, Haliartus, Kopæ, Anthedon, Tanagra, Thespiæ, and Platæa before its secession. Akræphia with the neighboring Mount Ptoon and its oracle, Skolus, Glisas and other places, were dependencies of Thebes: Chæroneia, Aspledon, Holmones, and Hyettus, of Orchomenus: Siphæ, Leuktra, Keressus and Thisbe, of Thespiæ. Certain generals or magistrates called Bœotarchs were chosen annually to manage the common affairs of the confederation. At the time of the battle of Delium in the Peloponnesian war, they were eleven in number, two of them from Thebes; but whether this number was always maintained, or in what proportions the choice was made by the different cities, we find no distinct information. There were likewise during the Peloponnesian war four different senates, with whom the Bœotarchs consulted on matters of importance; a curious arrangement, of which we have no explanation. Lastly, there was the general concilium and religious festival—the Pambœotia—held periodically at Koroneia. Such were the forms, as far as we can make them out, of the Bœotian confederacy; each of the separate cities possessing its own senate and constitution, and having its political consciousness as an autonomous unit, yet with a certain habitual deference to the federal obligations. Substantially, the affairs of the confederation will be found in the hands of Thebes, managed in the interests of Theban ascendency, which appears to have been sustained by no other feeling except respect for superior force and bravery. The discontents of the minor Bœotian towns, harshly repressed and punished, form an uninviting chapter in Grecian history.

One piece of information we find respecting Thebes singly and apart from the other Bœotian towns, anterior to the year 700 B.C. Though brief and incompletely recorded, it is yet highly valuable as one of the first incidents of solid and positive Grecian history. Diokles the Corinthian stands enrolled as Olympic victor in the 13th Olympiad, or 728 B.C., at a time when the oligarchy called Bacchiadæ possessed the government of Corinth. The beauty of his person attracted toward him the attachment of Philolaus, one of the members of this oligarchial body—a sentiment which Grecian manners did not proscribe; but it also provoked an incestuous passion on the part of his own mother Halkyone, from which Diokles shrunk with hatred and horror. He abandoned forever his native city and retired to Thebes, whither he was followed by Philolaus, and where both of them lived and died. Their tombs were yet shown in the time of Aristotle, close adjoining to each other, yet with an opposite frontage; that of Philolaus being so placed that the inmate could command a view of the lofty peak of his native city, while that of Diokles was so disposed as to block out all prospect of the hateful spot. That which preserves to us the memory of so remarkable an

incident is the esteem entertained for Philolaus by the Thebans—a feeling so pronounced that they invited him to make laws for them. We shall have occasion to point out one or two similar cases in which Grecian cities invoked the aid of an intelligent stranger; and the practice became common, among the Italian republics in the middle ages, to nominate a person not belonging to their city either as podesta or as arbitrator in civil dissensions. It would have been highly interesting to know at length what laws Philolaus made for the Thebans; but Aristotle, with his usual conciseness, merely alludes to his regulations respecting the adoption of children and respecting the multiplication of offspring in each separate family. His laws were framed with a view to maintain the original number of lots of land, without either subdivision or consolidation; but by what means the purpose was to be fulfilled we are not informed. There existed a law at Thebes, which perhaps may have been part of the scheme of Philolaus, prohibiting exposure of children, and empowering a father under the pressure of extreme poverty to bring his newborn infant to the magistrates, who sold it for a price to any citizen-purchaser—taking from him the obligation to bring it up, but allowing him in return to consider the adult as his slave. From these brief allusions, coming to us without accompanying illustration, we can draw no other inference except that the great problem of population—the relation between the well-being of the citizens and their more or less rapid increase in numbers—had engaged the serious attention even of the earliest Grecian legislators. We may, however, observe that the old Corinthian legislator Pheidon (whose precise date cannot be fixed) is stated by Aristotle to have contemplated much the same object as that which is ascribed to Philolaus at Thebes; an unchangeable number both of citizens and of lots of land, without any attempt to alter the unequal ratio of the lots, one to the other.

CHAPTER IV.

EARLIEST HISTORICAL VIEW OF PELOPONNESUS.—DORIANS IN ARGOS AND THE NEIGHBORING CITIES.

We now pass from the northern members to the heart and head of Greece—Peloponnesus and Attica, taking the former first in order, and giving as much as can be ascertained respecting its early historical phenomena.

The traveler who entered Peloponnesus from Bœotia during the youthful days of Herodotus and Thucydides, found an array of powerful Doric cities conterminous to each other, and beginning at

the Isthmus of Corinth. First came Megara, stretching across the isthmus from sea to sea, and occupying the high and rugged mountain-ridge called Geraneia: next Corinth, with its strong and conspicuous acropolis, and its territory including Mount Oneion as well as the portion of the isthmus at once most level and narrowest, which divided its two harbors called Lechæum and Kenchreæ. Westward of Corinth, along the Corinthian gulf, stood Sikyon, with a plain of uncommon fertility between the two towns: southward of Sikyon and Corinth were Phlius and Kleonæ, both conterminous, as well as Corinth, with Argos and the Argolic peninsula. The inmost bend of the Argolic gulf, including a considerable space of flat and marshy ground adjoining to the sea, was possessed by Argos; the Argolic peninsula was divided by Argos with the Doric cities of Epidaurus and Trœzen, and the Dryopian city of Hermione, the latter possessing the south-western corner. Proceeding southward along the western coast of the gulf, and passing over the little river called Tanos the traveler found himself in the dominion of Sparta, which comprised the entire southern region of the peninsula from its eastern to its western sea, where the river Neda flows into the latter. He first passed from Argos across the difficult mountain range called Parnon (which bounds to the west the southern portion of Argolis), until he found himself in the valley of the river Œnus, which he followed until it joined the Eurotas. In the larger valley of the Eurotas, far removed from the sea, and accessible only through the most impracticable mountain roads, lay the five unwalled, unadorned adjoining villages, which bore collectively the formidable name of Sparta. The whole valley of the Eurotas, from Skiritis and Belminatis at the border of Arcadia, to the Laconian gulf—expanding in several parts into fertile plain, especially near to its mouth, where the towns of Gythium and Helos were found—belonged to Sparta; together with the cold and high mountain range to the eastward which projects into the promontory of Malea—and the still loftier chain of Taygetus to the westward, which ends in the promontory of Tænarus. On the other side of Taygetus, on the banks of the river Pamisus, which there flows into the Messenian gulf, lay the plain of Messene, the richest land in the peninsula. This plain had once yielded its ample produce to the free Messenian Dorians, resident in the towns of Stenyklerus and Andania. But in the time of which we speak, the name of Messenians was borne only by a body of brave but homeless exiles, whose restoration to the land of their forefathers overpassed even the exile's proverbially sanguine hope. Their land was confounded with the western portion of Laconia, which reached in a south-westerly direction down to the extreme point of Cape Akritas, and northward as far as the river Neda.

Throughout his whole journey to the point last mentioned from the borders of Bœotia and Megaris, the traveler would only step from one Dorian state into another. But on crossing from the south

to the north bank of the river Neda, at a point near to its mouth, he would find himself out of Doric land altogether; first in the territory called Triphylia—next in that of Pisa, or the Pisatid—thirdly in the more spacious and powerful state called Elis; these three comprising the coast-land of Peloponnesus from the mouth of the Neda to that of the Larissus. The Triphylians, distributed into a number of small townships, the largest of which was Lepreon—and the Pisatans, equally destitute of any centralizing city—had both at the period of which we are now speaking, been conquered by their more powerful northern neighbors of Elis, who enjoyed the advantage of a spacious territory united under one government; the middle portion, called the Hollow Elis, being for the most part fertile. The Eleians were a section of Ætolian immigrants into Peloponnesus, but the Pisatans and Triphylians had both been originally independent inhabitants of the peninsula—the latter being affirmed to belong to the same race as the Minyæ who had occupied the ante-Bœotian Orchomenus; both, too, bore the ascendency of Elis with perpetual murmur and occasional resistance.

Crossing the river Larissus, and pursuing the northern coast of Peloponnesus south of the Corinthian gulf, the traveler would pass into Achaia—a name which designated the narrow strip of level land, and the projecting spurs and declivities, between that gulf and the northernmost mountains of the peninsula, Skollis, Erymanthus, Aroania, Krathis, and the towering eminence called Kyllene. Achæan cities—twelve in number at least, if not more—divided this long strip of land among them, from the mouth of the Larissus and the north-western Cape Araxus on one side, to the western boundary of the Sikyonian territory on the other. According to the accounts of the ancient legends and the belief of Herodotus, this territory had been once occupied by Ionian inhabitants, whom the Achæans had expelled.

In making this journey the traveler would have finished the circuit of Peloponnesus; but he would still have left untrodden the great central region, inclosed between the territories just enumerated—approaching nearest to the sea on the borders of Triphylia, but never touching it anywhere. This region was Arcadia, possessed by inhabitants who are uniformly represented as all of one race, and all aboriginal. It was high and bleak, full of wild mountain, rock, and forest, and abounding, to a degree unusual even in Greece, with those land-locked basins from whence the water finds only a subterraneous issue. It was distributed among a large number of distinct villages and cities. Many of the village tribes, the Mænalii, Parrhasii, Azanes, etc., occupying the central and the western regions, were numbered among the rudest of the Greeks; but along its eastern frontier there were several Arcadian cities which ranked deservedly among the more civilized Peloponnesians. Tegea, Mantineia, Orchomenus, Stymphalus, Pheneus, possessed the whole eastern frontier of

Arcadia from the borders of Laconia to those of Sykion and Pellene in Achaia: Phigaleia at the south-western corner, near the borders of Triphylia, and Heræa on the north bank of the Alpheius, near the place where that river quits Arcadia to enter the Pisatis, were also towns deserving of notice. Toward the north of this cold and thinly-peopled region, near Pheneos, was situated the small town of Nonakris, adjoining to which rose the hardly accessible crags where the rivulet of Styx flowed down—a point of common feeling for all Arcadians, from the terrific sanction which this water was understood to impart to their oaths.

The distribution of Peloponnesus here sketched, suitable to the Persian invasion and the succeeding half century, may also be said (with some allowances) to be adapted to the whole interval between about B.C 550–370; from the time of the conquest of Thyreatis by Sparta to the battle of Leuktra. But it is not the earliest distribution which history presents to us. Not presuming to criticise the Homeric map of Peloponnesus, and going back only to 776 B.C., we find this material difference—that Sparta occupies only a very small fraction of the large territory above described as belonging to her. Westward of the summit of Mount Taygetus are found another section of Dorians, independent of Sparta—the Messenian Dorians, whose city is on the hill of Stenyklerus, near the south-western boundary of Arcadia, and whose possessions cover the fertile plain of Messene along the river Pamisus to its mouth in the Messenian gulf: it is to be noted that Messene was then the name of the plain generally, and that no town so called existed until after the battle of Leuktra. Again, eastward of the valley of the Eurotas, the mountainous region and the western shores of the Argolic gulf down to Cape Malea are also independent of Sparta; belonging to Argos, or rather to Dorian towns in union with Argos. All the great Dorian towns, from the borders of the Megarid to the eastern frontier of Arcadia, as above enumerated, appear to have existed in 776 B.C.; Achaia was in the same condition, so far as we are able to judge, as well as Arcadia, except in regard to its southern frontier conterminous with Sparta, of which more will hereafter be said. In respect to the western portion of Peloponnesus, Elis (properly so called) appears to have embraced the same territory in 776 B.C. as in 550 B.C.: but the Pisatid had been recently conquered, and was yet imperfectly subjected by the Eleians; while Triphylia seems to have been quite independent of them. Respecting the south-western promontory of Peloponnesus down to Cape Akritas, we are altogether without positive information; reasons will hereafter be given for believing that it did not at that time form part of the territory of Messenian Dorians.

Of the different races or people whom Herodotus knew in Peloponnesus, he believed three to be original—the Arcadians, the Achæans, and the Kynurians. The Achæans, though belonging indigenously to the peninsula, had yet removed from the southern portion of it to

the northern, expelling the previous Ionian tenants: this is a part of the legend respecting the Dorian conquest or return of the Herakleids, and we can neither verify nor contradict it. But neither the Arcadians not the Kynurians had ever changed their abodes. Of the latter I have not before spoken, because they were never (so far as history knows them) an independent population. They occupied the larger portion of the territory of Argolis, from the Orneæ, near the northern or Phliasian border, to Thyrea and the Thyreatis, on the Laconian border; and though belonging originally (as Herodotus imagines rather than asserts) to the Ionic race, they had been so long subjects of Argos in his time that almost all evidence of their ante-Dorian condition had vanished.

But the great Dorian states in Peloponnesus—the capital powers in the peninsula—were all originally immigrants according to the belief not only of Herodotus, but of all the Grecian world; so also were the Ætolians of Elis, the Triphylians, and the Dryopes at Hermione and Asine. All these immigrations are so described as to give them a root in the Grecian legendary world: the Triphylians are traced back to Lemnos, as the offspring of the Argonautic heroes, and we are too uniform about them to venture upon any historical guesses. But respecting the Dorians, it may perhaps be possible, by examining the first historical situation in which they are presented to us, to offer some conjectures as to the probable circumstances under which they arrived. The legendary narrative of it has already been given in the first chapter of this volume—that great mythical event called the Return of the Children of Herakles, by which the first establishment of the Dorians in the promised land of Peloponnesus was explained to the full satisfaction of Grecian faith. One single armament and expedition, acting by the special direction of the Dephian god, and conducted by three brothers, lineal descendants of the principal Achæo-Dorian hero through Hyllus (the eponymus of the principal tribe); the national heroes of the pre-existing population vanquished and expelled, and the greater part of the peninsula both acquired and partitioned at a stroke; the circumstances of the partition adjusted to the historical relations of Laconia and Messenia; the friendly power of Ætolian Elis, with its Olympic games as the bond of union in Peloponnesus, attached to this event as an appendage in the person of Oxylus—all these particulars compose a narrative well calculated to impress the retrospective imagination of a Greek. They exhibit an epical fitness and sufficiency which it would be unseasonable to impair by historical criticism.

The Alexandrine chronology sets down a period of 328 years from the return of the Herakleids to the first Olympiad (1104–776 B.C.), a period measured by the lists of the kings of Sparta, on the trustworthiness of which some remarks have already been offered. Of these 328 years, the first 250, at the least, are altogether barren of facts; and even if we admitted them to be historical, we should have

nothing to recount except a succession of royal names. Being unable either to guarantee the entire list, or to discover any valid test for discriminating the historical and the non-historical items, I here enumerate the Lacedæmonian kings as they appear in Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici. There were two joint kings at Sparta, throughout nearly all the historical time of independent Greece, deducing their descent from Herakles through Eurysthenes and Prokles, the twin sons of Aristodemus; the latter being one of those three Herakleid brothers to whom the conquest of the peninsula is ascribed:

SPARTAN KINGS.

Line of Eurysthenes.			*Line of Prokles.*		
Eurysthenes	reigned	42 years.	Prokles	reigned	51 years.
Agis	"	31 "	Sous	"	— "
Echestratus	"	35 "	Eurypon	"	— "
Labotas	"	37 "	Prytanis	"	49 "
Doryssus	"	29 "	Eunomus	"	45 "
Agesilaus	"	44 "	Charilaus	"	60 "
Archelaus	"	60 "	Nikander	"	38 "
Teleklus	"	40 "	Theopompus	"	10 "
Alkamenes	"	10 "			
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Both Theopompus and Alkamenes reigned considerably longer, but the chronologists affirm that the year 776 B.C. (or the first Olympiad) occurred in the tenth year of each of their reigns. It is necessary to add, with regard to this list, that there are some material discrepancies between different authors even as to the names of individual kings, and still more as to the duration of their reigns, as may be seen both in Mr. Clinton's chronology and in Müller's Appendix to the History of the Dorians. The alleged sum total cannot be made to agree with the items without great license of conjecture. O. Müller observes, in reference to this Alexandrine chronology, "that our materials only enable us to restore it to its original state, not to verify its correctness." In point of fact they are insufficient even for the former purpose, as the dissensions among learned critics attest.

We have a succession of names, still more barren of facts, in the case of the Dorian sovereigns of Corinth. This city had its own line of Herakleids, descended from Herakles, but not through Hyllus. Hippotes, the progenitor of the Corinthian Herakleids, was reported in the legend to have originally joined the Dorian invaders of the Peloponnesus, but to have quitted them in consequence of having slain the prophet Karnus. The three brothers, when they became masters of the peninsula, sent for Aletes, the son of Hippotes, and placed him in possession of Corinth, over which the chronologists make him begin to reign thirty years after the Herakleid conquest. His successors are thus given:

Aletes	reigned	38 years.
Ixion	"	38 "
Agelas	"	37 "
Prymnis	"	35 "
Bacchis	"	35 "
Agelas	"	30 "
Eudemus	"	25 "
Aristomedes	"	35 "
Agemon	"	16 "
Alexander	"	25 "
Telestes	"	12 "
Automenes	"	1 "
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Such was the celebrity of Bacchis, we are told, that those who succeeded him took the name of Bacchiads in place of Aletiads or Herakleids. One year after the accession of Automenes, the family of the Bacchiads generally, amounting to 200 persons, determined to abolish royalty, to constitute themselves a standing oligarchy, and to elect out of their own number an annual prytanis. Thus commenced the oligarchy of the Bacchiads, which lasted for ninety years, until it was subverted by Kypselus in 657 B.C. Reckoning the thirty years previous to the beginning of the reign of Aletes, the chronologists thus provide an interval of 447 years between the return of the Herakleids and the accession of Kypselus, and 357 years between the same period and the commencement of the Bacchiad oligarchy. The Bacchiad oligarchy is unquestionably historical; the conquest of the Herakleids belongs to the legendary world; while the interval between the two is filled up, as in so many other cases, by a mere barren genealogy.

When we jump this vacant space, and place ourselves at the first opening of history, we find that although ultimately Sparta came to hold the first place, not only in Peloponnesus, but in all Hellas, this was not the case at the earliest moment of which we have historical cognizance. Argos, and the neighboring towns connected with her by a bond of semi-religious, semi-political union—Sikyon, Phlius, Epidaurus, and Trœzen—were at first of greater power and consideration than Sparta; a fact which the legend of the Herakleids seems to recognize by making Temenus the eldest brother of the three. And Herodotus assures us that at one time all the eastern coast of Peloponnesus down to Cape Malea, including the island of Kythera, all which came afterward to constitute a material part of Laconia, had belonged to Argos. Down to the time of the first Messenian war, the comparative importance of the Dorian establishments in Peloponnesus appears to have been in the order in which the legend placed them—Argos first, Sparta second, Messene third. It will be seen hereafter that the Argeians never lost the recollection of this early pre-eminence, from which the growth of Sparta had extruded them; and the liberty of entire Hellas was more than once in danger from their disastrous jealousy of a more fortunate competitor.

At a short distance of about three miles from Argos, and at the exact point where that city approaches nearest to the sea, was situated the isolated hillock called Temenion, noticed both by Strabo and Pausanias. It was a small village deriving both its name and its celebrity from the chapel and tomb of the hero Temenus, who was there worshiped by the Dorians; and the statement which Pausanias heard was that Temenus with his invading Dorians had seized and fortified the spot, and employed it as an armed post to make war upon Tisamenus and the Achæans. What renders this report deserving of the greater attention is that the same thing is affirmed with regard to the eminence called Solygeius near Corinth: this too, was believed to be the place which the Dorian assailants had occupied and fortified against the pre-existing Corinthians in the city. Situated close upon the Saronic gulf, it was the spot which invaders landing from that gulf would naturally seize upon, and which Nikias with his powerful Athenian fleet did actually seize and occupy against Corinth in the Peloponnesian war. In early days the only way of overpowering the inhabitants of a fortified town, generally also planted in a position itself very defensible, was that the invaders, intrenching themselves in the neighborhood, harassed the inhabitants and ruined their produce until they brought them to terms. Even during the Peloponnesian war, when the art of besieging had made some progress, we read of several instances in which this mode of aggressive warfare was adopted with efficient results. We may readily believe that the Dorians obtained admittance both into Argos and Corinth in this manner And it is remarkable that, except Sikyon (which is affirmed to have been surprised by night), these were the only towns in the Argolic region which are said to have resisted them; the story being that Phlius, Epidaurus, and Trœzen had admitted the Dorian intruders without opposition, although a certain portion of the previous inhabitants seceded. We shall hereafter see that the non-Dorian population of Sikyon and Corinth still remained considerable.

The separate statements which we thus find, and the position of the Temenion and the Solygeius, lead to two conjectures—first, that the acquisitions of the Dorians in Peloponnesus were also isolated and gradual, not at all conformable to the rapid strides of the old Herakleid legend; next, that the Dorian invaders of Argos and Corinth made their attack from the Argolic and the Saronic gulfs by sea and not by land. It is indeed difficult to see how they can have got to the Temenion in any other way than by sea; and a glance at the map will show that the eminence Solygeius presents itself, with reference to Corinth, as the nearest and most convenient holding-ground for a maritime invader, conformably to the scheme of operations laid by Nikias. To illustrate the supposition of a Dorian attack by sea on Corinth, we may refer to a story quoted from Aristotle (which we find embodied in the explanation of an old adage) representing Hip-

potes, the father of Aletes, as having crossed the Maliac gulf (the sea immediately bordering on the ancient Malians, Dryopians, and Dorians) in ships for the purpose of colonizing. And if it be safe to trust the mention of Dorians in the Odyssey, as a part of the population of the island of Krete, we there have an example of Dorian settlements which must have been effected by sea, and that too at a very early period. "We must suppose," observes O. Müller, in reference to these Kretan Dorians, "that the Dorians pressed by want or restless from inactivity, constructed piratical canoes, manned these frail and narrow barks with soldiers who themselves worked at the oar, and thus being changed from mountaineers into seamen—the Normans of Greece—set sail for the distant island of Krete." In the same manner we may conceive the expeditions of the Dorians against Argos and Corinth to have been effected; and whatever difficulties may attach to this hypothesis, certain it is that the difficulties of a long land march, along such a territory as Greece, are still more serious.

The supposition of Dorian emigrations by sea from the Maliac gulf to the north-eastern promontory of Peloponnesus, is farther borne out by the analogy of the Dryopes or Dryopians. During the historical times, this people occupied several detached settlements in various parts of Greece, all maritime, and some insular: they were found at Hermione, Asine, and Eion, in the Argolic peninsula (very near to the important Dorian towns constituting the Amphiktyony of Argos); at Styra and Karystus in the island of Eubœa; in the island of Kythnus, and even at Cyprus. These dispersed colonies can only have been planted by expeditions over the sea. Now we are told that the original Dryopis, the native country of this people, comprehended both the territory near the river Spercheius, and north of Œta, afterward occupied by the Malians, as well as the neighboring district south of Œta, which was afterward called Doris. From hence the Dryopians were expelled—according to one story, by the Dorians; according to another, by Herakles and the Malians: however this may be, it was from the Maliac gulf that they started on shipboard in quest of new homes, which some of them found on the headlands of the Argolic peninsula. And it was from this very country, according to Herodotus, that the Dorians also set forth, in order to reach Peloponnesus. Nor does it seem unreasonable to imagine that the same means of conveyance which bore the Dryopians from the Maliac gulf to Hermione and Asine also carried the Dorians from the same place to the Temenion and the hill Solygeius.

The legend represents Sikyon, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Phlius, Kleonæ, as all occupied by Dorian colonists from Argos, under the different sons of Temenus: the first three are on the sea, and fit places for the occupation of maritime invaders. Argos and the Dorian towns in and near the Argolic peninsula are to be regarded as a cluster of settlements

by themselves, completely distinct from Sparta and the Messenian Stenyklerus, which appear to have been formed under totally different conditions. First, both of them are very far inland—Stenyklerus not easy, Sparta very difficult of access from the sea; next, we know that the conquests of Sparta were gradually made down the valley of the Eurotas seaward. Both these acquisitions present the appearance of having been made from the land side, and perhaps in the direction which the Herakleid legend describes—by warriors entering Peloponnesus across the narrow mouth of the Corinthian gulf through the aid or invitation of those Ætolian settlers who at the same time colonized Elis. The early and intimate connection (on which I shall touch presently) between Sparta and the Olympic games as administered by the Elians, as well as the leading part ascribed to Lykurgus in the constitution of the solemn Olympic truce, tend to strengthen such a persuasion.

How Sparta came constantly to gain upon Argos will be matter for future explanation; at present it is sufficient to remark that the ascendancy of Argos was derived not exclusively from her own territory, but came in part from her position as metropolis of an alliance of autonomous neighboring cities, all Dorian and all colonized from herself—and this was an element of power essentially fluctuating. What Thebes was to the cities of Bœotia, of which she either was, or professed to have been, the founder—the same was Argos in reference to Kleonæ, Phlius, Sikyon, Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Ægina. These towns formed, in mythical language, "the lot of Temenus," in real matter of fact the confederated allies or subordinates of Argos: the first four of them were said to have been *Dorized* by the sons or immediate relatives of Temenus, and the kings of Argos, as acknowledged descendants of the latter, claimed and exercised a sort of suzeraineté over them. Hermione, Asine, and Nauplia seem also to have been under the supremacy of Argos, though not colonies. But this supremacy was not claimed directly and nakedly: agreeably to the ideas of the time, the ostensible purposes of the Argeian confederacy or Amphiktyony were religious, though its secondary, and not less real effects, were political. The great patron-god of the league was Apollo Pythaeus, in whose name the obligations incumbent on the members of the league were imposed. While in each of the confederated cities there was a temple to this god, his most holy and central sanctuary was on the Larissa or acropolis of Argos. At this central Argeian sanctuary solemn sacrifices were offered by Epidaurus as well as by other members of the confederacy, and as it should seem, accompanied by money-payments—which the Argeians, as chief administrators on behalf of the common god, took upon them to enforce against defaulters, and actually tried to enforce during the Peloponnesian war against Epidaurus. On another occasion, during the 66th Olympiad (B.C. 514), they imposed the large fine of 500 talents upon each

of the two states Sikyon and Ægina, for having lent ships to the Spartan king Kleomenes wherewith he invaded the Argeian territory. The Æginetans set the claim at defiance, but the Sikyonians acknowledged its justice, and only demurred to its amount, professing themselves ready to pay 100 talents. There can be no doubt that at this later period the ascendency of Argos over the members of her primitive confederacy had become practically inoperative; but the tenor of the cases mentioned shows that her claims were revivals of bygone privileges, which had once been effective and valuable.

How valuable the privileges of Argos were, before the great rise of the Spartan power—how important an ascendancy they conferred in the hands of an energetic man, and how easily they admitted of being used in furtherance of ambitious views—is shown by the remarkable case of Pheidon the Temenid. The few facts which we learn respecting this prince exhibit to us, for the first time, something like a real position of parties in the Peloponnesus, wherein the actual conflict of living, historical men and cities comes out in tolerable distinctness.

Pheidon was designated by Ephorus as the tenth, and by Theopompus as the sixth in lineal descent from Temenus. Respecting the date of his existence, opinions the most discrepant and irreconcilable have been delivered: but there seems good reason for referring him to the period a little before and a little after the 8th Olympiad—between 770 B.C. and 730 B.C. Of the preceding kings of Argos we hear little; one of them, Eratus, is said to have expelled the Dryopian inhabitants of Asine from their town on the Argolic peninsula, in consequence of their having co-operated with the Spartan king Nikander when he invaded the Argeian territory, seemingly during the generation preceding Pheidon; there is another, Damokratidas, whose date cannot be positively determined, but he appears rather as subsequent than as anterior to Pheidon. We are informed, however, that these anterior kings, even beginning with Medon, the grandson of Temenus, had been forced to submit to great abridgment of their power and privileges, and that a form of government substantially popular, though nominally regal, had been established. Pheidon, breaking through the limits imposed, made himself despot of Argos. He then re-established the power of Argos over all the cities of her confederacy, which had before been so nearly dissolved as to leave all the members practically independent. Next, he is said to have acquired dominion over Corinth, and to have endeavored to assure it by treacherously entrapping 1000 of her warlike citizens; but his artifice was divulged and frustrated by Abron, one of his confidential friends. He is farther reported to have aimed at extending his sway over the greater part of Peloponnesus — laying claim, as the descendant of Herakles through the eldest son of Hyllus, to all the cities which that restless and irresistible hero had ever taken. According to Grecian

ideas, this legendary title was always seriously construed and often admitted as conclusive; though of course, where there were strong opposing interests, reasons would be found to elude it. Pheidon would have the same ground of right as that which, 250 years afterward, determined the Herakleid Dorieus, brother of Kleomenes, king of Sparta, to acquire for himself the territory near Mount Eryx in Sicily, because his progenitor Herakles had conquered it before him. So numerous, however, were the legends respecting the conquests of Herakles, that the claim of Pheidon must have covered the greater part of Peloponnesus, except Sparta and the plain of Messene, which were already in the hands of Herakleids.

Nor was the ambition of Pheidon satisfied even with these large pretensions. He farther claimed the right of presiding at the celebration of those religious games or Agones which had been instituted by Herakles—and among these was numbered the Olympic Agon, then, however, enjoying but a slender fraction of the luster which afterward came to attach to it. The presidency of any of the more celebrated festivals current throughout Greece was a privilege immensely prized. It was at once dignified and lucrative, and the course of our history will present more than one example in which blood was shed to determine what state should enjoy it. Pheidon marched to Olympia, at the epoch of the 8th recorded Olympiad, or 747 B.C.; on the occasion of which event we are made acquainted with the real state of parties in the peninsula.

The plain of Olympia—now ennobled only by immortal recollections, but once crowded with all the decorations of religion and art, and forming for many centuries the brightest center of attraction known in the ancient world—was situated on the river Alpheius in the territory called the Pisatid, hard by the borders of Arcadia. At what time its agonistic festival, recurring every fourth year at the first full moon after the summer solstice, first began or first acquired its character of special sanctity, we have no means of determining. As with so many of the native waters of Greece—we follow the stream upward to a certain point, but the fountain-head and the earlier flow of history are buried under mountains of unsearchable legend. The first celebration of the Olympic contests was ascribed by Grecian legendary faith to Herakles—and the site of the place, in the middle of the Pisatid with its eight small townships, is quite sufficient to prove that the inhabitants of that little territory were warranted in describing themselves as the original administrators of the ceremony. But this state of things seems to have been altered by the Ætolian settlement in Elis, which is represented as having been conducted by Oxylus and identified with the return of the Herakleids. The Ætolo-Eleians, bordering upon the Pisatid to the north, employed their superior power in subduing their weaker neighbors, who thus lost their autonomy and became annexed to the territory of Elis. It was the general rule throughout Greece that a

victorious state undertook to perform the current services of the conquered people toward the gods—such services being conceived as attaching to the soil. Hence the celebration of the Olympic games became numbered among the incumbencies of Elis, just in the same way as the worship of the Eleusinian Demeter, when Eleusis lost its autonomy, was included among the religious obligations of Athens. The Pisatans, however, never willingly acquiesced in this absorbtion of what had once been their separate privilege. They long maintained their conviction that the celebration of the games was their right, and strove on several occasions to regain it. Of those occasions the earliest, so far as we hear, was connected with the intervention of Pheidon. It was at their invitation that the king of Argos went to Olympia and celebrated the games himself, in conjunction with the Pisatans, as the lineal successor of Herakles; while the Elians, being thus forcibly dispossessed, refused to include the 8th Olympiad in their register of the victorious runners. But their humiliation did not last long, for the Spartans took their part, and the contest ended in the defeat of Pheidon. In the next Olympiad, the Elican management and the regular enrollment appear as before. The Spartans are even said to have confirmed Elis in her possession both of Pisatis and Triphylia.

Unfortunately these scanty particulars are all which we learn respecting the armed conflict at the 8th Olympiad, in which the religious and the political grounds of quarrel are so intimately blended —as we shall find to be often the case in Grecian history. But there is one act of Pheidon yet more memorable, of which also nothing beyond a meager notice has come down to us. He first coined both copper and silver money in Ægina, and first established a scale of weights and measures, which through his influence became adopted throughout Peloponnesus, and acquired ultimately footing both in all the Dorian states, and in Bœotia, Thessaly, northern Hellas generally, and Macedonia—under the name of the Æginæan scale. There arose subsequently another rival scale in Greece, called the Euboic, differing considerably from the Æginæan. We do not know at what time the Euboic came in, but it was employed both at Athens and in the Ionic cities generally, as well as in Eubœa—being modified at Athens, so far as money was concerned, by Solon's debasement of the coinage.

The copious and valuable information contained in M. Boeckh's recent publication on metrology has thrown new light upon these monetary and statical scales. He has shown that both the Æginæan and the Euboic scales—the former standing to the latter in the proportion of 6 to 5—had contemporaneous currency in different parts of the Persian empire; the divisions and denominations of the scale being the same in both—100 drachmæ to a mina, and sixty minæ to a talent. The Babylonian talent, mina, and drachma are identical with the Æginæan; the word mina is of Asiatic origin; and it has now been rendered highly probable that the scale circulated by Pheidon was borrowed immediately from the Phœnicians, and by them originally from the Babylonians. The Babylonian, Hebraic, Phœnician, Egyptian, and Grecian scales of weight (which were subsequently followed wherever coined money was introduced) are found to be so nearly comformable as to warrant a belief that they are all deduced from one common origin, and that origin the Chaldean priesthood of Babylon. It is to Pheidon, and to his position as chief of the Argeian confederacy, that the Greeks owe the first introduction of the Babylonian scale of weight, and the first employment of coined and stamped money.

If we maturely weigh the few but striking acts of Pheidon which have been preserved to us, and which there is no reason to discredit, we shall find ourselves introduced to an early historical state of Peloponnesus very different from that to which another century will bring us. That Argos, with the federative cities attached to her, was at this early time decidedly the commanding power in that peninsula, is sufficiently shown by the establishment and reception of the Pheidonian weights, measures, and monetary system—while the other incidents mentioned completely harmonize with the same idea. Against the oppression of Elis, the Pisatans invoked Pheidon —partly as exercising a primacy in Peloponnesus, just as the inhabitants of Lepreum in Triphylia, three centuries afterward, called in the aid of Sparta for the same object, at a time when Sparta possessed the headship—and partly as the lineal representative of Herakles, who had founded those games from the management of which they had been unjustly extruded. On the other hand, Sparta appears as a second-rate power. The Æginæan scale of weight and measure was adopted there as elsewhere—the Messenian Dorians were still equal and independent—and we find Sparta interfering to assist Elis by virtue of an obligation growing (so the legend represents it) out of the common Ætolo-Dorian immigration; not at all from any acknowledged primacy, such as we shall see her enjoying hereafter. The first coinage of copper and silver money is a capital event in Grecian history, and must be held to imply considerable commerce as well as those extensive views which belong only to a conspicuous and leading position. The ambition of Pheidon to resume all the acquisitions made by his ancestor Herakles suggests the same large estimate of his actual power. He is characterized as a despot, and even as the most insolent of all despots: how far he deserved such a reputation we have no means of judging. We may remark, however, that he lived before the age of despots or tyrants, properly so called, and before the Herakleid lineage had yet lost its primary half-political, half-religious character. Moreover, the later historians have invested his actions with a color of exorbitant aggression, by applying them to a state of things which belonged to their time, and not to his. Thus Ephorus represents him as having deprived the

Lacedæmonians of the headship of Peloponnesus, which they never possessed until long after him—and also as setting at nought the sworn inviolability of the territory of the Eleians, enjoyed by the latter as celebrators of the Olympic games; whereas the Agonothesia, or right of superintendence claimed by Elis, had not at that time acquired the sanction of prescription—while the conquest of Pisa by the Eleians themselves had proved that this sacred function did not protect the territory of a weaker people.

How Pheidon fell, and how the Argeians lost that supremacy which they once evidently possessed, we have no positive details to inform us; with respect to the latter points, however, we can discern a sufficient explanation. The Argeians stood predominant as an entire and unanimous confederacy, which required a vigorous and able hand to render its internal organization effective or its ascendency respected without. No such leader afterward appeared at Argos, the whole history of which city is destitute of eminent individuals: her line of kings continued at least down to the Persian war, but seemingly with only titular functions, for the government had long been decidedly popular. The statements which represent the government as popular anterior to the time of Pheidon appear unworthy of trust. That prince is rather to be taken as wielding the old, undiminished prerogatives of the Herakleid kings, but wielding them with unusual effect—enforcing relaxed privileges, and appealing to the old heroic sentiment in reference to Herakles, rather than revolutionizing the existing relations either of Argos or of Peloponnesus. It was, in fact, the great and steady growth of Sparta, for three centuries after the Lykurgean institutions, which operated as a cause of subversion to the previous order of command and obedience in Greece.

The assertion made by Herodotus—that in earlier times the whole eastern coast of Laconia, as far as Cape Malea, including the island of Kythera and several other islands, had belonged to Argos—is referred by O. Müller to about the 50th Olympiad, or 580 B.C. Perhaps it had ceased to be true at that period; but that it was true in the age of Pheidon, there seem good grounds for believing. What is probably meant is that the Dorian towns on this coast, Prasiæ, Zarex, Epidaurus Limera, and Bœæ, were once autonomous, and members of the Argeian confederacy; a fact highly probable, on independent evidence, with respect to Epidaurus Limera, inasmuch as that town was a settlement from Epidaurus in the Argolic peninsula: and Bœæ, too, had its own œkist and eponymus, the Herakleid Bœus, no way connected with Sparta—perhaps derived from the same source as the name of the town Bœon in Doris. The Argeian confederated towns would thus comprehend the whole coast of the Argolic and Saronic gulfs, from Kythera as far as Ægina, besides other islands which we do not know: Ægina had received a colony of Dorians from Argos and Epidaurus, upon which latter town it

continued for some time in a state of dependence. It will at once be seen that this extent of coast implies a considerable degree of commerce and maritime activity. We have besides to consider the range of Doric colonies in the southern islands of the Ægean and in the south-western corner of Asia Minor—Krete, Kos, Rhodes (with its three distinct cities), Halikarnassus, Knidus, Myndus, Nisyrus, Syme, Karpathus, Kalydna, etc. Of the Doric establishments here named, several are connected (as has been before stated) with the great emigration of the Temenid Althæmenes from Argos: but what we particularly observe is that they are often referred as colonies promiscuously to Argos, Trœzen, Epidaurus—more frequently, however, as it seems, to Argos. All these settlements are doubtless older than Pheidon, and we may conceive them as proceeding conjointly from the allied Dorian towns in the Argolic peninsula, at a time when they were more in the habit of united action than they afterward became: a captain of emigrants selected from the line of Herakles and Temenus was suitable to the feelings of all of them. We may thus look back to a period, at the very beginning of the Olympiads, when the maritime Dorians on the east of Peloponnesus maintained a considerable intercourse and commerce not only among themselves, but also with their settlements on the Asiastic coast and islands. That the Argolic peninsula formed an early center for maritime rendezvous, we may farther infer from the very ancient Amphiktyony of the seven cities (Hermione, Epidaurus, Ægina, Athens, Prasiæ, Nauplia, and the Minyeian Orchomenus), on the holy island of Kalauria, off the harbor of Trœzen.

The view here given of the early ascendency of Argos, as the head of the Peloponnesian Dorians and the metropolis of the Asiatic Dorians, enables us to understand the capital innovation of Pheidon—the first coinage, and the first determinate scale of weight and measure known in Greece. Of the value of such improvements, in the history of Grecian civilization, it is superfluous to speak, especially when we recollect that the Hellenic states, having no political unity, were only held together by the aggregate of spontaneous uniformities, in language, religion, sympathies, recreations, and general habits. We see both how Pheidon came to contract the wish, and how he acquired the power, to introduce throughout so much of the Grecian world a uniform scale. We also see that the Asiatic Dorians form the link between him and Phœnicia, from whence the scale was derived, just as the Euboic scale came, in all probability, through the Ionic cities in Asia, from Lydia. It is asserted by Ephorus, and admitted even by the ablest modern critics, that Pheidon first coined money "in Ægina:" other authors (erroneously believing that his scale was the Euboic scale) alleged that his coinage had been carried on "in a place of Argos called Eubœa." Now both these statements appear highly improbable, and both are traceable to the same mistake—of supposing that the title, by which the scale had come to be

commonly known must necessarily be derived from the place in which the coinage had been struck. There is every reason to conclude that what Pheidon did was done in Argos, and nowhere else: his coinage and scale were the earliest known in Greece, and seem to have been known by his own name, "the Pheidonian measures," under which designation they were described by Aristotle in his account of the constitution of Argos. They probably did not come to bear the specific epithet of *Æginæan* until there was another scale in vogue, the *Euboic*, from which to distinguish them; and both the epithets were probably derived, not from the place where the scale first originated but from the people whose commercial activity tended to make them most generally known—in the one case, the Æginetans; in the other case the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria. I think, therefore, that we are to look upon the Pheidonian measures as emanating from Argos, and as having no greater connection, originally, with Ægina than with any other city dependent upon Argos.

There is, moreover, another point which deserves notice. What was known by the name of the Æginæan scale, as contrasted with and standing in a definite ratio (6 to 5) with the Euboic scale, related only to weight and money, so far as our knowledge extends: we have no evidence to show that the same ratio extended either to measures of length or measures of capacity. But there seems ground for believing that the Pheidonian regulations, taken in their full comprehension, embraced measures of capacity as well as weights: Pheidon, at the same time when he determined the talent, mina, and drachm, seems also to have fixed the dry and liquid measures—the medimnus and metretes, with their parts and multiples: and there existed Pheidonian measures of capacity, though not of length, so far as we know. The Æginæan scale may thus have comprised only a portion of what was established by Pheidon, namely that which related to weight and money.

CHAPTER V.

ÆTOLO-DORIAN IMMIGRATION INTO PELOPONNESUS—ELIS, LACONIA, AND MESSENIA.

It has already been stated that the territory properly called Elis, apart from the enlargement which it acquired by conquest, included the westernmost land in Peloponnesus, south of Achaia, and west of Mount Pholoe and Olenus in Arcadia—but not extending so far southward as the river Alpheius, the course of which lay along the southern portion of Pisatis and on the borders of Triphylia. This

territory, which appears in the Odyssey as "the divine Elis, where the Epeians hold sway," is in the historical times occupied by a population of Ætolian origin. The connection of race between the historical Eleians and the historical Ætolians was recognized by both parties, nor is there any ground for disputing it.

That Ætolian invaders or immigrants into Elis would cross from Naupaktus or some neighboring point in the Corinthian gulf, is in the natural course of things—and such is the course which Oxylus, the conductor of the invasion, is represented by the Herakleid legend as taking. That legend (as has been already recounted) introduces Oxylus as the guide of the three Herakleid brothers—Temenus, Kresphontes, and Aristodemus—and as stipulating with them that in the new distribution about to take place of Peloponnesus, he shall be allowed to possess the Eleian territory, coupled with many holy privileges as to the celebration of the Olympic games.

In the preceding chapter I have endeavored to show that the settlements of the Dorians in and near the Argolic peninsula, so far as the probabilities of the case enable us to judge, were not accomplished by any inroad in this direction. But the localities occupied by the Dorians of Sparta, and by the Dorians of Stenyklerus in the territory called Messene, lead us to a different conclusion. The easiest and most natural road through which immigrants could reach either of these two spots is through the Eleian and the Pisatid country. Colonel Leake observes that the direct road from the Eleian territory to Sparta, ascending the valley of the Alpheius near Olympia to the sources of its branch the Theius, and from thence descending the Eurotas, affords the only easy march toward that very inaccessible city and both ancients and moderns have remarked the vicinity of the source of the Alpheius to that of the Eurotas. The situation of Stenyklerus and Andania, the original settlements of the Messenian Dorians, adjoining closely the Arcadian Parrhasii, is only at a short distance from the course of the Alpheius; being thus reached most easily by the same route. Dismissing the idea of a great collective Dorian armament, powerful enough to grasp at once the entire peninsula—we may conceive two moderate detachments of hardy mountaineers from the cold regions in and near Doris, attaching themselves to the Ætolians their neighbors, who were proceeding to the invasion of Elis. After having aided the Ætolians both to occupy Elis and to subdue the Pisatid, these Dorians advanced up the valley of the Alpheius in quest of settlements for themselves. One of these bodies ripens into the stately, stubborn, and victorious Spartans; the other into the short-lived, trampled, and struggling Messenians.

Amid the darkness which overclouds these original settlements, we seem to discern something like special causes to determine both of them. With respect to the Spartan Dorians, we are told that a person named Philonomus betrayed Sparta to them, persuading the

sovereign in possession to retire with his people into the habitations of the Ionians in the north of the peninsula—and that he received as a recompense for this acceptable service Amyklæ with the district around it. It is farther stated—and this important fact there seems no reason to doubt—that Amyklæ, though only twenty stadia, or two miles and a half, distant from Sparta, retained both its independence and its Achæan inhabitants long after the Dorian immigrants had acquired possession of the latter place, and was only taken by them under the reign of Teleklus, one generation before the first Olympiad. Without presuming to fill up by conjecture incurable gaps in the statements of our authorities, we may from hence reasonably presume that the Dorians were induced to invade, and enabled to acquire, Sparta by the invitation and assistance of a party in the interior of the country. Again, with respect to the Messenian Dorians, a different, but not less effectual temptation was presented by the alliance of the Arcadians in the south-western portion of that central region of Peloponnesus. Kresphontes, the Herakleid leader, it is said, espoused the daughter of the Arcadian king Kypselus, which procured for him the support of a powerful section of Arcadia. His settlement at Stenyklerus was a considerable distance from the sea, at the north-east corner of Messenia, close to the Arcadian frontier; and it will be seen hereafter that this Arcadian alliance is a constant and material element in the disputes of the Messenian Dorians with Sparta.

We may thus trace a reasonable sequence of events, showing how two bodies of Dorians, having first assisted the Ætolo-Eleians to conquer the Pisatid, and thus finding themselves on the banks of the Alpheius, followed the upward course of that river, the one to settle at Sparta, the other at Stenyklerus. The historian Ephorus, from whom our scanty fragments of information respecting these early settlements are derived—it is important to note that he lived in the age immediately succeeding the first foundation of Messene as a city, the restitution of the long-exiled Messenians, and the amputation of the fertile western half of Laconia for their benefit, by Epameinondas—imparts to these proceedings an immediate decisiveness of effect which does not properly belong to them; as if the Spartans had become at once possessed of all Laconia, and the Messenians of all Messenia; Pausanias, too, speaks as if the Arcadians collectively had assisted and allied themselves with Kresphontes. This is the general spirit which pervades his account, though the particular facts, in so far as we find any such, do not always harmonize with it. Now we are ignorant of the pre-existing divisions of the country, either east or west of Mount Taygetus, at the time when the Dorians invaded it. But to treat the one and the other as integral kingdoms, handed over at once to two Dorian leaders, is an illusion borrowed from the old legend, from the historicizing fancies of Ephorus, and from the fact that in the well-known

times this whole territory came to be really united under the Spartan power.

At what date the Dorian settlements at Sparta and Stenyklerus were effected we have no means of determining. Yet that there existed between them in the earliest times a degree of fraternity which did not prevail between Lacedæmon and Argos, we may fairly presume from the common temple, with joint religious sacrifices, of Artemis Limnatis (or Artemis on the Marsh) erected on the confines of Messenia and Laconia. Our first view of the two, at all approaching to distinctness, seems to date from a period about half a century earlier than the first Olympiad (776 B.C.)—about the reign of king Teleklus of the Eurystheneidor Agid line, and the introduction of the Lykurgean discipline. Teleklus stands in the list as the eighth king dating from Eurysthenes. But how many of the seven kings before him are to be considered as real persons—or how much, out of the brief warlike expeditions ascribed to them, is to be treated as authentic history—I pretend not to define.

The earliest determinable event in the *internal* history of Sparta is the introduction of the Lykurgean discipline; the earliest *external* events are the conquest of Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ, effected by king Teleklus, and the first quarrel with the Messenians, in which that prince was slain. When we come to see how deplorably great was the confusion and ignorance which reigned with reference to a matter so pre-eminently important as Lykurgus and his legislation, we shall not be inclined to think that facts much less important, and belonging to an earlier epoch, can have been handed down upon any good authority. And in like manner, when we learn that Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ (all south of Sparta, and the first only two and a half miles distant from that city) were independent of the Spartans until the reign of Teleklus, we shall require some decisive testimony before we can believe that a community, so small and so hemmed in as Sparta must then have been, had in earlier times undertaken expeditions against Helos on the sea-coast, against Kleitor on the extreme northern side of Arcadia, against the Kynurians, or against the Argeians. If Helos and Kynuria were conquered by these early kings, it appears that they had to be conquered a second time by kings succeeding Teleklus. It would be more natural that we should hear when and how they conquered the places nearer to them—Sellasia, or Belemina, the valley of the Œnus or the upper valley of the Eurotas. But these seem to be assumed as matters of course; the proceedings ascribed to the early Spartan kings are such only as might beseem the palmy days when Sparta was undisputed mistress of all Laconia.

The succession of Messenian kings, beginning with Kresphontes, the Herakleid brother, and continuing from father to son—Æpytus, Glaukus, Isthmius, Dotadas, Subotas, Phintas, the last being contemporary with Teleklus—is still less marked by incident than that

of the early Spartan kings. It is said that the reign of Kresphontes was troubled, and himself ultimately slain, by mutinies among his subjects; Æpytus, then a youth, having escaped into Arcadia, was afterward restored to the throne by the Arcadians, Spartans, and Argeians. From Æpytus the Messenian line of kings are stated to have been denominated Æpytids in preference to Herakleids—which affords another proof of their intimate connection with the Arcadians, since Æpytus was a very ancient name in Arcadian heroic antiquity.

There is considerable resemblance between the alleged behavior of Kresphontes on first settling at Stenyklerus, and that of Eurysthenes and Prokles at Sparta—so far as we gather from statements, alike meager and uncertified, resting on the authority of Ephorus. Both are said to have tried to place the pre-existing inhabitants of the country on a level with their own Dorian bands; both provoked discontents and incurred obloquy, with their contemporaries as well as with posterity, by the attempt; nor did either permanently succeed. Krosphontes was forced to concentrate all his Dorians in Stenyklerus, while, after all the discontents ended in his violent death. And Agis, the son of Eurysthenes, is said to have reversed all the liberal tentatives of his father, so as to bring the whole of Laconia into subjection and dependence on the Dorians at Sparta, with the single exception of Amyklæ. So odious to the Spartan Dorians was the conduct of Eurysthenes that they refused to aknowledge him as their œkist, and conferred that honor upon Agis; the two lines of kings being called Agiads and Eurypontids, instead of Eurysthenеids and Prokleids. We see in these statements the same tone of mind as that which pervades the Panathenaic oration of Isokrates, the master of Ephorus—the facts of an unknown period so colored as to suit an ideal of haughty Dorian exclusiveness.

Again, as Eurysthenes and Prokles appear, in the picture of Ephorus, to carry their authority at once over the whole of Laconia, so too does Kresphontes over the whole of Messenia—over the entire south-western region of Peloponnesus, westward of Mount Taygetus and Cape Tænarus, and southward of the river Neda. He sends an envoy to Pylus and Rhium, the western and southern portions of the south-western promontory of Peloponnesus, treating the entire territory as if it were one sovereignty, and inviting the inhabitants to submit under equal laws. But it has already been observed that this supposed oneness and indivisibility is not less uncertified in regard to Messenia than in regard to Laconia. How large a proportion of the former territory these kings of Stenyklerus may have ruled, we have no means of determining, but there were certainly portions of it which they did not rule—not merely during the reign of Teleklus at Sparta, but still later, during the first Messenian war. For not only we are informed that Teleklus established three townships, Poieessa, Echeiæ, and Tragium, near the Messenian gulf and on the

course of the river Nedon, but we read also a farther matter of evidence in the roll of Olympic victors. Every competitor for the prize at one of these great festivals was always entered as member of some autonomous Hellenic community, which constituted his title to approach the lists: if successful, he was proclaimed with the name of the community to which he belonged. Now, during the first ten Olympiads seven winners are proclaimed as Messenians; in the eleventh Olympiad we find the name of Oxythemis, Koronæus—Oxythemis, not of Koroneia in Bœotia, but of Korone in the western bend of the Messenian gulf, some miles on the right bank of the Pamisus, and a considerable distance to the north of the modern Coron. Now, if Korone had then been comprehended in Messenia, Oxythemis would have been proclaimed as a Messenian, like the seven winners who preceded him; and the fact of his being proclaimed as a Koronæan proves that Korone was then an independent community, not under the dominion of the Dorians of Stenyklerus. It seems clear, therefore, that the latter did not reign over the whole territory commonly known as Messenia, though we are unable to assign the proportion of it which they actually possessed.

The Olympic festival, in its origin doubtless a privilege of the neighboring Pisatans, seems to have derived its great and gradually expanding importance from the Ætolo-Eleian settlement in Peloponnesus, combined with the Dorians of Laconia and Messenia. Lykurgus of Sparta and Iphitus of Elis are alleged to have joined their efforts for the purpose of establishing both the sanctity of the Olympic truce and the inviolability of the Eleian territory. Hence, though this tale is not to be construed as matter of fact, we may see that the Lacedæmonians regarded the Olympic games as a portion of their own antiquities. Moreover, it is certain both that the dignity of the festival increased simultaneously with their ascendency, and that their peculiar fashions were very early introduced into the practice of the Olympic competitors. Probably the three bands of co-operating invaders, Ætolians and Spartan and Messenian Dorians, may have adopted this festival as a periodical renovation of mutual union and fraternity; from which cause the games became an attractive center for the western portion of Peloponnesus, before they were much frequented by people from the eastern, or still more from extra-Peloponnesian Hellas. For it cannot be altogether accidental, when we read the names of the first twelve proclaimed Olympic victors (occupying nearly half a century from 776 B.C. downward), to find that seven of them are Messenians, three Eleians, one from Dyme in Achaia, and one from Korone; while after the twelfth Olympiad, Corinthians and Megarians and Epidaurians begin to occur, later still, extra-Peloponnesian victors. We may reasonably infer from hence that the Olympic ceremonies were at this early period chiefly frequented by visitors and competitors from the western regions of Peloponnesus, and that the affluence to them from the more distant

parts of the Hellenic world did not become considerable until the first Messenian war had closed.

Having thus set forth the conjectures, to which our very scanty knowledge points, respecting the first establishment of the Ætolian and Dorian settlements in Elis, Laconia, and Messenia, connected as they are with the steadily-increasing dignity and frequentation of the Olympic festival, I proceed in the next chapter to that memorable circumstance which both determined the character and brought about the political ascendency, of the Spartans separately—I mean the laws and discipline of Lykurgus.

Of the pre-existing inhabitants of Laconia and Messenia, whom we are accustomed to call Achæans and Pylians, so little is known, that we cannot at all measure the difference between them and their Dorian invaders, either in dialect, in habits, or in intelligence. There appear no traces of any difference of dialect among the various parts of the population of Laconia; the Messenian allies of Athens, in the Peloponnesian war, speak the same dialect as the Helots, and the same also as the Ambrakiotic colonists from Corinth—all Doric. Nor are we to suppose that the Doric dialect was at all peculiar to the people called Dorians. As far as can be made out by the evidence of inscriptions, it seems to have been the dialect of the Phokians, Delphians, Lokrians, Ætolians, and Achæans of Phthiotis: with respect to the latter, the inscriptions of Thaumaki in Achæa Phthiotis afford a proof the more curious and the more cogent of native dialect, because the Phthiots were both immediate neighbors and subjects of the Thessalians, who spoke a variety of the Æolic. So too, within Peloponnesus, we find evidences of Doric dialect among the Achæans in the north of Peloponnesus—the Dryopic inhabitants of Hermione—and the Eleuthero-Lacones, or Laconian townships (compounded of Perioeki and Helots), emancipated by the Romans in the second century B.C. Concerning the speech of that population whom the invading Dorians found in Laconia, we have no means of judging; the presumption would rather be that it did not differ materially from the Doric. Thucydides designates the Corinthians, whom the invading Dorians attacked from th hill Solygeius, as being Æolians, and Strabo speaks both of the Achæans as an Æolic nation and of the Æolic dialect as having been originally preponderant in Peloponnesus. But we do not readily see what means of information either of these authors possessed respecting the speech of a time which must have been four centuries anterior even to Thucydides.

Of that which is called the Æolic dialect there are three marked and distinguishable varieties—the Lesbian, the Thessalian, and the Bœotian; the Thessalian forming a mean term between the other two. Ahrens has shown that the ancient grammatical critics are accustomed to affirm peculiarities, as belonging to the Æolic dialect generally, which in truth belong only to the Lesbian variety of it, or

to the poems of Alkæus and Sappho, which these critics attentively studied. Lesbian, Æolic, Thessalian Æolic, and Bœotian Æolic, are all different; and if, abstracting from these differences, we confine our attention to that which is common to all three, we shall find little to distinguish this abstract Æolic from the abstract Doric, or that which is common to the many varieties of the Doric dialect. These two are sisters, presenting both of them more or less the Latin side of the Greek language, while the relationship of either of them to the Attic and Ionic is more distant. Now it seems that (putting aside Attica) the speech of all Greece, from Perrhæbia and Mount Olympus to Cape Malea and Cape Akritas, consisted of different varieties either of the Doric or of the Æolic dialect; this being true (as far as we are able to judge) not less of the aboriginal Arcadians than of the rest. The Laconian dialect contained more specialties of its own, and approached nearer to the Æolic, and to the Eleian, than any other variety of the Dorian: it stands at the extreme of what has been classified as the strict Dorian—that is, the farthest removed from Ionic and Attic. The Kretan towns manifest also a strict Dorism; as well as the Lacedæmonian colony of Tarentum, and seemingly most of the Italiotic Greeks, though some of them are called Achæan colonies. Most of the other varieties of the Doric dialect (Phokian, Lokrian, Delphian, Achæan of Phthiotis) exhibit a form departing less widely from the Ionic and Attic: Argos and the towns in the Argolic peninsula seem to form a stepping-stone between the two.

These positions represent all our scanty information respecting those varieties of Grecian speech which are not known to us by written works. The little presumption which can be raised upon them favors the belief that the Dorian invaders of Laconia and Messenia found there a dialect little different from that which they brought with them—a conclusion which it is the more necessary to state distinctly, since the work of O. Müller has caused an exaggerated estimate to be formed of the distinctive peculiarities whereby Dorism was parted off from the rest of Hellas.

CHAPTER VI.

LAWS AND DISCIPLINE OF LYKURGUS AT SPARTA.

PLUTARCH begins his biography of Lykurgus with the following ominous words:

"Concerning the lawgiver Lykurgus we can assert absolutely nothing which is not controverted: there are different stories in respect to his birth, his travels, his death, and also his mode of proceeding, political as well as legislative: least of all is the time in which he lived agreed upon."

And this exordium is but too well borne out by the unsatisfactory nature of the accounts which we read, not only in Plutarch himself, but in those other authors out of whom we are obliged to make up our idea of the memorable Lykurgean system. If we examine the sources from which Plutarch's life of Lykurgus is deduced, it will appear that—excepting the poets Alkman, Tyrtæus, and Simonides, from whom he has borrowed less than we could have wished—he has no authorities older than Xenophon and Plato: Aristotle is cited several times, and is unquestionably the best of his witnesses, but the greater number of them belong to the century subsequent to that philosopher. Neither Herodotus nor Ephorus is named, though the former furnishes some brief but interesting particulars—and the latter also (as far as we can judge from the fragments remaining) entered at large into the proceedings of the Spartan lawgiver.

Lykurgus is described by Herodotus as uncle and guardian to king Labotas, of the Eurysthenêid or Agid line of Spartan kings; and this would place him, according to the received chronology, about 220 years before the first recorded Olympiad (about B.C. 996). All the other accounts, on the contrary, seem to represent him as a younger brother, belonging to the other or Prokleid line of Spartan kings, though they do not perfectly agree respecting his parentage. While Simonides stated him to be the son of Prytanis, Dientychidas described him as grandson of Prytanis, son of Eunomus, brother of Polydektes, and uncle as well as guardian to Charilaus—thus making him eleventh in descent from Herakles. This latter account was adopted by Aristotle, coinciding, according to the received chronology, with the date of Iphitus the Eleian, and the first celebration of the Olympic games by Lykurgus and Iphitus conjointly, which Aristotle accepted as a fact. Lykurgus, on the hypothesis here mentioned, would stand about B.C. 880, a century before the recorded Olympiads. Eratosthenes and Apollodorus placed him "not a few years earlier than the first Olympiad." If they meant hereby the epoch commonly assigned as the Olympiad of Iphitus, their date would coincide pretty nearly with that of Herodotus; if, on the other hand, they meant the first recorded Olympiad (B.C. 776), they would be found not much removed from the opinion of Aristotle. An unequivocal proof of the inextricable confusion in ancient times respecting the epoch of the great Spartan lawgiver is indirectly afforded by Timæus, who supposed that there had existed two persons named Lykurgus, and that the acts of both had been ascribed to one. It is plain from hence that there was no certainty attainable, even in the third century before the Christain era, respecting the date or parentage of Lykurgus.

Thucydides, without mentioning the name of Lykurgus, informs us that it was "400 years and somewhat more" anterior to the close of the Peloponnesian war, when the Spartans emerged from their previous state of desperate internal disorder, and entered upon "their present polity." We may fairly presume that this alludes to the Lykurgean

discipline and constitution, which Thucydides must thus have conceived as introduced about B.C. 830–820—coinciding with something near the commencement of the reign of king Teleklus. In so far as it is possible to form an opinion, amid evidence at once so scanty and so discordant, I incline to adopt the opinion of Thucydides as to the time at which the Lykurgean constitution was introduced at Sparta. The state of "eunomy" and good order which that constitution brought about—combined with the healing of great previous internal sedition, which had tended much to enfeeble them—is represented (and with great plausibility) as the grand cause of the victorious career beginning with king Teleklus, the conqueror of Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ. Therefore it would seem, in the absence of better evidence, that a date, connecting the fresh stimulus of the new discipline with the reign of Teleklus, is more probable than any epoch either later or earlier.

O. Müller, after glancing at the strange and improbable circumstances handed down to us respecting Lykurgus, observes "that we have absolutety no account of him as an individual person." This remark is perfectly just; but another remark made by the same distinguished author, respecting the Lykurgean system of laws, appears to me erroneous—and requires more especially to be noticed, inasmuch as the corollaries deduced from it pervade a large portion of his valuable history of the Dorians. He affirms that the laws of Sparta were considered the true Doric institutions, and that their origin was identical with that of the people: Sparta is, in his view, the full type of Dorian principles, tendencies, and sentiments—and is so treated throughout his entire work. But such an opinion is at once gratuitous (for the passage of Pindar cited in support of it is scarcely of any value) and contrary to the whole tenor of anciente vidence. The institutions of Sparta were not Dorian, but peculiar to herself; distinguishing her not less from Argos, Corinth, Megara, Epidaurus, Sikyon, Korkyra, or Knidus, than from Athens or Thebes. Krete was the only other portion of Greece in which there prevailed institutions in many respects analogous, yet still dissimilar in those two attributes which form the real mark and pinch of Spartan legislation, viz., the military discipline and the rigorous private training. There were doubtless Dorians in Krete, but we have no proof that these peculiar institutions belonged to them more than to the other inhabitants of the island. That the Spartans had an original organization and tendencies, common to them with the other Dorians, we may readily conceive; but the Lykurgean constitution impressed upon them a peculiar tendency which took them out of the general march, and rendered them the least fit of all states to be cited as an example of the class-attributes of Dorism. One of the essential causes, which made the Spartan institutions work so impressively upon the Grecian mind, was their perfect singularity, combined with the conspicuous ascendency of the state in which they

were manifested; while the Kretan communities, even admitting their partial resemblance (which was chiefly in the institution of the Syssitia, and was altogether more in form than in spirit) to Sparta, were too insignificant to attract notice except from speculative observers. It is therefore a mistake on the part of O. Müller, to treat Sparta as the type and representative of Dorians generally, and very many of the positions advanced in his History of the Dorians require to be modified when this mistake is pointed out.

The first capital fact to notice respecting the institutions ascribed to Lykurgus, is the very early period at which they had their commencement: it seems impossible to place this period later than 825 B.C. We do not find, nor have we a right to expect, trustworthy history in reference to events so early. If we have one foot on historical ground, inasmuch as the institutions themselves are real—the other foot still floats in the unfaithful region of mythe, when we strive to comprehend the generating causes: the mist yet prevails which hinders us from distinguishing between the god and the man. The light in which Lykurgus appeared, to an intelligent Greek of the fifth century before the Christian era, is so clearly, yet briefly depicted, in the following passage of Herodotus, that I cannot do better than translate it:

"In the very early times," Herodotus observes, "the Spartans were among themselves the most lawless of all Greeks, and unapproachable by foreigners. Their transition to good legal order took place in the following manner. When Lycurgus, a Spartan of consideration, visited Delphi to consult the oracle, the instant that he entered the sanctuary, the Pythian priestess exclaimed:

"'Thou art come, Lycurgus, to my fat shrine, beloved by Zeus and by all the Olympic gods. Is it as god or as man that I am to address thee in the spirit? I hesitate—and yet, Lycurgus, I incline more to call thee a god.'"

(So spake the Pythian priestess.) "Moreover, in addition to these words, some affirm that the Pythia revealed to him the order of things now established among the Spartans. *But the Lacedæmonians themselves* say, that Lycurgus, when guardian of his nephew Labotas king of the Spartans, introduced these institutions out of Krete. No sooner had he obtained this guardianship than he changed all the institutions into their present form, and took security against any transgression of it. Next, he constituted the military divisions, the Enomoties and the Triakads, as well as the Syssitia or public mess: he also, farther, appointed the ephors and the senate. By this means the Spartans passed from bad to good order: to Lycurgus, after his death, they built a temple, and they still worship him reverentially. And as might naturally be expected in a productive soil, and with no inconsiderable numbers of men, they immediately took a start forward, and flourished so much that they could not be content to remain tranquil within their own limits," etc.

Such is our oldest statement (coming from Herodotus) respecting Lykurgus, ascribing to him that entire order of things which the writer witnessed at Sparta. Thucydides also, though not mentioning Lykurgus, agrees in stating that the system among the Lacedæmonians, as he saw it, had been adopted by them four centuries previously,—had rescued them from the most intolerable disorders, and had immediately conducted them to prosperity and success. Hellanikus, whose writings a little preceded those of Herodotus, not only did not (any more than Thucydides) make mention of Lykurgus, but can hardly be thought to have attached any importance to the name; since he attributed the constitution of Sparta to the first kings, Eurysthenes and Prokles.

But those later writers, from whom Plutarch chiefly compiled his biography, profess to be far better informed on the subject of Lykurgus, and enter more into detail. His father, we are told, was assassinated during the preceding state of lawlessness; his elder brother Polydektes died early, leaving a pregnant widow, who made to Lykurgus propositions that he should marry her and become king. But Lykurgus, repudiating the offer with indignation, awaited the birth of his young nephew Charilaus, held up the child publicly in the agora as the future king of Sparta, and immediately relinquished the authority which he had provisionally exercised. However, the widow and her brother Leonidas raised slanderous accusations against him, of designs menacing to the life of the infant king—accusations which he deemed it proper to obviate by a temporary absence. Accordingly he left Sparta and went to Krete, where he studied the polity and customs of the different cities; next he visited Ionia and Egypt, and (as some authors affirm) Libya, Iberia, and even India. While in Ionia, he is reported to have obtained from the descendants of Kreophylus a copy of the Homeric poems, which had not up to that time become known in Peloponnesus: there were not wanting authors, indeed, who said that he had conversed with Homer himself.

Meanwhile the young king Charilaus grew up and assumed the scepter, as representing the Prokleid or Eurypontid family. But the reins of government had become more relaxed, and the disorders worse than ever, when Lykurgus returned. Finding that the two kings as well as the people were weary of so disastrous a condition, he set himself to the task of applying a corrective, and with this view consulted the Delphian oracle; from which he received strong assurances of the divine encouragement, together with one or more special injunctions (the primitive Rhetræ of the constitution) which he brought with him to Sparta. He then suddenly presented himself in the agora, with thirty of the most distinguished Spartans, all in arms, as his guards and partisans. King Charilaus, though at first terrified, when informed of the designs of his uncle, stood forward willingly to second them; while the bulk of the Spartans

respectfully submitted to the venerable Herakleid who came as reformer and missionary from Delphi. Such were the steps by which Lykurgus acquired his ascendency; we have now to see how he employed it.

His first proceeding, pursuant to the Rhetra or compact brought from Delphi, was to constitute the Spartan senate, consisting of twenty-eight ancient men; making an aggregate of thirty in conjunction with the two kings, who sat and voted in it. With this were combined periodical assemblies of the Spartan people, in the open air between the river Knakion and the bridge Babyka. Yet no discussion was permitted in these assemblies—their functions were limited to the simple acceptance or rejection of that which had previously been determined in the senate. Such was the Spartan political constitution as fixed by Lykurgus; but a century afterward (so Plutarch's account runs), under the kings Polydorus and Theopompus, two important alterations were made. A rider was then attached to the old Lykurgean Rhetra, by which it was provided that "in case the people decided crookedly, the senate, with the kings, should reverse their decisions;" while another change, perhaps intended as a sort of compensation for this bridle on the popular assembly, introduced into the constitution a new executive directory of five men, called the ephors. This Board—annually chosen, by some capricious method the result of which could not well be foreseen, and open to be filled by every Spartan citizen—either originally received, or gradually drew to itself, functions so extensive and commanding, in regard to internal administration and police, as to limit the authority of the kings to little more than the exclusive command of the military force. Herodotus was informed at Sparta that the ephors as well as the senate had been constitued by Lykurgus; but the authority of Aristotle as well as the internal probability of the case sanctions the belief that they were subsequently added.

Taking the political constitution of Sparta ascribed to Lykurgus, it appears not to have differed materially from the rude organization exhibited in the Homeric poems, where we always find a council of chiefs or old men and occasional meetings of a listening agora. It is hard to suppose that the Spartan kings can ever have governed without some formalities of this sort; so that the innovation (if innovation there really was) ascribed to Lykurgus must have consisted in some new details respecting the senate and the agora—in fixing the number thirty, and the life-tenure of the former, and the special place of meeting of the latter as well as the extent of privilege which it was to exercise; consecrating the whole by the erection of the temples of Zeus Hellanius and Athene Hellania. The view of the subject presented by Plutarch as well as by Plato, as if the senate were an entire novelty, does not consist with the pictures of the old epic. Hence we may more naturally imagine that the Lykurgean political constitution, apart from the ephors who were afterward tacked to it, presents only the old features of the heroic government of Greece, defined and regularized in a particular manner. The presence of two co-existent and co-ordinate kings, indeed, succeeding in hereditary descent and both belonging to the gens of Herakleids, is something peculiar to Sparta—the origin of which receives no other explanation than a reference to the twin sons of Aristodemus, Eurysthenes and Prokles. These two primitive ancestors are a type of the two lines of Spartan kings; for they are said to have passed their lives in perpetual dissensions, which was the habitual state of the two contemporaneous kings, at Sparta. While the co-existence of the pair of kings, equal in power, and constantly thwarting each other, had often a baleful effect upon the course of public measures, it was, nevertheless, a security to the state against successful violence, ending in the establishment of a despotism, on the part of any ambitious individual among the regal line.

During five successive centuries of Spartan history, from Polydorus and Theopompus downward, no such violence was attempted by any of the kings, until the times of Agis III. and Kleomenes III. (240–220 B.C.) The importance of Greece had at this last-mentioned period irretrievably declined, and the independent political action which she once possessed had become subordinate to the more powerful force either of the Ætolian mountaineers (the rudest among her own sons) or to Epirotic, Macedonian, and Asiatic foreigners, preparatory to the final absorption by the Romans. But among all the Grecian states, Sparta had declined the most; her ascendency was totally gone, and her peculiar training and discipline (to which she had chiefly owed it) had degenerated in every way. Under these untoward circumstances, two young kings, Agis and Kleomenes—the former a generous enthusiast, the latter more violent and ambitious—conceived the design of restoring the Lykurgean constitution in its supposed pristine purity, with the hope of reviving both the spirit of the people and the ascendency of the state. But the Lykurgean constitution had been, even in the time of Xenophon, in part, an *ideal*, not fully realized in practice—much less was it a reality in the days of Kleomenes and Agis; moreover, it was an *ideal* which admitted of being colored according to the fancy or feelings of those reformers who professed, and probably believed, that they were aiming at its genuine restoration. What the reforming kings found most in their way was the uncontrolled authority, and the conservative dispositions, of the ephors—which they naturally contrasted with the original fullness of the kingly power, when kings and senate stood alone. Among the various ways in which men's ideas of what the primitive constitution *had* been were modified by the feelings of their own time (we shall presently see some other instances of this), is probably to be reckoned the assertion of Kleomenes respecting the first appointment of the ephors. Kleomenes affirmed that the ephors had

originally been nothing more than subordinates and deputies of the kings, chosen by the latter to perform for a time their duties during the long absence of the Messenian war. Starting from this humble position, and profiting by the dissensions of the two kings, they had in process of time, especially by the ambition of the ephor Asteropus, found means first to constitute themselves an independent board, then to usurp themselves more and more of the kingly authority, until they at last reduced the kings to a state of intolerable humiliation and impotence. As a proof of the primitive relation between the kings and the ephorst he alluded to that which was the custom at Sparta in his own time. When the ephors sent for either of the kings, the latter had a right to refuse obedience to two successive summons, but the third summons he was bound to obey.

It is obvious that the fact here adduced by Kleomenes (a curious point in Spartan manners) contributes little to prove the conclusion which he deduced from it of the original nomination of the ephors as mere deputies by the kings. That they were first appointed at the time of the Messenian war is probable, and coincides with the tale that king Theopompus was a consenting party to the measure —that their functions were at first comparatively circumscribed, and extended by successive encroachments, is also probable. But they seem to have been from the beginning a board of specially popular origin, in contraposition to the kings and the senate. One proof of this is to be found in the ancient oath, which was every month interchanged between the kings and the ephors; the king swearing for himself, that he would exercise his regal functions according to the established laws—the ephors swearing on behalf of the city, that his authority should on that condition remain unshaken. This mutual compact, which probably formed a part of the ceremony during the monthly sacrifices offered by the king, continued down to a time when it must have become a pure form, and when the kings had long been subordinate in power to the ephors. But it evidently began first as a reality—when the king was predominant and effective chief of the state, and when the ephors, clothed with functions chiefly defensive, served as guarantees to the people against abuse of the regal authority. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, all interpret the original institution of the ephors as designed to protect the people and restrain the kings: the latter assimilates them to the tribunes at Rome.

Such were the relations which had once subsisted between the kings and the ephors: though in later times these relations had been so completely reversed, that Polybius considers the former as essentially subordinate to the latter—reckoning it as a point of duty in the kings to respect the ephors "as their fathers." And such is decidedly the state of things throughout all the better-known period of history which we shall hereafter traverse. The ephors are the general directors of public affairs and the supreme controlling board

holding in check every other authority in the state, without any assignable limit to their powers. The extraordinary ascendency of these magistrates is particularly manifested in the fact stated by Aristotle, that they exempted themselves from the public discipline, so that their self-indulgent year of office stood in marked contrast with the toilsome exercises and sober mess common to rich and poor alike. The kings are reduced to a certain number of special functions, combined with privileges partly religious, partly honorary: their most important political attribute is, that they are ex officio generals of the military force on foreign expeditions. But even here we trace the sensible decline of their power. For whereas Herodotus was informed, and it probably had been the old privilege, that the king could levy war against whomsoever he chose, and that no Spartan could impede him on pain of committing sacrilege—we shall see throughout the best-known periods of this history that it is usually the ephors (with or without the senate and public assembly) who determine upon war—the king only takes the command when the army is put on the march. Aristotle seems to treat the Spartan king as a sort of hereditary general; but even in this privilege, shackles were put upon him—for two out of the five ephors accompanied the army, and their power seems to have been not seldom invoked to insure obedience to his orders.

The direct political powers of the kings were thus greatly curtailed; yet importance in many ways was still left to them. They possessed large royal domains, in many of the townships of the Perioeki: they received frequent occasional presents, and when victims were offered to the gods, the skins and other portions belonged to them as perquisites; they had their votes in the senate, which, if they were absent, were given on their behalf by such of the other senators as were most nearly related to them: the adoption of children received its formal accomplishment in their presence—and conflicting claims at law, for the hand of an unbequeathed orphan heiress, were adjudicated by them. But above all, their root was deep in the religious feelings of the people. Their pre-eminent lineage connected the entire state with a divine paternity. They, the chiefs of the Herakleids, were the special grantees of the soil of Sparta from the gods—the occupation of the Dorians being only sanctified and blest by Zeus for the purpose of establishing the children of Herakles in the valley of the Eurotas. They represented the state in its relations with the gods, being by right, priests of Zeus Lacedæmon (the ideas of the god and the country coalescing into one) and of Zeus Uranius, and offering the monthly sacrifices necessary to insure divine protection to the people. Though individual persons might sometimes be put aside, nothing short of a new divine revelation could induce the Spartans to step out of the genuine lineage of Eurysthenes and Prokles. Moreover, the remarkable mourning ceremony which took place at the death of every king,

seems to indicate that the two kingly families—which counted themselves Achæan, not Dorian—were considered as the great common bond of union between the three component parts of the population of Laconia—Spartans, Periœki, and Helots. Not merely was it required, on this occasion, that two members of every house in Sparta should appear in sackcloth and ashes—but the death of the king was formally made known throughout every part of Laconia; and deputies from the townships of the Periœki and the villages of the Helots, to the number of several thousand, were summoned to Sparta to take their share in the profuse and public demonstrations of sorrow, which lasted for ten days, and which imparted to the funeral obsequies a superhuman solemnity. Nor ought we to forget, in enumerating the privileges of the Spartan king, that he (conjointly with two officers called Pythii nominated by him) carried on the communications between the state and the temple of Delphi, and had the custody of oracles and prophecies generally. In most of the Grecian states, such inspired declarations were treasured up, and consulted in cases of public emergency: but the intercourse of Sparta with the Delphian oracle was peculiarly frequent and intimate, and the responses of the Pythian priestess met with more reverential attention from the Spartans than from any other Greeks. So much the more important were the king's functions, as the medium of this intercourse: the oracle always upheld his dignity, and often even seconded his underhand personal schemes.

Sustained by so great a force of traditional reverence a Spartan king of military talent and individual energy like Agesilaus exercised great ascendency: but such cases were very rare, and we shall find the king throughout the historical period only a secondary force, available on special occasions. For real political orders, in the greatest cases as well as the least, the Spartan looks to the council of ephors, to whom obedience is paid with a degree of precision which nothing short of the Spartan discipline could have brought about—by the most powerful citizens not less than by the meanest. Both the internal police and the foreign affairs of the state are in the hands of the ephors, who exercise an authority approaching to despotism, and altogether without accountability. They appoint and direct the body of 300 young and active citizens, who performed the immediate police of Laconia: they cashier at pleasure any subordinate functionary; and inflict fine or arrest at their own discretion; they assemble the military force, on occasion of foreign war, and determine its destination, though the king has the actual command of it; they imprison on suspicion even the regent or the king himself; they sit as judges, sometimes individually and sometimes as a board, upon causes and complaints of great moment, and they judge without the restraint of written laws, the use of which was peremptorily forbidden by a special Rhetra, erroneously connected with Lykurgus himself, but at any rate ancient. On certain occasions of peculiar

moment they take the sense of the senate and the public assembly—such seems to have been the habit on questions of war and peace. It appears, however, that persons charged with homicide, treason, or capital offenses generally, were tried before the senate. We read of several instances in which the kings were tried and severely fined, and in which their houses were condemned to be razed to the ground, probably by the senate on the proposition of the ephors: in one instance, it seems that the ephors inflicted by their own authority a fine even upon Agesilaus.

War and peace appear to have been submitted, on most if not on all occasions, to the senate and the public assembly; no matter could reach the latter until it had passed through the former. And we find some few occasions on which the decision of the public assembly was a real expression of opinion, and operative as to the result—as for example, the assembly which immediately preceded and resolved upon the Peloponnesian war. Here, in addition to the serious hazard of the case and the general caution of a Spartan temperament, there was the great personal weight and experience of king Archidamus opposed to the war, though the ephors were favorable to it. The public assembly, under such peculiar circumstances, really manifested an opinion and came to a division. But for the most part, it seems to have been little better than an inoperative formality. The general rule permitted no open discussion, nor could any private citizen speak except by special leave from the magistrates. Perhaps even the general liberty to discuss, if given, might have been of no avail, for not only was there no power of public speaking, but no habit of canvassing public measures, at Sparta: nothing was more characteristic of the government than the extreme secrecy of its proceedings. The propositions brought forward by the magistrates were either accepted or rejected, without any license of amending. There could be no attraction to invite the citizen to be present at such an assembly; and we may gather from the language of Xenophon that in his time it consisted only of a certain number of notables specially summoned in addition to the senate, which latter body is itself called "the lesser Ekklesia." Indeed the constant and formidable diminution in the number of qualified citizens was alone sufficient to thin the attendance of the assembly, as well as to break down any imposing force which it might once have possessed.

An assembly thus circumstanced—though always retained as a formality, and though its consent on considerable matters and for the passing of laws (which, however, seems to have been a rare occurrence at Sparta) was indispensable—could be very little of a practical check upon the administration of the ephors. The senate, a permanent body with the kings included in it, was the only real check upon them, and must have been to a certain extent a concurrent body in the government—though the large and imposing language in which its political supremacy is spoken of by Demosthenes and Isokrates

exceeds greatly the reality of the case. Its most important function was that of a court of criminal justice, before whom every man put on trial for his life was arraigned. But both in this and in their other duties we find the senators as well as the kings and the ephors charged with corruption and venalty. As they were not appointed until sixty years of age, and then held their offices for life, we may readily believe that some of them continued to act after the period of extreme and disqualifying senility—which, though the extraordinary respect of the Lacedæmonians for old age would doubtless tolerate it, could not fail to impair the influence of the body as a concurrent element of government.

The brief sketch here given of the Spartan government will show that though Greek theorists found a difficulty in determining under what class they should arrange it, it was in substance a close, unscrupulous, and well-obeyed oligarchy; including within it, as subordinate, those portions which had once been dominant, the kings and the senate, and softening the odium, without abating the mischief, of the system, by its annual change of the ruling ephors. We must at the same time distinguish the government from the Lykurgean discipline and education, which doubtless tended much to equalize rich and poor in respect to practical life, habits, and enjoyments. Herodotus (and seemingly also Xenophon) thought that the form just described was that which the government had originally received from the hand of Lykurgus. Now, though there is good reason for supposing otherwise, and for believing the ephors to be a subsequent addition, yet the mere fact that Herodotus was so informed at Sparta points our attention to one important attribute of the Spartan polity, which it is proper to bring into view. This attribute is, its unparalleled steadiness for four or five successive centuries, in the midst of governments like the Grecian, all of which had undergone more or less of fluctuation. No considerable revolution—not even any palpable or formal change—occurred in it from the days of the Messenian war down to those of Agis III.; in spite of the irreparable blow which the power and territory of the state sustained from Epameinondas and the Thebans, the form of government nevertheless remained unchanged. It was the only government in Greece which could trace an unbroken peaceable descent from a high antiquity and from its real or supposed founder. Now this was one of the main circumstances (among others which will hereafter be mentioned) of the astonishing ascendency which the Spartans acquired over the Hellenic mind, and which they will not be found at all to deserve by any superior ability in the conduct of affairs. The steadiness of their political sympathies—exhibited at one time by putting down the tyrants or despots, at another by overthrowing the democracies—stood in the place of ability, and even the recognized failings of their government were often covered by the sentiment of respect for its early commencement and uninterrupted continuance. If such a feeling acted on the Greeks generally, much more powerful was its action upon the Spartans themselves in inflaming that haughty exclusiveness for which they stood distinguished. And it is to be observed that the Spartan mind continued to be cast on the old-fashioned scale, and unsusceptible of modernizing influences, longer than that of most other people of Greece. The ancient legendary faith, and devoted submission to the Delphian oracle, remained among them unabated at a time when various influences had considerably undermined it among their fellow-Hellens and neighbors. But though the unchanged title and forms of the government thus contributed to its imposing effect, both at home and abroad, the causes of internal degeneracy were not the less really at work in undermining its efficiency. It has been already stated that the number of qualified citizens went on continually diminishing, and even of this diminished number a larger proportion than before were needy, since the landed property tended constantly to concentrate itself in fewer hands. There grew up in this way a body of discontent, which had not originally existed, both among the poorer citizens and among those who had lost their franchise as citizens; thus aggravating the danger arising from Periœki and Helots, who will be presently noticed.

We pass from the political constitution of Sparta to the civil ranks and distribution, economical relations, and lastly the peculiar system of habits, education, and discipline said to have been established among the Lacedæmonians by Lykurgus. Here again we shall find ourselves imperfectly informed as to the existing institutions, and surrounded by confusion when we try to explain how those institutions arose.

It seems, however, ascertained that the Dorians in all their settlements were divided into three tribes—the Hylleis, the Pamphyli, and the Dymanes: in all Dorian cities, moreover, there were distinguished Herakleid families from whom œkists were chosen when new colonies were formed. These three tribes can be traced at Argos, Sikyon, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Megara, Korkyra, and seemingly also at Sparta. The Hylleis recognized, as their eponym and progenitor, Hyllus, the son of Herakles, and were therefore in their own belief descended from Herakles himself: we may suppose the Herakleids, specially so called, comprising the two regal families, to have been the elder brethren of the tribe of Hylleis, the whole of whom are sometimes spoken of as Herakleids or descendants of Herakles. But there seem to have been also at Sparta, as in other Dorian towns, non-Dorian inhabitants, apart from these three tribes and embodied in tribes of their own. One of these, the Ægeids, said to have come from Thebes as allies of the Dorian invaders, is named by Aristotle, Pindar, and Herodotus; while the Ægialeis at Sikyon, the tribe Hyrnethia at Argos and Epidaurus, and others, whose titles we do not know, at Corinth, represent in like manner the non-Dorian portions of their respective communities. At Corinth the total number of

tribes is said to have been eight. But at Sparta, though we seem to make out the existence of the three Dorian tribes, we do not know how many tribes there were in all; still less do we know what relation the Obæ or Obes, another subordinate distribution of the people, bore to the tribes. In the ancient Rhetra of Lykurgus, the tribes and obes are directed to be maintained unaltered; but the statement of O. Müller and Boeckh—that there were thirty obes in all, ten to each tribe—rests upon no other evidence than a peculiar punctuation of this Rhetra, which various other critics reject; and seemingly with good reason. We are thus left without any information respecting the obe, though we know that it was an old, peculiar, and lasting division among the Spartan people, since it occurs in the oldest Rhetra of Lykurgus, as well as in late inscriptions of the date of the Roman empire. In similar inscriptions and in the account of Pausanias, there is, however, recognized a classification of Spartans distinct from and independent of the three old Dorian tribes, and founded upon the different quarters of the city—Limnæ, Mesoa, Pitane, and Kynosura; from one of these four was derived the usual description of a Spartan in the days of Herodotus. There is reason to suppose that the old Dorian tribes became antiquated at Sparta (as the four old Ionian tribes did at Athens), and that the topical classification derived from the quarters of the city superceded it—these quarters having been originally the separate villages, of the aggregate of which Sparta was composed. That the number of the old senators, thirty, was connected with the three Dorian tribes, deriving ten members from each, is probable enough, though there is no proof of it.

Of the population of Laconia three main divisions are recognized —Spartans, Periœki, and Helots. The first of the three were the full qualified citizens, who lived in Sparta itself, fulfilled all the exigencies of the Lykurgean discipline, paid their quota to the Syssitia or public mess, and were alone eligible to honors or public offices. These men had neither time nor taste even for cultivation of the land, still less for trade or handicraft: such occupations were inconsistent with the prescribed training, even if they had not been positively interdicted. They were maintained from the lands round the city, and from the large proportion of Laconia which belonged to them; the land being tilled for them by Helots, who seem to have paid over to them a fixed proportion of the produce, in some cases at least, as much as one-half. Each Spartan retained his qualification, and transmitted it to his children, on two conditions—first, that of submitting to the prescribed discipline; next, that of paying each his stipulated quota to the public mess, which was only maintained by these individual contributions. The multiplication of children in the poorer families, after acquisitions of new territory ceased, continually augmented both the number snd the proportion of citizens who were unable to fulfill the second of these conditions, and who

therefore lost their franchise; so that there arose toward the close of the Peloponnesian war a distinction, among the Spartans themselves, unknown to the earlier times—the reduced number of fully qualified citizens being called the equals or peers—the disfranchised poor, the inferiors. The latter, disfranchised as they were, nevertheless did not become Periœki: it was probably still competent to them to resume their qualification, should any favorable accident enable them to make their contributions to the public mess.

The Periœkus was also a freeman and a citizen, not of Sparta, but of some one of the hundred townships of Laconia. Both he and the community to which he belonged received their orders only from Sparta, having no political sphere of their own, and no share in determining the movements of the Spartan authorities. In the island of Kythera, which formed one of the Periœkic townships, a Spartan bailiff resided as administrator. But whether the same was the case with others, we cannot affirm: nor is it safe to reason from one of these townships to all—there may have been considerable differences in the mode of dealing with one and another. For they were spread through the whole of Laconia, some near and some distant from Sparta; the free inhabitants of Amyklæ must have been Periœki, as well as those of Kythera, Thuria, Æthcia, or Aulon; nor can we presume that the feeling on the part of the Spartan authorities toward all of them was the same. Between the Spartans and their neighbors, the numerous Periœki of Amyklæ, there must have subsisted a degree of intercourse and mutual relation in which the more distant Periœki did not partake—besides that both the religious edifices and the festivals of Amyklæ were most reverentially adopted by the Spartans and exalted into a national dignity: and we seem to perceive, on some occasions, a degree of consideration manifested for the Amyklæan hoplites such as perhaps other Periœki might not have obtained. The class-name, Periœki—circum-residents, or dwellers around the city—usually denoted native inhabitants of inferior political condition as contrasted with the full-privileged burghers who lived in the city, but it did not mark any precise or uniform degree of inferiority. It is sometimes so used by Aristotle as to imply a condition no better than that of the Helots, so that in a large sense all the inhabitants of Laconia (Helots as well as the rest) might have been included in it. But when used in reference to Laconia, it bears a technical sense whereby it is placed in contraposition with the Spartan on one side and with the Helot on the other: it means native freemen and proprietors, grouped in subordinate communities with more or less power of local management, but (like the subject towns belonging to Bern, Zurich, and most of the old thirteen cantons of Switzerland) embodied in the Lacedæmonian aggregate, which was governed exclusively by the kings, senate, and citizens of Sparta.

When we come to describe the democracy of Athens after the revolution of Kleisthenes, we shall find the demes, or local townships

and villages of Attica, incorporated as equal and constituent fractions of the integer called the deme (or the city) of Athens, so that a demot of Acharnæ or Sphettus is at the same time a full Athenian citizen. But the relation of the Periœkic townships to Sparta is one of inequality and obedience, though both belong to the same political aggregate, and make up together the free Lacedæmonian community. In like manner, Orneæ and other places were townships of men personally free, but politically dependent on Argos—Akræphiæ on Thebes, Chæroneia on Orchomenus, and various Thessalian towns on Pharsalus and Larissa. This condition carried with it a sentiment of degradation, and a painful negation of that autonomy for which every Grecian community thirsted; while being maintained through superior force, it had a natural tendency, perhaps without the deliberate wish of the reigning city, to degenerate into practical oppression. But in addition to this general tendency, the peculiar education of a Spartan, while it imparted force, fortitude, and regimental precision, was at the same time so rigorously peculiar, that it rendered him harsh, unaccommodating, and incapable of sympathizing with the ordinary march of Grecian feeling—not to mention the rapacity and love of money, which is attested, by good evidence, as belonging to the Spartan character, and which we should hardly have expected to find in the pupils of Lykurgus. As Harmosts out of their native city, and in relations with inferiors, the Spartans seem to have been more unpopular than other Greeks, and we may presume that a similar haughty roughness pervaded their dealings with their own Periœki; who were bound to them certainly by no tie of affection, and who for the most part revolted after the battle of Leuktra as soon as the invasion of Laconia by Epameinondas enabled them to do so with safety.

Isokrates, taking his point of departure from the old Herakleid legend, with its instantaneous conquest and triple partition of all Dorian Peloponnesus among the three Herakleid brethren, deduces the first origin of the Periœkic townships from internal seditions among the conquerors of Sparta. According to him, the period immediately succeeding the conquest was one of fierce intestine warfare in newly-conquered Sparta, between the few and the many—the oligarchy and the demus. The former being victorious, two important measures were the consequences of their victory. They banished the defeated many from Sparta into Laconia, retaining the residence in Sparta exclusively for themselves; they assigned to them the smallest and least fertile half of Laconia, monopolising the larger and better for themselves; and they desseminated them into many very small townships, or subordinate little communities, while they concentrated themselves entirely at Sparta. To these precautions for insuring dominion they added another pot less important. They established among their own Spartan citizens equality of legal privilege and democratical government, so as to take the greatest securities

for internal harmony; which harmony, according to the judgment of Isokrates, had been but too effectually perpetuated, enabling the Spartans to achieve their dominion over oppressed Greece—like the accord of pirates for the spoliation of the peaceful. The Periœkic townships (he tells us), while deprived of all the privileges of freemen, were exposed to all the toils as well as to an unfair share of the dangers of war. The Spartan authorities put them in situations and upon enterprises which they deemed too dangerous for their own citizens; and what was still worse, the ephors possessed the power of putting to death, without any form of preliminary trial, as many Periœki as they pleased.

The statement here delivered by Isokrates, respecting the first origin of the distinction of Spartans and Periœki, is nothing better than a conjecture, nor is it even a probable conjecture, since it is based on the historical truth of the Herakleid legend, and transports the disputes of his own time between the oligarchy and the demus into an early period to which such disputes do not belong. Nor is there anything, as far as our knowledge of Grecian history extends, to bear out his assertion that the Spartans took to themselves the least dangerous post in the field, and threw undue peril upon their Periœki. Such dastardly temper was not among the sins of Sparta; but it is undoubtedly true that as the number of citizens continually diminished, so the Periœki came to constitute, in the later times, a larger and larger proportion of the Spartan force. Yet the power which Isokrates represents to have been vested in the ephors, of putting to death Periœki without preliminary trial, we may fully believe to be real, and to have been exercised as often as the occasion seemed to call for it. We shall notice presently the way in which these magistrates dealt with the Helots, and shall see ample reason from thence to draw the conclusion that whenever the ephors believed any man to be dangereus to the public peace—whether an inferior Spartan, a Periœkus, or a Helot—the most summary mode of getting rid of him would be considered as the best. Toward Spartans of rank and consideration they were doubtless careful and measured in their application of punishment, but the same necessity for circumspection did not exist with regard to the inferior classes: moreover, the feeling that the exigences of justice required a fair trial before punishment was inflicted, belongs to Athenian associations much more than to Spartan. How often any such summary executions may have taken place, we have no information.

We may remark that the account which Isokrates has here given of the origin of the Laconian Periœki is not essentially irreconcilable with that of Ephorus, who recounted that Eurysthenes and Prokles, on first conquering Laconia, had granted to the pre-existing population equal rights with the Dorians—but that Agis, son of Eurysthenes, had deprived them of this equal position, and degraded them into dependent subjects of the latter. At least the two narra-

tives agree in presuming that the Periœki had once enjoyed a better position, from which they had been extruded by violence. And the policy which Isokrates ascribes to the victorious Spartan oligarchs—of driving out the demus from concentrated residence in the city to disseminated residence in many separate and insignificant townships—seems to be the expression of that proceeding which in his time was numbered among the most efficient precautions against refractory subjects—the Diœkisis, or breaking up of a town-aggregate into villages. We cannot assign to the statement any historical authority. Moreover, the division of Laconia into six districts, together with its distribution into townships (or the distribution of settlers into pre-existing townships), which Ephorus ascribed to the first Dorian kings, are all deductions from the primitive legendary account, which described the Dorian conquest as achieved at one stroke, and must all be dismissed, if we suppose it to have been achieved gradually. This gradual conquest is admitted by O. Müller and by many of the ablest subsequent inquirers—who nevertheless seem to have the contrary supposition involuntarily present to their minds when they criticise the early Spartan history, and always unconsciously imagine the Spartans as masters of all Laconia. We cannot even assert that Laconia was ever under one government before the consummation of the successive conquests of Sparta.

Of the assertion of O. Müller—repeated by Schömann—that the difference of races was strictly preserved, and that the Periœki were always considered as Achæans—I find no proof, and I believe it to be erroneous. Respecting Pharis, Geronthræ, and Amyklæ, three Periœkic towns, Pausanias gives us to understand that the pre-existing inhabitants were expelled some long time after the Dorian conquest, and that a Dorian population replaced them. Without placing great faith in this statement, for which Pausanias could hardly have any good authority, we may yet accept it as representing the probabilities of the case and as counterbalancing the unsupported hypothesis of Müller. The Periœkic townships were probably composed either of Dorians entirely, or of Dorians incorporated in greater or less proportion with the pre-existing inhabitants. But whatever difference of race there may once have been, it was effaced before the historical times, during which we find no proof of Achæans, known as such, in Laconia. The Herakleids, the Ægeids, and the Talthybiads, all of whom belong to Sparta, seem to be the only examples of separate races (partially distinguishable from Dorians) known after the beginning of authentic history. The Spartans and the Periœki constitute one political aggregate, and that too so completely melted together in the general opinion (speaking of the times before the battle of Leuktra), that the peace of Antalkidas, which guaranteed autonomy to every separate Grecian city, was never so construed as to divorce the Periœkic towns from Sparta. Both are known as Laconians or Lacedæmonians, and Sparta is regarded by Herodotus

only as the first and bravest among the many and brave Lacedæmonian cities. The victors at Olympia are proclaimed not as Spartans, but as Laconians—a title alike borne by the Periœki. And many of the numerous winners whose names we read in the Olympic lists as Laconians, may probably have belonged to Amyklæ or other Periœkic towns.

The Periœkic hoplites constituted always a large—in later times a preponderant—numerical proportion of the Lacedæmonian army, and must undoubtedly have been trained, more or less perfectly, in the peculiar military tactics of Sparta; since they were called upon to obey the same orders as the Spartans in the field, and to perform the same evolutions. Some cases appear, though rare, in which a Periœkus has high command in a foreign expedition. In the time of Aristotle, the larger proportion of Laconia (then meaning only the country eastward of Taygetus, since the foundation of Messene by Epameinondas had been consummated) belong to Spartan citizens, but the remaining smaller half must have been the property of the Periœki, who must besides have carried on most of the commerce of export and import, the metallurgic enterprise, and the distribution of internal produce which the territory exhibited, since no Spartan ever meddled in such occupations. And thus the peculiar training of Lykurgus, by throwing all these employments into the hands of the Periœki, opened to them a new source of importance which the dependent townships of Argos, of Thebes, or of Orchomenus would not enjoy.

The Helots of Laconia were Coloni, or serfs, bound to the soil, who tilled it for the benefit of the Spartan proprietors certainly—probably, of Periœkic proprietors also. They were the rustic population of the country, who dwelt, not in towns, but either in small villages or in detached farms, both in the district immediately surrounding Sparta, and round the Periœkic Laconian towns also. Of course, there were also Helots who lived in Sparta and other towns, and did the work of domestic slaves—but such was not the general character of the class. We cannot doubt that the Dorian conquest from Sparta found this class in the condition of villagers and detached rustics; but whether they were dependent upon pre-existing Achæan proprietors, or independent like much of the Arcadian village population, is a question which we cannot answer. In either case, however, it is easy to conceive that the village lands (with the cultivators upon them) were the most easy to appropriate for the benefit of masters resident at Sparta; while the towns, with the district immediately around them, furnished both dwelling and maintenance to the outgoing detachments of Dorians. If the Spartans had succeeded in their attempt to enlarge their territory by the conquest of Arcadia, they might very probably have converted Tegea and Mantineia into Periœkic towns, with a diminished territory inhabited (either wholly or in part) by Dorian settlers—while they would have made over to

proprietors in Sparta much of the village lands of the Mænalii, Azanes, and Parrhasii, helotizing the inhabitants. The distinction between a town and a village population seems the main ground of the different treatment of Helots and Periœki in Laconia. A considerable proportion of the Helots were of genuine Dorian race, being the Dorian Messenians west of Mount Taygetus, subsequently conquered and aggregated to this class of dependent cultivators, who, as a class, must have begun to exist from the very first establishment of the invading Dorians in the district round Sparta. From whence the name of Helots arose we do not clearly make out: Ephorus deduced it from the town of Helus, on the southern coast, which the Spartans are said to have taken after a resistance so obstinate as to provoke them to deal very rigorously with the captives. There are many reasons for rejecting this story, and another etymology has been proposed according to which Helot is synonymous with *captive:* this is more plausible, yet still not convincing. The Helots lived in the rural villages as adscripti glebæ, cultivating their lands and paying over their rent to the master at Sparta, but enjoying their homes, wives, families, and mutual neighborly feelings apart from the master's view. They were never sold out of the country, and probably never sold at all; belonging not so much to the master as to the state, which constantly called upon them for military service, and recompensed their bravery or activity with a grant of freedom. Meno the Thessalian of Pharsalus took out three hundred Penestæ of his own to aid the Athenians against Amphipolis: these Thessalian Penestæ were in many points analogous to the Helots, but no individual Spartan possessed the like power over the latter. The Helots were thus a part of the state, having their domestic and social sympathies developed, a certain power of acquiring property, and the consciousness of Grecian lineage and dialect—points of marked superiority over the foreigners who formed the slave population of Athens or Chios. They seem to have been noway inferior to any village population of Greece; while the Grecian observer sympathized with them more strongly than with the bought slaves of other states—not to mention that their homogeneous aspect, their numbers, and their employment in military service, rendered them more conspicuous to the eye.

The service in the Spartan house was all performed by members of the Helot class; for there seem to have been few, if any, other slaves in the country. The various anecdotes which are told respecting their treatment at Sparta betoken less of cruelty than of ostentatious scorn—a sentiment which we are noway surprised to discover among the citizens at the mess-table. But the great mass of the Helots, who dwelt in the country, were objects of a very different sentiment on the part of the Spartan ephors, who knew their bravery, energy, and standing discontent, and yet were forced to employ them as an essential portion of the state army. The Helots commonly served as light

armed, in which capacity the Spartan hoplites could not dispense with their attendance. At the battle of Platæa, every Spartan hoplite had seven Helots, and every Periœkic hoplite one Helot to attend him; but even in camp, the Spartan arrangements were framed to guard against any sudden mutiny of these light-armed companions, while at home, the citizen habitually kept his shield disjoined from its holding-ring to prevent the possibility of its being snatched for the like purpose. Sometimes select Helots were clothed in heavy armor, and thus served in the ranks, receiving manumission from the state as the reward of distinguished bravery.

But Sparta, even at the maximum of her power, was more than once endangered by the reality, and always beset with the apprehension, of Helotic revolt. To prevent or suppress it, the ephors submitted to insert express stipulation for aid in their treaties with Athens—to invite Athenian troops into the heart of Laconia—and to practice combinations of cunning and atrocity which even yet stand without parallel in the long list of precautions for fortifying unjust dominion. It was in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, after the Helots had been called upon for signal military efforts in various ways, and when the Athenians and Messenians were in possession of Pylus, that the ephors felt especially apprehensive of an outbreak. Anxious to single out the most forward and daring Helots, as the men from whom they had most to dread, they issued proclamation that every member of that class who had rendered distinguished services should make his claims known at Sparta, promising liberty to the most deserving. A large number of Helots came forward to claim the boon: not less than 2,000 of them were approved, formally manumitted, and led in solemn procession round the temples, with garlands on their heads, as an inauguration to their coming life of freedom. But the treacherous garland only marked them out as victims for the sacrifice: every man of them forthwith disappeared—the manner of their death was an untold mystery.

For this dark and bloody deed Thucydides is our witness, and Thucydides describing a contemporary matter into which he had inquired. Upon any less evidence we should have hesitated to believe the statement; but standing as it thus does above all suspicion, it speaks volumes as to the inhuman character of the Lacedæmonian government, while it lays open to us at the same time the intensity of their fears from the Helots. In the assassination of this fated regiment of brave men, a large number of auxiliaries and instruments must have been concerned; yet Thucydides with all his inquiries could not find out how any of them perished; he tells us that no man knew. We see here a fact which demonstrates unequivocally the impenetrable mystery in which the proceedings of the Spartan government were wrapped—the absence not only of public discussion, but of public curiosity, and the perfection with which the ephors reigned over the will, the hands, and the tongues of their

Spartan subjects. The Venetian Council of Ten, with all the facilities for noctural drowning which their city presented, could hardly have accomplished so vast a *coup d'état* with such invisible means. And we may judge from hence, even if we had no other evidence, how little the habits of a public assembly could have suited either the temper of mind or the march of government at Sparta.

Other proceedings, ascribed to the ephors against the Helots, are conceived in the same spirit as the incident just recounted from Thucydides, though they do not carry with them the same certain attestation. It was a part of the institutions of Lykurgus (according to a statement which Plutarch professes to have borrowed from Aristotle) that the ephors should every year declare war against the Helots, in order that the murder of them might be rendered innocent; and that active young Spartans should be armed with daggers and sent about Laconia, in order that they might, either in solitude or at night, assassinate such of the Helots as were considered formidable. This last measure passes by the name of the Krypteia, yet we find some difficulty in determining to what extent it was ever realized. That the ephors, indeed, would not be restrained by any scruples of justice or humanity, is plainly shown by the murder of the 2,000 Helots above noticed. But this latter incident really answered its purpose; while a standing practice such as that of the Krypteia, and a formal notice of war given before-hand, would provoke the reaction of despair rather than enforce tranquillity. There seems, indeed, good evidence that the Krypteia was a real practice—that the ephors kept up a system of police or espionage throughout Laconia by the employment of active young citizens, who lived a hard and solitary life, and suffered their motions to be as little detected as possible. The ephors might naturally enough take this method of keeping watch both over the Periœkic townships and the Helot villages, and the assassination of individual Helots by these policemen or Krypts would probably pass unnoticed. But it is impossible to believe in any standing murderous order, or deliberate annual assassination of Helots, for the purpose of intimidation, as Aristotle is alleged to have represented—for we may well doubt whether he really did make such a representation, when we see that he takes no notice of this measure in his Politics, where he speaks at some length both of the Spartan constitution and of the Helots. The well-known hatred and fear entertained by the Spartans toward their Helots has probably colored Plutarch's description of the Krypteia, so as to exaggerate those unpunished murders which occasionally happened, into a constant phenomenon with express design. A similar deduction is to be made from the statement of Myron of Priene, who alleged that they were beaten every year without any special fault, in order to put them in mind of their slavery—and that those Helots, whose superior beauty or stature placed them above the visible stamp of their condition, were put to death; whilst

such masters as neglected to keep down the spirit of their vigorous Helots were punished. That secrecy, for which the ephors were so remarkable, seems enough of itself to refute the assertion that they publicly proclaimed war against the Helots; though we may well believe that this unhappy class of men may have been noticed as objects for jealous observation in the annual ephoric oath of office. Whatever may have been the treatment of the Helots in later times, it is at all events hardly to be supposed that any regulation hostile to them can have emanated from Lykurgus. For the dangers arising from that source did not become serious until after the Messenian war—nor, indeed, until after the gradual diminution of the number of Spartan citizens had made itself felt.

The manumitted Helots did not pass into the class of Periœki—for this purpose a special grant, of the freedom of some Periækic township would probably be required—but constituted a class apart, known at the time of the Peloponnesian war by the name of Neodamodes. Being persons who had earned their liberty by signal bravery, they were of course regarded by the ephors with peculiar apprehension, and, if possible, employed on foreign service, or planted on some foreign soil as settlers. In what manner these freedmen employed themselves, we find no distinct information; but we can hardly doubt that they quitted the Helot village and field, together with the rural costume (the leather cap and sheep-skin) which the Helot commonly wore, and the change of which exposed him to suspicion, if not to punishment, from his jealous masters. Probably they, as well as the disfranchised Spartan citizens (called Hypomeiones or inferiors), became congregated at Sparta, and found employment either in various trades or in the service of the government.

It has been necessary to give this short sketch of the orders of men who inhabited Laconia, in order to enable us to understand the statements given about the legislation of Lykurgus. The arrangements ascribed to that lawgiver, in the way that Plutarch describes them, presuppose, and do not create, the three orders of Spartans, Periœki, and Helots. We are told by Plutarch that the disorders which Lykurgus found existing in the state arose in a great measure from the gross inequality of property, and from the luxurious indulgence and unprincipled rapacity of the rich—who had drawn to themselves the greater portion of the lands in the country, leaving a large body of poor, without any lot of land, in hopeless misery and degradation. To this inequality (according to Plutarch) the reforming legislator applied at once a stringent remedy. He redistributed the whole territory belonging to Sparta, as well as the remainder of Laconia; the former in 9,000 equal lots, one to each Spartan citizen; the latter in 30,000 equal lots, one to each Periœkus; of this alleged distribution I shall speak further presently. Moveover, he banished the use of gold and silver money, tolerating nothing in the shape of cir-

culating medium but pieces of iron, heavy and scarcely portable; and he forbade to the Spartan citizen every species of industrious or money-seeking occupation, agriculture included. He further constituted—though not without strenuous opposition, during the course of which his eye is said to have been knocked out by a violent youth named Alkander—the Syssitia or public mess. A certain number of joint tables were provided, and every citizen was required to belong to some one of them and habitually to take his meals at it—no new member being admissible without an unanimous ballot in his favor by the previous occupants. Each provided from his lot of land a specified quota of barley-meal, wine, cheese, and figs, and a small contribution of money for condiments; game was obtained in addition by hunting in the public forests of the state, while every one who sacrificed to the gods, sent to his mess-table a part of the victim killed. From boyhood to old age, every Spartan citizen took his sober meals at this public mess, where all shared alike; nor was distinction of any kind allowed, except on signal occasions of service rendered by an individual to the state.

These public Syssitia, under the management of the Polemarchs, were connected with the military distribution, the constant gymnastic training, and the rigorous discipline of detail enforced by Lykurgus. From the early age of seven years, throughout his whole life, as youth and man no less than as boy, the Spartan citizen lived habitually in public, always either himself under drill, gymnastic and military, or a critic and spectator of others—always under the fetters and observances of a rule partly military, partly monastic—estranged from the independence of a separate home—seeing his wife, during the first years after marriage, only by stealth, and maintaining little peculiar relation with his children. The supervision not only of his fellow-citizens, but also of authorized censors or captains nominated by the state, was perpetually acting upon him: his day was passed in public exercises and meals, his nights in the public barrack to which he belonged. Besides the particular military drill, whereby the complicated movements required from a body of Lacedæmonian hoplites in the field were made familiar to him from his youth, he also became subject to severe bodily discipline of other kinds calculated to impart strength, activity, and endurance. To manifest a daring and pugnacious spirit—to sustain the greatest bodily torture unmoved—to endure hunger and thirst, heat, cold, and fatigue—to tread the worst ground barefoot, to wear the same garment winter and summer—to suppress external manifestations of feeling, and to exhibit in public, when action was not called for, a bearing shy, silent, and motionless as a statue—all these were the virtues of the accomplished Spartan youth. Two squadrons were often matched against each other to contend (without arms) in the little insular circumscription called the Platanistus, and these contests were carried on, under the eye of the authorities, with the utmost extremity of fury. Nor was the competition among them less obstinate, to bear without murmur the cruel scourgings inflicted before the altar of Artemis Orthia, supposed to be highly acceptable to the goddess, though they sometimes terminated even in the death of the uncomplaining sufferer. Besides the various descriptions of gymnastic contests, the youths were instructed in the choric dances employed in festivals of the god, which contributed to impart to them methodized and harmonious movements. Hunting in the woods and mountains of Laconia was encouraged, as a means inuring them to fatigue and privation. The nourishment supplied to the youthful Spartans was purposely kept insufficient, but they were allowed to make up the deficiency not only by hunting, but even by stealing whatever they could lay hands upon, provided they could do so without being detected in the fact; in which latter case they were severely chastised. In reference simply to bodily results, the training at Sparta was excellent, combining strength and agility with universal aptitude and endurance, and steering clear of that mistake by which Thebes and other cities impaired the effect of their gymnastics—the attempt to create an athletic habit, suited for the games but suited for nothing else.

Of all the attributes of this remarkable community, there is none more difficult to make out clearly than the condition and character of the Spartan women. Aristotle asserts that in his time they were imperious and unruly, without being really so brave and useful in moments of danger as other Grecian females; that they possessed great influence over the men, and even exercised much ascendency over the course of public affairs; and that nearly half the landed property of Laconia had come to belong to them. The exemption of the women from all control formed, in his eye, a pointed contrast with the rigorous discipline imposed upon the men,—and a contrast hardly less pointed with the condition of women in other Grecian cities, where they were habitually confined to the interior of the house, and seldom appeared in public. While the Spartan husband went through the hard details of his ascetic life, and dined on the plainest fare at the Pheidition or mess, the wife (it appears) maintained an ample and luxurious establishment at home, and the desire to provide for such outlay was one of the causes of that love of money which prevailed among men forbidden to enjoy it in the ordinary ways. To explain this antithesis between the treatment of the two sexes at Sparta, Aristotle was informed that Lykurgus had tried to bring the women no less than the men under a system of discipline, but that they made so obstinate a resistance as to compel him to desist.

The view here given by the philosopher, and deserving of course careful attention, is not easy to reconcile with that of Xenophon and Plutarch, who look upon the Spartan women from a different side, and represent them as worthy and homogeneous companions to the

men. The Lykurgean system (as these authors describe it), considering the women as a part of the state, and not as a part of the house, placed them under training hardly less than the men. Its grand purpose, the maintenance of a vigorous breed of citizens, determined both the treatment of the younger women, and the regulations as to the intercourse of the sexes. "Female slaves are good enough (Lykurgus thought) to sit at home spinning and weaving—but who can expect a splendid offspring, the appropriate mission and duty of a free Spartan woman towards her country, from mothers brought up in such occupations?" Pursuant to these views, the Spartan damsels underwent a bodily training analogous to that of the Spartan youth—being formally exercised, and contending with each other in running, wrestling and boxing, agreeably to the forms of the Grecian agones. They seem to have worn a light tunic, cut open at the skirts, so as to leave the limbs both free and exposed to view—hence Plutarch speaks of them as completely uncovered, while other critics in different quarters of Greece heaped similar reproach upon the practice, as if it had been perfect nakedness. The presence of the Spartan youths, and even of the kings and the body of citizens, at these exercises, lent animation to the scene. In like manner, the young women marched in the religious processions, sung and danced at particular festivals, and witnessed, as spectators, the exercises and contentions of the youth; so that the two sexes were perpetually intermingled with each other in public, in a way foreign to the habits, as well as repugnant to the feelings, of other Grecian states. We may well conceive that such an education imparted to the women both a demonstrative character and an eager interest in masculine accomplishments, so that the expression of their praise was the strongest stimulus, and that of their reproach the bitterest humiliation, to the youthful troop who heard it.

The age of marriage (which in some of the unrestricted cities of Greece was so early as to deteriorate visibly the breed of citizens) was deferred by the Spartan law, both in women and men, until the period supposed to be most consistent with the perfection of the offspring. And when we read the restriction which Spartan custom imposed upon the intercourse even between married persons, we shall conclude without hesitation that the public intermixture of the sexes in the way just described led to no such liberties, between persons not married, as might be likely to arise from it under other circumstances. Marriage was almost universal among the citizens, enforced by general opinion at least, if not by law. The young Spartan carried away his bride by a simulated abduction, but she still seems, for some time at least, to have continued to reside with her family, visiting her husband in his barrack in the disguise of male attire and on short and stolen occasions. To some married couples, according to Plutarch, it happened that they had been married long enough to have two or three children, while they had

scarcely seen each other apart by daylight. Secret intrigue on the part of married women was unknown at Sparta; but to bring together the finest couples was regarded by the citizens as desirable, and by the lawgiver as a duty. No personal feeling or jealousy on the part of the husband found sympathy from any one—and he permitted without difficulty, sometimes actively encouraged, compliances on the part of his wife consistent with this generally acknowledged object. So far was such toleration carried, that there were some married women who were recognized mistresses of two houses, and mothers of two distinct families—a sort of bigamy strictly forbidden to the men; and never permitted except in the remarkable case of king Anaxandrides, when the royal Herakleidan line of Eurysthenes was in danger of becoming extinct. The wife of Anaxandrides being childless, the ephors strongly urged him, on grounds of public necessity, to repudiate her and marry another. But he refused to dismiss a wife who had given him no cause of complaint; upon which, when they found him inexorable, they desired him to retain her, but to marry another wife besides, in order that at any rate there might be issue to the Eurystheneid line. "He thus (says Herodotus) married two wives, and inhabited two family-hearths, a proceeding unknown at Sparta;" yet the same privilege which, according to Xenophon, some Spartan women enjoyed without reproach from any one, and with perfect harmony between the inmates of both their houses. O. Müller remarks—and the evidence, as far as we know it, bears him out—that love-marriages and genuine affection toward a wife were more familiar to Sparta than to Athens; though in the former, marital jealousy was a sentiment neither indulged nor recognized—while in the latter it was intense and universal.

To reconcile the careful gymnastic training, which Xenophon and Plutarch mention, with that uncontrolled luxury and relaxation which Aristotle condemns in the Spartan women, we may perhaps suppose that in the time of the latter the women of high position and wealth had contrived to emancipate themselves from the general obligation, and that it is of such particular cases that he chiefly speaks. He dwells especially upon the increasing tendency to accumulate property in the hands of the women, which seems to have been still more conspicuous a century afterward in the reign of Agis III. And we may readily imagine that one of the employments of wealth thus acquired would be to purchase exemption from laborious training—an object more easy to accomplish in their case than in that of the men, whose services were required by the state as soldiers. By what steps so large a proportion as two-fifths of the landed property of the state came to be possessed by women, he partially explains to us. There were (he says) many sole heiresses—the dowries given by fathers to their daughters were very large—and the father had unlimited power of testamentary bequest, which he was disposed to

use to the advantage of his daughter over his son. Perfect equality of bequest or inheritance between the two sexes, without any preference for females, would accomplish a great deal; but besides this, we are told by Aristotle that there was in the Spartan mind a peculiar sympathy and yielding disposition toward women, which he ascribes to the warlike temper both of the citizen and of the state—Ares bearing the yoke of Aphrodite. But apart from such a consideration, if we suppose on the part of a wealthy Spartan father the simple disposition to treat sons and daughters alike as to bequest—nearly one-half of the inherited mass of property would naturally be found in the hands of the daughters, since on an average of families the number of the two sexes born is nearly equal. In most societies, it is the men who make new acquisitions; but this seldom or never happened with Spartan men, who disdained all money-getting occupations.

Xenophon, a warm panegyrist of Spartan manners, points with some pride to the tall and vigorous breed of citizens which the Lykurgic institutions had produced. The beauty of the Lacedæmonian women was notorious throughout Greece, and Lampito, the Lacedæmonian woman introduced in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes, is made to receive from the Athenian women the loudest compliments upon her fine shape and masculine vigor. We may remark that, on this as well as on the other points, Xenophon emphatically insists on the peculiarity of Spartan institutions, contradicting thus the views of those who regard them merely as something a little Hyper-Dorian. Indeed, such peculiarity seems never to have been questioned in antiquity, either by the enemies or by the admirers of Sparta. And those who censured the public masculine exercises of the Spartan maidens, as well as the liberty tolerated in married women, allowed at the same time that the feelings of both were actively identified with the state to a degree hardly known in Greece; that the patriotism of the men greatly depended upon the sympathy of the other sex, which manifested itself publicly, in a manner not compatable with the recluse life of Grecian women generally, to the exaltation of the brave as well as to the abasement of the recreant; and that the dignified bearing of the Spartan matrons under private family loss seriously assisted the state in the task of bearing up against public reverses. "Return either with your shield or upon it," was their exhortation to their sons when departing for foreign service; and after the fatal day of Leuktra, those mothers who had to welcome home their surviving sons in dishonor and defeat, were the bitter sufferers; while those whose sons had perished, maintained a bearing comparatively cheerful.

Such were the leading points of the memorable Spartan discipline, strengthened in its effect on the mind by the absence of communication with strangers. For no Spartan could go abroad without leave, nor were strangers permitted to stay at Sparta; they came thither, it

seems, by a sort of sufferance, but the uncourteous process called xenelasy was always available to remove them; nor could there arise in Sparta that class of resident metics or aliens who constituted a large part of the population of Athens, and seem to have been found in most other Grecian towns. It is in this universal schooling, training, and drilling, imposed alike upon boys and men, youths and virgins, rich and poor, that the distinctive attribute of Sparta is to be sought—not in her laws or political constitution.

Lykurgus (or the individual to whom this system is owing, whoever he was) is the founder of a warlike brotherhood rather than the lawgiver of a political community; his brethren live together like bees in a hive (to borrow a simile from Plutarch), with all their feelings implicated in the commonwealth, and divorced from house and home. Far from contemplating the society as a whole, with its multifarious wants and liabilities, he interdicts beforehand, by one of the three primitive Rhetræ, all written laws, that is to say, all formal and premeditated enactments on any special subject. When disputes are to be settled or judicial interference is required, the magistrate is to decide from his own sense of equity; that the magistrate will not depart from the established customs and recognized purposes of the city, is presumed from the personal discipline which he and the select body to whom he belongs have undergone. It is this select body, maintained by the labor of others, over whom Lykurgus exclusively watches, with the provident eye of a trainer, for the purpose of disciplining them into a state of regimental preparation, single-minded obedience, and bodily efficiency and endurance, so that they may be always ready and fit for defense, for conquest, and for dominion. The parallel of the Lykurgean institutions is to be found in the Republic of Plato, who approves the Spartan principle of select guardians, carefully trained, and administering the community at discretion; with this momentous difference, indeed, that the Spartan character formed by Lykurgus is of a low type, rendered savage and fierce by exclusive and overdone bodily discipline, destitute even of the elements of letters, immersed in their own narrow specialities, and taught to despise all that lay beyond, possessing all the qualities requisite to procure dominion, but none of those calculated to render dominion popular or salutary to the subject; while the habits and attributes of the guardians, as shadowed forth by Plato, are enlarged as well as philanthropic, qualifying them not simply to govern, but to govern for purposes protective, conciliatory, and exalted. Both Plato and Aristotle conceive as the perfection of society something of the Spartan type—a select body of equally privileged citizens, disengaged from industrious pursuits, and subjected to public and uniform training. Both admit (with Lykurgus) that the citizen belongs neither to himself nor to his family, but to his city; both at the same time note with regret that the Spartan training was turned only to one portion of human virtue

—that which is called forth in a state of war; the citizens being converted into a sort of garrison, always under drill, and always ready to be called forth either against Helots at home or against enemies abroad. Such exclusive tendency will appear less astonishing if we consider the very early and insecure period at which the Lykurgean institutions arose, when none of those guarantees which afterward maintained the peace of the Hellenic world had as yet become effective—no constant habit of intercourse, no custom of meeting in Amphiktyony from the distant parts of Greece, no common or largely frequented festivals, no multiplication of proxenies (or standing tickets of hospitality) between the important cities, no pacific or industrious habits anywhere. When we contemplate the general insecurity of Grecian life in the ninth or eighth century before the Christian era, and especially the precarious condition of a small band of Dorian conquerers, in Sparta and its district, with subdued Helots on their own lands and Achæans unsubdued all around them—we shall not be surprised that the language which Brasidas in the Peloponnesian war addresses to his army in reference to the original Spartan settlement, was still more powerfully present to the mind of Lykurgus four centuries earlier—"We are a few in the midst of many enemies; we can only maintain ourselves by fighting and conquering."

Under such circumstances, the exclusive aim which Lykurgus proposed to himself is easily understood; but what is truly surprising is the violence of his means and the success of the result. He realized his project of creating in the 8,000 or 9,000 Spartan citizens unrivaled habits of obedience, hardihood, self-denial, and military aptitude—complete subjection on the part of each individual to the local public opinion, and preference of death to the abandonment of Spartan maxims—intense ambition on the part of every one to distinguish himself within the prescribed sphere of duties, with little ambition for anything else. In what manner so rigorous a system of individual training can have been first brought to bear upon any community, mastering the course of the thoughts and actions from boyhood to old age—a work far more difficult than any political revolution—we are not permitted to discover. Nor does even the influence of an earnest and energetic Herakleid man—seconded by the still more powerful working of the Delphian god behind, upon the strong pious susceptibilities of the Spartan mind—sufficiently explain a phenomenon so remarkable in the history of mankind, unless we suppose them aided by some combination of co-operating circumstances which history has not transmitted to us, and preceded by disorders so exaggerated as to render the citizens glad to escape from them at any price.

Respecting the ante-Lykurgean Sparta, we possess no positive information whatever. But although this unfortunate gap cannot be filled up, we may yet master the negative probabilities of the case,

sufficiently to see that in what Plutarch has told us (and from Plutarch the modern views have, until lately, been derived), there is indeed a basis of reality, but there is also a large superstructure of romance—in not a few particulars essentially misleading. For example, Plutarch treats Lykurgus as introducing his reforms at a time when Sparta was mistress of Laconia, and distributing the whole of that territory among the Periœki. Now we know that Laconia was not then in possession of Sparta, and that the partition of Lykurgus (assuming it to be real), could only have been applied to the land in the immediate vicinity of the latter. For even Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ were not conquered until the reign of Teleklus, posterior to any period which we can reasonably assign to Lykurgus; nor can any such distribution of Laconia have really occurred. Further, we are told that Lykurgus banished from Sparta coined gold and silver, useless professions and frivolities, eager pursuit of gain, and ostentatious display. Without dwelling upon the improbability that any one of these anti-Spartan characteristics should have existed at so early a period as the ninth century before the Christian era, we may at least be certain that coined silver was not then to be found, since it was first introduced into Greece by Pheidon of Argos in the succeeding century, as has been stated in the preceding section.

But amongst all the points stated by Plutarch, the most suspicious by far and the most misleading, because endless calculations have been built upon it, is the alleged redivision of landed property. He tells us that Lykurgus found fearful inequality in the landed possessions of the Spartans; nearly all the land in the hands of a few, and a great multitude without any land; that he rectified this evil by a redivision of the Spartan district into 9,000 equal lots, and the rest of Laconia into 30,000, giving to each citizen as much as would produce a given quota of barley, etc.; and that he wished, moreover, to have divided the movable property upon similar principles of equality, but was deterred by the difficulties of carrying his design into execution.

Now we shall find on consideration that this new and equal partition of lands by Lykurgus is still more at variance with fact and probability than the two former alleged proceedings. All the historical evidences exhibit decided inequalities of property among the Spartans—inequalities which tended constanly to increase; moreover, the earlier authors do not conceive this evil as having grown up by way of abuse out of a primeval system of perfect equality, nor do they know anything of the original equal redivision by Lykurgus. Even as early as the poet Alkæus (B.C. 600-580) we find bitter complaints of the oppressive ascendency of wealth, and the degradation of the poor man, cited as having been pronounced by Aristodemus at Sparta: "Wealth (said he) makes the man—no poor person is either accounted good or honored." Next, the historian Hellanikus certainly

knew nothing of the Lykurgean redivision—for he ascribed the whole Spartan polity to Eurysthenes and Prokles, the original founders, and hardly noticed Lykurgus at all. Again, in the brief but impressive description of the Spartan lawgiver by Herodotus, several other institutions are alluded to, but nothing is said about a redivision of the lands; and this latter point is in itself of such transcendent moment, and was so recognized among all Grecian thinkers, that the omission is almost a demonstration of ignorance. Thucydides certainly could not have believed that equality of property was an original feature of the Lykurgean system; for he says that at Lacedæmon "the rich men assimilated themselves greatly in respect of clothing and general habits of life to the simplicity of the poor, and thus set an example which was partially followed in the rest of Greece:" a remark which both implies the existence of unequal property, and gives a just appreciation of the real working of Lykurgic institutions. The like is the sentiment of Xenophon: he observes that the rich at Sparta gained little by their wealth in point of superior comfort; but he never glances at any original measure carried into effect by Lykurgus for equalizing possessions. Plato, too, while he touches upon the great advantage possessed by the Dorians, immediately after their conquest of Peloponnesus, in being able to apportion land suitably to all—never hints that this original distribution had degenerated into an abuse, and that an entire subsequent redivision had been resorted to by Lykurgus: moreover, he is himself deeply sensible of the hazards of that formidable proceeding. Lastly, Aristotle clearly did not believe that Lykurgus had redivided the soil. For he informs us, first, that "both in Lacedæmon and in Krete, the legislator had rendered the enjoyment of property common through the establishment of the Syssitia or public mess." Now this remark (if read in the chapter of which it forms part, a refutation of the scheme of communism for the select guardians in the Platonic Republic) will be seen to tell little for its point, if we assume that Lykurgus at the same time equalized all individual possessions. Had Aristotle known that fact, he could not have failed to notice it; nor could he have assimilated the legislators in Lacedæmon and Krete, seeing that in the latter no one pretends that any such equalization was ever brought about. Next, only does Aristotle dwell upon the actual inequality of property at Sparta as a serious public evil, but he nowhere treats this as having grown out of a system of absolute equality once enacted by the lawgiver as a part of the primitive constitution; he expressly notices inequality of property so for back as the second Messenian war. Moreover, in that valuable chapter of his Politics where the scheme of equality of possessions is discussed, Phaleas of Chalkedon is expressly mentioned as the first author of it, thus indirectly excluding Lykurgus. The mere silence of Aristotle is in this discussion a negative argument of the greatest weight. Isokrates, too, speaks much about Sparta for good and for evil, mentions Lykurgus as having established a political constitution much like that of the earliest days of Athens, praises the gymnasia and the discipline, and compliments the Spartans upon the many centuries which they have gone through without violent sedition, extinction of debts, and redivision of the land—those "monstrous evils" as he terms them. Had he conceived Lykurgus as being himself the author of a complete redivision of land, he could hardly have avoided some allusion to it.

It appears, then, that none of the authors down to Aristotle ascribe to Lykurgus a redivision of the lands, either of Sparta or of Loconia. The statement to this effect in Plutarch, given in great detail and with precise specification of number and produce, must have been borrowed from some author later than Aristotle; and I think we may trace the source of it, when we study Plutarch's biography of Lykurgus in conjunction with that of Agis and Kleomenes. The statement is taken from authors of the century after Aristotle, either in, or shortly before, the age when both those kings tried extreme measures to renovate the sinking state: the former by a thorough change of system and property, yet proposed and accepted according to constitutional forms; the latter by projects substantially similar, with violence to enforce them. The accumulation of landed property in few hands, the multiplication of poor, and the decline in the number of citizens, which are depicted as grave mischiefs by Aristotle, had become greatly aggravated during the century between him and Agis. The number of citizens, reckoned by Herodotus in the time of the Persian invasion at 8,000, had dwindled down in the time of Aristotle to 1000, and in that of Agis to 700, out of which latter number 100 alone possessed most of the landed property of the state. Now by the ancient rule of Lykurgus, the qualification for citizenship was the ability to furnish the prescribed quota, incumbent on each individual, at the public mess: so soon as a citizen became too poor to answer to this requisition, he lost his franchise and his eligibility to offices. The smaller lots of land, though it was held discreditable either to buy or sell them, and though some have asserted (without ground I think) that it was forbidden to divide them —became insufficient for numerous families, and seem to have been alienated in some indirect manner to the rich; while every industrious occupation being both interdicted to a Spartan citizen and really inconsistent with his rigorous personal discipline, no other means of furnishing his quota, except the lot of land, was open to him. The difficulty felt with regard to these smaller lots of land may be judged of from the fact stated by Polybius, that three or four Spartan brothers had often one and the same wife, the paternal land being just sufficient to furnish contributions for all to the public mess, and thus to keep alive the citizen-rights of all the sons. The tendency to diminution in the number of Spartan citizens seems to have gone on uninterruptedly from the time of the Persian war, and must have

been aggravated by the foundation of Messene, with its independent territory around, after the battle of Leuktra, an event which robbed the Spartans of a large portion of their property. Apart from these special causes, moreover, it has been observed often as a statistical fact, that a close corporation of citizens, or any small number of families, intermarrying habitually among one another, and not reinforced from without, have usually a tendency to diminish.

The present is not the occasion to enter at length into that combination of causes which partly sapped, partly overthrew, both the institutions of Lykurgus and the power of Sparta. But taking the condition of that city as it stood in the time of Agis III. (say about 250 B.C.), we know that its citizens had become few in number, the bulk of them miserably poor, and all the land in a small number of hands. The old discipline and the public mess (as far as the rich were concerned) had degenerated into mere forms—a numerous body of strangers or non-citizens (the old xenelasy, or prohibition of resident strangers, being long discontinued) were domiciled in the town, forming a powerful moneyed interest; and lastly, the dignity and ascendency of the state amongst its neighbors were altogether ruined. It was insupportable to a young enthusiast like king Agis, as well as to many ardent spirits among his contemporaries, to contrast this degradation with the previous glories of their country; nor did they see any other way of reconstructing the old Sparta except by again admitting the disfranchised poor citizens, redividing the lands, canceling all debts, and restoring the public mess and military training in all their strictness. Agis endeavored to carry through these subversive measures (such as no demagogue in the extreme democracy of Athens would ever have ventured to glance at) with the consent of the senate and public assembly, and the acquiescence of the rich. His sincerity is attested by the fact, that his own property, and that of his female relatives, among the largest in the state, was cast as the first sacrifice into the common stock. But he became the dupe of unprincipled coadjutors, and perished in the unavailing attempt to realize his scheme by persuasion. His successor, Kleomenes, afterwards accomplished by violence a change substantially similar, though the intervention of foreign arms speedily overthrew both himself and his institutions.

Now it was under the state of public feeling which gave birth to these projects of Agis and Kleomenes at Sparta, that the historic fancy, unknown to Aristotle and his predecessors, first gained ground, of the absolute equality of property as a primitive institution of Lykurgus. How much such a belief would favor the schemes of innovation is too obvious to require notice; and without supposing any deliberate imposture, we cannot be astonished that the predispositions of enthusiastic patriots interpreted according to their own partialities an old unrecorded legislation from which they were separated by more than five centuries. The Lykurgean discipline

tended forcibly to suggest to men's minds the *idea* of equality among the citizens—that is, the negation of all inequality not founded on some personal attribute, inasmuch as it assimilated the habits, enjoyments, and capacities of the rich to those of the poor; and the equality thus existing in idea and tendency, which seemed to proclaim the wish of the founder, was strained by the later reformers into a positive institution which he had at first realized, but from which his degenerate followers had receded. It was thus that the fancies, longings, and indirect suggestions of the present assumed the character of recollections out of the early, obscure, and extinct historical past. Perhaps the philosopher Sphærus of Borysthenes (friend and companion of Kleomenes, disciple of Zeno the Stoic, and author of works now lost both on Lykurgus and Sokrates and on the constitution of Sparta) may have been one of those who gave currency to such an hypothesis. And we shall readily believe, that if advanced, it would find easy and sincere credence, when we recollect how many similar delusions have obtained vogue in modern times far more favorable to historical accuracy—how much false coloring has been attached by the political feeling of recent days to matters of ancient history, such as the Saxon Witenagemote, the great charter, the rise and growth of the English house of commons, or even the poor law of Elizabeth.

When we read the division of lands really proposed by king Agis, it is found to be a very close copy of the original division ascribed to Lykurgus. He parcels the lands bounded by the four limits of Pellene, Sellasia, Malea, and Taygetus into 4,500 lots, one to every Spartan; and the lands beyond these limits into 15,000 lots, one to each Periœkus; and he proposes to constitute in Sparta fifteen Pheiditia or public mess-tables, some including 400 individuals, others 200—thus providing a place for each of his 4,500 Spartans. With respect to the division originally ascribed to Lykurgus, different accounts were given. Some considered it to have set out 9,000 lots for the district of Sparta, and 30,000 for the rest of Laconia; others affirmed that 6,000 lots had been given by Lykurgus, and 3,000 added afterwards by king Polydorus; a third tale was, that Lykurgus had assigned 4,500 lots, and king Polydorus as many more. This last scheme is much the same as what was really proposed by Agis.

In the preceding argument respecting the redivision of land ascribed to Lykurgus, I have taken that measure as it is described by Plutarch. But there has been a tendency, in some able modern writers, while admitting the general fact of such redivision, to reject the account given by Plutarch in some of its main circumstances. That, for instance, which is the capital feature in Plutarch's narrative, and which gives soul and meaning to his picture of the lawgiver—the equality of partition—is now rejected by many as incorrect, and it is supposed that Lykurgus made some new agrarian regulations tending toward a general equality of landed property, but not an entirely new partition; that he may have resumed from

the wealthy men lands which they had unjustly taken from the conquered Achæans, and thus provided allotments both for the poorer citizens and for the subject Laconians. Such is the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, who at the same time admits that the exact proportion of the Lykurgean distribution can hardly be ascertained.

I cannot but take a different view of the statement made by Plutarch. The moment that we depart from that rule of equality which stands so prominently marked in his biography of Lykurgus, we step into a boundless field of possibility, in which there is nothing to determine us to one point more than to another. The surmise started by Dr. Thirlwall, of lands unjustly taken from the conquered Achæans by wealthy Spartan proprietors, is altogether gratuitous; and granting it to be correct, we have still to explain how it happened that this correction of a partial injustice came to be transformed into the comprehensive and systematic measure which Plutarch describes; and to explain, further, from whence it arose that none of the authors earlier than Plutarch take any notice of Lykurgus as an agrarian equalizer. These two difficulties will still remain, even if we overlook the gratuitous nature of Dr. Thirlwall's supposition, or of any other supposition which can be proposed respecting the real Lykurgean measure which Plutarch is affirmed to have misrepresented.

It appears to me that these difficulties are best obviated by adopting a different canon of historical interpretation. We cannot accept as real the Lykurgean land division described in the life of the lawgiver; but treating this account as a fiction, two modes of proceeding are open to us. We may either consider the fiction as it now stands to be the exaggeration and distortion of some small fact, and then try to guess, without any assistance, what the small fact was; or we may regard it as fiction from first to last, the expression of some large idea and sentiment so powerful in its action on men's minds at a given time as to induce them to make a place for it among the realities of the past. Now the latter supposition, applied to the times of Agis III., best meets the case before us. The eighth chapter of the life of Lykurgus by Plutarch, in recounting the partition of land, describes the dream of king Agis, whose mind is full of two sentiments—grief and shame for the actual condition of his country, together with reverence for its past glories, as well as for the lawgiver from whose institutions those glories had emanated. Absorbed with this double feeling, the reveries of Agis go back to the old ante-Lykurgean Sparta as it stood more than five centuries before. He sees in the spirit the same mischiefs and disorders as those which afflict his waking eye—gross inequalities of property, with a few insolent and luxurious rich, a crowd of mutinous and suffering poor, and nothing but fierce antipathy reigning between the two. Into the midst of this froward, lawless, and distempered community steps the venerable missionary from Delphi, breathes into men's minds

new impulses, and an impatience to shake off the old social and political Adam—and persuades the rich, voluntarily abnegating their temporal advantages, to welcome with satisfaction a new system wherein no distinction shall be recognized, except that of good or evil deserts. Having thus regenerated the national mind, he parcels out the territory of Laconia into equal lots, leaving no superiority to any one. Fraternal harmony becomes the reigning sentiment, while the coming harvests present the gratifying spectacle of a paternal inheritance recently distributed, with the brotherhood contented, modest, and docile. Such is the picture with which "mischievous Oneirus" cheats the fancy of the patriotic Agis, whispering the treacherous message that the gods have promised *him* success in a similar attempt, and thus seducing him into that fatal revolutionary course which is destined to bring himself, his wife, and his aged mother to the dungeon and the hangman's rope.

That the golden dream just described was dreamt by some Spartan patriots is certain, because it stands recorded in Plutarch; that it was not dreamt by the authors of centuries preceding Agis, I have already endeavored to show; that the earnest feelings of sickness of the present and yearning for a better future under the colors of a restored past, which filled the soul of this king and his brother reformers—combined with the leveling tendency between rich and poor which really was inherent in the Lykurgean discipline—were amply sufficient to beget such a dream and to procure for it a place among the great deeds of the old lawgiver, so much venerated and so little known—this too I hold to be unquestionable. Had there been any evidence that Lykurgus had interfered with private property, to the limited extent which Dr. Thirlwall and other able critics imagine—that he had resumed certain lands unjustly taken by the rich from the Achæans—I should have been glad to record it; but finding no such evidence, I cannot think it necessary to presume the fact simply in order to account for the story in Plutarch.

The various items in that story all hang together, and must be understood as forming parts of the same comprehensive fact, or comprehensive fancy. The fixed total of 9,000 Spartan and 30,000 Laconian lots, the equality between them, and the rent accruing from each, represented by a given quantity of moist and dry produce—all these particulars are alike true or alike uncertified. Upon the various numbers here given, many authors have raised calculations as to the population and produce of Laconia, which appear to me destitute of any trustworthy foundation. Those who accept the history, that Lykurgus constituted the above-mentioned numbers both of citizens and of lots of land, and that he contemplated the maintenance of both numbers in unchangeable proportion—are perplexed to assign the means whereby this adjustment was kept undisturbed. Nor are they much assisted in the solution of this embarrassing problem by the statement of Plutarch, who tells us that the number remained

fixed of itself, and that the succession ran on from father to son without either consolidation or multiplication of parcels, down to the period when foreign wealth flowed into Sparta, as a consequence of the successful conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. Shortly after that period (he tells us) a citizen named Epitadeus became ephor—a vindictive and malignant man, who, having had a quarrel with his son, and wishing to oust him from the succession, introduced and obtained sanction to a new Rhetra, whereby power was granted to every father of a family either to make over during life, or to bequeath after death, his house and his estate to any one whom he chose. But it is plain that this story (whatever be the truth about the family quarrel of Epitadeus) does not help us out of the difficulty. From the time of Lykurgus to that of this disinheriting ephor, more than four centuries must be reckoned; now had there been real causes at work sufficient to main inviolate the identical number of lots and families during this long period, we see no reason why his new law, simply permissive and nothing more, should have overthrown it. We are not told by Plutarch what was the law of succession prior to Epitadeus. If the whole estate went by law to one son in the family, what became of the other sons, to whom industrious acquisition in any shape was repulsive as well as interdicted? If, on the other hand, the estate was divided between the sons equally (as it was by the law of succession at Athens), how can we defend the maintenance of an unchanged aggregate number of parcels?

Dr. Thirlwall, after having admitted a modified interference with private property by Lykurgus, so as to exact from the wealthy a certain sacrifice in order to create lots for the poor, and to bring about something approaching to equi-producing lots for all, observes: "The average amount of the rent (paid by the cultivating Helots from each lot) seems to have been no more than was required for the frugal maintenance of a family with six persons. The right of transfer was as strictly confined as that of enjoyment: the patrimony was indivisible, inalienable, and descended to the eldest son; in default of a male heir, to the eldest daughter. The object seems to have been, after the number of the allotments became fixed, that each should be constantly represented by one head of a household. But the nature of the means employed for this end is one of the most obscure points of the Spartan system. . . . . In the better times of the commonwealth, this seems to have been principally effected by adoptions and marriages with heiresses, which provided for the marriages of younger sons in families too numerous to be supported on their own hereditary property. It was then probably seldom necessary for the state to interfere, in order to direct the childless owner of an estate, or the father of a rich heiress, to a proper choice. But as all adoption required the sanction of the kings, and they had also the disposal of the hand of orphan heiresses, there can be little doubt that the magistrate had the power of interposing on such occasions, even in opposition to the wishes of individuals, to relieve poverty and check the accumulation of wealth" (*Hist. Gr.* ch. 8, vol. i. p. 367).

I cannot concur in the view which Dr. Thirlwall here takes of the state of property, or the arrangements respecting its transmission, in ancient Sparta. Neither the equal modesty of possession which he supposes, nor the precautions for perpetuating it, can be shown to have ever existed among the pupils of Lykurgus. Our earliest information intimates the existence of rich men at Sparta: the story of king Aristo and Agetus, in Herodotus, exhibits to us the latter as a man who cannot be supposed to have had only just "enough to maintain six persons frugally"—while his beautiful wife, whom Aristo coveted and entrapped from him, is expressly described as the daughter of opulent parents. Sperthies and Bulis the Talthybiads are designated as belonging to a distinguished race, and among the wealthiest men in Sparta. Demaratus was the only king of Sparta, in the days of Herodotus, who had ever gained a chariot victory in the Olympic games; but we know by the case of Lichas during the Peloponnesian war, Evagoras, and others, that private Spartans were equally successful; and for one Spartan who won the prize, there must of course have been many who bred their horses and started their chariots unsuccessfully. It need hardly be remarked that chariot-competition at Olympia was one of the most significant evidences of a wealthy house: nor were there wanting Spartans who kept horses and dogs without any exclusive view to the games. We know from Xenophon, that at the time of the battle of Leuktra, "the very rich Spartans" provided the horses to be mounted for the state-cavalry. These and other proofs of the existence of rich men at Sparta, are inconsistent with the idea of a body of citizens each possessing what was about enough for the frugal maintenance of six persons and no more.

As we do not find that such was in practice the state of property in the Spartan community so neither can we discover that the lawgiver ever tried either to make or to keep it so. What he did was to impose a rigorous public discipline, with simple clothing and fare, incumbent alike upon the rich and the poor (this was his special present to Greece, according to Thucydides, and his great point of contact with democracy, according to Aristotle); but he took no pains either to restrain the enrichment of the former, or to prevent the impoverishment of the latter. He meddled little with the distribution of property, and such neglect is one of the capital deficiencies for which Aristotle censures him. That philosopher tells us, indeed, that the Spartan law had made it dishonorable (he does not say peremptorily forbidden) to buy or sell landed property, but that there was the fullest liberty both of donation and bequest: and the same results (he justly observes) ensued from the practice tolerated as would have ensued from the practice discountenanced—since it was easy to disguise a real sale

under an ostensible donation. He notices pointedly the tendency of property at Sparta to concentrate itself in fewer hand unopposed by any legal hindrances: the fathers married their daughters to whomsoever they choose, and gave dowries according to their own discretion, generally very large: the rich families moreover intermarried among one another habitually and without restriction. Now all the these are indicated by Aristotle as cases in which the law might have interfered—and ought to have interfered, but did not—for the great purpose of disseminating the benefits of landed property as much as possible among the mass of the citizens. Again, he tells us that the law encouraged the multiplication of progeny, and granted exemptions to such citizens as had three or four children; but took no thought how the numerous families of poorer citizens were to live, or to maintain their qualification at the public tables—most of the lands of the state being in the hands of the rich. His notice, and condemnation of that law, which made the franchise of the Spartan citizen dependent upon his continuing to furnish his quota to the public table, have been already adverted to; as well as the potent love of money which he notes in the Spartan character, and which must have tended continually to keep together the richer families among themselves: while amongst a community where industry was unknown, no poor citizen could ever become rich.

If we duly weigh these evidences, we shall see that equality of possessions neither existed in fact, nor ever entered into the scheme and tendencies of the lawgiver at Sparta. And the picture which Dr. Thirlwall has drawn of a body of citizens each possessing a lot of land about adequate to the frugal maintenance of six persons—of adoptions and marriages of heiresses arranged with a deliberate view of providing for the younger children of numerous families—of interference on the part of the kings to ensure this object—of a fixed number of lots of land, each represented by one head of a household—this picture is one, of which the reality must not be sought on the banks of the Eurotas. The "better times of the commonwealth," to which he refers, may have existed in the glowing retrospect of Agis, but are not acknowledged in the sober appreciation of Aristotle. That the citizens were far more numerous in early times, the philosopher tells us, and that the community had in his day greatly declined in power, we also know: in this sense the times of Sparta had doubtless once been better. We may even concede that during the three centuries succeeding Lykurgus, when they were continually acquiring new territory, and when Aristotle had been told that they had occasionally admitted new citizens, so that the aggregate number of citizens had once been 10,000—we may concede that in these previous centuries the distribution of land had been less unequal, so that the disproportion between the great size of the territory and the small number of citizens was not so marked as it had become at the period which the philosopher personally witnessed; for the causes

tending to augmented inequality were constant and uninterrupted in their working. But this admission will still leave us far removed from the sketch drawn by Dr. Thirlwall, which depicts the Lykurgean Sparta as starting from a new agrarian scheme not far removed from equality of landed property—the citizens as spontaneously disposed to uphold this equality by giving to unprovided men the benefit of adoptions and heiress-marriages, and the magistrate as interfering to enforce this latter purpose, even in cases where the citizens were themselves unwilling. All our evidence exhibits to us both decided inequality of possessions and inclinations on the part of rich men the reverse of those which Dr. Thirlwall indicates; nor will the powers of interference which he ascribes to the magistrate be found sustained by the chapter of Herodotus on which he seems to rest them.

To conceive correctly, then, the Lykurgean system, as far as obscurity and want of evidence will permit, it seems to me that there are two current misconceptions which it is essential to discard. One of these is, that the system included a repartition of landed property, upon principles of exact or approximative equality (distinct from that appropriation which belonged to the Dorian conquest and settlement), and provisions for perpetuating the number of distinct and equal lots. The other is, that it was first brought to bear when the Spartans were masters of all Laconia. The illusions created by the old legend—which depicts Laconia as all one country, and all conquered at one stroke—yet survive after the legend itself has been set aside as bad evidence: we cannot conceive Sparta as subsisting by itself without dominion over Laconia, nor Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ as really and truly independent of Sparta. Yet, if these towns were independent in the time of Lykurgus, much more confidently may the same independence be affirmed of the portions of Laconia which lie lower than Amyklæ down the valley of the Eurotas, as well as of the eastern coast, which Herodotus expressly states to have been originally connected with Argos.

Discarding then these two suppositions, we have to consider the Lykurgean system as brought to bear upon Sparta and its immediate circumjacent district, apart from the rest of Laconia, and as not meddling systematically with the partition of property, whatever that may have been, which the Dorian conquerors established at their original settlement. Lykurgus does not try to make the poor rich, nor the rich poor; but he imposes upon both the same subjugating drill—the same habits of life, gentlemanlike idleness, and unlettered strength—the same fare, clothing, labors, privations, endurance, punishments, and subordination. It is a lesson instructive at least, however unsatisfactory, to political students—that with all this equality of dealing, he ends in creating a community in whom not merely the love of pre-eminence, but even the love of money, stands powerfully and specially developed.

How far the peculiar of the primitive Sparta extended we have no

means of determining; but its limits down the valley of the Eurotas were certainly narrow, inasmuch as it did not reach so far as Amyklæ. Nor can we tell what principles the Dorian conquerors may have followed in the original allotment of lands within the limits of that peculiar. Equal apportionment is not probable, because all the individuals of a conquering band are seldom regarded as possessing equal claims; but whatever the original apportionment may have been, it remained without any general or avowed disturbance until the days of Agis III. and Kleomenes III. Here then we have the primitive Sparta, including Dorian warriors with their Helot subjects, but no Periœki. And it is upon these Spartans separately, perhaps after the period of aggravated disorder and lawlessness noticed by Herodotus and Thucydides, that the painful but invigorating discipline above sketched must have been originally brought to bear.

The gradual conquest of Laconia, with the acquisition of additional lands and new Helots, and the formation of the order of Periœki, both of which were a consequence of it, is to be considered as posterior to the introduction of the Lykurgean system at Sparta, and as resulting partly from the increased force which that system imparted. The career of conquest went on, beginning from Teleklus, for nearly three centuries—with some interruptions indeed, and in the case of the Messenian war, with a desperate and even precarious struggle—so that in the time of Thucydides, and for some time previously, the Spartans possessed two-fifths of Peloponnesus. And this series of new acquisitions and victories disguised the really weak point of the Spartan system, by rendering it possible either to plant the poorer citizens as Periœki in a conquered township, or to supply them with lots of land, of which they could receive the produce without leaving the city—so that their numbers and their military strength were prevented from declining. It is even affirmed by Aristotle, that during these early times they augmented the number of their citizens by fresh admissions, which, of course, implies the acquisition of additional lots of land. But successful war (to use an expression substantially borrowed from the same philosopher) was necessary to their salvation: the establishment of their ascendency, and of their maximum of territory, was followed, after no very long interval, by symptoms of decline. It will hereafter be seen that at the period of the conspiracy of Kinadon (395 B.C.), the full citizens (called Homoioi or peers) were considerably inferior in number to the Hypomeiones, or Spartans who could no longer furnish their qualification, and had become disfranchised. And the loss thus sustained was very imperfectly repaired by the admitted practice sometimes resorted to by rich men, of associating with their own children the children of poorer citizens, and paying the contribution of these latter to the public tables, so as to enable them to go through the prescribed course of education and discipline—whereby they became

(under the title or sobriquet of Mothakes) citizens, with a certain taint of inferiority, yet were sometimes appointed to honorable commands.

Laconia, the state and territory of the Lacedæmonians, was affirmed at the time of its greatest extension to have comprehended 100 cities—this after the conquest of Messenia, so that it would include all the southern portion of Peloponnesus, from Thyrea on the Argolic gulf to the southern bank of the river Nedon in its course into the Ionian sea. But Laconia, more strictly so called, was distinguished from Messenia, and was understood to designate the portion of the above-mentioned territory which lay to the east of Mount Taygetus. The conquest of Messenia by the Spartans we shall presently touch upon; but that of Laconia proper is very imperfectly narrated to us. Down to the reign of Teleklus, as has been before remarked, Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ were still Achæan: in the reign of that prince they were first conquered, and the Achæans either expelled or subjugated. It cannot be doubted that Amyklæ had been previously a place of consequence: in point of heroic antiquity and memorials, this city, as well as Therapnæ, seems to have surpassed Sparta. And the war of the Spartans against it is represented as a struggle of some moment—indeed, in those times the capture of any walled city was tedious and difficult. Timomachus, an Ægeid from Thebes, at the head of a body of his countrymen, is said to have rendered essential service to the Spartans in the conquest of the Achæans of Amyklæ; and the brave resistance of the latter was commemorated by a monument erected to Zeus Tropæus at Sparta, which was still to be seen in the time of Pausanias. The Achæans of Pharis and Geronthræ, alarmed by the fate of Amyklæ, are said to have surrendered their towns with little or no resistance: after which the inhabitants of all the three cities, either wholly or in part, went into exile beyond sea, giving place to colonists from Sparta. From this time forward, according to Pausanias, Amyklæ continued as a village. But as the Amyklæan hoplites constituted a valuable portion of the Spartan army, it must have been numbered among the cities of the Periœki as one of the hundred, the distinction between a dependent city and a village not being very strictly drawn. The festival of the Hyacinthia, celebrated at the great temple of the Amyklæan Apollo, was among the most solemn and venerated in the Spartan calendar.

It was in the time of Alkamenes, the son of Teleklus, that the Spartans conquered Helus, a maritime town on the left bank of the Eurotas, and reduced its inhabitants to bondage—from whose name, according to various authors, the general title *Helots*, belonging to all the serfs of Laconia, was derived. But of the conquest of the other towns of Laconia—Gytheium, Akriæ, Therapnæ, etc.—or of the eastern land on the coast of the Argolic gulf, including Brasiæ and Epidaurus Limera, or the island of Kythera, all which at one time belonged to the Argeian confederacy, we have no accounts.

Scanty as our information is, it just enables us to make out a progressive increase of force and dominion on the part of the Spartans, resulting from the organization of Lykurgus. Of this progress a further manifestation is found, besides the conquest of the Achæans in the south by Teleklus and Alkamenes, in their successful opposition to the great power of Pheidon, the Argeian, related in a previous chapter. We now approach the long and arduous efforts by which they accomplished the subjugation of their brethren the Messenian Dorians.

CHAPTER VII.

FIRST AND SECOND MESSENIAN WARS.

THAT there were two long contests between the Lacedæmonians and Messenians, and that, in both, the former were completely victorious, is a fact sufficiently attested. And if we could trust the statements in Pausanias—our chief and almost only authority on the subject—we should be in a situation to recount the history of both these wars in considerable detail. But unfortunately the incidents narrated in that writer have been gathered from sources which are, even by his own admission, undeserving of credit—from Rhianus, the poet of Bene in Krete, who had composed an epic poem on Aristomenes and the second Messenian war, about B.C. 220—and from Myron of Priene, a prose author whose date is not exactly known, but belonging to the Alexandrine age, and not earlier than the third century before the Christian era. From Rhianus we have no right to expect trustworthy information, while the accuracy of Myron is much depreciated by Pausanias himself—on some points even too much, as will presently be shown. But apart from the mental habits either of the prose writer or the poet, it does not seem that any good means of knowledge were open to either of them, except the poems of Tyrtæus, which we are by no means sure that they ever consulted. The account of the two wars, extracted from these two authors by Pausanias, is a string of tableaux, several of them, indeed, highly poetical, but destitute of historical coherence or sufficiency; and O. Müller has justly observed that "absolutely no reason is given in them for the subjection of Messenia." They are accounts unworthy of being transcribed in detail into the pages of general history, nor can we pretend to do anything more than verify a few leading facts of the war.

The poet Tyrtæus was himself engaged on the side of the Spartans in the second war, and it is from him that we learn the few indisputable facts respecting both the first and the second. If the Messenians had never been re-established in Peloponnesus, we should probably never have heard any further details respecting these early contests.

That re-establishment, together with the first foundation of the city called Messene on Mount Ithome, was among the capital wounds inflicted on Sparta by Epaminondas, in the year B.C. 369—between 300 and 250 years after the conclusion of the second Messenian war. The descendants of the old Messenians, who had remained for so long a period without any fixed position in Greece, were incorporated in the new city, together with various Helots and miscellaneous settlers who had no claim to a similar genealogy. The gods and heroes of the Messenian race were reverentially invoked at this great ceremony, especially the great hero Aristomenes; and the sight of Mount Ithome, the ardor of the newly established citizens, the hatred and apprehension of Sparta, operating as a powerful stimulus to the creation and multiplication of what are called *traditions*, sufficed to expand the few facts known respecting the struggles of the old Messenians into a variety of details. In almost all these stories we discover a coloring unfavorable to Sparta, contrasting forcibly with the account given by Isokrates in his discourse called Archidamus, wherein we read the view which a Spartan might take of the ancient conquests of his forefathers. But a clear proof that these Messenian stories had no real basis of tradition is shown in the contradictory statements respecting the principal hero Aristomenes, for some place him in the first, others in the second, of the two wars. Diodorus and Myron both placed him in the first; Rhianus in the second. Though Pausanias gives it as his opinion that the account of the latter is preferable, and that Aristomenes really belongs to the second Messenian war, it appears to me that the one statement is as much worthy of belief as the other, and that there is no sufficient evidence for deciding between them—a conclusion which is substantially the same with that of Wesseling, who thinks that there were two persons named Aristomenes, one in the first and one in the second war. This inextricable confusion respecting the greatest name in Messenian antiquity shows how little any genuine stream of tradition can here be recognized.

Pausanias states the first Messenian war as beginning in B.C. 743 and lasting till B.C. 724—the second as beginning in B.C. 685 and lasting till B.C. 668. Neither of these dates rests upon any assignable positive authority; but the time assigned to the first war seems probable, while that of the second is apparently too early. Tyrtæus authenticates both the duration of the first war, twenty years, and the eminent services rendered in it by the Spartan king Theopompus. He says, moreover (speaking during the second war), "the fathers of our fathers conquered Messene;" thus loosely indicating the relative dates of the two.

The Spartans (as we learn from Isokrates, whose words date from a time when the city of Messene was only a recent foundation) professed to have seized the territory, partly in revenge for the impiety of the Messenians in killing their own king the Herakleid Kres-

phontes, whose relative had appealed to Sparta for aid—partly by sentence of the Delphian oracle. Such were the causes which had induced them first to invade the country, and they had conquered it after a struggle of twenty years. The Lacedæmonian explanations, as given in Pausanias, seem for the most part to be counter-statements arranged after the time when the Messenian version, evidently the interesting and popular account, had become circulated.

It has already been stated that the Lacedæmonians and Messenians had a joint border temple and sacrifice in honor of Artemis Limnatis, dating from the earliest times of their establishment in Peloponnesus. The site of this temple near the upper course of the river Nedon, in the mountainous territory north-east of Kalamata, but west of the highest ridge of Taygetus, has recently been exactly verified—and it seems in these early days to have belonged to Sparta. That the quarrel began at one of these border sacrifices was the statement of both parties, Lacedæmonians and Messenians. According to the latter, the Lacedæmonian king Teleklus laid a snare for the Messenians, by dressing up some youthful Spartans as virgins and giving them daggers; whereupon a contest ensued, in which the Spartans were worsted and Teleklus slain. That Teleklus was slain at the temple by the Messenians, was also the account of the Spartans—but they affirmed that he was slain in attempting to defend some young Lacedæmonian maidens, who were sacrificing at the temple, against outrageous violence from the Messenian youth. In spite of the death of this king, however, the war did not actually break out until some little time after, when Alkamenes and Theopompus were kings at Sparta, and Antiochus and Androkles, sons of Phintas, kings of Messenia. The immediate cause of it was a private altercation between the Messenian Polychares (victor at the fourth Olympiad, B.C. 764) and the Spartan Euæphnus. Polychares, having been grossly injured by Euæphnus, and his claim for redress having been rejected at Sparta, took revenge by aggressions upon other Lacedæmonians. The Messenians refused to give him up; though one of the two kings, Androkles, strongly insisted upon doing so, and maintained his opinion so earnestly against the opposite sense of the majority and of his brother Antiochus, that a tumult arose, and he was slain. The Lacedæmonians, now resolving upon war, struck the first blow without any formal declaration, by surprising the border town of Ampheia, and putting its defenders to the sword. They farther overran the Messenian territory, and attacked some other towns, but without success. Euphaes, who had now succeeded his father Antiochus as king of Messenia, summoned the forces of the country and carried on the war against them with energy and boldness. For the first four years of the war the Lacedæmonians made no progress, and even incurred the ridicule of the old men of their nation as faint-hearted warriors. In the fifth year, however, they

undertook a more vigorous invasion, under their two kings, Theopompus and Polydorus, who were met by Euphaes with the full force of the Messenians. A desperate battle ensued, in which it does not seem that either side gained much advantage: nevertheless the Messenians found themselves so much enfeebled by it, that they were forced to take refuge on the fortified mountain of Ithome, abandoning the rest of the country. In their distress they sent to solicit counsel and protection from Delphi, but their messenger brought back the appalling answer that a virgin of the royal race of Æpytus must be sacrificed for their salvation. At the tragic scene which ensues, Aristodemus puts to death his own daughter, yet without satisfying the exigences of the oracle. The war still continued, and in the thirteenth year of it another hard-fought battle took place, in which the brave Euphaes was slain, but the result was again indecisive. Aristodemus, being elected king in his place, prosecuted the war strenuously. The fifth year of his reign is signalized by a third general battle, wherein the Corinthians assist the Spartans, and the Arcadians and Sikyonians are on the side of Messenia; the victory is here decisive on the side of Aristodemus, and the Lacedæmonians are driven back into their own territory. It was now their turn to send envoys and ask advice from the Delphian oracle. The remaining events of the war exhibit a series, partly of stratagems to fulfil the injunctions of the priestess,—partly of prodigies in which the divine wrath is manifested against the Messenians. The king Aristodemus, agonized with the thought that he has slain his own daughter without saving his country, puts an end to his own life. In the twentieth year of the war the Messenians abandoned Ithome, which the Lacedæmonians razed to the ground: the rest of the country being speedily conquered, such of the inhabitants as did not flee either to Arcadia or to Eleusis, were reduced to complete submission.

Such is the abridgment of what Pausanias gives as the narrative of the first Messenian war. Most of his details bear the evident stamp of mere late romance; and it will easily be seen that the sequence of events presents no plausible explanation of that which is really indubitable—the result. The twenty years' war, and the final abandonment of Ithome is attested by Tyrtæus beyond all doubt, as well as the harsh treatment of the conquered, "Like asses worn down by heavy burthens" (says the Spartan poet), "they were compelled to make over to their masters an entire half of the produce of their fields, and to come in the garb of woe to Sparta, themselves and their wives, as mourners at the decease of the kings and principal persons." The revolt of their descendants, against a yoke so oppressive, goes by the name of the second Messenian war.

Had we possessed the account of the first Messenian war as given by Myron and Diodorus, it would evidently have been very different from the above, because they included Aristomenes in it, and to him the leading parts would be assigned. As the narrative now stands in

Pausanias, we are not introduced to that great Messenian hero—the Achilles of the epic of Rhianus—until the second war, in which his gigantic proportions stand prominently forward. He is the great champion of his country in the three battles which are represented as taking place during this war: the first, with indecisive result, at Deræ; the second, a signal victory on the part of the Messenians, at the Boar's Grave; the third, an equally signal defeat, in consequence of the traitorous flight of Aristokrates, king of the Arcadian Orchomenus, who, ostensibly embracing the alliance of the Messenians, had received bribes from Sparta. Thrice did Aristomenes sacrifice to Zeus Ithomates the sacrifice called Hekatomphonia, reserved for those who had slain with their own hands 100 enemies in battle. At the head of a chosen band he carried his incursions more than once into the heart of the Lacedæmonian territory, surprised Amyklæ and Pharis, and even penetrated by night into the unfortified precinct of Sparta itself, where he suspended his shield as a token of defiance in the temple of Athene Chalkiœkus. Thrice was he taken prisoner, but on two occasions marvelously escaped before he could be conveyed to Sparta: the third occasion was more fatal, and he was cast by order of the Spartans into the Keadas, a deep rocky cavity in Mount Taygetus into which it was their habit to precipitate criminals. But even in this emergency the divine aid was not withheld from him. While the fifty Messenians who shared his punishment were all killed by the shock, he alone was both supported by the gods so as to reach the bottom unhurt, and enabled to find an unexpected means of escape. For when, abandoning all hope, he had wrapped himself up in his cloak to die, he perceived a fox creeping about among the dead bodies: waiting until the animal approached him, he grasped its tail, defending himself from its bites as well as he could by means of his cloak; and being thus enabled to find the aperture by which the fox had entered, enlarged it sufficiently for crawling out himself. To the surprise both of friends and enemies he again appeared alive and vigorous at Eira. That fortified mountain, on the banks of the river Nedon, and near the Ionian sea, had been occupied by the Messenians after the battle in which they had been betrayed by Aristokrates the Arcadian; it was there that they had concentrated their whole force, as in the former war at Ithome, abandoning the rest of the country. Under the conduct of Aristomenes, assisted by the prophet Theoklus, they maintained this strong position for eleven years. At length they were compelled to abandon it. Yet as in the case of Ithome, the final determining circumstances are represented to have been, not any superiority of bravery or organization on the part of the Lacedæmonians, but treacherous betrayal and stratagem, seconding the fatal decree of the gods. Unable to maintain Eira longer, Aristomenes, with his sons and a body of his countrymen, forced his way through the assailants and quitted the country—some of them retiring to Arcadia and Elis, and finally

migrating to Rhegium. He himself passed the remainder of his days in Rhodes, where he dwelt along with his son-in-law Damagetus, the ancestor of the noble Rhodian family called the Diagorids, celebrated for its numerous Olympic victories.

Such are the main features of what Pausanias calls the second Messenian war, or of what ought rather to be called the Aristomeneis of the poet Rhianus. That after the foundation of Messene, and the recall of the exiles by Epaminondas, favor and credence was found for many tales respecting the prowess of the ancient hero whom they invoked in their libations—tales well calculated to interest the fancy, to vivify the patriotism, and to inflame the anti-Spartan antipathies, of the new inhabitants—there can be little doubt. And the Messenian maidens of that day may well have sung in their public processional sacrifices, how "Aristomenes pursued the flying Lacedæmonians down to the mid-plain of Stenyklerus and up to the very summit of the mountain." From such stories (*traditions* they ought not to be denominated) Rhianus may doubtless have borrowed; but if proof were wanting to show how completely he looked at his materials from the point of view of the poet and not from that of the historian, we should find it in the remarkable fact noticed by Pausanias. Rhianus represented Leotychides as having been king of Sparta during the second Messenian war: now Leotychides (as Pausanias observes) did not reign until near a century and a half afterwards, during the Persian invasion.

To the great champion of Messenia, during this war, we may oppose on the side of Sparta another remarkable person, less striking as a character of romance, but more interesting in many ways to the historian—I mean the poet Tyrtæus, a native of Aphidnæ in Attica, an inestimable ally of the Lacedæmonians during most part of this second struggle. According to a story—which, however, has the air partly of a boast of the later Attic orators—the Spartans, disheartened at the first successes of the Messenians, consulted the Delphian oracle, and were directed to ask for a leader from Athens. The Athenians complied by sending Tyrtæus, whom Pausanias and Justin represent as a lame man and a schoolmaster, despatched with a view of nominally obeying the oracle, and yet rendering no real assistance. This seems to be a coloring put upon the story by later writers, but the intervention of the Athenians in the matter in any way deserves little credit. It seems more probable that the legendary connection of the Dioskuri with Aphidnæ, celebrated at or near that time by the poet Alkman, brought about through the Delphian oracle the presence of the Aphidnæan poet at Sparta. Respecting the lameness of Tyrtæus, we can say nothing. But that he was a schoolmaster (if we are constrained to employ an unsuitable term) is highly probable—for in that day, minstrels who composed and sung poems were the only persons from whom the youth received any mental training. Moreover his sway over the youthful mind is particularly noted in

the compliment paid to him in after-days by king Leonidas—"Tyrtæus was an adept in tickling the souls of youth." We see enough to satisfy us that he was by birth a stranger, though he became a Spartan by the subsequent recompense of citizenship conferred upon him—that he was sent through the Delphian oracle—that he was an impressive and efficacious minstrel—and that he had moreover sagacity enough to employ his talents for present purposes and diverse needs; being able not merely to reanimate the languishing courage of the baffled warrior, but also to soothe the discontents of the mutinous. That his strains, which long maintained undiminished popularity among the Spartans, contributed much to determine the ultimate issue of this war, there is no reason to doubt; nor is his name the only one to attest the susceptibility of the Spartan mind in that day toward music and poetry. The first establishment of the Karneian festival with its musical competition at Sparta, falls during the period assigned by Pausanias to the second Messenian war: the Lesbian harper Terpander, who gained the first recorded prize at this solemnity, is affirmed to have been sent for by the Spartans pursuant to a mandate from the Delphian oracle, and to have been the means of appeasing a sedition. In like manner, the Kretan Thaletas was invited thither during a pestilence, which his art (as it is pretended) contributed to heal (about 620 B.C.); and Alkman, Xenokritus, Polymnastus, and Sakadas, all foreigners by birth, found favorable reception, and acquired popularity by their music and poetry. With the exception of Sakadas, who is a little later, all these names fall in the same century as Tyrtæus, between 660 B.C.—610 B.C. The fashion which the Spartan music continued for a long time to maintain, is ascribed chiefly to the genius of Terpander.

The training in which a Spartan passed his life consisted of exercises warlike, social, and religious, blended together. While the individual, strengthen by gymnastics, went through his painful lessons of fatigue, endurance, and aggression—the citizens collectively were kept in the constant habit of simultaneous and regulated movement in the warlike march, in the religious dance, and in the social procession. Music and song, being constantly employed to direct the measure and keep alive the spirit of these multitudinous movements, became associated with the most powerful feelings which the habitual self-suppression of a Spartan permitted to arise, and especially with those sympathies which are communicated at once to an assembled crowd. Indeed the musician and the minstrel were the only persons who ever addressed themselves to the feelings of a Lacedæmonian assembly. Moreover the simple music of that early day, though destitute of artistical merit and superseded afterwards by more complicated combinations, had nevertheless a pronounced ethical character. It wrought much more powerfully on the impulses and resolutions of the hearers, though it tickled the ear less gratefully, than the scientific compositions of after-days. Farther, each

particular style of music had its own appropriate mental effect—the Phrygian mode imparted a wild and maddening stimulus; the Dorian mode created a settled and deliberate resolution, exempt alike from the desponding and from the impetuous sentiments. What is called the Dorian mode seems to be in reality the old native Greek mode as contradistinguished from the Phrygian and Lydian—these being the three primitive modes, subdivided and combined only in later times, with which the first Grecian musicians became conversant. It probably acquired its title of Dorian from the musical celebrity of Sparta and Argos, during the seventh and sixth centuries before the Christian era; but it belonged as much to the Arcadians and Achæans as to the Spartans and Argeians. And the marked ethical effects, produced both by the Dorian and the Phrygian modes in ancient times, are facts perfectly well-attested, however difficult they may be to explain upon any general theory of music.

That the impression produced by Tyrtæus at Sparta, therefore, with his martial music, and emphatic exhortations to bravery in the field, as well as union at home, should have been very considerable, is perfectly consistent with the character both of the age and of the people; especially as he is represented to have appeared pursuant to the injunction of the Delphian oracle. From the scanty fragments remaining to us of his elegies and anapests, however, we can satisfy ourselves only of two facts—first, that the war was long, obstinately contested, and dangerous to Sparta as well as to the Messenians; next, that other parties in Peloponnesus took part on both sides, especially on the side of the Messenians. So frequent and harassing were the aggressions of the latter upon the Spartan territory, that a large portion of the border land was left uncultivated: scarcity ensued, and the proprietors of the deserted farms, driven to despair, pressed for a redivision of the landed property in the state. It was in appeasing these discontents that the poem of Tyrtæus called Eunomia, "Legal order," was found signally beneficial. It seems certain that a considerable portion of the Arcadians, together with the Pisatæ and the Triphylians, took part with the Messenians; there are also some statements numbering the Eleians among their allies, but this appears not probable. The state of the case rather seems to have been that the old quarrel between the Eleians and the Pisatæ respecting the right to preside at the Olympic games, which had already burst forth during the preceding century in the reign of the Argeian Pheidon, still continued. Unwilling dependents of Elis, the Pisatæ and Triphylians, took part with the subject Messenians, while the masters at Elis and Sparta made common cause, as they had before done against Pheidon. Pantaleon, king of Pisa, revolting from Elis, acted as commander of his countrymen in co-operation with the Messenians; and he is further noted for having, at the period of the 34th Olympiad (644 B.C.), marched a body of troops to Olympia, and thus dispossessed the Eleians, on that occasion, of the presidency: that particular fes-

tival—as well as the 8th Olympiad, in which Pheidon interfered—and the 104th Olympiad, in which the Arcadians marched in—were always marked on the Eleian register as non-Olympiads, or informal celebrations. We may reasonably connect this temporary triumph of the Pisatans with the Messenian war, inasmuch as they were no match for the Eleians single-handed, while the fraternity of Sparta with Elis is in perfect harmony with the scheme of Peloponnesian politics which we have observed as prevalent even before and during the days of Pheidon. The second Messenian war will thus stand as beginning somewhere about the 33d Olympiad, or 648 B.C., between seventy and eighty years after the close of the first, and lasting, according to Pausanias, seventeen years; according to Plutarch, more than twenty years.

Many of the Messenians who abandoned their country after this second conquest are said to have found shelter and sympathy among the Arcadians, who admitted them to a new home and gave them their daughters in marriage; and who, moreover, punished severely the treason of Aristokrates, king of Orchomenus, in abandoning the Messenians at the battle of the Trench. That perfidious leader was put to death and his race dethroned, while the crime as well as the punishment was farther commemorated by an inscription, which was to be seen near the altar of Zeus Lykæus in Arcadia. The inscription doubtless existed in the days of Kallisthenes, in the generation after the restoration of Messene. But whether it had any existence prior to that event, or what degree of truth there may be in the story about Aristokrates, we are unable to determine; the son of Aristokrates, named Aristodemus, is alleged in another authority to have reigned afterward at Orchomenus. That which stands strongly marked is the sympathy of Arcadians and Messenians against Sparta—a sentiment which was in its full vigor at the time of the restoration of Messene.

The second Messenian war was thus terminated by the complete subjugation of the Messenians. Such of them as remained in the country were reduced to a servitude probably not less hard than that which Tyrtæus described them as having endured between the first war and the second. In after-times, the whole territory which figures on the map as Messenia—south of the river Nedon, and westward of the summit of Taygetus—appears as subject to Sparta, and as forming the western portion of Laconia; distributed (in what proportion we know not) between Periœkic towns and Helot villages. By what steps, or after what degree of further resistance, the Spartans conquered this country we have no information; but we are told that they made over Asine to the expelled Dryopes from the Argolic peninsula, and Mothone to the fugitives from Nauplia. Nor do we hear of any serious revolt from Sparta in this territory until 150 years afterward, subsequent to the Persian invasion—a revolt which Sparta, after serious efforts, succeeded in crushing, so that the territory

remained in her power until her defeat at Leuktra, which led to the foundation of Messene by Epaminondas. The fertility of the plains —especially of the central portion near the river Pamisus, so much extolled by observers, modern as well as ancient—rendered it an acquisition highly valuable. At some time or other it must of course have been formally partitioned among the Spartans, but it is probable that different and successive allotments were made, according as the various portions of territory, both to the east and to the west of Taygetus, were conquered. Of all this we have no information.

Imperfectly as these two Messenian wars are known to us, we may see enough to warrant us in making two remarks. Both were tedious, protracted, and painful, showing how slowly the results of war were then gathered, and adding one additional illustration to prove how much the rapid and instantaneous conquest of Laconia and Messenia by the Dorians, which the Herakleid legend sets forth, is contradicted by historical analogy. Both were characterized by a similar defensive proceeding on the part of the Messenians—the occupation of a mountain difficult of access, and the fortification of it for the special purpose and resistance—Ithome (which is said to have had already a small town upon it) in the first war, Eira in the second. It is reasonable to infer from hence that neither their principal town, Stenyklerus, nor any other town in their country, was strongly fortified so as to be calculated to stand a siege; that there were no walled towns among them analogous to Mykenæ and Tiryns on the eastern portion of Peloponnesus; and that perhaps what were called towns were, like Sparta itself, clusters of unfortified villages. The subsequent state of Helotism into which they were reduced is in consistency with this dispersed village residence during their period of freedom.

The relations of Pisa and Elis form a suitable counterpart and sequel to those of Messenia and Sparta. Unwilling subjects themselves, the Pisatans had lent their aid to the Messenians—and their king Pantaleon, one of the leaders of this combined force, had gained so great a temporary success, as to dispossess the Eleians of the agonothesia or administration of the games for one Olympic ceremony, in the 34th Olympiad. Though again reduced to their condition of subjects, they manifested dispositions to renew the revolt at the 48th Olympiad, under Damophon, the son of Pantaleon, and the Eleians marched into their country to put them down, but were persuaded to retire by protestations of submission. At length, shortly afterward, under Pyrrhus, the brother of Damophon, a serious revolt broke out. The inhabitants of Dyspontium and the other villages in the Pisatid, assisted by those of Makistus, Skillus, and the other towns in Triphylia, took up arms to throw off the yoke of Elis; but their strength was inadequate to the undertaking. They were completely conquered: Dyspontium was dismantled, and the inhabitants of it obliged to flee the country, from whence most of them emigrated to the colonies of Epidamnus and Apollonia in Epirus. The inhab-

itants of Makistus and Skillus were also chased from their abodes, while the territory became more thoroughly subject to Elis than it had been before. These incidents seem to have occurred about the 50th Olympiad, or B.C. 580; and the dominion of Elis over her Periœkid territory was thus as well assured as that of Sparta. The separate denominations both of Pisa and Triphylia became more and more urged in the sovereign name of Elis: the town of Lepreum alone, in Triphylia, seems to have maintained a separate name and a sort of half-autonomy down to the time of the Peloponnesian war, not without perpetual struggles against the Eleians. But toward the period of the Peloponnesian war, the political interests of Lacedæmon had become considerably changed, and it was to her advantage to maintain the independence of the subordinate states against the superior: accordingly, we find her at that time upholding the autonomy of Lepreum. From what cause the devastation of the Triphylian towns by Elis which Herodotus mentions as having happened in his time, arose, we do not know; the fact seems to indicate a continual yearning for their original independence, which was still commemorated, down to a much later period, by the ancient Amphiktyony at Samikum in Triphylia in honor of Poseidon—a common religious festival frequented by all the Triphylian towns and celebrated by the inhabitants of Makistus, who sent round proclamation of a formal truce for the holy period. The Lacedæmonians, after the close of the Peloponnesian war had left them undisputed heads of Greece, formally upheld the independence of the Triphylian towns against Elis, and seem to have countenanced their endeavors to attach themselves to the Arcadian aggregate, which however was never fully accomplished. Their dependence on Elis became loose and uncertain, but was never wholly shaken off.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONQUESTS OF SPARTA TOWARD ARCADIA AND ARGOLIS.

I HAVE described in the last two chapters, as far as our imperfect evidence permits, how Sparta came into possession both of the southern portion of Laconia along the course of the Eurotas down to its mouth, and of the Messenian territory westward. Her progress toward Arcadia and Argolis is now to be sketched, so as to conduct her to that position which she occupied during the reign of Peisistratus at Athens, or about 560–540 B.C., a time when she had reached the maximum of her territorial possessions, and when she was confessedly the commanding state in Hellas.

The central region of Peloponnesus, called Arcadia, had never received any immigrants from without. Its indigenous inhabitants—

a strong and hardy race of mountaineers, the most numerous Hellenic tribe in the peninsula, and the constant hive for mercenary troops—were among the rudest and poorest of Greeks, retaining for the longest period their original subdivision into a number of petty hill-villages, each independent of the other; while the union of all who bore the Arcadian name (though they had some common sacrifices, such as the festival of the Lykæan Zeus, of Despoina, daughter of Poseidon and Demeter, and of Artemis Hymnia) was more loose and ineffective than that of Greeks generally, either in or out of Peloponnesus. The Arcadian villagers were usually denominated by the names of regions, coincident with certain ethnical subdivisions—the Azanes, the Parrhasii, the Mænalii (adjoining Mount Mænalus), the Eutresii, the Ægytæ, the Skiritæ, etc. Some considerable towns, however, there were—aggregations of villages or demes which had been once autonomous. Of these the principal were Tegea and Mantineia, bordering on Laconia and Argolis—Orchomenus, Pheneus, and Stymphalus, toward the north-east, bordering on Achaia and Phlius—Kleitor and Heræa, westward, where the country is divided from Elis and Triphylia by the woody mountains of Pholoe and Erymanthus—and Phigaleia, on the south-western border near to Messenia. The most powerful of all were Tegea and Mantineia—conterminous towns, nearly equal in force, dividing between them the cold and high plain of Tripolitza, and separated by one of those capricious torrents which only escape through katabothra. To regulate the efflux of this water was a difficult task, requiring friendly co-operation of both the towns; and when their frequent jealousies brought on a quarrel, the more aggressive of the two inundated the territory of its neighbor as one means of annoyance. The power of Tegea, which had grown up out of nine constituent townships originally separate, appears to have been more ancient than that of its rival; as we may judge from its splendid heroic pretensions connected with the name of Echemus, and from the post conceded to its hoplites in joint Peloponnesian armaments, which was second in distinction only to that of the Lacedæmonians. If it be correct, as Strabo asserts, that the incorporation of the town of Mantineia, out of its five separate demes, was brought about by the Argeians, we may conjecture that the latter adopted this proceeding as a means of providing some check upon their powerful neighbors of Tegea. The plain common to Tegea and Mantineia was bounded to the west by the wintry heights of Mænalus, beyond which, as far as the boundaries of Laconia, Messenia, and Triphylia, there was nothing in Arcadia but small and unimportant townships or villages—without any considerable town, before the important step taken by Epaminondas in founding Megalopolis, a short time after the battle of Leuktra. The mountaineers of these regions who joined Epaminondas before the battle of Mantineia (at a time when Mantineia and most of the towns of Arcadia were opposed to him) were so inferior to the other Greeks in equipment,

that they still carried as their chief weapon, in place of the spear, nothing better than the ancient club.

Both Tegea and Mantineia held several of these smaller Arcadian townships near them in a sort of dependence, and were anxious to extend this empire over others: during the Peloponnesian war, we find the Mantineians establishing and garrisoning a fortress at Kypsela among the Parrhasii, near the site in which Megalopolis was afterward built. But at this period, Sparta, as the political chief of Hellas—having a strong interest in keeping all the Grecian towns, small and great, as much isolated from each other as possible, and in checking all schemes for the formation of local confederacies—stood forward as the protectress of the autonomy of these smaller Arcadians, and drove back the Mantineians within their own limits. At a somewhat later period, during the acme of her power, a few years before the battle of Leuktra, she even proceeded to the extreme length of breaking up the unity of Mantineia itself, causing the walls to be razed, and the inhabitants to be again parceled into their five original demes—a violent arrangement which the turn of political events very soon reversed. It was not until after the battle of Leuktra and the depression of Sparta that any measures were taken for the formation of an Arcadian political confederacy; and even then the jealousies of the separate cities rendered it incomplete and short-lived. The great permanent change, the establishment of Megalopolis, was accomplished by the ascendency of Epaminondas. Forty petty Arcadian townships, among those situated to the west of Mount Mænalus, were aggregated into the new city; the jealousies of Tegea, Mantineia, and Kleitor were for a while suspended; and œkists came from all of them, as well as from the districts of the Mænalii and Parrhasii, in order to impart to the new establishment a genuine Pan-Arcadian character. It was thus that there arose for the first time a powerful city on the borders of Laconia and Messenia, rescuing the Arcadian townships from their dependence on Sparta, and imparting to them political interests of their own, which rendered them both a check upon their former chief and a support to the re-established Messenians.

It has been necessary thus to bring the attention of the reader for one moment to events long posterior in the order of time (Megalopolis was founded in 370 B.C.), in order that he may understand, by contrast, the general course of those incidents of the earlier time, where direct accounts are wanting. The northern boundary of the Spartan territory was formed by some of the many small Arcadian townships or districts, several of which were successively conquered by the Spartans and incorporated with their dominion, though at what precise time we are unable to say. We are told that Charilaus, the reputed nephew and ward of Lykurgus, took Ægys, and that he also invaded the territory of Tegea, but with singular ill-success, for

he was defeated and taken prisonor: we also hear that the Spartans took Phigaleia by surprise in the 30th Olympiad, but were driven out again by the neighboring Arcadian Oresthasians. During the second Messenian war the Arcadians are represented as cordially seconding the Messenians: and it may seem perhaps singular, that while neither Mantineia nor Tegea are mentioned in this war, the more distant town of Orchomenus, with its king Aristokrates, takes the lead. But the facts of the contest come before us with so poetical a coloring, that we cannot venture to draw any positive inference as to the times to which they are referred.

Œnus and Karystus seem to have belonged to the Spartans in the days of Alkman: moreover the district called Skiritis, bordering on the territory of Tegea—as well as Belemina and Maleatis, to the westward, and Karyæ to the eastward and south-eastward of Skiritis—forming all together the entire northern frontier of Sparta, and all occupied by Arcadian inhabitants—had been conquered and made part of the Spartan territory before 600 B.C. And Herodotus tells us, that at this period the Spartan kings Leon and Hegesikles contemplated nothing less than the conquest of entire Arcadia, and sent to ask from the Delphian oracle a blessing on their enterprise. The priestess dismissed their wishes as extravagant, in reference to the whole of Arcadia, but encouraged them, though with the usual equivocations of language, to try their fortune against Tegea. Flushed with their course of previous success, not less than by the favorable construction which they put upon the words of the oracle, the Lacedæmonians marched against Tegea with such entire confidence of success as to carry with them chains for the purpose of binding their expected prisoners. But the result was disappointment and defeat. They were repulsed with loss; and the prisoners whom they left behind, bound in the very chains which their own army had brought, were constrained to servile labor on the plain of Tegea—the words of the oracle being thus literally fulfilled, though in a sense different from that in which the Lacedæmonians had first understood them.

For one whole generation, we are told, they were constantly unsuccessful in their campaigns against the Tegeans, and this strenuous resistance probably prevented them from extending their conquests farther among the petty states of Arcadia.

At length in the reign of Anaxandrides and Aristo, the successors of Leon and Hegesikles (about 560 B.C.), the Delphian oracle, in reply to a question from the Spartans—which of the gods they ought to propitiate in order to become victorious—enjoined them to find and carry to Sparta the bones of Orestes, son of Agamemnon. After a vain search, since they did not know where the body of Orestes was to be found, they applied to the oracle for more specific directions, and were told that the son of Agamemnon was buried at Tegea itself, in a place "where two blasts were blowing under powerful constraint,—where there was stroke and counterstroke, and destruction

upon destruction." These mysterious words were elucidated by a lucky accident. During a truce with Tegea, Lichas, one of the chiefs of the 300 Spartan chosen youth who acted as the movable police of the country under the ephors, visited the place, and entered the forge of a blacksmith—who mentioned to him, in the course of conversation, that in sinking a well in his outer court he had recently discovered a coffin containing a body seven cubits long; astounded at the sight, he had left it there undisturbed. It struck Lichas that the gigantic relic of aforetime could be nothing else but the corpse of Orestes, and he felt assured of this when he reflected how accurately the indications of the oracle were verified; for there were the "two blasts blowing by constraint," in the two bellows of the blacksmith: there was "the stroke and counterstroke" in his hammer and anvil, as well as the "destruction upon destruction" in the murderous weapons which he was forging. Lichas said nothing, but returned to Sparta with his discovery, which he communicated to the authorities, who, by a concerted scheme, banished him under a pretended criminal accusation. He then again returned to Tegea, under the guise of an exile, prevailed upon the blacksmith to let to him the premises, and when he found himself in possession, dug up and carried off to Sparta the bones of the venerated hero.

From and after this fortunate acquisition, the character of the contest was changed; the Spartans found themselves constantly victorious over the Tegeans. But it does not seem that these victories led to any positive result, though they might perhaps serve to enforce the practical conviction of Spartan superiority; for the territory of Tegea remained unimpaired, and its autonomy noway restrained. During the Persian invasion Tegea appears as the willing ally of Lacedæmon, and as the second military power in the Peloponnesus; and we may fairly presume that it was chiefly the strenuous resistance of the Tegeans which prevented the Lacedæmonians from extending their empire over the larger portion of the Arcadian communities. These latter always maintained their independence, though acknowledging Sparta as the presiding power in Peloponnesus, and obeying her orders implicitly as to the disposal of their military force. And the influence which Sparta thus possessed over all Arcadia was one main item in her power, never seriously shaken until the battle of Leuktra; which took away her previous means of insuring success and plunder to her minor followers.

Having thus related the extension of the power of Sparta on her northern or Arcadian frontier, it remains to mention her acquisitions on the eastern and north-eastern side, towards Argos. Originally (as has been before stated) not merely the province of Kynuria and the Thyreatis, but also the whole coast down to the promontory of Malea, had either been part of the territory of Argos or belonged to the Argeian confederacy. We learn from Herodotus, that before the time when the embassy from Crœsus king of Lydia came to solicit

aid in Greece (about 347 B.C.), the whole of this territory had fallen into the power of Sparta; but how long before, or at what precise epoch, we have no information. A considerable victory is said to have been gained by the Argeians over the Spartans in the 27th Olympiad or 669 B.C., at Hysæ, on the road between Argos and Tegea. At that time it does not seem probable that Kynuria could not have been in the possession of the Spartans—so that we must refer the acquisition to some period in the following century; though Pausanias places it much earlier, during the reign of Theopompus—and Eusebius connects it with the first establishment of the festival called Gymnopædia at Sparta in 698 B.C.

About the year 574 B.C., the Argeians made an effort to reconquer Thyrea from Sparta, which led to a combat long memorable in the annals of Grecian heroism. It was agreed between the two powers that the possession of this territory should be determined by a combat of 300 select champions on each side; the armies of both retiring, in order to leave the field clear. So undaunted, and so equal was the valor of these two chosen companies, that the battle terminated by leaving only three of them alive—Alkenor and Chromius among Argeians, Othryades among the Spartans. The two Argeian warriors hastened home to report their victory, but Othryades remained on the field, carried off the arms of the enemy's dead into the Spartan camp, and kept his position until he was joined by his countrymen the next morning. Both Argos and Sparta claimed the victory for their respective champions, and the dispute after all was decided by a general conflict, in which the Spartans were the conquerors, though not without much slaughter on both sides. The brave Othryades, ashamed to return home as the single survivor of the 300, fell upon his own sword on the field of battle.

This defeat decided the possession of Thyrea, which did not again pass, until a very late period of Grecian history, under the power of Argos. The preliminary duel of the 300, with its uncertain issue, though well established as to the general fact, was represented by the Argeians in a manner totally different from the above story, which seems to have been current among the Lacedæmonians. But the most remarkable circumstance is, that more than a century afterward—when the two powers were negotiating for a renewal of the then expiring truce—the Argeians, still hankering after this their ancient territory, desired the Lacedæmonians to submit the question to arbitration; which being refused, they next stipulated for the privilege of trying the point in dispute by a similar duel to the former, at any time during the prevalence of war or of an epidemic disease. The historian tells us that the Lacedæmonians acquiesced in this proposition, though they thought it absurd, in consequence of their anxiety to keep their relations with Argos at that time smooth and pacific. But there is no reason to imagine that the real duel, in which Othryades contended, was considered as absurd at the time

when it took place or during the age immediately succeeding. It fell in with a sort of chivalrous pugnacity which is noticed among the attributes of the early Greeks, and also with various legendary exploits, such as the single combat of Echemus and Hyllus, of Melanthus and Xanthus, of Menelaus and Paris, etc. Moreover, the heroism of Othryades and his countrymen was a popular theme for poets not only at the Spartan gymnopædia, but also elsewhere, and appears to have been frequently celebrated. The absurdity attached to this proposition, then, during the Peloponnesian war—in the minds even of the Spartans, the most old-fashioned and unchanging people in Greece—is to be ascribed to a change in the Grecian political mind, at and after the Persian war. The habit of political calculation had made such decided progress among them, that the leading states especially had become familiarized with something like a statesmanlike view of their resources, their dangers, and their obligations. How lamentably deficient this sort of sagacity was during the Persian invasion, will appear when we come to describe that imminent crisis of Grecian independence: but the events of those days were well calculated to sharpen it for the future, and the Greeks of the Peloponnesian war had become far more refined political schemers than their forefathers. And thus it happened that the proposition to settle a territorial dispute by a duel of chosen champions, admissible and even becoming a century before, came afterward to be derided as childish.

The inhabitants of Kynuria are stated by Herodotus to have been Ionians, but completely Dorized through their long subjection to Argos, by whom they were governed as Periœki. Pausanias gives a different account of their race, which he traces to the eponymous hero Kynurus son of Perseus: but he does not connect them with the Kynurians whom he mentions in another place as a portion of the inhabitants of Arcadia. It is evident, that even in the time of Herodotus, the traces of their primitive descent were nearly effaced. He says they were "Orneates and Periœki" to Argos; and it appears that the inhabitants of Orneæ also, whom Argos had reduced to the same dependent condition, traced their eponymous hero to an Ionic stock—Orneus was the son of the Attic Erechtheus. Strabo seems to have conceived the Kynurians as occupying originally, not only the frontier district of Argolis and Laconia, wherein Thyrea is situated, but also the north-western portion of Argolis, under the ridge called Lyrkeium, which separates the latter from the Arcadian territory of Stymphalus. This ridge was near the town of Orneæ, which lay on the border of Argolis near the confines of Phlius; so that Strabo thus helps to confirm the statement of Herodotus, that the Orneates were a portion of Kynurians, held by Argos along with the other Kynurians in the condition of dependent allies and Periœki, and very probably also of Ionian origin.

The conquest of Thyrea (a district valuable to the Lacedæmonians, as we may presume from the large booty which the Argeians got from it during the Peloponnesian war) was the last territorial acquisition made by Sparta. She was now possessed of a continuous dominion, comprising the whole southern portion of the Peloponnesus, from the southern bank of the river Nedon on the western coast, to the northern boundary of Thyreatis on the eastern coast. The area of her territory, including as it did both Laconia and Messenia, was equal to two-fifths of the entire peninsula, all governed from the single city, and for the exclusive purpose and benefit of the citizens of Sparta. Within all this wide area there was not a single community pretending to independent agency. The townships of the Periœki, and the villages of the Helots, were each individually unimportant; nor do we hear of any one of them presuming to treat with a foreign state. All consider themselves as nothing else but subjects of the Spartan ephors and their subordinate officers. They are indeed discontented subjects, hating as well as fearing their masters, and not to be trusted if a favorable opportunity for secure revolt presents itself. But no individual township or district is strong enough to stand up for itself, while combinations among them are prevented by the habitual watchfulness and unscrupulous precautions of the ephors, especially by the jealous secret police called the Krypteia, to which allusion has already been made.

Not only therefore was the Spartan territory larger and its population more numerous than that of any other state in Hellas, but its government was also more completely centralized and more strictly obeyed. Its source of weakness was the discontent of its Periœki and Helots, the latter of whom were not (like the slaves of other states) imported barbarians from different countries, and speaking a broken Greek, but genuine Hellens—of one dialect and lineage, sympathizing with each other, and as much entitled to the protection of Zeus Hellanius as their masters—from whom indeed they stood distinguished by no other line except the perfect training, individual and collective, which was peculiar to the Spartans. During the period on which we are at present dwelling, it does not seem that this discontent comes sensibly into operation; but we shall observe its manifestations very unequivocally after the Persian and during the Peloponnesian war.

To such auxiliary causes of Spartan predominance we must add another—the excellent military position of Sparta, and the unassailable character of Laconia generally. On three sides that territory is washed by the sea, with a coast remarkably dangerous and destitute of harbors; hence Sparta had nothing to apprehend from this quarter until the Persian invasion and its consequences—one of the most remarkable of which was, the astonishing development of the Athenian naval force. The city of Sparta, far removed from the sea, was admirably defended by an almost impassable northern frontier, composed of those districts which we have observed above to have been

conquered from Arcadia—Karyatis, Skiritis, Maleatis, and Beleminatis. The difficulty as well as danger of marching into Laconia by these mountain passes, noticed by Euripides, was keenly felt by every enemy of the Lacedæmonians, and has been powerfully stated by a first-rate modern observer, Colonel Leake. No site could be better chosen for holding the key of all the penetrable passes than that of Sparta. This well-protected frontier was a substitute more than sufficient for fortifications to Sparta itself, which always maintained, down to the times of the despot Nabis, its primitive aspect of a group of adjacent hill-villages rather than a regular city.

When, along with such territorial advantages, we contemplate the personal training peculiar to the Spartan citizens, as yet undiminished in their numbers,—combined with the effect of that training upon Grecian sentiment, in inspiring awe and admiration,—we shall not be surprised to find, that during the half-century which elapsed between the year 600 B.C. and the final conquest of Thyreatis from Argos, Sparta had acquired and begun to exercise a recognized ascendency over all the Grecian states. Her military force was at that time superior to that of any of the rest, in a degree much greater than it afterward came to be; for other states had not yet attained their maximum, and Athens in particular was far short of the height which she afterward reached. In respect to discipline as well as number, the Spartan military force had even at this early period reached a point which it did not subsequently surpass, while in Athens, Thebes, Argos, Arcadia, and even Elis (as will be hereafter shown), the military training in later days received greater attention, and improved considerably. The Spartans (observes Aristotle) brought to perfection their gymnastic training and their military discipline, at a time when other Greeks neglected both the one and the other: their early superiority was that of the trained men over the untrained, and ceased in after-days when other states came to subject their citizens to systematic exercises of analogous character or tendency. This fact—the early period at which Sparta attained her maximum of discipline, power, and territory—is important to bear in mind when we are explaining the general acquiescence which her ascendency met with in Greece, and which her subsequent acts would certainly not have enabled her to earn. That acquiescence first began, and became a habit of the Grecian mind, at a time when Sparta had no rival to come near her—when she had completely shot ahead of Argos—and when the vigor of the Lykurgean discipline had been manifested in a long series of conquests, made during the stationary period of other states, and ending only (to use the somewhat exaggerated phrase of Herodotus) when she had subdued the greater part of Peloponnesus.

Our accounts of the memorable military organization of Sparta are scanty, and insufficient to place the details of it clearly before us. The arms of the Spartans, as to all material points, were not different

from those of other Greek hoplites. But one grand peculiarity is observable from the beginning, as an item in the Lykurgean institutions. That lawgiver established military divisions quite distinct from the civil divisions, whereas in the other states of Greece, until a period much later than that which we have now reached, the two were confounded—the hoplites or horsemen of the same tribe or ward being marshaled together on the field of battle. Every Lacedæmonian was bound to military service from the age of twenty to sixty, and the ephors, when they sent forth an expedition, called to arms all the men within some given limit of age. Herodotus tells us that Lykurgus established both the Syssitia or public mess, and the Enomoties and Triakads, or the military subdivisions peculiar to Sparta. The Triakads are not mentioned elsewhere, nor can we distinctly make out what they were; but the Enomoty was the special characteristic of the system, and the pivot upon which all its arrangements turned. It was a small company of men, the number of whom was variable, being given differently at 25, 32, or 36 men—drilled and practiced together in military evolutions, and bound to each other by a common oath. Each Enomoty had a separate captain or enomotarch, the strongest and ablest soldier of the company, who always occupied the front rank, and led the Enomoty when it marched in single file, giving the order of march as well as setting the example. If the Enomoty was drawn up in three, or four, or six files, the enomotarch usually occupied the front post on the left, and care was taken that both the front-rank men and the rear-rank men, of each file, should be soldiers of particular merit.

It was upon these small companies that the constant and severe Lacedæmonian drilling was brought to act. They were taught to march in concert, to change rapidly from line to file, to wheel right or left in such manner as that the enomotarch and the other protostates or front-rank men should always be the persons immediately opposed to the enemy. Their step was regulated by the fife, which played in martial measures peculiar to Sparta, and was employed in actual battle as well as in military practice; and so perfectly were they habituated to the movements of the Enomoty, that if their order was deranged by any adverse accident, scattered soldiers could spontaneously form themselves into the same order, each man knowing perfectly the duties belonging to the place into which chance had thrown him. Above the Enomoty were several larger divisions—the Pentekostys, the Lochus, and the Mora, of which latter there seem to have been *six* in all. Respecting the number of each division, and the proportion of the larger to the smaller, we find statements altogether different, yet each resting upon good authority,—so that we are driven to suppose that there was no peremptory standard, and that the Enomoty comprised 25, 32, or 36 men; the Pentekostys two or four Enomoties; the Lochus two or four Pentekosties, and the Mora, 400, 500, 600, or 900 men—at different times, or according to

the limits of age which the ephors might prescribe for the men whom they called into the field.

What remains fixed in the system is, first, the small number, though varying within certain limits, of the elementary company called Enomoty, trained to act together, and composed of men nearly of the same age, in which every man knew his place: secondly, the scale of divisions and the hierarchy of officers, each rising above the other,—the Enomotarch, the Pentekonter, the Lochage, and the Polemarch, or commander of the Mora,—each having the charge of their respective divisions. Orders were transmitted from the king, as commander-in-chief, through the Polemarchs to the Lockages,—from the Lochages to the Pentekonters, and then from the latter to the Enomotarchs, each of whom caused them to be executed by his Enomoty. As all these men had been previously trained to the duties of their respective stations, the Spartan infantry possessed the arrangements and aptitudes of a standing army. Originally they seem to have had no cavalry at all, and when cavalry was at length introduced into their system, it was of a very inferior character, no provision having been made for it in the Lykurgean training. But the military force of the other cities of Greece, even down to the close of the Peloponnesian war, enjoyed little or no special training, having neither any small company like the enomoty, consisting of particular men drilled to act together—nor fixed and disciplined officers —nor triple scale of subordination and subdivision. Gymnastics and the use of arms made a part of education everywhere, and it is to be presumed that no Grecian hoplite was entirely without some practice of marching in line and military evolutions, inasmuch as the obligation to serve was universal and often enforced. But such practice was casual and unequal, nor had any individual of Argos or Athens a fixed military place and duty. The citizen took arms among his tribe, under a Taxiarch chosen from it for the occasion, and was placed in a rank or line wherein neither his place nor his immediate neighbors were predetermined. The tribe appears to have been the only military classification known to Athens, and the taxiarch the only tribe officer for infantry, as the phylarch was for cavalry, under the general-in-chief. Moreover, orders from the general were proclaimed to the line collectively by a herald of loud voice, not communicated to the taxiarch so as to make him responsible for the proper execution of them by his division. With an arrangement thus perfunctory and unsystematized, we shall be surprised to find how well the military duties were often performed. But every Greek who contrasted it with the symmetrical structure of the Lacedæmonian armed force, and with the laborious preparation of every Spartan for his appropriate duty, felt an internal sentiment of inferiority which made him willingly accept the headship of "these professional artists in the business of war," as they are often denominated.

It was through the concurrence of these various circumstances that the willing acknowledgment of Sparta as the leading state of Hellas became a part of Grecian habitual sentiment, during the interval between about 600 B.C. and 547 B.C. During this period too, chiefly, Greece and her colonies were ripening into a sort of recognized and active partnership. The common religious assemblies, which bound the parts together, not only acquired greater formality and more extended development, but also became more numerous and frequent—while the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games were exalted into a national importance, approaching to that of the Olympic. The recognized superiority of Sparta thus formed part and parcel of the first historical aggregation of the Grecian states. It was about the year 547 B.C. that Crœsus of Lydia, when pressed by Cyrus and the Persians, solicited aid from Greece, addressing himself to the Spartans as confessed presidents of the whole Hellenic body. And the tendencies then at work toward a certain degree of increased intercourse and co-operation among the dispersed members of the Hellenic name, were doubtless assisted by the existence of a state recognized by all as the first—a state whose superiority was the more readily acquiesced in because it was earned by a painful and laborious discipline, which all admired but none chose to copy.

Whether it be true (as O. Müller and other learned men conceive) that the Homeric mode of fighting was the general practice in Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece anterior to the invasion of the Dorians, and that the latter first introduced the habit of fighting with close ranks and protended spears, is a point which cannot be determined. Throughout all our historical knowledge of Greece, a close rank among the hoplites, charging with spears always in hand, is the prevailing practice; though there are cases of exception, in which the spear is hurled, when troops seem afraid of coming to close quarters. Nor is it by any means certain that the Homeric manner of fighting ever really prevailed in Peloponnesus, which is a country eminently inconvenient for the use of war-chariots. The descriptions of the bard may perhaps have been founded chiefly upon what he and his auditors witnessed on the coast of Asia Minor, where chariots were more employed, and where the country was much more favorable to them. We have no historical knowledge of any military practice in Peloponnesus anterior to the hoplites with close ranks and protended spears.

One Peloponnesian state there was, and one alone, which disdained to acknowledge the superiority or headship of Lacedæmon. Argos never forgot that she had once been the chief power in the peninsula, and her feeling toward Sparta was that of a jealous but impotent competitor. By what steps the decline of her power had taken place we are unable to make out, nor can we trace the succession of her kings subsequent to Pheidon. It has been already stated that about 669 B.C. the Argeians gained a victory over the Spartans at Hysiæ,

and that they expelled from the port of Nauplia its pre-existing inhabitants, who found shelter by favor of the Lacedæmonians at the port of Mothone in Messenia: Damokratidas was then king of Argos. Pausanias tells us that Meltas the son of Lakides was the last descendant of Temenus who succeeded to this dignity, he being condemned and deposed by the people. Plutarch, however, states that the family of the Herakleids died out, and that another king, named Ægon, was chosen by the people at the indication of the Delphian oracle. Of this story Pausanias appears to have known nothing. His language implies that the kingly dignity ceased with Meltas—wherein he is undoubtedly mistaken, since the title existed (though probably with very limited functions) at the time of the Persian war. Moreover, there is some ground for presuming that the king of Argos was even at that time a Herakleid—since the Spartans offered to him a third part of the command of the Hellenic force, conjointly with their own two kings. The conquest of Thyreatis by the Spartans deprived the Argeians of a valuable portion of their Periœkis, or dependent territory. But Orneæ and the remaining portion of Kynuria still continued to belong to them: the plain round their city was very productive; and, except Sparta, there was no other power in Peloponnesus superior to them. Mykenæ and Tiryns, nevertheless, seem both to have been independent states at the time of the Persian war, since both sent contingents to the battle of Platæa, at a time when Argos held aloof and rather favored the Persians. At what time Kleonæ became the ally or dependent of Argos, we cannot distinctly make out. During the Peloponnesian war it is numbered in that character along with Orneæ; but it seems not to have lost its autonomy about the year 470 B.C., at which period Pindar represents the Kleonæans as presiding and distributing prizes at the Nemean games. The grove of Nemea was less than two miles from their town, and they were the original presidents of this great festival—a function of which they were subsequently robbed by the Argeians in the same manner as the Pisatans had been treated by the Eleians with reference to the Olympic Agon. The extinction of the autonomy of Kleonæ and the acquisition of the presidency of the Nemean festival by Argos, were doubtless simultaneous, but we are unable to mark the exact time. For the statement of Eusebius that the Argeians celebrated the Nemean festival as early as the 53d Olympiad, or 568 B.C., is contradicted by the more valuable evidence of Pindar.

Of Corinth and Sikyon it will be more convenient to speak when we survey what is called the Age of the Tyrants or Despots; and of the inhabitants of Achaia (who occupied the southern coast of the Corinthian gulf, westward of Sikyon as far as Cape Araxus, the north-western point of Peloponnesus), a few words exhaust our whole knowledge down to the time at which we are arrived. These Achæans are given to us as representing the anti-Dorian inhabitants of Laconia,

whom the legend affirms to have retired under Tisamenus, to the northern parts of Peloponnesus, from whence they expelled the pre-existing Ionians and occupied the country. The race of their kings is said to have lasted from Tisamenus down to Ogygus—how long we do not know. After the death of the latter, the Achæan towns formed each a separate republic, but with periodical festivals and sacrifice at the temple of Zeus Homarius, affording opportunity of settling differences and arranging their common concerns. Of these towns twelve are known from Herodotus and Strabo—Pellene, Ægira, Ægæ, Bura, Helike, Ægium, Rhypes, Patræ, Pharæ, Olenus, Dyme, Tritæa. But there must originally have been some other autonomous towns besides these twelve; for in the 23d Olympiad, Ikarus of Hyperesia was proclaimed as victor, and there seems good reason to believe that Hyperesia, an old town of the Homeric Catalogue, was in Achaia. It affirmed that before the Achæan occupation of the country the Ionians had dwelt in independent villages, several of which were subsequently aggregated into towns; thus Patræ was formed by a coalescence of seven villages, Dyme from eight (one of which was named Teuthea), and Ægium also from seven or eight. But all these towns were small, and some of them underwent a further junction one with the other; thus Ægæ was joined with Ægeira and Olenus with Dyme. All the authors seem disposed to recognize twelve cities, and no more, in Achaia; for Polybius, still adhering to that number, substitutes Leontium and Keryneia in place of Ægæ and Rhypes; Pausanias gives Kerynea in place of Patræ. We hear of no facts respecting these Achæan towns until a short time before the Peloponnesian war, and even then their part was inconsiderable.

The greater portion of the territory comprised under the name of Achaia was mountain, forming the northern descent of those high ranges, passable only through very difficult gorges, which separate the country from Arcadia to the south, and which throw out various spurs approaching closely to the Gulf of Corinth. A strip of flat land with white clayey soil, often very fertile, between these mountains and the sea, formed *the plain* of each of the Achæan towns, which were situated for the most part upon steep outlying eminences overhanging it. From the mountains between Achaia and Arcadia numerous streams flow into the Corinthian gulf, but few of them are perennial, and the whole length of coast is represented as harborless.

CHAPTER IX.

CORINTH, SIKYON, AND MEGARA—AGE OF THE GRECIAN DESPOTS.

I HAVE thus brought down the history of Sparta to the period marked by the reign of Peisistratus at Athens; at which time she

had attained her maximum of territory, was confessedly the most powerful state in Greece, and enjoyed a proportionate degree of deference from the rest. I now proceed to touch upon the three Dorian cities on and near to the Isthmus—Corinth, Sikyon, and Megara, as they existed at this same period.

Even amidst the scanty information which has reached us, we trace the marks of considerable maritime energy and commerce among the Corinthians, as far back as the eighth century B.C. The foundation of Korkyra and Syracuse, in the eleventh Olympiad, or 734 B.C. (of which I shall speak farther in connection with Grecian colonization generally), by expeditions from Corinth, affords proof that they knew how to turn to account the excellent situation which connected them with the sea on both sides of Peloponnesus. Moreover, Thucydides, while he notices them as the chief liberators of the sea in early times from pirates, also tells us that the first great improvement in ship-building—the construction of the trireme, or ship of war, with a full deck and triple bank of for the rowers—was the fruit of Corinthian ingenuity. It was in the year 703 B.C., that the Corinthian Ameinokles built four triremes for the Samians, the first which those islanders had ever possessed. The notice of this fact attests as well the importance attached to the new invention, as the humble scale on which the naval force in those early days was equipped. And it is a fact of not less moment, in proof of the maritime vigor of Corinth in the seventh century B.C., that the earliest naval battle known to Thucydides was one which took place between the Corinthians and the Korkyræans B.C. 664.

It has already been stated that the line of Herakleid kings in Corinth subsides gradually, through a series of empty names, into the oligarchy denominated Bacchiadæ or Bacchiads, under whom our first historical knowledge of the city begins. The persons so named were all accounted descendants of Herakles, and formed the governing caste in the city; intermarrying usually among themselves, and choosing from their own number an annual prytanis, or president, for the administration of affairs. Of their internal government we have no accounts, except the tale respecting Archias the founder of Syracuse, one of their number, who had made himself so detested by an act of brutal violence terminating in the death of the beautiful youth Aktæon, as to be forced to expatriate. That such a man should have been placed in the distinguished post of Œkist of the colony of Syracuse, gives us no favorable idea of the Bacchiad oligarchy: we do not, however, know upon what original authority the story depends, nor can we be sure that it is accurately recounted. But Corinth under their government had already become a powerful commercial and maritime city.

Megara, the last Dorian state in this direction eastward, and conterminous with Attica at the point where the mountains called Kerata descend to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, is affirmed to

have been originally settled by the Dorians of Corinth, and to have remained for some time a dependency of that city. It is farther said to have been at first merely one of five separate villages—Megara, Heræa, Peiræa, Kynosura, Tripodiskus—inhabited by a kindred population, and generally on friendly terms, yet sometimes distracted by quarrels, and on those occasions carrying on war with a degree of lenity and chivalrous confidence which reverses the proverbial affirmation respecting the sanguinary character of enmities between kindred. Both these two statements are transmitted to us (we know not from what primitive source) as explanatory of certain current phrases, the author of the latter cannot have agreed with the author of the former in considering the Corinthians as masters of the Megarid, because he represents them as fomenting wars among these five villages for the purpose of acquiring that territory. Whatever may be the truth respecting this alleged early subjection of Megara, we know it in the historical age, and that too as early as the fourteenth Olympiad, only as an independent Dorian city, maintaining the integrity of its territory under its leader Orsippus, the famous Olympic runner, against some powerful enemies, probably the Corinthians. It was of no mean consideration, possessing a territory which extended across Mount Geraneia to the Corinthian gulf, on which the fortified town and port of Pegæ, belonging to the Megarians, was situated. It was mother of early and distant colonies—and competent, during the time of Solon, to carry on a protracted contest with the Athenians, for the possession of Salamis; wherein, although the latter were at last victorious, it was not without an intermediate period of ill-success and despair.

Of the early history of Sikyon, from the period when it became Dorian down to the seventh century B.C., we know nothing. Our first information respecting it, concerns the establishment of the despotism of Orthagoras, about 680–670 B.C. And it is a point deserving of notice, that all the three above-mentioned towns,—Corinth, Sikyon, and Megara—underwent during the course of this same century a similar change of government. In each of them a despot established himself: Orthagoras in Sikyon; Kypselus in Corinth; Theagenes in Megara.

Unfortunately we have too little evidence as to the state of things by which this change of government was preceded and brought about, to be able to appreciate fully its bearing. But what draws our attention to it more particularly is, that the like phenomenon seems to have occurred contemporaneously throughout a large number of cities, continental, insular, and colonial, in many different parts of the Grecian world. The period between 650 and 500 B.C. witnessed the rise and downfall of many despots and despotic dynasties, each in its own separate city. During the succeeding interval between 500 and 350 B.C., new despots, though occasionally springing up, become more rare. Political dispute takes another turn, and

the question is raised directly and ostensibly between the many and the few—the people and the oligarchy. But in the still later times which follow the battle of Chæroneia, in proportion as Greece, declining in civic not less than in military spirit, is driven to the constant employment of mercenary troops, and humbled by the overruling interference of foreigners—the despot with his standing foreign body-guard becomes again a characteristic of the time; a tendency partially counteracted, but never wholly subdued, by Aratus and the Achæan league of the third century B.C.

It would have been instructive if we had possessed a faithful record of these changes of government in some of the more considerable of the Grecian towns. In the absence of such evidence, we can do little more than collect the brief sentences of Aristotle and others respecting the causes which produced them. For as the like change of government was common, near about the same time, to cities very different in locality, in race of inhabitants, in tastes and habits, and in wealth, it must partly have depended upon certain general causes which admit of being assigned and explained.

In a preceding chapter I tried to elucidate the heroic government of Greece, so far as it could be known from the epic poems—a government founded (if we may employ modern phraseology) upon divine right as opposed to the sovereignty of the people, but requiring, as an essential condition, that the king shall possess force, both of body and mind, not unworthy of the exalted breed to which he belongs. In this government the authority, which pervades the whole society, all resides in the king. But on important occasions it is exercised through the forms of publicity: he consults, and even discusses, with the council of chiefs or elders; he communicates after such consultation with the assembled agora—who hear and approve, perhaps hear and murmur, but are not understood to exercise an option or to reject. In giving an account of the Lykurgean system, I remarked that the old primitive Rhetræ (or charters of compact) indicated the existence of these same elements; a king of superhuman lineage (in this particular case two co-ordinate kings); a senate of twenty-eight old men, besides the kings who sat in it; and an ekklesia, or public assembly of citizens, convened for the purpose of approving or rejecting propositions submitted to them, with little or no liberty of discussion. The elements of the heroic government of Greece are thus found to be substantially the same as those existing in the primitive Lykurgean constitution; in both cases the predominant force residing in the kings—and the functions of the senate, still more those of the public assembly, being comparatively narrow and restricted: in both cases the regal authority being upheld by a certain religious sentiment, which tended to exclude rivalry and to insure submission in the people up to a certain point, in spite of misconduct or deficiency in the reigning individual. Among the principal Epirotic tribes this government subsisted down to the third

century B.C., though some of them had passed out of it, and were in the habit of electing annually a president out of the gens to which the king belonged.

Starting from these points, common to the Grecian heroic government, and to the original Lykurgean system, we find that in the Grecian cities generally the king is replaced by an oligarchy, consisting of a limited number of families—while at Sparta the kingly authority, though greatly curtailed, is never abolished. And the different turn of events at Sparta admits of being partially explained. It so happened that for five centuries neither of the two co-ordinate lines of Spartan kings was ever without some male representatives, so that the sentiment of divine right, upon which their pre-eminence was founded, always proceeded in an undeviating channel. That sentiment never wholly died out in the tenacious mind of Sparta, but it became sufficiently enfeebled to occasion a demand for guarantees against abuse. If the senate had been a more numerous body, composed of a few principal families, and comprising men of all ages, it might perhaps have extended its powers so much as to absorb those of the king. But a council of twenty-eight old men, chosen indiscriminately from all Spartan families, was essentially an adjunct and secondary force. It was insufficient even as a restraint upon the king—still less was it competent to become his rival; and it served indirectly even as a support to him, by preventing the formation of any other privileged order powerful enough to be an overmatch for his authority. This insufficiency on the part of the senate was one of the causes which occasioned the formation of the annually renewed council of five, called the ephors; originally a defensive board like the Roman tribunes, intended as a restraint upon abuse of power in the kings, but afterward expanding into a paramount and unresponsible executive directory. Assisted by endless dissensions between the two co-ordinate kings, the ephors encroached upon their power on every side, limited them to certain special functions, and even rendered them accountable and liable to punishment, but never aspired to abolish the dignity. That which the regal authority lost in extent (to borrow the just remark of King Theopompus), it gained in durability. The descendants of the twins Eurysthenes and Prokles continued in possession of their double scepter from the earliest historical times down to the revolutions of Agis III. and Kleomenes III.—generals of the military force, growing richer and richer, and reverenced as well as influential in the state, though the directory of ephors were their superiors. And the ephors became in time quite as despotic, in reference to internal affairs, as the kings could ever have been before them. For the Spartan mind, deeply possessed with the feelings of command and obedience, remained comparatively insensible to the ideas of control and responsibility, and even averse to that open discussion and censure of public measures or officers which such ideas imply. We

must recollect that the Spartan political constitution was both simplified in its character and aided in its working by the comprehensive range of the Lykurgean discipline with its rigorous equal pressure upon rich and poor, which averted many of the causes elsewhere productive of sedition, habituating the proudest and most refractory citizen to a life of undeviating obedience, satisfying such demand as existed for system and regularity, rendering Spartan personal habits of life much more equal than even democratical Athens could parallel; but contributing at the same time to engender a contempt for talkers, and a dislike of methodical and prolonged speech, which of itself sufficed to exclude all regular interference of the collective citizens, either in political or judicial affairs.

Such were the facts at Sparta. But in the rest of Greece the primitive heroic government was modified in a very different manner: the people outgrew, much more decidedly, that feeling of divine right and personal reverence which originally gave authority to the king. Willing submission ceased on the part of the people, and still more on the part of the inferior chiefs; and with it ceased the heroic royalty. Something like a system or constitution came to be demanded.

Of this discontinuance of kingship, so universal in the political march of Hellas, one main cause is doubtless to be sought in the smallness and concentrated residence of each distinct Hellenic society. A single chief, perpetual and unresponsible, was noway essential for the maintenance of union. In modern Europe, for the most part, the different political societies which grew up out of the Roman empire embraced each a considerable population and a wide extent of territory. The monarchical form presented itself as the only known means of union between the parts; the only visible and imposing symbol of a national identity. Both the military character of the Teutonic invaders, as well as the traditions of the Roman empire which they dismembered, tended toward the establishment of a monarchical chief. The abolition of his dignity would have been looked upon as equivalent, and would really have been equivalent, to the breaking up of the nation; since the maintenance of a collective union by means of general assemblies was so burdensome, that the kings themselves vainly tried to exact it by force, and representative government was then unknown.

The history of the middle ages—though exhibiting constant resistance on the part of powerful subjects, frequent deposition of individual kings, and occasional changes of dynasty—contains few instances of any attempt to maintain a large political aggregate united without a king, either hereditary or elective. Even toward the close of the last century, at the period when the federal constitution of the United States of America was first formed, many reasoners regarded as an impossibility the application of any other system than the monarchical to a territory of large size and population, so as to combine union of the whole with equal privileges and securities to each of the

parts. And it might perhaps be a real impossibility among any rude people, with strong local peculiarities, difficult means of communication, and habits of representative government not yet acquired. Hence throughout all the larger nations of mediæval and modern Europe, with few exceptions, the prevailing sentiment has been favorable to monarchy; but wherever any single city or district, or cluster of villages, whether in the plains of Lombardy or in the mountains of Switzerland, has acquired independence—wherever any small fraction has severed itself from the aggregate—the opposite sentiment has been found, and the natural tendency has been toward some modification of republican government; out of which, indeed, as in Greece, a despot has often been engendered, but always through some unnatural mixture of force and fraud. The feudal system, evolved out of the disordered state of Europe between the eighth and thirteenth centuries, always presumed a permanent suzerain, vested with large rights of a mixed personal and proprietary character over his vassals, though subject also to certain obligations toward them: the immediate vassals of the king had subordinate vassals of their own, to whom they stood in the same relation: and in this hierarchy of power, property, and territory blended together, the rights of the chief, whether king, duke, or baron, were conceived as constituting a status apart, and neither conferred originally by the grant, nor revocable at the pleasure of those over whom they were exercised. This view of the essential nature of political authority was a point in which the three great elements of modern European society—the Teutonic, the Roman, and the Christian—all concurred, though each in a different way and with different modifications; and the result was, a variety of attempts on the part of subjects to compromise with their chief, without any idea of substituting a delegated executive in his place. On particular points of these feudal monarchies there grew up gradually towns with a concentrated population, among whom was seen the remarkable combination of a republican feeling, demanding collective and responsible management in their own local affairs, with a necessity of union and subordination toward the great monarchical whole; and hence again arose a new force tending both to maintain the form and to predetermine the march of kingly government. And it has been found in practice possible to attain this latter object—to combine regal government with fixity of administration, equal law impartially executed, security to person and property, and freedom of discussion under representative forms—in a degree which the wisest ancient Greek would have deemed hopeless. Such an improvement in the practical working of this species of government, speaking always comparatively with the kings of ancient times in Syria, Egypt, Judea, the Grecian cities, and Rome—coupled with the increased force of all established routine, and the greater durability of all institutions and creeds which have obtained footing throughout any wide extent of territory and people—has caused the

monarchical sentiment to remain predominant in the European mind (though not without vigorous occasional dissent) throughout the increased knowledge and the enlarged political experience of the last two centuries.

It is important to show that the monarchical institutions and monarchical tendencies prevalent throughout mediæval and modern Europe have been both generated and perpetuated by causes peculiar to those societies, whilst in the Hellenic societies such causes had no place—in order that we may approach Hellenic phenomena in the proper spirit, and with an impartial estimate of the feeling universal among Greeks toward the idea of a king. The primitive sentiment entertained toward the heroic king died out, passing first into indifference, next—after experience of the despots—into determined antipathy.

To an historian like Mr. Mitford, full of English ideas respecting government, this anti-monarchical feeling appears of the nature of insanity, and the Grecian communities like madmen without a keeper; while the greatest of all benefactors is the hereditary king who conquers them from without—the second best is the home despot, who seizes the acropolis and puts his fellow-citizens under coercion. There cannot be a more certain way of misinterpreting and distorting Grecian phenomena than to read them in this spirit, which reverses the maxims both of prudence and morality current in the ancient world. The hatred of kings as it stood among the Greeks (whatever may be thought about a similar feeling now) was a pre-eminent virtue, flowing directly from the noblest and wisest part of their nature. It was a consequence of their deep conviction of the necessity of universal legal restraint; it was a direct expression of that regulated sociality which required the control of individual passion from every one without exception, and most of all from him to whom power was confided. The conception which the Greeks formed of an unresponsible one, or of a king who could do no wrong, may be expressed in the pregnant words of Herodotus: "He subverts the customs of the country; he violates women; he puts men to death without trial." No other conception of the probable tendencies of kingship was justified either by a general knowledge of human nature, or by political experience as it stood from Solon downward; no other feeling than abhorrence could be entertained for the character so conceived; no other than a man of unprincipled ambition would ever seek to invest himself with it.

Our larger political experience has taught us to modify this opinion, by showing that under the conditions of monarchy in the best governments of modern Europe the enormities described by Herodotus do not take place; and that it is possible, by means of representative constitutions acting under a certain force of manners, customs, and historical recollection, to obviate many of the mischiefs likely to flow from proclaiming the duty of peremptory obedience to

an hereditary and unresponsible king, who cannot be changed without extra-constitutional force. But such larger observation was not open to Aristotle, the wisest as well as the most cautious of ancient theorists; nor if it had been open, could he have applied with assurance its lessons to the governments of the single cities of Greece. The theory of a constitutional king, especially, as it exists in England, would have appeared to him impracticable: to establish a king who will reign without governing; in whose name all government is carried on, yet whose personal will is in practice of little or no effect; exempt from all responsibility, without making use of the exemption; receiving from every one unmeasured demonstrations of homage, which are never translated into act except within the bounds of a known law; surrounded with all the paraphernalia of power, yet acting as a passive instrument in the hands of ministers marked out for his choice by indications which he is not at liberty to resist. This remarkable combination of the fiction of superhuman grandeur and license with the reality of an invisible strait-waistcoat, is what an Englishman has in his mind when he speaks of a constitutional king. The events of our history have brought it to pass in England, amid an aristocracy the most powerful that the world has yet seen—but we have still to learn whether it can be made to exist elsewhere, or whether the occurrence of a single king, at once able, aggressive, and resolute, may not suffice to break it up. To Aristotle, certainly, it could not have appeared otherwise than unintelligible and impracticable; not likely even in a single case—but altogether inconceivable as a permanent system and with all the diversities of temper inherent in the successive members of an hereditary dynasty. When the Greeks thought of a man exempt from legal responsibility, they conceived him as really and truly such, in deed as well as in name, with a defenseless community exposed to his oppressions; and their fear and hatred of him was measured by their reverence for a government of equal law and free speech, with the ascendency of which their whole hopes of security were associated—in the democracy of Athens more perhaps than in any other portion of Greece. And this feeling, as it was one of the best in the Greek mind, so it was also one of the most widely spread—a point of unanimity highly valuable amid so many points of dissension. We cannot construe or criticise it by reference to the feelings of modern Europe, still less to the very peculiar feelings of England, respecting kingship; and it is the application, sometimes explicit and sometimes tacit, of this unsuitable standard which renders Mr. Mitford's appreciation of Greek politics so often incorrect and unfair.

When we try to explain the course of Grecian affairs, not from the circumstances of other societies, but from those of the Greeks themselves, we shall see good reason for the discontinuance as well as for the dislike of kingship. Had the Greek mind been as stationary and unimproving as that of the orientals, the discontent with individual

kings might have led to no other change than the deposition of a bad king in favor of one who promised to be better, without ever extending the views of the people to any higher conception than that of a personal government. But the Greek mind was of a progressive character, capable of conceiving and gradually of realizing amended social combinations. Moreover, it is in the nature of things that any government—regal, oligarchical, or democratical—which comprises only a single city is far less stable than if it embraced a wider surface and a larger population. When that semi-religious and mechanical submission, which made up for the personal deficiencies of the heroic king, became too feeble to serve as a working principle, the petty prince was in too close contact with his people, and too humbly furnished out in every way, to get up a prestige or delusion of any other kind. He had no means of overawing their imaginations by that combination of pomp, seclusion, and mystery which Herodotus and Xenophon so well appreciate among the artifices of kingcraft. As there was no new feeling upon which a perpetual chief could rest his power, so there was nothing in the circumstances of the community which rendered the maintenance of such a dignity necessary for visible and effective union. In a single city, and a small circumjacent community, collective deliberation and general rules, with temporary and responsible magistrates, were practicable without difficulty.

To maintain an unresponsible king, and then to contrive accompaniments which shall extract from him the benefits of responsible government, is in reality a highly complicated system, though, as has been remarked, we have become familiar with it in modern Europe. The more simple and obvious change is, to substitute one or more temporary and responsible magistrates in place of the king himself. Such was the course which affairs took in Greece. The inferior chiefs, who had originally served as council to the king, found it possible to supersede him, and to alternate the functions of administration among themselves; retaining probably the occasional convocation of the general assembly, as it had existed before, and with as little practical efficacy. Such was in substance the character of that mutation which occurred generally throughout the Grecian states, with the exception of Sparta: kingship was abolished, and an oligarchy took its place—a council deliberating collectively, deciding general matters by the majority of voices, and selecting some individuals of their own body as temporary and accountable administrators. It was always an oligarchy which arose on the defeasance of the heroic kingdom. The age of democratical movement was yet far distant, and the condition of the people—the general body of freemen—was not immediately altered, either for better or worse, by the revolution. The small number of privileged persons, among whom the kingly attributes were distributed and put in rotation, were those nearest in rank to the king himself; perhaps members of the same large gens

with him, and pretending to a common divine and heroic descent. As far as we can make out, this change seems to have taken place in the natural course of events and without violence. Sometimes the kingly lineage died out and was not replaced; sometimes, on the death of a king, his son and successor was acknowledged only as archon—or perhaps set aside altogether to make room for a Prytanis or president out of the men of rank around.

At Athens, we are told that Kodrus was the last king and that his descendants were recognized only as archons for life. After some years, the archons for life were replaced by archons for ten years, taken from the body of Eupatridæ or nobles; susequently, the duration of the archonship was further shortened to one year. At Corinth, the ancient kings are said to have passed in like manner into the oligarchy of the Bacchiadæ, out of whom an annual Prytanis was chosen. We are only able to make out the general fact of such a change, without knowing how it was brought about—our first historical acquaintance with the Grecian cities beginning with these oligarchies.

Such oligarchical governments, varying in their details but analogous in general features, were common throughout the cities of Greece proper as well as of the colonies, throughout the seventh century B.C. Though they had little immediate tendency to benefit the mass of the freemen, yet when we compare them with the antecedent heroic government, they indicate an important advance—the first adoption of a deliberate and preconceived system in the management of public affairs. They exhibit the first evidences of new and important political ideas in the Greek mind—the separation of legislative and executive powers; the former vested in a collective body, not merely deliberating but also finally deciding—while the latter is confided to temporary individual magistrates, responsible to that body at the end of their period of office. We are first introduced to a community of citizens, according to the definition of Aristotle—men qualified, and thinking themselves qualified, to take turns in command and obedience. The collective sovereign, called The City, is thus constituted. It is true that this first community of citizens comprised only a small proportion of the men personally free; but the ideas upon which it was founded began gradually to dawn upon the minds of all. Political power had lost its heaven-appointed character, and had become an attribute legally communicable as well as determined to certain definite ends: and the ground was thus laid for those thousand questions which agitated so many of the Grecian cities during the ensuing three centuries, partly respecting its apportionment, partly respecting its employment,—questions sometimes raised among the members of the privileged oligarchy itself, sometimes between that order as a whole and the non-privileged many. The seeds of those popular movements, which called forth so much profound emotion, so much bitter antipathy, so much energy and

talent, throughout the Grecian world, with different modifications in each particular city, may thus be traced back to that early revolution which erected the primitive oligarchy upon the ruins of the heroic kingdom.

How these first oligarchies were administered we have no direct information. But the narrow and anti-popular interests naturally belonging to a privileged few, together with the general violence of private manners and passions, leave us no ground for presuming favorably respecting either their prudence or their good feeling; and the facts which we learn respecting the condition of Attica prior to the Solonian legislation (to be recounted in the next chapter) raise inferences all of an unfavorable character.

The first shock which they received, and by which so many of them were subverted, arose from the usurpers called Despots, who employed the prevalent discontents both as pretexts and as aids for their own personal ambition, while their very frequent success seems to imply that such discontents were widespread as well as serious. These despots arose out of the bosom of the oligarchies, but not all in the same manner. Sometimes the executive magistrate, upon whom the oligarchy themselves had devolved important administrative powers for a certain temporary period, became unfaithful to his choosers, and acquired sufficient ascendency to retain his dignity permanently in spite of them—perhaps even to transmit it to his son. In other places, and seemingly more often, there arose that noted character called the Demagogue, of whom historians both ancient and modern commonly draw so repulsive a picture: a man of energy and ambition, sometimes even a member of the oligarchy itself, who stood forward as champion of the grievances and sufferings of the non-privileged many, acquired their favor, and employed their strength so effectively as to put down the oligarchy by force, and constitute himself despot. A third form of despot, some presumptuous wealthy man, like Kylon at Athens, without even the pretense of popularity, was occasionally emboldened, by the success of similar adventurers in other places, to hire a troop of retainers and seize the acropolis. And there were examples, though rare, of a fourth variety—the lineal descendant of the ancient kings—who, instead of suffering himself to be restricted or placed under control by the oligarchy, found means to subjugate them, and to extort by force an ascendency as great as that which his forefathers had enjoyed by consent. To these must be added, in several Grecian states, the Æsymnete or Dictator, a citizen formally invested with supreme and unresponsible power, placed in command of the military force, and armed with a standing body-guard, but only for a time named, and in order to deal with some urgent peril or ruinous internal dissension. The person thus exalted, always enjoying a large measure of confidence, and generally a man of ability, was sometimes so successful, or made himself so essential to the community, that the term of his office was prolonged, and he became practically despot for life; or even if the community were not disposed to concede to him this permanent ascendency, he was often strong enough to keep it against their will.

Such were the different modes in which the numerous Greek despots of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. acquired their power. Though we know thus much in general terms from the brief statements of Aristotle, yet unhappily we have no contemporary picture of any one of these communities, so as to give us the means of appreciating the change in detail. Of the persons who, possessing inherited kingly dignity, stretched their paternal power so far as to become despots, Aristotle gives us Pheidon of Argos as an example, whose reign has been already narrated. Of those who made themselves despots by means of official power previously held under an oligarchy, he names Phalaris at Agrigentum and the despots at Miletus and other cities of the Ionic Greeks: among others who raised themselves by becoming demagogues, he specifies Panætius in the Sicilian town of Leontini, Kypselus at Corinth, and Peisistratus at Athens: of Æsymnetes or chosen despots, Pittakus of Mitylene is the prominent instance. The military and aggressive demagogue, subverting an oligarchy which had degraded and ill-used him, governing as a cruel despot for several years, and at last dethroned and slain, is farther depicted by Dionysius of Halikarnassus in the history of Aristodemus of the Italian Cumæ.

From the general statement of Thucydides as well as of Aristotle, we learn that the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. were centuries of progress for the Greek cities generally, in wealth, in power, and in population; and the numerous colonies founded during this period (of which I shall speak in a future chapter) will furnish further illustration of such progressive tendencies. Now the changes just mentioned in the Grecian governments, imperfectly as we know them, are on the whole decided evidences of advancing citizenship. For the heroic government, with which Grecian communities begin, is the rudest and most infantine of all governments: destitute even of the pretense of system or security, incapable of being in any way foreknown, and depending only upon the accidental variations in the character of the reigning individual, who in most cases, far from serving as a protection to the poor against the rich and great, was likely to indulge his passions in the same unrestrained way as the latter, and with still greater impunity.

The despots, who in so many towns succeeded and supplanted this oligarchical government, though they governed on principles usually narrow and selfish, and often oppressively cruel, "taking no thought (to use the emphatic words of Thucydides) except each for his own body and his own family"—yet since they were not strong enough to crush the Greek mind, imprinted upon it a painful but improving political lesson, and contributed much to enlarge the range of experi-

ence as well as to determine the subsequent cast of feeling. They partly broke down the wall of distinction between the people—properly so called, the general mass of freemen—and the oligarchy: indeed the demagogue-despots are interesting as the first evidence of the growing importance of the people in political affairs. The demagogue stood forward as representing the feelings and interests of the people against the governing few, probably availing himself of some special cases of ill-usage, and taking pains to be conciliatory and generous in his own personal behavior. When the people by their armed aid had enabled him to overthrow the existing rulers, they had thus the satisfaction of seeing their own chief in possession of the supreme power, but they acquired neither political rights nor increased securities for themselves. What measure of positive advantage they may have reaped, beyond that of seeing their previous oppressors humiliated, we know too little to determine. But even the worst of despots was more formidable to the rich than to the poor; and the latter may, perhaps, have gained by the change, in comparative importance, notwithstanding their share in the rigors and exactions of a government which had no other permanent foundation than naked fear.

A remark made by Aristotle deserves especial notice here, as illustrating the political advance and education of the Grecian communities. He draws a marked distinction between the early demagogue of the seventh and sixth centuries, and the later demagogue, such as he himself, and the generations immediately preceding, had witnessed. The former was a military chief, daring and full of resource, who took arms at the head of a body of popular insurgents, put down the government by force, and made himself the master both of those whom he deposed and of those by whose aid he deposed them; while the latter was a speaker, possessed of all the talents necessary for moving an audience, but neither inclined to, nor qualified for, armed attack—accomplishing all his purposes by pacific and constitutional methods. This valuable change—substituting discussion and the vote of an assembly in place of an appeal to arms, and procuring for the pronounced decision of the assembly such an influence over men's minds as to render it final and respected even by dissentients—arose from the continued practical working of democratical institutions. I shall have occasion, at a later period of this history, to estimate the value of that unmeasured obloquy which has been heaped on the Athenian demagogues of the Peloponnesian war—Kleon and Hyperbolus; but assuming the whole to be well-founded, it will not be the less true that these men were a material improvement on the earlier demagogues such as Kypselus and Peisistratus, who employed the armed agency of the people for the purpose of subverting the established government and acquiring despotic authority for themselves. The demagogue was essentially a leader of opposition, who gained his influence by denouncing the men in real ascendency, and in actual

executive functions. Now under the early oligarchies his opposition could be shown only by armed insurrection, and it conducted him either to personal sovereignty or to destruction. But the growth of democratical institutions insured both to him and to his political opponents full liberty of speech, and a paramount assembly to determine between them; whilst it both limited the range of his ambition, and set aside the appeal to armed force. The railing demagogue of Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian war (even if we accept literally the representations of his worst enemies) was thus a far less mischievous and dangerous person than the fighting demagogue of the earlier centuries; and the "growth of habits of public speaking" (to use Aristotle's expression) was the cause of the difference. Opposition by the tongue was a beneficial substitute for opposition by the sword.

The rise of these despots on the ruins of the previous oligarchies was, in appearance, a return to the principles of the heroic age—the restoration of a government of personal will in place of that systematic arrangement known as the City. But the Greek mind had so far outgrown those early principles, that no new government founded thereupon could meet with willing acquiescence, except under some temporary excitement. At first doubtless the popularity of the usurper—combined with the fervor of his partisans and the expulsion or intimidation of opponents, and further enhanced by the punishment of rich oppressors—was sufficient to procure for him obedience; and prudence on his part might prolong this undisputed rule for a considerable period, perhaps even throughout his whole life. But Aristotle intimates that these governments, even when they began well, had a constant tendency to become worse and worse. Discontent manifested itself, and was aggravated rather than repressed by the violence employed against it, until at length the despot became a prey to mistrustful and malevolent anxiety, losing any measure of equity or benevolent sympathy which might once have animated him. If he was fortunate enough to bequeath his authority to his son, the latter, educated in a corrupt atmosphere and surrounded by parasites, contracted dispositions yet more noxious and unsocial. His youthful appetites were more ungovernable, while he was deficient in the prudence and vigor which had been indispensable to the self-accomplished rise of his father. For such a position, mercenary guards and a fortified acropolis were the only stay—guards fed at the expense of the citizens, and thus requiring constant exactions on behalf of that which was nothing better than a hostile garrison. It was essential to the security of the despot that he should keep down the spirit of the free people whom he governed; that he should isolate them from each other, and prevent those meetings and mutual communications which Grecian cities habitually presented in the School, the Lesche, or the Palæstra; that he should strike off the overtopping ears of corn in the field

(to use the Greek locution) or crush the exalted and enterprising minds. Nay, he had even to a certain extent an interest in degrading and impoverishing them, or at least in debarring them from the acquisition either of wealth or leisure. The extensive constructions undertaken by Polykrates at Samos, as well as the rich donations of Periander to the temple at Olympia, are considered by Aristotle to have been extorted by these despots with the express view of engrossing the time and exhausting the means of their subjects.

It is not to be imagined that all were alike cruel or unprincipled. But the perpetual supremacy of one man or one family had become so offensive to the jealousy of those who felt themselves to be his equals, and to the general feeling of the people, that repression and severity were inevitable, whether originally intended or not. And even if an usurper, having once entered upon this career of violence, grew sick and averse to its continuance, abdication only left him in imminent peril, exposed to the vengeance of those whom he had injured—unless indeed he could clothe himself with the mantle of religion, and stipulate with the people to become priest of some temple and deity; in which case his new function protected him, just as the tonsure and the monastery sheltered a dethroned prince in the middle ages. Several of the despots were patrons of music and poetry, courting the good-will of contemporary intellectual men by invitation as well as by reward. Moreover there were some cases, such as that of Peisistratus and his sons at Athens, in which an attempt was made (analogous to that of Augustus at Rome) to reconcile the reality of personal omnipotence with a certain respect for pre-existing forms. In such instances the administration—though not unstained by guilt, never otherwise than unpopular, and carried on by means of foreign mercenaries—was doubtless practically milder. But cases of this character were rare; and the maxims usual with Grecian despots were personified in Periander the Kypselid of Corinth—a harsh and brutal person, though not destitute either of vigor or intelligence.

The position of a Grecian despot, as depicted by Plato, by Xenophon, and by Aristotle, and further sustained by the indications in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Isokrates, though always coveted by ambitious men, reveals clearly enough "those wounds and lacerations of mind" whereby the internal Erinnys avenged the community upon the usurper who trampled them down. Far from considering success in usurpation as a justification of the attempt (according to the theories now prevalent respecting Cromwell and Bonaparte, who are often blamed because they kept out a legitimate king, but never because they seized an unauthorized power over the people), these philosophers regard the despot as among the greatest of criminals. The man who assassinated him was an object of public honor and reward, and a virtuous Greek would seldom have scrupled to carry his sword concealed in myrtle branches, like

Harmodius and Aristogeiton, for the execution of the deed. A station which overtopped the restraints and obligations involved in citizenship was understood at the same time to forfeit all title to the common sympathy and protection; so that it was unsafe for the despot to visit in person those great Pan-Hellenic games in which his own chariot might perhaps have gained the prize, and in which the Theors or sacred envoys, whom he sent as representatives of his Hellenic city, appeared with ostentatious pomp. A government carried on under these unpropitious circumstances could never be otherwise than short-lived. Though the individual daring enough to seize it often found means to preserve it for the term of his own life, yet the sight of a despot living to old age was rare, and the transmission of his power to his son still more so.

Amid the numerous points of contention in Grecian political morality, this rooted antipathy to a permanent hereditary ruler stood apart as a sentiment almost unanimous, in which the thirst for pre-eminence felt by the wealthy few, and the love of equal freedom in the bosoms of the many, alike concurred. It first began among the oligarchies of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., being a reversal of that pronounced monarchical sentiment which we now read in the Iliad; and it was transmitted by them to the democracies which did not arise until a later period. The conflict between oligarchy and despotism preceded that between oligarchy and democracy, the Lacedæmonians standing forward actively on both occasions to uphold the oligarchical principle. A mingled sentiment of fear and repugnance led them to put down despotism in several cities of Greece during the sixth century B.C., just as during their contest with Athens in the following century, they assisted the oligarchical party to overthrow democracy. And it was thus that the demagogue-despot of these earlier times—bringing out the name of the people as a pretext, and the arms of the people as a means of accomplishment, for his own ambitious designs—served as a preface to the reality of democracy which manifested itself at Athens a short time before the Persian war, as a development of the seed planted by Solon.

As far as our imperfect information enables us to trace, these early oligarchies of the Grecian states, against which the first usurping despots contended, contained in themselves more repulsive elements of inequality, and more mischievous barriers between the component parts of the population, than the oligarchies of later days. What was true of Hellas as an aggregate, was true, though in a less degree, of each separate community which went to compose that aggregate. Each included a variety of clans, orders, religious brotherhoods, and local or professional sections, very imperfectly cemented together: so that the oligarchy was not (like the government so denominated in subsequent times) the government of a rich few over the less rich and the poor, but that of a peculiar order, sometimes a patrician order,

over all the remaining society. In such a case the subject Many might number opulent and substantial proprietors as well as the governing Few; but these subject Many would themselves be broken into different heterogeneous fractions not heartily sympathizing with each other, perhaps not intermarrying together, nor partaking of the same religious rites. The country population, or villagers who tilled the land, seem in these early times to have been held to a painful dependence on the great proprietors who lived in the fortified town, and to have been distinguished by a dress and habits of their own, which often drew upon them an unfriendly nickname. These town proprietors often composed the governing class in early Grecian states; while their subjects consisted: 1. Of the dependent cultivators living in the district around, by whom their lands were tilled. 2. Of a certain number of small self-working proprietors (*αὐτουργοὶ*), whose possessions were too scanty to maintain more than themselves by the labor of their own hands on their own plot of ground—residing either in the country or the town, as the case might be. 3. Of those who lived in the town, having not land, but exercising handicraft, arts, or commerce.

The governing proprietors went by the name of the Gamori or Geomori, according as the Doric or Ionic dialect might be used in describing them, since they were found in states belonging to one race as well as to the other. They appear to have constituted a close order, transmitting their privileges to their children, but admitting no new members to a participation. The principle called by Greek thinkers a Timocracy (the apportionment of political rights and privileges according to comparative property) seems to have been little, if at all, applied in the earlier times. We know no example of it earlier than Solon. So that by the natural multiplication of families and mutation of property, there would come to be many individual Gamori possessing no land at all, and perhaps worse off than those small freeholders who did not belong to the order; while some of these latter freeholders, and some of the artisans and traders in the towns, might at the same be rising in wealth and importance. Under a political classification such as this, of which the repulsive inequality was aggravated by a rude state of manners, and which had no flexibility to meet the changes in relative position among individual inhabitants, discontent and outbreaks were unavoidable. The earliest despot, usually a wealthy man of the disfranchised class, became champion and leader of the malcontents. However oppressive his rule might be, at least it was an oppression which bore with indiscriminate severity upon all the fractions of the population; and when the hour of reaction against him or against his successor arrived, so that the common enemy was expelled by the united efforts of all, it was hardly possible to revive the pre-existing system of exclusion and inequality without some considerable abatements.

As a general rule, every Greek city-community included in its population, independent of bought slaves, the three elements above noticed,—considerable land proprietors with rustic dependents, small self-working proprietors, and town-artisans,—the three elements being found everywhere in different proportions. But the progress of events in Greece, from the seventh century B.C. downward, tended continually to elevate the comparative importance of the two latter; while in those early days the ascendency of the former was at its maxium, and altered only to decline. The military force of most of the cities was at first in the hands of the great proprietors, and formed by them. It consisted of cavalry, themselves and their retainers, with horses fed upon their lands. Such was the primitive oligarchical militia, as constituted in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., at Chalkis and Eretria in Eubœa, as well as at Kolophon and other cities in Ionia, and as it continued in Thessaly down to the fourth century B.C. But the gradual rise of the small proprietors and town-artisans was marked by the substitution of heavy-armed infantry in place of cavalry. Moreover, a further change not less important took place, when the resistance to Persia led to the great multiplication of Grecian ships of war, manned by a host of seamen who dwelt congregated in the maritime towns. All these movements in the Grecian communities tended to break up the close and exclusive oligarchies with which our first historical knowledge commences; and to conduct them, either to oligarchies rather more open, embracing all men of a certain amount of property—or else to democracies. But the transition in both cases was usually attained through the interlude of the despot.

In enumerating the distinct and unharmonious elements of which the population of these early Grecian communities was made up, we must not forget one further element which was to be found in the Dorian states generally—men of Dorian, as contrasted with men of non-Dorian, race. The Dorians were in all cases immigrants and conquerors, establishing themselves along with and at the expense of the prior inhabitants. Upon what terms the cohabitation was established, and in what proportions invaders and invaded came together—we have little information. Important as this circumstance is in the history of these Dorian communities, we know it only as a general fact, without being able to follow its results in detail. But we see enough to satisfy ourselves that in those revolutions which overthrew the oligarchies both at Corinth and Sikyon—perhaps also at Megara—the Dorian and non-Dorian elements of the community came into conflict more or less direct.

The despots of Sikyon are the earliest of whom we have any distinct mention. Their dynasty lasted 100 years, a longer period than any other Grecian despots known to Aristotle; they are said, moreover, to have governed with mildness and with much practical respect to the pre-existing laws. Orthagoras, the beginner of the

dynasty, raised himself to the position of despot about 676 B.C., subverting the pre-existing Dorian oligarchy; but the cause and circumstances of this revolution are not preserved. He is said to have been originally a cook. In his line of successors we find mention of Andreas, Myron, Aristonymus, and Kleisthenes. Myron gained a chariot victory at Olympia in the 33d Olympiad (648 B.C.), and built at the same holy place a thesaurus containing two ornamented alcoves of copper, for the reception of commemorative offerings from himself and his family. Respecting Kleisthenes (whose age must be placed between 600–560 B.C., but can hardly be determined accurately), some facts are reported to us highly curious, but of a nature not altogether easy to follow or verify.

We learn from the narrative of Herodotus that the tribe to which Kleisthenes himself (and of course his progenitors Orthagoras and the other Orthagoridæ also) belonged, was distinct from the three Dorian tribes, who have been already named in my previous chapter respecting the Lykurgean constitution at Sparta—the Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes. We also learn that these tribes were common to the Sikyonians and the Argeians. Kleisthenes, being in a state of bitter hostility with Argos, tried in several ways to abolish the points of community between the two. Sikyon, originally Dorized by settlers from Argos, was included in the "lot of Temenus," or among the towns of the Argeian confederacy. The coherence of this confederacy had become weaker and weaker, partly without doubt through the influence of the predecessors of Kleisthenes; but the Argeians may perhaps have tried to revive it, thus placing themselves in a state of war with the latter, and inducing him to disconnect palpably and violently Sikyon from Argos. There were two anchors by which the connection held—first, legendary and religious sympathy; next, the civil rites and denominations current among the Sikyonian Dorians: both of them were torn up by Kleisthenes. He changed the names both of the three Dorian tribes, and of that non-Dorian tribe to which he himself belonged: the last he called by the complimentary title of Archelai (commanders of the people); the first three he styled by the insulting names of Hyatæ, Oneatæ, and Chœreatæ, from the three Greek words signifying a boar, an ass, and a little pig. The extreme bitterness of such an insult can only be appreciated when we fancy to ourselves the reverence with which the tribes in a Grecian city regarded the hero from whom their name was borrowed. That these new denominations, given by Kleisthenes, involved an intentional degradation of the Dorian tribes as well as an assumption of superiority for his own, is affirmed by Herodotus, and seems well deserving of credit.

But the violence of which Kleisthenes was capable in his anti-Argeian antipathy, is manifested still more plainly in his proceedings with respect to the hero Adrastus and to the legendary sentiment of the people. Something has already been said in a former chapter

about this remarkable incident, which must however be here again briefly noticed. The hero Adrastus, whose chapel Herodotus himself saw in the Sikyonian agora, was common both to Argos and to Sikyon, and was the object of special reverence at both. He figures in the legend as king of Argos, and as the grandson and heir of Polybus king of Sikyon. He was the unhappy leader of the two sieges of Thebes, so famous in the ancient epic. The Sikyonians listened with delight both to the exploits of the Argeians against Thebes, as celebrated in the recitations of the epical rhapsodes, and to the mournful tale of Adrastus and his family misfortunes, as sung in the tragic chorus. Kleisthenes not only forbade the rhapsodes to come to Sikyon, but further resolved to expel Adrastus himself from the country—such is the literal Greek expression, the hero himself being believed to be actually present and domiciled among the people. He first applied to the Delphian oracle for permission to carry this banishment into direct effect; but the Pythian priestess returned an answer of indignant refusal,—"Adrastus is king of the Sikyonians, but thou art a ruffian." Thus baffled, he put in practice a strategem calculated to induce Adrastus to depart of his own accord. He sent to Thebes to beg that he might be allowed to introduce into Sikyon the hero Melanippus; and the permission was granted. Now Melanippus —being celebrated in the legend as the puissant champion of Thebes against Adrastus and the Argeian besiegers, and as having slain both Mekisteus the brother, and Tydeus the son-in-law, of Adrastus—was pre-eminently odious to the latter. Kleisthenes brought this anti-national hero into Sikyon, assigning to him consecrated ground in the prytaneium or government-house, and even in that part which was most strongly fortified (for it seems that Adrastus was conceived as likely to assail and to battle with the intruder)—moreover he took away both the tragic choruses and the sacrifice from Adrastus, assigning the former to the god Dionysus, and the latter to Melanippus.

The religious manifestations of Sikyon being thus transferred from Adrastus to his mortal foe, and from the cause of Argeians in the siege of Thebes to that of the Thebans, Adrastus was presumed to have voluntarily retired from the place. And the purpose which Kleisthenes contemplated, of breaking the community of feeling between Sikyon and Argos, was in part accomplished.

A ruler who could do such violence to the religious and legendary sentiment of his community may well be supposed capable of inflicting that deliberate insult upon the Dorian tribes which is implied in their new appellations. As we are uninformed, however, of the state of things which preceded, we know not how far it may have been a retaliation for previous insult in the opposite direction. It is plain that the Dorians of Sikyon maintained themselves and their ancient tribes quite apart from the remaining community; though what the other constituent portions of the population were, or in

what relation they stood to these Dorians, we are not enabled to make out. We hear, indeed, of a dependent rural population in the territory of Sikyon, as well as in that of Argos and Epidaurus, analogous to the Helots in Laconia. In Sikyon this class was termed the Korynephori (club-men) or the Katonakophori, from the thick woolen mantle which they wore, with a sheepskin sewn on to the skirt: in Argos they were called Gymnesii, from their not possessing the military panoply or the use of regular arms: in Epidaurus, Konipodes or the Dusty-footed. We may conclude that a similar class existed in Corinth, in Megara, and in each of the Dorian towns of the Argolic Akte. But besides the Dorian tribes and these rustics, there must probably have existed non-Dorian proprietors and town-residents, and upon them we may suppose that the power of the Orthagoridæ and of Kleisthenes was founded, perhaps more friendly and indulgent to the rustic serfs than that of the Dorians had been previously. The moderation which Aristotle ascribes to the Orthagoridæ generally is belied by the proceedings of Kleisthenes. But we may probably believe that his predecessors, content with maintaining the real predominance of the non-Dorian over the Dorian population, meddled very little with the separate position and civil habits of the latter—while Kleisthenes, provoked or alarmed by some attempt on their part to strengthen alliance with the Argeians, resorted both to repressive measures and to that offensive nomenclature which has been above cited. The preservation of the power of Kleisthenes was due to his military energy (according to Aristotle) even more than to his moderation and popular conduct. It was aided probably by his magnificent displays at the public games, for he was victor in the chariot-race at the Pythian games 582 B.C., as well as at the Olympic games besides. Moreover he was in fact the last of the race, nor did he transmit his power to any successor.

The reigns of the early Orthagoridæ then may be considered as marking a predominance, newly acquired but quietly exercised, of the non-Dorians over the Dorians in Sikyon: the reign of Kleisthenes, as displaying a strong explosion of antipathy from the former toward the latter. And though this antipathy, with the application of those opprobrious tribe-names in which it was conveyed, stand ascribed to Kleisthenes personally—we may see that the non-Dorians in Sikyon shared it generally, because these same tribe-names continued to be applied not only during the reign of that despot, but also for sixty years longer, after his death. It is hardly necessary to remark that such denominations could never have been acknowledged or employed among the Dorians themselves. After the lapse of sixty years from the death of Kleisthenes, the Sikyonians came to an amicable adjustment of the feud, and placed the tribe-names on a footing satisfactory to all parties. The old Dorian denominations (Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes) were re-established, while the name of the fourth tribe, or non-Dorians, was changed from Archelai

to Ægialeis—Ægialeus son of Adrastus being constituted their eponymus. This choice, of the son of Adrastus for an eponymus, seems to show that the worship of Adrastus himself was then revived in Sikyon, since it existed in the time of Herodotus.

Of the war which Kleisthenes helped to conduct against Kirrha, for the protection of the Delphian temple, I shall speak in another place. His death and the cessation of his dynasty seem to have occurred about 560 B.C., as far as the chronology can be made out. That he was put down by the Spartans (as K. F. Hermann, O. Müller, and Dr. Thirlwall suppose) can be hardly admitted consistently with the narrative of Herodotus, who mentions the continuance of the insulting names imposed by him upon the Dorian tribes for many years after his death. Now, had the Spartans forcibly interfered for the suppression of his dynasty, we may reasonably presume that, even if they did not restore the decided preponderance of the Dorians in Sikyon, they would at least have rescued the Dorian tribes from this obvious ignominy. But it seems doubtful whether Kleisthenes had any son: and the extraordinary importance attached to the marriage of his daughter Agariste, whom he bestowed upon the Athenian Megakles of the great family Alkmæonidæ, seems rather to envince that she was an heiress—not to his power, but to his wealth. There can be no doubt as to the fact of that marriage, from which was born the Athenian leader Kleisthenes, afterward the author of the great democratical revolution at Athens after the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ; but the lively and amusing details with which Herodotus has surrounded it bear much more the stamp of romance than of reality. Dressed up apparently by some ingenious Athenian as a compliment to the Alkmæonid lineage of his city, which comprised both Kleisthenes and Perikles, the narrative commemorates a marriage-rivalry between that lineage and another noble Athenian house, and at the same time gives a mythical explanation of a phrase seemingly proverbial at Athens—"*Hippokleides don't care.*"

Plutarch numbers Æschines of Sikyon among the despots put down by Sparta: at what period this took place, or how it is to be connected with the history of Kleisthenes as given in Herodotus, we are unable to say.

Contemporaneous with the Orthagoridæ at Sikyon—but beginning a little later and closing somewhat earlier—we find the despots Kypselus and Periander at Corinth. The former appears as the subverter of the oligarchy called the Bacchiadæ. Of the manner in which he accomplished his object we find no information: and this historical blank is inadequately filled up by various religious prognostics and oracles, foreshadowing the rise, the harsh rule, and the dethronement after two generations, of these powerful despots.

According to an idea deeply seated in the Greek mind, the destruction of a great prince or of a great power is usually signified by the gods beforehand, though either through hardness of heart or inad-

vertence no heed is taken of the warning. In reference to Kypselus and the Bacchiadæ, we are informed that Melas, the ancestor of the former, was one of the original settlers at Corinth who accompanied the first Dorian chief Aletes, and that Aletes was in vain warned by an oracle not to admit him. Again, too, immediately before Kypselus was born, the Bacchiadæ received notice that his mother was about to give birth to one who would prove their ruin: the dangerous infant escaped destruction only by a hair's breadth, being preserved from the intent of his destroyers by lucky concealment in a chest. Labda, the mother of Kypselus, was daughter of Amphion, who belonged to the gens or sept of the Bacchiadæ; but she was lame, and none of the gens would consent to marry her with that deformity. Eetion, son of Echekrates, who became her husband, belonged to a different, yet hardly less distinguished, heroic genealogy. He was of the Lapithæ, descended from Kæneus, and dwelling in the Corinthian deme called Petra. We see thus that Kypselus was not only a high-born man in the city, but a Bacchiad by half-birth: both of these circumstances were likely to make exclusion from the government intolerable to him. He rendered himself highly popular with the people, and by their aid overthrew and expelled the Bacchiadæ, continuing as despot at Corinth for thirty years until his death (B.C. 655–625). According to Aristotle, he maintained throughout life the same conciliatory behavior by which his power had first been acquired; and his popularity was so effectually sustained that he had never any occasion for a body-guard. But the Corinthian oligarchy of the century of Herodotus (whose tale that historian has embodied in the oration of the Corinthian envoy Sosikles to the Spartans) gave a very different description, and depicted Kypselus as a cruel ruler, who banished, robbed, and murdered by wholesale.

His son and successor Periander, though energetic as a warrior, distinguished as an encourager of poetry and music, and even numbered by some among the seven wise men of Greece, is nevertheless uniformly represented as oppressive and inhuman in his treatment of subjects. The revolting stories which are told respecting his private life, and his relations with his mother and his wife, may for the most part be regarded as calumnies suggested by odious associations with his memory. But there seems good reason for imputing to him tyranny of the worst character. The sanguinary maxims of precaution, so often acted upon by Grecian despots, were traced back in ordinary belief to Periander and his contemporary Thrasybulus despot of Miletus. He maintained a powerful body-guard, shed much blood, and was exorbitant in his exactions, a part of which was employed in votive offerings at Olympia. Such munificence to the gods was considered by Aristotle and others as part of a deliberate system, with the view of keeping his subjects both hard at work and poor. On one occasion we are told that he invited the women of Corinth to assemble for the celebration of a religious festival, and

then stripped them of their rich attire and ornaments. By some later writers he is painted as the stern foe of everything like luxury and dissolute habits—enforcing industry, compelling every man to render account of his means of livelihood, and causing the procuresses of Corinth to be thrown into the sea. Though the general features of his character, his cruel tyranny no less than his vigor and ability, may be sufficiently relied on, yet the particular incidents connected with his name are all extremely dubious. The most credible of all seems to be the tale of his inexpiable quarrel with his son and his brutal treatment of many noble Korkyræan youths, as related in Herodotus. Periander is said to have put to death his wife Melissa, daughter of Prokles despot of Epidaurus. His son Lykophron, informed of this deed, contracted an incurable antipathy against him. Periander, after vainly trying both by rigor and by conciliation, to conquer this feeling on the part of his son, sent him to reside at Korkyra, then dependent upon his rule; but when he found himself growing old and disabled, he recalled him to Corinth, in order to insure the continuance of the dynasty. Lykophron still obstinately declined all personal communication with his father, upon which the latter desired him to come to Corinth, and engaged himself to go over to Korkyra. So terrified were the Korkyræans at the idea of a visit from this formidable old man, that they put Lykophron to death—a deed which Periander avenged by seizing 300 youths of their noblest families, and sending them over to the Lydian king Alyattes at Sardis, in order that they might be castrated and made to serve as eunuchs. The Corinthian vessels in which the youths were dispatched fortunately touched at Samos in the way; where the Samians and Knidians, shocked at a proceeding which outraged all Hellenic sentiment, contrived to rescue the youths from the miserable fate intended for them, and after the death of Periander sent them back to their native island.

While we turn with displeasure from the political life of this man, we are at the same time made acquainted with the great extent of his power—greater than that which was ever possessed by Corinth after the extinction of his dynasty. Korkyra, Ambrakia, Leukas, and Anaktorium, all Corinthian colonies, but in the next century independent states, appear in his time dependencies of Corinth. Ambrakia is said to have been under the rule of another despot named Periander, probably also a Kypselid by birth. It seems, indeed, that the towns of Anaktorium, Leukas, and Apollonia in the Ionian gulf, were either founded by the Kypselids, or received reinforcements of Corinthian colonists, during their dynasty, though Korkyra was established considerably earlier.

The reign of Periander lasted for forty years (B C. 625–585): Psammetichus son of Gordius, who succeeded him, reigned three years, and the Kypselid dynasty is then said to have closed after having continued for seventy-three years. In respect of power, magnificent

display, and widespread connections both in Asia and in Italy, they evidently stood high among the Greeks of their time. Their offerings consecrated at Olympia excited great admiration, especially the gilt colossal statue of Zeus and the large chest of cedar-wood dedicated in the temple of Here, overlaid with various figures in gold and ivory. The figures were borrowed from mythical and legendary story, while the chest was a commemoration both of the name of Kypselus and of the tale of his marvelous preservation in infancy. If Plutarch is correct, this powerful dynasty is to be numbered among the despots put down by Sparta. Yet such intervention of the Spartans, granting it to have been matter of fact, can hardly have been known to Herodotus.

Coincident in point of time with the commencement of Periander's reign at Corinth, we find Theagenes despot at Megara, who is also said to have acquired his power by demagogic arts, as well as by violent aggressions against the rich proprietors, whose cattle he destroyed in their pastures by the side of the river. We are not told by what previous conduct on the part of the rich this hatred of the people had been earned; but Theagenes carried the popular feeling completely along with him, obtained by public vote a body of guards ostensibly for his personal safety, and employed them to overthrow the oligarchy. Yet he did not maintain his power even for his own life. A second revolution dethroned and expelled him, on which occasion, after a short interval of temperate government, the people are said to have renewed in a still more marked way their antipathies against the rich; banishing some of them with confiscation of property, intruding into the houses of others with demands for forced hospitality, and even passing a formal Palintokia—or decree to require from the rich who had lent money on interest, the refunding of all past interest paid to them by their debtors. To appreciate correctly such a demand, we must recollect that the practice of taking interest for money lent was regarded by a large proportion of early ancient society with feelings of unqualified reprobation. And it will be seen, when we come to the legislation of Solon, how much such violent reactionary feeling against the creditor was provoked by the antecedent working of the harsh law determining his rights.

We hear in general terms of more than one revolution in the government of Megara—a disorderly democracy subverted by returning oligarchical exiles, and these again unable long to maintain themselves; but we are alike uninformed as to dates and details. And in respect to one of these struggles we are admitted to the outpourings of a contemporary and a sufferer—the Megarian poet Theognis. Unfortunately his elegiac verses as we possess them are in a state so broken, incoherent, and interpolated, that we make out no distinct conception of the events which call them forth. Still less can we discover in the verses of Theognis that strength and peculiarity of pure Dorian feeling, which, since the publication of O. Müller's History of the Dorians, it has been the fashion to look for so extensively. But we see that the poet was connected with an oligarchy of birth, and not of wealth, which had recently been subverted by the breaking in of the rustic population previously subject and degraded—that these subjects were content to submit to a single-headed despot, in order to escape from their former rulers—and that Theognis had himself been betrayed by his own friends and companions, stripped of his property and exiled, through the wrong-doing "of enemies whose blood he hopes one day to be permitted to drink." The condition of the subject cultivators previous to this revolution he depicts in sad colors: they "dwelt without the city, clad in goatskins, and ignorant of judicial sanctions or laws:" after it, they had become citizens, and their importance had been immensely enhanced. Thus (according to his impression) the vile breed has trodden down the noble—the bad have become masters, and the good are no longer of any account. The bitterness and humiliation which attend upon poverty, and the undue ascendency which wealth confers even upon the most worthless of mankind, are among the prominent subjects of his complaint. His keen personal feeling on this point would be alone sufficient to show that the recent revolution had no way overthrown the influence of property; in contradiction to the opinion of Welcker, who infers without ground, from a passage of uncertain meaning, that the land of the state had been formally redivided. The Megarian revolution, so far as we apprehend it from Theognis, appears to have improved materially the condition of the cultivators around the town, and to have strengthened a certain class whom he considers "the bad rich"—while it extinguished the privileges of that governing order, to which he himself belonged, denominated in his language "the good and the virtuous," with ruinous effect upon his own individual fortunes. How far this governing order was exclusively Dorian, we have no means of determining. The political change by which Theognis suffered, and the new despot whom he indicates as either actually installed or nearly impending, must have come considerably after the despotism of Theagenes; for the life of the poet seems to fall between 570–490 B.C., while Theagenes must have ruled about 630–600 B.C. From the unfavorable picture, therefore, which the poet gives as his own early experience, of the condition of the rural cultivators, it is evident that the despot Theagenes had neither conferred upon them any permanent benefit, nor given them access to the judicial protection of the city.

It is thus that the despots of Corinth, Sikyon, and Megara serve as samples of those revolutionary influences which, toward the beginning of the sixth century B.C., seem to have shaken or overturned the oligarchical governments in very many cities throughout the Grecian world. There existed a certain sympathy and alliance between the despots of Corinth and Sikyon: how far such feeling was further extended to Megara we do not know. The latter city

seems evidently to have been more populous and powerful during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. than we shall afterward find her throughout the two brilliant centuries of Grecian history. Her colonies, found as far distant as Bithynia and the Thracian Bosphorus on one side, and as Sicily on the other, argue an extent of trade as well as naval force once not inferior to Athens; so that we shall be the less suprised when we approach the life of Solon, to find her in possession of the island of Salamis, and long maintaining it, at one time with every promise of triumph, against the entire force of the Athenians.

CHAPTER X.

IONIC PORTION OF HELLAS—ATHENS BEFORE SOLON.

HAVING traced in the preceding chapters the scanty stream of Peloponnesian history, from the first commencement of an authentic chronology in 776 B.C., to the maximum of Spartan territorial acquisition, and the general acknowledgment of Spartan primacy, prior to 547 B.C., I proceed to state as much as can be made out respecting the Ionic portion of Hellas during the same period. This portion comprehends Athens and Eubœa—the Cyclades islands—and the Ionic cities on the coast of Asia Minor, with their different colonies.

In the case of Peloponnesus, we have been enabled to discern something like an order of real facts in the period alluded to—Sparta makes great strides, while Argos falls. In the case of Athens, unfortunately, our materials are less instructive. The number of historical facts, anterior to the Solonian legislation, is very few indeed: the interval between 776 B.C. and 624 B.C., the epoch of Drako's legislation a short time prior to Kylon's attempted usurpation, gives us merely a list of archons, denuded of all incident.

In compliment to the heroism of Kodrus, who had sacrificed his life for the safety of his country, we are told that no person after him was permitted to bear the title of king. His son Medon, and twelve successors—Akastus, Archippus, Thersippus, Phorbas, Megakles, Diognetus, Pherekles, Ariphron, Thespieus, Agamestor, Æschylus, and Alkmæon—were all archons for life. In the second year of Alkmæon (752 B.C.), the dignity of archon was restricted to a duration of ten years; and seven of these decennial archons are numbered —Charops, Æsimides, Kleidikus, Hippomenes, Leokrates, Apsandrus, Eryxias. With Kreon, who succeeded Eryxias, the archonship was not only made annual, but put into commission and distributed among nine persons. These nine archons annually changed continue throughout all the historical period, interrupted only by the few

intervals of political disturbance and foreign compression. Down to Kleidikus and Hippomenes (714 B.C.), the dignity of archon had continued to belong exclusively to the Medontidæ or descendants of Medon and Kodrus; at that period it was thrown open to all the Eupatrids, or order of nobility in the state.

Such is the series of names by which we step down from the level of legend to that of history. All our historical knowledge of Athens is confined to the annual archons; which series of eponymous archons, from Kreon downwards, is perfectly trustworthy. Above 683 B.C., the Attic antiquaries have provided us with a string of names, which we must take as we find them, without being able either to warrant the whole or to separate the false from the true. There is no reason to doubt the general fact that Athens, like so many other communities of Greece, was in its primitive times governed by an hereditary line of kings, and that it passed from that form of government into a commonwealth, first oligarchical, afterward democratical.

We are in no condition to determine the civil classification and political constitution of Attica, even at the period of the archonship of Kreon, 683 B.C., when authentic Athenian chronology first commences—much less can we pretend to any knowledge of the anterior centuries. Great political changes were introduced first by Solon (about 594 B.C.), next by Kleisthenes (509 B.C.), afterward by Aristeides, Perikles, and Ephialtes, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars; so that the old ante-Solonian—nay even the real Solonian—polity was thus put more and more out of date and out of knowledge. But all the information which we possess respecting that old polity is derived from authors who lived after all or most of these great changes—and who, finding no records, nor anything better than current legends, explained the foretime as well as they could by guesses more or less ingenious, generally attached to the dominant legendary names. They were sometimes able to found their conclusions upon religious usages, periodical ceremonies, or common sacrifices, still subsisting in their own time. These were doubtless the best evidences to be found respecting Athenian antiquity, since such practices often continued unaltered throughout all the political changes. It is in this way alone that we arrive at some partial knowledge of he ante-Solonian condition of Attica, though as a whole it still remains dark and unintelligible, even after the many illustrations of modern commentators.

Philochorus, writing in the third century before the Christian era, stated, that Kekrops had originally distributed Attica into twelve districts—Kekropia, Tetrapolis Epakria, Dekeleia, Eleusis, Aphidnæ, Thorikus, Brauron, Kytherus, Sphettus; Kephisia, Phalerus—and that these twelve were consolidated into one political society by Theseus. This partition does not comprise the Megarid, which, according to other statements, is represented as united with Attica,

and as having formed part of the distribution made by king Pandion among his four sons, Nisus, Ægeus, Pallas and Lykus—a story as old as Sophokles at least. In other accounts, again, a quadruple division is applied to the tribes, which are stated to have been four in number, beginning from Kekrops—called in his time Kekropis, Autochthon, Aktæa, and Paralia. Under King Kranaus, these tribes (we are told) received the names of Kranais, Atthis, Mesogæa, and Diakria—under Erichthonius, those of Dias, Athenais, Poseidonias, Hephæstias: at last, shortly after Erechtheus, they were denominated after the four sons of Ion (son of Kreusa daughter of Erechtheus, by Apollo), Geleontes, Hopletes, Ægikoreis, Argadeis. The four Attic or Ionic tribes, under these last-mentioned names, continued to form the classification of the citizens until the revolution of Kleisthenes in 509 B.C., by which the ten tribes were introduced, as we find them down to the period of Macedonian ascendency. It is affirmed, and with some etymological plausibility, that the denominations of these four tribes must originally have had reference to the occupations of those who bore them—the Hopletes being the *warrior-class*, the Ægikoreis *goatherds*, the Argadeis *artisans*, and the Geleontes (Teleontes, or Gedeontes) *cultivators*. Hence some authors have ascribed to the ancient inhabitants of Attica an actual primitive distribution into hereditary professions or castes, similar to that which prevailed in India and Egypt. If we should even grant that such a division into castes might originally have prevailed, it must have grown obsolete long before the time of Solon: but there seem no sufficient grounds for believing that it ever did prevail. The names of the tribes may have been originally borrowed from certain professions, but it does not necessarily follow that the reality corresponded to this derivation, or that every individual who belonged to any tribe was a member of the profession from whence the name had originally been derived. From the etymology of the names, be it ever so clear, we cannot safely assume the historical reality of a classification according to professions. And this objection (which would be weighty even if the etymology had been clear) becomes irresistible when we add that even the etymology is not beyond dispute; that the names themselves are written with a diversity which cannot be reconciled; and that the four professions named by Strabo omit the goatherds and include the priests; while those specified by Plutarch leave out the latter and include the former.

All that seems certain is, that these were the four ancient Ionic tribes (analogous to the Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes among the Dorians) which prevailed not only at Athens, but among several of the Ionic cities derived from Athens. The Geleontes are mentioned in inscriptions now remaining belonging to Teos in Ionia, and all the four are named in those of Kyzikus in the Propontis, which was a foundation from the Ionic Miletus. The four tribes, and the four names (allowing for some variations of reading), are therefore historically verified. But neither the time of their introduction, nor their primitive import, are ascertainable matters; nor can any faith be put in the various constructions of the legends of Ion, Erechtheus, and Kekrops, by modern commentators.

These four tribes may be looked at either as religious and social aggregates, in which capacity each of them comprised three Phratries and ninety Gentes; or as political aggregates, in which point of view each included three Trittyes and twelve Naukraries. Each Phratry contained thirty Gentes: each Trittys comprised four Naukraries: the total numbers were thus 360 Gentes and 48 Naukraries. Moreover each gens is said to have contained thirty heads of families, of whom therefore there would be a total of 10,800.

Comparing these two distributions one with the other, we may remark that they are distinct in their nature and proceed in opposite directions. The Trittys and the Naukrary are essentially fractional subdivisions of the tribe, and resting upon the tribe as their higher unity: the Naukrary is a local circumscription, composed of the Naukrars or principal householders (so the etymology seems to indicate), who levy in each respective district the quota of public contributions which belongs to it, and superintend the disbursement, —provide the military force incumbent upon the district, being for each naukrary two horsemen and one ship,—and furnish the chief district-officers, the Prytanes of the Naukrari. A certain number of foot-soldiers, varying according to the demand, must probably be understood as accompanying these horsemen; but the quota is not specified, as it was, perhaps, thought unnecessary to limit precisely the obligations of any except the wealthier men who served on horseback,—at a period when oligarchical ascendency was paramount, and when the bulk of the people was in a state of comparative subjection. The 48 naukraries are thus a systematic subdivision of the four tribes, embracing altogether the whole territory, population, contributions, and military force of Attica,—a subdivision framed exclusively for purposes connected with the entire state.

But the Phratries and Gentes are a distribution completely different from this. They seem aggregations of small primitive unities into larger; they are independent of, and do not presuppose, the tribe; they arise separately and spontaneously, without preconcerted uniformity, and without reference to a common political purpose; the legislator finds them pre-existing, and adapts or modifies them to answer some national scheme. We must distinguish the general fact of the classification, and the successive subordination in the scale, of the families to the gens, of the gentes to the phratry, and of the phratries to the tribe—from the precise numerical symmetry with which this subordination is invested, as we read it—thirty families to a gens, thirty gentes to a phratry, three phratries to each tribe. If such nice equality of numbers could ever have been procured, by legislative constraint operating upon pre-existent natural elements, the propor-

tions could not have been permanently maintained. But we may reasonably doubt whether it ever did so exist: it appears more like the fancy of an antiquary who pleased himself by supposing an original systematic creation in times anterior to records, by multiplying together the number of days in the month and of months in the year. That every phratry contained an equal number of gentes, and every gens an equal number of families, is a supposition hardly admissible without better evidence than we possess. But apart from this questionable precision of numerical scale, the Phratries and Gentes themselves were real, ancient, and durable associations among the Athenian people, highly important to be understood. The basis of the whole was the house, hearth, or family—a number of which, greater or less, composed the Gens or Genos. This gens was therefore a clan, sept, or enlarged, and partly factitious, brotherhood, bound together by—1. Common religious ceremonies, and exclusive privilege of priesthood, in honor of the same god, supposed to be the primitive ancestor and characterized by a special surname. 2. By a common burial-place. 3. By mutual rights of successions to property. 4. By reciprocal obligations of help, defense, and redress of injuries. 5. By mutual right and obligation to intermarry in certain determinate cases, especially where there was an orphan daughter or heiress. 6. By possession, in some cases at least, of common property, an archon and a treasurer of their own.

Such were the rights and obligations characterizing the gentile union. The phratric union, binding together several gentes, was less intimate, but still included some mutual rights and obligations of an analogous character; especially a communion of particular sacred rights, and mutual privileges of prosecution in the event of a phrator being slain. Each phratry was considered as belonging to one of the four tribes, and all the phratries of the same tribe enjoyed a certain periodical communion of sacred rites, under the presidency of a magistrate called the Phylo-Basileus or tribe king, selected from the Eupatrids: Zeus Geleon was in this manner the patron god of the tribe Geleontes. Lastly, all the four tribes were linked together by the common worship of Apollo Patrous as their divine father and guardian; for Apollo was the father of Ion, and the Eponyms of all the four tribes were reputed sons of Ion.

Thus stood the primitive religious and social union of the population of Attica in its gradually ascending scale—as distinguished from the political union, probably of later introduction, represented at first by the Trittyes and Naukraries, and in after times by the ten Kleisthenean tribes, subdivided into Trittyes and Demes. The religious and family bond of aggregation is the earlier of the two: but the political bond, though beginning later, will be found to acquire constantly increasing influence throughout the greater part of this history. In the former, personal relation is the essential and predominant characteristic—local relation being subordinate: in the latter,

property and residence become the chief considerations, and the personal element counts only as measured along with these accompaniments. All these phratric and gentile associations, the larger as well as the smaller, were founded upon the same principles and tendencies of the Grecian mind—a coalescence of the idea of worship with that of ancestry, or of communion in certain special religious rites with communion of blood, real or supposed. The god or hero, to whom the assembled members offered their sacrifices, was conceived as the primitive ancestor to whom they owed their origin; often through a long list of intermediate names, as in the case of the Milesian Hekatæus, so often before adverted to. Each family had its own sacred rites and funereal commemoration of ancestors, celebrated by the master of the house, to which none but members of the family were admissible: so that the extinction of a family, carrying with it the suspension of these religious rites, was held by the Greeks to be a misfortune, not merely from the loss of the citizens composing it, but also because the family gods and the names of deceased citizens were thus deprived of their honors and might visit the country with displeasure. The larger associations, called Gens, Phratry, tribe, were formed by an extension of the same principle—of the family considered as a religious brotherhood, worshiping some common god or hero with an appropriate surname, and recognizing him as their joint ancestor: and the festivals Theoenia and Apaturia (the first Attic, the second common to all the Ionic race) annually brought together the members of these phratries and gentes for worship, festivity, and maintenance of special sympathies; thus strengthening the larger ties without effacing the smaller.

Such were the manifestations of Grecian socialty, as we read them in the early constitution, not merely of Attica, but of other Grecian states besides. To Aristotle and Dikæarchus it was an interesting inquiry to trace back all political society into certain assumed elementary atoms, and to show by what motives and means the original families, each having its separate meal-bin and fireplace, had been brought together into larger aggregates. But the historian must accept as an ultimate fact the earliest state of things which his witnesses make known to him, and in the case now before us, the gentile and phratric unions are matters into the beginning of which we cannot pretend to penetrate.

Pollux (probably from Aristotle's lost work on the Constitutions of Greece) informs us distinctly that the members of the same gens at Athens were not commonly related by blood,—and even without any express testimony we might have concluded such to be the fact. To what extent the gens at the unknown epoch of its first formation was based upon actual relationship, we have no means of determining, either with regard to the Athenian or the Roman gentes, which were in all main points analogous. Gentilism is a tie by itself; distinct from the family ties, but presupposing their existence and extending

them by an artificial analogy, partly founded in religious belief and partly on positive compact, so as to comprehend strangers in blood. All the members of one gens, or even of one phratry, believed themselves to be sprung, not indeed from the same grandfather or great-grandfather, but from the same divine or heroic ancestor. All the contemporary members of the phratry of Hekatæus had a common god for their ancestor in the sixteenth degree; and this fundamental belief, into which the Greek mind passed with so much facility, was adopted and converted by positive compact into the Gentile and phratric principle of union. It is because such a transfusion, not recognized by Christianity, is at variance with modern habits of thought, and because we do not readily understand how such a legal and religious fiction can have sunk deep into the Greek feelings, that the phratries and gentes appear to us mysterious. But they are in harmony with all the legendary genealogies which have been set forth in the preceding volume. Doubtless Niebuhr, in his valuable discussion of the ancient Roman Gentes, is right in supposing that they were not real families, procreated from any common historical ancestor. Still, it is not the less true (though he seems to suppose otherwise) that the idea of the gens involved *the belief* in a common first father, divine or heroic—a genealogy which we may properly call fabulous, but which was consecrated and accredited among the members of the gens itself, and served as one important bond of union between them. And though an analytical mind like Aristotle might discern the difference between the gens and the family, so as to distinguish the former as the offspring of some special compact—still this is no fair test of the feelings usual among early Greeks. Nor is it certain that Aristotle himself, son of the physician Nikomachus, who belonged to the gens of the Asklepiads, would have consented to disallow the procreative origin of *all* these religious families without any exception. The natural families, of course, changed from generation to generation, some extending themselves while others diminished or died out; but the gens received no alterations, except through the procreation, extinction, or subdivision of these component families. Accordingly, the relations of the families with the gens were in perpetual course of fluctuaton, and the gentile ancestoral genealogy, adapted as it doubtless was to the early condition of the gens, became in process of time partially obsolete and unsuitable. We hear of this genealogy but rarely because it is only brought before the public in certain cases pre-eminent and venerable. But the humbler gentes had their common rites, and common superhuman ancestor and genealogy, as well as the more celebrated: the scheme and ideal basis was the same in all.

Analogies, borrowed from very different people and parts of the world, prove how readily these enlarged and factitious family unions assort with the ideas of an early stage of society. The Highland clan, the Irish sept, the ancient legally constituted families in Friesland and Dithmarsch, the Phis or Phara among the Albanians, are examples of a similar practice: and the adoption of prisoners by the North American Indians, as well as the universal prevalence and efficacy of the ceremony of adoption in the Grecian and Roman world, exhibit to us a solemn formality under certain circumstances, originating an union and affections similar to those of kindred. Of this same nature were the Phratries and Gentes at Athens, the Curiæ and Gentes at Rome. But they were peculiarly modified by the religious imagination of the ancient world, which always traced back the past time to gods and heroes: and religion thus supplied both the common genealogy as their basis, and the privileged communion of special sacred rites as means of commemoration and perpetuity. The Gentes, both at Athens and in other parts of Greece, bore a patronymic name, the stamp of their believed common paternity: we find the Asklepiadæ in many parts of Greece—the Aleuadæ in Thessaly—the Midylidæ, Psalychidæ, Blepsiadæ, Euxenidæ, at Ægina—the Branchidæ at Miletus—the Nebridæ at Kos—the Iamidæ and Klytiadæ at Olympia—the Akestoridæ at Argos—the Kinyradæ in Cyprus—the Penthilidæ at Mitylene—the Talthybiadæ at Sparta,—not less than the Kodridæ, Eumolpidæ, Phytalidæ, Lykomedæ, Butadæ, Euneidæ, Hesychidæ, Brytiadæ, etc., in Attica. To each of these corresponded a mythical ancestor more or less known, and passing for the first father as well as the eponymous hero of the gens—Kodrus, Eumolpus, Butes, Phytalus, Hesychus, etc.

The revolution of Kleisthenes in 509 B.C. abolished the old tribes for civil purposes, and created ten new tribes—leaving the phratries and gentes unaltered, but introducing the local distribution according to demes or cantons, as the foundation of his new political tribes. A certain number of demes belong to each of the ten Kleisthenean tribes (the demes in the same tribes were not usually contiguous, so that the tribe was not coincident with a definite circumscription), and the deme, in which every individual was then registered, continued to be that in which his descendants were also registered. But the gentes had no connection, as such, with these new tribes, and the members of the same gens might belong to different demes. It deserves to be remarked, however, that to a certain extent, in the old arrangement of Attica, the division into gentes coincided with the division into demes, i.e., it happened not unfrequently that the gennetes (or members of the same gens) lived in the same canton, so that the name of the gens and the name of the deme was the same. Moreover, it seems that Kleisthenes recognized a certain number of new demes, to which he gave names derived from some important gens resident near the spot. It is thus that we are to explain the large number of the Kleisthenean demes which bear patronymic names.

There is one remarkable difference between the Roman and the Grecian gens, arising from the different practice in regard to naming. A Roman patrician bore habitually three names—the gentile name,

with one name following it to denote his family, and another preceding it peculiar to himself in that family. But in Athens, at least after the revolution of Kleisthenes, the gentile name was not employed: a man was described by his own single name, followed first by the name of his father and next by that of the deme to which he belonged—as *Æschines, son of Atrometus, a Kothokid.* Such a difference in the habitual system of naming tended to make the gentile tie more present to every one's mind at Rome than in the Greek cities.

Before the pecuniary classification of the Atticans introduced by Solon, the phratries and gentes, and the Trittyes and Naukraries, were the only recognized bonds among them, and the only basis of legal rights and obligations, over and above the natural family. The gens constituted a close incorporation, both as to property and as to persons. Until the time of Solon, no man had any power of testamentary disposition. If he died without children, his gennetes succeeded to his property, and so they continued to do even after Solon, if he died intestate. An orphan girl might be claimed in marriage of right by any member of the gens, the nearest agnates being preferred; if she was poor, and he did not choose to marry her himself, the law of Solon compelled him to provide her with a dowry proportional to his enrolled scale of property, and to give her out in marriage to another; and the magnitude of the dowry required to be given (large even as fixed by Solon and afterwards doubled) seems a proof that the lawgiver intended indirectly to enforce actual marriage. If a man was murdered, first his near relations, next his gennetes and phrators, were both allowed and required to prosecute the crime at law; while his fellow demots, or inhabitants of the same deme, did not possess the like right of prosecuting. All that we hear of the most ancient Athenian laws is based upon the gentile and phratric divisions, which are treated throughout as extensions of the family. It is to be observed that this division is completely independent of any property qualification—rich men as well as poor being comprehended in the same gens. Moreover, the different gentes were very unequal in dignity, arising chiefly from the religious ceremonies of which each possessed the hereditary and exclusive administration, and which, being in some cases considered as of pre-eminent sanctity in reference to the whole city, were therefore nationalized. Thus the Eumolpidæ and Kerykes, who supplied the Hierophant and superintended the mysteries of the Eleusinian Demeter—and the Butadæ, who furnished the priestess of Athene Polias as well as the priest of Poseidon Erechtheus in the acropolis—seem to have been reverenced above all the other gentes. When the name Butadæ was selected in the Kleisthenean arrangement as the name of a deme, the holy gens so called adopted the distinctive denomination of Eteobutadæ, or "The true Butadæ."

A great many of the ancient gentes of Attica are known to us by

name; but there is only one phratry (the Achniadæ) whose title has come down to us. These phratries and gentes probably never at any time included the whole population of the country—and the proportion not included in them tended to become larger and larger, in the times anterior to Kleisthenes, as well as afterward. They remained, under his constitution and throughout the subsequent history, as religious quasi-families or corporations, conferring rights and imposing liabilities which were enforced in the regular dikasteries, but not directly connected with the citizenship or with political functions: a man might be a citizen without being enrolled in any gens. The forty-eight Naukraries ceased to exist, for any important purposes, under his constitution. The deme, instead of the naukrary, became the elementary political division, for military and financial objects; while the demarch became the working local president, instead of the chief of the naukrars. The deme, however, was not coincident with a naukrary, nor the demarch with the previous chief of the naukrary, though they were analogous and constituted for the like purpose. While the naukraries had been only forty-eight in number, the demes formed smaller subdivisions, and (in later times at least) amounted to a hundred and seventy-four.

But though this early quadruple division into tribes is tolerably intelligible in itself, there is much difficulty in reconciling it with that severalty of government which we learn to have originally prevailed among the inhabitants of Attica. From Kekrops down to Theseus (says Thucydides) there were many different cities in Attica, each of them autonomous and self-governing, with its own prytaneium and its own archons. It was only on occasions of some common danger that these distinct communities took counsel together under the authority of the Athenian kings, whose city at that time comprised merely the holy rock of Athene on the plain (afterward so conspicuous as the acropolis of the enlarged Athens), together with a narrow area under it on the southern side. It was Theseus (he states) who effected that great revolution whereby the whole of Attica was consolidated into one government—all the local magistracies and councils being made to center in the prytaneium and senate of Athens. His combined sagacity and power enforced upon all the inhabitants of Attica the necessity of recognizing Athens as the one city in the country, and of occupying their own abodes simply as constituent portions of Athenian territory. This important move, which naturally produced a great extension of the central city, was commemorated throughout the historical times by the Athenians in the periodical festival called Synœkia, in honor of the goddess Athene.

Such is the account which Thucydides gives of the original severalty and subsequent consolidation of the different portions of Attica. Of the general fact there is no reason to doubt, though the operative cause assigned by the historian—the power and sagacity of Theseus

—belongs to legend and not to history. Nor can we pretend to determine either the real steps by which such a change was brought about, or its date, or the number of portions which went to constitute the full-grown Athens—further enlarged at some early period, though we do not know when, by voluntary junction of the Bœotian or semi-Bœotian town Eleutheræ, situated among the valleys of Kithæron between Eleusis and Platæa. It was the standing habit of the population of Attica, even down to the Peloponnesian war, to reside in their several cantons, where their ancient festivals and temples yet continued as relics of a state of previous autonomy. Their visits to the city were made only at special times, for purposes religious or political, and they still looked upon the country residence as their real home. How deep-seated this cantonal feeling was among them, we may see by the fact that it survived the temporary exile forced upon them by the Persian invasion, and was resumed when the expulsion of that destroying host enabled them to rebuild their ruined dwellings in Attica.

How many of the demes recognized by Kleisthenes had originally separate governments, or in what local aggregates they stood combined, we cannot now make out. It must be recollected that the city of Athens itself contained several demes, while Peiræeus also formed a deme apart. Some of the twelve divisions, which Philochorus ascribes to Kekrops, present probable marks of an ancient substantive existence—Kekropia, or the region surrounding and including the city and acropolis; the Tetrapolis, composed of Œnoe, Trykorythus, Probalinthus, and Marathon; Eleusis; Aphidnæ and Dekeleia, both distinguished by their peculiar mythical connection with Sparta and the Dioskuri. But it is difficult to imagine that Phalerum (which is one of the separate divisions named by Philochorus) can ever have enjoyed an autonomy apart from Athens. Moreover, we find among some of the demes which Philochorus does not notice, evidences of standing antipathies, and prohibitions of intermarriage, which might seem to indicate that these had once been separate little states. Though in most cases we can infer little from the legends and religious ceremonies which nearly every deme had peculiar to itself, yet those of Eleusis are so remarkable, as to establish the probable autonomy of that township down to a comparatively late period. The Homeric hymn to Demeter, recounting the visit of that goddess to Eleusis after the abduction of her daughter, and the first establishment of the Eleusinian ceremonies, specifies the eponymous prince Eleusis, and the various chiefs of the place—Keleos, Triptolemus, Diokles, and Eumolpus. It also notices the Rharian plain in the neighborhood of Eleusis. But not the least allusion is made to Athens or to any concern of the Athenians in the presence or worship of the goddess. There is reason to believe that at the time when this hymn was composed, Eleusis was an independent town: what that time was, we have no means of settling, though Voss puts it as

low as the 30th Olympiad. And the proof hence derived is so much the more valuable, because the hymn to Demeter presents a coloring strictly special and local: moreover the story told by Solon to Crœsus, respecting Tellus the Athenian who perished in battle against the neighboring townsmen of Eleusis, assumes in like manner the independence of the latter in earlier times. Nor is it unimportant to notice, that even so low as 300 B.C. the observant visitor Dikæarchus professes to detect a difference between the native Athenians and the Atticans, as well in physiognomy as in character and taste.

In the history set forth to us of the proceedings of Theseus, no mention is made of these four Ionic tribes; but another and a totally different distribution of the people into Eupatridæ, Geomori, and Demiurgi, which he is said to have first introduced, is brought to our notice: Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives only a double division—Eupatridæ and dependent cultivators; corresponding to his idea of the patricians and clients in early Rome. As far as we can understand this triple distinction, it seems to be disparate and unconnected with the four tribes above mentioned. The Eupatridæ are the wealthy and powerful men, belonging to the most distinguished families in all the various gentes, and principally living in the city of Athens, after the consolidation of Attica: from them are distinguished the middling and lower people, roughly classified into husbandmen and artisans. To the Eupatridæ is ascribed a religious as well as a political and social ascendency. They are represented as the source of all authority on matters both sacred and profane: they doubtless comprised those gentes, such as the Butadæ, whose sacred ceremonies were looked upon with the greatest reverence by the people; and we may conceive Eumolpus, Keleos, Diokles etc., as they are described in the Homeric hymn to Demeter, in the character of Eupatridæ of Eleusis. The humbler gentes, and the humbler members of each gens, would appear in this classification confounded with that portion of the people who belonged to no gens at all.

From these Eupatridæ exclusively, and doubtless by their selection, the nine annual archons—probably also the Prytanes of the Naukrari—were taken. That the senate of Areopagus was formed of members of the same order, we may naturally presume. The nine archons all passed into it at the expiration of their year of office, subject only to the condition of having duly passed the test of accountability; and they remained members for life. These are the only political authorities of whom we hear in the earliest imperfectly known period of the Athenian government, after the discontinuance of the king, and the adoption of the annual change of archons. The senate of Areopagus seems to represent the Homeric council of old men; and there were doubtless, on particular occasions, general assemblies of the people, with the same formal and passive character as the Homeric agora—at least we shall observe traces of such assemblies anterior to the Solonian legislation. Some of the writers of antiquity ascribed

the first establishment of the senate of Areopagus to Solon, just as there were also some who considered Lycurgus as having first brought together the Spartan Gerusia. But there can be little doubt that this is a mistake, and that the senate of Areopagus is a primordial institution, of immemorial antiquity, though its constitution as well as its functions underwent many changes. It stood at first alone as a permanent and collegiate authority, originally by the side of the kings and afterward by the side of the archons. It would then of course be known by the title of *The* Boule—*The* senate or council; its distinctive title, "Senate of Areopagus" (borrowed from the place where its sittings were held) would not be bestowed until the formation by Solon of the second senate or council, from which there was need to discriminate it.

This seems to explain the reason why it was never mentioned in the ordinances of Drako, whose silence supplied one argument in favor of the opinion that it did not exist in his time, and that it was first constituted by Solon. We hear of the senate of Areopagus chiefly as a judicial tribunal, because it acted in this character constantly throughout Athenian history, and because the orators have most frequent occasion to allude to its decision on matters of trial. But its functions were originally of the widest senatorial character, directive generally as well as judicial. And although the gradual increase of democracy at Athens (as will be hereafter explained) both abridged its powers and contributed still further comparatively to lower it, by enlarging the direct working of the people in assembly and judicature, as well as that of the senate of Five Hundred, which was a permanent adjunct and auxiliary of the public assembly—yet it seems to have been, even down to the time of Perikles, the most important body in the state. And after it had been cast into the background by the political reforms of that great man, we still find it on particular occasions stepping forward to reassert its ancient powers, and to assume for the moment that undefined interference which it had enjoyed without dispute in antiquity. The attachment of the Athenians to their ancient institutions gave to the senate of Areopagus a constant and powerful hold on their minds, and this feeling was rather strengthened than weakened when it ceased to be an object of popular jealousy—when it could no longer be employed as an auxiliary of oligarchical pretensions.

Of the nine archons, whose number continued unaltered from 683 B.C. to the end of the free democracy, three bore special titles—the Archon Eponymus, from whose name the designation of the year was derived, and who was spoken of as *The Archon;* the Archon Basileus (king), or more frequently, the Basileus; and the Polemarch. The remaining six passed by the general title of Thesmothetæ. Of the first three, each possessed exclusive judicial competencei n regard to certain special matters: the Thesmothetæ were in this respect all on a par, acting sometimes as a board, sometimes individually. The

Archon Eponymus determined all disputes relative to the family, the gentile, and the phratric relations: he was the legal protector of orphans and widows. The Archon Basileus (or king archon) enjoyed competence in complaints respecting offences against the religious sentiment and respecting homicide. The Polemarch (speaking of times anterior to Kleisthenes) was the leader of military force and judge in disputes between citizens and non-citizens. Moreover each of these three archons had particular religious festivals assigned to him which it was his duty to superintend and conduct. The six Thesmothetæ seem to have been judges in disputes and complaints, generally, against citizens, saving the special matters reserved for the cognizance of the first two archons. According to the proper sense of the word Thesmothetæ, all the nine archons were entitled to be so called, though the first three had especial designations of their own. The word Thesmoi (analogous to the Themistes of Homer) includes in its meaning both general laws and particular sentences—the two ideas not being yet discriminated, and the general law being conceived only in its application to some particular case. Drako was the first Thesmothet who was called upon to set down his Thesmoi in writing, and thus to invest them essentially with a character of more or less generality.

In the later and better-known times of Athenian law, we find these archons deprived in great measure of their powers of judging and deciding, and restricted to the task of first hearing the parties and collecting the evidence, next, of introducing the matter for trial into the appropriate dikastery, over which they presided. But originally there was no separation of powers; the archons both judged and administered, sharing among themselves those privileges which had once been united in the hands of the king, and probably accountable at the end of their year of office to the senate of Areopagus. It is probable also that the functions of that senate, and those of the prytanes of the naukrars, were of the same double and confused nature. All of these functionaries belonged to the Eupatrids, and all of them doubtless acted more or less in the narrow interest of their order: moreover there was ample room for favoritism, in the way of connivance, as well as antipathy, on the part of the archons. That such was decidedly the case, and that discontent began to be serious, we may infer from the duty imposed on the thesmothet Drako, B.C. 624, to put in writing the Thesmoi or Ordinances, so that they might be "shown publicly" and known beforehand. He did not meddle with the political constitution, and in his ordinances Aristotle finds little worthy of remark except the extreme severity of the punishments awarded: petty thefts, or even proved idleness of life, being visited with death or disfranchisement.

But we are not to construe this remark as demonstrating any special inhumanity in the character of Drako, who was not invested with the large power which Solon afterward enjoyed, and cannot be imagined

to have imposed upon the community severe laws of his own invention. Himself of course an Eupatrid, he set forth in writing such ordinances as the Eupatrid archons had before been accustomed to enforce without writing, in the particular cases which came before them; and the general spirit of penal legislation had become so much milder, during the two centuries which followed, that these old ordinances appeared to Aristotle intolerably rigorous. Probably neither Drako, nor the Lokrian Zaleukus, who somewhat preceded him in date, were more rigorous than the sentiment of the age: indeed the few fragments of the Drakonian tables which have reached us, far from exhibiting indiscriminate cruelty, introduce, for the first time, into the Athenian law, mitigating distinctions in respect to homicide; founded on the variety of concomitant circumstances. He is said to have constituted the judges called Ephetæ, fifty-one elders belonging to some respected gens or possessing an exalted position, who held their sittings for trial of homicide in three different spots, according to the difference of the cases submitted to them. If the accused party, admitting the fact, denied any culpable intention and pleaded accident, the case was tried at the place called the Palladium; when found guilty of accidental homicide, he was condemned to a temporary exile, unless he could appease the relatives of the deceased, but his property was left untouched. If, again, admitting the fact, he defended himself by some valid ground of justification, such as self-defense, or flagrant adultery with his wife on the part of the deceased, the trial took place on ground consecrated to Apollo and Artemis, called the Delphinium. A particular spot called the Phreattys, close to the sea-shore, was also named for the trial of a person, who while under sentence of exile for an unintentional homicide, might be charged with a second homicide, committed of course without the limits of the territory: being considered as impure from the effects of the former sentence, he was not permitted to set foot on the soil, but stood his trial on a boat hauled close in shore. At the Prytaneium or government-house itself, sittings were held by the four Phylo-Basileis or Tribe Kings, to try any inanimate object (a piece of wood or stone etc.) which had caused death to any one, without the proved intervention of a human hand: the wood or stone, when the fact was verified, was formally cast beyond the border. All these distinctions of course imply the preliminary investigation of the case (called Anakrisis) by the king archon, in order that it might be known what was the issue and where the sittings of the Ephetæ were to be held.

So intimately was the mode of dealing with homicide connected with the religious feelings of the Athenians, that these old regulations, never formally abrogated throughout the historical times, were read engraved on their column by the contemporaries of Demosthenes. The Areopagus continued in judicial operation, and the Ephetæ are spoken of as if they were so, even through the age of Demosthenes, though their functions were tacitly usurped or narrowed, and their

dignity impaired, by the more popular dikasteries afterward created. It is in this way that they have become known to us, while the other Drakonian institutions have perished: but there is much obscurity respecting them, particularly in regard to the relation between the Ephetæ and the Areopagites. Indeed so little was known on the subject, even by the historical inquirers of Athens, that most of them supposed the council of Areopagus to have received its first origin from Solon; and even Aristotle, though he contradicts this view, expresses himself in no very positive language. That judges sat at the Areopagus for the trial of homicide, previous to Drako, seems implied in the arrangements of that lawgiver respecting the Ephetæ, inasmuch as he makes no new provision for trying the direct issue of intentional homicide, which, according to all accounts, fell within the cognizance of the Areopagus: but whether the Ephetæ and the Areopagites were the same persons, wholly or partially, our information is not sufficient to discover. Before Drako, there existed no tribunal for trying homicide, except the senate, sitting at the Areopagus. And we may conjecture that there was something connected with that spot—legends, ceremonies, or religious feelings—which compelled judges there sitting to condemn every man proved guilty of homicide, and forbade them to take account of extenuating or justifying circumstances. Drako appointed the Ephetæ to sit at different places; places so pointedly marked, and so unalterably maintained, that we may see in how peculiar a manner those special issues, of homicide under particular circumstances, which he assigned to each, were adapted in Athenian belief, to the new sacred localities chosen, each having its own distinct ceremonial and procedure appointed by the gods themselves. That the religious feelings of the Greeks were associated in the most intimate manner with particular localities, has already been often remarked; and Drako proceeded agreeably to them in his arrangements for mitigating the indiscriminate condemnation of every man found guilty of homicide, which was unavoidable so long as the Areopagus remained the only place of trial. The man who either confessed, or was proved, to have shed the blood of another, could not be acquitted or condemned to less than the full penalty (of death or perpetual exile with confiscation of property) by the judges on the hill of Ares, whatever excuse he might have to offer: but the judges at the Palladium and Delphinium might hear him, and even admit his plea, without contracting the taint of irreligion. Drako did not directly meddle with, nor indeed ever mention, the judges sitting in Areopagus.

In respect to homicide, then, the Drakonian ordinances were partly a reform of the narrowness, partly a mitigation of the rigor, of the old procedure; and these are all that have come down to us, having been preserved unchanged from the religious respect of the Athenians for antiquity on this peculiar matter. The rest of his ordinances are said to have been repealed by Solon, on account of their intolerable

severity. So they doubtless appeared, to the Athenians of a later day, who had come to measure offenses by a different scale; and even to Solon, who had to calm the wrath of a suffering people in actual mutiny.

That under this eupatrid oligarchy and severe legislation the people of Attica were sufficiently miserable, we shall presently see when I recount the proceedings of Solon. But the age of democracy had not yet begun, and the government received its first shock from the hands of an ambitious Eupatrid who aspired to the despotism. Such was the phase (as has been remarked in the preceding chapter) through which, during the century now under consideration, a large proportion of the Grecian governments passed.

Kylon, an Athenian patrician—who superadded, to a great family position, the personal celebrity of a victory at Olympia, as runner in the double stadium—conceived the design of seizing the acropolis and constituting himself despot. Whether any special event had occurred at home to stimulate this project, we do not know: but he obtained both encouragement and valuable aid from his father-in-law Theagenes of Megara, who, by means of his popularity with the people, had already subverted the Megarian oligarchy, and become despot of his native city. Previous to so hazardous an attempt, however, Kylon consulted the Delphian oracle, and was advised by the god in reply, to take the opportunity of "the greatest festival of Zeus" for seizing the acropolis. Such expressions, in the natural interpretation put upon them by every Greek, designated the Olympic games in Peloponnesus. To Kylon, moreover, himself an Olympic victor, that interpretation came recommended by an apparent peculiar propriety. But Thucydides, not indifferent to the credit of the oracle, reminds his readers that no question was asked nor any express direction given, *where* the intended "greatest festival of Zeus" was to be sought—whether in Attica or elsewhere—and that the public festival of the Diasia, celebrated periodically and solemnly in the neighborhood of Athens, was also denominated the "greatest festival of Zeus Meilichius." Probably no such exegetical scruples presented themselves to any one, until after the miserable failure of the conspiracy; least of all to Kylon himself, who, at the recurrence of the next ensuing Olympic games, put himself at the head of a force, partly furnished by Theagenes, partly composed of his friends at home, and took sudden possession of the sacred rock of Athens. But the attempt excited general indignation among the Athenian people, who crowded in from the country to assist the archons and the prytanes of the Naukrari in putting it down. Kylon and his companions were blockaded in the Acropolis, where they soon found themselves in straits for want of water and provisions; and though many of the Athenians went back to their homes, a sufficient besieging force was left to reduce the conspirators to the last extremity. After Kylon himself had escaped by stealth, and several of his companions had died of hunger, the remainder, renouncing all hope of defense, sat down as suppliants at the altar. The archon Megakles, on regaining the citadel, found these suppliants on the point of expiring with hunger on the sacred ground, and to prevent such a pollution, engaged them to quit the spot by a promise of sparing their lives. No sooner, however, had they been removed into profane ground, than the promise was violated and they were put to death: some even, who, seeing the fate with which they were menaced, contrived to throw themselves upon the altar of the Venerable goddesses (or Eumenides) near the Areopagus, received their death wounds in spite of that inviolable protection.

Though the conspiracy was thus put down, and the government upheld, these deplorable incidents left behind them a long train of calamity—profound religious remorse mingled with exasperated political antipathies. There still remained, if not a considerable Kylonian party, at least a large body of persons who resented the way in which the Kylonians had been put to death, and who became in consequence bitter enemies of Megakles the archon, and of the great family of the Alkmæonidæ, to which he belonged. Not only Megakles himself and his personal assistants were denounced as smitten with a curse, but the taint was supposed to be transmitted to his descendants, and we shall hereafter find the wound reopened, not only in the second and third generation, but also two centuries after the original event. When we see that the impression left by the proceeding was so very serious, even after the length of time which had elapsed, we may well believe that it was sufficient, immediately afterward, to poison altogether the tranquillity of the state. The Alkmæonids and their partisans long defied their opponents, resisting any public trial. The dissensions continued without hope of termination, until Solon, then enjoying a lofty reputation for sagacity and patriotism, as well as for bravery, persuaded them to submit to judicial cognizance,—at a moment so far distant from the event, that several of the actors were dead. They were accordingly tried before a special judicature of 300 Eupatrids, Myron of the deme Phlyeis being their accuser. In defending themselves against the charge that they had sinned against the reverence due to the gods and the consecrated right of asylum, they alleged that the Kylonian suppliants, when persuaded to quit the holy ground, had tied a cord round the statue of the goddess and clung to it for protection in their march; but on approaching the altar of the Eumenides, the cord accidentally broke —and this critical event (so the accused persons argued) proved that the goddess had herself withdrawn from them her protecting hand and abandoned them to their fate. Their argument, remarkable as an illustration of the feelings of the time, was not however accepted as an excuse. They were found guilty, and while such of them as were alive retired into banishment, those who had already died were disinterred and cast beyond the borders. Yet their exile, continuing

as it did only for a time, was not held sufficient to expiate the impiety for which they had been condemned. The Alkmæonids, one of the most powerful families in Attica, long continued to be looked upon as a tainted race, and in cases of public calamity were liable to be singled out as having by their sacrilege drawn down the judgment of the gods upon their countrymen.

The banishment of the guilty parties was not found sufficient to restore tranquillity. Not only did pestilential disorders prevail, but the religious susceptibilities and apprehensions of the Athenian community also remained deplorably excited. They were oppressed with sorrow and despondency, saw phantoms and heard supernatural menaces, and felt the curse of the gods upon them without abatement. In particular, it appears that the minds of the women (whose religious impulses were recognized generally by the ancient legislators as requiring watchful control) were thus disturbed and frantic. The sacrifices offered at Athens did not succeed in dissipating the epidemic, nor could the prophets at home, though they recognized that special purifications were required, discover what were the new ceremonies capable of appeasing the divine wrath. The Delphian oracle directed them to invite a higher spiritual influence from abroad, and this produced the memorable visit of the Kretan prophet and sage Epimenides to Athens.

The century between 620 and 500 B.C. appears to have been remarkable for the first diffusion and potent influence of distinct religious brotherhoods, mystic rites, and expiatory ceremonies, none of which (as I have remarked in a former chapter) find any recognition in the Homeric epic. To this age belong Thaletas, Aristeas, Abaris, Pythagoras, Onomakritus, and the earliest provable agency of the Orphic sect. Of the class of men here noticed, Epimenides, a native of Phæstus or Knossus in Krete, was one of the most celebrated—and the old legendary connection between Athens and Krete, which shows itself in the tales of Theseus and Minos, is here again manifested in the recourse which the Athenians had to this island to supply their spiritual need. Epimenides seems to have been connected with the worship of the Kretan Zeus, in whose favor he stood so high as to receive the denomination of the new Kurete (the Kuretes having been the primitive ministers and organizers of that worship). He was said to be the son of the nymph Balte; to be supplied by the nymphs with constant food, since he was never seen to eat; to have fallen asleep in his youth in a cave, and to have continued in this state without interruption for fifty-seven years; though some asserted that he remained all this time a wanderer in the mountains, collecting and studying medicinal botany, in the vocation of an Iatromantis, or Leech and Prophet combined. Such narratives mark the idea entertained by antiquity of Epimenides the Purifier, who was now called in to heal both the epidemic and the mental affliction prevalent among the Athenian people, in the same manner as his countryman

and contemporary Thaletas had been, a few years before, invited to Sparta to appease a pestilence by the effect of his music and religious hymns. The favor of Epimenides with the gods, his knowledge of propitiatory ceremonies, and his power of working upon the religious feeling, was completely successful in restoring both health and mental tranquillity at Athens. He is said to have turned out some black and white sheep on the Areopagus, directing attendants to follow and watch them, and to erect new altars to the appropriate local deities on the spots where the animals lay down. He founded new chapels and established various lustral ceremonies; and more especially, he regulated the worship paid by the women in such manner as to calm the violent impulses which had before agitated them. We know hardly anything of the details of his proceeding, but the general fact of his visit, and the salutary effects produced in removing the religious despondency which oppressed the Athenians, are well attested. Consoling assurances and new ritual precepts, from the lips of a person supposed to stand high in the favor of Zeus, were the remedy which this unhappy disorder required. Moreover, Epimenides had the prudence to associate himself with Solon, and while he thus, doubtless, obtained much valuable advice, he assisted indirectly in exalting the reputation of Solon himself, whose career of constitutional reform was now fast approaching. He remained long enough at Athens to restore completely a more comfortable tone of religious feeling, and then departed, carrying with him universal gratitude and admiration, but refusing all other reward, except a branch from the sacred olive tree in the acropolis. His life is said to have been prolonged to the unusual period of 154 years, according to a statement which was current during the time of his younger contemporary Xenophanes of Kolophon. The Kretans even ventured to affirm that he lived 300 years. They extolled him not merely as a sage and a spiritual purifier, but also as a poet—very long compositions on religious and mythical subjects being ascribed to him; according to some accounts, they even worshiped him as a god. Both Plato and Cicero considered Epimenides in the same light in which he was regarded by his contemporaries, as a prophet, divinely inspired, and foretelling the future under fits of temporary ecstacy. But, according to Aristotle, Epimenides himself professed to have received from the gods no higher gift than that of divining the unknown phenomena of the past.

The religious mission of Epimenides to Athens, and its efficacious as well as healing influence on the public mind, deserve notice as characteristic of the age in which they occurred. If we transport ourselves two centuries forward to the Peloponnesian war, when rational influences and positive habits of thought had acquired a durable hold upon the superior minds, and when practical discussions on political and judicial matters were familiar to every Athenian citizen, no such uncontrollable religious misery could well have sub-

dued the entire public; while, if it had, no living man could have drawn to himself such universal veneration as to be capable of effecting a cure. Plato, admitting the real healing influence of rites and ceremonies, fully believed in Epimenides as an inspired prophet during the past; but toward those who preferred claims to supernatural power in his own day, he was not so easy of faith. He, as well as Euripides and Theophrastus, treated with indifference, and even with contempt, the Orpheotelestæ of the later times, who advertised themselves as possessing the same patent knowledge of ceremonial rites, and the same means of guiding the will of the gods, as Epimenides had wielded before them. These Orpheotelestæ unquestionably numbered a considerable tribe of believers, and speculated with great effect, as well as with profit to themselves, upon the timorous consciences of rich men. But they enjoyed no respect with the general public, or with those to whose authority the public habitually looked up. Degenerate as they were, however, they were the legitimate representatives of the prophet and purifier from Knossus, to whose presence the Athenians had been so much indebted two centuries before: and their altered position was owing less to any falling off in themselves, than to an improvement in the mass upon whom they sought to operate. Had Epimenides himself come to Athens in those days, his visits would probably have been as much inoperative to all public purposes as a repetition of the stratagem of Phye, clothed and equipped as the goddess Athene, which had succeeded so completely in the days of Peisistratus—a stratagem which even Herodotus treats as incredibly absurd, although a century before his time, both the city of Athens and the Demes of Attica had obeyed, as a divine mandate, the orders of this magnificent and stately woman to restore Peisistratus.

CHAPTER XI.

SOLONIAN LAWS AND CONSTITUTION.

We now approach a new era in Grecian history—the first known example of a genuine and disinterested constitutional reform, and the first foundation-stone of that great fabric, which afterwards became the type of democracy in Greece. The archonship of the eupatrid Solon dates in 594 B.C., thirty years after that of Drake, and about eighteen years after the conspiracy of Kylon (assuming the latter event to be correctly placed B.C. 612).

The lives of Solon by Plutarch and Diogenes (especially the former) are our principal sources of information respecting this remarkable man, and while we thank them for what they have told us, it is impossible to avoid expressing disappointment that they have not

told us more. For Plutarch certainly had before him both the original poems, and the original laws, of Solon, and the few transcripts, which he gives from one or the other, form the principal charm of his biography. But such valuable materials ought to have been made available to a more instructive result than that which he has brought out. There is hardly anything more to be deplored, amidst the lost treasures of the Grecian mind, than the poems of Solon; for we see by the remaining fragments, that they contained notices of the public and social phenomena before him, which he was compelled attentively to study—blended with the touching expression of his own personal feelings, in the post alike honorable and difficult, to which the confidence of his countrymen had exalted him.

Solon, son of Exekestides, was a Eupatrid of middling fortune, but of the purest heroic blood, belonging to the gens or family of the Kodrids and Neleids, and tracing his origin to the god Poseidon. His father is said to have diminished his substance by prodigality, which compelled Solon in his earlier years to have recourse to trade, and in this pursuit he visited many parts of Greece and Asia. He was thus enabled to enlarge the sphere of his observation, and to provide material for thought as well as for composition. His poetical talents displayed themselves at a very early age, first on light, afterwards on serious subjects. It will be recollected that there was at that time no Greek prose writing, and that the acquisitions as well as the effusions of an intellectual man, even in their simplest form, adjusted themselves not to the limitations of the period and the semicolon, but to those of the hexameter and pentameter. Nor in point of fact do the verses of Solon aspire to any higher effect than we are accustomed to associate with an earnest, touching, and admonitory prose composition. The advice and appeals which he frequently addressed to his countrymen were delivered in this easy meter, doubtless far less difficult than the elaborate prose of subsequent writers or speakers, such as Thucydides, Isokrates, or Demosthenes. His poetry and his reputation became known throughout many parts of Greece, so that he was classed along with Thales of Miletus, Bias of Priene, Pittakus of Mitylene, Periander of Corinth, Kleobulus of Lindus, Cheilon of Lacedæmon—altogether forming the constellation afterward renowned as the seven wise men.

The first particular event in respect to which Solon appears as an active politician, is the possession of the island of Salamis, then disputed between Megara and Athens. Megara was at that time able to contest with Athens, and for some time to contest with success, the occupation of this important island—a remarkable fact, which perhaps may be explained by supposing that the inhabitants of Athens and its neighborhood carried on the struggle with only partial aid from the rest of Attica. However this may be, it appears that the Megarians had actually established themselves in Salamis, at the time when Solon began his political career, and that the Athenians had

experienced so much loss in the struggle, as to have formally prohibited any citizen from ever submitting a proposition for its reconquest. Stung with this dishonorable abnegation, Solon counterfeited a state of ecstatic excitement, rushed into the agora, and there on the stone usually occupied by the official herald, pronounced to the surrounding crowd a short elegiac poem which he had previously composed on the subject of Salamis. Enforcing upon them the disgrace of abandoning the island, he wrought so powerfully upon their feelings, that they rescinded the prohibitory law: "Rather (he exclaimed) would I forfeit my native city and become a citizen of Pholegandrus, than be still named an Athenian, branded with the shame of surrendered Salamis!" The Athenians again entered into the war, and conferred upon him the command of it—partly, as we are told, at the instigation of Peisistratus, though the latter must have been at this time (600-594 B.C.) a very young man, or rather a boy.

The stories in Plutarch, as to the way in which Salamis was recovered, are contradictory as well as apocryphal, ascribing to Solon various stratagems to deceive the Megarian occupiers. Unfortunately no authority is given for any of them. According to that which seems the most plausible, he was directed by the Delphian god first to propitiate the local heroes of the island; and he accordingly crossed over to it by night, for the purpose of sacrificing to the heroes Periphemus and Kychreus on the Salaminian shore. Five hundred Athenian volunteers were then levied for the attack of the island, under the stipulation that if they were victorious they should hold it in property and citizenship. They were safely landed on an outlying promontory, while Solon, having been fortunate enough to seize a ship which the Megarians had sent to watch the proceedings, manned it with Athenians and sailed straight toward the city of Salamis, to which the Athenians who had landed also directed their march. The Megarians marched out from the city to repel the latter, and during the heat of the engagement, Solon, with his Megarian ship and Athenian crew, sailed directly to the city. The Megarians, interpreting this as the return of their own crew, permitted the ship to approach without resistance, and the city was thus taken by surprise. Permission having been given to the Megarians to quit the island, Solon took possession of it for the Athenians, erecting a temple to Enyalius, the god of war, on Cape Skiradium, near the city of Salamis.

The citizens of Megara, however, made various efforts for the recovery of so valuable a possession, so that a war ensued long as well as disastrous to both parties. At last it was agreed between them to refer the dispute to the arbitration of Sparta, and five Spartans were appointed to decide it—Kritolaidas, Amompharetus, Hypsechidas, Anaxilas, and Kleomenes. The verdict in favor of Athens was founded on evidence which it is somewhat curious to trace. Both parties attempted to show that the dead bodies buried in the island conformed to their own peculiar mode of interment,

and both parties are said to have cited verses from the catalogue of the Iliad—each accusing the other of error or interpolation. But the Athenians had the advantage on two points; first, there were oracles from Delphi, wherein Salamis was mentioned with the epithet Ionian; next, Philæus and Eurysakes, sons of the Telamonian Ajax, the great hero of the island, had accepied the citizenship of Athens, made over Salamis to the Athenians, and transferred their own residences to Brauron and Melite in Attica, where the deme, or gens, Philaidæ still worshiped Philæus as its eponymous ancestor. Such a title was held sufficient, and Salamis was adjudged by the five Spartans to Attica, with which it ever afterward remained incorporated until the days of Macedonian supremacy. Two centuries and a half later, when the orator Æschines argued the Athenian right to Amphipolis against Philip of Macedon, the legendary elements of the title were indeed put forward, but more in the way of preface or introduction to the substantial political grounds. But in the year 600 B.C., the authority of the legend was more deep-seated and operative, and adequate by itself to determine a favorable verdict.

In addition to the conquest of Salamis, Solon increased his reputation by espousing the cause of the Delphian temple against the extortionate proceedings of the inhabitants of Kirrha, of which more will be said in a coming chapter; and the favor of the oracle was probably not without its effect in procuring for him that encouraging prophecy with which his legislative career opened.

It is on the occasion of Solon's legislation that we obtain our first glimpse—unfortunately but a glimpse—of the actual state of Attica and its inhabitants. It is a sad and repulsive picture, presenting to us political discord and private suffering combined.

Violent dissensions prevailed among the inhabitants of Attica, who were separated into three factions—the Pedieis, or men of the plain, comprising Athens, Eleusis, and the neighboring territory, among whom the greatest number of rich families were included; the mountaineers in the east and north of Attica, called Diakrii, who were, on the whole, the poorest party; and the Paralii in the southern portion of Attica from sea to sea, whose means and social position were intermediate between the two. Upon what particular points these intestine disputes turned we are not distinctly informed. They were not, however, peculiar to the period immediately preceding the archontate of Solon. They had prevailed before, and they reappear afterward prior to the despotism of Peisistratus; the latter standing forward as the leader of the Diakrii, and as champion, real or pretended, of the poorer population.

But in the time of Solon these intestine quarrels were aggravated by something much more difficult to deal with—a general mutiny of the poorer population against the rich, resulting from misery combined with oppression. The Thetes, whose condition we have already contemplated in the poems of Homer and Hesiod, are now

presented to us as forming the bulk of the population of Attica—the cultivating tenants, metayers, and small proprietors of the country. They are exhibited as weighed down by debts and dependence, and driven in large numbers out of a state of freedom into slavery—the whole mass of them (we are told) being in debt to the rich, who were proprietors of the greater part of the soil. They had either borrowed money for their own necessities, or they tilled the lands of the rich as dependent tenants, paying a stipulated portion of the produce, and in this capacity they were largely in arrear.

All the calamitous effects were here seen of the old harsh law of debtor and creditor—once prevalent in Greece, Italy, Asia, and a large portion of the world—combined with the recognition of slavery as a legitimate status, and of the right of one man to sell himself as well as that of another man to buy him. Every debtor unable to fulfill his contract was liable to be adjudged as the slave of his creditor, until he could find means either of paying it or working it out; and not only he himself, but his minor sons and unmarried daughters and sisters also, whom the law gave him the power of selling. The poor man thus borrowed upon the security of his body (to translate literally the Greek phrase) and upon that of the persons in his family. So severely had these oppressive contracts been enforced, that many debtors had been reduced from freedom to slavery in Attica itself,—many others had been sold for exportation,—and some had only hitherto preserved their own freedom by selling their children. Moreover a great number of the smaller properties in Attica were under mortgage, signified (according to the formality usual in the Attic law, and continued down throughout the historical times) by a stone pillar erected on the land, inscribed with the name of the lender and the amount of the loan. The proprietors of these mortgaged lands, in case of an unfavorable turn of events, had no other prospect except that of irremediable slavery for themselves and their families, either in their own native country robbed of all its delights, or in some barbarian region where the Attic accent would never meet their ears. Some had fled the country to escape legal adjudication of their persons, and earned a miserable subsistence in foreign parts by degrading occupations. Upon several, too, this deplorable lot had fallen by unjust condemnation and corrupt judges; the conduct of the rich, in regard to money sacred and profane, in regard to matters public as well as private, being thoroughly unprincipled and rapacious.

The manifold and long-continued suffering of the poor under this system, plunged into a state of debasement not more tolerable than that of the Gallic plebs—and the injustices of the rich in whom all political power was then vested—are facts well attested by the poems of Solon himself, even in the short fragments preserved to us. It appears that immediately preceding the time of his archonship, the evils had ripened to such a point—and the determination of the mass

of sufferers, to extort for themselves some mode of relief, had become so pronounced—that the existing laws could no longer be enforced. According to the profound remark of Aristotle—that seditions are generated by great causes but out of small incidents—we may conceive that some recent events had occurred as immediate stimulants to the outbreak of the debtors—like those which lend so striking an interest to the early Roman annals, as the inflaming sparks of violent popular movements for which the train had long before been laid. Condemnations by the archons, of insolvent debtors, may have been unusually numerous; or the maltreatment of some particular debtor, once a respected freeman, in his condition of slavery, may have been brought to act vividly upon the public sympathies—like the case of the old plebeian centurion at Rome (first impoverished by the plunder of the enemy, then reduced to borrow, and lastly adjudged to his creditor as an insolvent), who claimed the protection of the people in the forum, rousing their feelings to the highest pitch by the marks of the slave-whip visible on his person. Some such incidents had probably happened, though we have no historians to recount them. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to imagine, that that public mental affliction which the purifier Epimenides had been invoked to appease, as it sprung in part from pestilence, so it had its cause partly in years of sterility, which must of course have aggravated the distress of the small cultivators. However this may be, such was the condition of things in 594 B.C., through mutiny of the poor freemen and Thetes, and uneasiness of the middling citizens, that the governing oligarchy, unable either to enforce their private debts or to maintain their political power, were obliged to invoke the well-known wisdom and integrity of Solon. Though his vigorous protest (which doubtless rendered him acceptable to the mass of the people) against the iniquity of the existing system, had already been proclaimed in his poems—they still hoped that he would serve as an auxiliary to help them over their difficulties. They therefore chose him, nominally as archon along with Philombrotus, but with power in substance dictatorial.

It had happened in several Grecian states, that the governing oligarchies, either by quarrels among their own members or by the general bad condition of the people under their government, were deprived of that hold upon the public mind which was essential to their power. Sometimes (as in the case of Pittakus of Mitylene anterior to the archonship of Solon, and often in the factions of the Italian republics in the middle ages) the collision of opposing forces had rendered society intolerable, and driven all parties to acquiesce in the choice of some reforming dictator. Usually, however, in the early Greek oligarchies, this ultimate crisis was anticipated by some ambitious individual, who availed himself of the public discontent to overthrow the oligarchy and usurp the powers of a despot. And so probably it might have happened in Athens, had not the recent failure

of Kylon, with all its miserable consequences, operated as a deterring motive. It is curious to read, in the words of Solon himself, the temper in which his appointment was construed by a large portion of the community, but most especially by his own friends: bearing in mind that at this early day, so far as our knowledge goes, democratical government was a thing unknown in Greece—all Grecian governments were either oligarchical or despotic, the mass of the freemen having not yet tasted of constitutional privilege. His own friends and supporters were the first to urge him, while redressing the prevalent discontents, to multiply partisans for himself personally, and seize the supreme power. They even "chid him as a madman, for declining to haul up the net when the fish were already enmeshed." The mass of the people, in despair with their lot, would gladly have seconded him in such an attempt; while many even among the oligarchy might have acquiesced in his personal government, from the mere apprehension of something worse if they resisted it. That Solon might easily have made himself despot, admits of little doubt. And though the position of a Greek despot was always perilous, he would have had greater facility for maintaining himself in it than Peisistratus possessed after him; so that nothing but the combination of prudence and virtue, which marks his lofty character, restricted him within the trust specially confided to him. To the surprise of every one—to the dissatisfaction of his own friends—under the complaints alike (as he says) of various extreme and dissentient parties, who required him to adopt measures fatal to the peace of society—he set himself honestly to solve the very difficult and critical problem submitted to him.

Of all grievances, the most urgent was the condition of the poorer class of debtors. To their relief Solon's first measure, the memorable Seisachtheia, or shaking off of burthens, was directed. The relief which it afforded was complete and immediate. It cancelled at once all those contracts in which the debtor had borrowed on the security either of his person or of his land: it forbade all future loans or contracts in which the person of the debtor was pledged as security: it deprived the creditor in future of all power to imprison, or enslave, or extort work from his debtor, and confined him to an effective judgment at law authorizing the seizure of the property of the latter It swept off all the numerous mortgage pillars from the landed properties in Attica, leaving the land free from all past claims. It liberated and restored to their full rights all debtors actually in slavery under previous legal adjudication; and it even provided the means (we do not know how) of repurchasing in foreign lands, and bringing back to a renewed life of liberty in Attica, many insolvents who had been sold for exportation. And while Solon forbade every Athenian to pledge or sell his own person into slavery, he took a step farther in the same direction by forbidding him to pledge or sell his son, his daughter, or an unmarried sister under his tutelage—except-

ing only the case in which either of the latter might be dectected in unchastity. Whether this last ordinance was contemporaneous with the Seisachtheia, or followed as one of his subsequent reforms, seems doubtful.

By this extensive measure the poor debtors—the Thetes, small tenants, and proprietors—together with their families, were rescued from suffering and peril. But these were not the only debtors in the state: the creditors and landlords of the exonerated Thetes were doubtless in their turn debtors to others, and were less able to discharge their obligations in consequence of the loss inflicted upon them by the Seisachtheia. It was to assist these wealthier debtors, whose bodies were in no danger—yet without exonerating them entirely—that Solon resorted to the additional expedient of debasing the money standard. He lowered the standard of the drachma in a proportion something more than 25 per cent, so that 100 drachmas of the new standard contained no more silver than 73 of the old, or 100 of the old were equivalent to 138 of the new. By this change the creditors of these more substantial debtors were obliged to submit to a loss, while the debtors acquired an exemption, to the extent of about 27 per cent.

Lastly, Solon decreed that all those who had been condemned by the archons to atimy (civil disfranchisement) should be restored to their fuh privileges of citizens—excepting, however, from this indulgence those who had been condemned by the Ephetæ, or by the Areopagus, or by the Phylo-Basileis (the four kings of the tribes), after trial in the Prytaneium, on charges either of murder or treason. So wholesale a measure of amnesty affords strong grounds for believing that the previous judgments of the archons had been intolerably harsh; and it is to be recollected that the Drakonian ordinances were then in force.

Such were the measures of relief with which Solon met the dangerous discontent then prevalent. That the wealthy men and leaders of the people—whose insolence and iniquity he has himself severely denounced in his poems, and whose views in nominating him he had greatly disappointed—should have detested propositions which robbed them without compensation of many legal rights, it is easy to imagine. But the statement of Plutarch that the poor emancipated debtors were also dissatisfied from having expected that Solon would not only remit their debts, but also re-divide the soil of Attica, seems utterly incredible; nor is it confirmed by any passage now remaining of the Solonian poems. Plutarch conceives the poor debtors as having in their minds the comparison with Lykurgus and the equality of property at Sparta, which (as I have already endeavored to show) is a fiction; and even had it been true as matter of history long past and antiquated, would not have been likely to work upon the minds of the multitude of Attica in the forcible way that the biographer supposes. The Seisachtheia must have exasperated the feelings

and diminished the fortunes of many persons; but it gave to the large body of Thetes and small proprietors all that they could possibly have hoped. We are told that after a short interval it became eminently acceptable in the general public mind, and procured for Solon a great increase of popularity—all ranks concurring in a common sacrifice of thanksgiving and harmony. One incident there was which occasioned an outcry of indignation. Three rich friends of Solon, all men of great family in the state, and bearing names which will hereafter reappear in this history as borne by their descendants—Konon, Kleinias, and Hipponikus—having obtained from Solon some previous hint of his designs, profited by it, first to borrow money, and next to make purchases of lands; and this selfish breach of confidence would have disgraced Solon himself, had it not been found that he was personally a great loser, having lent money to the extent of five talents.

In regard to the whole measure of the Seisachtheia, indeed, though the poems of Solon were open to every one, ancient authors gave different statements both of its purport and of its extent. Most of them construed it as having canceled indiscriminately all money contracts; while Androtion and others thought that it did nothing more than lower the rate of interest and depreciate the currency to the extent of 27 per cent, leaving the letter of the contracts unchanged. How Androtion came to maintain such an opinion we cannot easily understand. For the fragments now remaining from Solon seem distinctly to refute it, though, on the other hand, they do not go so far as to substantiate the full extent of the opposite view entertained by many writers,—that all money contracts indiscriminately were rescinded: against which there is also a farther reason, that if the fact had been so, Solon could have had no motive to debase the money standard. Such debasement supposes that there must have been *some* debtors at least whose contracts remained valid, and whom nevertheless he desired partially to assist. His poems distinctly mention three things: 1. The removal of the mortgage-pillars. 2. The enfranchisement of the land. 3. The protection, liberation, and restoration of the persons of endangered or enslaved debtors. All these expressions point distinctly to the Thetes and small proprietors, whose sufferings and peril were the most urgent, and whose case required a remedy immediate as well as complete. We find that his repudiation of debts was carried far enough to exonerate them, but no farther.

It seems to have been the respect entertained for the character of Solon which partly occasioned these various misconceptions of his ordinances for the relief of debtors. Androtion in ancient, and some eminent critics in modern times, are anxious to make out that he gave relief without loss or injustice to any one. But this opinion seems inadmissible. The loss to creditors by the wholesale abrogation of numerous pre-existing contracts, and by the partial depreciation of the coin, is a fact not to be disguised. The Seisachtheia of Solon, unjust so far as it rescinded previous agreements, but highly salutary in its consequences, is to be vindicated by showing that in no other way could the bonds of government have been held together, or the misery of the multitude alleviated. We are to consider, first, the great personal cruelty of these pre-existing contracts, which condemned the body of the free debtor and his family to slavery; next, the profound detestation created by such a system in the large mass of the poor, against both the judges and the creditors by whom it had been enforced, which rendered their feelings unmanageable, so soon as they came together under the sentiment of a common danger and with the determination to insure to each other mutual protection. Moreover, the law which vests a creditor with power over the person of his debtor, so as to convert him into a slave, is likely to give rise to a class of loans which inspire nothing but abhorrence--money lent with the foreknowledge that the borrower will be unable to repay it, but also in the conviction that the value of his person as a slave will make good the loss; thus reducing him to a condition of extreme misery, for the purpose sometimes of aggrandizing, sometimes of enriching, the lender. Now the foundation on which the respect for contracts rests, under a good law of debtor and creditor, is the very reverse of this. It rests on the firm conviction that such contracts are advantageous to both parties as a class, and that to break up the confidence essential to their existence would produce extensive mischief throughout all society. The man whose reverence for the obligation of a contract is now the most profound, would have entertained a very different sentiment if he had witnessed the dealings of lender and borrower at Athens under the old ante-Solonian law. The oligarchy had tried their best to enforce this law of debtor and creditor with its disastrous series of contracts; and the only reason why they consented to invoke the aid of Solon, was because they had lost the power of enforcing it any longer, in consequence of the newly awakened courage and combination of the people. That which they could not do for themselves, Solon could not have done for them, even had he been willing. Nor had he in his position the means either of exempting or compensating those creditors who, separately taken, were open to no reproach; indeed, in following his proceedings, we see plainly that he thought compensation due, not to the creditors, but to the past sufferings of the enslaved debtor, since he redeemed several of them from foreign captivity, and brought them back to their home. It is certain that no measure, simply and exclusively prospective, would have sufficed for the emergency. There was an absolute necessity for overruling all that class of pre-existing rights which had produced so violent a social fever. While, therefore, to this extent, the Seisachtheia cannot be acquitted of injustice, we may confidently affirm that the injustice inflicted was an indispensable price paid for the maintenance of the

peace of society, and for the final abrogation of a disastrous system as regarded insolvents. And the feeling as well as the legislation universal in the modern European world, by interdicting beforehand all contracts for selling a man's person or that of his children into slavery, goes far to sanction practically the Solonian repudiation.

One thing is never to be forgotten in regard to this measure, combined with the concurrent amendments introduced by Solon in the law—it settled finally the question to which it referred. Never again do we hear of the law of debtor and creditor as disturbing Athenian tranquillity. The general sentiment which grew up at Athens, under the Solonian money-law and under the democratical government, was one of high respect for the sanctity of contracts. Not only was there never any demand in the Athenian democracy for new tables or a depreciation of the money standard, but a formal abnegation of any such projects was inserted in the solemn oath taken annually by the numerous Dikasts, who formed the popular judicial body called Heliæa or the Heliastic jurors—the same oath which pledged them to uphold the democratical constitution, also bound them to repudiate all proposals either for an abrogation of debts or for a redivision of the lands. There can be little doubt that under the Solonian law, which enabled the creditor to seize the property of his debtor, but gave him no power over the person, the system of money-lending assumed a more beneficial character. The old noxious contracts, mere snares for the liberty of a poor freeman and his children, disappeared, and loans of money took their place, founded on the property and prospective earnings of the debtor, which were in the main useful to both parties, and therefore maintained their place in the moral sentiment of the public. And though Solon had found himself compelled to rescind all the mortgages on land subsisting in his time, we see money freely lent upon this same security, throughout the historical times of Athens, and the evidentiary mortgage-pillars remaining ever after undisturbed.

In the sentiment of an early society, as in the old Roman law, a distinction is commonly made between the principal and the interest of a loan, though the creditors have sought to blend them indissolubly together. If the borrower cannot fulfill his promise to repay the principal, the public will regard him as having committed a wrong which he must make good by his person. But there is not the same unanimity as to his promise to pay interest: on the contrary, the very exaction of interest will be regarded by many in the same light in which the English law considers usurious interest, as tainting the whole transaction. But in the modern mind, principal, and interest within a limited rate, have so grown together, that we hardly understand how it can ever have been pronounced unworthy of an honorable citizen to lend money on interest. Yet such is the declared opinion of Aristotle and other superior men of antiquity; while at Rome, Cato the censor went so far as to denounce the practice as a

heinous crime. It was comprehended by them among the worst of the tricks of trade—and they held that all trade, or profit derived from interchange, was unnatural, as being made by one man at the expense of another: such pursuits therefore could not be commended, though they might be tolerated to a certain extent as a matter of necessity, but they belonged essentially to an inferior order of citizens. What is remarkable in Greece is, that the antipathy of a very early state of society against traders and money-lenders lasted longer among the philosophers than among the mass of the people—it harmonized more with the social *idéal* of the former, than with the practical instincts of the latter.

In a rude condition such as that of the ancient Germans described by Tacitus, loans on interest are unknown. Habitually careless of the future, the Germans were gratified both in giving and receiving presents, but without any idea that they thereby either imposed or contracted an obligation. To a people in this state of feeling, a loan on interest presents the repulsive idea of making profit out of the distress of the borrower. Moreover, it is worthy of remark, that the first borrowers must have been for the most part men driven to this necessity by the pressure of want, and contracting debt as a desperate resource, without any fair prospect of ability to repay: debt and famine run together in the mind of the poet Hesiod. The borrower is, in this unhappy state, rather a distressed man soliciting aid, than a solvent man capable of making and fulfilling a contract. If he cannot find a friend to make him a free gift in the former character, he will not, under the latter character, obtain a loan from a stranger, except by the promise of exorbitant interest, and by the fullest eventual power over his person which he is in a condition to grant. In process of time a new class of borrowers rise up who demand money for temporary convenience or profit, but with full prospect of repayment—a relation of lender and borrower quite different from that of the earlier period, when it presented itself in the repulsive form of misery on the one side, set against the prospect of very large profit on the other. If the Germans of the time of Tacitus looked to the condition of the poor debtors in Gaul, reduced to servitude under a rich creditor, and swelling by hundreds the crowd of his attendants, they would not be disposed to regret their own ignorance of the practice of money-lending. How much the interest of money was then regarded as an undue profit extorted from distress, is powerfully illustrated by the old Jewish law; the Jew being permitted to take interest from foreigners (whom the lawgiver did not think himself obliged to protect), but not from his own countrymen. The Koran follows out this point of view consistently, and prohibits the taking of interest altogether. In most other nations, laws have been made to limit the rate of interest, and at Rome especially, the legal rate was successively lowered—though it seems, as might have been expected, that the restrictive ordinances were constantly eluded. All such

restrictions have been intended for the protection of debtors; an effect which large experience proves them never to produce, unless it be called protection to render the obtaining of money on loan impracticable for the most distressed borrowors. But there was another effect which they *did* tend to produce—they softened down the primitive antipathy against the practice generally, and confined the odious name of usury to loans lent above the fixed legal rate.

In this way alone could they operate beneficially, and their tendency to counterwork the previous feeling was at that time not unimportant, coinciding as it did with other tendencies arising out of the industrial progress of society, which gradually exhibited the relation of lender and borrower in a light more reciprocal beneficial, and less repugnant to the sympathies of the bystander.

At Athens the more favorable point of view prevailed throughout all the historical times. The march of industry and commerce, under the mitigated law which prevailed subsequently to Solon, had been sufficient to bring it about at a very early period and to suppress all public antipathy against lenders at interest. We may remark too, that this more equitable tone of opinion grew up spontaneously, without any legal restriction on the rate of interest—no such restriction having ever been imposed and the rate being expressly declared free by a law ascribed to Solon himself. The same may probably be said of the communities of Greece generally—at least there is no information to make us suppose the contrary. But the feeling against lending money at interest remained in the bosoms of the philosophical men long after it had ceased to form a part of the practical morality of the citizens, and long after it had ceased to be justified by the appearances of the case as at first it really had been. Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Plutarch, treat the practice as a branch of the commercial and money-getting spirit which they are anxious to discourage; and one consequence of this was, that they were less disposed to contend strenuously for the inviolability of existing money-contracts. The conservative feeling on this point was stronger among the mass than among the philosophers. Plato even complains of it as inconveniently preponderant, and as arresting the legislator in all comprehensive projects of reform. For the most part indeed schemes of canceling debts and redividing lands were never thought of except by men of desperate and selfish ambition, who made them stepping-stones to despotic power. Such men were denounced alike by the practical sense of the community and by the speculative thinkers: but when we turn to the case of the Spartan king Agis III., who proposed a complete extinction of debts and an equal redivision of the landed property of the state, not with any selfish or personal views, but upon pure ideas of patriotism, well or ill understood, and for the purpose of renovating the lost ascendency of Sparta—we find Plutarch expressing the most unqualified admiration of this young king and his projects, and treating the opposition made to him as originating in no better feelings

than meanness and cupidity. The philosophical thinkers on politics conceived (and to a great degree justly, as I shall show hereafter) that the conditions of security, in the ancient world, imposed upon the citizens generally the absolute necessity of keeping up a military spirit and willingness to brave at all times personal hardship and discomfort: so that increase of wealth, on account of the habits of self-indulgence which it commonly introduces, was regarded by them with more or less of disfavor. If in their estimation any Grecian community had become corrupt, they were willing to sanction great interference with pre-existing rights for the purpose of bringing it back nearer to their ideal standard. And the real security for the maintenance of these rights lay in the conservative feelings of the citizens generally, much more than in the opinions which superior minds imbibed from the philosophers.

Such conservative feelings were in the subsequent Athenian democracy peculiarly deep-rooted. The mass of the Athenian people identified inseparably the maintenance of property in all its various shapes with that of their laws and constitution. And it is a remarkable fact, that though the admiration entertained at Athens for Solon was universal, the principle of his Seisachtheia and of his money-depreciation was not only never imitated, but found the strongest tacit reprobation; whereas at Rome, as well as in most of the kingdoms of modern Europe, we know that one debasement of the coin succeeded another. The temptation of thus partially eluding the pressure of financial embarrassments, proved, after one successful trial, too strong to be resisted, and brought down the coin by successive depreciations from the full pound of twelve ounces to the standard of one half ounce. It is of some importance to take notice of this fact, when we reflect how much "Grecian faith" has been degraded by the Roman writers into a byword for duplicity in pecuniary dealings. The democracy of Athens (and indeed the cities of Greece generally, both oligarchies and democracies) stands far above the senate of Rome, and far above the modern kingdoms of France and England until comparatively recent times, in respect of honest dealing with the coinage. Moreover, while there occurred at Rome several political changes which brought about new tables or at least a partial depreciation of contracts, no phenomenon of the same kind ever happened at Athens, during the three centuries between Solon and the end of the free working of the democracy. Doubtless there were fraudulent debtors at Athens; while the administration of private law, though not in any way conniving at their proceedings, was far too imperfect to repress them as effectually as might have been wished. But the public sentiment on the point was just and decided. It may be asserted with confidence that a loan of money at Athens was quite as secure as it ever was at any time or place of the ancient world—in spite of the great and important superiority of Rome with respect to the accumulation of a body of authoritative legal precedent, the source of what

was ultimately shaped into the Roman jurisprudence. Among the various causes of sedition or mischief in the Grecian communities, we hear little of the pressure of private debt.

By the measures of relief above described, Solon had accomplished results surpassing his own best hopes. He had healed the prevailing discontents; and such was the confidence and gratitude which he had inspired, that he was now called upon to draw up a constitution and laws for the better working of the government in future. His constitutional changes were great and valuable: respecting his laws, what we hear is rather curious than important.

It has been already stated that, down to the time of Solon, the classification received in Attica was that of the four Ionic tribes, comprising in one scale the Phratries and Gentes, and in another scale the three Trittyes and forty-eight Naukraries—while the Eupatridæ, seemingly a few specially respected gentes, and perhaps a few distinguished families in all the gentes, had in their hands all the powers of government. Solon introduced a new principle of classification—called in Greek the timocratic principle. He distributed all the citizens of the tribes, without any reference to their gentes or phratries, into four classes, according to the amount of their property, which he caused to be assessed and entered in a public schedule. Those whose annual income was equal to 500 medimni of corn (about 700 imperial bushels) and upward—one medimnus being considered equivalent to one drachma in money—he placed in the highest class; those who received between 300 and 500 medimni or drachmas formed the second class; and those between 200 and 300, the third. The fourth and most numerous class comprised all those who did not possess land yielding a produce equal to 200 medimni. The first class, called Pentakosiomedimni, were alone eligible to the archonship and to all commands: the second were called the knights or horsemen of the state, as possessing enough to enable them to keep a horse and perform military service in that capacity: the third class, called the Zeugitæ, formed the heavy-armed infantry, and were bound to serve, each with his full panoply. Each of these three classes was entered in the public schedule as possessed of a taxable capital calculated with a certain reference to his annual income, but in a proportion diminishing according to the scale of that income—and a man paid taxes to the state according to the sum for which he stood rated in the schedule; so that this direct taxation acted really like a graduated income-tax. The ratable property of the citizen belonging to the richest class (the Pentakosiomedimnus) was calculated and entered on the state schedule at a sum of capital equal to twelve times his annual income: that of the Hippeus, horseman or knight, at a sum equal to ten times his annual income: that of the Zeugite, at a sum equal to five times his annual income. Thus a Pentakosiomedimnus, whose income was exactly 500 drachmas (the minimum qualification of his class), stood rated in the schedule for a taxable property of 6,000

drachmas or one talent, being twelve times his income—if his annual income were 1000 drachmas, he would stand rated for 12,000 drachmas or two talents, being the same proportion of income to ratable capital. But when we pass to the second class, horsemen or knights, the proportion of the two is changed. The horseman possessing an income of just 300 drachmas (or 300 medimni) would stand rated for 3,000 drachmas, or ten times his real income, and so in the same proportion for any income above 300 and below 500. Again, in the third class, or below 300, the proportion is a second time altered—the Zeugite possessing exactly 200 drachmas of income was rated upon a still lower calculation, at 1000 drachmas, or a sum equal to five times his income; and all incomes of this class (between 200 and 300 drachmas) would in like manner be multiplied by five in order to obtain the amount of ratable capital. Upon these respective sums of schedule capital, all direct taxation was levied. If the state required one per cent of direct tax, the poorest Pentakosiomedimnus would pay (upon 6,000 drachmas) 60 drachmas; the poorest Hippeus would pay (upon 3,000 drachmas) 30; the poorest Zeugite would pay (upon 1000 drachmas) 10 drachmas. And thus this mode of assessment would operate like a *graduated* income-tax, looking at it in reference to the three different classes—but as an *equal* income tax, looking at it in reference to the different individuals comprised in one and the same class.

All persons in the state whose annual income amounted to less than 200 medimni or drachmas were placed in the fourth class, and they must have constituted the large majority of the community. They were not liable to any direct taxation, and perhaps were not at first even entered upon the taxable schedule, more especially as we do not know that any taxes were actually levied upon this schedule during the Solonian times. It is said that they were all called Thetes, but this appellation is not well sustained, and cannot be admitted: the fourth compartment in the descending scale was indeed termed the Thetic census, because it contained all the Thetes, and because most of its members were of that humble description; but it is not conceivable that a proprietor whose land yielded to him a clear annual return of 100, 120, 140, or 180 drachmas, could ever have been designated by that name.

Such were the divisions in the political scale established by Solon, called by Aristotle a Timocracy, in which the rights, honors, functions, and liabilities of the citizens were measured out according to the assessed property of each. The highest honors of the state—that is, the places of the nine archons annually chosen, as well as those in the senate of Areopagus, into which the past archons always entered—perhaps also the posts of Prytanes of the Naukrari—were reserved for the first class: the poor Eupatrids became ineligible, while rich men not Eupatrids were admitted. Other posts of inferior distinction were filled by the second and third classes, who

were moreover bound to military service, the one on horseback, the other as heavy armed soldiers on foot. Moreover, the Liturgies of the state, as they were called—unpaid functions such as the trierarchy, choregy, gymnasiarchy, etc., which entailed expense and trouble on the holder of them—were distributed in some way or other between the members of the three classes, though we do not know how the distribution was made in these early times. On the other hand, the members of the fourth or lowest class were disqualified from holding any individual office of dignity. They performed no liturgies, served in case of war only as light-armed or with a panoply provided by the state, and paid nothing to the direct property-tax or Eisphora. It would be incorrect to say that they paid *no* taxes, for indirect taxes, such as duties on imports, fell upon them in common with the rest; and we must recollect that these latter were, throughout a long period of Athenian history, in steady operation, while the direct taxes were only levied on rare occasions.

But though this fourth class, constituting the great numerical majority of the free people, were shut out from individual office, their collective importance was in another way greatly increased. They were invested with the right of choosing the annual archons, out of the class of Pentakosiomedimni; and what was of more importance still, the archons and the magistrates generally, after their year of office, instead of being accountable to the senate of Areopagus, were made formally accountable to the public assembly sitting in judgment upon their past conduct. They might be impeached and called upon to defend themselves, punished in case of misbehavior, and debarred from the usual honor of a seat in the senate of Areopagus.

Had the public assembly been called upon to act alone without aid or guidance, this accountability would have proved only nominal. But Solon converted it into a reality by another new institution, which will hereafter be found of great moment in the working out of the Athenian democracy. He created the pro-bouleutic or pre-considering senate, with intimate and especial reference to the public assembly—to prepare matters for its discussion, to convoke and superintend its meetings, and to insure the execution of its decrees. The senate, as first constituted by Solon, comprised 400 members, taken in equal proportions from the four tribes—not chosen by lot (as they will be found to be in the more advanced stage of the democracy), but elected by the people, in the same way as the archons then were—persons of the fourth or poorest class of the census, though contributing to elect, not being themselves eligible.

But while Solon thus created the new pre-considering senate, identified with and subsidiary to the popular assembly, he manifested no jealousy of the pre-existing Areopagitic senate. On the contrary, he enlarged its powers, gave to it an ample supervision over the execution of the laws generally, and imposed upon it the

censorial duty of inspecting the lives and occupation of the citizens, as well as of punishing men of idle and dissolute habits. He was himself, as past archon, a member of this ancient senate, and he is said to have contemplated that by means of the two senates, the state would be held fast, as it were with a double anchor, against all shocks and storms.

Such are the only new political institutions (apart from the laws to be noticed presently) which there are grounds for ascribing to Solon, when we take proper care to discriminate what really belongs to Solon and his age, from the Athenian constitution as afterward remodeled. It has been a practice common with many able expositors of Grecian affairs, and followed partly even by Dr. Thirlwall, to connect the name of Solon with the whole political and judicial state of Athens as it stood between the age of Perikles and that of Demosthenes—the regulations of the senate of 500, the numerous public dikasts or jurors taken by lot from the people, as well as the body annually selected for law-revision, and called Nomothets, and the prosecution (called the Graphe Paranomon) open to be instituted against the proposer of any measure illegal, unconstitutional, or dangerous. There is indeed some countenance for this confusion between Solonian and post-Solonian Athens, in the usage of the orators themselves. For Demosthenes and Æschines employ the name of Solon in a very loose manner, and treat him as the author of institutions belonging evidently to a later age: for example the striking and characteristic oath of the Heliastic jurors, which Demosthenes ascribes to Solon, proclaims itself in many ways as belonging to the age after Kleisthenes, especially by the mention of the senate of 500, and not of 400. Among the citizens who served as jurors or dikasts, Solon was venerated generally as the author of the Athenian laws. An orator therefore might well employ his name for the purpose of emphasis, without provoking any critical inquiry whether the particular institution, which he happened to be then impressing upon his audience, belonged really to Solon himself or to the subsequent periods. Many of those institutions, which Dr. Thirlwall mentions in conjunction with the name of Solon, are among the last refinements and elaborations of the democratical mind of Athens—gradually prepared, doubtless, during the interval between Kleisthenes and Perikles, but not brought into full operation until the period of the latter (460–429 B.C.). For it is hardly possible to conceive these numerous dikasteries and assemblies in regular, frequent, and long standing operation, without an assured payment to the dikasts who composed them. Now such payment first began to be made about the time of Perikles, if not by his actual proposition; and Demosthenes had good reason for contending that if it were suspended, the judicial as well as the administrative system of Athens would at once fall to pieces. It would be a marvel, such as nothing short of strong direct

evidence would justify us in believing, that in an age when even partial democracy was yet untried, Solon should conceive the idea of such institutions; it would be a marvel still greater that the half-emancipated Thetes and small proprietors, for whom he legislated—yet trembling under the rod of the Eupatrid archons, and utterly inexperienced in collective business—should have been found suddenly competent to fulfill these ascendant functions, such as the citizens of conquering Athens in the days of Perikles—full of the sentiment of force and actively identifying themselves with the dignity of their community—became gradually competent, and not more than competent, to exercise with effect. To suppose that Solon contemplated and provided for the periodical revision of his laws by establishing a Nomothetic jury or dikastery, such as that which we find in operation during the time of Demosthenes, would be at variance (in my judgment) with any reasonable estimate either of the man or of the age. Herodotus says that Solon, having exacted from the Athenians solemn oaths that *they* would not rescind any of his laws for ten years, quitted Athens for that period, in order that he might not be compelled to rescind them himself: Plutarch informs us that he gave to his laws force for a century absolute. Solon himself, and Drako before him, had been lawgivers evoked and empowered by the special emergency of the times: the idea of a frequent revision of laws, by a body of lot-selected dikasts, belongs to a far more advanced age, and could not well have been present to the minds of either. The wooden rollers of Solon, like the tables of the Roman decemvirs, were doubtless intended as a permanent "fons omnis publici privatique juris."

If we examine the facts of the case, we shall see that nothing more than the bare foundation of the democracy of Athens as it stood in the time of Perikles, can reasonably be ascribed to Solon. "I gave to the people (Solon says in one of his short remaining fragments) as much strength as sufficed for their needs, without either enlarging or diminishing their dignity: for those too who possessed power and were noted for wealth, I took care that no unworthy treatment should be reserved. I stood with the strong shield cast over both parties, so as not to allow an unjust triumph to either." Again, Aristotle tells us that Solon bestowed upon the people as much power as was indispensable, but no more: the power to elect their magistrates and hold them to accountability: if the people had had less than this, they could not have been expected to remain tranquil—they would have been in slavery and hostile to the constitution. Not less distinctly does Herodotus speak, when he describes the revolution subsequently operated by Kleisthenes—the latter (he tells us) found "the Athenian people excluded from everything." These passages seem positively to contradict the supposition, in itself sufficiently improbable, that Solon is the author of the peculiar democratical institutions of Athens, such as the constant and numerous dikasts

for judicial trials and revision of laws. The genuine and forward democratical movement of Athens begins only with Kleisthenes, from the moment when that distinguished Alkmæonid, either spontaneously or from finding himself worsted in his party strife with Isagoras, purchased by large popular concessions the hearty co-operation of the multitude under very dangerous circumstances. While Solon, in his own statement as well as in that of Aristotle, gave to the people as much power as was strictly needful, but no more—Kleisthenes (to use the significant phrase of Herodotus), "being vanquished in the party contest with his rival, *took the people into partnership.*" It was, thus, to the interests of the weaker section, in a strife of contending nobles, that the Athenian people owed their first admission to political ascendency—in part, at least, to this cause, though the proceedings of Kleisthenes indicate a hearty and spontaneous popular sentiment. But such constitutional admission of the people would not have been so astonishingly fruitful in positive results, if the course of public events for the half century after Kleisthenes had not been such as to stimulate most powerfully their energy, their self-reliance, their mutual sympathies, and their ambition. I shall recount in a future chapter these historical causes, which, acting upon the Athenian character, gave such efficiency and expansion to the great democratical impulse communicated by Kleisthenes: at present it is enough to remark that that impulse commences properly with Kleisthenes, and not with Solon.

But the Solonian constitution, though only the foundation, was yet the indispensable foundation, of the subsequent democracy. And if the discontents of the miserable Athenian population, instead of experiencing his disinterested and healing management, had fallen at once into the hands of selfish power-seekers like Kylon or Peisistratus—the memorable expansion of the Athenian mind during the ensuing century would never have taken place, and the whole subsequent history of Greece would probably have taken a different course. Solon left the essential powers of the state still in the hands of the oligarchy. The party combats (to be recounted hereafter) between Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megakles, thirty years after his legislation, which ended in the despotism of Peisistratus, will appear to be of the same purely oligarchical character as they had been before Solon was appointed archon. But the oligarchy which he established was very different from the unmitigated oligarchy which he found, so teeming with oppression and so destitute of redress, as his own poems testify.

It was he who first gave both to the citizens of middling property and to the general mass a *locus standi* against the Eupatrids. He enabled the people partially to protect themselves, and familiarized them with the idea of protecting themselves, by the peaceful exercise of a constitutional franchise. The new force, through which this protection was carried into effect, was the public assembly called

Heliæa, regularized and armed with enlarged prerogatives and further strengthened by its indispensable ally—the probouleutic or preconsidering senate. Under the Solonian constitution, this force was merely secondary and defensive, but after the renovation of Kleisthenes it became paramount and sovereign. It branched out gradually into those numerous popular dikasteries which so powerfully modified both public and private Athenian life, drew to itself the undivided reverence and submission of the people, and by degrees rendered the single magistracies essentially subordinate functions. The popular assembly, as constituted by Solon, appearing in modified efficiency and trained to the office of reviewing and judging the general conduct of a past magistrate—forms the intermediate stage between the passive Homeric agora and those omnipotent assemblies and dikasteries which listened to Perikles or Demosthenes. Compared with these last, it has in it but a faint streak of democracy—and so it natually appeared to Aristotle, who wrote with a practical experience of Athens in the time of the orators; but compared with the first, or with the ante-Solonian constitution of Attica, it must doubtless have appeared a concession eminently democratical. To impose upon the Eupatrid archon the necessity of being elected, or put upon his trial of after-accountability, by the *rabble* of freemen (such would be the phrase in Eupatrid society), would be a bitter humiliation to those among whom it was first introduced; for we must recollect that this was the most extensive scheme of constitutional reform yet propounded in Greece, and that despots and oligarchies shared between them at that time the whole Grecian world. As it appears that Solon, while constituting the popular assembly with its probouleutic senate, had no jealousy of the senate of Areopagus, and indeed even enlarged its powers—we may infer that his grand object was, not to weaken the oligarchy generally, but to improve the administration and to repress the misconduct and irregularities of the individual archons; and that, too, not by diminishing their powers, but by making some degree of popularity the condition both of their entry into office, and of their safety or honor after it.

It is, in my judgment, a mistake to suppose that Solon transferred the judicial power of the archons to a popular dikastery. These magistrates still continued self-acting judges, deciding and condemning without appeal—not mere presidents of an assembled jury, as they afterward came to be during the next century. For the general exercise of such power they were accountable after their year of office. Such accountability was the security against abuse—a very insufficient security, yet not wholly inoperative. It will be seen however presently, that these archons, though strong to coerce, and perhaps to oppress, small and poor men, had no means of keeping down rebellious nobles of their own rank, such as Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megakles, each with his armed followers. When we compare the drawn swords of these ambitious competitors, ending in the despotism of one of them, with the vehement parliamentary strife between Themistokles and Aristeides afterward, peaceably decided by the vote of the sovereign people and never disturbing the public tranquillity—we shall see that the democracy of the ensuing century fulfilled the conditions of order, as well as of progress, better than the Solonian constitution.

To distinguish this Solonian constitution from the democracy which followed it, is essential to a due comprehension of the progress of the Greek mind, and especially of Athenian affairs. That democracy was achieved by gradual steps, which will be hereafter described. Demosthenes and Æschines lived under it as a system consummated and in full activity, when the stages of its previous growth were no longer matter of exact memory; and the dikasts then assembled in judgment were pleased to hear their constitution associated with the names either of Solon or of Theseus. Their inquisitive contemporary Aristotle was not thus misled: but even commonplace Athenians of the century preceding would have escaped the same delusion. For during the whole course of the democratical movement, from the Persian invasion down to the Peloponnesian war, and especially during the changes proposed by Perikles and Ephialtes, there was always a strenuous party of resistance, who would not suffer the people to forget that they had already forsaken, and were on the point of forsaking still more, the orbit marked out by Solon. The illustrious Perikles underwent innumerable attacks both from the orators in the assembly and from the comic writers in the theater. And among these sarcasms on the political tendencies of the day, we are probably to number the complaint, breathed by the poet Kratinus, of the desuetude into which both Solon and Drako had fallen—"I swear (said he in a fragment of one of his comedies) by Solon and Drako, whose wooden tablets (of laws) are now employed by people to roast their barley." The laws of Solon respecting penal offenses, respecting inheritance and adoption, respecting the private relations generally, etc., remained for the most part in force: his quadripartite census also continued, at least for financial purposes, until the archonship of Nausinikus in 377 B.C.—so that Cicero and others might be warranted in affirming that his laws still prevailed at Athens: but his political and judicial arrangements had undergone a revolution not less complete and memorable than the character and spirit of the Athenian people generally. The choice, by way of lot, of archons and other magistrates—and the distribution by lot of the general body of dikasts or jurors into panels for judicial business—may be decidedly considered as not belonging to Solon, but adopted after the revolution of Kleisthenes; probably the choice of senators by lot also. The lot was a symptom of pronounced democratical spirit, such as we must not seek in the Solonian institutions.

It is not easy to make out distinctly what was the political position of the ancient Gentes and Phratries, as Solon left them. The four

tribes consisted altogether of gentes and phratries, insomuch that no one could be included in any one of the tribes who was not also a member of some gens and phratry. Now the new probouleutic or preconsidering senate consisted of 400 members,—100 from each of the tribes: persons not included in any gens or phratry could therefore have had no access to it. The conditions of eligibility were similar, according to ancient custom, for the nine archons—of course, also, for the senate of Areopagus. So that there remained only the public assembly, in which an Athenian not a member of these tribes could take part: yet he was a citizen, since he could give his vote for archons and senators, and could take part in the annual decision of their accountability, besides being entitled to claim redress for wrong from the archons in his own person—while the alien could only do so through the intervention of an avouching citizen or Prostates. It seems, therefore, that all persons not included in the four tribes, whatever their grade of fortune might be, were on the same level in respect to political privilege as the fourth and poorest class of the Solonian census. It has already been remarked, that even before the time of Solon, the number of Athenians not included in the gentes or phratries was probably considerable: it tended to become greater and greater, since these bodies were close and unexpansive, while the policy of the new lawgiver tended to invite industrious settlers from other parts of Greece to Athens. Such great and increasing inequality of political privilege helps to explain the weakness of the government in repelling the aggressions of Peisistratus, and exhibits the importance of the revolution afterward wrought by Kleisthenes, when he abolished (for all political purposes) the four old tribes, and created ten new comprehensive tribes in place of them.

In regard to the regulations of the senate and the assembly of the people, as constituted by Solon, we are altogether without information: nor is it safe to transfer to the Solonian constitution the information, comparatively ample, which we possess respecting these bodies under the later democracy.

The laws of Solon were inscribed on wooden rollers and triangular tablets, in the species of writing called Boustrophedon (lines alternating first from left to right, and next from right to left, like the course of the plowman), and preserved first in the Akropolis, subsequently in the Prytaneium. On the tablets, called Kyrbeis, were chiefly commemorated the laws respecting sacred rites and sacrifices: on the pillars or rollers, of which there were at least sixteen, were placed the regulations respecting matters profane. So small are the fragments which have come down to us, and so much has been ascribed to Solon by the orators which belongs really to the subsequent times, that it is hardly possible to form any critical judgment respecting the legislation as a whole, or to discover by what general principles or purposes he was guided.

He left unchanged all the previous laws and practices respecting the crime of homicide, connected as they were intimately with the religious feelings of the people. The laws of Drako on this subject, therefore, remained, but on other subjects, according to Plutarch, they were altogether abrogated: there is, however, room for supposing, that the repeal cannot have been so sweeping as this biographer represents.

The Solonian laws seem to have borne more or less upon all the great departments of human interest and duty. We find regulations political and religious, public and private, civil and criminal, commercial, agricultural, sumptuary, and disciplinarian. Solon provides punishment for crimes, restricts the profession and status of the citizen, prescribes detailed rules for marriage as well as for burial, for the common use of springs and wells, and for the mutual interest of conterminous farmers in planting or hedging their properties. As far as we can judge from the imperfect manner in which his laws come before us, there does not seem to have been any attempt at a systematic order or classification. Some of them are mere general and vague directions, while others again run into the extreme of speciality.

By far the most important of all was the amendment of the law of debtor and creditor which has already been adverted to, and the abolition of the power of fathers and brothers to sell their daughters and sisters into slavery. The prohibition of all contracts on the security of the body was itself sufficient to produce a vast improvement in the character and condition of the poorer population,—a result which seems to have been so sensibly obtained from the legislation of Solon, that Boeckh and some other eminent authors suppose him to have abolished villeinage and conferred upon the poor tenants a property in their lands, annuling the seignioral rights of the landlord. But this opinion rests upon no positive evidence, nor are we warranted in ascribing to him any stronger measure in reference to the land than the annulment of the previous mortgages.

The first pillar of his laws contained a regulation respecting exportable produce. He forbade the exportation of all produce of the Attic soil, except olive-oil alone. And the sanction employed to enforce observance of this law deserves notice, as an illustration of the ideas of the time—the archon was bound on pain of forfeiting 100 drachmas, to pronounce solemn curses against every offender. We are probably to take this prohibition in conjunction with other objects said to have been contemplated by Solon, especially the encouragement of artisans and manufacturers at Athens. Observing (we are told) that many new immigrants were just then flocking into Attica to seek an establishment, in consequence of its greater security, he was anxious to turn them rather to manufacturing industry than to the cultivation of a soil naturally poor. He forbade the granting of citizenship to any immigrants, except to such as had quitted irrev-

ocably their former abodes, and come to Athens for the purpose of carrying on some industrious profession; and in order to prevent idleness, he directed the senate of Arcopagus to keep watch over the lives of the citizens generally, and punish every one who had no course of regular labor to support him. If a father had not taught his son some art or profession, Solon relieved the son from all obligation to maintain him in his old age. And it was to encourage the multiplication of these artisans, that he insured, or sought to insure, to the residents in Attica the exclusive right of buying and consuming all its landed produce except olive-oil, which was raised in abundance more than sufficient for their wants. It was his wish that the trade with foreigners should be carried on by exporting the produce of artisan labor, instead of the produce of land.

This commercial prohibition is founded on principles substantially similar to those which were acted upon in the early history of England, with reference both to corn and to wool, and in other European countries also. In so far as it was at all operative it tended to lessen the total quantity of produce raised upon the soil of Attica, and thus to keep the price of it from rising,—a purpose less objectionable (if we assume that the legislator is to interfere at all) than that of our late Corn Laws, which were destined to prevent the price of grain from falling. But the law of Solon must have been altogether inoperative, in reference to the great articles of human subsistence; for Attica imported, both largely and constantly, grain and salt-provisions,—probably also wool and flax for the spinning and weaving of the women, and certainly timber for building. Whether the law was ever enforced with reference to figs and honey, may well be doubted; at least these productions of Attica were in after-times generally consumed and celebrated throughout Greece. Probably also in the time of Solon, the silver-mines of Laureium had hardly begun to be worked: these afterward became highly productive, and furnished to Athens a commodity for foreign payments not less convenient than lucrative.

It is interesting to notice the anxiety, both of Solon and of Drako, to enforce among their fellow-citizens industrious and self-maintaining habits; and we shall find the same sentiment proclaimed by Perikles, at the time when Athenian power was at its maximum. Nor ought we to pass over this early manifestation in Attica of an opinion equitable and tolerant toward sedentary industry, which in most other parts of Greece was regarded as comparatively dishonorable. The general tone of Grecian sentiment recognized no occupations as perfectly worthy of a free citizen except arms, agriculture, and athletic and musical exercises; and the proceedings of the Spartans, who kept aloof even from agriculture and left it to their Helots, were admired, though they could not be copied, throughout most part of the Hellenic world. Even minds like Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon concurred to a considerable extent in this feeling,

which they justified on the ground that the sedentary life and unceasing house-work of the artisan were inconsistent with military aptitude. The town-occupations are usually described by a word which carries with it contemptuous ideas, and though recognized as indispensable to the existence of the city, are held suitable only for an inferior and semi-privileged order of citizens. This, the received sentiment among Greeks, as well as foreigners, found a strong and growing opposition at Athens, as I have already said—corroborated also by a similar feeling at Corinth. The trade of Corinth, as well as of Chalkis in Eubœa, was extensive, at a time when that of Athens had scarce any existence. But while the despotism of Periander can hardly have failed to operate as a discouragement to industry at Corinth, the contemporaneous legislation of Solon provided for traders and artisans a new home at Athens, giving the first encouragement to that numerous town-population both in the city and in the Peiræeus, which we find actually residing there in the succeeding century. The multiplication of such town residents, both citizens and metics (i.e., resident persons, not citizens, but enjoying an assured position and civil rights), was a capital fact in the onward march of Athens, since it determined not merely the extension of her trade, but also the pre-eminence of her naval force—and thus, as a further consequence, lent extraordinary vigor to her democratical government. It seems, moreover, to have been a departure from the primitive temper of Atticism, which tended both to cantonal residence and rural occupation. We have, therefore, the greater interest in noting the first mention of it as a consequence of the Solonian legislation.

To Solon is first owing the admission of a power of testamentary bequest at Athens in all cases in which a man had no legitimate children. According to the pre-existing custom, we may rather presume that if a deceased person left neither children nor blood relations, his property descended (as at Rome) to his gens and phratry. Throughout most rude states of society the power of willing is unknown, as among the ancient Germans—among the Romans prior to the twelve tables—in the old laws of the Hindus, etc. Society limits a man's interest or power of enjoyment to his life, and considers his relatives as having joint reversionary claims to his property, which take effect, in certain determinate proportions, after his death. Such a view was the more likely to prevail at Athens, since the perpetuity of the family sacred rites, in which the children and near relatives partook of right, was considered by the Athenians as a matter of public as well as of private concern. Solon gave permission to every man dying without children to bequeath his property by will as he should think fit; and the testament was maintained unless it could be shown to have been procured by some compulsion or improper seduction. Speaking generally, this continued to be the law throughout the historical times of Athens. Sons, wherever there were sons, succeeded to the property

of their father in equal shares, with the obligation of giving out their sisters in marriage along with a certain dowry. If there were no sons, then the daughters succeeded, though the father might by will, within certain limits, determine the person to whom they should be married, with their rights of succession attached to them; or might, with the consent of his daughters, make by will certain other arrangements about his property. A person who had no children or direct lineal descendants might bequeath his property at pleasure: if he died without a will, first his father, then his brother or brother's children, next his sister or sister's children succeeded: if none such existed, then the cousins by the father's side, next the cousins by the mother's side,—the male line of descent having preference over the female. Such was the principle of the Solonian laws of succession, though the particulars are in several ways obscure and doubtful. Solon, it appears, was the first who gave power of superseding by testament the rights of agnates and gentiles to succession,—a proceeding in consonance with his plan of encouraging both industrious occupation and the consequent multiplication of individual acquisitions.

It has been already mentioned that Solon forbade the sale of daughters or sisters into slavery by fathers or brothers; a prohibition which shows how much females had before been looked upon as articles of property. And it would seem that before his time the violation of a free woman must have been punished at the discretion of the magistrates; for we are told that he was the first who enacted a penalty of 100 drachmas against the offender, and twenty drachmas against the seducer of a free woman. Moreover, it is said, that he forbade a bride when given in marriage to carry with her any personal ornaments and appurtenances, except to the extent of three robes and certain matters of furniture not very valuable. Solon further imposed upon women several restraints in regard to proceeding at the obsequies of deceased relatives. He forbade profuse demonstrations of sorrow, singing of composed dirges, and costly sacrifices and contributions. He limited strictly the quantity of meat and drink admissible for the funeral banquet, and prohibited nocturnal exit, except in a car and with a light. It appears that both in Greece and Rome, the feelings of duty and affection on the part of surviving relatives prompted them to ruinous expense in a funeral, as well as to unmeasured effusions both of grief and conviviality; and the general necessity experienced for legal restriction is attested by the remark of Plutarch, that similar prohibitions to those enacted by Solon were likewise in force at his native town of Chæroneia.

Other penal enactments of Solon are yet to be mentioned. He forbade absolutely evil-speaking with respect to the dead. He forbade it likewise with respect to the living, either in a temple or before judges or archons, or at any public festival—on pain of a forfeit of three drachmas to the person aggrieved, and two

more to the public treasury. How mild the general character of his punishments was, may be judged by this law against foul language, not less than by the law before-mentioned against rape. Both the one and the other of these offenses were much more severely dealt with under the subsequent law of democratical Athens. The peremptory edict against speaking ill of a deceased person, though doubtless springing in a great degree from disinterested repugnance, is traceable also in part to that fear of the wrath of the departed which strongly possessed the early Greek mind.

It seems generally that Solon determined by law the outlay for the public sacrifices, though we do not know what were his particular directions. We are told that he reckoned a sheep and a medimnus (of wheat or barley?) as equivalent, either of them, to a drachma, and that he also prescribed the prices to be paid for first-rate oxen intended for solemn occasions. But it astonishes us to see the large recompense which he awarded out of the public treasury to a victor at the Olympic or Isthmian games: to the former 500 drachmas, equal to one year's income of the highest of the four classes on the census; to the latter 100 drachmas. The magnitude of these rewards strikes us the more when we compare them with the fines on rape and evil-speaking. We cannot be surprised that the philosopher Xenophanes noticed, with some degree of severity, the extravagant estimate of this species of excellence, current among the Grecian cities. At the same time, we must remember both that these Pan-Hellenic sacred games presented the chief visible evidence of peace and sympathy among the numerous communities of Greece, and that in the time of Solon, factitious reward was still needful to encourage them. In respect to land and agriculture Solon proclaimed a public reward of five drachmas for every wolf brought in, and one drachma for every wolf's cub: the extent of wild land has at all times been considerable in Attica. He also provided rules respecting the use of wells between neighbors, and respecting the planting in conterminous olive grounds. Whether any of these regulations continued in operation during the better-known period of Athenian history cannot be safely affirmed.

In respect to theft, we find it stated that Solon repealed the punishment of death which Drako had annexed to that crime, and enacted as a penalty, compensation to an amount double the value of the property stolen. The simplicity of this law perhaps affords ground for presuming that it really does belong to Solon. But the law which prevailed during the time of the orators respecting theft must have been introducod at some later period, since it enters into distinctions and mentions both places and forms of procedure, which we cannot reasonably refer to the forty-sixth Olympiad. The public dinners at the Prytaneium, of which the archons and a select few partook in common, were also either first established, or perhaps only more strictly regulated, by Solon. He ordered barley-cakes for their ordi-

nary meals, and wheaten loaves for festival days, prescribing how often each person should dine at the table. The honor of dining at the table of the Prytaneium was maintained throughout as a valuable reward at the disposal of the government.

Among the various laws of Solon, there are few which have attracted more notice than that which pronounces the man, who in a sedition stood aloof and took part with neither side, to be dishonored and disfranchised. Strictly speaking, this seems more in the nature of an emphatic moral denunciation, or a religious curse, than a legal sanction capable of being formally applied in an individual case and after judicial trial,—though the sentence of Atimy, under the more elaborated Attic procedure, was both definite in its penal consequences and also judicially delivered. We may, however, follow the course of ideas under which Solon was induced to write this sentence on his tables, and we may trace the influence of similar ideas in later Attic institutions. It is obvious that his denunciation is confined to that special case in which a sedition has already broken out: we must suppose that Kylon has seized the Akropolis, or that Peisistratus, Megakles, and Lykurgus are in arms at the head of their partisans. Assuming these leaders to be wealthy and powerful men, which would in all probability be the fact, the constituted authority—such as Solon saw before him in Attica, even after his own organic amendments— was not strong enough to maintain the peace; it became, in fact itself, one of the contending parties. Under such given circumstances, the sooner every citizen publicly declared his adherence to some of them, the earlier this suspension of legal authority was likely to terminate. Nothing was so mischievous as the indifference of the mass, or their disposition to let the combatants fight out the matter among themselves, and then to submit to the victor. Nothing was more likely to encourage aggression on the part of an ambitious malcontent, than the conviction, that if he could once overpower the small amount of physical force which surrounded the archons, and exhibit himself in armed possession of the Prytaneium or the Akropolis, he might immediately count upon passive submission on the part of all the freemen without. Under the state of feeling which Solon inculcates, the insurgent leader would have to calculate that every man who was not actively in his favor would be actively against him, and this would render his enterprise much more dangerous. Indeed, he could then never hope to succeed, except on the double supposition of extraordinary popularity in his own person, and widespread detestation of the existing government. He would thus be placed under the influence of powerful deterring motives; so that ambition would be less likely to seduce him into a course which threatened nothing but ruin, unless under such encouragements from the pre-existing public opinion as to make his success a result desirable for the community. Among the small political societies of Greece—especially in the age of Solon, when the number of despots

in other parts of Greece seems to have been at its maximum—every government, whatever might be its form, was sufficiently weak to make its overthrow a matter of comparative facility. Unless upon the supposition of a band of foreign mercenaries—which would render the government a system of naked force, and which the Athenian lawgiver would of course never contemplate—there was no other stay for it except a positive and pronounced feeling of attachment on the part of the mass of citizens. Indifference on their part would render them a prey to every daring man of wealth who chose to become a conspirator. That they should be ready to come forward, not only with voice but with arms—and that they should be known beforehand to be so—was essential to the maintenance of every good Grecian government. It was salutary, in preventing mere personal attempts at revolution; and pacific in its tendency, even where the revolution had actually broken out—because in the greater number of cases the proportion of partisans would probably be very unequal, and the inferior party would be compelled to renounce their hopes.

It will be observed that in this enactment of Solon, the existing government is ranked merely as one of the contending parties. The virtuous citizen is enjoined, not to come forward in its support, but to come forward at all events, either for it or against it. Positive and early action is all which is prescribed to him as matter of duty. In the age of Solon there was no political idea or system yet current which could be assumed as an unquestionable datum—no conspicuous standard to which the citizens could be pledged under all circumstances to attach themselves. The option lay only, between a mitigated oligarchy in possession, and a despot in possibility; a contest wherein the affections of the people could rarely be counted upon in favor of the established government. But this neutrality in respect to the constitution was at an end after the revolution of Kleisthenes, when the idea of the sovereign people and the democratical institutions became both familiar and precious to every individual citizen. We shall hereafter find the Athenians binding themselves by the most sincere and solemn oaths to uphold their democracy against all attempts to subvert it; we shall discover in them a sentiment not less positive and uncompromising in its direction, than energetic in its inspirations. But while we notice this very important change in their character, we shall at the same time perceive that the wise precautionary recommendation of Solon, to obviate sedition by an early declaration of the impartial public between two contending leaders, was not lost upon them. Such, in point of fact, was the purpose of that salutary and protective institution which is called the Ostracism. When two party-leaders, in the early stages of the Athenian democracy, each powerful in adherents and influence, had become passionately embarked in bitter and prolonged opposition to each other, such opposition was likely to conduct one or other to violent measures. Over and above the hopes of party triumph, each

might well fear that if he himself continued within the bounds of legality, he might fall a victim to aggressive proceedings on the part of his antagonists. To ward off this formidable danger, a public vote was called for to determine which of the two should go into temporary banishment, retaining his property and unvisited by any disgrace. A number of citizens, not less than 6,000, voting secretly, and therefore independently, were required to take part, pronouncing upon one or other of these eminent rivals a sentence of exile for ten years. The one who remained became, of course, more powerful, yet less in a situation to be driven into anti-constitutional courses, than he was before. I shall, in a future chapter, speak again of this wise precaution and vindicate it against some erroneous interpretations to which it has given rise. At present, I merely notice its analogy with the previous Solonian law, and its tendency to accomplish the same purpose of terminating a fierce party-feud, by artificially calling in the votes of the mass of impartial citizens against one or other of the leaders,—with this important difference, that while Solon assumed the hostile parties to be actually in arms, the ostracism averted that grave public calamity by applying its remedy to the premonitory symptoms.

I have already considered, in a previous chapter, the directions given by Solon for the more orderly recital of the Homeric poems; and it is curious to contrast his reverence for the old epic with the unqualified repugnance which he manifested toward Thespis and the drama—then just nascent, and holding out little promise of its subsequent excellence. Tragedy and comedy were now beginning to be grafted on the lyric and choric song. First one actor was provided to relieve the chorus; next two actors were introduced to sustain fictitious characters and carry on a dialogue, in such manner that the songs of the chorus and the interlocution of the actors formed a continuous piece. Solon, after having heard Thespis acting (as all the early composers did, both tragic and comic) in his own comedy, asked him afterward if he was not ashamed to pronounce such falsehoods before so large an audience. And when Thespis answered that there was no harm in saying and doing such things merely for amusement, Solon indignantly exclaimed, striking the ground with his stick, "If once we come to praise and esteem such amusement as this, we shall quickly find the effects of it in our daily transactions." For the authenticity of this anecdote it would be rash to vouch, but we may at least treat it as the protest of some early philosopher against the deceptions of the drama; and it is interesting as marking the incipient struggles of that literature in which Athens afterward attained such unrivaled excellence.

It would appear that all the laws of Solon were proclaimed, inscribed, and accepted without either discussion or resistance. He is said to have described them, not as the best laws which he could himself have imagined, but as the best which he could have induced

the people to accept. He gave them validity for the space of ten years during which period both the senate collectively and the archons individually swore to observe them with fidelity; under penalty, in case of non-observance, of a golden statue as large as life to be erected at Delphi. But though the acceptance of the laws was accomplished without difficulty, it was not found so easy either for the people to understand and obey, or for the framer to explain them. Every day persons came to Solon either with praise, or criticism, or suggestions of various improvements, or questions as to the construction of particular enactments; until at last he became tired of this endless process of reply and vindication, which was seldom successful either in removing obscurity or in satisfying complainants. Foreseeing that if he remained he would be compelled to make changes, he obtained leave of absence from his countrymen for ten years, trusting that before the expiration of that period they would have become accustomed to his laws. He quitted his native city, in the full certainty that his laws would remain unrepealed until his return; for (says Herodotus) "the Athenians *could not* repeal them, since they were bound by solemn oaths to observe them for ten years." The unqualified manner in which the historian here speaks of an oath, as if it created a sort of physical necessity and shut out all possibility of a contrary result, deserves notice as illustrating Grecian sentiment.

On departing from Athens, Solon first visited Egypt, where he communicated largely with Psenophis of Heliopolis and Sonchis of Sais, Egyptian priests who had much to tell respecting their ancient history, and from whom he learnt matters real or pretended, far transcending in alleged antiquity the oldest Grecian genealogies—especially the history of the vast submerged island of Atlantis, and the war which the ancestors of the Athenians had successfully carried on against it, 9,000 years before. Solon is said to have commenced an epic poem upon this subject, but he did not live to finish it, and nothing of it now remains. From Egypt he went to Cyprus, where he visited the small town of Æpeia, said to have been originally founded by Demophon son of Theseus, and ruled at this period by the prince Philokyprus—each town in Cyprus having its own petty prince. It was situated near the river Klarius in a position precipitous and secure, but inconvenient and ill-supplied. Solon persuaded Philokyprus to quit the old site and establish a new town down in the fertile plain beneath. He himself staid and became Œkist of the new establishment, making all the regulations requisite for its safe and prosperous march, which was indeed so decisively manifested, that many new settlers flocked into the new plantation, called by Philokyprus *Soli*, in honor of Solon. To our deep regret, we are not permitted to know what these regulations were; but the general fact is attested by the poems of Solon himself, and the lines in which he bade farewell to Philokyprus on quitting the island are

yet before us. On the dispositions of this prince his poem bestowed unqualified commendation.

Besides his visit to Egypt and Cyprus, a story was also current of his having conversed with the Lydian king Crœsus at Sardis. The communication said to have taken place between them has been woven by Herodotus into a sort of moral tale which forms one of the most beautiful episodes in his whole history Though this tale has been told and retold as if it were genuine history, yet as it now stands, it is irreconcilable with chronology—although very possibly Solon may at some time or other have visited Sardis, and seen Crœsus as hereditary prince.

But even if no chronological objections existed, the moral purpose of the tale is so prominent, and pervades it so systematically from beginning to end, that these internal grounds are of themselves sufficiently strong to impeach its credibility as a matter of fact, unless such doubts happen to be outweighed—which in this case they are not—by good contemporary testimony. The narrative of Solon and Crœsus can be taken for nothing else but an illustrative fiction, borrowed by Herodotus from some philosopher, and clothed in his own peculiar beauty of expression, which on this occasion is more decidedly poetical than is habitual with him. I cannot transcribe, and I hardly dare to abridge it. The vainglorious Crœsus, at the summit of his conquests and his riches, endeavors to win from his visitor Solon an opinion that he is the happiest of mankind. The latter, after having twice preferred to him modest and meritorious Grecian citizens, at length reminds him that his vast wealth and power are of a tenure too precarious to serve as an evidence of happiness—that the gods are jealous and meddlesome, and often make the show of happiness a mere prelude to extreme disaster—and that no man's life can be called happy until the whole of it has been played out, so that it may be seen to be out of the reach of reverses. Crœsus treats this opinion as absurd, but "a great judgment from God fell upon him, after Solon was departed—probably (observes Herodotus) because he fancied himself the happiest of all men." First he lost his favorite son Atys, a brave and intelligent youth (his only other son being dumb). For the Mysians of Olympus being ruined by a destructive and formidable wild boar which they were unable to subdue, applied for aid to Crœsus, who sent to the spot a chosen hunting force, and permitted—though with great reluctance, in consequence of an alarming dream—that his favorite son should accompany them. The young prince unintentionally slain by the Phrygian exile Adrastus, whom Crœsus had sheltered and protected. Hardly had the latter recovered from the anguish of this misfortune, when the rapid growth of Cyrus and the Persian power induced him to go to war with them, against the advice of his wisest counselors. After a struggle of about three years he was completely defeated, his capital Sardis taken by storm, and himself made prisoner. Cyrus ordered a large pile to be prepared, and

placed upon it Crœsus in fetters, together with fourteen young Lydians, in the intention of burning them alive, either as a religious offering, or in fulfillment of a vow, "or perhaps (says Herodotus) to see whether some of the gods would not interfere to rescue a man so pre-eminently pious as the king of Lydia." In this sad extremity, Crœsus bethought him of the warning which he had before despised, and thrice pronounced, with a deep groan, the name of Solon. Cyrus desired the interpreters to inquire whom he was invoking, and learnt in reply the anecdote of the Athenian lawgiver, together with the solemn memento which he had offered to Crœsus during more prosperous days, attesting the frail tenure of all human greatness. The remark sunk deep into the Persian monarch as a token of what might happen to himself: he repented of his purpose, and directed that the pile, which had already been kindled, should be immediately extinguished. But the orders came too late. In spite of the most zealous efforts of the bystanders, the flame was found unquenchable, and Crœsus would still have been burnt, had he not implored with prayers and tears the succor of Apollo, to whose Delphian and Theban temples he had given such munificent presents. His prayers were heard, the fair sky was immediately overcast and a profuse rain descended, sufficient to extinguish the flames. The life of Crœsus was thus saved, and he became afterward the confidential friend and adviser of his conqueror.

Such is the brief outline of a narrative which Herodotus has given with full development and with impressive effect. It would have served as a show-lecture to the youth of Athens not less admirably than the well-known fable of the Choice of Herakles, which the philosopher Prodikus, a junior contemporary of Herodotus, delivered with so much popularity. It illustrates forcibly the religious and ethical ideas of antiquity; the deep sense of the jealousy of the gods, who would not endure pride in any one except themselves; the impossibility, for any man, of realizing to himself more than a very moderate share of happiness; the danger from reactionary Nemesis, if at any time he had overpassed such limit; and the necessity of calculations taking in the whole of life, as a basis for rational comparison of different individuals. And it embodies, as a practical consequence from these feelings, the often-repeated protest of moralists against vehement impulses and unrestrained aspirations. The more valuable this narrative appears, in its illustrative character, the less can we presume to treat it as a history.

It is much to be regretted that we have no information respecting events in Attica immediately after the Solonian laws and constitution, which were promulgated in 594 B.C., so as to understand better the practical effect of these changes. What we next hear respecting Solon in Attica refers to a period immediately preceding the first usurpation of Peisistratus in 560 B.C., and after the return of Solon from his long absence. We are here again introduced to the same

oligarchical dissensions as are reported to have prevailed before the Solonian legislation: the Pedicis, or opulent proprietors of the plain round Athens, under Lykurgus; the Parali of the south of Attica, under Megakles; and the Diakrii or mountaineers of the eastern cantons, the poorest of the three classes, under Peisistratus, are in a state of violent intestine dispute. The account of Plutarch represents Solon as returning to Athens during the height of this sedition. He was treated with respect by all parties, but his recommendations were no longer obeyed, and he was disqualified by age from acting with effect in public. He employed his best efforts to mitigate party animosities, and applied himself particularly to restrain the ambition of Peisistratus, whose ulterior projects he quickly detected.

The future greatness of Peisistratus is said to have been first portended by a miracle which happened, even before his birth, to his father Hippokrates at the Olympic games. It was realized, partly by his bravery and conduct, which had been displayed in the capture of Nisæa from the Megarians—partly by his popularity of speech and manners, his championship of the poor, and his ostentatious disavowal of all selfish pretensions—partly by an artful mixture of stratagem and force. Solon, after having addressed fruitless remonstrances to Peisistratus himself, publicly denounced his designs in verses addressed to the people. The deception, whereby Peisistratus finally accomplished his design, is memorable in Grecian tradition. He appeared one day in the agora of Athens in his chariot with a pair of mules: he had intentionally wounded both his person and the mules, and in this condition he threw himself upon the compassion and defense of the people, pretending that his political enemies had violently attacked him. He implored the people to grant him a guard, and at the moment when their sympathies were freshly aroused both in his favor and against his supposed assassins, Aristo proposed formally to the ekklesia (the pro-bouleutic senate, being composed of friends of Peisistratus, had previously authorized the proposition) that a company of fifty club-men should be assigned as a permanent body-guard for the defense of Peisistratus. To this motion Solon opposed a strenuous resistance, but found himself overborne, and even treated as if he had lost his senses. The poor were earnest in favor of it, while the rich were afraid to express their dissent; and he could only comfort himself after the fatal vote had been passed, by exclaiming that he was wiser than the former and more determined than the latter. Such was one of the first known instances in which this memorable stratagem was played off against the liberty of a Grecian community.

The unbounded popular favor which had procured the passing of this grant was still farther manifested by the absence of all precautions to prevent the limits of the grant from being exceeded. The number of the body-guard was not long confined to fifty, and probably their clubs were soon exchanged for sharper weapons.

Peisistratus thus found himself strong enough to throw off the mask and seize the Akropolis. His leading opponents, Megakles and the Alkmæonids, immediately fled the city, and it was left to the venerable age and undaunted patriotism of Solon to stand forward almost alone in a vain attempt to resist the usurpation. He publicly presented himself in the market-place, employing encouragement, remonstrance and reproach, in order to rouse the spirit of the people. To prevent this despotism from coming (he told them) would have been easy; to shake it off now was more difficult, yet at the same time more glorious. But he spoke in vain, for all who were not actually favorable to Peisistratus listened only to their fears, and remained passive; nor did any one join Solon, when, as a last appeal, he put on his armor and planted himself in military posture before the door of his house. "I have done my duty (he exclaimed at length); I have sustained to the best of my power my country and the laws;" and he then renounced all further hope of opposition—though resisting the instances of his friends that he should flee, and returning for answer, when they asked him on what he relied for protection, "On my old age." Nor did he even think it necessary to repress the inspirations of his Muse. Some verses yet remain, composed seemingly at a moment when the strong hand of the new despot had begun to make itself sorely felt, in which he tells his countrymen—"If ye have endured sorrow from your own baseness of soul, impute not the fault of this to the gods. Ye have yourselves put force and dominion into the hands of these men, and have thus drawn upon yourselves wretched slavery."

It is gratifying to learn that Peisistratus, whose conduct throughout his despotism was comparatively mild, left Solon untouched. How long this distinguished man survived the practical subversion of his own constitution, we cannot certainly determine; but according to the most probable statement he died during the very next year, at the advanced age of eighty.

We have only to regret that we are deprived of the means of following more in detail his noble and exemplary character. He represents the best tendencies of his age, combined with much that is personally excellent; the improved ethical sensibility; the thirst for enlarged knowledge and observation, not less potent in old age than in youth; the conception of regularized popular institutions, departing sensibly from the type and spirit of the governments around him, and calculated to found a new character in the Athenian people; a genuine and reflecting sympathy with the mass of the poor, anxious not merely to rescue them from the oppressions of the rich, but also to create in them habits of self-relying industry; lastly, during his temporary possession of a power altogether arbitrary, not merely an absence of all selfish ambition, but a rare discretion in seizing the mean between conflicting exigencies. In reading his poems we must always recollect that what now appears common-

place was once new, so that to his comparatively unlettered age the social pictures which he draws were still fresh, and his exhortations calculated to live in the memory. The poems composed on moral subjects generally inculcate a spirit of gentleness toward others and moderation in personal objects. They represent the gods as irresistible, retributive, favoring the good and punishing the bad, though sometimes very tardily. But his compositions on special and present occasions are usually conceived in a more vigorous spirit; denouncing the oppressions of the rich at one time, and the timid submission to Peisistratus at another—and expressing in emphatic language his own proud consciousness of having stood forward as champion of the mass of the people. Of his early poems hardly anything is preserved. The few lines remaining seem to manifest a jovial temperament which we may well conceive to have been overlaid by such political difficulties as he had to encounter—difficulties arising successively out of the Megarian war, the Kylonian sacrilege, the public despondency healed by Epimenides, and the task of arbiter between a rapacious oligarchy and a suffering people. In one of his elegies addressed to Mimnermus, he marked out the sixtieth year as the longest desirable period of life, in preference to the eightieth year, which that poet had expressed a wish to attain. But his own life, as far as we can judge, seems to have reached the longer of the two periods; and not the least honorable part of it (the resistance to Peisistratus) occurs immediately before his death.

There prevailed a story, that his ashes were collected and scattered around the island of Salamis, which Plutarch treats as absurd—though he tells us at the same time that it was believed both by Aristotle and by many other considerable men. It is at least as ancient as the poet Kratinus, who alluded to it in one of his comedies, and I do not feel inclined to reject it. The inscription on the statue of Solon at Athens described him as a Salaminian: he had been the great means of acquiring the island for his country: and it seems highly probable that among the new Athenian citizens, who went to settle there, he may have received a lot of land and become enrolled among the Salaminian demots. The dispersion of his ashes connecting him with the island as its Œkist, may be construed, if not as the expression of a public vote, at least as a piece of affectionate vanity on the part of his surviving friends.

We have now reached the period of the usurpation of Peisistratus (B.C. 560), whose dynasty governed Athens (with two temporary interruptions during the life of Peisistratus himself) for fifty years. The history of this despotism, milder than Grecian despotism generally, and productive of important consequences to Athens, will be reserved for a succeeding chapter.

APPENDIX.

The explanation which M. von Savigny gives of the Nexi and Addicti under the old Roman law of debtor and creditor (after he has refuted the elucidation of Niebuhr on the same subject), while it throws great light on the historical changes in Roman legislation on that important matter, sets forth at the same time the marked difference made in the procedure of Rome, between the demand of the creditor for repayment of *principal*, and the demand for payment of *interest*.

The primitive Roman law distinguished a debt arising from money lent (*pecunia certa credita*) from debts arising out of contract, delict, sale, etc., or any other source: the creditor on the former ground had a quick and easy process, by which he acquired the fullest power over the person and property of his debtor. After the debt on loan was either confessed or proved before the magistrate, thirty days were allowed to the debtor for payment: if payment was not made within that time, the creditor laid hold of him (*manûs injectio*) and carried him before the magistrate again. The debtor was now again required either to pay or to find a surety (*vindex*); if neither of these demands were complied with, the creditor took possession of him and carried him home, where he kept him in chains for two months; during which interval he brought him before the prætor publicly on three successive nundinæ. If the debt was not paid within these two months, the sentence of addiction was pronounced, and the creditor became empowered either to put his debtor to death, or to sell him for a slave, or to keep him at forced work, without any restriction as to the degree of ill-usage which might be inflicted upon him. The judgment of the magistrate authorized him, besides, to seize the property of his debtor wherever he could find any, within the limits sufficient for payment: this was one of the points which Niebuhr had denied.

Such was the old law of Rome, with respect to the consequences of an action for money had and received, for more than a century after the Twelve Tables. But the law did not apply this stringent personal execution to any debt except that arising from loan—and even in that debt only to the principal money, not to the interest—which latter had to be claimed by a process both more gentle and less efficient, applying to the property only and not to the person of the debtor. Accordingly it was to the advantage of the creditor to devise some means for bringing his claim of interest under the same stringent process as his claim for the principal; it was also to his advantage, if his claim arose, not out of money lent, but out of sale, compensation for injury, or any other source, to give to it *the form* of an action for money lent. Now the Nexum, or Nexi obligatio, was an artifice—a fictitious loan—whereby this purpose was accomplished. The severe process which legally belonged only to the recovery of the principal money, was extended by the Nexum so as to comprehend the interest; and so as to comprehend also claims for money arising from all other sources (as well as from loan), wherein the law gave no direct recourse except against the property of a debtor. The Debitor Nexus was made liable by this legal artifice to pass into the condition of an Addictus, either without having borrowed money at all, or for the interest as well as for the principal of that which he had borrowed.

The Lex Pœtelia, passed about B.C. 325, liberated all the Nexi then under liability, and interdicted the Nexi obligatio forever afterward (Cicero, De Republ. ii. 34; Livy, viii. 28). Here, as in the Seisachtheia of Solon, the existing contracts were canceled, at the same time that the whole class of similar contracts were forbidden for the future.

But though the Nexi obligatio was thus abolished, the old stringent remedy still continued against the debtor on loan, *as far as the principal sum borrowed*, apart from interest. Some mitigations were introduced: by Lex Julia, the still more important provision was added, that the debtor by means of a Cessio Bonorum might save his person from seizure. But this Cessio Bonorum was coupled with conditions which could not always be fulfilled, nor was the debtor

admitted to the benefit of it, if he had been guilty of carelessness or dishonesty. Accordingly the old stringent process, and the addiction in which it ended, though it became less frequent, still continued throughout the course of Imperial Rome, and even down to the time of Justinian. The private prison, with adjudicated debtors working in it, was still the appendage to a Roman money-lender's house, even in the third and fourth centuries after the Christian era, though the practice seems to have become rarer and rarer. The status of the *Addictus Debitor*, with its peculiar rights and obligations, is discussed by Quintilian (vii. 3); and Aulus Gellius (A.D. 160) observes—"Addici namque *nunc* et vinciri multos *videmus*, quia vinculorum pœnam deterrimi homines contemnunt." (xx. 1.)

If the *Addictus Debitor* was adjudged to several creditors, they were allowed by the Twelve Tables to divide his body among them. No example was known of this power having been ever carried into effect, but the law was understood to give the power distinctly.

It is useful to have before us the old Roman law of debtor and creditor, partly as a point of comparison with the ante-Solonian practice in Attica, partly to illustrate the difference drawn in an early state of society between the claim for the principal and the claim for the interest.

See the Abhandlung of Von Savigny in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy for 1833, p. 70–103; the subject is also treated by the same admirable expositor in his System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, vol. v. sect. 19, and in Beilage xi. 10, 11 of that volume.

The same peculiar stringent process, which was available in the case of an action for *pecunia certa credita*, was also specially extended to the surety, who had paid down money to liquidate another man's debt: the debtor, if insolvent, became his Addictus—this was the *Actio Depensi*. I have already remarked in a former note, that in the Attic law, a case analogous to this was the only one in which the original remedy against the person of the debtor was always maintained. When a man had paid money to redeem a citizen from captivity, the latter, if he did not repay it, became the slave of the party who had advanced the money.

Walter (Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, sect. 583–715, 2d ed.) calls in question the above explanation of Von Savigny, on grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.

How long the feeling continued, that it was immoral and irreligious to receive any interest at all for money lent, may be seen from the following notice respecting the state of the law in France even down to 1789:

"Avant la Révolution Française (de 1789) le prêt à intérêt n'était pas également admis dans les diverses parties du royaume. Dans les pays de droit écrit, il était permis de stipuler l'intérêt des deniers prêtés: mais la jurisprudence des parlemens résistait souvent à cet usage. Suivant le droit commun des pays coutumiers, on ne pouvait stipuler aucun intérêt pour le prêt appelé en droit *mutuum*. On tenait pour maxime que l'argent ne produisant rien par lui-même, un tel prêt devait être gratuit: que la perception d'intérêts était une usure: à cet égard, on admettait assez généralement les principes du droit canonique. Du reste, la législation et la jurisprudence variaient suivant les localités et suivant la nature des contrâts et des obligations." (Carette, Lois Annotées, ou Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Paris 1843; Note sur le Décret de l'Assemblée Nationale concernant le Prêt et Intérêt, Août 11, 1789.)

The National Assembly declared the legality of all loans on interest, "suivant le taux déterminé par la loi," but did not then fix any special rate. "Le décret du 11 Avril 1793 défendit la vente et l'achat du numéraire." "La loi du 6 floréal, an III, déclara que l'or et l'argent sont marchandises; mais elle fut rapportée par le décret du 2 prairial suivant. Les articles 1905 et 1907 du Code Civil permettent le prêt à intérêt, mais au taux fixé ou autorisé par la loi. La loi du 3 Sept. 1807 a fixé le taux d'intérêt à 5 per cent. en matière civile et à 6 per cent. en matière commerciale."

The article on Lending-houses, in Beckman's History of Inventions (vol. iii. pp. 9–50), is highly interesting and instructive on the same subject. It traces the gradual calling in question, mitigation, and disappearence, of the ancient antipathy against taking interest for money; an antipathy long sanctioned by the ecclesiastics as well as by the jurists. Lending-houses, or Monts de Piété, were first commenced in Italy about the middle of the fifteenth century, by some Franciscan monks, for the purpose of rescuing poor borrowers from the exorbitant exactions of the Jews: Pope Pius II. (Æneas Silvius, one of the ablest of the Popes, about 1458–1464) was the first who approved of one of them at Perugia, but even the papal sanction was long combated by a large proportion of ecclesiastics. At first it was to be purely charitable; not only neither giving interest to those who contributed money, nor taking interest from the borrowers—but not even providing fixed pay to the administrators: interest was tacitly taken, but the popes were a long time before they would formally approve of such a practice. "At Vicenza, in order to avoid the reproach of usury, the artifice was employed of not demanding any interest, but admonishing the borrowers that they should give a remuneration according to their piety and ability." The Dominicans, partisans of the old doctrine, called these establishments Montes *Impietatis*. A Franciscan monk, Bernardinus, one of the most active promoters of the Monts de Piété, did not venture to defend, but only to excuse as an unavoidable evil, the payment of wages to the clerks and administrators: "Speciosius et religiosius fatebatur Bernardinus fore, si absque ullo penitus obolo et pretio mutuum daretur et commodaretur libere pecunia, sed pium opus et pauperum subsidium exiguo sic duraturum tempore. Non enim (inquit) tantus est ardor hominum, ut gubernatores et officiales, Montium ministerio necessarii, velint laborem hunc omnem gratis subire: quod si remunerandi sint ex sorte principali, vel ipso deposito, seu exili Montium ærario, brevi exhaurietur, et commodum opportunumque istud pauperum refugium ubique peribit."

The council of Trent, during the following century, pronounced in favor of the legality and usefulness of these lending-houses, and this has since been understood to be the sentiment of the Catholic church generally.

To trace this gradual change of moral feeling is highly instructive—the more so, as that general basis of sentiment, of which the antipathy against lending money on interest is only a particular case, still prevails largely in society and directs the current of moral approbation and disapprobation. In some nations, as among the ancient Persians before Cyrus, this sentiment has been carried so far as to repudiate and despise all buying and selling. (Herodot. i. 153.) With many, the principle of reciprocity in human dealings appears, when conceived in theory, odious and contemptible, and goes by some bad name, such as egoism, selfishness, calculation, political economy, etc.: the only sentiment which they will admit in theory is, that the man who has, ought to be ready at all times to give away to him who has not; while the latter is encouraged to expect and require such gratuitous donation.

CHAPTER XII.

EUBŒA.—CYCLADES.

AMONG the Ionic portion of Hellas are to be reckoned (besides Athens) Eubœa, and the numerous group of islands included between the southernmost Eubœan promontory, the eastern coast of Peloponnesus and the north-western coast of Krete. Of these islands some are to be considered as outlying prolongations, in a south-easterly direction, of the mountain-system of Attica; others, of that of Eubœa; while a certain number of them lie apart from either system, and seem referable to a volcanic origin. To the first class belong Keos, Kythnus, Seriphus, Pholegandrus, Sikinus, Gyarus, Syra,

Paros, and Antiparos; to the second class, Andros, Tenos, Mykonos, Delos, Naxos, Amorgos; to the third class, Kimolus, Melos, Thera. These islands passed among the ancients by the general names of Cyclades and Sporades; the former denomination being commonly understood to comprise those which immediately surrounded the sacred island of Delos,—the latter being given to those which lay more scattered and apart. But the names are not applied with uniformity or steadiness even in ancient times: at present, the whole group are usually known by the title of Cyclades.

The population of these islands was called Ionic—with the exception of Styra and Karystus in the southern part of Eubœa, and the island of Kythnus, which were peopled by Dryopes, the same tribe as those who have been already remarked in the Argolic peninsula; and with the exception also of Melos and Thera, which were colonies from Sparta.

The island of Eubœa, long and narrow like Krete, and exhibiting a continuous backbone of lofty mountains from north-west to south-east, is separated from Bœotia at one point by a strait so narrow (celebrated in antiquity under the name of the Euripus), that the two were connected by a bridge for a large portion of the historical period of Greece, erected during the later times of the Peloponnesian war by the inhabitants of Chalkis. Its general want of breadth leaves little room for plains. The area of the island consists principally of mountain, rock, dell, and ravine, suited in many parts for pasture, but rarely convenient for grain-culture or town habitations. Some plains there were, however, of great fertility, especially that of Lelantum, bordering on the sea near Chalkis, and continuing from that city in a southerly direction toward Eretria. Chalkis and Eretria, both situated on the western coast, and both occupying parts of this fertile plain, were the two principal places in the island: the domain of each seems to have extended across the island from sea to sea. Toward the northern end of the island were situated Histiæa, afterward called Oreus—as well as Kerinthus and Dium: Athenæ Diades, Ædepsus, Ægæ, and Orobiæ are also mentioned on the north-western coast over against Lokris. Dystus, Styra, and Karystus are made known to us in the portion of the island south of Eretria—the two latter opposite to the Attic demes Halæ Araphenides and Prasiæ. The wide extent of the island of Eubœa was thus distributed between six or seven cities, the larger and central portion belonging to Chalkis and Eretria. But the extensive mountain lands, applicable only for pastures in the summer—for the most part public lands, let out for pasture to such proprietors as had the means of providing winter sustenance elsewhere for their cattle,—were never visited by any one except the shepherds. They were hardly better known to the citizens resident in Chalkis and Eretria than if they had been situated on the other side of the Ægean.

The towns above enumerated in Eubœa, excepting Athenæ Diades,

all find a place in the Iliad. Of their history we know no particulars until considerably after 776 B.C. They are first introduced to us as Ionic, though in Homer the population are called Abantes. The Greek authors are never at a loss to give us the etymology of a name. While Aristotle tells us that the Abantes were Thracians who had passed over into the island from Abæ in Phokis, Hesiod deduces the name of Eubœa from the cow Io. Hellopia, a district near Histiæa, was said to have been founded by Hellops son of Ion: according to others, Æklus and Kothus, two Athenians, were the founders, the former of Eretria, the latter of Chalkis and Kerinthus: and we are told, that among the demes of Attica, there were two named Histiæa and Eretria, from whence some contended that the appellations of the two Eubœan towns were derived. Though Herodotus represents the population of Styra as Dryopian, there were others who contended that the town had originally been peopled from Marathon and the Tetrapolis of Attica, partly from the deme called Steireis. The principal writers whom Strabo consulted seem to trace the population of Eubœa, by one means or another, to an Attic origin; though there were peculiarities in the Eretrian dialect which gave rise to the supposition that they had been joined by settlers from Elis, or from the Triphylian Makistus.

Our earliest historical intimations represent Chalkis and Eretria as the wealthiest, most powerful, and most enterprising Ionic cities in European Greece—apparently surpassing Athens, and not inferior to Samos or Miletus. Besides the fertility of the plain Lelantum, Chalkis possessed the advantage of copper and iron ore—obtained in immediate proximity both to the city and to the sea—which her citizens smelted and converted into arms and other implements, with a very profitable result. The Chalkidic sword acquired a distinctive renown. In this mineral source of wealth several of the other islands shared: iron ore is found in Keos, Kythnus, and Seriphus, and traces are still evident in the latter island of extensive smelting formerly practiced. Moreover in Siphnus, there were in early times veins of silver and gold, by which the inhabitants were greatly enriched; though their large acquisitions, attested by the magnitude of the tithe which they offered at the Delphian temple, were only of temporary duration, and belong principally to the seventh and sixth centuries before the Christian era. The island of Naxos too was at an early day wealthy and populous. Andros, Tenos, Keos, and several other islands, were at one time reduced to dependence upon Eretria: other islands seem to have been in like manner dependent upon Naxos, which at the time immediately preceding the Ionic revolt possessed a considerable maritime force, and could muster 8,000 heavy-armed citizens—a very large force for any single Grecian city. The military force of Eretria was not much inferior; for in the temple of the Amarynthian Artemis, nearly a mile from the city, to which the Eretrians were in the

habit of marching in solemn procession to celebrate the festival of the goddess, there stood an ancient column setting forth that the procession had been performed by no less than 3,000 hoplites, 600 horsemen, and 60 chariots. The date of this inscription cannot be known, but it can hardly be earlier than the forty-fifth Olympiad, or 600 B.C.—near about the time of the Solonian legislation. Chalkis was still more powerful than Eretria: both were in early times governed by an oligarchy, which among the Chalkidians was called the Hippobotæ or Horsefeeders—proprietors probably of most part of the plain called Lelantum, and employing the adjoining mountains as summer pasture for their herds. The extent of their property is attested by the large number of 4,000 Kleruchs or out-freemen, whom Athens quartered upon their lands, after the victory gained over them when they assisted the expelled Hippias in his efforts to regain the Athenian scepter.

Confining our attention, as we now do, to the first two centuries of Grecian history, or the interval between 776 B.C. and 560 B.C., there are scarce any facts which we can produce to ascertain the condition of these Ionic islands. Two or three circumstances, however, may be named which go to confirm our idea of their early wealth and importance.

1. The Homeric Hymn to Apollo presents to us the island of Delos as the center of a great periodical festival in honor of Apollo, celebrated by all the cities, insular and continental, of the Ionic name. What the date of this hymn is, we have no means of determining. Thucydides quotes it without hesitation as the production of Homer, and doubtless it was in his time universally accepted as such—though modern critics concur in regarding both that and the other hymns as much later than the Iliad and Odyssey. Yet it cannot probably be later than 600 B.C. The description of the Ionic visitors presented to us in this hymn is splendid and imposing. The number of their ships, the display of their finery, the beauty of their women, the athletic exhibitions as well as the matches of song and dance—all these are represented as making an ineffaceable impression on the spectator: "the assembled Ionians look as if they were beyond the reach of old age or death" Such was the magnificence of which Delos was the periodical theater, calling forth the voices and poetical genius not merely of itinerant bards, but also of the Delian maidens in the temple of Apollo, during the century preceding 560 B.C. At that time it was the great central festival of the Ionians in Asia and Europe; frequented by the twelve Ionic cities in and near Asia Minor, as well as by Athens and Chalkis in Europe. It had not yet been superceded by the Ephesia as the exclusive festival of these Asiatics; nor had the Panathenæa of Athens reached the importance which afterward came to belong to them during the plenitude of the Athenian power.

We find both Polykrates of Samos, and Peisistratus of Athens,

taking a warm interest in the sanctity of Delos and the celebrity of her festival. But it was partly the rise of these two great Ionian despots, partly the conquests of the Persians in Asia Minor, which broke up the independence of the numerous petty Ionian cities, during the last half of the sixth century before the Christian era; hence the great festival at Delos gradually declined in importance. Though never wholly intermitted, it was shorn of much of its previous ornament, and especially of that which constituted the first of all ornaments—the crowd of joyous visitors. And Thucydides, when he notices the attempt made by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war, in the height of their naval supremacy, to revive the Delian festival, quotes the Homeric Hymn to Apollo as a certificate of its foregone and long-forgotten splendor. We perceive that even *he* could find no better evidence than this hymn, for Grecian transactions of a century anterior to Peisistratus—and we may therefore judge how imperfectly the history of this period was known to the men who took part in the Peloponnesian war. The hymn is exceedingly precious as an historical document, because it attests to us a transitory glory and extensive association of the Ionic Greeks on both sides of the Ægean Sea, which the conquest of the Lydians first, and of the Persians afterward, overthrew—a time when the hair of the wealthy Athenian was decorated with golden ornaments, and his tunic made of linen, like that of the Milesians and Ephesians, instead of the more sober costume and woolen clothing which he subsequently copied from Sparta and Peloponnesus—a time too when the Ionic name had not yet contracted that stain of effeminacy and cowardice which stood imprinted upon it in the time of Herodotus and Thucidides, and which grew partly out of the subjugation of the Asiatic Ionians by Persia, partly out of the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens. The author of the Homeric hymn, in describing the proud Ionians who thronged in his day to the Delian festival, could hardly have anticipated a time to come when the name *Ionian* would become a reproach, such as the European Greeks, to whom it really belonged were desirous of disclaiming.

2. Another illustrative fact in reference both to the Ionians generally, and to Chalkis and Eretria in particular, during the century anterior to Peisistratus—is to be found in the war between these two cities respecting the fertile plain Lelantum which lay between them. In general, it appears, these two important towns maintained harmonious relations. But there were some occasions of dispute, and one in particular, wherein a formidable war ensued between them, several allies joining with each. It is remarkable that this was the only war known to Thucydides (anterior to the Persian conquest) which had risen above the dignity of a mere quarrel between neighbors; and in which so many different states manifested a disposition to interfere, as to impart to it a semi-Hellenic character. Respecting

the allies of each party on this occasion we know only, that the Milesians lent assistance to Eretria, and the Samians, as well as the Thessalians and the Chalkidic colonies in Thrace, to Chalkis. A column, still visible during the time of Strabo in the temple of the Amarynthian Artemis near Eretria, recorded the covenant entered into mutually by the two belligerants, to abstain from missiles, and to employ nothing but hand-weapons. The Eretrians are said to have been superior in horse, but they were vanquished in the battle; the tomb of Kleomachus of Pharsalus, a distinguished warrior who had perished in the cause of the Chalkidians, was erected in the agora of Chalkis. We know nothing of the date, the duration, or the particulars of this war; but it seems that the Eretrians were worsted, though their city always maintained its dignity as the second state in the island. Chalkis was decidedly the first, and continued to be flourishing, populous, and commercial, long after it had lost its political importance, throughout all the period of Grecian independent history.

3. Of the importance of Chalkis and Eretria, during the seventh and part of the eighth century before the Christian era, we gather other evidences—partly in the numerous colonies founded by them (to which I shall advert in a subsequent chapter)—partly in the prevalence throughout a large portion of Greece, of the Euboic scale of weight and money. What the quantities and proportions of this scale were, has been first shown by M. Boeckh in his "Metrologie." It was of Eastern origin, and the gold collected by Darcius in tribute throughout the vast Persian empire was ordered to be delivered in Euboic talents. Its divisions—the talent equal to 60 minæ, the mina equal to 100 drachmas, the drachma equal to 6 obols—were the same as those of the scale called Æginæan, introduced by Pheidon of Argos. But the six obols of the Euboic drachma contained a weight of silver equal only to five Æginæan obols, so that the Euboic denominations drachma, mina, and talent—were equal only to five-sixths of the same denominations in the Æginæan scale. It was the Euboic scale which prevailed at Athens before the debasement introduced by Solon; which debasement (amounting to about 27 per cent, as has been mentioned in a previous chapter) created a third scale called the Attic, distinct both from the Æginæan and Euboic—standing to the former in the ratio of 3·5, and to the latter in the ratio of 18:25. It seems plain that the Euboic scale was adopted by the Ionians through their intercourse with the Lydians and other Asiatics, and that it became naturalized among their cities under the name of the Euboic, because Chalkis and Eretria were the most actively commercial states in the Ægæan—just as the superior commerce of Ægina, among the Dorian states, had given to the scale introduced by Pheidon of Argos the name of Æginæan. The fact of its being so called indicates a time when these two Eubœan cities surpassed Athens in maritime power and extended commercial relations, and when they stood among the foremost of the Ionic cities throughout Greece. The Euboic scale, after having been debased by Solon in reference to coinage and money, still continued in use at Athens for merchandise. The Attic mercantile mina retained its primitive Euboic weight.

CHAPTER XIII.

ASIATIC IONIANS.

THERE existed at the commencement of historical Greece in 776 B.C., besides the Ionians in Attica and the Cyclades, twelve Ionian cities of note on or near the coast of Asia Minor, besides a few others less important. Enumerated from south to north, they stand—Miletus, Myus, Priene, Samos, Ephesus, Kolophon, Lebedus, Teos, Erythræ, Chios, Klazomenæ, Phokæa.

That these cities, the great ornament of the Ionic name, were founded by emigrants from European Greece, there is no reason to doubt. How or when they were founded, we have no history to tell us: the legend, which has already been set forth in a preceding chapter, gives us a great event called the Ionic migration, referred by chronologists to one special year, 140 years after the Trojan war. This massive grouping belongs to the character of legend. The Æolic and Ionic emigrations, as well as the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus, are each invested with unity and imprinted upon the imagination as the results of a single great impulse. But such is not the character of the historical colonies: when we come to relate the Italian and Sicilian emigrations, it will appear that each colony has its own separate nativity and causes of existence. In the case of the Ionic emigration, this large scale of legendary conception is more than usually conspicuous, since to that event is ascribed the foundation or re-peopling both of the Cyclades and of the Asiatic Ionian cities.

Euripides treats Ion, the son of Kreusa by Apollo, as the planter of these latter cities. But the more current form of the legend assigns that honor to the sons of Kodrus, two of whom are especially named, corresponding to the two greatest of the ten continental Ionic cities; Androklus as founder of Ephesus, Neileus of Miletus. These two towns are both described as founded directly from Athens. The others seem rather to be separate settlements, neither consisting of Athenians, nor emanating from Athens, but adopting the characteristic Ionic festival of the Apaturia and (in part at least) the Ionic tribes—and receiving princes from the Kodrid families at Ephesus or Miletus, as a condition of being admitted into the Pan-Ionic confederate festival. The poet Mimnermus ascribed the foundation of his native city Kolophon to emigrants from Pylus in Peloponnesus, under Andræmon; Teos was settled by Minyæ of Orchomenus,

under Athamas; Klazomenæ by settlers from Kleonæ and Phlius, Phokæa by Phokians, Priene in large portion by Kadmeians from Thebes. And with regard to the powerful islands of Chios and Samos, it does not appear that their native authors—the Chian poet Ion or the Samian poet Asius—ascribed to them a population emanating from Athens. Nor could Pausanias make out from the poems of Ion how it happened that Chios came to form a part of the Ionic federation. Herodotus especially dwells upon the number of Grecian tribes and races who contributed to supply the population of the twelve Ionic cities—Minyæ from Orchomenus, Kadmeians, Dryopians, Phokians, Molossians, Arkadian Pelasgians, Dorians from Epidaurus, and "several other sections" of Greeks. Moreover he particularly singles out the Milesians, as claiming for themselves the truest Ionic blood, and as having started from the Prytaneium at Athens; thus plainly implying his belief that the majority at least of the remaining settlers did not take their departure from the same hearth.

But the most striking information which Herodotus conveys to us is, the difference of language or dialect which marked these twelve cities. Miletus, Myus and Priene, all situated on the soil of the Karians, had one dialect; Ephesus, Kolophon, Lebedus, Teos, Klazomenæ, and Phokæa had a dialect common to all, but distinct from that of the three preceding; Chios and Erythræ exhibited a third dialect, and Samos by itself a fourth. The historian does not content himself with simply noting such quadruple variety of speech; he employs very strong terms to express the degree of dissimilarity. The testimony of Herodotus as to these dialects is of course indisputable.

Instead of one great Ionic emigration, then, the statements above cited conduct us rather to the supposition of many separate and successive settlements, formed by Greeks of different sections, mingling with and modified by pre-existing Lydians and Karians, and subsequently allying themselves with Miletus and Ephesus into the so-called Ionic Amphiktyony. As a condition of this union, they are induced to adopt among their chiefs, princes of the Kodrid gens or family, who are called sons of Kodrus, but who are not for that reason to be supposed necessarily contemporary with Androklus or Neileus.

The chiefs selected by some of the cities are said to have been Lykians, of the heroic family of Glaukus and Bellerophon; there were other cities wherein the Kodrids and the Glaukids were chiefs conjointly. Respecting the dates of these separate settlements, we cannot give any account, for they lie beyond the commencement of authentic history. We see some ground for believing that most of them existed for some time previous to 776 B.C., but at what date the federate solemnity uniting the twelve cities was commenced, we do not know.

The account of Herodotus shows us that these colonies were composed of mixed sections of Greeks—an important circumstance in estimating their character. Such was usually the case more or less in respect to all emigrations. Hence the establishments thus planted contracted at once, generally speaking, both more activity and more instability than was seen among those Greeks who remained at home, among whom the old habitual routine had not been counterworked by any marked change of place or of social relations. For in a new colony it became necessary to alter the classification of the citizens, to range them together in fresh military and civil divisions, and to adopt new characteristic sacrifices and religious ceremonies as bonds of union among all the citizens conjointly. At the first outset of a colony, moreover, there were inevitable difficulties to be surmounted which imposed upon its leading men the necessity of energy and forethought—more especially inregard to maritime affairs, on which not only their connection with the countrymen whom they had left behind, but also their means of establishing advantageous relations with the population of the interior, depended. At the same time, the new arrangements indispensable among the colonists were far from working always harmoniously; dissension and partial secessions were not unfrequent occurrences. And what has been called the mobility of the Ionic race, as compared with the Doric, is to be ascribed in a great measure to this mixture of races and external stimulus arising out of expatriation. For there is no trace of it in Attica anterior to Solon; while on the other hand, the Doric colonies of Korkyra and Syracuse exhibit a population not less excitable than the Ionic towns generally, and much more so than the Ionic colony of Massalia. The remarkable commercial enterprise, which will be seen to characterize Miletus, Samos, and Phokæa, belongs but little to anything connected with the Ionic temperament.

All the Ionic towns, except Klazomenæ and Phokæa, are represented to have been founded on some pre-existing settlements of Karians, Lelegians, Kretans, Lydians, or Pelasgians. In some cases these previous inhabitants were overcome, slain, or expelled; in others they were accepted as fellow-residents, so that the Grecian cities, thus established, acquired a considerable tinge of Asiatic customs and feelings. What is related by Herodotus respecting the first establishment of Neileus and his emigrants at Miletus is in this point of view remarkable. They took out with them no women from Athens (the historian says), but found wives in the Karian women of the place, whose husbands and fathers they overcame and put to death; and the women, thus violently seized, manifested their repugnance by taking a solemn oath among themselves that they would never eat with their new husbands, nor ever call them by their personal names. This same pledge they imposed upon their daughters; but how long the practice lasted we are not informed. We may suspect from the language of the historian that traces of it were visible even in his day,

in the family customs of the Milesians. The population of this greatest of the Ionic towns must thus have been half of Karian breed. It is to be presumed that what is true of Neileus and his companions would be found true also respecting most of the maritime colonies of Greece, and that the vessels which took them out would be scantily provided with women. But on this point, unfortunately, we are left without information.

The worship of Apollo Didymæus, at Branchidæ near Miletus—that of Artemis, near Ephesus—and that of the Apollo Klarius, near Kolophon—seems to have existed among the native Asiatic population before the establishment of either of these three cities. To maintain such pre-existing local rights was not less congenial to the feelings than beneficial to the interests of the Greeks. All the three establishments acquired increased celebrity under Ionic administration, contributing in their turn to the prosperity of the towns to which they were attached. Miletus, Myus, and Priene were situated on or near the productive plain of the river Mæander; while Ephesus was in like manner planted near the mouth of the Kaister, thus immediately communicating with the productive breadth of land separating Mount Tmolus on the north from Mount Messogis on the south, through which that river runs: Kolophon is only a very few miles north of the same river. Possessing the best means of communication with the interior, these three towns seem to have thriven with greater rapidity than the rest; and they, together with the neighboring island of Samos, constituted in early times the strength of the Pan-Ionic Amphiktyony. The situation of the sacred precinct of Poseidon (where this festival was celebrated), on the north side of the promontory of Mykale, near Priene, and between Ephesus and Miletus, seems to show that these towns formed the primitive center to which the other Ionian settlements became gradually aggregated. For it was by no means a centrical site with reference to all the twelve; so that Thales of Miletus—who at a subsequent period recommended a more intimate political union between the twelve Ionic towns, and the establishment of a common government to manage their collective affairs—indicated Teos, and not Priene, as the suitable place for it. Moreover, it seems that the Pan-Ionic festival, though still formally continued, had lost its importance before the time of Thucydides, and had become practically superseded by the festival of the Ephesia, near Ephesus, where the cities of Ionia found a more attractive place of meeting.

An island close adjoining to the coast, or an outlying tongue of land connected with the continent by a narrow isthmus, and presenting some hill sufficient for an acropolis, seem to have been considered the most favorable situations for Grecian colonial settlement. To one or other of these descriptions most of the Ionic cities comform. The city of Miletus at the height of its power had four separate harbors, formed probably by the aid of the island of Lade and one or

two islets which lay close off against it. The Karian or Kretan establishment, which the Ionic colonists found on their arrival and conquered, was situated on an eminence overhanging the sea, and became afterward known by the name of Old Miletus, at a time when the new Ionic town had been extended down to the water-side and rendered maritime. The territory of this important city seems to have comprehended both the southern promontory called Poseidium and the greater part of the northern promontory of Mykale, reaching on both sides of the river Mæander. The inconsiderable town of Myus on the southern bank of the Mæander, an offset seemingly formed by the secession of some Milesian malcontents under a member of the Neleid gens named Kydrelus, maintained for a long time its autonomy, but was at length absorbed into the larger unity of Miletus; its swampy territory having been rendered uninhabitable by a plague of knats. Priene acquired an importance, greater than naturally belonged to it, by its immediate vicinity to the holy Pan-Ionic temple and its function of administering the sacred rites—a dignity which it probably was only permitted to enjoy in consequence of the jealousies of its greater neighbors Miletus, Ephesus, and Samos. The territories of these Grecian cities seem to have been interspersed with Karian villages, probably in the condition of subjects.

It is rare to find a genuine Greek colony established at any distance from the sea; but the two Asiatic towns called Magnesia form exceptions to this position—one situated on the south side of the Mæander, or rather on the river Lethæus, which runs into the Mæander; the other more northerly, adjoining to the Æolic Greeks, on the northern declivity of Mount Sipylus, and near to the plain of the river Hermus. The settlement of both these towns dates before the period of history. The tale which we read affirms them to be settlements from the Magnetes in Thessaly, formed by emigrants who had first passed into Krete, under the orders of the Delphian oracle, and next into Asia, where they are said to have extricated the Ionic and Æolic colonists, then recently arrived, from a position of danger and calamity. By the side of this story, which can neither be verified nor contradicted, it is proper to mention the opinion of Niebuhr, that both these towns of Magnesia are remnants of a primitive Pelasgic population, akin to, but not emigrants from, the Magnetes of Thessaly—Pelasgians whom he supposes to have occupied both the valley of the Hermus and that of the Kaister, anterior to the Æolic and Ionic migrations. In support of this opinion, it may be stated that there were towns bearing the Pelasgic name of Larissa, both near the Hermus and near the Mæander; Menekrates of Elæa considered the Pelasgians as having once occupied most part of that coast; and O. Müller even conceives the Tyrrhenians to have been Pelasgians from Tyrrha, a town in the interior of Lydia south of Tmolus. The point is one upon which we have not sufficient evidence to advance beyond conjecture.

Of the Ionic towns, with which our real knowledge of Asia Minor begins, Miletus was the most powerful. Its celebrity was derived not merely from its own wealth and population, but also from the extraordinary number of its colonies, established principally in the Propontis and Euxine, and amounting, as we are told by some authors, to not less than seventy-five or eighty. Respecting these colonies I shall speak presently, in treating of the general colonial expansion of Greece during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.; at present it is sufficient to notice, that the islands of Ikarus and Lerus, not far from Samos and the Ionic coast generally, were among the places planted with Milesian settlers.

The colonization of Ephesus by Androklus appears to be connected with the Ionic occupation of Samos, so far as the confused statements which we find enable us to discern. Androklus is said to have lingered upon that island for a long time, until the oracle vouchsafed to indicate to him what particular spot to occupy on the continent. At length, the indication being given, he planted his colonists at the fountain of Hypelæon and on a portion of the hill of Koressus, within a short distance of the temple and sanctuary of Artemis; whose immediate inhabitants he respected and received as brethren, while he drove away for the most part the surrounding Lelegians and Lydians. The population of the new town of Ephesus was divided into three tribes,—the pre-existing inhabitants, or Ephesians proper, the Bennians, and the Euonymeis, so named (we are told) from the deme Euonymus in Attica. So much did the power of Androklus increase, that he was enabled to conquer Samos, and to expel from it the prince Leogorus. Of the retiring Samians, a part are said to have gone to Samothrace and to have there established themselves; while another portion acquired possession of Marathesium near Ephesus, on the adjoining continent of Asia Minor, from whence, after a short time, they recovered their island, compelling Androklus to return to Ephesus. It seems, however, that in the compromise and treaty which ensued, they yielded possession of Marathesium to Androklus, and confined themselves to Anæa, a more southerly district farther removed from the Ephesian settlement, and immediately opposite to the island of Samos. Androklus is said to have perished in a battle fought for the defense of Priene, which town he had come to aid against an attack of the Karians. His dead body was brought from the field and buried near the gates of Ephesus, where the tomb was yet shown during the days of Pausanias. But a sedition broke out against his sons after him, and the malcontents strengthened their party by inviting reinforcements from Teos and Karina. The struggle which ensued terminated in the discontinuance of the kingly race and the establishment of a republican government—the descendants of Androklus being allowed to retain both considerable honorary privileges and the hereditary priesthood of the Eleusinian Demeter. The newly-received inhabitants were enrolled in two new tribes,

making in all five tribes, which appear to have existed throughout the historical times at Ephesus. It appears, too, that a certain number of fugitive proprietors from Samos found admission among the Ephesians and received the freedom of the city; and the part of the city in which they resided acquired the name of Samorna or Smyrna, by which name it was still known in the time of the satirical poet Hipponax, about 530 B.C.

Such are the stories which we find respecting the infancy of the Ionic Ephesus. The fact of its increase and of its considerable acquisitions of territory, at the expense of the neighboring Lydians, is at least indisputable. It does not appear to have been ever very powerful or enterprising at sea. Few maritime colonies owed their origin to its citizens. But its situation near the mouth and the fertile plain of the Kaister was favorable both to the multiplication of its inland dependencies and to its trade with the interior. A despot named Pythagoras is said to have subverted by stratagem the previous government of the town, at some period before Cyrus, and to have exercised power for a certain time with great cruelty. It is worthy of remark, that we find no trace of the existence of the four Ionic tribes at Ephesus; and this, when coupled with the fact that neither Ephesus nor Kolophon solemnized the peculiar Ionic festival of the Apaturia, is one among other indications that the Ephesian population had little community of race with Athens, though the Œkist may have been of heroic Athenian family. Guhl attempts to show, on mistaken grounds, that the Greek settlers at Ephesus were mostly of Arkadian origin.

Kolophon—about fifteen miles north of Ephesus, and divided from the territory of the latter by the precipitous mountain range called Gallesium—though a member of the Pan-Ionic Amphiktyony, seems to have had no Ionic origin. It recognized neither an Athenian Œkist nor Athenian inhabitans. The Kolophonian poet Mimnermus tells us that the Œkist of the place was the Pylian Andræmon, and that the settlers were Pylians from Peloponnesus. "We quitted (he says) Pylus, the city of Neleus, and passed in our vessels to the much-desired Asia. There, with the insolence of superior force, and employing from the beginning cruel violence, we planted ourselves in the tempting Kolophon." This description of the primitive Kolophonian settlers, given with Homeric simplicity, forcibly illustrates the account given by Herodotus of the proceedings of Neileus at Miletus. The establishment of Andræmon must have been effected by force, and by the dispossession of previous inhabitants, leaving probably their wives and daughters as a prey to the victors. The city of Kolophon seems to have been situated about two miles inland; having a fortified port called Notium, not joined to it by long walls as the Peiræus to Athens, but completely distinct. There were times in which this port served the Kolophonians as a refuge, when their upper town was assailed by Persians from the interior. But the inhabitants of

Notium occasionally manifested inclinations to act as a separate community, and dissensions thus occurred between them and the people in Kolophon—so difficult was it in the Greek mind to keep up a permanent feeling of political amalgamation beyond the circle of the town walls.

It is much to be regretted that nothing beyond a few lines of Mimnermus, and nothing at all of the long poem of Xenophanes (composed seemingly nearly a century after Mimnermus) on the foun dation of Kolophon, has reached us. The statements of Pausanias omit all notice of that violence which the native Kolophonian poet so emphatically signalizes in his ancestors. They are derived more from the temple legends of the adjoining Klarian Apollo, and from morsels of epic poetry referring to that holy place, which connected itself with the worship of Apollo in Krete, at Delphi, and at Thebes. The old Homeric poem, called Thebais, reported that Manto, daughter of the Theban prophet Teiresias, had been presented to Apollo and Delphi as a votive offering by the victorious Epigoni; the god directed her to migrate to Asia, and she thus arrived at Klarus, where she married the Kretan Rhakius. The offspring of this marriage was the celebrated prophet Mopsus, whom the Hesiodic epic described as having gained a victory in prophetic skill over Kalchas; the latter having come to Klarus after the Trojan war in company with Amphilochus, son of Amphiaraus. Such tales evince the early importance of the temple and oracle of Apollo at Klarus, which appears to have been in some sort an emanation from the great sanctuary of Branchidæ near Miletus; for we are told that the high priest of Klarus was named by the Milesians. Pausanias states that Mopsus expelled the indigenous Karians, and established the city of Kolophon; and the Ionic settlers under Promethus and Damasichthon, sons of Kodrus, were admitted amicably as additional inhabitants: a story probably emanating from that of the Kolophonian townsmen in the time of Mimnermus. It seems evident that not only the Apollinic sanctuary at Klarus, but also the analogous establishments on the south of Asia Minor at Phaselis, Mallus, etc., had their own foundation legends (apart from those of the various bands of emigrant settlers), in which they connected themselves by the best thread which they could devise with the epic glories of Greece.

Passing along the Ionian coast in a north-westerly direction from Kolophon, we come first to the small but independent Ionic settlement of Lebedus—next, to Teos, which occupies the southern face of a narrow isthmus, Klazomenæ being placed on the northern. This isthmus, a low narrow valley of about six miles across, forms the eastern boundary of a very considerable peninsula, containing the mountainous and woody regions called Mimas and Korykus. Teos is said to have been first founded by Orchomenian Minyæ under Athamas, and to have received afterward by consent various swarms

of settlers, Orchomenians and others, under the Kodrid leaders Apœkus, Nauklus, and Damasus. The valuable Teian inscriptions published in the large collection of Boeckh, while they mention certain names and titles of honor which connect themselves with this Orchomenian origin, reveal to us some particulars respecting the internal distribution of the Teian citizens. The territory of the town was distributed amongst a certain number of towers, to each of which corresponded a symmory or section of the citizens, having its common altar and sacred rites, and often its heroic Eponymus. How many in number the tribes of Teos were, we do not know. The name of the Geleontes, one of the four old Ionic tribes, is preserved in an inscription; but the rest, both as to names and number, are unknown. The symmories or tower-fellowships of Teos seem to be analogous to the phratries of ancient Athens—forming each a factitious kindred, recognizing a common mythical ancestor, and bound together by a communion at once religious and political. The individual name attached to each tower is in some cases Asiatic rather than Hellenic, indicating in Teos the mixture not merely of Ionic and Æolic, but also of Karian or Lydian inhabitants, of which Pausanias speaks. Gerrhæidæ or Cherræidæ, the port on the west side of the town of Teos, had for its eponymous hero Geres the Bœotian, who was said to have accompanied the Kodrids in their settlement.

The worship of Athene Polias at Erythræ may probably be traceable to Athens, and that of the Tyrian Herakles (of which Pausanias recounts a singular legend) would seem to indicate an intermixture of Phœnician inhabitants. But the close neighborhood of Erythræ to the island of Chios, and the marked analogy of dialect which Herodotus attests between them, show that the elements of the population must have been much the same in both. The Chian poet Ion mentioned the establishment of Abantes from Eubœa in his native island, under Amphiklus, intermixed with the pre-existing Karians. Hektor, the fourth descendant from Amphiklus, was said to have incorporated this island in the Pan-Ionic Amphiktyony. It is to Pherekydes that we owe the mention of the name of Egertius, as having conducted a miscellaneous colony into Chios; and it is through Egertius (though Ion, the native poet, does not appear to have noticed him) that this logographer made out the connection between the Chians and the other group of Kodrid settlements. In Erythræ, Knopus, or Kleopus is noted as the Kodrid Œkist, and as having procured for himself, partly by force, partly by consent, the sovereignty of the pre-existing settlement of mixed inhabitants. The Erythræan historian Hippias recounted how Knopus had been treacherously put to death on shipboard, by Ortyges and some other false adherents; who, obtaining some auxiliaries from the Chian king Amphiklus, made themselves masters of Erythræ and established in it an oppressive oligarchy. They maintained the government, with a temper at once licentious and cruel, for some time, admitting none

but a chosen few of the population within the walls of the town; until at length Hippotes, the brother of Knopus, arriving from without at the head of some troops, found sufficient support from the discontents of the Erythræans to enable him to overthrow the tyranny. Overpowered in the midst of a public festival, Ortyges and his companions were put to death with cruel tortures. The like tortures were inflicted upon their innocent wives and children—a degree of cruelty which would at no time have found place amidst a community of European Greeks: even in the murderous party dissensions of Korkyra during the Peloponnesian war, death was not aggravated by preliminary tortures. Aristotle mentions the oligarchy of the Basilids as having existed in Erythræ, and as having been overthrown by a democratical revolution, although prudently managed To what period this is to be referred we do not know.

Klazomenæ is said to have been founded by a wandering party, either of Ionians or of inhabitants from Kleonæ and Phlius, under Parphorus or Paralus; and Phokæa by a band of Phokians under Philogones and Damon. This last-mentioned town was built at the end of a peninsula which formed part of the territory of the Æolic Kyme: the Kymæans were induced to cede it amicably, and to permit the building of the new town. The Phokians asked and obtained permission to enroll themselves in the Pan-Ionic Amphiktyony; but the permission is said to have been granted only on condition that they should adopt members of the Kodrid family as their Œkists: and they accordingly invited from Erythræ and Teos three chiefs belonging to that family or gens—Deœtes, Periklus, and Abartus.

Smyrna, originally an Æolic colony, established from Kyme, fell subsequently into the hands of the Ionians of Kolophon. A party of exiles from the latter city, expelled during an intestine dispute, were admitted by the Smyrnæans into their city—a favor which they repaid by shutting the gates and seizing the place for themselves, at a moment when the Smyrnæans had gone forth in a body to celebrate a religious festival. The other Æolic towns sent auxiliaries for the purpose of re-establishing their dispossessed brethren; but they were compelled to submit to an accommodation whereby the Ionians retained possession of the town, restoring to the prior inhabitants all their movables. These exiles were distributed as citizens among the other Æolic cities.

Smyrna after this became wholly Ionian; and the inhabitants in later times, if we may judge by Aristeides the rhetor, appear to have forgotten the Æolic origin of their town, though the fact is attested by Herodotus and by Mimnermus. At what time the change took place we do not know, but Smyrna appears to have become Ionian before the celebration of the twenty-third Olympiad (B. C. 668), when Onomastus the Smyrnæan gained the prize. Nor have we information as to the period at which the city was received as a member into the Pan-Ionic Amphiktyony; for the assertion of Vitruvius is obviously inadmissible, that it was admitted at the instance of Attalus king of Pergamus, in place of a previous town called Melite, excluded by the rest for misbehavior. As little can we credit the statement of Strabo, that the city of Smyrna was destroyed by the Lydian kings, and that the inhabitants were compelled to live in dispersed villages until its restoration by Antigonus. A fragment of Pindar, which speaks of "the elegant city of the Smyrnæans," indicates that it must have existed in his time. The town of Eræ, near Lebedus, though seemingly autonomous, was not among the contributors to the Pan-Ionion; Myonnesus seems to have been a dependency of Teos, as Pygela and Marathesium were of Ephesus. Notium, after its re-colonization by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war, seems to have remained separate from and independent of Kolophon: at least the two are noticed by Skylax as distinct towns.

CHAPTER XIV.

ÆOLIC GREEKS IN ASIA.

On the coast of Asia Minor to the north of the twelve Ionic confederated cities, were situated the twelve Æolic cities, apparently united in a similar manner. Besides Smyrna, the fate of which has already been described, the eleven others were—Temnos, Larissa, Neon-Teichos, Kyme, Ægæ, Myrina, Gryneium, Killa, Notium, Ægiroessa, Pitane. These twelve are especially noted by Herodotus, as the twelve ancient continental Æolic cities, and distinguished on the one hand from the insular Æolic Greeks, in Lesbos, Tenedos, and Hekatonnesoi—and on the other hand from the Æolic establishments in and about Mount Ida, which seem to have been subsequently formed and derived from Lesbos and Kyme.

Of these twelve Æolic towns, eleven were situated very near together, clustered round the Elæitic gulf: their territories, all of moderate extent, seem also to have been conterminous with each other. Smyrna, the twelfth, was situated to the south of Mount Sipylus, and at greater distance from the remainder—one reason why it was so soon lost to its primitive inhabitants. These towns occupied chiefly a narrow but fertile strip of territory lying between the base of the woody mountain-range called Sardene and the sea. Gryneium, like Kolophon and Miletus, possessed a venerated sanctuary of Apollo, of older date than the Æolic immigration. Larissa, Temnos, and Ægæ were at some little distance from the sea; the first at a short distance north of the Hermus, by which its territory was watered and occasionally inundated, so as to render embankments necessary; the last two upon rocky mountain-sites, so inaccessible to attack, that the inhabitants were enabled, even during the height of the Persian power,

to maintain constantly a substantial independence. Elæa, situated at the mouth of the river Kaikus, became in later times the port of the strong and flourishing city of Pergamus; while Pitana, the northernmost of the twelve, was placed between the mouth of the Kaikus and the lofty promontory of Kane, which closes in the Elæitic gulf to the northward. A small town Kanæ close to that promontory is said to have once existed.

It has already been stated that the legend ascribes the origin of these colonies to a certain special event called the Æolic emigration, of which chronologers profess to know the precise date, telling us how many years it happened after the Trojan war, considerably before the Ionic emigration. That the Æolic as well as the Ionic inhabitants of Asia were emigrants from Greece, we may reasonably believe, but as to the time or circumstances of their emigration we can pretend to no certain knowledge. The name of the town Larissa, and perhaps that of Magnesia on Mount Sipylus (according to what has been observed in the preceding chapter), has given rise to the supposition that the anterior inhabitants were Pelasgians, who, having once occupied the fertile banks of the Hermus, as well as those of the Kaister near Ephesus, employed their industry in the work of embankment. Kyme was the earliest as well as the most powerful of the twelve Æolic towns; Neon-Teichos having been originally established by the Kymæans as a fortress for the purpose of capturing the Pelasgic Larissa. Both Kyme and Larissa were designated by the epithet of Phrikonis. By some this was traced to the mountain Phrikium in Lokris; from whence it was alleged that the Æolic emigrants had started to cross the Ægean: by others it seems to have been connected with an eponymous hero Phrikon.

It was probably from Kyme and its sister cities on the Elæitic gulf that Hellenic inhabitants penetrated into the smaller towns in the inland plain of the Kaikus—Pergamus, Halisarna, Gambreion, etc. In the more southerly plain of the Hermus, on the northern declivity of Mount Sipylus, was situated the city of Magnesia, called Magnesia *ad Sipylum* in order to distinguish it from Magnesia on the river Mæander. Both these towns called Magnesia were inland—the one bordering upon the Ionic Greeks, the other upon the Æolic, but seemingly not included in any Amphiktyony either with the one or the other. Each is referred to a separate and early immigration either from the Magnetes in Thessaly or from Krete. Like many other of the early towns, Magnesia ad Sipylum appears to have been originally established higher up on the mountain—in a situation nearer to Smyrna, from which it was separated by the Sipylene range—and to have been subsequently brought down nearer to the plain on the north side as well as to the river Hermus. The original site, Palæ-Magnesia, was still occupied as a dependent township, even during the times of the Attalid and Seleukid kings. A like transfer of situation, from a height difficult of access to some lower and more

convenient position, took place with other towns in and near this region; such as Gambreion and Skepsis, which had their Palæ-Gambreion and Palæ-Skepsis not far distant.

Of these twelve Æolic towns, it appears that all except Kyme were small and unimportant. Thucydides, in recapitulating the dependent allies of Athens at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, does not account them worthy of being enumerated. Nor are we authorized to conclude, because they bear the general name of Æolians, that the inhabitants were all of kindred race, though a large proportion of them are said to have been Bœotians, and the feeling of fraternity between Bœotians and Lesbians was maintained throughout the historical times. One etymology of the name is indeed founded upon the supposition that they were of miscellaneous origin. We do not hear, moreover, of any considerable poets produced by the Æolic continental towns. In this respect Lesbos stood alone—an island said to have been the earliest of all the Æolic settlements, anterior even to Kyme. Six towns were originally established in Lesbos—Mitylene, Methymna, Eresus, Pyrrha, Antissa, and Arisbe: the last-mentioned town was subsequently enslaved and destroyed by the Methymnæans, so that there remained only five towns in all. According to the political subdivision usual in Greece, the island had thus, first six, afterward five, independent governments; of which, however, Mitylene, situated in the south-eastern quarter and facing the promontory of Kane, was by far the first—while Methymna, on the north of the island over against Cape Lekton, was the second. Like so many other Grecian colonies, the original city of Mitylene was founded upon an islet divided from Lesbos by a narrow strait; it was subsequently extended on to Lesbos itself, so that the harbor presented two distinct entrances.

It appears that the native poets and fabulists who professed to deliver the archæology of Lesbos, dwelt less upon the Æolic settlers than upon the various heroes and tribes who were alleged to have had possession of the island anterior to that settlement, from the deluge of Deukalion downward—just as the Chian and Samian poets seem to have dwelt principally upon the ante-Ionic antiquities of their respective islands. After the Pelasgian Xanthus son of Triopas, comes Makar son of Krinakus, the great native hero of the island, supposed by Plehn to be the eponym of an occupying race called the Makares. The Homeric hymn to Apollo brings Makar into connection with the Æolic inhabitants, by calling him son of Æolus; and the native historian Myrsilus also seems to have treated him as an Æolian. To dwell upon such narratives suited the disposition of the Greeks; but when we come to inquire for the history of Lesbos, we find ourselves destitute of any genuine materials not only for the period prior to the Æolic occupation, but also for a long time after it: nor can we pretend to determine at what date that occupation took place. We may reasonably believe it to have occurred

before 776 B.C., and it therefore becomes a part of the earliest manifestation of real Grecian history. Both Kyme, with its eleven sister towns on the continent, and the islands Lesbos and Tenedos, were then Æolic. I have already remarked that the migration of the father of Hesiod the poet, from the Æolic Kyme to Askra in Bœotia, is the earliest authentic fact known to us on contemporary testimony —seemingly between 776 and 700 B.C.

But besides these islands, and the strip of the continent between Kyme and Pitane (which constituted the territory properly called Æolis), there were many other Æolic establishments in the region near Mount Ida, the Troad, and the Hellespont, and even in European Thrace. All those establishments seem to have emanated from Lesbos, Kyme, and Tenedos, but at what time they were formed we have no information. Thirty different towns are said to have been established by these cities, from whence nearly all the region of Mount Ida (meaning by that term the territory west of a line drawn from the town of Adramyttion northward, to Priapos on the Propontis) came to be Æolized. A new Æolis was thus formed, quite distinct from the Æolis near the Elæitic gulf, and severed from it partly by the territory of Atarneus, partly by the portion of Mysia and Lydia, between Atarneus and Adramyttium, including the fertile plain of Thebe. A portion of the lands on this coast seems indeed to have been occupied by Lesbos, but the far larger part of it was never Æolic. Nor was Ephorus accurate when he talked of the whole territory between Kyme and Abydos as known under the name of Æolis.

The inhabitants of Tenedos possessed themselves of the strip of the Troad opposite to their island, northward of Cape Lekton—those of Lesbos founded Assus, Gargara, Lamponia, Antandrus, etc., between Lekton and the north-eastern corner of the Adramyttian gulf—while the Kymæans seem to have established themselves at Kebren and other places in the inland Idæan district. As far as we can make out, this north-western corner (west of a line drawn from Smyrna to the eastern corner of the Propontis) seems to have been occupied, anterior to the Hellenic settlements, by Mysians and Teukrians—who are mentioned together, in such manner as to show that there was no great ethnical difference between them. The elegiac poet Kallinus, in the middle of the seventh century B.C., was the first who mentioned the Teukrians; treating them as immigrants from Krete, though other authors represented them as indigenous, or as having come from Attica. However the fact may stand as to their origin, we may gather that in the time of Kallinus they were still the great occupants of the Troad. Gradually the south and west coasts, as well as the interior of this region, became penetrated by successive colonies of Æolic Greeks, to whom the iron and ship timber of Mount Ida were valuable acquisitions. Thus the small Teukrian townships (for there were no considerable cities) became Æolized;

while on the coast northward of Ida, along the Hellespont and Propontis, Ionic establishments were formed from Miletus and Phokæa, and Milesian colonists were received into the inland town of Skepsis. In the time of Kallinus, the Teukrians seem to have been in possession of Hamaxitus and Kolonæ, with the worship of the Sminthian Apollo, in the south-western region of the Troad: a century and a half afterward, at the time of the Ionic revolt, Herodotus notices the inhabitants of Gergis (occupying a portion of the northern region of Ida in the line eastward from Dardanus and Ophrynion) as "the remnant of the ancient Teukrians." We also find the Mityleneans and Athenians contending by arms about 600–580 B.C. for the possession of Sigeium at the entrance of the Hellespont. Probably the Lesbian settlements on the southern coast of the Troad, lying as they do so much nearer to the island, as well as the Tenedian settlements on the western coast opposite Tenedos, had been formed at some time prior to this epoch. We further read of Æolic inhabitants as possessing Sestos on the European side of the Hellespont. The name Teukrians gradually vanished out of present use, and came to belong only to the legends of the past; preserved either in connection with the worship of the Sminthian Apollo, or by writers such as Hellanikus and Kephalon of Gergis, from whence it passed to the later poets and to the Latin epic. It appears that the native place of Kephalon was a town called Gergis or Gergithes, near Kyme: there was also another place called Gergetha on the river Kaikus, near its sources, and therefore higher up in Mysia. It was from Gergithes near Kyme (according to Strabo), that the place called Gergis in Mount Ida was settled: probably the non-Hellenic inhabitants, both near Kyme and in the region of Ida, were of kindred race, but the settlers who went from Kyme to Gergis in Ida were doubtless Greeks, and contributed in this manner to the conversion of that place from a Teukrian to an Hellenic settlement. In one of those violent dislocations of inhabitants, which were so frequent afterward among the successors of Alexander in Asia Minor, the Teukro-Hellenic population of the Idæan Gergis is said to have been carried away by Attalus of Pergamus, in order to people the village of Gergetha near the river Kaikus.

We must regard the Æolic Greeks as occupying not only their twelve cities on the continent round the Elæitic Gulf and the neighboring islands, of which the chief were Lesbos and Tenedos—but also as gradually penetrating and Hellenizing the Idæan region and the Troad. This last process belongs probably to a period subsequent to 776 B.C., but Kyme and Lesbos doubtless count as Æolic from an earlier period.

Of Mitylene, the chief city of Lesbos, we hear some facts between the fortieth and fiftieth Olympiad (620–580 B.C.), which unfortunately reach us only in a faint echo. That city then numbered as its own the distinguished names of Pittakus, Sappho, and Alkæus. Like

many other Grecian communities of that time, it suffered much from intestine commotion, and experienced more than one violent revolution. The old oligarchy called the Penthilids (seemingly a gens with heroic origin), rendered themselves intolerably obnoxious by misrule of the most reckless character; their brutal use of the bludgeon in the public streets was avenged by Megakles and his friends, who slew them and put down their government. About the forty-second Olympiad (612 B.C.) we hear of Melanchrus, as despot of Mitylene, who was slain by the conspiracy of Pittakus, Kikis, and Antimenidas—the last two being brothers of Alkæus the poet. Other despots, Myrsilus, Megalagyrus, and the Kleanaktidæ, whom we know only by name, and who appear to have been immortalized chiefly by the bitter stanzas of Alkæus, acquired afterward the sovereignty of Mitylene. Among all the citizens of the town, however, the most fortunate, and the most deserving, was Pittakus, the son of Hyrrhadus—a champion trusted by his countrymen alike in foreign war and in intestine broils.

The foreign war in which the Mityleneans were engaged and in which Pittakus commanded them, was against the Athenians on the continental coast opposite to Lesbos, in the Troad near Sigeium. The Mityleneans had already established various settlements along the Troad, the northernmost of which was Achilleium. They laid claim to the possession of the whole line of coast, and when Athens (about the forty-third Olympiad, as it is said) attempted to plant a settlement at Sigeium, they resisted the establishment by force. At the head of the Mitylenean troops, Pittakus engaged in single combat with the Athenian commander Phrynon, and had the good fortune to kill him. The general struggle was, however, carried on with no very decisive result. On one memorable occasion the Mityleneans fled; and Alkæus the poet, serving as an hoplite in their ranks, commemorated in one of his odes both his flight and the humiliating loss of his shield, which the victorious Athenians suspended as a trophy in the temple of Athene at Sigeium. His predecessor Archilochus, and his imitator Horace, have both been frank enough to confess a similar misfortune, which Tyrtæus perhaps would not have endured to survive. It was at length agreed by Mitylene and Athens to refer the dispute to Periander of Corinth. While the Mityleneans laid claim to the whole line of coast, the Athenians alleged that inasmuch as a contingent from Athens had served in the host of Agamemnon against Troy, their descendants had as good a right as any other Greeks to share in the conquered ground. It appears that Periander felt unwilling to decide this delicate question of legendary law. He directed that each party should retain what they possessed; a verdict still remembered and appealed to even in the time of Aristotle, by the inhabitants of Tenedos against those of Sigeium.

Though Pittakus and Alkæus were both found in the same line of hoplites against the Athenians at Sigeium, yet in the domestic politics

of their native city, their bearing was that of bitter enemies. Alkæus and Antimenidas, his brother, were worsted in this party-feud, and banished: but even as exiles they were strong enough seriously to alarm and afflict their fellow-citizens, while their party at home, and the general dissension within the walls, reduced Mitylene to despair. In this calamitous condition, the Mityleneans had recourse to Pittakus, who—with his great rank in the state (his wife belonged to the old gens of the Penthilids), courage in the field, and reputation for wisdom—inspired greater confidence than any other citizen of his time. He was by universal consent named Æsymnete or dictator for ten years, with unlimited powers: and the appointment proved eminently successful. How effectually he repelled the exiles, and maintained domestic tranquillity, is best shown by the angry effusions of Alkæus; whose songs (unfortunately lost) gave vent to the political hostility of the time in the same manner as the speeches of the Athenian orators two centuries afterward—and who, in his vigorous invectives against Pittakus, did not spare even the coarsest nicknames, founded on alleged personal deformities. Respecting the proceedings of this eminent dictator, the contemporary and reported friend of Solon, we know only in a general way, that he succeeded in re-establishing security and peace, and that at the end of his term he voluntarily laid down his power—affording presumption not only of probity superior to the lures of ambition, but also of that conscious moderation during the period of his dictatorship which left him without fear as a private citizen afterward. He enacted various laws for Mitylene, one of which was sufficiently curious to cause it to be preserved and commented on—for it prescribed double penalties against offenses committed by men in a state of intoxication. But he did not (like Solon at Athens) introduce any constitutional changes, nor provide any new formal securities for public liberty and good government: which illustrates the remark previously made, that Solon in doing this was beyond his age and struck out new lights for his successors—since on the score of personal disinterestedness, Pittakus and he are equally unimpeachable. What was the condition of Mitylene afterward, we have no authority to tell us. Pittakus is said (if the chronological computers of a latter age can be trusted) to have died in the fifty-second Olympiad (B.C. 572–568). Both he and Solon are numbered among the Seven Wise Men of Greece, respecting whom something will be said in a future chapter. The various anecdotes current about him are little better than uncertified exemplifications of a spirit of equal and generous civism: but his songs and his elegiac compositions were familiar to literary Greeks in the age of Plato.

CHAPTER XV.

ASIATIC DORIANS.

THE islands of Rhodes, Kos, Syme, Nisyros, Kasas, and Karpathus are represented in the Homeric Catalogue as furnishing troops to the Grecian armament before Troy. Historical Rhodes, and historical Kos, are occupied by Dorians, the former with its three separate cities of Lindus, Jalysus, and Kameirus. Two other Dorian cities, both on the adjacent continent, are joined with these four as members of an Amphiktyony on the Triopian promontory, or south-western corner of Asia Minor—thus constituting an Hexapolis, including Halikarnassus, Knidus, Kos, Lindus, Jalysus, and Kameirus. Knidus was situated on the Triopian promontory itself; Halikarnassus more to the northward, on the northern coast of the Keramic gulf; neither of the two are named in Homer.

The legendary account of the origin of these Asiatic Dorians has already been given, and we are compelled to accept their Hexapolis as a portion of the earliest Grecian history, of which no previous account can be rendered. The circumstance of Rhodes and Kos being included in the Catalogue of the Iliad leads us to suppose that they were Greek at an earlier period than the Ionic or Æolic settlements. It may be remarked that both the brothers Antiphus and Pheidippus from Kos, and Tlepolemus from Rhodes, are Herakleids,—the only Herakleids who figure in the Iliad: and the deadly combat between Tlepolemus and Sarpedon may perhaps be an heroic copy drawn from real contests, which doubtless often took place between the Rhodians and their neighbors, the Lykians. That Rhodes and Kos were already Dorian at the period of the Homeric Catalogue, I see no reason for doubting. They are not called Dorian in that Catalogue, but we may well suppose that the name Dorian had not at that early period come to be employed as a great distinctive class name, as it was afterward used in contrast with Ionian and Æolian. In relating the history of Pheidon of Argos, I have mentioned various reasons for suspecting that the trade of the Dorians on the eastern coast of the Peloponnesus was considerable at an early period, and there may well have been Doric migrations by sea to Krete and Rhodes, anterior to the time of the Iliad.

Herodotus tells us that the six Dorian towns which had established their Amphiktyony on the Triopian promontory, were careful to admit none of the neighboring Dorians to partake of it. Of these neighboring Dorians, we make out the islands of Astypalæa, and Kalymnæ, Nisyrus, Karpathus, Syme, Telus, Kasus, and Chalkia; also, on the continental coast, Myndus, situated on the same peninsula with Halikarnassus—and Phaselis, on the eastern coast of Lykia toward Pamphylia. The strong coast-rock of Iasus, midway between

Miletus and Halikarnassus, is said to have been originally founded by Argeians, but was compelled in consequence of destructive wars with the Karians to admit fresh settlers and a Neleid Œkist from Miletus. Bargylia and Karyanda seem to have been Karian settlements more or less Hellenized. There probably were other Dorian towns, not specially known to us, upon whom this exclusion from the Triopian solemnities was brought to operate. The six Amphiktyonized cities were in course of time reduced to five, by the exclusion of Halikarnassus: the reason for which (as we are told) was, that a citizen of Halikarnassus, who had gained a tripod as prize, violated the regulation, which required that the tripod should always be consecrated as an offering in the Triopian temple, in order that he might carry it off to decorate his own house. The Dorian Amphiktyony was thus contracted into a Pentapolis. At what time this incident took place we do not know, nor is it perhaps unreasonable to conjecture that the increasing predominance of the Karian element at Halikarnassus had some effect in producing the exclusion, as well as the individual misbehavior of the victor Agasikles.

CHAPTER XVI.

NATIVES OF ASIA MINOR WITH WHOM THE GREEKS BECAME CONNECTED.

FROM the Grecian settlements on the coast of Asia Minor and on the adjacent islands, our attention must now be turned to those non-Hellenic kingdoms and people with whom they there came in contact.

Our information with respect to all of them is unhappily very scanty. And we shall not improve our narrative by taking the catalogue, presented in the Iliad, of allies of Troy, and construing it as if it were a chapter of geography. If any proof were wanting of the unpromising results of such a proceeding, we may find it in the confusion which darkens so much of the work of Strabo—who perpetually turns aside from the actual and ascertainable condition of the countries which he is describing to conjectures on Homeric antiquity, often announced as if they were unquestionable facts. Where the Homeric geography is confirmed by other evidence, we note the fact with satisfaction; where it stands unsupported, or difficult to reconcile with other statements, we cannot venture to reason upon it as in itself a substantial testimony. The author of the Iliad, as he has congregated together a vast body of the different sections of Greeks for the attack of the consecrated hill of Ilium, so he has also summoned all the various inhabitants of Asia Minor to co-operate in its defense. He has planted portions of the Kilikians and Lykians, whose historical

existence is on the southern coast, in the immediate vicinity of the Troad. Those only will complain of this who have accustomed themselves to regard him as an historian or geographer. If we are content to read him only as the first of poets, we shall no more quarrel with him for a geographical misplacement, than with his successor Arktinus for bringing on the battlefield of Ilium the Amazons or the Æthiopians.

The geography of Asia Minor is even now very imperfectly known, and the matters ascertained respecting its ancient divisions and boundaries relate almost entirely either to the later periods of the Persian empire, or to times after the Macedonian and even after the Roman conquest. To state them as they stood in the time of Crœsus, king of Lydia, before the arrival of the conquering Cyrus, is a task in which we find little evidence to sustain us. The great mountain chain of Taurus, which begins from the Chelidonian promontory on the southern coast of Lydia, and strikes north-eastward as far as Armenia, formed the most noted boundary-line during the Roman times. But Herodotus does not once mention it; the river Halys is in his view the most important geographical limit. Northward of Taurus, on the upper portions of the rivers Halys and Sangarius, was situated the spacious and lofty central plain of Asia Minor. To the north, west, and south of this central plain, the region is chiefly mountainous, as it approaches all the three seas, the Euxine, the Ægean, and the Pamphylian—most mountainous in the case of the latter, permitting no rivers of long course. The mountains Kadmus, Messogis, Tmolus, stretch westward toward the Ægean Sea yet leaving extensive spaces of plain and long valleys, so that the Mæander, the Kaister, and the Hermus have each considerable length of course. The north-western part includes the mountainous regions of Ida, Temnus, and the Mysian Olympus, with much admixture of fertile and productive ground. The elevated tracts near the Euxine appear to have been the most wooded—especially Kytorus: the Parthenius, the Sangarius, the Halys, and the Iris, are all considerable streams flowing northward toward that sea. Nevertheless, the plain land interspersed through these numerous elevations was often of the greatest fertility; and as a whole, the peninsula of Asia Minor was considered as highly productive by the ancients, in grain, wine, fruit, cattle, and in many parts, oil; though the cold central plain did not carry the olive.

Along the western shores of this peninsula, where the various bands of Greek emigrants settled, we hear of Pelasgians, Teukrians, Mysians, Bithynians, Phrygians, Lydians or Mæonians, Karians, Lelegians. Farther eastward are Lykians, Pisidians, Kilikians, Phrygians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, Mariandynians, etc. Speaking generally, we may say that the Phrygians, Teukrians, and Mysians appear in the north-western portion, between the river Hermus and the Propontis—the Karians and Lelegians south of the river Mæander,—and the

Lydians in the central region between the two. Pelasgians are found here and there, seemingly both in the valley of the Hermus and in that of the Kaister. Even in the time of Herodotus, there were Pelasgian settlements at Plakia and Skylake on the Propontis, westward of Kyzikus: and O. Müller would trace the Tyrrhenian Pelasgians to Tyrrha, an inland town of Lydia, whence he imagines (though without much probability) the name Tyrrhenian to be derived.

One important fact to remark, in respect to the native population of Asia Minor at the first opening of this history is, that they were not aggregated into great kingdoms or confederations, nor even into any large or populous cities—but distributed into many inconsiderable tribes, so as to present no overwhelming resistance, and threaten no formidable danger, to the successive bodies of Greek emigrants. The only exception to this is, the Lydian monarchy of Sardis, the real strength of which begins with Gyges and the dynasty of the Mermnadæ, about 700 B.C. Though the increasing force of that kingdom ultimately extinguished the independence of the Greeks in Asia, it seems to have no way impeded their development, as it stood when they first arrived and for a long time afterward. Nor were either Karians or Mysians united under any one king, so as to possess facilities for aggression or conquest.

As far as can be made out from our scanty data, it appears that all the nations of Asia Minor west of the river Halys, were, in a large sense, of kindred race with each other, as well as with the Thracians on the European side of the Bosphorus and Hellespont. East of the Halys dwelt the people of Syro-Arabian or Semitic race,—Assyrians, Syrians, and Kappadokians—as well as Kilikians, Pamphylians and Solymi, along its upper course and farther southward to the Pamphylian sea. Westward of the Helys the languages were not Semitic, but belonging to a totally different family—cognate yet distinct one from another, perhaps not mutually intelligible. The Karians, Lydians, and Mysians recognized a certain degree of brotherhood with each other, attested by common religious sacrifices in the temple of Zeus Karios at Mylasa. But it is by no means certain that each of these nations mutually comprehended each other's speech. Herodotus, from whom we derive the knowledge of these common sacrifices, acquaints us at the same time that the Kaunians in the south-western corner of the peninsula had no share in them, though speaking the same language as the Karians. He does not, however, seem to consider identity or difference of language as a test of national affinity.

Along the coast of the Euxine, from the Thracian Bosphorus eastward to the river Halys, dwelt Bithynians or Thynians, Mariandynians, and Paphlagonians—all recognized branches of the widely extended Thracian race. The Bithynians especially, in the north-western portion of this territory, reaching from the Euxine to the Propontis, are often spoken of as Asiatic Thracians—while on the

other hand various tribes among the Thracians of Europe are denominated Thyni or Thynians: so little difference was there in the population on the two sides of the Bosphorus, alike brave, predatory, and sanguinary. The Bithynians of Asia are also sometimes called Bebrykians, under which denomination they extend as far southward as the Gulf of Kios in the Propontis. They here come in contact with Mygdonians, Mysians, and Phrygians. Along the southern coast of the Propontis, between the rivers Rhyndakus and Æsepus, in immediate neighborhood with the powerful Greek colony of Kyzikus, appear the Doliones; next, Pelasgians at Plakia and Skylake; then again, along the coast of the Hellespont near Abydus and Lampsakus, and occupying a portion of the Troad, we find mention made of other Bebrykians. In the interior of the Troad, or the region of Ida, are Teukrians and Mysians. The latter seem to extend southward down to Pergamus and the region of Mount Sipylus, and eastward to the mountainous region called the Mysian Olympus, south of the lake Askanius, near which they join with the Phrygians.

As far as any positive opinion can be formed respecting nations of whom we know so little, it would appear that the Mysians and Phrygians are a sort of connecting link between Lydians and Karians on one side, and Thracians (Europeans as well as Asiatic) on the other—a remote ethnical affinity pervading the whole. Ancient migrations are spoken of in both directions across the Hellespont and the Thracian Bosphorus. It was the opinion of some that Phrygians, Mysians, and Thracians had immigrated into Asia from Europe; and the Lydian historian Xanthus referred the arrival of the Phrygians to an epoch subsequent to the Trojan war. On the other hand, Herodotus speaks of a vast body of Teukrians and Mysians, who, before the Trojan war, had crossed the strait from Asia into Europe, expelled many of the European Thracians from their seats, crossed the Strymon and the Macedonian rivers, and penetrated as far southward as the river Peneus in Thessaly—as far westward as the Ionic gulf. This Teukro-Mysian migration (he tells us) brought about two consequences: first, the establishment near the river Strymon of the Pæonians, who called themselves Teukrian colonists; next, the crossing into Asia of many of the dispossessed Thracian tribes from the neighborhood of the Strymon into the north-western region of Asia Minor, by which the Bithynian or Asiatic Thracian people was formed. The Phrygians also are supposed by some to have originally occupied an European soil on the borders of Macedonia near the snow-clad Mount Bermion, at which time they were called Briges,—an appellative name in the Lydian language equivalent to freemen or Franks: while the Mysians are said to have come from the north-eastern portions of European Thrace south of the Danube, known under the Roman empire by the name of Mœsia. But with respect to the Mysians there was also another story, according to which they were described as colonists emanating from the Lydians; put forth according to that system of

devoting by solemn vow a tenth of the inhabitants, chosen by lot, to seek settlements elsewhere, which recurs not unfrequently among the stories of early emigrations, as the consequence of distress and famine. And this last opinion was supported by the character of the Mysian language, half Lydian and half Phrygian, of which both the Lydian historian Xanthus, and Menekrates of Elæa, by whom the opinion was announced), must have been very competent judges.

From such tales of early migration both ways across the Hellespont and the Bosphorus, all that we can with any certainty infer is, a certain measure of affinity among the population of Thrace and Asia Minor—especially visible in the case of the Phrygians and Mysians. The name and legends of the Phrygian hero Midas are connected with different towns throughout the extensive region of Asiatic Phrygia—Kelænæ, Pessinus, Ankyra, Gordium—as well as with the neighborhood of Mount Bermion in Macedonia. The adventure whereby Midas got possession of Silenus, mixing wine with the spring of which he drank, was localized at the latter place as well as at the town of Thymbrion, nearly at the eastern extremity of Asiatic Phrygia. The name Mygdonia, and the eponymous hero Mygdon, belong not less to the European territory near the river Axius (afterward a part of Macedonia) than to the Asiatic coast of the eastern Propontis, between Kios and the river Rhyndakus. Otreus and Mygdon are the commanders of the Phrygians in the Iliad; and the river Odryses, which flowed through the territory of the Asiatic Mygdonians into the Rhyndakus, affords another example of homonymy with the Odrysian Thracians in Europe. And as these coincidences of names and legends conduct us to the idea of analogy and affinity between Thracians and Phrygians, so we find Archilochus, the earliest poet remaining to us who mentions them as contemporaries, coupling the two in the same simile. To this early Parian Iambist, the population on the two sides of the Hellespont appears to have presented similarity of feature and customs.

To settle with any accuracy the extent and condition of these Asiatic nations during the early days of Grecian settlement among them is impracticable. The problem was not to be solved even by the ancient geographers, with their superior means of knowledge The early indigenous distribution of the Phrygian population is unknown to us; for even the division into the Greater and Lesser Phrygia belongs to a period at least subsequent to the Persian conquest (like most of the recognized divisions of Asia Minor), and is only misleading if applied to the period earlier than Crœsus. It appears that the name Phrygians like that of Thracians, was a generic designation, and comprehended tribes or separate communities who had also specific names of their own. We trace Phrygians at wide distances: on the western bank of the river Halys—at Kelænæ, in the interior of Asia Minor, on the upper course of the river Mæander—and on the coast of the Propontis near Kios In both of these latter localities

there is a salt lake called Askanius, which is the name both of the leader of the Phrygian allies of Troy and of the country from whence they are said to come, in the Iliad. They thus occupy a territory bounded on the south by the Pisidian mountains—on the west by the Lydians (indicated by a terminal pillar set up by Crœsus at Kydrara) on the east by the river Halys, on the other side of which were Kappadokians or Syrians: on the north by Paphlagonians and Mariandynians. But it seems besides this, that they must have extended farther to the west, so as to occupy a great portion of the region of Mount Ida and the Troad. For Apollodorus considered that both the Doliones and the Bebrykians were included in the great Phrygian name; and even in the ancient poem called "Phoronis" (which can hardly be placed later than 600 B.C.), the Daktyls of Mount Ida, the great discoverers of metallurgy, are expressly named Phrygian. The custom of the Attic tragic poets to call the inhabitants of the Troad Phrygians, does not necessarily imply any translation of inhabitants, but an employment of the general name, as better known to the audience whom they addressed, in preference to the less notorious specific name—just as the inhabitants of Bithynia might be described either as Bithynians or as Asiatic Thracians.

If (as the language of Herodotus and Ephorus would seem to imply) we suppose the Phrygians to be at a considerable distance from the coast and dwelling only in the interior, it will be difficult to explain to ourselves how or where the early Greek colonists came to be so much influenced by them; whereas the supposition that the tribes occupying the Troad and the region of Ida were Phrygians elucidates this point. And the fact is incontestable, that both Phrygians and Lydians did not only modify the religious manifestations of the Asiatic Greeks, and through them of the Grecian world generally—but also rendered important aid toward the first creation of the Grecian musical scale. Of this the denominations of the scale afford a proof.

Three primitive musical modes were employed by the Greek poets, in the earliest times of which later authors could find any account—the Lydian, which was the most acute—the Dorian, which was the most grave—and the Phrygian intermediate between the two; the highest note of the Lydian being one tone higher, that of the Dorian one tone lower, than the highest note of the Phrygian scale. Such were the three modes or scales, each including only a tetrachord, upon which the earliest Greek masters worked: many other scales, both higher and lower, were subsequently added, It thus appears that the earliest Greek music was, in large proportion, borrowed from Phrygia and Lydia. When we consider that in the eighth and seventh centuries before the Christian era, music and poetry conjoined (often also with dancing or rhythmical gesticulation) was the only intellectual manifestation known among the Greeks—and moreover, that in the belief of all the ancient writers, every musical mode had

its own peculiar emotional influences, powerfully modified the temper of hearers, and was intimately connected with the national worship—we shall see that this transmission of the musical modes implies much both of communication and interchange between the Asiatic Greeks and the indigenous population of the continent. Now the fact of communication between the Ionic and the Æolic Greeks, and their eastern neighbors, the Lydians, is easy to comprehend generally, though we have no details as to the way in which it took place. But we do not distinctly see where it was that the Greeks came so much into contact with the Phrygians, except in the region of Ida, the Troad, and the southern coast of the Propontis. To this region belonged those early Phrygian musicians (under the heroic names of Olympus, Hyagnis, Marsyas), from whom the Greeks borrowed. And we may remark that the analogy between Thracians and Phrygians seems partly to hold in respect both to music and to religion; since the old mythe in the Iliad, wherein the Thracian bard Thamyris, rashly contending in song with the Muses, is conquered, blinded, and stripped of his art, seems to be the prototype of the very similar story respecting the contention of Apollo with the Phrygian Marsyas—the cithara against the flute; while the Phrygian Midas is farther characterized as the religious disciple of Thracian Orpheus.

In my previous chapter relating to the legend of Troy, mention has been already made of the early fusion of the Æolic Greeks with the indigenous population of the Troad. It is from hence probably that the Phrygian music with the flute as its instrument—employed in the orgiastic rites and worship of the Great Mother in Mount Ida, in the Mysian Olympus, and other mountain regions of the country, and even in the Greek city of Lampsakus—passed to the Greek composers. Its introduction is coeval with the earliest facts respecting Grecian music, and must have taken place during the first century of the recorded Olympiads. In the Homeric poems we find no allusion to it, but it may probably have contributed to stimulate that development of lyric and elegiac composition which grew up among the post-homeric Æolians and Ionians, to the gradual displacement of the old epic. Another instance of the fusion of Phrygians with Greeks is to be found in the religious ceremonies of Kyzikus, Kius, and Prusa, on the southern and south-eastern coasts of the Propontis. At the first of the three places, the worship of the Great Mother of the Gods was celebrated with much solemnity on the hill of Dindymon, bearing the same name as that mountain in the interior, near Pessinus, from whence Cybele derived her principal surname of Dindymene. The analogy between the Kretan and Phrygian religious practices has been often noticed, and confusion occurs not unfrequently between Mount Ida in Krete and the mountain of the same name in the Troad; while the Teukrians of Gergis in the Troad—who were not yet Hellenized even at the time of the Persian invasion, and who were affirmed by the elegiac poet Kallinus to have immigrated from Krete—

if they were not really Phrygians, differed so little from them as to be called such by the poets.

The Phrygians are celebrated by Herodotus for the abundance both of their flocks and their agricultural produce. The excellent wool for which Miletus was always renowned came in part from the upper valley of the river Mæander, which they inhabited. He contrasts them in this respect with the Lydians, among whom the attributes and capacities of persons dwelling in cities are chiefly brought to our view: much gold and silver, retail trade, indigenous games, unchastity of young women, yet combined with thrift and industry. Phrygian cheese and salt-provisions—Lydian unguents, carpets and colored shoes—acquired notoriety. Both Phrygians and Lydians are noticed by Greek authors subsequent to the establishment of the Persian empire as a people timid, submissive, industrious, and useful as slaves—an attribute not ascribed to the Mysians, who are usually described as brave and hardy mountaineers, difficult to hold in subjection: nor even true respecting the Lydians, during the earlier times anterior to the complete overthrow of Crœsus by Cyrus; for they were then esteemed for their warlike prowess. Nor was the different character of these two Asiatic people yet effaced even in the second century after the Christian era. For the same Mysians, who in the time of Herodotus and Xenophon gave so much trouble to the Persian satraps, are described by the rhetor Aristeides as seizing and plundering his property at Laneion near Hadriani—while on the contrary he mentions the Phrygians as habitually coming from the interior toward the coast regions to do the work of the olive-gathering. During the time of Grecian autonomy and ascendency, in the fifth century B.C., the conception of a Phrygian or a Lydian was associated in the Greek mind with ideas of contempt and servitude, to which unquestionably these Asiatics became fashioned, since it was habitual with them under the Roman empire to sell their own children into slavery—a practice certainly very rare among the Greeks, even when they too had become confunded among the mass of subjects of imperial Rome. But we may fairly assume that this association of contempt with the name of a Phrygian or a Lydian did not prevail during the early period of Grecian Asiatic settlement, or even in the time of Alkman, Mimnermus, or Sappho, down to 600 B.C. We first trace evidence of it in a fragment of Hipponax. It began with the subjection of Asia Minor generally, first under Crœsus and then under Cyrus, and with the sentiment of comparitive pride which grew up afterwards in the minds of European Greeks. The native Phrygian tribes along the Propontis, with whom the Greek colonists came in contact—Bebrykians, Doliones, Mygdonians, etc.—seem to have been agricultural, cattle-breeding, and horse-breeding; yet more vehement and warlike than the Phrygians of the interior, as far at least as can be made out by their legends. The brutal but gigantic Amykus, son of Poseidon, chief of the Bebrykians, with whom Pollux contends in boxing—and his brother Mygdon to whom Herakles is opposed—are samples of a people whom the Greek poets considered ferocious, and not submissive: while the celebrity of the horses of Erichthonius, Laomedon, and Asius of Arisbe, in the Iliad, shows that horse-breeding was a distinguishing attribute of the region of Ida, not less in the mind of Homer than in that of Virgil.

According to the legend of the Phrygian town of Gordium on the river Sangarius, the primitive Phrygian king Gordius was originally a poor husbandman, upon the yoke of whose team, as he one day tilled his field, an eagle perched and posted himself. Astonished at this portent, he consulted the Telmissean augurs to know what it meant, when a maiden of the prophetic breed acquainted him that the kingdom was destined to his family. He espoused her, and the offspring of the marriage was Midas. Sedition afterward breaking out among the Phrygians, they were directed by an oracle, as the only means of tranquillity, to choose for themselves as king the man whom they should first see approaching in a wagon. Gordius and Midas happened to be then coming into the town in their wagon, and the crown was conferred upon them. Their wagon, consecrated in the citadel of Gordium to Zeus Basileus, became celebrated from the insoluble knot whereby the yoke was attached, and from the severance of it afterward by the sword of Alexander the Great. Whosoever could untie the knot, to him the kingdom of Asia was portended, and Alexander was the first whose sword both fulfilled the condition and realized the prophecy.

Of these legendary Phrygian names and anecdotes we can make no use for historical purposes. We know nothing of any Phrygian kings, during the historical times; but Herodotus tells us of a certain Midas son of Gordius, king of Phrygia, who was the first foreign sovereign that ever sent offerings to the Delphian temple, anterior to Gyges of Lydia. This Midas dedicated to the Delphian god the throne on which he was in the habit of sitting to administer justice. Chronologers have referred the incident to a Phrygian king Midas placed by Eusebius in the tenth Olympiad—a supposition which there are no means of verifying. There may have been a real Midas king of Gordium; but that there was ever any great united Phrygian monarchy, we have not the least ground for supposing. The name Gordius son of Midas again appears in the legend of Crœsus and Solon told by Herodotus, as part of the genealogy of the ill-fated prince Adrastus: here, too, it seems to represent a legendary rather than a real person.

Of the Lydians I shall speak in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XVII.

LYDIANS.—MEDES.—CIMMERIANS.—SCYTHIANS.

THE early relations between the Lydians and the Asiatic Greeks, anterior to the reign of Gyges, are not better known to us than those of the Phrygians. Their native music became partly incorporated with the Greek, as the Phrygian music was; to which it was very analogous, both in instruments and in character, though the Lydian mode was considered by the ancients as more effeminate and enervating. The flute was used alike by Phrygians and Lydians, passing from both of them to the Greeks. But the magadis or pectis (a harp with sometimes as many as twenty strings, sounded two together in octave) is said to have been borrowed by the Lesbian Terpander from the Lydian banquets. The flute-players who acquired esteem among the early Asiatic Greeks were often Phrygian or Lydian slaves; and even the poet Alkman, who gained for himself permanent renown among the Greek lyric poets, though not a slave born at Sardis, as is sometimes said, was probably of Lydian extraction.

It has been already mentioned that Homer knows nothing of Lydia or Lydians. He names Mæonians in juxtaposition with Karians, and we are told by Herodotus that the people once called Mæonian received the new appellation of Lydian from Lydus son of Atys. Sardis, whose almost inexpugnable citadel was situated on a precipitous rock on the northern side of the ridge of Tmolus, overhanging the plain of the river Hermus, was the capital of the Lydian kings. It is not named by Homer, though he mentions both Tmolus and the neighboring Gygæan lake: the fortification of it was ascribed to an old Lydian king named Meles, and strange legends were told concerning it. Its possessors were enriched by the neighborhood of the river Paktolus, which flowed down from Mount Tmolus toward the Hermus, bringing considerable quantities of gold in its sands. To this cause historians often ascribed the abundant treasure belonging to Crœsus and his predecessors. But Crœsus possessed, besides, other mines near Pergamus; while another cause of wealth is also to be found in the general industry of the Lydian people, which the circumstances mentioned respecting them seem to attest. They were the first people (according to Herodotus) who ever carried on retail trade, and the first to coin money of gold and silver.

The archæologists of Sardis in the time of Herodotus (a century after the Persian conquest) carried very far back the antiquity of the Lydian monarchy, by means of a series of names which are in great part, if not altogether, divine and heroic. Herodotus gives us first Manes, Atys, and Lydus—next a line of kings beginning with Herakles, twenty-two in number, succeeding each other from father to son and lasting for 505 years. The first of this line of Herakleid kings

was Agron, descended from Herakles in the fourth generation—Herakles, Alkæus, Ninus, Belus, and Agron. The twenty-second prince of this Herakleid family, after an uninterrupted succession of father and son during 505 years, was Kandaules, called by the Greeks Myrsilus the son of Myrsus. With him the dynasty ended, and ended by one of those curious incidents which Herodotus has narrated with his usual dramatic, yet unaffected, emphasis. It was the divine will that Kandaules should be destroyed, and he lost his rational judgment. Having a wife the most beautiful woman in Lydia, his vanity could not be satisfied without exhibiting her naked person to Gyges son of Daskylus, his principal confidant and the commander of his guards. In spite of the vehement repugnance of Gyges, this resolution was executed; but the wife became aware of the inexpiable affront, and took her measures to avenge it. Surrounded by her most faithful domestics, she sent for Gyges, and addressed him,—"Two ways are now open to thee, Gyges: take which thou wilt. Either kill Kandaules, wed me, and acquire the kingdom of Lydia—or else thou must at once perish. For thou hast seen forbidden things, and either thou, or the man who contrived it for thee, must die." Gyges in vain entreated to be spared so terrible an alternative: he was driven to the option, and he chose that which promised safety to himself. The queen, planting him in ambush behind the bed-chamber door, in the very spot where Kandaules had placed him as a spectator, armed him with a dagger, which he plunged into the heart of the sleeping king.

Thus ended the dynasty of the Herakleids; yet there was a large party in Lydia who indignantly resented the death of Kandaules, and took arms against Gyges. A civil war ensued, which both parties at length consented to terminate by reference to the Delphian oracle. The decision of that holy referee being given in favor of Gyges, the kingdom of Lydia passed to his dynasty, called the Mermnadæ. But the oracle accompanied its verdict with an intimation that in the person of the fifth descendant of Gyges, the murder of Kandaules would be avenged—a warning of which (Herodotus innocently remarks) no one took any notice, until it was actually fulfilled in the person of Crœsus.

In this curious legend, which marks the commencement of the dynasty called Mermnadæ, the historical kings of Lydia—we cannot determine how much, or whether any part, is historical. Gyges was probably a real man, contemporary with the youth of the poet Archilochus; but the name Gyges is also an heroic name in Lydian archæology. He is the eponymus of the Gygæan lake near Sardis. Of the many legends told respecting him, Plato has preserved one, according to which, Gyges is a mere herdsman of the king of Lydia: after a terrible storm and earthquake he sees near him a chasm in the earth, into which he descends and finds a vast horse of brass, hollow and partly open, wherein there lies a gigantic corpse with a golden ring.

This ring he carries away, and discovers unexpectedly that it possesses the miraculous property of rendering him invisible at pleasure. Being sent on a message to the king he makes the magic ring available to his ambition. He first possesses himself of the person of the queen, then with her aid assassinates the king, and finally seizes the scepter.

The legend thus recounted by Plato, thoroughly Oriental in character, has this one point in common with the Herodotean, that the adventurer Gyges, through the favor and help of the queen, destroys the king and becomes his successor. Feminine preference and patronage are the cause of his prosperity. Klausen has shown that this "aphrodisiac influence" runs in a peculiar manner through many of the Asiatic legends, both divine and heroic. The Phrygian Midas or Gordius (as before recounted) acquires the throne by marriage with a divinely privileged maiden: the favor, shown by Aphrodite to Anchises, confers upon the Æneadæ sovereignty in the Troad: moreover the great Phrygian and Lydian goddess Rhea or Cybele has always her favored and self-devoting youth Atys, who is worshiped along with her, and who serves as a sort of mediator between her and mankind. The feminine element appears predominant in Asiatic mythes. Midas, Sardanapalus, Sandon, and even Herakles, are described as clothed in women's attire and working at the loom; while on the other hand the Amazons and Semiramis achieve great conquests.

Admitting, therefore, the historical character of the Lydian kings called Mermnadæ, beginning with Gyges about 715–690 B.C., and ending with Crœsus, we find nothing but legend to explain to us the circumstances which led to their accession. Still less can we make out anything respecting the preceding kings, or determine whether Lydia was ever in former times connected with or dependent upon the kingdom of Assyria, as Ktesias affirmed. Nor can we certify the reality or dates of the old Lydian kings named by the native historian Xanthus—Alkimus, Kambles, Adramytes. One piece of valuable information, however, we acquire from Xanthus—the distribution of Lydia into two parts, Lydia proper and Torrhebia, which he traces to the two sons of Atys—Lydus and Torrhebus; he states that the dialect of the Lydians and Torrhebians differed much in the same degree as that of Doric and Ionic Greeks. Torrhebia appears to have included the valley of the Kaister, south of Tmolus, and near to the frontiers of Karia.

With Gyges, the Mermnad king, commences the series of aggressions from Sardis upon the Asiatic Greeks, which ultimately ended in their subjection. Gyges invaded the territories of Miletus and Smyrna, and even took the city (probably not the citadel, of Kolophon. Though he thus, however, made war upon the Asiatic Greeks, he was munificent in his donations to the Grecian god of Delphi. His numerous as well as costly offerings were seen in the temple by Herodotus. Elegiac compositions of the poet Mimnermus celebrated

the valor of the Smyrnæans in their battle with Gyges. We hear also, in a story which bears the impress of Lydian more than of Grecian fancy, of a beautiful youth of Smyrna named Magnes, to whom Gyges was attached, and who incurred the displeasure of his countrymen for having composed verses in celebration of the victories of the Lydians over the Amazons. To avenge the ill-treatment received by this youth, Gyges attacked the territory of Magnesia (probably Magnesia on Sipylus) and after a considerable struggle took the city.

How far the Lydian kingdom of Sardis extended during the reign of Gyges we have no means of ascertaining. Strabo alleges that the whole Troad belonged to him, and that the Greek settlement of Abydus on the Hellespont was established by the Milesians only under his auspices. On what authority this statement is made, we are not told, and it appears doubtful, especially as so many legendary anecdotes are connected with the name of Gyges. This prince reigned (according to Herodotus) thirty-eight years, and was succeeded by his son Ardys, who reigned forty-nine years (about B.C. 678–629). We learn that he attacked the Milesians, and took the Ionic city of Priene. Yet this possession cannot have been maintained, for the city appears afterward as autonomous. His long reign, however, was signalized by two events, both of considerable moment to the Asiatic Greeks; the invasion of the Cimmerians—and the first approach to collision (at least the first of which we have any historical knowledge) between the inhabitants of Lydia and those of Upper Asia under the Median kings.

It is affirmed by all authors that the Medes were originally numbered among the subjects of the great Assyrian empire, of which Nineveh (or Ninos, as the Greeks call it) was the chief town, and Babylon one of the principal portions. That the population and power of these two great cities (as well as of several others which the Ten Thousand Greeks in their march found ruined and deserted in those same regions) is of high antiquity, there is no room for doubting. But it is noway incumbent upon a historian of Greece to entangle himself in the mazes of Assyrian chronology, or to weigh the degree of credit to which the conflicting statements of Herodotus, Ktesias, Berosus, Abydenus, etc., are entitled. With the Assyrian empire—which lasted, according to Herodotus, 520 years, according to Ktesias, 1360 years—the Greeks have no ascertainable connection. The city of Nineveh appears to have been taken by the Medes a little before the year 600 B.C. (insofar as the chronology can be made out), and exercised no influence upon Grecian affairs. Those inhabitants of Upper Asia, with whom the early Greeks had relation, were the Medes, and the Assyrians or Chaldeans of Babylon—both originally subject to the Assyrians of Nineveh—both afterward acquiring independence—and both ultimately embodied in the Persian empire. At what time either of them became first independent, we do not know. The astronomical canon, which gives a list of kings of Babylon begin-

ning with what is called the era of Nabonassar, or 747 B.C., does not prove at what epoch these Babylonian chiefs became independent of Nineveh: and the catalogue of Median kings which Herodotus begins with Deiokes, about 709–711 B.C., is commenced by Ktesias more than a century earlier—moreover the names in the two lists are different almost from first to last.

For the historian of Greece, the Medes first begin to acquire importance about 656 B.C., under a king whom Herodotus calls Phraortes, son of Deiokes. Respecting Deiokes himself, Herodotus recounts to us how he came to be first chosen king. The seven tribes of Medes dwelt dispersed in separate villages, without any common authority, and the mischiefs of anarchy were painfully felt among them. Deiokes, having acquired great reputation in his own village as a just man, was invoked gradually by all the adjoining villages to settle their disputes. As soon as his efficiency in this vocation, and the improvement which he brought about, had become felt throughout all the tribes, he artfully threw up his post and retired again into privacy,—upon which the evils of anarchy revived in a manner more intolerable than before. The Medes had now no choice except to elect a king. The friends of Deiokes expatiated so warmly upon his virtues, that he was the person chosen. The first step of the new king was to exact from the people a body of guards selected by himself; next, he commanded them to build the city of Ekbatana, upon a hill surrounded with seven concentric circles of walls, his own palace being at the top and in the innermost. He farther organized the scheme of Median despotism; the king, though his person was constantly secluded in a fortified palace, inviting written communications from all aggrieved persons, and administering to each the decision or the redress which they required—informing himself, moreover, of passing events by means of ubiquitous spies and officials, who seized all wrong-doers and brought them to the palace for condign punishment. Deiokes farther constrained the Medes to abandon their separate abodes and concentrate themselves in Ekbatana, from whence all the powers of government branched out. And the seven distinct fortified circles in the town, coinciding as they do with the number of the Median tribes, were probably conceived by Herodotus as intended each for one distinct tribe—the tribe of Deiokes occupying the innermost along with himself.

Except the successive steps of this well-laid political plan, we hear of no other acts ascribed to Deiokes. He is said to have held the government for fifty-three years, and then dying, was succeeded by his son Phraortes. Of the real history of Deiokes, we cannot be said to know anything. For the interesting narrative of Herodotus, of which the above is an abridgement, presents to us in all its points Grecian society and ideas, not Oriental. It is like the discussion which the historian ascribes to the seven Persian conspirators, previous to the accession of Darius—whether they shall adopt an oligarchical, a democratical, or a monarchical form of government; or it may be compared, perhaps more aptly still, to the Cyropædia of Xenophon, who beautifully and elaborately works out an ideal such as Herodotus exhibits in brief outline. The story of Deiokes describes what may be called the despot's progress, first as candidate and afterward as fully established. Amidst the active political discussion carried on by intelligent Greeks in the days of Herodotus, there were doubtless many stories of the successful arts of ambitious despots, and much remark as to the probable means conducive to their success, of a nature similar to those in the politics of Aristotle: one of these tales Herodotus has employed to decorate the birth and infancy of the Median monarchy. His Deiokes begins like a clever Greek among other Greeks, equal, free, and disorderly. He is athirst for despotism from the beginning, and is forward in manifesting his rectitude and justice, "as beseems a candidate for command;" he passes into a despot by the public vote, and receives what to the Greeks was the great symbol and instrument of such transition, a personal body-guard; he ends by organizing both the machinery and the etiquette of a despotism in the Oriental fashion, like the Cyrus of Xenophon. Only that both these authors maintain the superiority of their Grecian ideal over Oriental reality, by ascribing both to Deiokes and Cyrus a just, systematic and laborious administration, such as their own experience did not present to them in Asia. Probably Herodotus had visited Ekbatana (which he describes and measures like an eye-witness, comparing its circuit to that of Athens), and there heard that Deiokes was the builder of the city, the earliest known Median king, and the first author of those public customs which struck him as peculiar, after a revolt from Assyria: the interval might then be easily filled up, between Median autonomy and Median despotism, by intermediate incidents such as would have accompanied that transition in the longitude of Greece. The features of these inhabitants of Upper Asia, for a thousand years forward from the time at which we are now arrived—under the descendants of Deiokes, of Cyrus, of Arsakes, and of Ardshir—are so unvarying, that we are much assisted in detecting those occasions in which Herodotus or others infuse into their history indigenous Grecian ideas.

Phraortes (658–636 B.C.), having extended the dominion of the Medes over a large portion of Upper Asia, and conquered both the Persians and several other nations, was ultimately defeated and slain in a war against the Assyrians, of Nineveh; who, though deprived of their external dependencies, were yet brave and powerful by themselves. His son Kyaxares (636–595 B.C.) followed up with still greater energy the same plans of conquest, and is said to have been the first who introduced any organization into the military force—before his time, archers, spearmen, and cavalry had been confounded together indiscriminately, until this monarch established separate

divisions for each. He extended the Median dominion to the eastern bank of the Halys, which river afterward, by the conquests of the Lydian king Crœsus, became the boundary between the Lydian and Median empires; and he carried on war for six years with Alyattes, king of Lydia, in consequence of the refusal of the latter to give up a band of Scythian Nomads, who having quitted the territory of Kyaxares in order to escape severities with which they were menaced, had sought refuge as suppliants in Lydia. The war, indecisive as respects success, was brought to its close by a remarkable incident. In the midst of a battle between the Median and Lydian armies there happened a total eclipse of the sun, which occasioned equal alarm to both parties, and induced them immediately to cease hostilities. The Kilikian prince Syennesis, and the Babylonian prince Labynetus interposed their mediation, and effected a reconciliation between Kyaxares and Alyattes, one of the conditions of which was that Alyattes gave his daughter Aryenis in marriage to Astyages, son of Kyaxares. In this manner began the connection between the Lydian and Median kings which afterward proved so ruinous to Crœsus. It is affirmed that the Greek philosopher Thales foretold this eclipse; but we may reasonably consider the supposed prediction as not less apocryphal than some others ascribed to him, and doubt whether at that time any living Greek possessed either knowledge or scientific capacity sufficient for such a calculation. The eclipse itself, and its terrific working upon the minds of the combatants, are facts not to be called in question; though the diversity of opinion among chronologists, respecting the date of it, is astonishing.

It was after this peace with Alyattes, as far as we can make out the series of events in Herodotus, that Kyaxares collected all his forces and laid siege to Nineveh, but was obliged to desist by the unexpected inroad of the Scythians. Nearly at the same time, or somewhat before the time, that Upper Asia was desolated by these formidable Nomads, Asia Minor too was overrun by other Nomads —the Cimmerians—Ardys being then king of Lydia; and the two invasions, both spreading extreme disaster, are presented to us as indirectly connected together in the way of cause and effect.

The name Cimmerians appears in the Odyssey—the fable describes them as dwelling beyond the ocean-stream, immersed in darkness and unblessed by the rays of Helios. Of this people as existent we can render no account, for they had passed away or lost their identity and become subject previous to the commencement of trustworthy authorities; but they seem to have been the chief occupants of the Tauric Chersonesus (Crimea) and of the territory between that peninsula and the river Tyras (Dniester), at the time when the Greeks first commenced their permanent settlements on those coasts in the seventh century B.C. The numerous localities which bore their name, even in the time of Herodotus, after they had ceased to exist as a nation —as well as the tombs of the Cimmerian kings then shown near the

Tyras—sufficiently attest this fact. There is reason to believe that they were (like their conquerors and successors the Scythians) a nomadic people, mare-milkers, moving about with their tents and herds, suitably to the nature of those unbroken steppes which their territory presented, and which offered little except herbage in profusion. Strabo tells us (on what authority we do not know) that they as well as the Treres and other Thracians had desolated Asia Minor more than once before the time of Ardys, and even earlier than Homer.

The Cimmerians thus belong partly to legend, partly to history; but the Scythians formed for several centuries an important section of the Grecian contemporary world. Their name, unnoticed by Homer, occurs for the first time in the Hesiodic poems. When the Homeric Zeus in the *Iliad* turns his eye away from Troy toward Thrace, he sees, besides the Thracians and Mysians, other tribes whose names cannot be made out, but whom the poet knows as milk-eaters and mare-milkers. The same characteristic attributes, coupled with that of "having wagons for their dwelling-houses," appear in Hesiod connected with the name of the Scythians. The navigation of the Greeks into the Euxine gradually became more and more frequent, and during the last half of the seventh century B.C. their first settlements on its coasts were established. The foundation of Byzantium, as well as of the Pontic Herakleia (at a short distance to the east of the Thracian Bosphorus) by the Megarians is assigned to the 30th Olympiad, or 658 B.C. The succession of colonies founded by the enterprise of Milesian citizens on the western coast of the Euxine seems to fall not very long after this date—at least within the following century. Istria, Tyras, and Olbia or Borysthenes, were planted respectively near the mouths of the three great rivers Danube, Dniester, and Bog: Kruni, Odessus, Tomi, Kallatis, and Apollonia, were also planted on the south-western or Thracian coast —northward of the dangerous land of Salmydessus, so frequent in wrecks—yet south of the Danube. According to the turn of Grecian religious faith, the colonists took out with them the worship of the hero Achilles (from whom, perhaps, the œkist and some of the expatriating chiefs professed to be descended), which they established with great solemnity both in the various towns and on the small adjoining islands. The earliest proof which we find of Scythia as a territory familiar to Grecian ideas and feeling, is found in a fragment of the poet Alkæus (about B.C. 600), wherein he addresses Achilles as "sovereign of Scythia." There were, besides, several othor Milesian foundations on or near the Tauric Chersonese (Crimea) which brought the Greeks into conjunction with the Scythians—Herakleia, Chersonesus, and Theodosia, on the southern coast and the south-western corner of the peninsula—Pantikapæum and the Teian colony of Phanagoria (these two on the European and Asiatic sides of the Cimmerian Bosphorus respectively), and Kepi, Hermonassa, etc., not

far from Phanagoria, on the Asiatic coast of the Euxine. Last of all there was, even at the extremity of the Palus Mæotis (Sea of Azof) the Grecian settlement of Tanais. All or most of these seem to have been founded during the course of the sixth century B.C., though the precise dates of most of them cannot be named; probably several of them anterior to the time of the mystic poet Aristeas of Prokonnesus, about 540 B.C. His long voyage from the Palus Mæotis (Sea of Azof) into the interior of Asia as far as the country of the Issedones (described in the poem, now lost, called the Arimaspian verses), implies an habitual intercourse between Scythians and Greeks which could not well have existed without Grecian establishments on the Cimmerian Bosphorus.

Hekatæus of Miletus appears to have given much geographical information respecting the Scythian tribes. But Herodotus, who personally visited the town of Olbia, together with the inland regions adjoining to it, and probably other Grecian settlements in the Euxine (at a time which we may presume to have been about 450–440 B.C.)—and who conversed with both Scythians and Greeks competent to give him information—has left us far more valuable statements respecting the Scythian people, dominion, and manners, as they stood in his day. His conception of the Scythians, as well as that of Hippokrates, is precise and well defined—very different from that of the later authors, who use the word almost indiscriminately to denote all barbarous Nomads. His territory called Scythia is a square area, twenty days' journey or 4,000 stadia (somewhat less than 500 English miles) in each direction—bounded by the Danube (the course of which river he conceives in a direction from N.W. to S.E.), the Euxine, and the Palus Mæotis with the river Tanais, on three sides respectively—and on the fourth or north side by the nations called Agathyrsi, Neuri, Androphagi, and Melanchlæni. However imperfect his idea of the figure of this territory may be found, if we compare it with a good modern map the limits which he gives us are beyond all dispute: from the Lower Danube and the mountains eastward of Transylvania to the Lower Tanais, the whole area was either occupied by or subject to the Scythians. And this name comprised tribes differing materially in habits and civilization. The great mass of the people who bore it, strictly Nomadic in their habits—neither sowing nor planting, but living only on food derived from animals, especially mare's-milk and cheese—moved from place to place, carrying their families in wagons covered with wicker and leather, themselves always on horseback with their flocks and herds, between the Borysthenes and the Palus Mæotis. They hardly even reached so far westward as the Borysthenes, since a river (not easily identified) which Herodotus calls Pantikapes, flowing into the Borysthenes from the eastward, formed their boundary. These Nomads were the genuine Scythians, possessing the marked attributes of the race, and including among their number the Regal Scythians—hordes so much

more populous and more effective in war than the rest, as to maintain undisputed ascendency, and to account all other Scythians no better than their slaves. It was to these that the Scythian kings belonged, by whom the religious and political unity of the name was maintained—each horde having its separate chief and to a certain extent separate worship and customs. But besides these Nomads there were also agricultural Scythians, with fixed abodes, living more or less upon bread, and raising corn for exportation, along the banks of the Borysthenes and the Hypanis. And such had been the influence of the Grecian settlement of Olbia at the mouth of the latter river in creating new tastes and habits, that two tribes on its western banks, the Kallipidæ and the Alazones, had become completely accustomed both to tillage and to vegetable food, and had in other respects so much departed from their Scythian rudenesss as to be called Hellenic-Scythians, many Greeks being seemingly domiciled among them. Northward of the Alazones lay those called the Agricultural Scythians, who sowed corn, not for food but for sale.

Such stationary cultivators were doubtless regarded by the predominant mass of the Scythians as degenerate brethren. Some historians even maintain that they belonged to a foreign race, standing to the Scythians merely in the relation of subjects—an hypothesis contradicted implicitly, if not directly, by the words of Herodotus, and no way necessary in the present case. It is not from them, however, that Herodotus draws his vivid picture of the people, with their inhuman rites and repulsive personal features. It is the purely Nomadic Scythians whom he depicts, the earliest specimens of the Mongolian race (so it seems probable) known to history, and prototypes of the Huns and Bulgarians of later centuries. The Sword, in the literal sense of the word, was their chief god—an iron scimitar solemnly elevated upon a wide and lofty platform, which was supported on masses of fagots piled underneath—to whom sheep, horses, and a portion of their prisoners taken in war, were offered up in sacrifice. Herodotus treats this sword as the image of the god Ares, thus putting an Hellenic interpretation upon that which he describes literally as a barbaric rite. The scalps and the skins of slain enemies, and sometimes the skull formed into a drinking-cup, constituted the decoration of a Scythian warrior. Whoever had not slain an enemy was excluded from participation in the annual festival and bowl of wine prepared by the chief of each separate horde. The ceremonies which took place during the sickness and funeral obsequies of the Scythian kings (who were buried at Gerrhi at the extreme point to which navigation extended up the Borysthenes) partook of the same sanguinary disposition. It was the Scythian practice to put out the eyes of all their slaves. The awkwardness of the Scythian frame, often overloaded with fat, together with extreme dirt of body, and absence of all discriminating feature between one man and another, complete the brutish portrait. Mare's milk (with cheese made from

it) seems to have been their chief luxury, and probably served the same purpose of procuring the intoxicating drink called *kumiss*, as at present among the Bashkirs and the Kalmucks.

If the habits of the Scythians were such as to create in the near observer no other feeling than repugnance, their force at least inspired terror. They appeared in the eyes of Thucydides so numerous and so formidable that he pronounces them irresistible, if they could but unite, by any other nation within his knowledge. Herodotus, too, conceived the same idea of a race among whom every man was a warrior and a practised horse-bowman, and who were placed by their mode of life out of all reach of an enemy's attack. Moreover, Herodotus does not speak meanly of their intelligence, contrasting them in favorable terms with the general stupidity of the other nations bordering on the Euxine. In this respect Thucydides seems to differ from him.

On the east, the Scythians of the time of Herodotus were separated only by the river Tanais from the Sarmatians, who occupied the territory for several days' journey north-east of the Palus Mæotis; on the south they were divided by the Danube from the section of Thracians called Getæ. Both these nations were Nomadic, analogous to the Scythians in habits, military efficiency, and fierceness. Indeed Herodotus and Hippokrates distinctly intimate that the Sarmatians were nothing but a branch of Scythians, speaking a Scythian dialect, and distinguished from their neighbors on the other side of the Tanais chiefly by this peculiarity—that the women among them were warriors hardly less daring and expert than the men. This attribute of Sarmatian women, as a matter of fact, is well attested; though Herodotus has thrown over it an air of suspicion not properly belonging to it, by his explanatory genealogical mythe, deducing the Sarmatians from a mixed breed between the Scythians and the Amazons.

The wide extent of steppe eastward and north-eastward of the Tanais, between the Ural mountains and the Caspian, and beyond the possessions of the Sarmatians, was traversed by Grecian traders, even to a good distance in the direction of the Altai mountains—the rich produce of gold, both in Altai and Ural, being the great temptation. First (according to Herodotus) came the indigenous Nomadic nation called Budini, who dwelt to the northward of the Sarmatians, and among whom were established a colony of Pontic Greeks intermixed with natives and called Geloni; these latter inhabited a spacious town, built entirely of wood. Beyond the Budini eastward dwelt the Thyssagetæ and the Jurkæ, tribes of hunters, and even a body of Scythians who had migrated from the territories of the Regal Scythians. The Issedones were the easternmost people respecting whom any definite information reached the Greeks; beyond them we find nothing but fable—the one-eyed Arimaspians, the gold-guarding Grypes or Griffins, and the bald-headed Argippæi. It is impossible to fix with precision the geography of these different tribes, or to do more than

comprehend approximately their local bearings and relations to each other.

But the best known of all is the situation of the Tauri (perhaps a remnant of the expelled Cimmerians), who dwelt in the southern portion of the Tauric Chersonesus (or Crimea), and who immolated human sacrifices to their native virgin goddess—identified by the Greeks with Artemis, and serving as a basis for the affecting legend of Iphigeneia. The Tauri are distinguished by Herodotus from Scythians, but their manners and state of civilization seem to have been very analogous. It appears also that the powerful and numerous Massagetæ, who dwelt in Asia on the plains eastward of the Caspian and southward of the Issedones, were so analogous to the Scythians as to be reckoned as members of the same race by many of the contemporaries of Herodotus.

This short enumeration of the various tribes near the Euxine and the Caspian, as well as we can make them out, from the seventh to the fifth century B.C., is necessary for the comprehension of that double invasion of Scythians and Cimmerians which laid waste Asia between 630 and 610 B.C. We are not to expect from Herodotus, born a century and a half afterward, any very clear explanations of this event, nor were all his informants unanimous respecting the causes which brought it about. But it is a fact perfectly within the range of historical analogy, that accidental aggregations of number, development of aggressive spirit, or failure in the means of subsistence, among the Nomadic tribes of the Asiatic plains, have brought on the civilized nations of Southern Europe calamitous invasions of which the primary moving cause was remote and unknown. Sometimes a weaker tribe, flying before a stronger, has been in this manner precipitated upon the territory of a richer and less military population, so that an impulse originating in the distant plains of Central Tartary has been propagated until it reached the southern extremity of Europe, through successive intermediate tribes—a phenomenon especially exhibited during the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era, in the declining years of the Roman empire. A pressure so transmitted onward is said to have brought down the Cimmerians and Scythians upon the more southerly regions of Asia. The most ancient story in explanation of this incident seems to have been contained in the epic poem (now lost) called *Arimaspia*, of the mystic Aristeas of Prokonnesus, composed apparently about 540 B.C. This poet, under the inspiration of Apollo, undertook a pilgrimage to visit the sacred Hyperboreans (especial votaries of that god) in their Elysium beyond the Rhipæan mountains; but he did not reach farther than the Issedones. According to him, the movement, whereby the Cimmerians had been expelled from their possessions on the Euxine Sea, began with the Grypes or Griffins in the extreme north—the sacred character of the Hyperboreans beyond was incompatible with aggression or bloodshed. The Grypes invaded the

Arimaspians, who on their part assailed their neighbors the Issedones. These latter moved southward or westward and drove the Scythians across the Tanais; while the Scythians, carried forward by this onset, expelled the Cimmerians from their territories along the Palus Mœotis and the Euxine.

We see thus that Aristeas referred the attack of the Scythians upon the Cimmerians to a distant impulse proceeding in the first instance from the Grypes or Griffins. But Herodotus had heard it explained in another way which he seems to think more correct—the Scythians, originally occupants of Asia, or the regions east of the Caspian, had been driven across the Araxes, in consequence of an unsuccessful war with the Massagetæ, and precipitated upon the Cimmerians in Europe.

When the Scythian host approached, the Cimmerians were not agreed among themselves whether to resist or retire. The majority of the people were dismayed and wished to evacuate the territory, while the kings of the different tribes resolved to fight and perish at home. Those who were animated with such fierce despair, divided themselves along with the kings into two equal bodies, and perished by each other's hands near the river Tyras, where the sepulchers of the kings were yet shown in the time of Herodotus. The mass of the Cimmerians fled and abandoned their country to the Scythians; who, however, not content with possession of the country, followed the fugitives across the Cimmerian Bosphorus from west to east, under the command of their prince Madyes, son of Protothyes. The Cimmerians, coasting along the east of the Euxine Sea and passing to the west of Mount Caucasus, made their way first into Kolchis, and next into Asia Minor, where they established themselves on the peninsula on the northern coast, near the site of the subsequent Grecian city of Sinope. But the Scythian pursuers, mistaking the course taken by the fugitives, followed the more circuitous route east of Mount Caucasus near to the Caspian Sea; which brought them, not into Asia Minor, but into Media. Both Asia Minor and Media became thus exposed nearly at the same time to the ravages of northern Nomads.

These two stories, representing the belief of Herodotus and Aristeas, involve the assumption that the Scythians were comparatively recent immigrants into the territory between the Ister and the Palus Mœotis. But the legends of the Scythians themselves, as well as those of the Pontic Greeks, imply the contrary of this assumption; and describe the Scythians as primitive and indigenous inhabitants of the country. Both legends are so framed as to explain a triple division, which probably may have prevailed, of the Scythian aggregate nationality, traced up to three heroic brothers: both also agree in awarding the predominance to the youngest brother of the three, though, in other respects, the names and incidents of the two are altogether different. The Scythians called themselves Skoloti.

Such material differences, in the various accounts given to Herodotus of the Scythian and Cimmerian invasions of Asia, are by no means wonderful, seeing that nearly two centuries had elapsed between that event and his visit to the Pontus. That the Cimmerians (perhaps the northernmost portion of the great Thracian name and conterminous with the Getæ on the Danube) were the previous tenants of much of the territory between the Ister and the Palus Mœotis, and that they were expelled in the seventh century B C., by the Scythians, we may follow Herodotus in believing. But Niebuhr has shown that there is great intrinsic improbability in his narrative of the march of the Cimmerians into Asia Minor, and in the pursuit of these fugitives by the Scythians. That the latter would pursue at all, when an extensive territory was abandoned to them without resistance, is hardly supposable: that they would pursue and mistake their way, is still more difficult to believe; nor can we overlook the great difficulties of the road and the Caucasian passes, in the route ascribed to the Cimmerians. Niebuhr supposes the latter to have marched into Asia Minor by the western side of the Euxine and across the Thracian Bosphorus, after having been defeated in a decisive battle by the Scythians near the river Tyras, where their last kings fell and were interred. Though this is both an easier route, and more in accordance with the analogy of other occupants expelled from the same territory, we must, in the absence of positive evidence, treat the point as unauthenticated.

The inroad of the Cimmerians into Asia Minor was doubtless connected with their expulsion from the northern coast of the Euxine by the Scythians, but we may well doubt whether it was at all connected (as Herodotus had been told that it was) with the invasion of Media by the Scythians, except as happening near about the same time. The same great evolution of Scythian power, or propulsion by other tribes behind, may have occasioned both events—brought about by different bodies of Scythians, but nearly contemporaneous.

Herodotus tells us two facts respecting the Cimmerian immigrants into Asia Minor. They committed destructive, through transient, ravages in many parts of Paphlagonia, Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia—and they occupied permanently the northern peninsula, whereon the Greek city of Sinope was afterward planted. Had the elegies of the contemporary Ephesian poet Kallinus been preserved, we should have known better how to appreciate these trying times. He strove to keep alive the energy of his countrymen against the formidable invaders. From later authors (who probably had these poems before them) we learn that the Cimmerian host, having occupied the Lydian chief town Sardis (its inaccessible acropolis defied them), poured with their wagons into the fertile valley of the Kaister, took and sacked Magnesia on the Mæander, and even threatened the temple of Artemis at Ephesus. But the goddess so well protected her own town and sanctuary, that Lygdamis, the leader of the Cimmerians, whose name marks him for a Greek, after a season of prosperous

depredation in Lydia and Ionia, conducting his host into the mountainous regions of Kilikia, was there overwhelmed and slain. Though these marauders perished, the Cimmerian settlers in the territory near Sinope remained: and Ambron, the first Milesian œkist who tried to colonize that spot, was slain by them, if we may believe Skymnus. They are not mentioned afterward, but it seems not unreasonable to believe that they appear under the name of the Chalybes, whom Herodotus mentions along that coast between the Mariandynians and Paphlagonians, and whom Mela notices as adjacent to Sinope and Amisus. Other authors place the Chalybes, on severl adifferent points, more to the east, through along the same parallel of latitude—between the Mosynœki and Tibareni—near the river Thermodon—and on the northern boundary of Armenia, near the sources of the Araxes; but Herodotus and Mela recognize Chalybes westward of the river Halys and the Paphlagonians, near to Sinope. These Chalybes were brave mountaineers, though savage in manners; distinguished as producers and workers of the iron which their mountains afforded. In the conceptions of the Greeks, as manifested in a variety of fabulous notices, they are plainly connected with Scythians or Cimmerians; whence it seems probable that this connection was present to the mind of Herodotus in regard to the inland population near Sinope.

Herodotus seems to have conceived only one invasion of Asia by the Cimmerians, during the reign of Ardys in Lydia. Ardys was succeeded by his son Sadyattes, who reigned twelve years; and it was Alyattes, son and successor of Sadyattes (according to Herodotus), who expelled the Cimmerians from Asia. But Strabo seems to speak of several invasions, in which the Treres, a Thracian tribe, were concerned, and which are not clearly discriminated; while Kallisthenês affirmed that Sardis had been taken by the Treres and Lykians. We see only that a large and fair portion of Asia Minor was for much of this seventh century B.C. in possession of these destroying Nomads, who while on the one hand they afflicted the Ionic Greeks, on the other hand indirectly befriended them by retarding the growth of the Lydian monarchy.

The invasion of Upper Asia by the Scythians appears to have been nearly simultaneous with that of Asia Minor by the Cimmerians, but more ruinous and longer protracted. The Median King Kyaxares, called away from the siege of Nineveh to oppose them, was totally defeated; and the Scythians became full masters of the country. They spread themselves over the whole of Upper Asia, as far as Palestine and the borders of Egypt, where Psammetichus the Egyptian king met them and only redeemed his kingdom from invasion by prayers and costly presents. In their return a detachment of them sacked the temple of Aphrodite at Askalon: an act of sacrilege which the goddess avenged both upon the plunderers and their descendants, to the third and fourth generations. Twenty-eight years did their dominion in Upper Asia continue, with intolerable cruelty and oppression;

until at length Kyaxares and the Medes found means to entrap the chiefs into a banquet, and slew them in the hour of intoxication. The Scythian host once expelled, the Medes resumed their empire. Herodotus tells us that these Scythians returned to the Tauric Chersonese, where they found that during their long absence their wives had intermarried with the slaves, while the new offspring which had grown up refused to readmit them. A deep trench had been drawn across a line over which their march lay, and the new-grown youth defended it with bravery, until at length (so the story runs) the returning masters took up their whips instead of arms, and scourged the rebellious slaves into submission.

Little as we know about the particulars of these Cimmerian and Scythian inroads, they deserve notice as the first (at least the first historically known) among the numerous invasions of cultivated Asia and Europe by the Nomads of Tartary. Huns, Avars, Bulgarians, Magyars, Turks, Mongols, Tartars, etc., are found in subsequent centuries repeating the same infliction, and establishing a dominion both more durable, and not less destructive, than the transient scourge of the Scythians during the reign of Kyaxares.

After the expulsion of the Scythians from Asia, the full extent and power of the Median empire was re-established; and Kyaxares was enabled again to besiege Nineveh. He took that great city, and reduced under his dominion all the Assyrians except those who formed the kingdom of Babylon. This conquest was achieved toward the close of his reign, and he bequeathed the Median empire, at the maximum of its grandeur, to his son Astyages, in 595 B.C.

As the dominion of the Scythians in Upper Asia lasted twenty-eight years before they were expelled by Kyaxares, so also the inroads of the Cimmerians through Asia Minor, which had begun during the reign of the Lydian king Ardys, continued through the twelve years of the reign of his son Sadyattes (629–617 B.C.), and were finally terminated by Alyattes, son of the latter. Notwithstanding the Cimmerians, however, Sadyattes was in a condition to prosecute a war against the Grecian city of Miletus, which continued during the last seven years of his reign, and which he bequeathed to his son and successor. Alyattes continued the war for five years longer. So feeble was the sentiment of union among the various Grecian towns on the Asiatic coast, that none of them would lend any aid to Miletus except the Chians, who were under special obligations to Miletus for previous aid in a contest against Erythræ. The Milesians unassisted were no match for a Lydian army in the field, though their great naval strength placed them out of all danger of a blockade; and we must presume that the erection of those mounds of earth against the walls, whereby the Persian Harpagus vanquished the Ionian cities half a century afterward, was then unknown to the Lydians. For twelve successive years the Milesian territory was annually overrun and ravaged, previous to the gathering in of the crop. The

inhabitants, after having been defeated in two ruinous battles, gave up all hope of resisting the devastation; so that the task of the invaders became easy, and the Lydian army pursued their destructive march to the sound of flutes and harps. While ruining the crops and the fruit-trees, Alyattes would not allow the farm-buildings or country-houses to be burnt, in order that the means of production might still be preserved, to be again destroyed during the following season. By such unremitting devastation the Milesians were reduced to distress and famine, in spite of their command of the sea. The fate which afterward overtook them during the reign of Crœsus of becoming tributary subjects to the throne of Sardis, would have begun half a century earlier, had not Alyattes unintentionally committed a profanation against the goddess Athene. Her temple at Assessus accidentally took fire and was consumed, when his soldiers on a windy day were burning the Milesian standing corn. Though no one took notice of this incident at the time, yet Alyattes on his return to Sardis was smitten with prolonged sickness. Unable to obtain relief, he dispatched envoys to seek humble advice from the god at Delphi. But the Pythian priestess refused to furnish any healing suggestions until he should have rebuilt the burnt temple of Athene,—and Periander, at that time despot of Corinth, having learnt the tenor of this reply, transmitted private information of it to Thrasybulus despot of Miletus, with whom he was intimately allied. Presently there arrived at Miletus a herald on the part of Alyattes, proposing a truce for the special purpose of enabling him to rebuild the destroyed temple—the Lydian monarch believing the Milesians to be so poorly furnished with subsistence that they would gladly embrace such temporary relief. But the herald on his arrival found abundance of corn heaped up in the agora, and the citizens engaged in feasting and enjoyment; for Thrasybulus had caused all the provision in the town, both public and private, to be brought out, in order that the herald might see the Milesians in a condition of apparent plenty, and carry the news of it to his master. The stratagem succeeded. Alyattes, under the persuasion that his repeated devastation inflicted upon the Milesians no sensible privations, abandoned his hostile designs, and concluded with them a treaty of amity and alliance. It was his first proceeding to build two temples to Athene, in place of the one which had been destroyed, and he then forthwith recovered from his protracted malady. His gratitude for the cure was testified by the transmission of a large silver bowl, with an iron footstand welded together by the Chian artist Glaukus—the inventor of the art of thus joining together pieces of iron.

Alyattes is said to have carried on other operations against some of the Ionic Greeks: he took Smyrna, but was defeated in an inroad on the territory of Klazomenæ. But on the whole his long reign of fifty-seven years was one of tranquillity to the Grecian

cities on the coast, though we hear of an expedition which he undertook against Karia. He is reported to have been during youth of overweening insolence, but to have acquired afterward a just and improved character. By an Ionian wife he became father of Crœsus, whom even during his lifetime he appointed satrap of the town of Adramyttium and the neighboring plain of Thebe. But he had also other wives and other sons, and one of the latter, Adramytus, is reported as the founder of Adramyttium. How far his dominion in the interior of Asia Minor extended, we do not know, but very probably his long and comparatively inactive reign may have favored the accumulation of those treasures which afterward rendered the wealth of Crœsus so proverbial. His monument, an enormous pyramidal mound upon a stone base, erected near Sardis by the joint efforts of the whole Sardian population, was the most memorable curiosity in Lydia during the time of Herodotus. It was inferior only to the gigantic edifices of Egypt and Babylon.

Crœsus obtained the throne, at the death of his father, by appointment from the latter. But there was a party among the Lydians who had favored the pretensions of his brother Pantaleon. One of the richest chiefs of that party was put to death afterward by the new king, under the cruel torture of a spiked carding machine—his property being confiscated. The aggressive reign of Crœsus, lasting fourteen years (559–545 B.C.), formed a marked contrast to the long quiescence of his father during a reign of fifty-seven years.

Pretenses being easily found for war against the Asiatic Greeks, Crœsus attacked them one after the other. Unfortunately we know neither the particulars of these successive aggressions, nor the previous history of the Ionic cities, so as to be able to explain how it was that the fifth of the Mermnad kings of Sardis met with such unqualified success, in an enterprise which his predecessors had attempted in vain. Miletus alone, with the aid of Chios, had resisted Alyattes and Sadyattes for eleven years—and Crœsus possessed no naval force, any more than his father and grandfather. But on this occasion, not one of the towns can have displayed the like individual energy. In regard to the Milesians, we may perhaps suspect that the period now under consideration was comprised in that long duration of intestine conflict which Herodotus represents (though without defining exactly when) to have crippled the forces of the city for two generations, and which was at length appeased by a memorable decision of some arbitrators invited from Paros. These latter, called in by mutual consent of the exhausted antagonist parties at Miletus, found both the city and her territory in a state of general neglect and ruin. But on surveying the lands, they discovered some which still appear to be tilled with undiminished diligence and skill: to the proprietors of these lands they consigned the government of the town, in the belief that they would manage the public affairs with as much success as their own. Such a state of

intestine weakness would partly explain the easy subjugation of the Milesians by Crœsus; while there was little in the habits of the Ionic cities to present the chance of united efforts against a common enemy. These cities, far from keeping up any effective political confederation, were in a state of habitual jealousy of each other, and not unfrequently in actual war. The common religious festivals—the Deliac festival as well as the Pan-Ionia, and afterward the Ephesia in place of the Delia—seem to have been regularly frequented by all the cities throughout the worst of times. But these assemblies had no direct political function, nor were they permitted to control that sentiment of separate city-autonomy which was paramount in the Greek mind—though their influence was extremely precious in calling forth social sympathies. Apart from the periodical festival, meetings for special emergencies were held at the Pan-Ionic temple; but from such meetings any city, not directly implicated, kept aloof. As in this case, so in others not less critical throughout the historical period—the incapacity of large political combination was the source of constant danger, and ultimately proved the cause of ruin, to the independence of all the Grecian states. Herodotus warmly commends the advice given by Thales to his Ionic countrymen—and given (to use his remarkable expression) "before the ruin of Ionia"—that a common senate, invested with authority over all the twelve cities, should be formed within the walls of Teos, as the most central in position; and that all the other cities should account themselves mere demes of this aggregate commonwealth or Polis. And we cannot doubt that such was the unavailing aspiration of many a patriot of Miletus or Ephesus, even before the final operations of Crœsus were opened against them.

That prince attacked the Greek cities successively, finding or making different pretenses for hostility against each. He began with Ephesus, which is said to have been then governed by a despot of harsh and oppressive character, named Pindarus, whose father Melas had married a daughter of Alyattes, and who was therefore himself nephew of Crœsus. The latter, having in vain invited Pindarus and the Ephesians to surrender the town, brought up his forces and attacked the walls. One of the towers being overthrown, the Ephesians abandoned all hope of defending their town, and sought safety by placing it under the guardianship of Artemis, to whose temple they carried a rope from the walls—a distance little less than seven furlongs. They at the same time sent a message of supplication to Crœsus, who is said to have granted them the preservation of their liberties, out of reverence to the protection of Artemis; exacting at the same time that Pindarus should quit the place. Such is the tale of which we find a confused mention in Ælian and Polyænus. But Herodotus, while he notices the fact of the long rope whereby the Ephesians sought to place themselves in contact with their divine protectress, does not indicate that Crœsus was induced to treat them

more favorably. Ephesus, like all the other Grecian towns on the coast, was brought under subjection and tribute to him. How he dealt with them, and what degree of coercive precaution he employed either to insure subjection or collect tribute, the brevity of the historian does not acquaint us. But they were required partially at least, if not entirely, to raze their fortifications; for on occasion of the danger which supervened a few years afterward from Cyrus, they are found practically unfortified.

Thus completely successful in his aggressions on the continental Asiatic Greeks, Crœsus conceived the idea of assembling a fleet, for the purpose of attacking the islanders of Chios and Samos; but became convinced (as some said, by the sarcastic remark of one of the seven Greek sages, Bias or Pittakus) of the impracticability of the project. He carried his arms, however, with full success, over other parts of the continent of Asia Minor, until he had subdued the whole territory within the river Halys, excepting only the Kilikians and the Lykians. The Lydian empire thus reached the maximum of its power, comprehending, besides the Æolic, Ionic, and Doric Greeks on the coast of Asia Minor, the Phrygians, Mysians, Mariandynians, Chalybes, Paphlagonians, Thynian and Bithynian Thracians, Karians, and Pamphylians. And the treasures amassed by Crœsus at Sardis, derived partly from this great number of tributaries, partly from mines in various places as well as the auriferous sands of the Paktolus, exceeded anything which the Greeks had ever before known.

We learn, from the brief but valuable observations of Herodotus, to appreciate the great importance of these conquests of Crœsus, with reference not merely to the Grecian cities actually subjected, but also indirectly to the whole Grecian world.

"Before the reign of Crœsus (observes the historian) all the Greeks were free: it was by him first that Greeks were subdued into tribute." And he treats this event as the initial phenomenon of the series, out of which grew the hostile relations between the Greeks on one side, and Asia as represented by the Persians on the other, which were uppermost in the minds of himself and his contemporaries.

It was in the case of Crœsus that the Greeks were first called upon to deal with a tolerably large barbaric aggregate under a warlike and enterprising prince, and the result was such as to manifest the inherent weakness of their political system, from its incapacity of large combination. The separated autonomous cities could only maintain their independence either through similar disunion on the part of barbaric adversaries—or by superiority, on their own side, of military organization as well as of geographical position. The situation of Greece proper and of the islands was favorable to the maintenance of such a system: not so the shores of Asia with a wide interior country behind. The Ionic Greeks were at this time different from what they became during the ensuing century. Little inferior in

energy to Athens or to the general body of European Greeks, they could doubtless have maintained their independence, had they cordially combined. But it will be seen hereafter that the Greek colonies—planted as isolated settlements, and indisposed to political union, even when neighbors—all of them fell into dependence so soon as attack from the interior came to be powerfully organized; especially if that organization was conducted by leaders partially improved through contact with the Greeks themselves. Small autonomous cities maintain themselves so long as they have only enemies of the like strength to deal with: but to resist larger aggregates requires such a concurrence of favorable circumstances as can hardly remain long without interruption. And the ultimate subjection of entire Greece, under the kings of Macedon, was only an exemplification on the widest scale of this same principle.

The Lydian monarchy under Crœsus, the largest with which the Greeks had come into contact down to that moment, was very soon absorbed into a still larger—the Persian; of which the Ionic Greeks, after unavailing resistance, became the subjects. The partial sympathy and aid which they obtained from the independent or European Greeks, their western neighbors, followed by the fruitless attempt on the part of the Persian king to add these latter to his empire, gave an entirely new turn to Grecian history and proceedings. First, it necessitated a degree of central action against the Persians which was foreign to Greek political instinct; next, it opened to the noblest and most enterprising section of the Hellenic name—the Athenians—an opportunity of placing themselves at the head of this centralizing tendency: while a concurrence of circumstances, foreign and domestic, imparted to them at the same time that extraordinary and many-sided impulse, combining action with organization, which gave such brilliancy to the period of Herodotus and Thucydides. It is thus that most of the splendid phenomena of Grecian history grew, directly or indirectly, out of the reluctant dependence in which the Asiatic Greeks were held by the inland barbaric powers, beginning with Crœsus.

These few observations will suffice to intimate that a new phase of Grecian history is now on the point of opening. Down to the time of Crœsus, almost everything which is done or suffered by the Grecian cities bears only upon one or other of them separately; the instinct of the Greeks repudiates even the modified form of political centralization, and there are no circumstances in operation to force it upon them. Relation of power and subjection exists between a strong and a weak state, but no tendency to standing political co-ordination. From this time forward, we shall see partial causes at work, tending in this direction, and not without considerable influence; though always at war with the indestructible instinct of the nation, and frequently counteracted by selfishness and misconduct on the part of the leading cities.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PHENICIANS.

Of the Phenicians, Assyrians, and Egyptians, it is necessary for me to speak so far as they acted upon the condition, or occupied the thoughts, of the early Greeks, without undertaking to investigate thoroughly their previous history. Like the Lydians, all three became absorbed into the vast mass of the Persian empire, retaining, however, their social character and peculiarities after having been robbed of their political independence.

The Persians and Medes—portions of the Arian race, and members of what has been classified, in respect of language, as the great Indo-European family—occupied a part of the vast space comprehended between the Indus on the east, and the line of Mount Zagros (running eastward of the Tigris and nearly parallel with that river) on the west. The Phenicians as well as the Assyrians belonged to the Semitic, Aramæan, or Syro-Arabian family, comprising, besides, the Syrians, Jews, Arabians, and in part the Abyssinians. To what established family of the human race the swarthy and curly-haired Egyptians are to be assigned, has been much disputed. We cannot reckon them as members of either of the two preceding, and the most careful inquiries render it probable that their physical type was something purely African, approximating in many points to that of the Negro.

It has already been remarked that the Phenician merchant and trading vessel figures in the Homeric poems as a well-known visitor, and that the variegated robes and golden ornaments fabricated at Sidon are prized among the valuable ornaments belonging to the chiefs. We have reason to conclude generally, that in these early times the Phenicians traversed the Ægean Sea habitually, and even formed settlements for trading and mining purposes upon some of its islands. On Thasos, especially, near the coast of Thrace, traces of their abandoned gold-mines were visible even in the days of Herodotus, indicating both persevering labor and considerable length of occupation. But at the time when the historical era opens, they seem to have been in course of gradual retirement from these regions. Their commerce had taken a different direction. Of this change we can furnish no particulars; but we may easily understand that the increase of the Grecian marine, both warlike and commercial, would render it inconvenient for the Phenicians to encounter such enterprising rivals—piracy (or private war at sea), being then an habitual proceeding, especially with regard to foreigners.

The Phenician towns occupied a narrow strip of the coast of Syria and Palestine, about 120 miles in length—never more, and generally much less, than twenty miles in breadth—between Mount Libanus and the sea. Aradus (on an islet, with Antaradus and Marathus over against it on the mainland) was the northernmost, and Tyre the

southernmost (also upon a little island, with Palæ-Tyrus and a fertile adjacent plain over against it). Between the two were situated Sidon, Berytus, Tripolis, and Byblus, besides some smaller towns attached to one or other of these last-mentioned, and several islands close to the coast occupied in like manner; while the colony of Myriandrus lay farther north, near the borders of Kilikia. Whether Sidon or Tyre was the most ancient, seems not determinable. If it be true, as some authorities affirmed, that Tyre was originally planted from Sidon, the colony must have grown so rapidly as to surpass its metropolis in power and consideration; for it became the chief of all the Phenician towns. Aradus, the next in importance after these two, was founded by exiles from Sidon, and all the rest either by Tyrian or Sidonian settlers. Within this confined territory was concentrated a greater degree of commercial wealth, enterprise, and manufacturing ingenuity, than could be found in any other portion of the contemporary world. Each town was an independent community, having its own surrounding territory and political constitution and its own hereditary prince; though the annals of Tyre display many instances of princes assassinated by men who succeeded them on the throne. Tyre appears to have enjoyed a certain presiding, perhaps controlling, authority over all of them, which was not always willingly submitted to; and examples occur in which the inferior towns, when Tyre was pressed by a foreign enemy, took the opportunity of revolting, or at least stood aloof. The same difficulty of managing satisfactorily the relations between a presiding town and its confederates, which Grecian history manifests, is found also to prevail in Phenicia, and will be hereafter remarked in regard to Carthage; while the same effects are also perceived, of the autonomous city polity, in keeping alive the individual energies and regulated aspirations of the inhabitants. The predominant sentiment of jealous town-isolation is forcibly illustrated by the circumstances of Tripolis, established jointly by Tyre, Sidon, and Aradus. It consisted of three distinct towns, each one furlong apart from the other two, and each with its own separate walls; though probably constituting to a certain extent one political community, and serving as a place of common meeting and deliberation for the entire Phenician name. The outlying promontories of Libanus and Anti-Libanus touched the sea along the Phenician coast, and those mountainous ranges, though rendering a large portion of the very confined area unfit for cultivation of corn, furnished what was perhaps yet more indispensable—abundant supplies of timber for ship-building; while the entire want of all wood in Babylonia, except the date palm, restricted the Assyrians of that territory from maritime traffic on the Persian gulf. It appears, however, that the mountains of Lebanon also afforded shelter to tribes of predatory Arabs, who continually infested both the Phenician territory and the rich neighboring plain of Cœle-Syria.

The splendid temple of that great Phenician god (Melkarth), whom the Greeks called Herakles, was situated in Tyre. The Tyrians affirmed that its establishment had been coeval with the first foundation of the city, 2300 years before the time of Herodotus. This god, the companion and protector of their colonial settlements, and the ancestor of the Phenico-Libyan kings, is found especially at Carthage, Gades, and Thasos. Some supposed that the Phenicians had migrated to their site on the Mediterranean coast from previous abodes near the mouth of the Euphrates, or on islands (named Tylus and Aradus) of the Persian Gulf; while others treated the Mediterranean Phenicians as original, and the others as colonists. Whether such be the fact or not, history knows them in no other portion of Asia earlier than in Phenicia proper.

Though the invincible industry and enterprise of the Phenicians maintained them as a people of importance down to the period of the Roman empire, yet the period of their widest range and greatest efficiency is to be sought much earlier—anterior to 700 B.C. In these remote times they and their colonists were the exclusive navigators of the Mediterranean: the rise of the Greek maritime settlements banished their commerce to a great degree from the Ægean sea, and embarrassed it even in the more westerly waters. Their colonial establishments were formed in Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, the Balearic Isles, and Spain. The greatness as well as the antiquity of Carthage, Utica, and Gades, attest the long-sighted plans of Phenician traders, even in days anterior to the first Olympiad. We trace the wealth and industry of Tyre, and the distant navigation of her vessels through the Red sea and along the coast of Arabia, back to the days of David and Solomon. And as neither Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, or Indians, addressed themselves to a sea-faring life, so it seems that both the importation and the distribution of the products of India and Arabia into Western Asia and Europe were performed by the Idumæan Arabs between Petra and the Red sea—by the Arabs of Gerrha on the Persian Gulf, joined as they were in later times by a body of Chaldæan exiles from Babylonia—and by the more enterprising Phenicians of Tyre and Sidon in these two seas as well as in the Mediterranean.

The most ancient Phenician colonies were Utica, nearly on the northernmost point of the coast of Africa and in the same gulf (now called the Gulf of Tunis) as Carthage, over against Cape Lilybæum in Sicily—and Gades, or Gadeira, in Tartessus, or the south-western coast of Spain. The latter town, founded perhaps near 1000 years before the Christian era, has maintained a continuous prosperity, and a name (Cadiz) substantially unaltered, longer than any town in Europe. How well the site of Utica was suited to the circumstances of Phenician colonists may be inferred from the fact that Carthage was afterward established in the same gulf and near to the same spot, and that both the two cities reached a high pitch of prosperity. The distance of Gades from Tyre seems surprising, and if we calculate by

time instead of by space, the Tyrians were separated from their Tartessian colonists by an interval greater than that which now divides an Englishman from Bombay; for the ancient navigator always coasted along the land, and Skylax reckons seventy-five days of voyage from the Kanopic (westernmost) mouth of the Nile to the pillars of Herakles (Strait of Gibraltar); to which some more days must be added to represent the full distance between Tyre and Gades. But the enterprise of these early mariners surmounted all difficulties consistent with the principle of never losing sight of the coast. Proceeding along the northern coast of Libya, at a time when the mouths of the Nile were still closed by Egyptian jealousy against all foreign ships, they appear to have found little temptation to colonize on the dangerous coast near to the two gulfs called the Great and Little Syrtis—in a territory for the most part destitute of water, and occupied by rude Libyan nomads, who were thinly spread over the wide space between the Western Nile and Cape Hermæa, now called Cape Bona. The subsequent Grecian towns of Kyrene and Barka, whose well-chosen site formed an exception to the general character of the region, were not planted with any view to commerce; while the Phenician town of Leptis, near the gulf called the Great Syrtis, was established more as a shelter for exiles from Sidon than by a preconcerted scheme of colonization. The site of Utica and Carthage, in the gulf immediately westward of Cape Bona, was convenient for commerce with Sicily, Italy, and Sardinia; and the other Phenician colonies, Adrumetum, Neapolis, Hippo (two towns so called), the Lesser Leptis, etc., were settled on the coast not far distant from the eastern or western promontories which included the Gulf of Tunis, common to Carthage and Utica.

These early Phenician settlements were planted thus in the territory now known as the kingdom of Tunis and the eastern portion of the French province of Constantine. From thence to the Pillars of Herakles (Strait of Gibraltar) we do not hear of any others. But the colony of Gades, outside of the strait, formed the center of a flourishing and extensive commerce, which reached on one side far to the south, not less than thirty days' sail along the western coast of Africa —and on the other side to Britain and the Scilly Islands. There were numerous Phenician factories and small trading towns along the western coast of what is now the empire of Morocco; while the island of Kerne, twelve days' sail along the coast from the Strait of Gibraltar, formed an established depot for Phenician merchandise in trading with the interior. There were, moreover, not far distant from the coast, towns of Libyans or Ethiopians, to which the inhabitants of the central regions resorted, and where they brought their leopard skins and elephants' teeth to be exchanged against the unguents of Tyre and the pottery of Athens. So distant a trade with the limited navigation of that day, could not be made to embrace very bulky goods.

But this trade, though seemingly a valuable one, constituted only

a small part of the sources of wealth open to the Phenicians of Gades. The Turditanians and Turduli, who occupied the south-western portion of Spain between the Anas river (Guadiana) and the Mediterranean, seem to have been the most civilized and improvable section of the Iberian tribes, well-suited for commercial relations with the settlers who occupied the Isle of Leon, and who established the temple, afterward so rich and frequented, of the Tyrian Herakles. And the extreme productiveness of the southern region of Spain, in corn, fish, cattle, and wine, as well as in silver and iron, is a topic upon which we find but one language among ancient writers. The territory round Gades, Carteia, and the other Phenician settlements in this district, was known to the Greeks in the sixth century B.C. by the name of Tartessus, and regarded by them somewhat in the same light as Mexico and Peru appeared to the Spaniards of the sixteenth century. For three or four centuries the Phenicians had possessed the entire monopoly of this Tartessian trade, without any rivalry on the part of the Greeks. Probably the metals there procured were in those days their most precious acquisition, and the tribes who occupied the mining regions of the interior found a new market and valuable demand for produce then obtained with a degree of facility exaggerated into fable. It was from Gades as a center that these enterprising traders, pushing their coasting voyage yet farther, established relations with the tin-mines of Cornwall, perhaps also with amber-gatherers from the coasts of the Baltic. It requires some effort to carry back our imaginations to the time, when, along all this vast length of country, from Tyre and Sidon to the coast of Cornwall, there was no merchant-ship to buy or sell goods except these Phenicians. The rudest tribes find advantage in such visitors; and we cannot doubt, that the men whose resolute love of gain braved so many hazards and difficulties, must have been rewarded with profits on the largest scale of monopoly.

The Phenician settlers on the coast of Spain became gradually more and more numerous, and appear to have been distributed, either in seperate townships or intermingled with the native population, between the mouth of the Anas (Guadina) and the town of Malaka (Malaga) on the Mediterranean. Unfortunately we are very little informed about their precise localities and details, but we find no information of Phenician settlements on the Mediterranean coast of Spain northward of Malaka; for Carthagena or New Carthage was a Carthaginian settlement, founded only in the third century B.C.—after the first Punic war. The Greek word Phenicians being used to signify as well the inhabitants of Carthage as those of Tyre and Sidon, it is not easy to distinguish what belongs to each of them. Nevertheless we can discern a great and important difference in the character of their establishments, especially in Iberia. The Carthaginians combined with their commercial projects large schemes of conquest and empire. It is thus that the independent Phenician establishments

in and near the Gulf of Tunis in Africa were reduced to dependence upon them—while many new small townships, direct from Carthage itself, were planted on the Mediterranean coast of Africa, and the whole of that coast from the Greek Syrtis westward to the Pillars of Herakles (Strait of Gibraltar) is described as their territory in the Periplus of Skylax (B.C. 360). In Iberia, during the third century B.C., they maintained large armies, constrained the inland tribes to subjection, and acquired a dominion which nothing but the superior force of Rome prevented from being durable; while in Sicily also the resistance of the Greeks prevented a similar consummation. But the foreign settlements of Tyre and Sidon were formed with views purely commercial. In the region of Tartessus, as well as in the western coast of Africa outside of the Strait of Gibraltar, we hear only of pacific interchange and metallurgy; and the number of Phenicians who acquired gradually settlements in the interior was so great, that Strabo describes these towns (not less than 200 in number) as altogether phenicized. Since, in his time, the circumstances favorable to new Phenician immigrations had been long passed and gone, there can be little hesitation in ascribing the preponderance, which this foreign element had then acquired, to a period several centuries earlier, beginning at a time when Tyre and Sidon enjoyed both undisputed autonomy at home and the entire monopoly of Iberian commerce, without interference from the Greeks.

The earliest Grecian colony founded in Sicily was that of Naxos, planted by the Chalkidians in 735 B.C.; Syracuse followed in the next year, and during the succeeding century many flourishing Greek cities took root on the island. These Greeks found the Phenicians already in possession of many outlying islets and promontories all round the island, which served them in their trade with the Sikels and Sikans who occupied the interior. The safety and facilities of this established trade were to so great a degree broken up by the new-comers, that the Phenicians, relinquishing their numerous petty settlements round the island, concentrated themselves in three considerable towns at the south-western angle near Lilybæum—Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus—and in the island of Malta, where they were least widely separated from Utica and Carthage. The Tyrians of that day were hard-pressed by the Assyrians under Salmaneser, and the power of Carthage had not yet reached its height; otherwise probably this retreat of the Sicilian Phenicians before the Greeks would not have taken place without a struggle. But the early Phenicians superior to the Greeks in mercantile activity, and not disposed to contend, except under circumstances of very superior force, with warlike adventurers bent on permanent settlement, took the prudent course of circumscribing their sphere of operations. A similar change appears to have taken place in Cyprus, the other island in which Greeks and Phenicians came into close contact. If we may trust the Tyrian annals consulted by the historian Menander, Cypress was subject to the Tyrians even in the time of Solomon. We do not know the dates of the establishment of Paphos, Salamis, Kitium, and the other Grecian cities there planted; but there can be no doubt that they were posterior to this period, and that a considerable portion of the soil and trade of Cyprus thus passed from Phenicians to Greeks; who, on their part, partially embraced and diffused the rites, sometimes voluptuous, embodied in the Phenician religion. In Kilikia, too, especially at Tarsus, the intrusion of Greek settlers appears to have gradually hellenized a town originally Phenician and Assyrian; contributing, along with the other Grecian settlements (Phaselis, Aspendus, and Side) on the southern coast of Asia Minor, to narrow the Phenician range of adventure in that direction.

Such was the manner in which the Phenicians found themselves affected by the Greek settlements. And if the Ionians of Asia Minor, when first conquered by Harpagus and the Persians, had followed the advice of the Prienean Bias to emigrate in a body and found one great Pan-Ionic colony in the island of Sardinia, these early merchants would have experienced the like hindrance carried still farther westward—perhaps, indeed, the whole subsequent history of Carthage might have been sensibly modified. But Iberia, and the golden region of Tartessus, remained comparatively little visited, and still less colonized, by the Greeks; nor did it even become known to them, until more than a century after their first settlements had been formed in Sicily. Easy as the voyage from Corinth to Cadiz may now appear to us, to a Greek of the seventh or sixth centuries B.C. it was a formidable undertaking. He was under the necessity of first coasting along Akarnania and Epirus, then crossing, first to the island of Korkyra, and next to the Gulf of Tarentum. Proceeding to double the southernmost cape of Italy, he followed the sinuosities of the Mediterranean coast, by Tyrrhenia, Liguria, Southern Gaul, and Eastern Iberia, to the Pillars of Herakles or Strait of Gibraltar: or if he did not do this, he had the alternative of crossing the open sea from Krete or Peloponnesus to Libya, and then coasting westward along the perilous coast of the Syrtes until he arrived at the same point. Both voyages presented difficulties hard to be encountered; but the most serious hazard of all, was the direct transit across the open sea from Krete to Libya. It was about the year 630 B.C. that the inhabitants of the island of Thera, starved out by a seven years' drought, were enjoined by the Delphian god to found a colony in Libya. Nothing short of the divine command would have induced them to obey so terrific a sentence of banishment; for not only was the region named quite unknown to them, but they could not discover, by the most careful inquiries among practiced Greek navigators, a single man who had ever intentionally made the voyage to Libya. One Kretan only could they find—a fisherman named Korobius—who had been driven thither accidentally by violent gales, and he served them as guide.

At this juncture Egypt had only been recently opened to Greek commerce—Psammetichus having been the first king who partially relaxed the jealous exclusion of ships from the entrance of the Nile, enforced by all his predecessors. The incitement of so profitable a traffic emboldened some Ionian traders to make the direct voyage from Krete to the mouth of that river. It was in the prosecution of one of these voyages, and in connection with the foundation of Kyrene (to be recounted in a future chapter), that we are made acquainted with the memorable adventure of the Samian merchant Kolæus. While bound for Egypt, he had been driven out of his course by contrary winds and had found shelter on an uninhabited islet called Platea, off the coast of Libya—the spot where the emigrants intended for Kyrene first established themselves, not long afterward. From hence he again started to proceed to Egypt, but again without success; violent and continuous east winds drove him continually to the westward, until he at length passed the Pillars of Herakles, and found himself, under the providential guidance of the gods, an unexpected visitor among the Phenicians and Iberians of Tartessus. What the cargo was which he was transporting to Egypt, we are not told. But it sold in this yet virgin market for the most exorbitant prices. He and his crew (says Herodotus) "realized a profit larger than ever fell to the lot of any known Greek except Sostratus the Æginetan, with whom no one else can compete." The magnitude of their profits may be gathered from the votive offering which they erected on their return in the sacred precinct of Here at Samos, in gratitude for the protection of that goddess during their voyage. It was a large bronze vase, ornamented with projecting griffins' heads and supported by three bronze kneeling figures of colossal stature: it cost six talents, and represented the tithe of their gains. The aggregate of sixty talents (about £16,000, speaking roughly), corresponding to this tithe, was a sum which not many even of the rich men of Athens in her richest time, could boast of possessing.

To the lucky accident of this enormous vase and the inscription doubtless attached to it, which Herodotus saw in the Heræon at Samos, and to the impression which such miraculous enrichment made upon his imagination—we are indebted for our knowledge of the precise period at which the secret of Phenician commerce at Tartessus first became known to the Greeks. The voyage of Kolæus opened to the Greeks of that day a new world hardly less important (regard being had to their previous aggregate of knowledge) than the discovery of America to the Europeans of the last half of the fifteenth century. But Kolæus did little more than make known the existence of this distant and lucrative region: he cannot be said to have shown the way to it. Nor do we find, in spite of the foundation of Kyrene and Barka, which made the Greeks so much more familiar with the coast of Libya than they had been before—that

the route, by which he had been carried against his own will, was ever deliberately pursued by Greek traders.

Probably the Carthaginians, altogether unscrupulous in proceedings against commercial rivals, would have aggravated its natural maritime difficulties by false information and hostile proceedings. The simple report of such gains, however, was well calculated to act as a stimulus to other enterprising navigators. The Phokæans, during the course of the next half century, pushing their exploring voyages both along the Adriatic and along the Tyrrhenian coast, and founding Massalia in the year 600 B.C., at length reached the Pillars of Herakles and Tartessus along the eastern coast of Spain. These men were the most adventurous mariners that Greece had yet produced, creating a jealous uneasiness even among their Ionian neighbors. Their voyages were made, not with round and bulky merchant ships, calculated only for the maximum of cargo, but with armed pentekonters—and they were thus enabled to defy the privateers of the Tyrrhenian cities on the Mediterranean, which had long deterred the Greek trader from any habitual traffic near the strait of Messina. There can be little doubt that the progress of the Phokæans was very slow, and the foundation of Massalia (Marseilles), one of the most remote of all Greek colonies, may for a time have absorbed their attention: moreover, they had to pick up information as they went on, and the voyage was one of discovery, in the strict sense of the word. The time at which they reached Tartessus may seemingly be placed between 570-560 B.C. They made themselves so acceptable to Arganthonius—king of Tartessus, or at least king of part of that region—that he urged them to relinquish their city of Phokæa and establish themselves in his territory, offering to them any site which they chose to occupy. Though they declined this tempting offer, yet he still continued anxious to aid them against dangers at home, and gave them a large donation of money—whereby they were enabled at a critical moment to complete their fortifications. Arganthonius died shortly afterward, having lived (we are told) to the extraordinary age of 120 years, of which he had reigned 80. The Phokæans had probably reason to repent of their refusal; since in no very long time their town having been taken by the Persians, half their citizens became exiles, and were obliged to seek a precarious abode in Corsica, in place of the advantageous settlement which old Arganthonius had offered to them in Tartessus.

By such steps did the Greeks gradually track out the lines of Phenician commerce in the Mediterranean, and accomplish that vast improvement in their geographical knowledge—the circumnavigation of what Eratosthenes and Strabo termed "our sea," as distinguished from the external ocean. Little practical advantage, however, was derived from the discovery, which was only made during the last years of Ionian independence. The Ionian cities became subjects

of Persia, and Phokæa especially was crippled and half depopulated in the struggle. Had the period of Ionian enterprise been prolonged, we should probably have heard of other Greek settlements in Iberia and Tartessus,—over and above Emporia and Rhodus, formed by the Massaliots between the Pyrenees and the Ebro,—as well as of increasing Grecian traffic with those regions. The misfortunes of Phokæa and the other Ionic towns saved the Phenicians of Tartessus from Grecian interference and competition, such as that which their fellow-countrymen in Sicily had been experiencing for a century and a half.

But though the Ephesian Artemis, the divine protectress of Phokæan emigration, was thus prevented from becoming consecrated in Tartessus along with the Tyrian Herakles, an impulse not the less powerful was given to the imaginations of philosophers like Thales and poets like Stesichorus—whose lives cover the interval between the supernatural transport of Kolæus on the wings of the wind, and the persevering, well-planned, exploration which emanated from Phokæa. While, on the one hand, the Tyrian Herakles with his venerated temple at Gades furnished a new locality and details for mythes respecting the Grecian Herakles—on the other hand, intelligent Greeks learnt for the first time that the waters surrounding their island and the Peloponnesus formed part of a sea circumscribed by assignable boundaries. Continuous navigation of the Phokæans round the coasts, first of the Adriatic, next of the Gulf of Lyons to the pillars of Herakles and Tartessus, first brought to light this important fact. The hearers of Archilochus, Simonides of Amorgus, and Kallinus, living before or contemporary with the voyage of Kolæus, had no known sea-limit either north of Korkyra or west of Sicily; but those of Anakreon and Hipponax, a century afterward, found the Euxine, the Palus Mæotis, the Adriatic, the Western Mediterranean, and the Libyan Syrtes, all so far surveyed as to present to the mind a definite conception, and to admit of being visibly represented by Anaximander on a map. However familiar such knowledge has now become to us, at the time now under discussion it was a prodigious advance The pillars of Herakles, especially, remained deeply fixed in the Greek mind, as a terminus of human adventure and aspiration; of the ocean beyond, men were for the most part content to remain ignorant.

It has already been stated, that the Phenicians, as coast explorers, were even more enterprising than the Phokæans. But their jealous commercial spirit induced them to conceal their track—to give information designedly false respecting dangers and difficulties—and even to drown any commercial rivals when they could do so with safety. One remarkable Phenician achievement, however, contemporary with the period of Phokæan exploration, must not be passed over. It was somewhere about 600 B.C. that they circumnavigated Africa; starting from the Red Sea, by direction of the Egyptian king Nekos, son of

Psammetichus—going round the cape of Good Hope to Gades—and from thence returning to the Nile.

It appears that Nekos, anxious to procure a water-communication between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, began digging a canal from the former to the Nile, but desisted from the undertaking after having made considerable progress. In prosecution of the same object, he dispatched these Phenicians on an experimental voyage from the Red Sea round Libya, which was successfully accomplished, though in a time not less than three years; for during each autumn, the mariners landed and remained on shore a sufficient time to sow their seed and raise a crop of corn. They reached Egypt again through the strait of Gibraltar, in the course of the third year, and recounted a tale—"which (says Herodotus) others may perhaps believe, but I cannot believe"—that in sailing round Libya they had the sun on their right hand, *i.e.* to the north.

The reality of this circumnavigation was confirmed to Herodotus by various Carthaginian informants, and he himself fully believes it. There seems good reason for sharing in his belief, though several able critics reject the tale as incredible. The Phenicians were expert and daring masters of coast navigation, and in going round Africa they had no occasion ever to lose sight of land. We may presume that their vessels were amply stored, so that they could take their own time, and lie by in bad weather; we may also take for granted that the reward consequent upon success was considerable. For any other mariners then existing, indeed, the undertaking might have been too hard, but it was not so for them, and that was the reason why Nekos chose them. To such reasons, which show the story to present no intrinsic incredibility (that indeed is hardly alleged even by Mannert and others who disbelieve it), we may add one other, which goes far to prove it positively true. They stated that in the course of their circuit, while going westward, they had the sun on their right hand (*i.e.* to the northward); and this phenomenon, observable according to the season even when they were within the tropics, could not fail to force itself on their attention as constant, after they had reached the southern temperate zone. But Herodotus at once pronounces this part of the story to be incredible, and so it might appear to almost every man, Greek, Phenician, or Egyptian, not only of the age of Nekos, but even of the time of Herodotus, who heard it; since none of them possessed either actual experience of the phenomena of a southern latitude, or a sufficiently correct theory of the relation between sun and earth, to understand the varying direction of the shadows; and few men would consent to set aside the received ideas with reference to the solar motions, from pure confidence in the veracity of these Phenecian narrators. Now that under such circumstances the latter should invent the tale is highly improbable; and if they were not inventors, they must have experienced the phenomenon during the southern portion of their transit.

Some critics disbelieve this circumnavigation, from supposing that if so remarkable an achievement had really taken place once, it must have been repeated, and practical application must have been made of it. But though such a suspicion is not unnatural, with those who recollect how great a revolution was operated when the passage was rediscovered during the fifteenth century—yet the reasoning will not be found applicable to the sixth century before the Christian era.

Pure scientific curiosity, in that age, counted for nothing. The motive of Nekos for directing this enterprise was the same as that which had prompted him to dig his canal—in order that he might procure the best communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. But, as it has been with the north-west passage in our time, so it was with the circumnavigation of Africa in his—the proof of its practicability at the same time showed that it was not available for purposes of traffic or communication, looking to the resources then at the command of navigators—a fact, however, which could not be known until the experiment was made. To pass from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea by means of the Nile still continued to be the easiest way; either by aid of the land journey, which in the times of the Ptolemies was usually made from Koptos on the Nile to Berenike on the Red Sea—or by means of the canal of Nekos, which Darius afterward finished, though it seems to have been neglected during the Persian rule in Egypt, and was subsequently repaired and put to service under the Ptolemies. Without any doubt the successful Phenician mariners underwent both severe hardship and great real perils, besides those still greater supposed perils, the apprehension of which so constantly unnerved the minds even of experienced and resolute men in the unknown ocean. Such was the force of these terrors and difficulties, to which there was no known termination, upon the mind of the Achæmenid Sataspes (upon whom the circumnavigation of Africa was imposed as a penalty "worse than death" by Xerxes, in commutation of a capital sentence), that he returned without having finished the circuit, though by so doing he forfeited his life. He affirmed that he had sailed "until his vessel stuck fast, and could move on no farther"—a persuasion not uncommon in ancient times and even down to Columbus, that there was a point, beyond which the ocean, either from mud, sands, shallows, fogs, or accumulations of sea-weed, was no longer navigable.

Now we learn from hence that the enterprise, even by those who believed the narrative of Nekos's captains, was regarded as at once desperate and unprofitable; but doubtless many persons treated it as a mere "Phenician lie" (to use an expression proverbial in ancient times). The circumnavigation of Libya is said to have been one of the projects conceived by Alexander the Great. We may readily believe that if he had lived longer, it would have been confided to Nearchus or some other officer of the like competence, and in all probability would have succeeded, especially since it would have been undertaken from the eastward—to the great profit of geographical knowledge among the ancients, but with little advantage to their commerce. There is then adequate reason for admitting that these Phenicians rounded the Cape of Good Hope from the East about 600 B.C., more than 2,000 years earlier than Vasco de Gama did the same thing from the West; though the discovery was in the first instance of no avail, either for commerce or for geographical science.

Besides the maritime range of Tyre and Sidon, their trade by land in the interior of Asia was of great value and importance. They were the speculative merchants who directed the march of the caravans laden with Assyrian and Egyptian products across the deserts which separated them from inner Asia—an operation which presented hardly less dificulties, considering the Arabian depredators whom they were obliged to conciliate and even to employ as carriers, than the longest coast voyage. They seem to have stood alone in antiquity in their willingness to brave, and their ability to surmount, the perils of a distant land-traffic; and their descendants at Carthage and Utica were not less active in pushing caravans far into the interior of Africa.

CHAPTER XIX.

ASSYRIANS—BABYLON.

THE name of the Assyrians who formed one wing of this early system of intercourse and commerce, rests chiefly upon the great cities of Nineveh and Babylon. To the Assyrians of Nineveh (as has been already mentioned) is ascribed in early times a very extensive empire, covering much of Upper Asia, as well as Mesopotamia or the country between the Euphrates and the Tigris. Respecting this empire—its commencement, its extent, or even the mode in which it was put down—nothing certain can be affirmed. But it seems unquestionable that many great and flourishing cities—and a population inferior in enterprise, but not in industry, to the Phenicians—were to be found on the Euphrates and Tigris, in times anterior to the first Olympiad. Of these cities, Nineveh on the Tigris and Babylon on the Euphrates were the chief: the latter being in some sort of dependence, probably, on the sovereigns of Nineveh, yet governed by kings or chiefs of its own, and comprehending an hereditary order of priests named Chaldeans, masters of all the science and literature as well as of the religious ceremonies current among the people, and devoted from very early times to that habit of astronomical observation which their brilliant sky so much favored.

The people called Assyrians or Syrians (for among the Greek

authors no constant distinction is maintained between the two) were distributed over the wide territory bounded on the east by Mount Zagros and its north-westerly continuation toward Mount Ararat, by which they were separated from the Medes—and extending from thence westward and southward to the Euxine sea, the river Halys, the Mediterranean sea, and the Persian gulf—thus covering the whole course of the Tigris and Euphrates south of Armenia, as well as Syria and Syria-Palestine, and the territory eastward of the Halys called Kappadokia. But the Chaldean order of priests appears to have been peculiar to Babylon and other towns in its territory, especially between that city and the Persian gulf. The vast, rich, and lofty temple of Belus in that city served them at once as a place of worship and an astronomical observatory. It was the paramount ascendency of this order which seems to have caused the Babylonian people generally to be spoken of as Chaldeans—though some writers have supposed, without any good proof, a conquest of Assyrian Babylon by barbarians called Chaldeans from the mountains near the Euxine.

There were exaggerated statements respecting the antiquity of their astronomical observations, which cannot be traced as of definite and recorded date higher than the era of Nabonassar (747 B.C.), as well as respecting the extent of their acquired knowledge, so largely blended with astrological fancies and occult influences of the heavenly bodies on human affairs. But however incomplete their knowledge may appear when judged by the standard of after-times, there can be no doubt, that compared with any of their comtemporaries of the sixth century B.C. (either Egyptians, Greeks, or Asiatics) they stood pre-eminent, and had much to teach, not only to Thales and Pythagoras, but even to later inquirers, such as Eudoxus and Aristotle. The conception of the revolving celestial sphere, the gnomon, and the division of the day into twelve parts, are affirmed by Herodotus to have been first taught to the Greeks by the Babylonians; and the continuous observation of the heavens both by the Egyptian and Chaldean priests, had determined with considerable exactness both the duration of the solar year and other longer periods of astronomical recurrence; thus impressing upon intelligent Greeks the imperfection of their own calendars, and furnishing them with a basis not only for enlarged observations of their own, but also for the discovery and application of those mathematical theories whereby astronomy first became a science.

It was not only the astronomical acquisitions of the priestly caste which distinguished the early Babylonians. The social condition, the fertility of the country, the dense population, and the persevering industry of the inhabitants, were not less remarkable. Respecting Nineveh, once the greatest of the Assyrian cities, we have no good information, nor can we safely reason from the analogy of Babylon, inasmuch as the peculiarties of the latter were altogether determined

by the Euphrates, while Nineveh was seated considerably farther north, and on the east bank of the Tigris. But Herodotus gives us valuable particulars respecting Babylon as an eye-witness. We may judge by his account, representing its condition after much suffering from the Persian conquest, what it had been a century earlier in the days of its full splendor.

The neighboring territory, receiving but little rain, owed its fertility altogether to the annual overflowing of the Euphrates, on which the labor bestowed, for the purpose of limiting, regularizing, and diffusing its supply of water, was stupendous. Embankments along the river—artifical reservoirs in connection with it to receive an excessive increase—new curvilinear channels dug for the water in places where the stream was too straight and rapid—broad and deep canals crossing the whole space between the Euphrates and the Tigris, and feeding numerous rivulets or ditches which enabled the whole breadth of land to be irrigated—all these toilsome applications were requisite to insure due moisture for the Babylonian soil. But they were rewarded with an exuberance of produce, in the various descriptions of grain, such as Herodotus hardly dares to particularize. The country produced no trees except the date-palm; which was turned to account in many different ways, and from the fruit of which, both copious and of extraordinary size, wine as well as bread was made. Moreover, Babylonia was still more barren of stone than of wood, so that buildings as well as walls were constructed almost entirely of brick, for which the earth was well adapted; while a flow of mineral bitumen, found near the town and river of Is, higher up the Euphrates, served for cement. Such persevering and systematic labor applied for the purpose of irrigation, excites our astonishment; yet the description of what was done for defense is still more imposing. Babylon, traversed in the middle by the Euphrates, was surrounded by walls 300 feet in height, seventy-five feet in thickness, and composing a square of which each side was 120 stadia (or nearly fifteen English miles) in length. Around the outside of the walls was a broad and deep moat from whence the material for the bricks composing them had been excavated; while one hundred brazen gates served for ingress and egress. Besides, there was an interior wall less thick, but still very strong; and as a still farther obstruction to invaders from the north and north-east, another high and thick wall was built at some miles from the city, across the space between the Euphrates and the Tigris—called the wall of Media, seemingly a little to the north of that point where the two rivers most nearly approach to each other, and joining the Tigris on its west bank. Of the houses many were three or four stories high, and the broad and straight streets, unknown in a Greek town until the distribution of the Peiræeus by Hippodamus near the time of the Peloponnesian war, were well calculated to heighten the astonishment raised by the whole spectacle in a visitor

like Herodotus. The royal palace, with its memorable terraces or hanging gardens, formed the central and commanding edifice in one-half of the city—the temple of Belus in the other half.

That celebrated temple, standing upon a basis of one square stadium, and inclosed in a precinct of two square stadia in dimension, was composed of eight solid towers, built one above the other, and is alleged by Strabo to have been as much as a stadium or furlong high (the height is not specified by Herodotus). It was full of costly decorations, and possessed an extensive landed property. Along the banks of the river, in its passage through the city, were built spacious quays, and a bridge on stone piles—for the placing of which (as Herodotus was told) Semiramis had caused the river Euphrates to be drained off into the large side reservoir and lake constructed higher up its course.

Besides this great town of Babylon itself, there were throughout the neighborhood, between the canals which united the Euphrates and the Tigris, many rich and populous villages, while Borsippa and other considerable towns were situated lower down on the Euphrates itself. And the industry, agricultural as well as manufacturing, of the collective population was not less persevering than productive. Their linen, cotton, and woolen fabrics, and their richly ornamented carpets were celebrated throughout all the eastern regions. Their cotton was brought in part from islands in the Persian gulf. The flocks of sheep tended by the Arabian Nomads supplied them with wool finer even than that of Miletus or Tarentum. Besides the Chaldean order of priests, there seem to have been among them certain other tribes with peculiar hereditary customs. Thus there were three tribes, probably near the mouth of the river, who restricted themselves to the eating of fish alone; but we have no evidences of a military caste (like that in Egypt) nor any other hereditary profession.

In order to present any conception of what Assyria was in the early days of Grecian history and during the two centuries preceding the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus in 536 B.C., we unfortunately have no witness earlier than Herodotus, who did not see Babylon until near a century after that event—about seventy years after its still more disastrous revolt and second subjugation by Darius. Babylonia had become one of the twenty satrapies of the Persian empire, and besides paying a larger regular tribute than any of the other nineteen, supplied, from its exuberant soil, provision for the Great King and his countless host of attendants during one-third part of the year. Yet it was then in a state of comparative degradation, having had its immense walls breached by Darius, and having afterward undergone the ill-usage of Xerxes, who, since he stripped its temples, and especially the venerated temple of Belus, of some of their richest ornaments, would probably be still more reckless in his mode of dealing with the civic edifices. If, in spite of such inflictions, and in spite of that manifest evidence of poverty and suffering in the

people which Herodotus expressly notices, it continued to be what he describes, still counted as almost the chief city of the Persian empire, both in the time of the younger Cyrus and in that of Alexander—we may judge what it must once have been, without either foreign satrap or foreign tribute, under its Assyrian kings and Chaldean priests, during the last of the two centuries which intervened between the era of Nabonassar and the capture of the city by Cyrus the Great. Though several of the kings, during the first of these two centuries, had contributed much to the great works of Babylon, yet it was during the second century of the two, after the capture of Nineveh by the Medes, and under Nebuchadnezzar and Nitokris, that the kings attained the maximum of their power and the city its greatest enlargement. It was Nebuchadnezzar who constructed the sea-port Teredon, at the mouth of the Euphrates, and who probably excavated the long ship canal of near 400 miles, which joined it. That canal was perhaps formed partly from a natural western branch of the Euphrates. The brother of the poet Alkæus—Antimenidas, who served in the Babylonian army, and distinguished himself by his personal valor (600–580 B.C.)—would have seen it in its full glory. He is the earliest Greek of whom we hear individually in connection with the Babylonians. It marks strikingly the contrast between the Persian kings and the Babylonian kings, on whose ruin they rose—that while the latter incurred immense expense to facilitate the communication between Babylon and the sea, the former artificially impeded the lower course of the Tigris, in order that their residence at Susa might be out of the reach of assailants.

That which strikes us most, and which must have struck the first Grecian visitors much more, both in Assyria and Egypt, is the unbounded command of naked human strength possessed by these early kings, and the effect of mere mass and indefatigable perseverance, unaided either by theory or by artifice, in the accomplishment of gigantic results. In Assyria the results were in great part exaggerations of enterprises in themselves useful to the people for irrigation and defense: religious worship was ministered to in the like manner, as well as the personal fancies and pomp of their kings: while in Egypt the latter class predominates more over the former. We scarcely trace in either of them the higher sentiment of art, which owes its first marked development to Grecian susceptibility and genius. But the human mind is in every stage of its progress, and most of all in its rude and unreflecting period, strongly impressed by visible and tangible magnitude, and awe-struck by the evidences of great power. To this feeling, for what exceeded the demands of practical convenience and security, the wonders both in Egypt and Assyria chiefly appealed. The execution of such colossal works demonstrates habits of regular industry, a concentrated population under one government, and, above all, an implicit submission to the regal and priestly sway—contrasting forcibly with the small autono-

mous communities of Greece and western Europe, wherein the will of the individual citizen was so much more energetic and uncontrolled. The acquisition of habits of regular industry, so foreign to the natural temper of man, was brought about in Egypt and Assyria, in China and Hindoostan before it had acquired any footing in Europe; but it was purchased either by prostrate obedience to a despotic rule or by imprisonment within the chain of a consecrated institution of caste. Even during the Homeric period of Greece these countries had attained a certain civilization in mass, without the acquisition of any high mental qualities or the development of any individual genius. The religious and political sanction, sometimes combined and sometimes separate, determined for every one his mode of life, his creed, his duties, and his place in society, without leaving any scope for the will or reason of the agent himself. Now the Phenicians and Carthaginians manifest a degree of individual impulse and energy which puts them greatly above this type of civilization, though in their tastes, social feelings, and religion they are still Asiatic. And even the Babylonian community—though their Chaldean priests are the parallel of the Egyptian priests, with a less measure of ascendency—combine with their industrial aptitude and constancy of purpose, something of that strenuous ferocity of character which marks so many people of the Semitic race—Jews, Phenicians, and Carthaginians. These Semitic people stand distinguished as well from the Egyptian life—enslaved by childish caprices and antipathies, and by endless frivolities of ceremonial detail—as from the flexible, many-sided, and self-organizing Greek; the latter not only capable of opening both for himself and for the human race the highest walks of intellect, and the full creative agency of art, but also gentler by far in his private sympathies and dealings than his contemporaries on the Euphrates, the Jordan, or the Nile—for we are not, of course, to compare him with the exigencies of western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Both in Babylonia and in Egypt the vast monuments, embankments, and canals, executed by collective industry, appeared the more remarkable to an ancient traveler by contrast with the desert regions and predatory tribes immediately surrounding them. West of the Euphrates the sands of Arabia extended northward, with little interruption, to the latitude of the Gulf of Issus; they even covered the greater part of Mesopotamia, or the country between the Euphrates and the Tigris, beginning a short distance northward of the wall called the wall of Media above-mentioned, which (extending in a direction nearly southward from the Tigris to the Euphrates) had been erected to protect Babylonia against the incursions of the Medes. Eastward of the Tigris again, along the range of Mount Zagros, but at no great distance from the river, were found the Elymæi, Kossæi, Uxii, Parætakeni, etc.—tribes which (to use the expression of Strabo), "as inhabiting a poor country, were under the necessity of living by the

plunder of their neighbors." Such rude bands of depredators on the one side, and such wide tracts of sand on the two others, without vegetation or water, contrasted powerfully with the industry and productiveness of Babylonia. Babylon itself is to be considered, not as one continuous city, but as a city together with its surrounding district inclosed within immense walls, the height and thickness of which were in themselves a sufficient defense, so that the place was assailable only at its gates. In case of need it would serve as shelter for the persons and property of the village-inhabitants in Babylonia. We shall see hereafter how useful under trying circumstances such a resource was, when we come to review the invasions of Attica by the Peloponnesians, and the mischiefs occasioned by a temporary crowd pouring in from the country, so as to overcharge the intramural accommodations of Athens. Spacious as Babylon was, however, it is affirmed by Strabo that Ninus or Nineveh was considerably larger.

APPENDIX.

Since the first edition of these volumes, the interesting work of Mr. Layard—"Nineveh and its Remains," together with his illustrative Drawings—"The Monuments of Nineveh"—have been published. And through his unremitting valuable exertions in surmounting all the difficulties connected with excavations on the spot, the British Museum has been enriched with a valuable collection of real Assyrian sculptures and other monuments. A number of similar relics of Assyrian antiquity, obtained by M. Botta and others, have also been deposited in the museum of the Louvre at Paris.

In respect to Assyrian art, indeed to the history of art in general, a new world has thus been opened, which promises to be fruitful of instruction; especially when we consider that the ground out of which the recent acquisitions have been obtained, has been yet most imperfectly examined, and may be expected to yield an ample harvest hereafter, assuming circumstances tolerably favorable to investigation. The sculptures to which we are now introduced, with all their remarkable peculiarities of style and idea, must undoubtedly date from the eighth or seventh century B.C. at the latest—and may be much earlier. The style which they display forms a parallel and subject of comparison, though in many points extremely different, to that of early Egypt—at a time when the ideal combinations of the Greeks were, as far as we know, embodied only in epic and lyric poetry.

But in respect to early Assyrian history, we have yet to find out whether much new information can be safely deduced from these interesting monuments. The cuneiform inscriptions now brought to light are indeed very numerous: and if they can be deciphered, on rational and trustworthy principles, we can hardly fail to acquire more or less of positive knowledge respecting a period now plunged in total darkness. But from the monuments of art alone, it would be unsafe to draw historical inferences. For example, when we find sculptures representing a king taking a city by assault, or receiving captives brought to him, etc., we are not to conclude that this commemorates any real and positive conquest recently made by the Assyrians. Our knowledge of the subjects of Greek sculpture on temples is quite sufficient to make us disallow any such inference, unless there be some corroborative proof. Some means must first be discovered, of discriminating historical from mythical subjects: a distinction which I here notice, the rather, because Mr. Layard shows occasional tendency to overlook it in his interesting remarks and explanations: see especially, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 409.

From the rich and abundant discoveries made at Nimroud, combined with those at Kouyunjik and Khorsabad, Mr. Layard is inclined to comprehend all these three within the circuit of ancient Nineveh; admitting for that circuit the prodigious space alleged by Diodorus out of Ktesias, 480 stadia or above fifty English miles. (See "Nineveh and its Remains," vol. ii. ch. ii. p. 242–253.) Mr. Layard considers that the north-west portion of Nimroud exhibits monuments more ancient, and at the same time better in style and execution, than the south-west portion,—or than Kouyunjik and Khorsabad (vol. ii. ch. i. p. 204; ch. iii. p. 305). If this hypothesis, as to the ground covered by Nineveh, be correct, probably future excavations will confirm it—or, if incorrect, refute it. But I do not at all reject the supposition on the simple ground of excessive magnitude; on the contrary, I should at once believe the statement, if it were reported by Herodotus after a visit to the spot, like the magnitude of Babylon. The testimony of Ktesias is indeed very inferior in value to that of Herodotus; yet it ought hardly to be outweighed by the supposed improbability of so great a walled space, when we consider how little we know where to set bounds to the power of the Assyrian kings in respect to command of human labor for any process merely simple and toilsome, with materials both near and inexhaustible. Not to mention the great wall of China, we have only to look at the Picts' Wall, and other walls built by the Romans in Britain, to satisfy ourselves that a great length of fortification under circumstances much less favorable than the position of the ancient Assyrian kings, is noway incredible in itself. Though the walls of Nineveh and Babylon were much *larger* than those of Paris as it now stands, yet when we compare the two not merely in size, but in respect of costliness, elaboration, and contrivance, the latter will be found to represent an infinitely greater *amount of work*.

Larissa and Mespila, those deserted towns and walls which Xenophon saw in the retreat of the Ten Thousand (Anabas iii. 4, 6–10), coincide in point of distance and situation with Nimroud and Kouyunjik, according to Mr. Layard's remark. And his supposition seems not improbable, that both of them were formed by the Medes out of the ruins of the conquered city of Nineveh. Neither of them singly seems at all adequate to the reputation of that ancient city, or walled circuit. According to the account of Herodotus, Phraortes the second Median king had attacked Nineveh, but had been himself slain in the attempt, and lost nearly all his army. It was partly to revenge this disgrace that Kyaxares, son of Phraortes, assailed Nineveh (Herod. i. 102, 103): we may thus see a special reason, in addition to his own violence of temper (i. 73), why he destroyed the city after having taken it (*Νίνον ἀναστάτου γενομένης*, i. 178). It is easy to conceive that this vast walled space may have been broken up and converted into two Median towns, both on the Tigris. In the subsequent change from Median to Persian dominion, these towns also became depopulated, as far as the strange tales which Xenophon heard in his retreat can be trusted. The interposition of these two Median towns doubtless contributed, for the time, to put out of sight the traditions respecting the old Ninus which had before stood upon their site. But such traditions never became extinct, and a new town bearing the old name of Ninus must have subsequently arisen on the spot. This second Ninus is recognized by Tacitus, Ptolemy, and Ammianus, not only as existing, but as pretending to uninterrupted continuity of succession from the ancient "caput Assyriæ."

Mr. Layard remarks on the facility with which edifices, such as those in Assyria, built of sunburnt bricks, perish when neglected, and crumble away into earth, leaving little or no trace.

CHAPTER XX.

EGYPTIANS.

If, on one side, the Phenicians were separated from the productive Babylonia by the Arabian Desert, on the other side, the western

portion of the same desert divided them from the no less productive valley of the Nile. In those early times which preceded the rise of Greek civilization, their land trade embraced both regions, and they served as the sole agents of international traffic between the two. Conveniently as their towns were situated for maritime commerce with the Nile, Egyptian jealousy had excluded Phenician vessels not less than those of the Greeks from the mouths of that river, until the reign of Psammetichus (672–618 B.C.); and thus even the merchants of Tyre could then reach Memphis only by means of caravans, employing as their instruments (as I have already observed) the Arabian tribes, alternately plunderers and carriers.

Respecting Egypt, as respecting Assyria, since the works of Hekatæus are unfortunately lost, our earliest information is derived from Herodotus, who visited Egypt about two centuries after the reign of Psammetichus, when it formed part of one of the twenty Persian satrapies. The Egyptian marvels and peculiarities which he recounts, are more numerous as well as more diversified, than the Assyrian; and had the vestiges been effaced as completely in the former as in the latter, his narrative would probably have met with an equal degree of suspicion. But the hard stone, combined with the dry climate of Upper Egypt (where a shower of rain counted as a prodigy), have given such permanence to the monuments in the valley of the Nile, that enough has remained to bear out the father of Grecian history, and to show, that in describing what he professes to have seen, he is a guide perfectly trustworthy. For that which he heard, he appears only in the character of a reporter, and often an incredulous reporter. Yet though this distinction between his hearsay and his ocular evidence is not only obvious, but of the most capital moment, it has been too often neglected by those who depreciate him as a witness.

The mysterious river Nile, a god in the eyes of ancient Egyptians, and still preserving both its volume and its usefulness undiminished amidst the general degradation of the country, reached the sea in the time of Herodotus by five natural mouths, besides two others artificially dug. Its Pelusiac branch formed the eastern boundary of Egypt, its Kanopic branch (170 miles distant) the western; while the Sebennytic branch was a continuation of the straight line of the upper river: from this latter branched off the Saitic and the Mendesian arms. The overflowings of the Nile are far more fertilizing than those of the Euphrates in Assyria,—partly from their more uniform recurrence both in time and quantity, partly from the rich silt which they bring down and deposit, whereas the Euphrates served only as moisture. The patience of the Egyptians had excavated, in Middle Egypt, the vast reservoir (partly, it seems, natural and pre-existing) called the Lake of Mœris—and in the Delta, a network of numerous canals. Yet on the whole the hand of man had been less tasked than in Babylonia; whilst the soil, annually enriched,

yielded its abundant produce without either plow or spade to assist the seed cast in by the husbandman. That under these circumstances a dense and regularly organized population should have been concentrated in fixed abodes along the valley occupied by this remarkable river, is no matter of wonder. The marked peculiarities of the locality seem to have brought about such a result, in the earliest periods to which human society can be traced. Along the 550 miles of its undivided course from Syene to Memphis, where for the most part the mountains leave only a comparatively narrow strip on each bank—as well as in the broad expanse between Memphis and the Mediterranean—there prevailed a peculiar form of theocratic civilization, from a date which even in the time of Herodotus was immemorially ancient. But if we seek for some measure of this antiquity, earlier than the time when Greeks were first admitted into Egypt in the reign of Psammetichus, we find only the computations of the priests, reaching back for many thousand years, first of government by immediate and present gods, next of human kings. Such computations have been transmitted to us by Herodotus, Manetho, and Diodorus—agreeing in their essential conception of the foretime, with gods in the first part of her series and men in the second, but differing materially in events, names, and epochs. Probably, if we possessed lists from other Egyptian temples, besides those which Manetho drew up at Heliopolis or which Herodotus learned at Memphis, we should find discrepancies from both these two. To compare these lists, and to reconcile them as far as they admit of being reconciled, is interesting as enabling us to understand the Egyptian mind, but conducts to no trustworthy chronological results, and forms no part of the task of an historian of Greece.

To the Greeks Egypt was a closed world before the reign of Psammetichus, though after that time it gradually became an important part of their field both of observation and action. The astonishment which the country created in the mind of the earliest Grecian visitors may be learned even from the narrative of Herodotus, who doubtless knew it by report long before he went there. Both the physical and moral features of Egypt stood in strong contrast with Grecian experience. "Not only (says Herodotus) does the climate differ from all other climates, and the river from all other rivers, but Egyptian laws and customs are opposed on almost all points to those of other men." The Delta was at that time full of large and populous cities, built on artificial elevations of ground and seemingly not much inferior to Memphis itself, which was situated on the left bank of the Nile (opposite to the site of the modern Cairo), a little higher up than the spot where the Delta begins. From the time when the Greeks first became cognizant of Egypt, to the building of Alexandria and the reign of the Ptolemies, Memphis was the first city in Egypt. Yet it seems not to have been always so; there had been an earlier period when Thebes was the seat of Egyptian power, and Upper

Egypt of far more consequence than Middle Egypt. Vicinity to the Delta, which must always have contained the largest number of cities and the widest surface of productive territory, probably enabled Memphis to usurp this honor from Thebes; and the predominance of Lower Egypt was still further confirmed when Psammetichus introduced Ionian and Karian troops as his auxiliaries in the government of the country. But the stupendous magnitude of the temples and palaces, the profusion of ornamental sculpture and painting, the immeasurable range of sepulchers hewn in the rocks still remaining as attestations of the grandeur of Thebes—not to mention Ombi, Edfu, and Elephantine—show that Upper Egypt was once the place to which the land-tax from the productive Delta was paid, and where the kings and priests who employed it resided. It has been even contended that Thebes itself was originally settled by immigrants from still higher regions of the river; and the remains, yet found along the Nile in Nubia, are analogous, both in style and in grandeur, to those in the Thebais. What is remarkable is, that both the one and the other are strikingly distinguished from the Pyramids, which alone remain to illustrate the site of the ancient Memphis. There are no pyramids either in Upper Egypt or in Nubia: but on the Nile above Nubia, near the Ethiopian Meroe, pyramids in great number, though of inferior dimensions, are again found.

From whence, or in what manner, Egyptian institutions first took their rise, we have no means of determining. Yet there seems little to bear out the supposition of Heeren and other eminent authors, that they were transmitted down the Nile by Ethiopian colonists from Meroe. Herodotus certainly conceived Egyptians and Ethiopians (who in his time jointly occupied the border island of Elephantine, which he had himself visited) as completely distinct from each other, in race and customs not less than in language; the latter being generally of the rudest habits, of great stature, and still greater physical strength—the chief part of them subsisting on meat and milk, and blest with unusual longevity. He knew of Meroe, as the Ethiopian metropolis and a considerable city, fifty-two days' journey higher up the river than Elephantine. But his informants had given him no idea of analogy between its institutions and those of Egypt. He states that the migration of a large number of the Egyptian military caste, during the reign of Psammetichus, into Ethiopia, had first communicated civilized customs to these southern barbarians. If there be really any connection between the social phenomena of Egypt and those of Meroe, it seems more reasonable to treat the latter as derivative from the former.

The population of Egypt was classified into certain castes or hereditary professions; of which the number was not exactly defined, and is represented differently by different authors. The priests stand clearly marked out, as the order richest, most powerful, and most venerated. Distributed all over the country, they possessed exclusively

the means of reading and writing, besides a vast amount of narrative matter treasured up in the memory, the whole stock of medical and physical knowledge then attainable, and those rudiments of geometry (or rather land-measuring) which were so often called into use in a country annually inundated. To each god, and to each temple, throughout Egypt, lands and other properties belonged, whereby the numerous bands of priests attached to him were maintained. It seems too that a further portion of the lands of the kingdom was set apart for them in individual property, though on this point no certainty is attainable. Their ascendency, both direct and indirect, over the minds of the people, was immense. They prescribed that minute ritual under which the life of every Egyptian, not excepting the king himself, was passed, and which was for themselves more full of harassing particularities than for any one else. Every day in the year belonged to some particular god; the priests alone knew to which. There were different gods in every Nome, though Isis and Osiris were common to all. The priests of each god constituted a society apart, more or less important, according to the comparative celebrity of the temple. The high priests of Hephæstos, whose dignity was said to have been transmitted from father to son through a series of 341 generations (commemorated by the like number of colossal statues, which Herodotus himself saw), were second in importance only to the king. The property of each temple included troops of dependents and slaves, who were stamped with "holy marks," and who must have been numerous in order to suffice for the large buildings and their constant visitors.

Next in importance to the sacerdotal caste were the military caste or order, whose native name indicated that they stood on the left hand of the king, while the priests occupied the right. They were classified into Kalasiries and Hermotybii, who occupied lands in eighteen particular Nomes or provinces principally in Lower Egypt. The Kalasiries had once amounted 160,000 men, the Hermotybii to 250,000, when at the maximum of their population; but that highest point had long been passed in the time of Herodotus. To each man of this soldier-caste was assigned a portion of land equal to about 6½ English acres, free from any tax; but what measures were taken to keep the lots of land in suitable harmony with a fluctuating number of holders, we know not. The statement of Herodotus relates to a time long past and gone, and describes what was believed, by the priests with whom he talked, to have been the primitive constitution of their country anterior to the Persian conquest. The like is still more true respecting the statement of Diodorus; who says that the territory of Egypt was divided into three parts—one part belonging to the king, another to the priests, and the remainder to the soldiers. His language seems to intimate that every Nome was so divided, and even that the three portions were equal, though he does not expressly say so. The result of these statements, combined with the history

of Joseph in the book of Genesis, seems to be, that the lands of the priests and the soldiers were regarded as privileged property and exempt from all burdens, while the remaining soil was considered as the property of the king, who, however, received from it a fixed proportion, one-fifth of the total produce, leaving the rest in the hands of the cultivators. We are told that Sethos, priest of the god Phtha (or Hephæstos) at Memphis and afterward named King, oppressed the military caste and deprived them of their lands. In revenge for this they withheld from him their aid when Egypt was invaded by Sennacherib. Further, in the reign of Psammetichus, a large number (240,000) of these soldiers migrated into Ethiopia from a feeling of discontent, leaving their wives and children behind them. It was Psammetichus who first introduced Ionian and Karian mercenaries into the country, and began innovations on the ancient Egyptian constitution: so that the disaffection toward him, on the part of the native soldiers, no longer permitted to serve as exclusive guards to the king, is not difficult to explain. The Kalasiries and Hermotybii were interdicted from every description of art or trade. There can be little doubt that under the Persians their lands were made subject to the tribute. This may partly explain the frequent revolts which they maintained, with very considerable bravery, against the Persian kings.

Herodotus enumerates five other *races* (so he calls them) or castes, besides priests and soldiers—herdsmen, swineherds, tradesmen, interpreters, and pilots; an enumeration which perplexes us, inasmuch as it takes no account of the husbandmen, who must always have constituted the majority of the population. It is perhaps for this very reason that they are not comprised in the list—not standing out specially marked or congregated together, like the five above-named, and therefore not seeming to constitute a race apart. The distribution of Diodorus, who specifies (over and above priests and soldiers) husbandmen, herdsmen, and artificers, embraces much more completely the whole population. It seems more the statement of a reflecting man, pushing out the principle of hereditary occupations to its consequences; (and the comments which the historian so abundantly interweaves with his narrative show that such was the character of the authorities which he followed;)—while the list given by Herodotus comprises that which struck his observation. It seems that a certain proportion of the soil of the Delta consisted of marsh land, including pieces of habitable ground, but impenetrable to an invading enemy, and favorable only to the growth of papyrus and other aquatic plants. Other portions of the Delta, as well as of the upper valley in parts where it widened to the eastward, were too wet for the culture of grain, though producing the richest herbage, and eminently suitable to the race of Egyptian herdsmen, who thus divided the soil with the husbandmen. Herdsmen generally were held reputable; but the race of swineherds were hated and despised, from the extreme anti-

pathy of all other Egyptians to the pig—which animal yet could not be altogether proscribed, because there were certain peculiar occasions on which it was imperative to offer him in sacrifice to Selene or Dionysus. Herodotus acquaints us that the swineherds were interdicted from all the temples, and that they always intermarried among themselves, other Egyptians disdaining such an alliance—a statement which indirectly intimates that there was no standing objection against intermarriage of the remaining castes with each other. The caste or race of interpreters began only with the reign of Psammetichus, from the admission of Greek settlers, then for the first time tolerated in the country. Though they were half Grecks, the historian does not note them as of inferior account, except as compared with the two ascendent castes of soldiers and priests. Moreover the creation of a new caste shows that there was no consecrated or unchangeable total number.

Those whom Herodotus denominates tradesmen (*κάπηλοι*) are doubtless identical with the artisans (*τεχνῖται*) specified by Diodorus—the town population generally as distinguished from that of the country. During the three months of the year when Egypt was covered with water, festival days were numerous—the people thronging by hundreds of thousands, in vast barges, to one or other of the many holy places, combining worship and enjoyment. In Egypt weaving was a trade, whereas in Greece it was the domestic occupation of females. Herodotus treats it as one of those reversals of the order of nature which were seen only in Egypt, that the weaver stayed at home plying his web while his wife went to market. The process of embalming bodies was elaborate and universal, giving employment to a large special class of men. The profusion of edifices, obelisks, sculpture and painting, all executed by native workmen, required a large body of trained sculptors, who in the mechanical branch of their business attained a high excellence. Most of the animals in Egypt were objects of religious reverence, and many of them were identified in the closest manner with particular gods. The order of priests included a large number of hereditary feeders and tenders of these sacred animals. Among the sacerdotal order were also found the computers of genealogies, the infinitely subdivided practitioners in the art of healing, etc., who enjoyed good reputation, and were sent for as surgeons to Cyrus and Darius. The Egyptian city population was thus exceedingly numerous, so that king Sethon, when called upon to resist an invasion without the aid of the military caste, might well be supposed to have formed an army out of "the tradesmen, the artisans, and the market-people." And Alexandria, at the commencement of the dynasty of the Ptolemies, acquired its numerous and active inhabitants at the expense of Memphis and the ancient towns of Lower Egypt.

The mechanical obedience and fixed habits of the mass of the Egyptian population (not priests or soldiers) was a point which made

much impression upon Grecian observers. Solon is said to have introduced at Athens a custom prevalent in Egypt, whereby the Nomarch or chief of each Nome was required to investigate every man's means of living, and to punish with death those who did not furnish evidence of some recognized occupation. It does not seem that the institution of Caste in Egpyt—though insuring unapproachable ascendency to the Priests and much consideration to the Soldiers—was attended with any such profound debasement to the rest as that which falls upon the lowest caste or Sudras in India. No such gulf existed between them as that between the Twice-born and the Once-born in the religion of Brahma. Yet those stupendous works, which form the permanent memorials of the country, remain at the same time as proofs of the oppressive exactions of the kings, and of the reckless caprice with which the lives as well as the contributions of the people were lavised. One hundred and twenty thousand Egyptians were said to have perished in the digging of the canal, which king Nekos began but did not finish, between the Pelusian arm of the Nile and the Red Sea; while the construction of the two great pyramids, attributed to the kings Cheops and Chephren, was described to Herodotus by the priests as a period of exhausting labor and extreme suffering to the whole Egyptian people. And yet the great Labyrinth (said to have been built by the Dodekarchs) appeared to him a more stupendous work than the Pyramids, so that the toil employed upon it cannot have been less destructive. The moving of such vast masses of stone as were seen in the ancient edifices both of Upper and Lower Egypt, with the imperfect mechanical resources then existing, must have tasked the efforts of the people yet more severely than the excavation of the half-finished canal of Nekos. Indeed, the associations with which the Pyramids were connected, in the minds of those with whom Herodotus conversed, were of the most odious character. Such vast works, Aristotle observes, are suitable to princes who desire to consume the strength and break the spirit of their people. With Greek despots, perhaps such an intention may have been sometimes deliberately conceived. But the Egyptian kings may be presumed to have followed chiefly caprice or love of pomp—sometimes views of a permanent benefit to be achieved—as in the canal of Nekos and the vast reservoir of Mœris, with its channel joining the river—when they thus expended the physical strength and even the lives of their subjects.

Sanctity of animal life generally, veneration for particular animals in particular Nomes, and abstinence on religious grounds from certain vegetables, were among the marked features of Egyptian life, and served pre-eminently to impress upon the country that air of singularity which foreigners, like Herodotus, remarked in it. The two specially marked bulls, called Apis at Memphis and Mnevis at Heliopolis, seemed to have enjoyed a sort of national worship. The ibis, the cat, and the dog, were throughout most of the Nomes venerated

during life, embalmed like men after death, and if killed, avenged by the severest punishment of the offending party: but the veneration of the crocodile was confined to the neighborhood of Thebes and the lake of Mœris. Such veins of religious sentiment, which distinguished Egypt from Phenicia and Assyria not less than from Greece, were explained by the native priests after their manner to Herodotus; though he declines from pious scruples to communicate what was told to him. They seem remnants continued from a very early stage of Fetichism—and the attempts of different persons, noticed in Diodorus and Plutarch, to account for their origin, partly by legends, partly by theory, will give little satisfaction to any one.

Though Thebes first, and Memphis afterward, were undoubtedly the principal cities of Egypt, yet if the dynasties of Manetho are at all trustworthy, even in their general outline, the Egyptian kings were not taken uniformly either from one or the other. Manetho enumerates on the whole twenty-six different dynasties or families of kings, anterior to the conquest of the country by Kambyses—the Persian kings between Kambyses and Darius Nothus, down to the death of the latter in 405 B.C., constituting his twenty-seventh dynasty. Of these twenty-six dynasties, beginning with the year 5702 B.C., the first two are Thinites—the third and fourth, Memphites—the fifth, from the island of Elephantine—the sixth, seventh, and eighth, again Memphites—the ninth and tenth, Herakleopolites—the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth, Diospolites or Thebans—the fourteenth, Choites—the fifteenth and sixteenth, Hyksos or Shepherd Kings—the seventeenth, Shepherd Kings, overthrown and succeeded by Diospolites—the eighteenth (B.C. 1655–1327, in which is included Rameses the great Egyptian conqueror, identified by many authors with Sesostris, 1411 B.C.)—nineteenth and twentieth, Diospolites—the twenty-first, Tanites—the twenty-second, Bubastites—the twenty-third, again Tanites—the twenty-fourth, Saites—the twenty-fifth, Ethiopians, beginning with Sabakon, whom Herodotus also mentions—the twenty-sixth, Saites, including Psammetichus, Nekos, Apries or Uaphris, and Amasis or Amosis. We see by these lists, that according to the manner in which Manetho construed the antiquities of his country, several other cities of Egypt, besides Thebes and Memphis, furnished kings to the whole territory. But we cannot trace any correspondence between the Nomes which furnished kings, and those which Herodotus mentions to have been exclusively occupied by the military caste. Many of the separate Nomes were of considerable substantive importance, and had a marked local character each to itself, religious as well as political; though the whole of Egypt, from Elephantine to Pelusium and Kanopus, is said to have always constituted one kingdom, from the earliest times which the native priests could conceive.

We are to consider this kingdom as engaged, long before the time when Greeks were admitted into it, in a standing caravan commerce

with Phenicia, Palestine, Arabia, and Assyria. Ancient Egypt having neither vines nor olives, imported both wine and oil; while it also needed especially the frankincense and aromatic products peculiar to Arabia, for its elaborate religious ceremonies. Toward the last quarter of the eighth century B.C. (a little before the time when the dynasty of the Mermnadæ in Lydia was commencing in the person of Gyges), we trace events tending to alter the relation which previously subsisted between these countries, by continued aggressions on the part of the Assyrian monarchs of Nineveh—Salmaneser and Sennacherib. The former having conquered and led into captivity the ten tribes of Israel, also attacked the Phenician towns on the adjoining coast: Sidon, Palæ-Tyrus, and Ake yielded to him, but Tyre itself resisted, and having endured for five years the hardships of a blockade with partial obstruction of its continental aqueducts, was enabled by means of its insular position to maintain independence. It was just at this period that the Grecian establishments in Sicily were forming, and I have already remarked that the pressure of the Assyrians upon Phenicia probably had some effect in determining that contraction of the Phenician occupations in Sicily which really took place (B.C. 730–720). Respecting Sennacherib, we are informed by the Old Testament that he invaded Judæa—and by Herodotus (who calls him king of the Assyrians and Arabians) that he assailed the pious king Sethos in Egypt: in both cases his army experienced a miraculous repulse and destruction. After this the Assyrians of Nineveh, either torn by intestine dissension, or shaken by the attacks of the Medes, appear no longer active; but about the year 630 B.C., the Assyrians or Chaldæans of Babylon manifest a formidable and increasing power. It is, moreover, during this century that the old routine of the Egyptian kings was broken through, and a new policy displayed toward foreigners by Psammetichus—which, while it rendered Egypt more formidable to Judæa and Phenicia, opened to Grecian ships and settlers the hitherto inaccessible Nile.

Herodotus draws a marked distinction between the history of Egypt before Psammetichus and the following period. The former he gives as the narration of the priests, without professing to guarantee it—the latter he evidently believes to be well ascertained. And we find that from Psammetichus downward, Herodotus and Manetho are in tolerable harmony, whereas even for the sovereigns occupying the last fifty years before Psammetichus, there are many and irreconcilable discrepancies between them; but they both agree in stating that Psammetichus reigned fifty-four years.

So important an event, as the first admission of the Greeks into Egypt, was made, by the informants of Herodotus, to turn upon two prophecies. After the death of Sethos (priest of Hephæstos as well as king), who left no son, Egypt became divided among twelve kings, of whom Psammetichus was one. It was under this dodekarchy,

according to Herodotus, that the marvelous labyrinth near the Lake of Mœris was constructed. The twelve lived and reigned for some time in perfect harmony. But a prophecy had been made known to them, that the one who should make libations in the temple of Hephæstos out of a brazen goblet, would reign over all Egypt. Now it happened that one day when they all appeared armed in that temple to offer sacrifice, the high priest brought out by mistake only eleven golden goblets instead of twelve; and Psammetichus, left without a goblet, made use of his brazen helmet as a substitute. Being thus considered, though unintentionally, to have fulfilled the condition of the prophecy, by making libations in a brazen goblet, he became an object of terror to his eleven colleagues, who united to despoil him of his dignity and drove him into the inaccessible marshes. In this extremity he sent to seek counsel from the oracle of Leto at Buto, and received for answer an assurance that "vengeance would come to him by the hands of brazen men showing themselves from the seaward." His faith was for the moment shaken by so startling a conception as that of brazen men for his allies. But the prophetic veracity of the priest at Buto was speedily shown, when an astonished attendant came to acquaint him in his lurking-place, that brazen men were ravaging the sea-coast of the Delta. It was a body of Ionian and Karian soldiers, who had landed for pillage; and the messenger who came to inform Psammetichus had never before seen men in an entire suit of brazen armor. That prince, satisfied that these were the allies whom the oracle had marked out for him, immediately entered into negotiation with the Ionians and Karians, enlisted them in his service, and by their aid, in conjunction with his other partisans, overpowered the other eleven kings—thus making himself the one ruler of Egypt.

Such was the tale by which the original alliance of an Egyptian king with Grecian mercenaries, and the first introduction of Greeks into Egypt, was accounted for and dignified. What followed is more authentic and more important. Psammetichus provided a settlement and lands for his new allies, on the Pelusiac or eastern branch of the Nile, a little below Bubastis. The Ionians were planted on one side of the river, the Karians on the other; and the place was made to serve as a military position, not only for the defense of the eastern border, but also for the support of the king himself against malcontents at home: it was called the Stratopeda, or the Camps. He took pains, moreover, to facilitate the intercourse between them and the neighboring inhabitants by causing a number of Egyptian children to be domiciled with them, in order to learn the Greek language. Hence sprung the interpreters, who, in the time of Herodotus, constituted a permanent hereditary caste or breed.

Though the chief purpose of this first foreign settlement in Egypt, between Pelusium and Bubastis, was to create an independent military force, and with it a fleet, for the king—yet it was of course an

opening both for communication and traffic, to all Greeks and to all Phenicians, such as had never before been available. And it was speedily followed by the throwing open of the Kanopic or western-most branch of the river for the purposes of trade specially. According to a statement of Strabo, it was in the reign of Psammetichus that the Milesians, with a fleet of thirty ships, made a descent on that part of the coast, first built a fort in the immediate neighborhood, and then presently founded the town of Naukratis on the right bank of the Kanopic Nile. There is much that is perplexing in this affirmation of Strabo; but on the whole I am inclined to think that the establishment of the Greek factories and merchants at Naukratis may be considered as dating in the reign of Psammetichus—Naukratis, however, must have been a city of Egyptian origin in which these foreigners were permitted to take up their abode—not a Greek colony, as Strabo would have us believe. The language of Herodotus seems rather to imply that it was king Amasis (between whom and the death of Psammetichus there intervened nearly half a century) who first allowed Greeks to settle at Naukratis. Yet on comparing what the historian tells us respecting the courtesan Rhodopis and the brother of Sappho, the poetess, it is evident that there must have been both Greek trade and Greek establishments in that town long before Amasis came to the throne. We may consider then, that both the eastern and western mouths of the Nile became open to the Greeks in the days of Psammetichus: the former as leading to the headquarters of the mercenary Greek troops in Egyptian pay—the latter for purposes of trade.

While this event afforded to the Greeks a valuable enlargement, both of their traffic and of their field of observation, it seems to have occasioned an internal revolution in Egypt. The Nome of Bubastis, in which the new military settlement of foreigners was planted, is numbered among those occupied by the Egyptian military caste. Whether their lands were in part taken away from them we do not know; but the mere introduction of such foreigners must have appeared an abomination to the strong conservative feeling of ancient Egypt. And Psammetichus treated the native soldiers in a manner which showed of how much less account Egyptian soldiers had become, since the "brazen helmets" had got footing in the land. It had hitherto been the practice to distribute such portions of the military, as were on actual service, in three different posts: at Daphne near Pelusium, on the north-eastern frontier—at Marea on the north-western frontier, near the spot where Alexandria was afterward built—and at Elephantine, on the southern or Ethiopian boundary. Psammetichus, having no longer occasion for their services on the eastern frontier, since the formation of the mercenary camp, accumulated them in greater number and detained them for an unusual time at the two other stations, especially at Elephantine. Here, as Herodotus tells us, they remained for three years unrelieved

Diodorus adds that Psammetichus assigned to those native troops who fought conjointly with the mercenaries, the least honorable post in the line. Discontent at length impelled them to emigrate in a body of 240,000 men into Ethiopia, leaving their wives and children behind in Egypt. No instances on the part of Psammetichus could induce them to return. This memorable incident, which is said to have given rise to a settlement in the southernmost regions of Ethiopia, called by the Greeks the Automoli (though the emigrant soldiers still call themselves by their old Egyptian name), attests the effect produced by the introduction of the foreign mercenaries in lowering the position of the native military. The number of the emigrants, however, is a point no way to be relied upon. We shall presently see that there were enough of them left behind to renew effectively the struggle for their lost dignity.

It was probably with his Ionian and Karian troops that Psammetichus carried on those warlike operations in Syria which filled so large a proportion of his long and prosperous reign of fifty-four years. He besieged the city of Azotus in Syria for twenty-nine years, until he took it—the longest blockade which Herodotus had ever heard of. Moreover he was in that country when the destroying Scythian Nomads (who had defeated the Median king Kyaxares and possessed themselves of Upper Asia) advanced to invade Egypt; a project which Psammetichus, by large presents, induced them to abandon.

There were, however, yet more powerful enemies, against whom he and his son Nekos (who succeeded him seemingly about 604 B.C.) had to contend in Syria and the lands adjoining. It is just at this period, during the reigns of Nabopolassar and his son Nebuchadnezzar (B.C. 625–561) that the Chaldeans or Assyrians of Babylon appear at the maximum of their power and aggressive disposition; while the Assyrians of Ninus or Nineveh lose their substantive position through the taking of that town by Kyaxares (about B.C. 600)—the greatest height which the Median power ever reached. Between the Egyptian Nekos and his grandson Apries (Pharaoh Necho and Pharaoh Hophra of the Old Testament) on the one side, and the Babylonian Nebuchadnezzar on the other, Judea and Phenicia form the intermediate subject of quarrel. The political independence of the Phenician towns is extinguished, never again to be recovered. At the commencement of his reign, it appears, Nekos was chiefly anxious to extend the Egyptian commerce, for which purpose he undertook two measures, both of astonishing boldness for that age—a canal between the lower part of the eastern or Pelusiac Nile and the inmost corner of the Red Sea—and the circumnavigation of Africa; his great object being to procure a water-communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. He began the canal (much about the same time as Nebuchadnezzar executed his canal from Babylon to Teredon) with such reckless determination, that 120,000 Egyptians are said to have perished in the work. But either from such disastrous proof of the difficulty, or (as Herodotus represents) from the terrors of a menacing prophecy which reached him, he was compelled to desist. Next he accomplished the circumnavigation of Africa, already above alluded to; but in this way too he found it impracticable to procure any available communication such as he wished. It is plain that in both these enterprises he was acting under Phenician and Greek instigation; and we may remark that the point of the Nile, from whence the canal took its departure, was close upon the mercenary camps or Stratopeda. Being unable to connect the two seas together, he built and equipped an armed naval force both upon the one and the other, and entered upon aggressive enterprises, naval as well as military. His army, on marching into Syria, was met at Megiddo (Herodotus says Magdolum) by Josiah, king of Judah, who was himself slain and so completely worsted, that Jerusalem fell into the power of the conqueror, and became tributary to Egypt. It deserves to be noted that Nekos sent the raiment which he had worn on the day of this victory as an offering to the holy temple of Apollo at Branchidæ near Miletus —the first recorded instance of a donation from an Egyptian king to a Grecian temple, and a proof that Hellenic affinities were beginning to take effect upon him. Probably we may conclude that a large proportion of his troops were Milesians.

But the victorious career of Nekos was completely checked by the defeat which he experienced at Carchemisch (or Circesium) on the Euphrates, from Nebuchadnezzar and the Babylonians, who not only drove him out of Judea and Syria, but also took Jerusalem, and carried away the king and the principal Jews into captivity. Nebuchadnezzar farther attacked the Phenician cities, and the siege of Tyre alone cost him severe toil for thirteen years. After this long and gallant resistance, the Tyrians were forced to submit, and underwent the same fate as the Jews. Their princes and chiefs were dragged captive into the Babylonian territory, and the Phenician cities became numbered among the tributaries of Nebuchadnezzar. So they seem to have remained, until the overthrow of Babylon by Cyrus: for we find among those extracts (unhappily very brief) which Josephus has preserved out of the Tyrian annals, that during this interval there were disputes and irregularities in the government of Tyre—judges being for a time substituted in the place of kings; while Merbal and Hirom, two princes of the regal Tyrian line, detained captive in Babylonia, were successively sent down on the special petition of the Tyrians, and reigned at Tyre; the former four years, the latter twenty years, until the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus. The Egyptian king Apries, indeed, son of Psammis and grandson of Nekos, attacked Sidon and Tyre both by land and sea, but seemingly without any result. To the Persian empire, as soon as Cyrus had conquered Babylon, they cheerfully and spontaneously submitted, whereby the restoration of the captive Tyrians to their home was probably conceded to them, like that of the captive Jews.

Nekos in Egypt was succeeded by his son Psammis, and he again, after a reign of six years, by his son Apries; of whose power and prosperity Herodotus speaks in very high general terms, though the few particulars which he recounts are of a contrary tenor. It was not till after a reign of twenty-five years that Apries undertook that expedition against the Greek colonies in Libya—Kyrene and Barka—which proved his ruin. The native Libyan tribes near those cities having sent to surrender themselves to him and entreat his aid against the Greek settlers, Apries dispatched to them a large force composed of native Egyptians; who (as has been before mentioned) were stationed on the north-western frontier of Egypt, and were therefore most available for the march against Kyrene. The Kyrenean citizens advanced to oppose them, and a battle ensued in which the Egyptians were completely routed with severe loss. It is affirmed that they were thrown into disorder from want of practical knowledge of Grecian warfare—a remarkable proof of the entire isolation of the Grecian mercenaries (who had now been long in the service of Psammetichus and his successors) from the native Egyptians.

This disastrous reverse provoked a mutiny in Egypt against Apries, the soldiers contending that he had dispatched them on the enterprise with a deliberate view to their destruction, in order to assure his rule over the remaining Egyptians. The malcontents found so much sympathy among the general population, that Amasis, a Saitic Egyptian of low birth but of considerable intelligence, whom Apries had sent to conciliate them, was either persuaded or constrained to become their leader, and prepared to march immediately against the king at Sais. Unbounded and reverential submission to the royal authority was a habit so deeply rooted in the Egyptian mind, that Apries could not believe the resistance to be serious. He sent an officer of consideration named Patarbemis to bring Amasis before him. When Patarbemis returned, bringing back from the rebel nothing better than a contemptuous refusal to appear except at the head of an army, the exasperated king ordered his nose and ears to be cut off. This act of atrocity caused such indignation among the Egyptians round him, that most of them deserted and joined the revolters, who thus became irresistibly formidable in point of numbers. There yet remained to Apries the foreign mercenaries—thirty thousand Ionians and Karians—whom he summoned from their Stratopeda on the Pelusiac Nile to his residence at Sais. This force, the creation of his ancestor Psammetichus and the main reliance of his family, still inspired him with such unabated confidence, that he marched to attack the far superior numbers under Amasis at Momemphis. Though his troops behaved with bravery, the disparity of numbers, combined with the excited feeling of the insurgents, overpowered him: he was defeated and carried prisoner to Sais, where at first Amasis not only spared his life, but treated him with generosity. Such, however, was the antipathy of the Egyptians, that

they forced Amasis to surrender his prisoner into their hands, and immediately strangled him.

It is not difficult to trace in these proceedings the outbreak of a long-suppressed hatred on the part of the Egyptian soldier-caste toward the dynasty of Psammetichus, to whom they owed their comparative degradation, and by whom that stream of Hellenism had been let in upon Egypt which doubtless was not witnessed without great repugnance. It might seem, also, that this dynasty had too little of pure Egyptianism in them to find favor with the priests. At least Herodotus does not mention any religious edifices erected either by Nekos or Psammis or Apries, though he describes much of such outlay on the part of Psammetichus—who built magnificent Propylæa to the temple of Hephæstos at Memphis and a splendid new chamber or stable for the sacred bull Apis—and more still on the part of Amasis.

Nevertheless Amasis, though he had acquired the crown by this explosion of native antipathy, found the foreign adjuncts so eminently advantageous, that he not only countenanced, but multiplied them. Egypt enjoyed under him a degree of power and consideration such as it neither before possessed, nor afterward retained—for his long reign of forty-four years (570–526 B.C.) closed just six months before the Persian conquest of the country. As he was eminently phil-Hellenic, the Greek merchants at Naukratis—the permanent settlers as well as the occasional visitors—obtained from him valuable enlargement of their privileges. Besides granting permission to various Grecian towns to erect religious establishments for such of their citizens as visited the place, he also sanctioned the constitution of a formal and organized emporium or factory, invested with commercial privileges, and armed with authority exercised by presiding officers regularly chosen. This factory was connected with, and probably grew out of, a large religious edifice and precinct, built at the joint cost of nine Grecian cities: four of them Ionic,—Chios, Teos, Phokæa, and Klazomenæ; four Doric,—Rhodes, Knidus, Halikarnassus, and Phaselis; and one Æolic,—Mitylene. By these nine cities the joint temple and factory was kept up, and its presiding magistrates chosen. But its destination, for the convenience of Grecian commerce generally, seems revealed by the imposing title of *The Hellenion*. Samos, Miletus, and Ægina had each founded a separate temple at Naukratis for the worship of such of their citizens as went there; probably connected (as the Hellenion was) with protection and facilities for commercial purposes. While these three powerful cities had thus constituted each a factory for itself, as guarantee to the merchandise, and as responsible for the conduct of its own citizens separately—the corporation of the Hellenion served both as protection and control to all other Greek merchants. And such was the usefulness, the celebrity, and probably the pecuniary profit, of the corporation, that other Grecian cities set up claims to a

share in it, falsely pretending to have contributed to the original foundation.

Naukratis was for a long time the privileged port for Grecian commerce with Egypt. No Greek merchant was permitted to deliver goods in any other part, or to enter any other of the mouths of the Nile except the Kanopic. If forced into any of them by stress of weather, he was compelled to make oath that his arrival was a matter of necessity, and to convey his goods round by sea into the Kanopic branch to Naukratis. If the weather still forbade such a proceeding, the merchandise was put into barges and conveyed round to Naukratis by the internal canals of the Delta. Such a monopoly, which made Naukratis in Egypt something like Canton in China, or Nagasaki in Japan, no longer subsisted in the time of Herodotus. But the factory of the Hellenion was in full operation and dignity, and very probably he himself, as a native of one of the contributing cities, Halikarnassus, may have profited by its advantages. At what precise time Naukratis first became licensed for Grecian trade, we cannot directly make out. But there seems reason to believe that it was the port to which the Greek merchants first went, so soon as the general liberty of trading with the country was conceded to them; and this would put the date of such grant at least as far back as the foundation of Kyrene and the voyage of the fortunate Kolæus, who was on his way with a cargo to Egypt when the storms overtook him—about 630 B.C., during the reign of Psammetichus. And in the time of the poetess Sappho and her brother Charaxus, it seems evident that Greeks had been some time established at Naukratis. But Amasis, though his predecessors had permitted such establishment, may doubtless be regarded as having given organization to the factories, and as having placed the Greeks on a more comfortable footing of security than they had ever enjoyed before.

This Egyptian king manifested several other evidences of his phil-Hellenic disposition by donations to Delphi and other Grecian temples. He even married a Grecian wife from the city of Kyrene. Moreover, he was in intimate alliance and relations of hospitality both with Polykrates, despot of Samos, and with Crœsus, king of Lydia. He conquered the island of Cyprus, and rendered it tributary to the Egyptian throne. His fleet and army were maintained in good condition, and the foreign mercenaries, the great strength of the dynasty whom he had supplanted, were not only preserved, but even removed from their camp near Pelusium to the chief town, Memphis, where they served as the special guards of Amasis. Egypt enjoyed under him a degree of power abroad and prosperity at home (the river having been abundant in its overflowing), which was the more tenaciously remembered on account of the period of disaster and subjugation immediately following his death. And his contributions, in architecture and sculpture, to the temples of Sais and Memphis were on a scale of vastness surpassing everything before known in Lower Egypt.

CHAPTER XXI.

DECLINE OF THE PHENICIANS.—GROWTH OF CARTHAGE.

THE preceding sketch of that important system of foreign nations—Phenicians, Assyrians, and Egyptians—who occupied the south-eastern portion of the (*οἰκουμένη*) inhabited world of an early Greek, brings them down nearly to the time at which they were all absorbed into the mighty Persian empire. In tracing the series of events which intervened between 700 B.C. and 530 B.C., we observe a material increase of power both in the Chaldæans and Egyptians, and an immense extention of Grecian maritime activity and commerce—but we at the same time notice the decline of Tyre and Sidon, both in power and traffic. The arms of Nebuchadnezzar reduced the Phenician cities to the same state of dependence as that which the Ionian cities underwent half a century later from Crœsus and Cyrus; while the ships of Miletus, Phokæa, and Samos gradually spread over all those waters of the Levant which had once been exclusively Phenician. In the year 704 B.C., the Samians did not yet possess a single trireme: down to the year 630 B.C., not a single Greek vessel had yet visited Libya. But when we reach 550 B.C., we find the Ionic ships predominant in the Ægean, and those of Corinth and Korkyra in force to the west of Peloponnesus—we see the flourishing cities of Kyrene and Barka already rooted in Libya, and the port of Naukratis a busy emporium of Grecian commerce with Egypt. The trade by land—which is all that Egypt had enjoyed prior to Psammetichus, and which was exclusively conducted by Phenicians—is exchanged for a trade by sea, of which the Phenicians have only a share, and seemingly a smaller share than the Greeks. Moreover the conquest by Amasis of the island of Cyprus, half-filled with Phenician settlements and once the tributary dependency of Tyre—affords an additional mark of the comparative decline of that great city. In her commerce with the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf she still remained without a competitor, the schemes of the Egyptian king Nekos having proved abortive. Even in the time of Herodotus, the spices and frankincense of Arabia were still brought and distributed only by the Phenician merchant. But, on the whole, both political and industrial development of Tyre are now cramped by impediments, and kept down by rivals, not before in operation; so that the part which she will be found to play in the Mediterranean, throughout the whole course of this history, is one subordinate and of reduced importance.

The course of Grecian history is not directly affected by these

countries. Yet their effect upon the Greek mind was very considerable, and the opening of the Nile by Psammetichus constitutes an epoch in Hellenic thought. It supplied to their observation a large and diversified field of present reality, while it was at the same time one great source of those mysticizing tendencies which corrupted so many of their speculative minds. But to Phenicia and Assyria, the Greeks owe two acquisitions well-deserving special mention—the alphabet, and the first standard and scale of weight as well as coined money. Of neither of these acquisitions can we trace the precise date. That the Greek alphabet is derived from the Phenician, the analogy of the two proves beyond dispute, though we know not how or where the inestimable present was handed over, of which no traces are to be found in the Homeric poems. The Latin alphabet, which is nearly identical with the most ancient Doric variety of the Greek, was derived from the same source—also the Etruscan alphabet, though (if O. Müller is correct in his conjecture) only at second-hand through the intervention of the Greek. If we cannot make out at what time the Phenicians made this valuable communication to the Greeks, much less can we determine when or how they acquired it themselves—whether it be of Semitic invention, or derived from improvement upon the phonetic hieroglyphics of the Egyptians.

Besides the letters of the Alphabet, the scale of weight and that of coined money passed from Phenicia and Assyria into Greece. It has been shown by Boeckh in his "Metrologie" that the Æginæan scale—with its divisions, talent, mna, and obolus—is identical with the Babylonian and Phenician; and that the word *Mna*, which forms the central point of the scale, is of Chaldæan origin. On this I have already touched in a former chapter, while relating the history of Pheidon of Argos, by whom what is called the Æginæan scale was first promulgated.

In tracing, therefore, the effect upon the Greek mind of early intercourse with the various Asiatic nations, we find that as the Greeks made up their musical scale (so important an element of their early mental culture) in part by borrowing from Lydians and Phrygians—so also their monetary and statical system, their alphabetical writing, and their duodecimal division of the day measured by the gnomon and the shadow, were all derived from Assyrians and Phenicians. The early industry and commerce of these countries were thus in many ways available to Grecian advance, and would probably have become more so if the great and rapid rise of the more barbarous Persions had not reduced them all to servitude. The Phenicians, though unkind rivals, were at the same time examples and stimulants to Greek maritime aspiration; and the Phenician worship of that goddess whom the Greeks knew under the name of Aphrodite, became communicated to the latter in Cyprus, in Kythera, in Sicily—perhaps also in Corinth.

The sixth century B.C., though a period of decline for Tyre and Sidon, was a period of growth for their African colony Carthage, which appears during this century in considerable traffic with the Tyrrhenian towns on the southern coast of Italy, and as thrusting out the Phokæan settlers from Alalia in Corsica. The wars of the Carthaginians with the Grecian colonies in Sicily, so far as they are known to us, commence shortly after 500 B.C., and continue at intervals, with fluctuating success, for two centuries and a half.

The foundation of Carthage by the Tyrians is placed at different dates, the lowest of which, however, is 819 B.C.: other authorities place it in 878 B.C., and we have no means of deciding between them. I have already remarked that it is by no means the oldest of the Tyrian colonies. But though Utica and Gades were more ancient than Carthage, the latter so greatly outstripped them in wealth and power, as to acquire a sort of federal pre-eminence over all the Phenician colonies on the coast of Africa. In those later times when the dominion of the Carthaginians had reached its maximum, it comprised the towns of Utica, Hippo, Adrumetum, and Leptis,—all original Phenician foundations, and enjoying probably even, as dependents of Carthage, a certain qualified autonomy—besides a great number of smaller towns planted by themselves, and inhabited by a mixed population called Liby-Phenicians. Three hundred such towns—a dependent territory covering half the space between the Lesser and the Greater Syrtis, and in many parts remarkably fertile—a city said to contain 700,000 inhabitants, active, wealthy, and seemingly homogeneous—and foreign dependencies in Sicily, Sardinia, the Balearic isles, and Spain,—all this aggregate of power, under one political management, was sufficient to render the contest of Carthage even with Rome for some time doubtful.

But by what steps the Carthaginians raised themselves to such a pitch of greatness we have no information. We are even left to guess how much of it had already been acquired in the sixth century B.C. As in the case of so many other cities, we have a foundation legend decorating the moment of birth, and then nothing farther. The Tyrian princess Dido or Elisa, daughter of Belus, sister of Pygmalion, king of Tyre, and wife of the wealthy Sichæus priest of Herakles in that city—is said to have been left a widow in consequence of the murder of Sichæus by Pygmalion, who seized the treasures belonging to his victim. But Dido found means to disappoint him of his booty, possessed herself of the gold which had tempted Pygmalion, and secretly emigrated, carrying with her the sacred insignia of Herakles. A considerable body of Tyrians followed her. She settled at Carthage on a small hilly peninsula joined by a narrow tongue of land to the continent, purchasing from the natives as much land as could be surrounded by an ox's hide, which she caused to be cut into the thinnest strip, and thus made it sufficient for the site of her first citadel, Byrsa, which afterward grew up into the great city of Carthage. As soon as her new settlement had acquired footing, she was solicited

in marriage by several princes of the native tribes, especially by the Gætulian Jarbas, who threatened war if he were refused. Thus pressed by the clamors of her own people, who desired to come into alliance with the natives, yet irrevocably determined to maintain exclusive fidelity to her first husband, she escaped the conflict by putting an end to her life. She pretended to acquiesce in the proposition of a second marriage, requiring only delay sufficient to offer an expiatory sacrifice to the manes of Sichæus. A vast funeral pile was erected, and many victims slain upon it, in the midst of which Dido pierced her own bosom with a sword and perished in the flames. Such is the legend to which Virgil has given a new color by interweaving the adventures of Æneas, and thus connecting the foundation legends of Carthage and Rome, careless of his deviation from the received mythical chronology. Dido was worshiped as a goddess at Carthage until the destruction of the city; and it has been imagined with some probability that she is identical with Astarte, the divine patroness under whose auspices the colony was originally established, as Gades and Tarsus were founded under those of Herakles—the tale of the funeral pile and self-burning appearing in the religious ceremonies of other Cicilian and Syrian towns. Phenician religion and worship was diffused along with the Phenician colonies throughout the larger portion of the Mediterranean.

The Phokæans of Ionia, who amid their adventurous voyages westward established the colony of Massalia (as early as 600 B.C.), were only enabled to accomplish this by a naval victory over the Carthaginians—the earliest example of Greek and Carthaginian collision which has been preserved to us. The Carthaginians were jealous of commercial rivalry, and their traffic with the Tuscans and Latins in Italy, as well as their lucrative mine-working in Spain, dates from a period when Greek commerce in those regions was hardly known. In Greek authors the denomination Phenicians is often used to designate the Carthaginians as well as the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, so that we cannot always distinguish which of the two is meant. But it is remarkable that the distant establishment of Gades, and the numerous settlements planted for commercial purposes along the western coast of Africa and without the Strait of Gibraltar, are expressly ascribed to the Tyrians. Many of the other Phenician establishments on the southern coast of Spain seem to have owed their origin to Carthage rather than to Tyre. But the relations between the two, so far as we know them, were constantly amicable, and Carthage even at the period of her highest glory sent Theori with a tribute of religious recognition to the Tyrian Herakles: the visit of these envoys coincided with the siege of the town by Alexander the Great. On that critical occasion the wives and children of the Tyrians were sent to find shelter at Carthage. Two centuries before, when the Persian empire was in its age of growth and expansion, the Tyrians had refused to aid Kambyses with their fleet in its plans

for conquering Carthage, and thus probably preserved their colony from subjugation.

CHAPTER XXII.

WESTERN COLONIES OF GREECE—IN EPIRUS, ITALY, SICILY, AND GAUL.

THE stream of Grecian colonization to the westward, as far as we can be said to know it authentically, with names and dates, begins from the 11th Olympiad. But it is reasonable to believe that there were other attempts earlier than this, though we must content ourselves with recognizing them as generally probable. There were doubtless detached bands of volunteer emigrants or marauders who, fixing themselves in some situation favorable to commerce or piracy, either became mingled with the native tribes, or grew up by successive reinforcements into an acknowledged town. Not being able to boast of any filiation from the Prytaneium of a known Grecian city, these adventurers were often disposed to fasten upon the inexhaustible legend of the Trojan war, and ascribe their origin to one of the victorious heroes in the host of Agamemnon, alike distinguished for their valor and for their ubiquitous dispersion after the siege. Of such alleged settlements by fugitive Grecian or Trojan heroes, there were a great number, on various points throughout the shores of the Mediterranean; and the same honorable origin was claimed even by many non-Hellenic towns.

In the eighth century B.C., when this westerly stream of Grecian colonization begins to assume an authentic shape (735 B.C.), the population of Sicily (as far as our scanty information permits us to determine it) consisted of two races completely distinct from each other—Sikels and Sikans—besides the Elymi (a mixed race apparently distinct from both, occupying Eryx and Egesta near the westernmost corner of the island) and the Phenician colonies and coast establishments formed for purposes of trade. According to the belief both of Thucydides and Philistus, these Sikans, though they gave themselves out as indigenous, were yet of Iberian origin and emigrants of earlier date than the Sikels—by whom they had been invaded and restricted to the smaller western half of the island. The Sikels were said to have crossed over originally from the south-western corner of the Calabrian peninsula, where a portion of the nation still dwelt in the time of Thucydides. The territory known to Greek writers of the fifth century B.C. by the names of Œnotria on the coast of the Mediterranean, and Italia on that of the Gulfs of Tarentum and Squillace, included all that lies south of a line drawn across the breadth of the country, from the Gulf of Poseidonia (Pæstum) and

the river Silarus on the Mediterranean sea, to the north-west corner of the Gulf of Tarentum. It was bounded northward by the Iapygians and Messapians, who occupied the Salentine peninsula and the country immediately adjoining to Tarentum, and by the Peuketians on the Ionic Gulf. According to the logographers Pherekydes and Hellanikus, Œnotrus and Peuketius were sons of Lykaon, grandsons of Pelasgus, and emigrants in very early times from Arcadia to this territory. An important statement in Stephanus Byzantinus acquaints us that the serf population, whom the great Hellenic cities in this portion of Italy employed in the cultivation of their lands, were called Pelasgi, seemingly even in the historical times. It is upon this name probably that the mythical genealogy of Pherekydes is constructed. This Œnotrian or Pelasgian race were the population whom the Greek colonists found there on their arrival. They were now apparently under other names, such as the Sikels (mentioned even in the Odyssey, though their exact locality in that poem cannot be ascertained), the Italians or Italia, properly so called—the Morgetes—and the Chaones—all of them names of tribes either cognate or subdivisional. The Chaones or Chaonians are also found not only in Italy, but in Epirus, as one of the most considerable of the Epirotic tribes; while Pandosia, the ancient residence of the Œnotrian kings in the southern corner of Italy, was also the name of a township or locality in Epirus, with a neighboring river Acheron in both. From hence, and from some other similarities of name, it has been imagined that Epirots, Œnotrians, Sikels, etc., were all names of cognate people, and all entitled to be comprehended under the generic appellation of Pelasgi. That they belonged to the same ethnical kindred, there seems fair reason to presume; and also that in point of language, manners, and character they were not very widely separated from the ruder branches of the Hellenic race.

It would appear too (as far as any judgment can be formed on a point essentially obscure) that the Œnotrians were ethnically akin to the primitive population of Rome and Latium on one side, as they were to the Epirots on the other; and that tribes of this race, comprising Sikels, and Itali properly so called, as sections, had at one time occupied most of the territory from the left bank of the river Tiber southward between the Apennines and the Mediterranean. Both Herodotus and his junior contemporary the Syracusan Antiochus, extend Œnotria as far northward as the river Silarus, and Sophokles includes the whole coast of the Mediterranean, from the Strait of Messina to the Gulf of Genoa, under the three successive names of Œnotria, the Tyrrhenian Gulf, and Liguria. Before or during the fifth century B.C., however, a different population, called Opicians, or Ausonians, had descended from their original seats on or north of the Apennines, and had conquered the territory between Latium and the Silarus, expelling or subjugating the Œnotrian

inhabitants, and planting outlying settlements even down to the Strait of Messina and the Liparæan isles. Hence the more precise Thucydides designates the Campanian territory, in which Cumæ stood, as the country of the Opici; a denomination which Aristotle extends to the river Tiber, so as to comprehend within it Rome and Latium. Not merely Campania, but in earlier times even Latium, originally occupied by a Sikel or Œnotrian population, appears to have been partially overrun and subdued by fiercer tribes from the Apennines, and had thus received a certain intermixture of Oscan race. But in the regions south of Latium, these Oscan conquests were still more overwhelming; and to this cause (in the belief of inquiring Greeks of the fifth century B.C.) were owing the first migrations of the Œnotrian race out of Southern Italy, which wrested the larger portion of Sicily from the pre-existing Sikanians.

This imperfect account, representing the ideas of Greeks of the fifth century B.C. as to the early population of Southern Italy, is borne out by the fullest comparison which can be made between the Greek, Latin, and Oscan language—the first two certainly, and the third probably, sisters of the same Indo-European family of languages. While the analogy, structural and radical, between Greek and Latin, establishes completely such community of family—and while comparative philology proves that on many points the Latin departs less from the supposed common type and mother-language than the Greek—there exists also in the former a non-Grecian element, and non-Grecian classes of words, which appear to imply a confluence of two or more different people with distinct tongues. The same non-Grecian element, thus traceable in the Latin, seems to present itself still more largely developed in the scanty remains of the Oscan. Moreover the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily caught several peculiar words from their association with the Sikels, which words approach in most cases very nearly to the Latin—so that a resemblance thus appears between the language of Latium on the one side, and that of Œnotrians and Sikels (in Southern Italy and Sicily) on the other, prior to the establishments of the Greeks. These are the two extremities of the Sikel population; between them appear in the intermediate country the Oscan or Ausonian tribes and language; and these latter seem to have been in a great measure conquerors and intruders from the central mountains. Such analogies of language countenance the supposition of Thucydides and Antiochus, that these Sikels had once been spread over a still larger portion of Southern Italy, and had migrated from thence into Sicily in consequence of Oscan invasions. The element of affinity existing between Latins, Œnotrians, and Sikels—to a certain degree also between all of them together and the Greeks, but not extending to the Opicians or Oscans, or to the Iapygians—may be called Pelasgic for want of a better name. But by whatever name it be called, the recognition of its existence connects and explains many isolated cir-

cumstances in the early history of Rome as well as in that of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks.

The earliest Grecian colony in Italy or Sicily, of which we know the precise date, is placed about 735 B.C., eighteen years subsequent to the Varronian era of Rome; so that the causes, tending to subject and hellenize the Sikel population in the southern region, begin their operation nearly at the same time as those which tended gradually to exalt and aggrandize the modified variety of it which existed in Latium. At that time, according to the information given to Thucydides, the Sikels had been established for three centuries in Sicily. Hellanikus and Philistus—who both recognized a similar migration into that island out of Italy, though they give different names both to the emigrants and to those who expelled them—assign to the migration a date three generations before the Trojan war. Earlier than 735 B.C., however, though we do not know the precise era of its commencement, there existed one solitary Grecian establishment in the Tyrrhenian Sea—the Campanian Cumæ near Cape Misenum; which the more common opinion of chronologists supposed to have been founded in 1050 B.C., and which has even been carried back by some authors to 1139 B.C. Without reposing any faith in this early chronology, we may at least feel certain that it is the most ancient Grecian establishment in any part of Italy, and that a considerable time elapsed before any other Greek colonists were bold enough to cut themselves off from the Hellenic world by occupying seats on the other side of the Strait of Messina, with all the hazards of Tyrrhenian piracy as well as of Scylla and Charybdis. The Campanian Cumæ (known almost entirely by this its Latin designation) received its name and a portion of its inhabitants from the Æolic Kyme in Asia Minor. A joint band of settlers, partly from this latter town, partly from Chalkis in Eubœa—the former under the Kymæan Hippokles, the latter under the Chalkidian Megasthenes—having combined to form the new town, it was settled by agreement that Kyme should bestow the name, and that Chalkis should enjoy the title and honors of the mother city.

Cumæ, situated on the neck of the peninsula, which terminates in Cape Misenum, occupied a lofty and rocky hill overhanging the sea, and difficult of access on the land side. The unexampled fertility of the Phlegræan plains in the immediate vicinity of the city, the copious supply of fish in the Lucrine lake, and the gold mines in the neighboring island of Pithekusæ—both subsisted and enriched the colonists. Being joined by fresh settlers from Chalkis, from Eretria, and even from Samos, they became numerous enough to form distinct towns at Dikæarchia and Neapolis, thus spreading over a large portion of the Bay of Naples. In the hollow rock under the very walls of the town was situated the cavern of the prophetic Sibyl—a parallel and reproduction of the Gergithian Sibyl near Kyme in Æolis. In the immediate neighborhood,

too, stood the wild woods and dark lake of Avernus, consecrated to the subterranean gods and offering an establishment of priests, with ceremonies evoking the dead for purposes of prophecy or for solving doubts and mysteries. It was here that Grecian imagination localized the Cimmerians and the fable of Odysseus; and the Cumæans derived gains from the numerous visitors to this holy spot, perhaps hardly less than those of the inhabitants of Krissa from the vicinity of Delphi. Of the relations of these Cumæans with the Hellenic world generally, we unfortunately know nothing. But they seem to have been in intimate connection with Rome during the time of the Kings, and especially during that of the last King Tarquin; forming the intermediate link between the Greek and Latin world, whereby the feelings of the Teukrians and Gergithians near the Æolic Kyme, and the legendary stories of Trojan as well as Grecian heroes—Æneas and Odysseus—passed into the antiquarian imagination of Rome and Latium. The writers of the Augustan age knew Cumæ only in its decline, and wondered at the vast extent of its ancient walls, yet remaining in their time. But during the two centuries prior to 500 B.C., these walls inclosed a full and thriving population, in the plenitude of prosperity,—with a surrounding territory extensive as well as fertile, resorted to by purchasers of corn from Rome in years of scarcity, and unassailed as yet by formidable neighbors—and with a coast and harbors well suited to maritime commerce. At that period the town of Capua (if indeed it existed at all) was of very inferior importance. The chief part of the rich plain around it was included in the possessions of Cumæ: not unworthy probably, in the sixth century B.C., to be numbered with Sybaris and Kroton.

The decline of Cumæ begins in the first half of the fifth century B.C. (500–450 B.C.), first from the growth of hostile powers in the interior—the Tuscans and Samnites—next from violent intestine dissensions and a destructive despotism. The town was assailed by a formidable host of invaders from the interior, Tuscans reinforced by Umbrian and Daunian allies; which Dionysius refers to the 64th Olympiad (524—520 B.C.), though upon what chronological authority we do not know, and though this same time is marked by Eusebius as the date of the foundation of Dikæarchia from Cumæ. The invaders, in spite of great disparity of number, were bravely repelled by the Cumæans, chiefly through the heroic example of the citizen then first known and distinguished—Aristodemus Malakus. The government of the city was oligarchical, and the oligarchy from that day became jealous of Aristodemus; who, on his part, acquired extraordinary popularity and influence among the people. Twenty years afterward, the Latin city of Aricia, an ancient ally of Cumæ, being attacked by a Tuscan host, entreated succor from the Cumæans. The oligarchy of the latter thought this a good opportunity to rid themselves of Aristodemus, whom they dispatched by sea to Aricia, with rotten vessels and an insufficient body of troops. But their strata-

gem failed and proved their ruin; for the skill and intrepidity of Aristodemus sufficed for the rescue of Aricia. He brought back his troops victorious and devoted to himself personally. He then, partly by force, partly by stratagem, subverted the oligarchy, put to death the principal rulers, and constituted himself despot. By a jealous energy, by disarming the people, and by a body of mercenaries, he maintained himself in this authority for twenty years, running his career of lust and iniquity until old age. At length a conspiracy of the oppressed population proved successful against him; he was slain with all his family, and many of his chief partisans, and the former government was restored.

The despotism of Aristodemus falls during the exile of the expelled Tarquin (to whom he gave shelter) from Rome, and during the government of Gelon at Syracuse. Such a calamitous period of dissension and misrule was one of the great causes of the decline of Cumæ. Nearly at the same time, the Tuscan powers, both by land and sea, appears at its maximum; while the Tuscan establishment at Capua also begins, if we adopt the era of the town as given by Cato. There was thus created at the expense of Cumæ a powerful city, which was still farther aggrandized afterward when conquered and occupied by the Samnites; whose invading tribes, under their own name or that of Lucanians, extended themselves during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. even to the shores of the Gulf of Tarentum. Cumæ was also exposed to formidable dangers from the sea-side: a fleet either of Tuscans alone, or of Tuscans and Carthaginians united, assailed it in 474 B.C., when it was only rescued by the active interposition of Hiero, despot of Syracuse; by whose naval force the invaders were repelled with slaughter. These incidents go partly to indicate, partly to explain, the decline of the most ancient Hellenic settlement in Italy—a decline from which it never recovered.

After briefly sketching the history of Cumæ, we pass naturally to that series of powerful colonies which were established in Sicily and Italy beginning with 735 B. C. — enterprises in which Chalkis, Corinth, Megara, Sparta, the Achæans in Peloponnesus and the Lokrians out of Peloponnesus, were all concerned. Chalkis, the metropolis of Cumæ, became also the metropolis of Naxos, the most ancient Grecian colony in Sicily, on the eastern coast of the island, between the Strait of Messina and Mount Ætna.

The great number of Grecian settlements, from different colonizing towns, which appear to have taken effect within a few years upon the eastern coast of Italy and Sicily—from the Iapygian cape to Cape Pachynus—leads us to suppose that the extraordinary capacities of the country for receiving new settlers had become known only suddenly. The colonies follow so close upon each other, that the example of the first cannot have been the single determining motive to those which followed. I shall have occasion to point out, even a century later (on the occasion of the settlement of Kyrene), the narrow range of Grecian navigation, so that the previous supposed ignorance would not be at all incredible, were it not for the fact of the pre-existing colony of Cumæ. According to the practice universal with Grecian ships—which rarely permitted themselves to lose sight of the coast except in cases of absolute necessity—every man, who navigated from Greece to Italy or Sicily, first coasted along the shores of Akarnania and Epirus until he reached the latitude of Korkyra, he then struck across first to that island, next to the Iapygian promontory, from whence he proceeded along the eastern coast of Italy (the Gulfs of Tarentum and Squillace) to the southern promontory of Calabria and the Sicilian Strait; he would then sail, still coastwise, either to Syracuse or to Cumæ, according to his destination. So different are nautical habits now, that this fact requires special notice. We must recollect, moreover, that in 735 B.C., there were yet no Grecian settlements either in Epirus or in Korkyra: outside the Gulf of Corinth, the world was non-Hellenic, with the single exception of the remote Cumæ. A little before the last-mentioned period, Theokles (an Athenian or a Chalkidian—probably the latter), being cast by storms on the coast of Sicily, became acquainted with the tempting character of the soil, as well as with the dispersed and half-organized condition of the petty Sikel communities who occupied it. The oligarchy of Chalkis, acting upon the information which he brought back, sent out under his guidance settlers, Chalkidian and Naxian, who founded the Sicilian Naxos. Theokles and his companions on landing first occupied the eminence of Taurus immediately overhanging the sea (whereon was established four centuries afterward the town of Tauromenium, after Naxos had been destroyed by the Syracusan despot Dionysius); for they had to make good their position against the Sikels, who were in occupation of the neighborhood, and whom it was requisite either to dispossess, or to subjugate. After they had acquired secure possession of the territory, the site of the city was transferred to a convenient spot adjoining; but the hill first occupied remained ever memorable, both to Greeks and to Sikels. On it was erected the altar of Apollo Archegetes, the divine patron who (through his oracle at Delphi) had sanctioned and determined Hellenic colonization in the island. The altar remained permanently as a sanctuary, common to all the Sicilian Greeks, where the Theors or sacred envoys from their various cities, when they visited the Olympic and other festivals of Greece, were always in the habit of offering sacrifice immediately before their departure. To the indigenous Sikels who maintained their autonomy, on the other hand, the hill was an object of lasting but odious recollection, as the spot in which Grecian conquest and intrusion had first begun; so that at the distance of three centuries and a half from the event, we find them still animated by this sentiment in obstructing the foundation of Tauromenium.

At the time when Theokles landed, the Sikels were in possession of

the larger half of the island, lying chiefly to the east of the Heræan mountains—a continuous ridge stretching from north-west to south-east, distinct from that chain of detached mountains, much higher, called the Nebrodes, which run nearly parallel with the northern shore. West of the Heræan hills were situated the Sikans; and west of these latter, Eryx and Egesta, the possessions of the Elymi: along the western portion of the northern coast, also, were placed Motye, Solœis, and Panormus (now Palermo), the Phenician or Carthaginian sea-ports. The formation (or at least the extension) of these three last-mentioned ports, however, was a consequence of the multiplied Grecian colonies; for the Phenicians down to this time had not founded any territorial or permanent establishments, but had contented themselves with occupying in a temporary way various capes or circumjacent islets for the purpose of trade with the interior. The arrival of formidable Greek settlers, maritime like themselves, induced them to abandon these outlying factories, and to concentrate their strength in the three considerable towns above named, all near to that corner of the island which approached most closely to Carthage. The east side of Sicily, and most part of the south, were left open to the Greeks, with no other opposition than that of the indigenous Sikels and Sikans, who were gradually expelled from all contact with the sea-shore except on part of the north side of the island—and who were indeed so unpractised at sea as well as destitute of shipping, that in the tale of their old migration out of Italy into Sicily, the Sikels were affirmed to have crossed the narrow strait upon rafts at a moment of favorable wind.

In the very next year to the foundation of Naxos, Corinth began her part in the colonization of the island. A body of settlers, under the Œkist Archias, landed in the islet Ortygia, farther southward on the eastern coast, expelled the Sikel occupants, and laid the first stone of the mighty Syracuse. Ortygia, two English miles in circumference, was separated from the main island only by a narrow channel, which was bridged over when the city was occupied and enlarged by Gelon in the 72d Olympiad, if not earlier. It formed only a small part, though the most secure and best fortified part, of the vast space which the city afterward occupied. But it sufficed alone for the inhabitants during a considerable time, and the present city in its modern decline has again reverted to the same modest limits. Moreover Ortygia offered another advantage of not less value. It lay across the entrance of a spacious harbor, approached by a narrow mouth, and its fountain of Arethusa was memorable in antiquity both for abundance and goodness of water. We should have been glad to learn something respecting the numbers, character, position, nativity, etc., of these primitive emigrants, the founders of a city afterward comprising a vast walled circuit, which Strabo reckons at 180 stadia, but which the modern observations of Colonel Leake announce as fourteen English miles, or about 122 stadia. We

are told only that many of them came from the Corinthian village of Tenea, and that one of them sold to a comrade on the voyage his lot of land in prospective for the price of a honey-cake. The little which we hear about the determining motives of the colony refers to the personal character of the œkist. Archias, son of Euagetus, one of the governing gens of the Bacchiadæ at Corinth, in the violent prosecution of unbridled lust, had caused, though unintentionally, the death of a free youth named Aktæon; whose father Melissus, after having vainly endeavored to procure redress, slew himself at the Isthmian games, invoking the vengeance of Poseidon against the aggressor. Such were the destructive effects of this paternal curse, that Archias was compelled to expatriate. The Bacchiadæ placed him at the head of the emigrants to Ortygia, in 734 B.C.: at that time, probably, this was a sentence of banishment to which no man of commanding station would submit except under the pressure of necessity.

There yet remained room for new settlements between Naxos and Syracuse, and Theokles, the œkist of Naxos, found himself in a situation to occupy part of this space only five years after the foundation of Syracuse: perhaps he may have been joined by fresh settlers. He attacked and expelled the Sikels from the fertile spot called Leontini, seemingly about half-way down on the eastern coast between Mount Ætna and Syracuse; and also from Katana, immediately adjoining to Mount Ætna, which still retains both its name and its importance. Two new Chalkidic colonies were thus founded—Theokles himself becoming œkist of Leontini, and Euarchus, chosen by the Katanæan settlers themselves, of Katana.

The city of Megara was not behind Corinth and Chalkis in furnishing emigrants to Sicily. Lamis the Megarian, having now arrived with a body of colonists, took posession first of a new spot called Trotilus, but afterward joined the recent Chalkidian settlement at Leontini. The two bodies of settlers, however, not living in harmony, Lamis, with his companions, was soon expelled; he then occupied Thapsus, at a little distance to the northward of Ortygia or Syracuse, and shortly afterward died. His followers made an alliance with Hyblon, king of a neighboring tribe of Sikels, who invited them to settle in his territory. They accepted the proposition, relinquished Thapsus, and founded, in conjunction with Hyblon, the city called the Hyblæan Megara, between Leontini and Syracuse. This incident is the more worthy of notice, because it is one of the instances which we find of a Grecian colony beginning by amicable fusion with the pre-existing residents. Thucydides seems to conceive the prince Hyblon as betraying his people against their wishes to the Greeks.

It was thus that, during the space of five years, several distinct bodies of Greek emigrants had rapidly succeeded each other in Sicily. For the next forty years, we do not hear of any fresh arrivals, which is the more easy to understand as there were during that interval

several considerable foundations on the coast of Italy, which probably took off the disposable Greek settlers. At length, forty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse, a fresh body of settlers arrived; partly from Rhodes under Antiphemus, partly from Krete under Entimus. They founded the city of Gela on the south-western front of the island, between Cape Pachynus and Lilybæum (B.C. 690)—still on the territory of the Sikels, though extending ultimately to a portion of that of the Sikans. The name of the city was given from that of the neighboring river Gela.

One other fresh migration from Greece to Sicily remains to be mentioned, though we cannot assign the exact date of it. The town of Zankle (now Messina), on the strait between Italy and Sicily, was at first occupied by certain privateers or pirates from Cumæ—the situation being eminently convenient for their operations. But the success of the other Chalkidic settlements imparted to this nest of pirates a more enlarged and honorable character. A body of new settlers joined them from Chalkis and other towns of Eubœa, the land was regularly divided, and two joint œkists were provided to qualify the town as a member of the Hellenic communion—Perieres from Chalkis, and Kratæmenes from Cumæ. The name Zankle had been given by the primitive Sikel occupants of the place, meaning in their language *a sickle;* but it was afterward changed to Messene by Anaxilas, despot of Rhegium, who, when he conquered the town, introduced new inhabitants in a manner hereafter to be noticed.

Besides these emigrations direct from Greece, the Hellenic colonies in Sicily became themselves the founders of sub-colonies. Thus the Syracusans, seventy years after their own settlement (B.C. 664), founded Akræ—Kasmenæ, twenty years afterward (B.C. 644), and Kamarina forty-five years after Kasmenæ (B.C. 599): Daskon and Menekolus were the œkists of the latter, which became in process of time an independent and considerable town, while Akræ and Kasmenæ seem to have remained subject to Syracuse. Kamarina was on the south-western side of the island, forming the boundary of the Syracusan territory toward Gela. Kallipolis was established from Naxos, and Eubœa (a town so called) from Leontini.

Hitherto the Greeks had colonized altogether on the territory of the Sikels. But the three towns which remain to be mentioned were all founded in that of the Sikans—Agrigentum or Akragas—Selinus—and Himera. The two former were both on the south-western coast—Agrigentum bordering upon Gela on the one side and upon Selinus on the other. Himera was situated on the westerly portion of the northern coast—the single Hellenic establishment in the time of Thucydides, which that long line of coast presented. The inhabitants of the Hyblæan Megara were founders of Selinus, about 630 B.C., a century after their own establishment. The œkist Pamillus, according to the usual Hellenic practice, was invited from their metropolis Megara in Greece Proper, but we are not told how many fresh

settlers came with him: the language of Thucydides leads us to suppose that the new town was peopled chiefly from the Hyblæan Megarians themselves. The town of Akragas or Agrigentum, called after the neighboring river of the former name, was founded from Gela in B.C. 582, Its œkists were Aristonous and Pystilus, and it received the statutes and religious characteristics of Gela. Himera, on the other hand, was founded from Zankle, under three œkists, Eukleides, Simus, and Sakon. The chief part of its inhabitants were of Chalkidic race, and its legal and religious characteristics were Chalkidic. But a portion of the settlers were Syracusan exiles, called Myletidæ, who had been expelled from home by a sedition, so that the Himeræan dialect was a mixture of Doric and Chalkidic. Himera was situated not far from the towns of the Elymi—Eryx and Egesta.

Such were the chief establishments founded by the Greeks in Sicily during the two centuries after their first settlement in 735 B.C. The few particulars just stated respecting them are worthy of all confidence—for they come to us from Thucydides—but they are unfortunately too few to afford the least satisfaction to our curiosity. It cannot be doubted that these first two centuries were periods of steady increase and prosperity among the Sicilian Greeks, undisturbed by those distractions and calamities which supervened afterward, and which led indeed to the extraordinary aggrandizement of some of their communities, but also to the ruin of several others. Moreover it seems that the Carthaginians in Sicily gave them no trouble until the time of Gelon. Their position will indeed seem singularly advantageous, if we consider the extraordinary fertility of the soil in this fine island, especially near the sea, its capacity for corn, wine and oil, the species of cultivation to which the Greek husbandman had been accustomed under less favorable circumstances—its abundant fisheries on the coast, so important in Grecian diet, and continuing undiminished even at the present day—together with sheep, cattle, hides, wool, and timber from the native population in the interior. These natives seem to have been of rude pastoral habits, dispersed either among petty hill-villages, or in caverns hewn out of the rock, like the primitive inhabitants of the Balearic islands and Sardinia; so that Sicily, like New Zealand in our century, was now for the first time approached by organized industry and tillage. Their progress, though very great during this most prosperous interval (between the foundation of Naxos in 735 B.C. to the reign of Gelon at Syracuse in 485 B.C), is not to be compared to that of the English colonies in America; but it was nevertheless very great, and appears greater from being concentrated as it was in and around a few cities. Individual spreading and separation of residence were rare, nor did they consist either with the security or the social feelings of a Grecian colonist. The city to which he belonged was the central point of his existence where the produce which he raised was brought home to be stored or sold, and where alone his active life, political, domestic, religious,

recreative, etc., was carried on. There were dispersed throughout the territory of the city small fortified places and garrisons, serving as temporary protection to the cultivators in case of sudden inroad; but there was no permanent residence for the free citizen except the town itself. This was, perhaps, even more the case in a colonial settlement, where everything began and spread from one central point, than in Attica, where the separate villages had once nourished a population politically independent. It was in the town, therefore, that the aggregate increase of the colony palpably concentrated itself—property as well as population—private comfort and luxury not less than public force and grandeur. Such growth and improvement was of course sustained by the cultivation of the territory, but the evidences of it were most manifest in the town. The large population which we shall have occasion to notice as belonging to Agrigentum, Sybaris, and other cities, will illustrate this position.

There is another point of some importance to mention in regard to the Sicilian and Italian cities. The population of the town itself may have been principally, though not wholly, Greek; but the population of the territory belonging to the town, or of the dependent villages which covered it, must have been in a great measure Sikel or Sikan. The proof of this is found in a circumstance common to all the Sicilian and Italian Greeks—the peculiarity of their weights, measures, monetary system, and language. The pound and ounce are divisions and denominations belonging altogether to Italy and Sicily, and unknown originally to the Greeks, whose scale consisted of the obolus, the drachma, the mina, and the talent. Among the Greeks, too, the metal first and most commonly employed for money was silver, while in Italy and Sicily copper was the primitive metal made use of. Now among all the Italian and Sicilian Greeks a scale of weight and money arose quite different from that of the Greeks at home, formed by a combination and adjustment of the one of these systems to the other. It is in many points complex and difficult to understand, but in the final result the native system seems to be predominant, and the Grecian system subordinate. Such a consequence as this could not have ensued, if the Greek settlers in Italy and Sicily had kept themselves apart as communities, and had merely carried on commerce and barter with communities of Sikels. It implies a fusion of the two races in the same community, though doubtless in the relation of superior and subject, and not in that of equals. The Greeks on arriving in the island expelled the natives from the town, perhaps also from the lands immediately round the town. But when they gradually extended their territory, this was probably accomplished, not by the expulsion, but by the subjugation, of those Sikel tribes, whose villages, much subdivided and each individually petty, their aggressions successively touched.

At the time when Theokles landed on the hill near Naxos, and Archias in the islet of Ortygia, and when each of them expelled the

Sikels from that particular spot, there were Sikel villages or little communities spread through all the neighboring country. By the gradual encroachments of the colony, some of these might be dispossessed and driven out of the plains near the coast into the more mountainous regions of the interior. But many of them, doubtless, found it convenient to submit, to surrender a portion of their lands, and to hold the rest as subordinate villagers of an Hellenic city community. We find even at the time of the Athenian invasion (414 B.C.) villages existing in distinct identity as Sikels, yet subject and tributary to Syracuse.

Moreover, the influence which the Greeks exercised, though in the first instance essentially compulsory, became also in part self-operating—the ascendency of a higher over a lower civilization. It was the working of concentrated townsmen, safe among one another by their walls and by mutual confidence, and surrounded by more or less of ornament, public as well as private—upon dispersed, unprotected, artless villagers, who could not be insensible to the charm of that superior intellect, imagination, and organization, which wrought so powerfully upon the whole contemporaneous world. To understand the action of these superior immigrants upon the native but inferior Sikels, during those three earliest centuries (730–430 B.C.) which followed the arrival of Archias and Theokles, we have only to study the continuance of the same action during the three succeeding centuries which preceded the age of Cicero. At the period when Athens undertook the siege of Syracuse (B.C. 415), the interior of the island was occupied by Sikel and Sikan communities, autonomous and retaining their native customs and language. But in the time of Verres and Cicero (three centuries and a half afterward) the interior of the island as well as the maritime regions had become hellenized: the towns in the interior were then hardly less Greek than those on the coast. Cicero contrasts favorably the character of the Sicilians with that of the Greeks generally (i.e., the Greeks out of Sicily), but he nowhere distinguishes Greeks in Sicily from native Sikels; nor Enna and Centuripi from Katana and Agrigentum. The little Sikel villages became gradually semi-hellenized and merged into subjects of a Grecian town: during the first three centuries, this change took place in the regions of the coast—during the following three centuries, in the regions of the interior; and probably with greater rapidity and effect in the earlier period, not only because the action of the Grecian communities was then closer, more concentrated, and more compulsory, but because also the obstinate tribes could then retire into the interior.

The Greeks in Sicily are thus not to be considered as purely Greeks, but as modified by a mixture of Sikel and Sikan language, customs, and character. Each town included in its non-privileged population a number of semi-hellenized Sikels (or Sikans, as the case might be), who, though in a state of dependence, contributed to mix the breed

and influence the entire mass. We have no reason to suppose that the Sikel or Œnotrian language ever became written, like Latin, Oscan, or Umbrian. The inscriptions of Segesta and Halesus are all in Doric Greek, which supplanted the native tongue for public purposes as a separate language, but not without becoming itself modified in the confluence. In following the ever-renewed succession of violent political changes, the inferior capacity of regulated and pacific popular government, and the more unrestrained voluptuous license—which the Sicilian and Italian Greeks exhibit as compared with Athens and the cities of Greece Proper—we must call to mind that we are not dealing with pure Hellenism; and that the native element, though not unfavorable to activity or increase of wealth, prevented the Grecian colonists from partaking fully in that improved organization which we so distinctly trace in Athens from Solon downward. How much the taste, habits, ideas, religion, and local mythes, of the native Sikels passed into the minds of the Sikeliots or Sicilian Greeks, is shown by the character of their literature and poetry. Sicily was the native country of that rustic mirth and village buffoonery which gave birth to the primitive comedy—politicized and altered at Athens so as to suit men of the market-place, the ekklesia, and the dikastery—blending, in the comedies of the Syracusan Epicharmus, copious details about the indulgences of the table (for which the ancient Sicilians were renowned) with Pythagorean philosophy and moral maxims—but given with all the naked simplicity of common life, in a sort of rhythmical prose without even the restraint of a fixed meter, by the Syracusan Sophron in his lost Mimes, and afterward polished as well as idealized in the Bucolic poetry of Theokritus. That which is commonly termed the Doric comedy was, in great part at least, the Sikel comedy taken up by Dorian composers—the Doric race and dialect being decidedly predominant in Sicily. The manners thus dramatized belonged to that coarser vein of humor which the Doric Greeks of the town had in common with the semi-hellenized Sikels of the circumjacent villages. Moreover, it seems probable that this rustic population enabled the despots of the Greco-Sicilian towns to form easily and cheaply those bodies of mercenary troops, by whom their power was sustained, and whose presence rendered the continuance of popular government, even supposing it begun, all but impossible.

It was the destiny of most of the Grecian colonial establishments to perish by the growth and aggression of those inland powers upon whose coast they were planted; powers which gradually acquired, from the vicinity of the Greeks, a military and political organization, and a power of concentrated action such as they had not originally possessed. But in Sicily the Sikels were not numerous enough even to maintain permanently their own nationality, and were ultimately penetrated on all sides by Hellenic ascendency and manners. We shall, nevertheless, come to one remarkable attempt, made by a native

Sikel prince in the 82d Olympiad (455 B.C.)—the enterprising Duketius—to group many Sikel petty villages into one considerable town, and thus to raise his countrymen into the Grecian stage of polity and organization. Had there been any Sikel prince endowed with these superior ideas at the time when the Greeks first settled in Sicily, the subsequent history of the island would probably have been very different. But Duketius had derived his projects from the spectacle of the Grecian towns around him, and these latter had acquired much too great power to permit him to succeed. The description of his abortive attempt, however, which we find in Diodorus, meager as it is, forms an interesting point in the history of the island.

Grecian colonization in Italy began nearly at the same time as in Sicily, and was marked by the same general circumstances. Placing ourselves at Rhegium (now Reggio) on the Sicilian strait, we trace Greek cities gradually planted on various points of the coast as far as Cumæ on the sea and Tarentum (Taranto) on the other. Between the two seas runs the lofty chain of the Apennines, calcareous in the upper part of its course, throughout Middle Italy—granitic and schistose in the lower part, where it traverses the territories now called the Hither and the Farther Calabria. The plains and valleys on each side of the Calabrian Apennines exhibit a luxuriance of vegetation extolled by all observers, and surpassing even that of Sicily; and great as the productive powers of this territory are now, there is full reason for believing that they must have been far greater in ancient times. For it has been visited by repeated earthquakes, each of which has left calamitous marks of devastation. Those of 1638 and 1783 (especially the latter, whose destructive effects were on a terrific scale both as to life and property) are of a date sufficiently recent to admit of recording and measuring the damage done by each; and that damage, in many parts of the south-western coast, was great and irreparable. Animated as the epithets are, therefore, with which the modern traveler paints the present fertility of Calabria, we are warranted in enlarging their meaning when we conceive the country as it stood between 720–320 B.C., the period of Grecian occupation and independence; while the unhealthy air which now desolates the plains generally, seems then to have been felt only to a limited extent, and over particular localities. The founders of Tarentum, Sybaris, Kroton, Lokri, and Rhegium planted themselves in situations of unexampled promise to the industrious cultivator, which the previous inhabitants had turned to little account; though since the subjugation of the Grecian cities, these once rich possessions have sunk into poverty and depopulation, especially the last three centuries, from insalubrity, indolence, bad administration, and fear of the Barbary corsairs.

The Œnotrians, Sikels, or Italians, who were in possession of these territories in 720 B.C., seem to have been rude petty communities—procuring for themselves safety by residence on lofty eminences—more pastoral than agricultural, and some of them consuming the

produce of their fields in common mess, on a principle analogous to the syssitia of Sparta or Krete. King Italus was said to have introduced this peculiarity among the southernmost portion of the Œnotrian population, and at the same time to have bestowed upon them the name of Italians, though they were also known by the name of Sikels. Throughout the center of Calabria between sea and sea, the high chain of the Apennines afforded protection to a certain extent both to their independence and to their pastoral habits. But these heights are made to be enjoyed in conjunction with the plains beneath, so as to alternate winter and summer pasture for the cattle. It is in this manner that the richness of the country is rendered available, since a large portion of the mountain range is buried in snow during the winter months. Such remarkable diversity of soil and climate rendered Calabria a land of promise for Grecian settlement. The plains and lower eminences were as productive in corn, wine, oil, and flax, as the mountains in summer-pasture and timber—and abundance of rain falls upon the higher ground, which requires only industry and care to be made to impart the maximum of fertility to the lower. Moreover a long line of sea-coast (though not well furnished with harbors) and an abundant supply of fish, came in aid of the advantages of the soil. While the poorer freemen of the Grecian cities were enabled to obtain small lots of fertile land in the neighborhood, to be cultivated by their own hands, and to provide for the most part their own food and clothing—the richer proprietors made profitable use of the more distant portions of the territory by means of their cattle, sheep, and slaves.

Of the Grecian towns on this favored coast, the earliest as well as the most prosperous were Sybaris and Kroton: both in the Gulf of Tarentum—both of Achæan origin—and conterminous with each other in respect of territory. Kroton was placed not far to the west of the south-eastern extremity of the Gulf, called in ancient times the Lakinian cape, and ennobled by the temple of the Lakinian Here, which became alike venerated and adorned by the Greek resident as well as by the passing navigator. One solitary column of the temple, the humble remnant of its past magnificence, yet marks the extremity of this once-celebrated promontory. Sybaris seems to have been planted in the year 720 B.C., Kroton in 710 B.C.: Iselikeus was œkist of the former, Myskellus of the latter. This large Achæan emigration seems to have been connected with the previous expulsion of the Achæan population from the more southerly region of Peloponnesus by the Dorians, though in what precise manner we are not enabled to see. The Achæan towns in Peloponnesus appear in later times too inconsiderable to furnish emigrants, but probably in the eighth century B. C., their population may have been larger. The town of Sybaris was planted between two rivers, the Sybaris and the Krathis (the name of the latter borrowed from a river of Achaia); the town of Kroton about twenty-five miles distant, on the river Æsarus. The

primitive settlers of Sybaris consisted in part of Trœzenians, who were however subsequently expelled by the more numerous Achæans —a deed of violence which was construed by the religious sentiment of Antiochus and some other Grecian historians, as having drawn down upon them the anger of the gods in the ultimate destruction of the city by the Krotoniates.

The fatal contest between these two cities, which ended in the ruin of Sybaris, took place in 510 B.C., after the latter had subsisted in growing prosperity for 210 years. And the astonishing prosperity to which both of them attained is a sufficient proof that during most of this period they had remained in peace at least, if not in alliance and common Achæan brotherhood. Unfortunately, the general fact of their great size, wealth, and power, is all that we are permitted to know. The walls of Sybaris embraced a circuit of fifty stadia, or near six miles, while those of Kroton were even larger, comprising little less than twelve miles. A large walled circuit was advantageous for sheltering the movable property in the territory around, which was carried in on the arrival of an invading enemy. Both cities possessed an extensive dominion across the Calabrian peninsula from sea to sea. But the territorial range of Sybaris seems to have been greater and her colonies wider and more distant—a fact which may perhaps explain the smaller circuit of the city.

The Sybarites were founders of Laus and Skidrus, on the Mediterranean Sea in the Gulf of Policastro, and even of the more distant Poseidonia—now known by its Latin name of Pæstum, as well as by the temples which still remain to decorate its deserted site. They possessed twenty-five dependent towns, and ruled over four distinct native tribes or nations. What these nations were we are not told, but they were probably different sections of the Œnotrian name. The Krotoniates also reached across to the Mediterranean Sea, and founded (upon the gulf now called St. Euphemia) the town of Terina, and seemingly also that of Lametini. The inhabitants of the Epizephyrian Lokri, which was situated in a more southern part of Calabria Ultra near the modern town of Gerace, extended themselves in like manner across the peninsula. They founded upon the Mediterranean coast the towns of Hipponium, Medma, and Mataurum, as well as Melæ and Itoneia, in localities not now exactly ascertained.

Myskellus of Rhypes in Achaia, the founder of Kroton under the express indication of the Delphian oracle, is said to have thought the site of Sybaris preferable, and to have solicited permission from the oracle to plant his colony there, but he was admonished to obey strictly the directions first given. It is farther affirmed that the foundation of Kroton was aided by Archias, then passing along the coast with his settlers for Syracuse, who is also brought into conjunction in a similar manner with the foundation of Lokri: but neither of these statements appears chronologically admissible.

The Italian Lokri (called Epizephyrian, from the neighborhood of Cape Zephyrium) was founded in the year 683 B.C. by settlers from the Lokrians—either the Ozolian Lokrians in the Krissæan gulf, or those of Opus on the Eubœan Strait. This point was disputed even in antiquity, and perhaps both the one and the other may have contributed: Euanthus was the œkist of the place. The first years of the Epizephyrian Lokri are said to have been years of sedition and discord. And the vile character which we hear ascribed to the primitive colonists, as well as their perfidious dealing with the natives, are the more to be noted, as the Lokrians, of the times both of Aristotle and of Polybius, fully believed these statements in regard to their own ancestors.

The original emigrants to Lokri were, according to Aristotle, a body of runaway slaves, men-stealers, and adulterers, whose only legitimate connection with an honorable Hellenic root arose from a certain number of well-born Lokrian women who accompanied them. These women belonged to those select families called the Hundred Houses, who constituted what may be called the nobility of the Lokrians in Greece Proper, and their descendants continued to enjoy a certain rank and pre-eminence in the colony, even in the time of Polybius. The emigration is said to have been occasioned by disorderly intercourse between these noble Lokrian women and their slaves—perhaps by intermarriage with persons of inferior station where there had existed no recognized connubium; a fact referred, by the informants of Aristotle, to the long duration of the first Messenian war—the Lokrian warriors having for the most part continued in the Messenian territory as auxiliaries of the Spartans during the twenty years of that war, permitting themselves only rare and short visits to their homes. This is a story resembling that which we shall find in explanation of the colony of Tarentum. It comes to us too imperfectly to admit of criticism or verification; but the unamiable character of the first emigrants is a statement deserving credit, and very unlikely to have been invented. Their first proceedings on settling in Italy display a perfidy in accordance with the character ascribed to them. They found the territory in this southern portion of the Calabrian peninsula possessed by native Sikels, who, alarmed at their force and afraid to try the hazard of resistance, agreed to admit them to a participation and joint residence. The covenant was concluded and sworn to by both parties in the following terms:—"There shall be friendship between us, and we will enjoy the land in common, so long as we stand upon this earth and have heads upon our shoulders." At the time when the oath was taken, the Lokrians had put earth into their shoes and concealed heads of garlic upon their shoulders; so that when they had divested themselves of these appendages, the oath was considered as no longer binding. Availing themselves of the first convenient opportunity, they attacked the Sikels by surprise and drove them out of the territory, of which they

thus acquired the exclusive possession. Their first establishment was formed upon the headland itself, Cape Zephyrium (now Bruzzano). But after three or four years the site of the town was moved to an eminence in the neighboring plain, in which the Syracusans are said to have aided them.

In describing the Grecian settlers in Sicily, I have already stated that they are to be considered as Greeks with a considerable infusion of blood, of habits, and of manners, from the native Sikels. The case is the same with the Italiots or Italian Greeks, and in respect to these Epizephyrian Lokrians, especially, we find it expressly noticed by Polybius. Composed as their band was of ignoble and worthless men, not bound together by strong tribe-feelings or traditional customs, they were the more ready to adopt new practices, as well religious as civil, from the Sikels. One in particular is noticed by the historian—the religious dignity called the Phialephorus or Censer-bearer, enjoyed among the native Sikels by a youth of noble birth, who performed the duties belonging to it in their sacrifices; but the Lokrians, while they identified themselves with the religious ceremony and adopted both the name and the dignity, altered the sex and conferred it upon one of those women of noble blood who constituted the ornament of their settlement. Even down to the days of Polybius, some maiden descended from one of these select Hundred Houses still continued to bear the title and to perform the ceremonial duties of Phialephorus. We learn from these statements how large a portion of Sikels must have become incorporated as dependents in the colony of the Epizephyrian Lokri, and how strongly marked was the intermixture of their habits with those of the Greek settlers; while the tracing back among them of all eminence of descent to a few emigrant women of noble birth, is a peculiarity belonging exclusively to their city.

That a body of colonists, formed of such unpromising materials, should have fallen into much lawlessness and disorder, is noway surprising; but these mischiefs appear to have become so utterly intolerable in the early years of the colony, as to force upon every one the necessity of some remedy. Hence arose a phenomenon new in the march of Grecian society—the first promulgation of written laws. The Epizephyrian Lokrians, having applied to the Delphian oracle for some healing suggestion under their distress, were directed to make laws for themselves; and received the ordinances of a shepherd named Zaleukus, which he professed to have learnt from the goddess Athene in a dream. His laws are said to have been put in writing and promulgated in 664 B.C., forty years earlier than those of Drako at Athens.

That these first of all Grecian written laws were few and simple, we may be sufficiently assured. The only fact certain respecting them is their extraordinary rigor: they seem to have enjoined the application of the lex talionis as a punishment for personal injuries.

In this general character of his laws, Zaleukus was the counterpart of Drako. But so little was certainly known, and so much falsely asserted, respecting him, that Timæus the historian went so far as to call in question his real existence—against the authority not only of Ephorus, but also of Aristotle and Theophrastus. The laws must have remained, however, for a long time, formally unchanged; for so great was the aversion of the Lokrians, we are told, to any new law, that the man who ventured to propose one appeared in public with a rope round his neck, which was at once tightened if he failed to convince the assembly of the necessity of his proposition. Of the government of the Epizephyrian Lokri we know only that in later times it included a great council of 1000 members, and a chief executive magistrate called Kosmopolis; it is spoken of also as strictly and carefully administered.

The date of Rhegium (Reggio), separated from the territory of the Epizephyrian Lokri by the river Halex, must have been not only earlier than Lokri, but even earlier than Sybaris—if the statement of Antiochus be correct, that the colonists were joined by those Messenians, who, prior to the first Messenian war, were anxious to make reparation to the Spartans for the outrage offered to the Spartan maidens at the temple of Artemis Limnatis, but were overborne by their countrymen and forced into exile. A different version, however, is given by Pausanias of this migration of Messenians to Rhegium, yet still admitting the fact of such migration at the close of the first Messenian war, which would place the foundation of the city earlier than 720 B.C. Though Rhegium was a Chalkidic colony, yet a portion of its inhabitants seem to have been undoubtedly of Messenian origin, and among them Anaxilas, despot of the town between 500–470 B.C., who traced his descent through two centuries to a Messenian emigrant named Alkidamidas. The celebrity and power of Anaxilas, just at the time when the ancient history of the Greek towns was beginning to be set forth in prose and with some degree of system, caused the Messenian element in the population of Rhegium to be noticed prominently. But the town was essentially Chalkidic, connected by colonial sisterhood with the Chalkidic settlements in Sicily—Zankle, Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. The original emigrants departed from Chalkis, as a tenth of the citizens consecrated by vow to Apollo in consequence of famine; and the directions of the god, as well as the invitation of the Zanklæans, guided their course to Rhegium. The town was flourishing, and acquired a considerable number of dependent villages around, inhabited doubtless by cultivators of the indigenous population. But it seems to have been often at variance with the conterminous Lokrians, and received one severe defeat, in conjunction with the Tarentines, which will be hereafter recounted.

Between Lokri and the Lakinian cape were situated the Achæan colony of Kaulonia, and Skylletium; the latter seemingly included

in the domain of Kroton, though pretending to have been originally founded by Menestheus, the leader of the Athenians at the siege of Troy; Petilia, also, a hill-fortress north-west of the Lakinian cape, as well as Makalla, both comprised in the territory of Kroton, were affirmed to have been founded by Philoktetes. Along all this coast of the Gulf of Tarentum, there were various establishments ascribed to the heroes of the Trojan war—Epeius, Philoktetes, Nestor—or to their returning troops. Of these establishments, probably the occupants had been small, miscellaneous, unacknowledged bands of Grecian adventurers, who assumed to themselves the most honorable origin which they could imagine, and who became afterward absorbed into the larger colonial establishments which followed; the latter adopting and taking upon themselves the heroic worship of Philoktetes or other warriors from Troy, which the prior emigrants had begun.

During the flourishing times of Sybaris and Kroton, it seems that these two great cities divided the whole length of the coast of the Tarentine Gulf, from the spot now called Rocca Imperiale down to the south of the Lakinian cape. Between the point where the dominion of Sybaris terminated on the Tarentine side, and Tarentum itself, there were two considerable Grecian settlements—Siris, afterward called Herakleia, and Metapontium. The fertility and attraction of the territory of Siris, with its two rivers, Akiris and Siris, were well known even to the poet Archilochus (660 B.C.), but we do not know the date at which it passed from the indigenous Chonians or Chaonians into the hands of Greek settlers. A citizen of Siris is mentioned among the suitors for the daughter of the Sikyonian Kleisthenes (580–560 B.C.). We are told that some Kolophonian fugitives, emigrating to escape the dominion of the Lydian kings, attacked and possessed themselves of the spot, giving to it the name Polieion. The Chonians of Siris ascribed to themselves a Trojan origin, exhibiting a wooden image of the Ilian Athene, which they affirmed to have been brought away by their fugitive ancestors after the capture of Troy. When the town was stormed by the Ionians, many of the inhabitants clung to this relic for protection, but were dragged away and slain by the victors, whose sacrilege was supposed to have been the cause that their settlement was not durable. At the time of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, the fertile territory of Siris was considered as still open to be colonized; for the Athenians, when their affairs appeared desperate, had this scheme of emigration in reserve as a possible resource; and there were inspired declarations from some of the contemporary prophets which encouraged them to undertake it. At length, after the town of Thurii had been founded by Athens, in the vicinity of the dismantled Sybaris, the Thurians tried to possess themselves of the Siritid territory, but were opposed by the Tarentines. According to the compromise concluded between them, Tarentum was recognized as the metropolis of the colony, but joint

possession was allowed both to Tarentines and Thurians. The former transferred the site of the city, under the new name Herakleia, to a spot three miles from the sea, leaving Siris as the place of maritime access to it.

About twenty-five miles eastward of Siris on the coast of the Tarentine Gulf was situated Metapontium, a Greek town, which was affirmed by some to draw its origin from the Pylian companions of Nestor—by others, from the Phokian warriors of Epeius, on their return from Troy. The proofs of the former were exhibited in the worship of the Neleid heroes—the proofs of the latter in the preservation of the reputed identical tools with which Epeius had constructed the Trojan horse. Metapontium was planted on the territory of the Chonians or Œnotrians, but the first colony is said to have been destroyed by an attack of the Samnites, at what period we do not know. It had been founded by some Achæan settlers—under the direction of the œkist Daulius, despot of the Phokian Krissa, and invited by the inhabitants of Sybaris—who feared that the place might be appropriated by the neighboring Tarentines, colonists from Sparta and hereditary enemies in Peloponnesus of the Achæan race. Before the new settlers arrived, however, the place seems to have been already appropriated by the Tarentines; for the Achæan Leukippus only obtained their permission to land by a fraudulent promise, and after all had to sustain a forcible struggle both with them and with the neighboring Œnotrians, which was compromised by a division of territory. The fertility of the Metapontine territory was hardly less celebrated than that of the Siritid

Farther eastward of Metapontium, again, at the distance of about twenty-five miles, was situated the great city of Taras or Tarentum, a colony from Sparta founded after the first Messenian war, seemingly about 707 B.C. The œkist Phalanthus, said to have been a Herakleid, was placed at the head of a body of Spartan emigrants—consisting principally of some citizens called Epeunaktæ and of the youth called Partheniæ, who had been disgraced by their countrymen on account of their origin and were on the point of breaking out into rebellion. It was out of the Messenian war that this emigration is stated to have arisen, in a manner analogous to that which has been stated respecting the Epizephyrian Lokrians. The Lacedæmonians, before entering Messenia to carry on the war, had made a vow not to return until they should have completed the conquest; a vow in which it appears that some of them declined to take part, standing altogether aloof from the expedition. When the absent soldiers returned after many years of absence consumed in the war, they found a numerous progeny which had been born to their wives and daughters during the interval, from intercourse with those (Epeunaktæ) who had staid at home. The Epeunaktæ were punished by being degraded to the rank and servitude of Helots; the children thus born, called Partheniæ, were also cut off from all the rights of

citizenship, and held in dishonor. But the parties punished were numerous enough to make themselves formidable, and a conspiracy was planned among them intended to break out at the great religious festival of the Hyakinthia, in the temple of the Amyklæan Apollo. Phalanthus was the secret chief of the conspirators, who agreed to commence their attack upon the authorities at the moment when he should put on his helmet. The leader, however, never intending that the scheme should be executed, betrayed it beforehand, stipulating for the safety of all those implicated in it. At the commencement of the festival, when the multitude were already assembled, a herald was directed to proclaim aloud that Phalanthus would not on that day put on his helmet—a proclamation which at once revealed to the conspirators that they were betrayed. Some of them sought safety in flight, others assumed the posture of suppliants; but they were merely detained in confinement, with assurance of safety, while Phalanthus was sent to the Delphian oracle to ask advice respecting emigration. He is said to have inquired whether he might be permitted to appropriate the fertile plain of Sikyon, but the Pythian priestess emphatically dissuaded him, and enjoined him to conduct his emigrants to Satyrium and Tarentum, where he would be "a mischief to the Iapygians." Phalanthus obeyed, and conducted the detected conspirators as emigrants to the Tarentine gulf, which he reached a few years after the foundation of Sybaris and Kroton by the Achæans. According to Ephorus, he found these prior emigrants at war with the natives, aided them in the contest, and received in return their aid to accomplish his own settlement. But this can hardly have consisted with the narrative of Antiochus, who represented the Achæans of Sybaris as retaining even in their colonies the hatred against the Dorian name which they had contracted in Peloponnesus. Antiochus stated that Phalanthus and his colonists were received in a friendly manner by the indigenous inhabitants and allowed to establish their new town in tranquillity.

If such was really the fact, it proves that the native inhabitants of the soil must have been of purely inland habits, making no use of the sea either for commerce or for fishery, otherwise they would hardly have relinquished such a site as that of Tarentum—which, while favorable and productive even in regard to the adjoining land, was with respect to sea advantages without a parallel in Grecian Italy. It was the only spot in the gulf which possessed a perfectly safe and convenient harbor. A spacious inlet of the sea is there formed, sheltered by an isthmus and an outlying peninsula so as to leave only a narrow entrance. This inlet, still known as the Mare Piccolo, though its shores and the adjoining tongue of land appear to have undergone much change, affords at the present day a constant, inexhaustible, and varied supply of fish, especially of shellfish; which furnish both nourishment and employment to a large proportion among the inhabitants of the contracted modern Taranto,

just as they once served the same purpose to the numerous, lively, and jovial population of the mighty Tarentum. The concentrated population of fishermen formed a predominant element in the character of the Tarentine democracy. Tarentum was just on the borders of the country originally known as Italy, within which Herodotus includes it, while Antiochus considers it in Iapygia, and regards Metapontium as the last Greek town in Italy.

Its immediate neighbors were the Iapygians, who, under various subdivisions of name and dialect, seem to have occupied the greater part of south-eastern Italy, including the peninsula denominated after them (yet sometimes also called the Salentine), between the Adriatic and the Tarentine gulf,—and who are even stated at one time to have occupied some territory on the south-east of that gulf, near the site of Kroton. The Iapygian name appears to have comprehended Messapians, Salentines, and Kalabrians; according to some even Peuketians and Daunians, as far along the Adriatic as Mount Garganus or Drion: Skylax notices in his time (about 360 B.C.) five different tongues in the country which he calls Iapygia. The Messapians and Salentines are spoken of as immigrants from Krete, akin to the Minoian or primitive Kretans; and we find a national genealogy which recognizes Iapyx, son of Dædalus, an immigrant from Sicily. But the story told to Herodotus was, that the Kretan soldiers who had accompanied Minos in his expedition to recover Dædalus from Kamikus in Sicily, were on their return home cast away on the shores of Iapygia, and became the founders of Hyria and other Messapian towns in the interior of the country. Brundusium also, or Brentesion as the Greeks called it, inconsiderable in the days of Herodotus, but famous in the Roman times afterward as the most frequented sea-port for voyaging to Epirus, was a Messapian town. The native language spoken by the Iapygian Messapians was a variety of the Oscan: the Latin poet Ennius, a native of Rudiæ in the Iapygian peninsula, spoke Greek, Latin, and Oscan, and even deduced his pedigree from the ancient national prince or hero Messapus.

We are told that during the lifetime of Phalanthus, the Tarentine settlers gained victories over the Messapians and Peuketians, which they commemorated afterward by votive offerings at Delphi—and that they even made acquisitions at the expense of the inhabitants of Brundusium—a statement difficult to believe, if we look to the distance of the latter place, and to the circumstance that Herodotus even in his time names it only as a harbor. Phalanthus too, driven into exile, is said to have found a hospitable reception at Brundusium and to have died there. Of the history of Tarentum, however, during the first 230 years of its existence, we possess no details. We have reason to believe that it partook in the general prosperity of the Italian Greeks during those two centuries, though remaining inferior both to Sybaris and to Kroton. About the year 510 B.C., these two

latter republics went to war, and Sybaris was nearly destroyed; while in the subsequent half-century the Krotoniates suffered the terrible defeat of Sagra from the Lokrians, and the Tarentines experienced an equally ruinous defeat from the Iapygian Messapians. From these reverses, however, the Tarentines appear to have recovered more completely than the Krotoniates; for the former stand first among the Italiots or Italian Greeks, from the year 400 B.C. down to the supremacy of the Romans, and made better head against the growth of the Lucanians and Bruttians of the interior.

Such were the chief cities of the Italian Greeks from Tarentum on the upper sea to Poseidonia on the lower; and if we take them during the period preceding the ruin of Sybaris (in 510 B.C.), they will appear to have enjoyed a degree of prosperity even surpassing that of the Sicilian Greeks. The dominion of Sybaris, Kroton, and Lokri extended across the peninsula from sea to sea. The mountainous regions of the interior of Calabria were held in amicable connection with the cities and cultivators in the plain and valley near the sea—to the reciprocal advantage of both The petty native tribes of Œnotrians, Sikels, or Italians properly so called, were partially hellenized, and brought into the condition of village cultivators and shepherds dependent upon Sybaris and its fellow-cities; a portion of them dwelling in the town, probably, as domestic slaves of the rich men, but most of them remaining in the country region as serfs, Penestæ, or coloni, intermingled with Greek settlers, and paying over parts of their produce to Greek proprietors.

But this dependence, though accomplished in the first instance by force, was yet not upheld exclusively by force. It was to a great degree the result of an organized march of life, and of more productive cultivation brought within their reach—of new wants, both created and supplied—of temples, festivals, ships, walls, chariots, etc., which imposed upon the imagination of the rude landsmen and shepherds. Against mere force the natives could have found shelter in the unconquerable forests and ravines of the Calabrian Apennines, and in that vast mountain region of the Sila, lying immediately behind the plains of Sybaris, where even the French army with its excellent organization in 1807 found so much difficulty in reaching the bandit villagers. It was not by arms alone, but by arms and arts combined—a mingled influence, such as enabled imperial Rome to subdue the fierceness of the rude Germans and Britons—that the Sybarites and Krotoniates acquired and maintained their ascendency over the natives of the interior. The shepherd of the banks of the river Sybaris or Krathis not only found a new exchangeable value for his cattle and other produce, becoming familiar with better diet and clothing and improved cultivation of the olive and the vine—but he was also enabled to display his prowess, if strong and brave, in the public games at the festival of the Lakinian Here, or even at the Olympic games in Peloponnesus. It is thus that we have to explain

the extensive dominion, the great population, and the wealth and luxury of the Sybarites and Krotoniates—a population of which the incidental reports as given in figures are not trustworthy, but which we may well believe to have been very numerous. The native Œnotrians, while unable to combine in resisting Greek force, were at the same time less widely distinguished from the Greeks in race and language, than the Oscans of Middle Italy, and therefore more accessible to Greek pacific influences; while the Oscan race seem to have been both fiercer in repelling the assaults of the Greeks, and more intractable as to their seductions. The Iapygians were not modified by the neighborhood of Tarentum in the same degree as the tribes adjoining to Sybaris and Kroton by their contact with those cities. The dialect of Tarentum, as well as of Herakleia, though a marked Doric, admitted many local peculiarities; and the farces of the Tarentine poet Rhinthon, like the Syracusan Sophron, seem to have blended the Hellenic with the Italic in language as well as in character.

About the year 560 B.C., the time of the accession of Peisistratus at Athens, the close of what may properly be called the first period of Grecian history, Sybaris and Kroton were at the maximum of their power, which each maintained for half a century afterward, until the fatal dissension between them. We are told that the Sybarites in that final contest marched against Kroton with an army of 300,000 men. Fabulous as this number doubtless is, we cannot doubt that for an irruption of this kind into an adjoining territory, their large body of semi-hellenized native subjects might be mustered in prodigious force. The few statements which have reached us respecting them, touch, unfortunately, upon little more than their luxury, fantastic self-indulgence, and extravagant indolence, for which qualities they have become proverbial in modern times as well as in ancient. Anecdotes illustrating these qualities were current, and served more than one purpose in antiquity. The philosopher recounted them in order to discredit and denounce the character which they exemplified: while among gay companies, "Sybaritic tales," or tales respecting saying and doing of ancient Sybarites, formed a separate and special class of excellent stories to be told simply for amusement—with which view witty romancers multiplied them indefinitely. It is probable that the Pythagorean philosophers (who belonged originally to Kroton, but maintained themselves permanently as a philosophical sect in Italy and Sicily with a strong tinge of ostentatious ascetism and mysticism), in their exhortations to temperance and in their denunciations of luxurious habits, might select by preference examples from Sybaris, the ancient enemy of the Krotoniates, to point their moral; and that the exaggerated reputation of the city thus first became the subject of common talk throughout the Grecian world. For little could be actually known of Sybaris in detail, since its humiliation dates from the first commencement of Grecian contemporeous history. Hekatæus of Miletus may perhaps have visited it in full splendor, but even

Herodotus knew it only by past report; and the principal anecdotes respecting it are cited from authors considerably later than him, who follow the tone of thought so common in antiquity, in ascribing the ruin of the Sybarites to their overweening corruption and luxury.

Making allowance, however, for exaggeration on all these accounts, there can be no reason to doubt that Sybaris, in 560 B.C., was one of the most wealthy, populous, and powerful cities of the Hellenic name; and that it also presented both comfortable abundance among the mass of the citizens, arising from the easy attainment of fresh lots of fertile land, and excessive indulgences among the rich—to a degree forming marked contrast with Hellas Proper, of which Herodotus characterized Poverty as the foster-sister. The extraordinary productivenes of the neighboring territory—alleged by Varro, in his time, when the culture must have been much worse than it had been under the old Sybaris, to yield an ordinany crop of a hundred-fold, and extolled by modern travelers even in its present yet more neglected culture—has been already touched upon. The river Krathis —still the most considerable river of that region—at a time when there was an industrious population to keep its water-course in order, would enable the extensive fields of Sybaris to supply abundant nourishment for a population larger, perhaps, than any other Grecian city could parallel. But though nature was thus bountiful industry, good management, and well-ordered government were required to turn her bounty to account: where these are wanting, later experience of the same territory shows that its inexhaustible capacities may exist in vain. That luxury which Grecian moralists denounced in the leading Sybarites between 560 and 510 B.C. was the result of acquisitions vigorously and industriously pushed, and kept together by an orderly central force, during a century and a half that the colony had existed. Though the Trœzenian settlers who formed a portion of the original emigrants had been expelled when the Achæans became more numerous, yet we are told that, on the whole, Sybaris was liberal in the reception of new immigrants to the citizenship and that this was one of the causes of its remarkable advance. Of these additional comers we may presume that many went to form its colonies on the Mediterranean Sea, and some to settle both among its four dependent inland nations and its twenty-five subject towns. Five thousand horsemen, we are told, clothed in showy attire, formed the processional march in certain Sybaritic festivals—a number which is best appreciated by comparison with the fact that the knights or horsemen of Athens in her best days did not exceed 1200. The Sybaritic horses, if we are to believe a story purporting to come from Aristotle, were taught to move to the sound of the flute; and the garments of these weathy citizens were composed of the finest wool from Miletus in Ionia—the Tarentine wool not having then acquired the distinguished renown which it possessed five centuries afterward toward the close of the Roman republic. Next to the great abun-

dance of home produce—corn, wine, oil, flax, cattle, fish, timber, etc.—the fact next in importance, which we hear respecting Sybaris is, the great traffic carried on with Miletus: these two cities were more intimately and affectionately connected together than any two Hellenic cities within the knowledge of Herodotus. The tie between Tarentum and Knidus was also of a very intimate character, so that the great intercourse, personal as well as commercial, between the Asiatic and the Italic Greeks, appears as a marked fact in the history of the sixth century before the Christian era.

In this respect, as well as in several others, the Hellenic world wears a very different aspect in 560 B.C. from that which it assumed a century afterward, and in which it is best known to modern readers. At the former period the Ionic and Italic Greeks are the great ornaments of the Hellenic name, carrying on a more lucrative trade with each other than either of them maintained with Greece Proper; which both of them recognized as their mother country, though without admitting anything in the nature of established headship. The military power of Sparta is indeed at this time great and preponderant in Peloponnesus, but she has no navy, and she is only just essaying her strength, not without reluctance, in ultramarine interference. After the lapse of a century, these circumstances change materially. The independence of the Asiatic Greeks is destroyed, and the power of the Italic Greek is greatly broken; while Sparta and Athens not only become the prominent and leading Hellenic states, but constitute themselves centers of action for the lesser cities to a degree previously unknown.

It was during the height of their prosperity, seemingly, in the sixth century B.C., that the Italic Greeks either acquired for, or bestowed upon, their territory the appellation of Magna Græcia, which at that time it well deserved; for not only were Sybaris and Kroton then the greatest Grecian cities situated near together, but the whole peninsula of Calabria may be considered as attached to the Grecian cities on the coast. The native Œnotrians and Sikels occupying the interior had become hellenized, or semi-hellenized with a mixture of Greeks among them—common subjects of these great cities. The whole extent of the Calabrian peninsula, within an imaginary straight line carried from Sybaris to Poseidonia, might then be fairly considered as Hellenic territory. Sybaris maintained much traffic with the Tuscan towns in the Mediterranean; so that the communication between Greece and Rome, across the Calabrian isthmus, may perhaps have been easier during the time of the Roman kings (whose expulsion was nearly contemporaneous with the ruin of Sybaris) than it became afterward during the first two centuries of the Roman republic. But all these relations underwent a complete change after the breaking up of the power of Sybaris in 510 B.C., and the gradual march of the Oscan population from Middle Italy towards the south. Cumæ was overwhelmed by the Samnites, Poseidonia by the Lucanians; who became possessed not only of these maritime cities, but also of the whole inland territory (now called the Basilicata, with part of the Hither Calabria) across from Poseidonia to the neighborhood of the Gulf of Tarentum: while the Bruttians—a mixture of outlying Lucanians with the Greco-Œnotrian population once subject to Sybaris, speaking both Greek and Oscan—became masters of the inland mountains in the Farther Calabria from Consentia nearly to the Sicilian strait. It was thus that the ruin of Sybaris, combined with the spread of the Lucanians and Bruttians, deprived the Italic Greeks of that inland territory which they had enjoyed in the sixth century B.C., and restricted them to the neighborhood of the coast. To understand the extraordinary power and prosperity of Sybaris and Kroton, in the sixth century B.C., when the whole of this inland territory was subject to them and before the rise of the Lucanians and Bruttians, and when the name Magna Græcia was first given—it is necessary to glance by contrast at these latter periods; more especially since the same name still continued to be applied by the Romans to Italic Greece after the contraction of territory had rendered it less appropriate.

Of Kroton at this early period of its power and prosperity we know even less than of Sybaris. It stood distinguished both for the number of its citizens who received prizes at the Olympic games, and for the excellence of its surgeons or physicians. And what may seem more surprising, if we consider the extreme present insalubrity of the site upon which it stood, it was in ancient times proverbially healthy, which was not so much the case with the more fertile Sybaris. Respecting all these cities of Italic Greeks, the same remark is applicable as was before made in reference to the Sicilian Greeks—that the intermixture of the native population sensibly affected both their character and habits. We have no information respecting their government during this early period of prosperity, except that we find mention at Kroton (as at the Epizephyrian Lokri) of a senate of 1000 members, yet not excluding occasionally the ecclesia or general assembly. Probably the steady increase of their dominion in the interior, and the facility of providing maintenance for new population, tended much to make their political systems, whatever they may have been, work in a satisfactory manner. The attempt of Pythagoras and his followers to constitute themselves a ruling faction as well as a philosophical sect, will be recounted in a subsequent chapter. The proceedings connected with that attempt will show that there was considerable analogy and sympathy between the various cities of Italian Greece, so as to render them liable to be acted on by the same causes. But though the festivals of the Lakinian Here, administered by the Krotoniates, formed from early times a common point of religious assemblage to all—yet the attempts to institute periodical meetings of deputies, for the express purpose of maintaining political harmony, did not begin

until after the destruction of Sybaris, nor were they ever more than partially successful.

One other city, the most distant colony founded by Greeks in the western regions, yet remains to be mentioned; and we can do no more than mention it, since we have no facts to make up its history. Massalia, the modern Marseilles, was founded by the Ionic Phokæans in the 45th Olympiad, about 597 B.C., at the time when Sybaris and Kroton were near the maximum of their power—when the peninsula of Calabria was all Hellenic, and when Cumæ also had not yet been visited by those calamities which brought about its decline. So much Hellenism in the south of Italy doubtless facilitated the western progress of the adventurous Phokæan mariner. It would appear that Massalia was founded by amicable fusion of Phokæan colonists with the indigenous Gauls, if we may judge by the romantic legend of the Protiadæ, a Massaliotic family or gens existing in the time of Aristotle. Euxenus, a Phokæan merchant, had contracted friendly relations with Nanus, a native chief in the south of Gaul, and was invited to the festival in which the latter was about to celebrate the marriage of his daughter Petta. According to the custom of the country, the maiden was to choose for herself a husband among the guests by presenting him with a cup: through accident, or by preference, Petta presented it to Euxenus, and became his wife. Protis of Massalia, the offspring of this marriage, was the primitive ancestor and eponym of the Protiadæ. According to another story respecting the origin of the same gens, Protis was himself the Phokæan leader who married Gyptis, daughter of Nannus, king of the Segobrigian Gauls.

Of the history of Massalia we know little, nor does it appear to have been connected with the general movement of the Grecian world. We learn generally that the Massaliots administered their affairs with discretion as well as with unanimity, and exhibited in their private habits an exemplary modesty—that although preserving alliance with the people of the interior, they were scrupulously vigilant in guarding their city against surprise, permitting no armed strangers to enter—that they introduced the culture of vines and olives, and gradually extended the Greek alphabet, language, and civilization among the neighboring Gauls—that they not only possessed and fortified many positions along the coast of the Gulf of Lyons, but also founded five colonies along the eastern coast of Spain—that their government was oligarchical, consisting of a perpetual senate of 600 persons, yet admitting occasionally new members from without, and a small council of fifteen members—that the Delphinian Apollo and the Ephesian Artemis were their chief deities, planted as guardians of their outlying posts, and transmitted to their colonies. Although it is common to represent a deliberate march and steady supremacy of the governing few, with contented obedience on the part of the many, as the characteristic of Dorian states, and mutability not less than disturbances as the prevalent tendency in Ionian—yet there is no Grecian community to whom the former attributes are more pointedly ascribed than the Ionic Massalia. The commerce of the Massaliots appears to have been extensive, and their armed maritime force sufficiently powerful to defend it against the aggressions of Carthage—their principal enemy in the western Mediterranean.

CHAPTER XXIII.

GRECIAN COLONIES IN AND NEAR EPIRUS.

On the eastern side of the Ionian Sea were situated the Grecian colonies of Korkyra, Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Apollonia, and Epidamnus.

Among these, by far the most distinguished, for situation, for wealth, and for power, was Korkyra—now known as Corfu, the same name belonging, as in antiquity, both to the town and the island, which is separated from the coast of Epirus by a strait varying from two to seven miles in breadth. Korkyra was founded by the Corinthians, at the same time (we are told) as Syracuse. Chersikrates, a Bacchiad, is said to have accompanied Archias on his voyage from Corinth to Syracuse, and to have been left with a company of emigrants on the island of Korkyra, where he founded a settlement. What inhabitants he found there, or how they were dealt with we cannot clearly make out. The island was generally conceived in antiquity as the residence of the Homeric Phæakians, and it is to this fact that Thucydides ascribes in part the eminence of the Korkyræan marine. According to another story, some Eretrians from Eubœa had settled there, and were compelled to retire. A third statement represents the Liburnians as the prior inhabitants—and this perhaps is the most probable, since the Liburnians were an enterprising, maritime, piratical race, who long continued to occupy the more northerly islands in the Adriatic along the Illyrian and Dalmatian coast. That maritime activity, and number of ships both warlike and commercial, which we find at an early date among the Korkyræans, and in which they stand distinguished from the Italian and Sicilian Greeks, may be plausibly attributed to their partial fusion with pre-existing Liburnians; for the ante-Hellenic natives of Magna Græcia and Sicily (as has been already noticed) were as unpracticed at sea as the Liburnians were expert.

At the time when the Corinthians were about to colonize Sicily, it was natural that they should also wish to plant a settlement at Korkyra, which was a post of great importance for facilitating the voyage from Peloponnesus to Italy, and was farther convenient for traffic with Epirus, at that period altogether non-Hellenic. Their

choice of a site was fully justified by the prosperity and power of the colony, which, however, though sometimes in combination with the mother city, was more frequently alienated from her and hostile, and continued so throughout most part of the three centuries from 700–400 B.C. Perhaps also Molykreia and Chalkis, on the south-western coast of Ætolia, not far from the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, may have been founded by Corinth at a date hardly less early than Korkyra.

It was at Corinth that the earliest improvements in Greek ship-building, and the first construction of the trireme or war-ship with a triple bank of oars, was introduced. It was probably from Corinth that this improvement passed to Korkyra, as it did to Samos. In early times, the Korkyræan navy was in a condition to cope with the Corinthian; and the most ancient naval battle known to Thucydides was one between these two states, in 664 B.C. As far as we can make out, it appears that Korkyra maintained her independence not only during the government of the Bacchiads at Corinth, but also throughout the long reign of the despot Kypselus, and a part of the reign of his son Periander. But toward the close of this latter reign, we find Korkyra subject to Corinth. The barbarous treatment inflicted by Periander, in revenge for the death of his son, upon 300 Korkyræan youths, has already been recounted in a former chapter. After the death of Periander, the island seems to have regained its independence, but we are left without any particulars respecting it from about 585 B.C. down to the period shortly preceding the invasion of Greece by Xerxes—nearly a century. At this later epoch the Korkyræans possessed a naval force hardly inferior to any state in Greece. The expulsion of the Kypselids from Corinth, and the re-establishment of the previous oligarchy or something like it, does not seem to have reconciled the Korkyræans to their mother city. For it was immediately previous to the Peloponnesian war that the Corinthians preferred the bitterest complaints against them, of setting at nought those obligations which a colony was generally understood to be obliged to render. No place of honor was reserved at the public festivals of Korkyra for Corinthian visitors, nor was it the practice to offer to the latter the first taste of the victims sacrificed—observances which were doubtless respectfully fulfilled at Ambrakia and Leukas. Nevertheless the Korkyræans had taken part conjointly with the Corinthians in favor of Syracuse, when that city was in imminent danger of being conquered and enslaved by Hippokrates, despot of Gela (about 492 B.C.)—an incident showing that they were not destitute of generous sympathy with sister states, and leading us to imagine that their alienation from Corinth was as much the fault of the mother-city as their own.

The grounds of the quarrel were, probably, jealousies of trade—especially trade with the Epirotic and Illyrian tribes, wherein both were to a great degree rivals. Safe at home and industrious in the

culture of their fertile island, the Korkyræans were able to furnish wine and oil to the Epirots on the main-land, in exchange for the cattle, sheep, hides, and wool of the latter—more easily and cheaply than the Corinthian merchant. And for the purposes of this trade, they had possessed themselves of a Peræa or strip of the main-land immediately on the other side of the intervening strait, where they fortified various posts for the protection of their property. The Corinthians were personally more popular among the Epirots than the Korkyræans; but it was not until long after the foundation of Korkyra that they established their first settlement on the main-land—Ambrakia, on the north side of the Ambrakiotic Gulf, near the mouth of the river Arachthus. It was during the reign of Kypselus, and under the guidance of his son Gorgus, that this settlement was planted, which afterward became populous and considerable. We know nothing respecting its growth, and we hear only of a despot named Periander as ruling in it, probably related to the despot of the same name at Corinth. Periander of Ambrakia was overthrown by a private conspiracy, provoked by his own brutality and warmly seconded by the citizens, who lived constantly afterward under a popular government.

Nothwithstanding the long-continued dissensions between Korkyra and Corinth, it appears that four considerable settlements on this same line of coast were formed by the joint enterprises of both—Leukas and Anaktorium, to the south of the mouth of the Ambrakiotic Gulf—and Apollonia and Epidamnus, both in the territory of the Illyrians at some distance to the north of the Akrokeraunian promontory. In the settlement of the two latter, the Korkyræans seem to have been the principals—in that of the two former, they were only auxiliaries. It probably did not suit their policy to favor the establishment of any new colony on the intermediate coast opposite to their own island, between the promontory and the gulf above-mentioned. Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia are all referred to the agency of Kypselus the Corinthian. The tranquillity which Aristotle ascribes to his reign may be in part ascribed to the new homes thus provided for poor or discontented Corinthian citizens. Leukas was situated near the modern Santa Maura: the present island was originally a peninsula, and continued to be so until the time of Thucydides; but in the succeeding half century, the Leukadians cut through the isthmus, and erected a bridge across the narrow strait connecting them with the main-land. It had been once an Akarnanian settlement, named Epileukadii, the inhabitants of which falling into civil dissension, invited 1000 Corinthian settlers to join them. The newcomers choosing their opportunity for attack, slew or expelled those who had invited them, made themselves masters of the place with its lands, and converted it from an Akarnanian village into a Grecian town. Anaktorium was situated a short distance within the mouth of the Ambrakian Gulf—founded, like Leukas, upon Akarnanian

soil and with a mixture of Akarnanian inhabitants, by colonists under the auspices of Kypselus or Periander. In both these establishments Korkyræan settlers participated; in both also, the usual religious feelings connected with Grecian emigration were displayed by the neighborhood of a venerated temple of Apollo overlooking the sea—Apollo Aktius near Anaktorium, and Apollo Leukatas near Leukas.

Between these three settlements—Ambrakia, Anaktorium, and Leukas—and the Akarnanian population of the interior, there were standing feelings of hostility, perhaps arising out of the violence which had marked the first foundation of Leukas. The Corinthians, though popular with the Epirots, had been indifferent or unsuccessful in conciliating the Akarnanians. It rather seems indeed that the Akarnanians were averse to the presence or neighborhood of any powerful sea-port; for in spite of their hatred toward the Ambrakiots, they were more apprehensive of seeing Ambrakia in the hands of the Athenians than in that of its own native citizens.

The two colonies north of the Akrokeraunian promontory, and on the coast-land of the Illyrian tribes—Apollonia and Epidamnus—were formed chiefly by the Korkyræans, yet with some aid and a portion of the settlers from Corinth, as well as from other Doric towns. Especially it is to be noticed, that the œkist was a Corinthian and a Herakleid, Phalius the son of Eratokleides—for according to the usual practice of Greece, whenever a city, itself a colony, founded a sub-colony, the œkist of the latter was borrowed from the mother city of the former. Hence the Corinthians acquired a partial right of control and interference in the affairs of Epidamnus, which we shall find hereafter leading to important practical consequences. Epidamnus (better known under its subsequent name Dyrrhachium) was situated on an isthmus on or near the territory of the Illyrian tribe called Taulantii, and is said to have been settled about 627 B.C. Apollonia, of which the god Apollo himself seems to have been recognized as œkist, was founded under similar circumstances, buring the reign of Periander of Corinth, on a maritime plain both extensive and fertile, near the river Aous, two days' journey south of Epidamnus.

Both the one and the other of these two cities seem to have flourished, and to have received accession of inhabitants from Triphylia in Peloponnesus, when that country was subdued by the Eleians. Respecting Epidamnus, especially, we are told that it acquired great wealth and population during the century preceding the Peloponnesian war. A few allusions which we find in Aristotle, too brief to afford much instruction, lead us to suppose that the governments of both began by being close oligarchies under the management of the primitive leaders of the colony—that in Epidamnus, the artisans and tradesmen in the town were considered in the light of slaves belonging to the public—but that in process of time (seemingly somewhat

before the Peloponnesian war) intestine dissension broke up this oligarchy, substituted a periodical senate, with occasional public assemblies, in place of the permanent phylarchs or chiefs of tribes. and thus introduced a form more or less democratical, yet still retaining the original single-headed archon. The Epidamnian government was liberal in the admission of metics or resident aliens—a fact which renders it probable that the alleged public slaveryof artisans in that town was a status carrying with it none of the hardships of actual slavery. It was through an authorized selling agent, or Poletes, that all traffic between Epidamnus and the neighboring Illyrians was carried on—individual dealing with them being interdicted. Apollonia was in one respect pointedly distinguished from Epidamnus, since she excluded metics or resident strangers with a degree of rigor hardly inferior to Sparta. These few facts are all that we are permitted to hear respecting colonies both important in themselves and interesting as they brought the Greeks into connetion with distant people and regions.

The six colonies just named—Korkyra, Ambrakia, Anaktorium, Leukas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus—form an aggregate lying apart from the Hellenic name and connected with each other, though not always maintained in harmony, by analogy of race and position, as well as by their common original from Corinth. That the commerce which the Corinthian merchants carried on with them, and through them with the tribes in the interior, was lucrative, we can have no doubt; and Leukas and Ambrakia continued for a long time to be not merely faithful allies, but servile imitators, of their mother-city. The commerce of Korkyra is also represented as very extensive, and carried even to the northern extremity of the Ionic Gulf. It would seem that they were the first Greeks to open a trade and to establish various settlements on the Illyrian and Dalmatian coasts, as the Phokæans were the first to carry their traffic along the Adriatic coast of Italy. The jars and pottery of Korkyra enjoyed great reputation throughout all parts of the Gulf. The general trade of the island, and the encouragement for its shipping, must probably have been greater during the sixth century B.C., while the cities of Magna Græcia were at the maximum of their prosperity, than in the ensuing century when they had comparatively declined. Nor can we doubt that the visitors and presents to the oracle of Dodona in Epirus, which was distant two days' journey on landing from Korkyra, and the importance of which was most sensible during the earlier periods of Grecian history, contributed to swell the traffic of the Korkyræans.

It is worthy of notice that the monetary system established at Korkyra was thoroughly Grecian and Corinthian, graduated on the usual scale of obols, drachms, minæ, and talents, without including any of those native Italian or Sicilian elements which were adopted by the cities in Magna Græcia and Sicily. The type of the Corinthian coin seems also to have passed to those of Leukas and Ambrakia.

Of the islands of Zakynthus and Kephallenia (Zante and Cephalonia) we hear very little: of Ithaka, so interesting from the story of the Odyssey, we have no historical information at all. The inhabitants of Zakynthus were Achæans from Peloponnesus: Kephallenia was distribuied among four separate city-governments. Neither of these islands plays any part in Grecian history until the time of the maritime empire of Athens, after the Persian war.

CHAPTER XXIV.

AKARNANIANS.—EPIROTS.

SOME notice must be taken of those barbarous or non-Hellenic nations who formed the immediate neighbors of Hellas, west of the range of Pindus, and north of that range which connects Pindus with Olympus—as well as of those other tribes who, though lying more remote from Hellas proper, were yet brought into relations of traffic or hostility with the Hellenic colonies.

Between the Greeks and these foreign neighbors, the Akarnanians, of whom I have already spoken briefly in my preceding volume, form the proper link of transition. They occupied the territory between the river Achelous, the Ionian Sea, and the Ambrakian Gulf: they were Greeks, and admitted as such to contend at the Pan-Hellenic games, yet they were also closely connected with the Amphilochi and Agræi, who were not Greeks. In manners, sentiments, and intelligence, they were half-Hellenic and half-Epirotic—like the Ætolians and the Ozolian Lokrians. Even down to the time of Thucydides, these nations were subdivided into numerous petty communities, lived in unfortified villages, were frequently in the habit of plundering each other, and never permitted themselves to be unarmed: in case of attack, they withdrew their families and their scanty stock, chiefly cattle, to the shelter of difficult mountains or marshes. They were for the most part light-armed, few among them being trained to the panoply of the Grecian hoplite; but they were both brave and skillful in their own mode of warfare, and the sling in the hands of the Akarnanian was a weapon of formidable efficiency.

Notwithstanding this state of disunion and insecurity, however, the Akarnanians maintained a loose political league among themselves. A hill near the Amphilochian Argos, on the shores of the Ambrakian Gulf, had been fortified to serve as a judgment-seat or place of meeting for the settlement of disputes. And it seems that both Stratus and Œniadæ had become fortified in some measure towards the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. The former, the most considerable township in Akarnania, was situated on the

Achelous, rather high up its course—the latter was at the mouth of the river, and was rendered difficult of approach by its inundations. Astakus, Solium, Palærus, and Alyzia, lay on or near the coast of the Ionian Sea, between Œniadæ and Leukas: Phytia, Koronta, Medeon, Limnæa, and Thyrium, were between the southern shore of the Ambrakian Gulf and the river Achelous.

The Akarnanians appear to have produced many prophets. They traced up their mythical ancestry, as well as that of their neighbors the Amphilochians, to the most renowned prophetic family among the Grecian heroes—Amphiaraus, with his sons Alkmæon and Amphilochus: Akarnan, the eponymous hero of the nation, and other eponymous heroes of the separate towns, were supposed to be the sons of Alkmæon. They are spoken of, together with the Ætolians, as mere rude shepherds by the lyric poet Alkman, and so they seem to have continued with little alteration until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when we hear of them, for the first time, as allies of Athens and as bitter enemies of the Corinthian colonies on their coast. The contact of those colonies, however, and the large spread of Akarnanian accessible coast, could not fail to produce some effect in socializing and improving the people. And it is probable that this effect would have been more sensibly felt, had not the Akarnanians been kept back by the fatal neighborhood of the Ætolians, with whom they were in perpetual feud—a people the most unprincipled and unimprovable of all who bore the Hellenic name, and whose habitual faithlessness stood in marked contrast with the rectitude and steadfastness of the Akarnanian character. It was in order to strengthen the Akarnanians against these rapacious neighbors that the Macedonian Kassander urged them to consolidate their numerous small townships into a few considerable cities. Partially at least the recommendation was carried into effect, so as to aggrandize Stratus and one or two other towns. But in the succeeding century, the town of Leukas seems to lose its original position as a separate Corinthian colony, and to pass into that of chief city of Akarnania, which it lost only by the sentence of the Roman conquerors.

Passing over the borders of Akarnania, we find small nations or tribes not considered as Greeks, but known, from the fourth century B.C. downward, under the common name of Epirots. This word signifies properly, inhabitants of a continent as opposed to those of an island or a peninsula. It came only gradually to be applied by the Greeks as their comprehensive denomination to designate all those diverse tribes, between the Ambrakian Gulf on the south and west, Pindus on the east, and the Illyrians and Macedonians to the north and north-east. Of these Epirots, the principal were—the Chaonians, Thesprotians, Kassopians, and Molossians, who occupied the country inland as well as maritime along the Ionian Sea from the Akrokeraunian mountains to the borders of Ambrakia in the

interior of the Ambrakian Gulf. The Agræans and Amphilochians dwelt eastward of the last-mentioned gulf, bordering upon Akarnania: the Athamanes, the Tymphæans, and the Talares lived along the western skirts and high range of Pindus. Among these various tribes it is difficult to discriminate the semi-Hellenic from the non-Hellenic; for Herodotus considers both Molossians and Thesprotians as Hellenic—and the oracle of Dodona, as well as the Nekyomanteion (or holy cavern for evoking the dead) of Acheron, were both in the territory of the Thesprotians, and both (in the time of the historian) Hellenic. Thucydides, on the other hand, treats both Molossians and Thesprotians as barbaric, and Strabo says the same respecting the Athamanes, whom Plato numbers as Hellenic. As the Epirots were confounded with the Hellenic communities towards the south, so they become blended with the Macedonian and Illyrian tribes towards the north. The Macedonian Orestæ, north of the Cambunian mountains and east of Pindus, are called by Hekatæus a Molossian tribe; and Strabo even extends the designation Epirots to the Illyrian Paroræi and Atintanes, west of Pindus, nearly on the same parallel of latitude with the Orestæ. It must be remembered (as observed above), that while the designations Illyrians and Macedonians are properly ethnical, given to denote analogies of language, habits, feeling, and supposed origin, and probably acknowledged by the people themselves—the name Epirots belongs to the Greek language, is given by Greeks alone, and marks nothing except residence on a particular portion of the continent. Theopompus (about 340 B.C.) reckoned fourteen distinct Epirotic nations, among whom the Molossians and Chaonians were the principal. It is possible that some of these may have been semi-Illyrian, others semi-Macedonian, though all were comprised by him under the common name Epirots.

Of these various tribes, who dwelt between the Akrokeraunian promontory and the Ambrakian Gulf, some at least appear to have been of ethnical kindred with portions of the inhabitants of Southern Italy. There were Chaonians on the Gulf of Tarentum before the arrival of the Greek settlers, as well as in Epirus. Though we do not find the name Thesprotians in Italy, we find there a town named Pandosia and a river named Acheron, the same as among the Epirotic Thesprotians: the ubiquitous name Pelasgian is connected both with one and with the other. This ethnical affinity, remote or near, between Œnotrians and Epirots, which we must accept as a fact without being able to follow it into detail, consists at the same time with the circumstance—that both seem to have been susceptible of Hellenic influences to an unusual degree, and to have been molded, with comparatively little difficulty, into an imperfect Hellenism, like that of the Ætolians and Akarnanians. The Thesprotian conquerors of Thessaly passed in this manner into Thessalian Greeks. The Amphilochians who inhabited Argos on the Ambrakian Gulf were

hellenized by the reception of Greeks from Ambrakia, though the Amphilochians situated without the city still remained barbarous in the time of Thucydides: a century afterwards, probably, they would be hellenized like the rest by a longer continuance of the same influences—as happened with the Sikels in Sicily.

To assign the names and exact boundaries of the different tribes inhabiting Epirus as they stood in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., at the time when the western stream of Grecian colonization was going on, and when the newly-estaalished Ambrakiots must have been engaged in subjugating or expelling the prior occupants of their valuable site—is out of our power. We have no information prior to Herodotus and Thucydides, and that which they tell us cannot be safely applied to a time either much earlier or much later than their own. That there was great analogy between the inland Macedonians and the Epirots, from Mount Bermius across the continent to the coast opposite Korkyra, in military equipment, in the fashion of cutting the hair, and in speech, we are apprised by a valuable passage of Strabo; who farther tells us that many of the tribes spoke two different languages—a fact which at least proves very close intercommunion, if not a double origin and incorporation. Wars or voluntary secessions and new alliances would alter the boundaries and relative situation of the various tribes. And this would be the more easily effected, as all Epirus, even in the fourth century B.C. was parceled out among an aggregate of villages, without any great central cities: so that the severance of a village from the Molossian union, and its junction with the Thesprotian (abstracting from the feelings with which it might be connected), would make little practical difference in its condition or proceedings. The gradual increase of Hellenic influence tended partially to centralize this political dispersion, enlarging some of the villages into small towns by the incorporation of some of their neighbors; and in this way probably were formed the seventy Epirotic cities which were destroyed and given up to plunder on the same day, by Paulus Emilius and the Roman senate. The Thesprotian Ephyre is called a city even by Thucydides. Nevertheless the situation was unfavorable to the formation of considerable cities, either on the coast or in the interior, since the physical character of the territory is an exaggeration of that of Greece—almost throughout, wild, rugged and mountainous. The valleys and low grounds, though frequent, are never extensive—while the soil is rarely suited, in any continuous spaces, for the cultivation of corn; insomuch that the flour for the consumption of Janina, at the present day, is transported from Thessaly over the lofty ridge of Pindus by means of asses and mules; while the fruits and vegetables are brought from Arta, the territory of Ambrakia. Epirus is essentially a pastoral country: its cattle as well as its shepherds and shepherd's dogs were celebrated throughout all antiquity; and its population then, as now, found divided village residence the

most suitable to their means and occupations. In spite of this natural tendency, however, Hellenic influences were to a certain extent efficacious, and it is to them that we are to ascribe the formation of towns like Phœnike—an inland city a few miles removed from the sea, in a latitude somewhat north of the northernmost point of Korkyra, which Polybius notices as the most flourishing of the Epirotic cities at the time when it was plundered by the Illyrians in 230 B.C. Passaron, the ancient spot where the Molossian kings were accustomed on their accession to take their coronation-oath, had grown into a considerable town, in this last century before the Roman conquest; while Tekmon, Phylake, and Horreum also become known to us at the same period. But the most important step which those kings made towards aggrandizement, was the acquisition of the Greek city of Ambrakia, which became the capital of the kingdom of Pyrrhus, and thus gave to him the only site suitable for a concentrated population which the country afforded.

If we follow the coast of Epirus from the entrance of the Ambrakian Gulf northward to the Akrokeraunian promontory, we shall find it discouraging to Grecian colonization. There are none of those extensive maritime plains which the Gulf of Tarentum exhibits on its coast, and which sustained the grandeur of Sybaris and Kroton. Throughout the whole extent, the mountain-region, abrupt and affording little cultivable soil, approaches near to the sea; and the level ground, wherever it exists, must be commanded and possessed (as it is now) by villagers on hill-sites, always difficult of attack and often inexpugnable. From hence, and from the neighborhood of Korkyra—herself well situated for traffic with Epiros, and jealous of neighboring rivals—we may understand why the Grecian emigrants omitted this unprofitable tract, and passed on either northward to the maritime plains of Illyria, or westward to Italy. In the time of Herodotus and Thucydides, there seems to have been no Hellenic settlement between Ambrakia and Apollonia. The harbor called Glykys Limen, with the neighboring valley and plain, the most considerable in Epirus next to that of Ambrakia, near the junction of the lake and river of Acheron with the sea—were possessed by the Thesprotian town of Ephyre, situated on a neighboring eminence; perhaps also in part by the ancient Thesprotian town of Pandosia, so pointedly connected, both in Italy and Epirus, with the river Acheron. Amidst the almost inexpugnable mountains and gorges which mark the course of that Thesprotian river, was situated the memorable recent community of Suli, which held in dependence many surrounding villages in the lower grounds and in the plain—the counterpart of primitive Epirotic rulers in situation, in fierceness, and in indolence, but far superior to them in energetic bravery and endurance. It appears that after the time of Thucydides, certain Greek settlers must have found admission into the Epirotic towns in this region. For Demosthenes mentions Pandosia, Buchetia, and Elæa, as settlements from Elis, which Philip of Macedon conquered and handed over to his brother-in-law the king of the Molossian Epirots; and Strabo tells us that the name of Ephyre had been changed to Kichyrus, which appears to imply an accession of new inhabitants.

Both the Chaonians and Thesprotians appear, in the time of Thucydides, as having no kings; there was a privileged kingly race, but the presiding chief was changed from year to year. The Molossians, however, had a line of kings, succeeding from father to son, which professed to trace its descent through fifteen generations downward, from Achilles and Neoptolemus to Tharypas about the year 400 B.C.: thus forming a scion of the great Æakid race. Admetus, the Molossian king to whom Themistokles presented himself as a suppliant, appears to have lived in the simplicity of an island village chief. But Arrybas, his son or grandson, is said to have been educated at Athens, and to have introduced improved social regularity into his native country: while the subsequent kings both imitated the ambition and received the aid of Philip of Macedon, extending their dominion over a large portion of the other Epirots. Even in the time of Skylax, they covered a large inland territory, though their portion of sea-coast was confined. From the narrative of Thucydides, we gather that all the Epirots, though held together by no political union, were yet willing enough to combine for purposes of aggression and plunder. The Chaonians enjoyed a higher military reputation than the rest. But the account which Thucydides gives of their expedition against Akarnania exhibits a blind, reckless, boastful impetuosity, which contrasts strikingly with the methodical and orderly march of their Greek allies and companions.

To collect the few particulars known, respecting these ruder communities adjacent to Greece, is a task indispensable for the just comprehension of the Grecian world, and for the appreciation of the Greeks themselves by comparison or contrast with their contemporries. Indispensable as it is, however, it can hardly be rendered in itself interesting to the reader, whose patience I have to bespeak by assuring him that the facts hereafter to be recounted of Grecian history would be only half understood without this preliminary survey of the lands around.

CHAPTER XXV.

ILLYRIANS, MACEDONIANS, PÆONIANS.

NORTHWARD of the tribes called Epirotic lay those more numerous and widely extended tribes who bore the general name of Illyrians, bounded on the west by the Adriatic, on the east by the mountain-range of Skardus, the northern continuation of Pindus, and thus

covering what is now called Middle and Upper Albania, together with the more northerly mountains of Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Bosnia. Their limits to the north and north east cannot be assigned. But the Dardani and Autariatæ must have reached to the north-east of Skardus and even east of the Servian plain of Kossovo; while along the Adriatic coast, Skylax extends the race so far northward as to include Dalmatia, treating the Liburnians and Istrians beyond them as not Illyrian: yet Appian and others consider the Liburnians and Istrians as Illyrian, and Herodotus even includes under that name the Eneti of Veneti at the extremity of the Adriatic Gulf. The Bulini, according to Skylax, were the northernmost Illyrian tribe; the Amantini, immediately northward of the Epirotic Chaonians, were southernmost. Among the Southern Illyrian tribes are to be numbered the Taulantii—originally the possessors, afterwards the immediate neighbors, of the territory on which Epidamnus was founded. The ancient geographer Hekatæus (about 500 B.C.) is sufficiently well acquainted with them to specify their town Sesarethus. He names the Chelidonii as their northern, the Encheleis as their southern, neighbors; and the Abri also as a tribe nearly adjoining. We hear of the Illyrian Parthini, nearly in the same regions—of the Dassaretii, near Lake Lychnidus—of the Penestæ, with a fortified town Uscana, north of the Dassaretii—of the Ardiæans, the Autariatæ, and the Dardanians, throughout Upper Albania eastward as far as Upper Mœsia, including the range of Skardus itself; so that there were some Illyrian tribes conterminous on the east, with Macedonians, and on the south with Macedonians. as well as with Pæonians. Strabo extends some of the Illyrian tribes much farther northward, nearly to the Julian Alps.

With the exception of some portions of what is now called Middle Albania, the territory of these tribes consisted principally of mountain pastures with a certain proportion of fertile valley, but rarely expanding into a plain. The Autariatæ had the reputation of being unwarlike, but the Illyrians generally were poor, rapacious, fierce and formidable in battle. They shared with the remote Thracian tribes the custom of tattooing their bodies and of offering human sacrifices: moreover, they were always ready to sell their military service for hire, like the modern Albanian Schkipetars, in whom probably their blood yet flows, though with considerable admixture from subsequent immigrations. Of the Illyrian Kingdom on the Adriatic coast, with Skodra (Scutari) for its capital city, which became formidable by its reckless piracies in the third century B.C., we hear nothing in the flourishing period of Grecian history. The description of Skylax notices in his day all along the northern Adriatic, a considerable and standing traffic between the coast and the interior, carried on by Liburnians, Istrians, and the small Grecian insular settlements of Pharus and Issa. But he does not name Skodra, and probably this strong post (together with the Greek town

Lissus, founded by Dionysius of Syracuse) was occupied after his time by conquerors from the interior; the predecessors of Agron and Gentius, just as the coast-land of the Thermaic Gulf was conquered by inland Macedonians,

Once during the Peloponnesian war, a detachment of hired Illyrians, marching into Macedonia Lynkestis (seemingly over the pass of Skardus a little east of Lychnidus or Ochrida), tried the valor of the Spartan Brasidas. On that occasion (as in the expedition above alluded to of the Epirots against Akarnania) we shall notice the marked superiority of the Grecian character, even in the case of an armament chiefly composed of helots newly enfranchised, over both Macedonians and Illyrians. We shall see the contrast between brave men acting in concert and obedience to a common authority, and an assailing host of warriors, not less brave individually, but in which every man is his own master, and fights as he pleases. The rapid and impetuous rush of the Illyrians, if the first shock failed of its effect, was succeeded by an equally rapid retreat or flight. We hear nothing afterward respecting these barbarians until the time of Philip of Macedon, whose vigor and military energy first repressed their incursions, and afterward partially conquered them. It seems to have been about this period (400–350 B.C.) that the great movement of the Gauls from west to east took place, which brought the Gallic Skordiski and other tribes into the regions between the Danube and the Adriatic Sea, and which probably dislodged some of the northern Illyrians so as to drive them upon new enterprises and fresh abodes.

What is now called Middle Albania, the Illyrian territory immediately north of Epirus, is much superior to the latter in productiveness. Though mountainous, it possesses more both of low hill and valley, and ampler as well as more fertile cultivable spaces. Epidamnus and Apollonia formed the sea-ports of this territory. To them commerce with southern Illyrians, less barbarous than the northern, was one of the sources of great prosperity during the first century of their existence—a prosperity interrupted in the case of the Epidamnians by internal dissensions, which impaired their ascendancy over their Illyrian neighbors, and ultimately placed them at variance with their mother-city Korkyra. The commerce between these Greek seaports and the interior tribes, when once the Greeks became strong enough to render violent attack from the latter hopeless, was reciprocally beneficial to both of them. Grecian oil and wine were introduced among these barbarians, whose chiefs at the same time learnt to appreciate the woven fabrics, the polished and carved metallic work, the tempered weapons, and the pottery which issued from Grecian artisans. Moreover, the importation sometimes of salt-fish, and always that of salt itself, was of the greatest importance to these inland residents, especially for such localities as possessed lakes abounding in fish like that of Lychnidus. We hear of

wars between the Autariatæ and the Ardiæi, respecting salt springs near their boundaries, and also of other tribes whom the privation of salt reduced to the necessity of submitting to the Romans. On the other hand these tribes possessed two articles of exchange so precious in the eyes of the Greeks, that Polybius reckons them as absolutely indispensable—cattle and slaves; which latter were doubtless procured from Illyria, often in exchange for salt, as they were from Thrace and from the Euxine, and from Aquileia in the Adriatic, through the internal wars of one tribe with another. Silver-mines were worked at Damastium in Illyria. Wax and honey were probably also articles of export, and it is a proof that the natural products of Illyria were carefully sought out, when we find a species of iris peculiar to the country collected and sent to Corinth, where its root was employed to give the special flavor to a celebrated kind of aromatic unguent.

The intercourse between the Hellenic ports and the Illyrians inland, was not exclusively commercial. Grecian exiles also found their way into Illyria, and Grecian mythes became localized there, as may be seen by the tale of Kadmus and Harmonia, from whom the chiefs of the Illyrian Encheleis professed to trace their descent.

The Macedonians of the fourth century B.C. acquired, from the ability and enterprise of two successive kings, a great perfection in Greek military organization without any of the loftier Hellenic qualities. Their career in Greece is purely destructive, extinguishing the free movement of the separate cities, and disarming the citizen-soldier to make room for the foreign mercenary whose sword was unhallowed by any feelings of patriotism—yet totally incompetent to substitute any good system of central or pacific administration. But the Macedonians of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. are an aggregate only of rude inland tribes, subdivided into distinct petty principalities, and separated from the Greeks by a wider ethnical difference even than the Epirots; since Herodotus, who considers the Epirotic Molossians and Thesprotians as children of Hellen, decidedly thinks the contrary respecting the Macedonians. In the main however, they seem at this early period analogous to the Epirots in character and civilization. They had some few towns, but they were chiefly village residents, extremely brave and pugnacious: the customs of some of their tribes enjoined that the man who had not yet slain an enemy should be distinguished on some occasions by a badge of discredit.

The original seats of the Macedonians were in the regions east of the chain of Skardus (the northerly continuation of Pindus) north of the chain called the Cambunian mountains, which connects Olympus with Pindus, and which forms the north-western boundary of Thessaly; but they did not reach so far eastward as the Thermaic Gulf; apparently not farther eastward than Mount Bermius, or about the longitude of Edessa and Berrhoia. They thus covered the upper portions of the course of the rivers Haliakmon and Erigon, before the junction of the latter with the Axius; while the upper course of

the Axius, higher than this point of junction, appears to have belonged to Pæonia, though the boundaries of Macedonia and Pæonia cannot be distinctly marked out at any time.

The large space of country included between the above-mentioned boundaries is in a great part mountainous, occupied by lateral ridges or elevations which connect themselves with the main line of Skardus. But it also comprises three wide alluvial basins or plains, which are of great extent and well-adapted to cultivation—the plain of Tettovo or Kalkandele (northernmost of the three), which contains the sources and early course of the Axius or Vardar—that of Bitolia, coinciding to a great degree with the ancient Pelagonia, wherein the Erigon flows toward the Axius—and the larger and more undulating basin of Greveno and Anaselitzas, containing the Upper Haliakmon with its confluent streams: this latter region is separated from the basin of Thessaly by a mountainous line of considerable length, but presenting numerous easy passes. Reckoning the basin of Thessaly as a fourth, here are four distinct enclosed plains on the east side of this long range of Skardus and Pindus—each generally bounded by mountains which rise precipitously to an Alpine height, and each leaving only one cleft for drainage by a single river—the Axius, the Erigon, the Haliakmon, and the Peneius respectively. All four, moreover, though of high level above the sea, are yet for the most part of distinguished fertility, especially the plains of Tettovo, of Bitolia, and Thessaly. The fat rich land to the east of Pindus and Skardus is described as forming a marked contrast with the light calcareous soil of the Albanian plains and valleys on the western side. The basins of Bitolia and of the Heliakmon, with the mountains around and adjoining, were possessed by the original Macedonians; that of Tettovo, on the north, by a portion of the Pæonians. Among the four, Thessaly is the most spacious; yet the two comprised in the primitive seats of the Macedonians, both of them very considerable in magnitude, formed a territory better calculated to nourish and to generate a considerable population than the less favored home, and smaller breadth of valley and plain, occupied by Epirots or Illyrians. Abundance of corn easily raised, of pasture for cattle, and of new fertile land open to cultivation, would suffice to increase the numbers of hardy villagers, indifferent to luxury as well as to accumulation, and exempt from that oppressive extortion of rulers which now harasses the same fine regions.

The inhabitants of this primitive Macedonia doubtless differed much in ancient times, as they do now, according as they dwelt on mountain or plain, and in soil and climate more or less kind. But all acknowledged a common ethnical name and nationality, and the tribes were in many cases distinguished from each other, not by having substantive names of their own, but merely by local epithets of Grecian origin. Thus we find Elymiotæ Macedonians or Macedonians of Elymeia—Lynkestæ Macedonians or Macedonians of Lynkus,

etc. Orestæ is doubtless an adjunct name of the same character. The inhabitants of the more northerly tracts, called Pelagonia and Deuriopus, were also portions of the Macedonian aggregate, though neighbors of the Pæonians, to whom they bore much affinity: whether the Eordi and Almopians were of Macedonian race, it is more difficult to say. The Macedonian language was different from Illyrian, from Thracian, and seemingly also from Pæonian; it was also different from Greek, yet apparently not more widely distinct than that of the Epirots; so that the acquisition of Greek was comparatively easy to the chiefs and people, though there were always some Greek letters which they were incapable of pronouncing. And when we follow their history, we shall find in them more of the regular warrior conquering in order to maintain dominion and tribute, and less of the armed plunderer, than the Illyrians, Thracians, or Epirots, by whom it was their misfortune to be surrounded. They approach nearer to the Thessalians, and to the other ungifted members of the Hellenic family.

The large and comparatively productive region covered by the various sections of Macedonians, helps to explain that increase of ascendency which they successively acquired over all their neighbors. It was not however until a late period that they became united under one government. At first, each section—how many we do not know—had its own prince or chief. The Elymiots, or inhabitants of Elymien, the southernmost portion of Macedonia, were thus originally distinct and independent; also the Orestæ, in mountain seats somewhat north-west of the Elymiots—the Lynkestæ and Eordi, who occupied portions of territory on the track of the subsequent Egnatian way, between Lychnidus (Ochrida) and Edessa—the Pelagonians, with a town of the same name, in the fertile plain of Bitolia—and the more northerly plain of Deuriopians. And the early political union was usually so loose, that each of these denominations probably includes many petty independencies, small towns, and villages. The section of the Macedonian name who afterward swallowed up all the rest and became known as *The Macedonians*, had their original center at Ægæ or Edessa—the lofty, commanding and picturesque site of the modern Vodhena. And though the residence of the kings was in later times transferred to the marshy Pella, in the maritime plain beneath, yet Edessa was always retained as the regal burial place, and as the hearth to which the religious continuity of the nation (so much reverenced in ancient times) was attached. This ancient town, which lay on the Roman Egnatian way from Lychnidus to Pella and Thessalonika, formed the pass over the mountain-ridge called Bermius, or that prolongation to the northward of Mount Olympus, through which the Haliakmon makes its way out into the maritime plain at Verria, by a cleft more precipitous and impracticable than that of the Peneius in the defile of Tempe.

This mountain-chain called Bermius, extending from Olympus considerably to the north of Edessa, formed the original eastern boundary of the Macedonian tribes; who seem at first not to have reached the valley of the Axius in any part of its course, and who certainly did not reach at first to the Thermaic Gulf. Between the last-mentioned gulf and the eastern counterforts of Olympius and Bermius there exists a narrow strip of plain land or low hill which reaches from the mouth of the Peneius to the head of the Thermaic Gulf: it there widens into the spacious and fertile plain of Salonichi, comprising the mouths of the Haliakmon, the Axius, and the Echeidorus. The river Ludias, which flows from Edessa into the marshes surrounding Pella, and which in antiquity joined the Haliakmon, near its mouth, has now altered its course so as to join the Axius. This narrow strip, between the mouths of the Peneius and the Haliakmon, was the original abode of the Pierian Thracians, who dwelt close to the foot of Olympus, and among whom the worship of the Muses seems to have been a primitive characteristic; Grecian poetry teems with local allusions and epithets which appear traceable to this early fact, though we are unable to follow it in detail. North of the Pierians, from the mouth of the Haliakmon to that of the Axius, dwelt the Bottiæans. Beyond the river Axius, at the lower part of its course, began the tribes of the great Thracian race—Mygdonians, Krestonians, Edonians, Bisaltæ, Sithonians: the Mygdonians seem to have been originally the most powerful, since the country still continued to be called by their name, Mygdonia, even after the Macedonian conquest. These, and various other Thracian tribes, originally occupied most part of the country between the mouth of the Axius and that of the Strymon; together with that memorable three-pronged peninsula which derived from the Grecian colonies its name of Chalkidike. It will thus appear, if we consider the Bottiæans as well as the Pierians to be Thracians, that the Thracian race extended originally southward as far as the mouth of the Peneius: the Bottiæans professed indeed a Kretan origin, but this pretension is not noticed by either Herodotus or Thucydides. In the time of Skylax, seemingly during the early reign of Philip the son of Amyntas, Macedonia and Thrace were separated by the Strymon.

We have yet to mention the Pæonians, a numerous and much divided race, seemingly neither Thracian nor Macedonian nor Illyrian, but professing to be descended from the Teukri of Troy. These Pæonians occupied both banks of the Strymon, from the neighborhood of Mount Skomius, in which that river rises, down to the lake near its mouth: some of their tribes possessed the fertile plain of Siris (now Seres)—the land immediately north of Mount Pangæus—and even a portion of the space through which Xerxes marched on his route from Akanthus to Therma. Besides this, it appears that the upper parts of the valley of the Axius were also occupied by Pæonian tribes; how far down the river they extended, we are una-

ble to say. We are not to suppose that the whole territory between Axius and Strymon was continuously peopled by them. Continuous population is not the character of the ancient world, and it seems moreover that while the land immediately bordering on both rivers is in very many places of the richest quality, the spaces between the two are either mountain or barren low hill—forming a marked contrast with the rich alluvial basin of the Macedonian river Erigon. The Pæonians in their north-western tribes, thus bordered upon the Macedonian Pelagonia—in their northern tribes, upon the Illyrian Dardani and Autariatæ—in their eastern, southern and south-eastern tribes, upon the Thracians and Pierians; that is, upon the second seats occupied by the expelled Pierians under Mount Pangæus.

Such was, as far as we can make it out, the position of the Macedonians and their immediate neighbors, in the seventh century B.C. It was first altered by the enterprise and ability of a family of exiled Greeks, who conducted a section of the Macedonian people to those conquests which their descendants, Philip and Alexander the Great, afterwards so marvelously multiplied.

Respecting the primitive ancestry of these two princes, there were different stories, but all concurred in tracing the origin of the family to the Herakleid or Temenid race of Argos. According to one story (which apparently cannot be traced higher than Theopompus), Karanus, brother of the despot Pheidon, had migrated from Argos to Macedonia, and established himself as conqueror at Edessa. According to another tale which we find in Herodotus, there were three exiles of the Temenid race, Gauanes, Aeropus, and Perdikkas, who fled from Argos to Illyria, from whence they passed into Upper Macedonia, in such poverty as to be compelled to serve the petty king of the town Lebæa in the capacity of shepherds. A remarkable prodigy happening to Perdikkas foreshadows the future eminence of his family, and leads to his dismissal by the king of Lebæa—from whom he makes his escape with difficulty. He is preserved by the sudden rise of a river, immediately after he had crossed it, so as to become impassable by the horsemen who pursued him; to this river, as to the saviour of the family, solemn sacrifices were still offered by the kings of Macedonia in the time of Herodotus. Perdikkas with his two brothers having thus escaped, established himself near the spot called the Garden of Midas or Mount Bermius. From the loins of this hardy young shepherd sprang the dynasty of Edessa. This tale bears much more the marks of a genuine local tradition than that of Theopompus; and the origin of the Macedonian family, or Argeadæ, from Argos, appears to have been universally recognized by Grecian inquirers, so that Alexander the son of Amyntas, the contemporary of the Persian invasion, was admitted by the Hellanodikæ to contend at the Olympic games as a genuine Greek, though his competitors sought to exclude him as a Macedonian.

The talent for command was so much more the attribute of the Greek mind than of any of the neighboring barbarians, that we easily conceive a courageous Argeian adventurer acquiring to himself great ascendancy in the local disputes of the Macedonian tribes, and transmitting the chieftainship of one of those tribes to his offspring. The influence acquired by Miltiades among the Thracians of the Chersonese, and by Phormio among the Akarnanians (who specially requested that after his death his son or some one of his kindred might be sent from Athens to command them) was very much of this character. We may add the case of Sertorius among the native Iberians. In like manner, the kings of the Macedonian Lynkestæ professed to be descended from the Bacchiadæ of Corinth: and the neighborhood of Epidamnus and Apollonia, in both of which doubtless members of that great gens were domiciliated, renders this tale even more plausible than that of an emigration from Argos. The kings of the Epirotic Molossi pretended also to a descent from the heroic Æakid race of Greece. In fact, our means of knowledge do not enable us to discriminate the cases in which these reigning families were originally Greeks, from those in which they were hellenized natives pretending to Grecian blood.

After the foundation-legend of the Macedonian kingdom, we have nothing but a long blank until the reign of king Amyntas (about 520-500 B.C.), and his son Alexander (about 480 B.C.). Herodotus gives us five successive kings between the founder Perdikkas and Amyntas—Perdikkas, Argæus, Philippus, Aëropus, Alketas, Amyntas, and Alexander—the contemporary and to a certain extent the ally of Xerxes. Though we have no means of establishing any dates in this early series, either of names or of facts, yet we see that the Temenid kings, beginning from a humble origin, extended their dominions successfully on all sides. They conquered the Briges, originally their neighbors on Mount Bermius—the Eordi, bordering on Edessa to the westward, who were either destroyed or expelled from the country (a small remnant of them still existed in the time of Thucydides at Physka between Strymon and Axius)—the Almopians, an inland tribe of unknown site—and many of the interior Macedonian tribes who had been at first autonomous. Besides these inland conquests, they had made the still more important acquisition of Pieria (the territory which lay betwen Mount Bermius and the sea), from whence they expelled the original Pierians, who found new seats on the eastern bank of the Strymon between Mount Pangæus and the sea. Amyntas king of Macedon was thus master of a very considerable territory, comprising the coast of the Thermaic Gulf as far north as the mouth of the Haliakmon, and also some other territory on the same gulf from which the Bottiæans had been expelled; but not comprising the coast between the mouths of the Axius and the Heliakmon, nor even Pella the subsequent capital, which were still in the hands of the Bottiæans at the period when Xerxes passed through. He possessed also Anthemus, a town and territory in the

peninsula of Chalkidike, and some parts of Mygdonia, the territory east of the mouth of the Axius; but how much, we do not know, We shall find the Macedonians hereafter extending their dominion still farther, during the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian war.

We hear of king Amyntas in friendly connection with the Peisistratid princes at Athens, whose dominion was in part sustained by mercenaries from the Strymon; and this amicable sentiment was continued between his son Alexander and the emancipated Athenians It is only in the reigns of these two princes that Macedonia begins to be implicated in Grecian affairs. The regal dynasty had become so completely Macedonized, and had so far renounced its Hellenic brotherhood, that the claim of Alexander to run at the Olympic games was contested by his competitors, who compelled him to prove his lineage before the Hellanonikæ.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THRACIANS AND GREEK COLONIES IN THRACE.

THAT vast space comprised between the rivers Strymon and Danube, and bounded to the west by the easternmost Illyrian tribes, northward of the Strymon, was occupied by the innumerable subdivisions of the race called Thracians or Threicians. They were the most numerous and most terrible race known to Herodotus: could they by possibility act in unison or under one dominion (he says) they would be irresistible. A conjunction thus formidable once seemed impending, during the first years of the Peloponnesian war, under the reign of Sitalkes, king of the Odrysæ, who reigned from Abdera at the mouth of the Nestus to the Euxine, and compressed under his sceptre a large proportion of these ferocious but warlike plunderers; so that the Greeks even down to Thermopylæ trembled at his expected approach. But the abilities of that prince were not found adequate to bring the whole force of Thrace into effective co-operation and aggression against others.

Numerous as the tribes of Thracians were, their customs and character (according to Herodotus) were marked by great uniformity: of the Getæ, the Trausi, and others, he tells us a few particularities. And the large tract over which the race were spread, comprising as it did the whole chain of Mount Hæmus and the still loftier chain of Rhodope, together with a portion of the mountains Orbelus and Skomius, was yet partly occupied by level and fertile surface—such as the great plain of Adrianople, and the land toward the lower course of the rivers Nestus and Hebrus. The Thracians of the plain, though not less warlike, were at least more home-keeping, and

less greedy of foreign plunder, than those of the mountains. But the general character of the race presents an aggregate of repulsive features, unredeemed by the presence of even the commonest domestic affections. The Thracian chief deduced his pedigree from a god called by the Greeks Hermes, to whom he offered up worship apart from the rest of his tribe, sometimes with the acceptable present of a human victim. He tattooed his body, and that of the women belonging to him, as a privilege of honorable descent: he bought his wives from their parents, and sold his children for exportation to the foreign merchant: he held it disgraceful to cultivate the earth, and felt honored only by the acquisitions of war and robbery. The Thracian tribes worshiped deities whom the Greeks assimilate to Ares, Dionysus, and Artemis. The great sanctuary and oracle of their god Dionysus was in one of the loftiest summits of Rhodope, amidst dense and foggy thickets—the residence of the fierce and unassailable Satræ. To illustrate the Thracian character, we may turn to a deed perpetrated by the king of the Bisaltæ—perhaps one out of several chiefs of that extensive Thracian tribe—whose territory, between Strymon and Axius, lay in the direct march of Xerxes into Greece, and who, to escape the ignominy of being dragged along amidst the compulsory auxiliaries of the Persian invasion, fled to the heights of Rhodope, forbidding his six sons to take any part in it. From recklessness, or curiosity, the sons disobeyed his commands, and accompanied Xerxes into Greece. They returned unhurt by the Greek spear, but the incensed father, when they again came into his presence, caused the eyes of all them to be put out. Exultation of success manifested itself in the Thracians by increased alacrity in shedding blood; but as warriors, the only occupation which they esteemed, they were not less brave than patient of hardship; maintaining a good front, under their own peculiar array, against forces much superior in all military efficacy. It appears that the Thynians and Bithynians, on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, perhaps also, the Mysians, were members of this great Thracian race which was more remotely connected also with the Phrygians. And the whole race may be said to present a character more Asiatic than European; especially in those ecstatic and maddening religious rites, which prevailed not less among the Edonian Thracians than in the mountains of Ida and Dindymon of Asia, though with some important differences. The Thracians served to furnish the Greeks with mercenary troops and slaves, and the number of Grecian colonies planted on the coast had the effect of partially softening the tribes in the immediate vicinity, between whose chiefs and the Greek leaders intermarriages were not unfrequent. But the tribes in the interior seem to have retained their savage habits with little mitigation: so that the language in which Tacitus describes them is an apt continuation to that of Herodotus, though coming more than five centuries after.

To note the situation of each one among these many different tribes, in the large territory of Thrace, which is even now imperfectly known and badly mapped, would be unnecessary and indeed impracticable. I shall proceed to mention the principal Grecian colonies which were formed in the country, noticing occasionally the particular Thracian tribes with which they came in contact.

The Grecian colonies established on the Thermaic Gulf, as well as in the peninsula of Chalkidike—emanating principally from Chalkis and Eretria, though we do not know their precise epoch—appear to have been of early date, and probably preceded the time when the Macedonians of Edessa extended their conquest to the sea. At that early period, they would find the Pierians still between the Peneius and Haliakmon—also a number of petty Thracian tribes throughout the broad part of the Chalkidic peninsula; they would find Pydna a Pierian town, and Therma, Anthemus, Chalastra, etc., Mygdonian.

The most ancient Grecian colony in these regions seems to have been Methone, founded by the Eretrians in Pieria; nearly at the same time (if we may trust a statement of rather suspicious character, though the date itself is noway improbable) as Korkyra was settled by the Corinthians (about 730–720 B.C.). It was a little to the north of the Pierian town of Pydna, and separated by about ten miles from the Bottiæan town of Alorus, which lay north of the Haliakmon. We know very little about Methone, except that it preserved its autonomy and its Hellenism until the time of Philip of Macedon, who took and destroyed it. But though, when once established, it was strong enough to sustain itself in spite of conquest made all around by the Macedonians of Edessa, we may fairly presume that it could not have been originally planted on Macedonian territory. Nor in point of fact was the situation peculiarly advantageous for Grecian colonists, inasmuch as there were other maritime towns, not Grecian, in its neighborhood—Pydna, Alorus, Therma, Chalastra; whereas the point of advantage for a Grecian colony was, to become the exclusive seaport for inland indigenous people.

The colonies, founded by Chalkis and Eretria on all the three projections of the Chalkidic peninsula, were numerous, though for a long time inconsiderable. We do not know how far these projecting headlands were occupied before the arrival of the settlers from Eubœa. Such arrival we may probably place at some period earlier than 600 B.C. For after that period Chalkis and Eretria seem rather on the decline; and it appears too, that the Chalkidian colonists in Thrace aided their mother-city, Chalkis, in her war against Eretria, which cannot be much later than 600 B.C., though it may be considerably earlier.

The range of mountains which crosses from the Thermaic to the Strymonic Gulf and forms the northern limit of the Chalkidic peninsula, slopes down toward the southern extremity, so as to leave a

considerable tract of fertile land between the Toronaic and the Thermaic gulfs, including the fertile headland called Pallene—the westernmost of these three prongs of Chalkidike which run out into the Ægean. Of the other two prongs or projections, the easternmost is terminated by the sublime Mount Athos, which rises out of the sea as a precipituous rock 6,400 feet in height, connected with the mainland by a ridge not more than half the height of the mountain itself, yet still high, rugged, and woody from sea to sea, leaving only little occasional spaces fit to be occupied or cultivated. The intermediate or Sithonian headland is also hilly and woody, though in a less degree—both less inviting and less productive than Pallene.

Æneia, near that cape which marks the entrance of the inner Thermaic Gulf—and Potidæa, at the narrow isthmus of Pallene—were both founded by Corinth. Between these two towns lay the fertile territory called Krusis or Krossæa, forming in aftertimes a part of the domain of Olynthus, but in the sixth century B.C. occupied by petty Thracian townships. Within Pallene were the towns of Mende, a colony from Eretria—Skione, which, having no legitimate mother-city, traced its origin to Pellenian warriors returning from Troy—Aphytis, Neapolis, Æge, Therambos, and Sane, either wholly or partly colonies from Eretria. In the Sithonian peninsula were Assa, Pilorus, Singus, Sarte, Torone, Galepsus, Sermyle, and Mekyberna: all or most of these seem to have been of Chalkidic origin. But at the head of the Toronaic Gulf (which lies between Sithonia and Pallene) was placed Olynthus, surrounded by an extensive and fertile plain. Originally a Bottiæan town, Olynthus will be seen at the time of the Persian invasion to pass into the hands of the Chalkidian Greeks, and gradually to incorporate with itself several of the petty neighboring establishments belonging to that race: whereby the Chalkidians acquired that marked preponderance in the peninsula which they retained, even against the efforts of Athens, until the days of Philip of Macedon.

On the scanty spaces, admitted by the mountainous promontory or ridge ending in Athos, were planted some Thracian and some Pelasgic settlements of the same inhabitants as those who occupied Lemnos and Imbros; a few Chalkidic citizens being domiciliated with them, and the people speaking both Pelasgic and Hellenic. But near the narrow isthmus which joins this promontory to Thrace, and along the north-western coast of the Strymonic Gulf, were Grecian towns of considerable importance—Sane, Akanthus, Stageira, and Argilus, all colonies from Andros, which had itself been colonized from Eretria. Akanthus and Stageira are said to have been founded in 654 B.C.

Following the southern coast of Thrace, from the mouth of the river Strymon toward the east, we may doubt whether, in the year 560 B.C., any considerable independent colonies of Greeks had yet been formed upon it. The Ionic colony of Abdera, eastward of the

mouth of the river Nestus, formed from Teos in Ionia, is of more recent date, though the Klasomenians had begun an unsuccessful settlement there as early as the year 651 B.C.; while Dikæa—the Chian settlement of Maroneia—and the Lesbian settlement of Ænus at the mouth of the Hebrus—are of unknown date. The important and valuable territory near the mouth of the Strymon, where, after many ruinous failures, the Athenian colony of Amphipolis afterwards maintained itself, was at the date here mentioned, possessed by Edonian Thracians and Pierians. The various Thracian tribes—Satræ, Edonians, Dersæans, Sapæans, Bistones, Kikones, Pætians, etc.—were in force on the principal part of the tract between Strymon and Hebrus, even to the sea-coast. It is to be remarked, however, that the island of Thasus, and that of Samothrace, each possessed what in Greek was called a Peræa—a strip of the adjoining mainland cultivated and defended by means of fortified posts or small towns. Probably these occupations are of very ancient date, since they seem almost indispensable as a means of support to the islands. For the barren Thasus, especially, merits even at this day the uninviting description applied to it by the poet Archilochus, in the seventh century B.C.—"an ass's backbone, overspread with wild wood;" so wholly is it composed of mountain naked or wooded, and so scanty are the patches of cultivable soil left in it, nearly all close to the sea-shore.

This island was originally occupied by the Phenicians, who worked the gold-mines in its mountains with a degree of industry, which, even in its remains, excited the admiration of Herodotus. How and when it was evacuated by them, we do not know. But the poet Archilochus formed one of a body of Parian colonists, who planted themselves on it in the seventh century B.C., and carried on war, not always successful, against the Thracian tribe called Saians: on one occasion, Archilochus found himself compelled to throw away his shield. By their mines and their possessions on the mainland (which contained even richer mines, at Skapte Hyle, and elsewhere, than those in the island), the Thasian Greeks rose to considerable power and population. And as they seem to have been the only Grecks, until the settlement of the Milesian Histiæus on the Strymon about 510 B.C., who actively concerned themselves in the mining districts of Thrace opposite to their island, we cannot be surprised to hear that their clear surplus revenue before the Persian conquest, about 493 B.C., after defraying the charges of their government without any taxation, amounted to the large sum of 200 talents, sometimes even to 300 talents, in each year (£46,000—66,000).

On the long peninsula called the Thracian Chersonese there may probably have been small Grecian settlements at an early date, though we do not know at what time either the Milesian settlement of Kardia, on the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula, near the Ægean Sea—or the Æolic colony of Sestus on the Hellespont—was founded. The Athenian ascendency in the peninsula begins only with the migration of the first Miltiades, during the reign of Peisistratus at Athens. The Samian colony of Perinthus, on the northern coast of the Propontis, is spoken of as ancient in date, and the Megarian colonies, Selymbria and Byzantium, belong to the seventh century B.C.: the latter of these two is assigned to the 30th Olympiad (657 B.C.), and its neighbor Chalkedon, on the opposite coast, was a few years earlier. The site of Byzantium in the narrow strait of the Bosphorus, with its abundant thunny-fishery, which both employed and nourished a large proportion of the poorer freemen, was alike convenient either for maritime traffic or for levying contributions on the numerous corn ships which passed from the Euxine into the Ægean. We are even told that it held a considerable number of the neighboring Bithynian Thracians as tributary Perioeki. Such dominion, though probably maintained during the more vigorous period of Grecian city life, became in later times impracticable, and we even find the Byzantines not always competent to the defense of their own small surrounding territory. The place, however, will be found to possess considerable importance during all the period of this history.

The Grecian settlements on the inhospitable south-western coast of the Euxine, south of the Danube, appear never to have attained any consideration: the principal traffic of Greek ships in that sea tended to more northerly ports, on the banks of the Borysthenes and in the Tauric Chersonese. Istria was founded by the Milesians near the southern embouchure of the Danube—Apollonia and Odessus on the same coast more to the south—all probably between 600-560 B.C. The Megarian or Byzantine colony of Mesambria seems to have been later than the Ionic revolt: of Kallatis the age is not known. Tomi, north of Kallatis and south of Istria, is renowned as the place of Ovid's banishment. The picture which he gives of that uninviting spot, which enjoyed but little truce from the neighborhood of the murderous Getæ, explains to us sufficiently why these towns acquired little or no importance.

The islands of Lemnos and Imbros, in the Ægean, were at this early period occupied by Tyrrhenian Pelasgi. They were conquered by the Persians about 508 B.C., and seem to have passed into the power of the Athenians, at the time when Ionia revolted from the Persians. If the mythical or poetical stories respecting these Tyrrhenian Pelasgi contain any basis of truth, they must have been a race of buccaneers not less rapacious than cruel. At one time, these Pelasgi seem also to have possessed Samothrace, but how or when they were supplanted by Greeks, we find no trustworthy account: the population of Samothrace at the time of the Persian war was Ionic.

CHAPTER XXVII.

KYRENE AND BARKA.—HESPERIDES.

It has been already mentioned in a former chapter, that Psammetichus, king of Egypt, about the middle of the seventh century B.C., first removed those prohibitions which had excluded Grecian commerce from the country. In his reign, Grecian mercenaries were first established in Egpyt, and Grecian traders admitted, under certain regulations, into the Nile. The opening of this new market emboldened them to traverse the direct sea which separates Krete from Egypt—a dangerous voyage with vessels which rarely ventured to lose sight of land—and seems to have first made them acquainted with the neighboring coast of Libya, between the Nile and the gulf called the Great Syrtis. Hence arose the foundation of the important colony called Kyrene.

As in the case of most other Grecian colonies, so in that of Kyrene, both the foundation and the early history are very imperfectly known. The date of the event, as far as can be made out amid much contradiction of statement, was about 630 B.C. Thera was the mother-city, herself a colony from Lacedæmon; and the settlements formed in Libya became no inconsiderable ornaments to the Dorian name in Hellas.

According to the account of a lost historian, Menekles, political dissension among the inhabitants of Thera led to that emigration which founded Kyrene. The more ample legendary details which Herodotus collected, partly from Theræan, partly from Kyrenæan informants, are not positively inconsistent with this statement, though they indicate more particularly bad seasons, distress, and over-population. But both of them dwell emphatically on the Delphian oracle as the instigator as well as the director of the first emigrants, whose apprehensions of a dangerous voyage and an unknown country were very difficult to overcome. Both of them affirmed that the original œkist Battus was selected and consecrated to the work by the divine command: both called Battus the son of Polymnestus, of the mythical breed called Minyæ. But on other points there was complete divergence between the two stories, and the Kyrenæans themselves, whose town was partly peopled by emigrants from Krete, described the mother of Battus as daughter of Etearchus, prince of the Kretan town of Axus. Battus had an impediment in his speech, and it was on his entreating from the Delphian oracle a cure for this infirmity that he received directions to go as "a cattle-breeding œkist to Libya." The suffering Theræans were directed to assist him. But neither he nor they knew where Libya was, nor could they find any resident in Krete who had ever visited it. Such was the limited reach of Grecian navigation to the south of the

Ægean Sea, even a century after the foundation of Syracuse. At length, by prolonged inquiry, they discovered a man employed in catching the purple shellfish, named Korobius, who said that he had been once forced by stress of weather to the island of Platea, close on the shores of Libya, and on the side not far removed from the western limit of Egypt. Some Theræans being sent along with Korokius to inspect this island, left him there with a stock of provisions, and returned to Thera, to conduct the emigrants. From the seven districts into which Thera was divided, emigrants were drafted for the colony, one brother being singled out from the different numerous families by lot. But so long was their return to Platea deferred, that the provisions of Korobius were exhausted, and he was only saved from starvation by the accidental arrival of a Samian ship, driven by contrary winds out of her course on the voyage to Egypt. Kolæus, the master of this ship (whose immense profits made by the first voyage to Tartessus have been noticed in a former chapter), supplied him with provisions for a year—an act of kindness which is said to have laid the first foundation of the alliance and good feeling afterwards prevalent between Thera, Kyrene, and Samos. At length the expected emigrants reached the island, having found the voyage so perilous and difficult, that they once returned in despair to Thera, where they were only prevented by force from re-landing. The band which accompanied Battus was all conveyed in two pentekonters—armed ships with fifty rowers each. Thus humble was the start of the mighty Kyrene, which in the days of Herodotus, covered a city-area equal to the entire island of Platea.

That island, however, though near to Libya, and supposed by the colonists to be Libya, was not so in reality: the commands of the oracle had not been literally fulfilled. Accordingly the settlement carried with it nothing but hardship for the space of two years; and Battus returned with his companions to Delphi, to complain that the promised land had proved a bitter disappointment. The god, through his priestess, returned for answer, "If you, who have never visited the cattle-breeding Libya, know it better than I who *have*, I greatly admire your cleverness." Again the inexorable mandate forced them to return. This time they planted themselves on the actual continent of Libya, nearly over against the island of Platea, in a district called Aziris, surrounded on both sides by fine woods, and with a running stream adjoining. After six years of residence in this spot, they were persuaded by some of the indigenous Libyans to abandon it, under the promise that they should be conducted to a better situation. Their guides now brought them to the actual site of Kyrene, saying, "Here, men of Hellas, is the place for you to dwell, for here the sky is perforated." The road through which they passed had led through the tempting region of Irasa with its fountain Theste, and their guides took the precaution to carry them through it by night, in order that they might remain ignorant of its beauties.

Such were the preliminary steps, divine and human, which brought Battus and his colonists to Kyrene. In the time of Herodotus, Irasa was an outlying portion of the eastern territory of this powerful city. But we trace in the story just related an opinion prevalent among his Kyrenæan informants, that Irasa with its fountain Theste was a more inviting position than Kyrene with its fountain of Apollo, and ought in prudence to have been originally chosen: out of which opinion, according to the general habit of the Greek mind, an anecdote is engendered and accredited, explaining how the supposed mistake was committed. What may have been the recommendations of Irasa, we are not permitted to know; but descriptions of modern travelers, no less than the subsequent history of Kyrene, go far to justify the choice actually made. The city was placed at the distance of about ten miles from the sea, having a sheltered port called Apollonia, itself afterwards a considerable town—it was about twenty miles from the promontory Phykus, which forms the northernmost projection of the African coast, nearly in the longitude of the Peloponnesian Cape Tænarus (Matapan). Kyrene was situated about 1800 feet above the level of the Mediterranean, of which it commanded a fine view, and from which it was conspicuously visible, on the edge of a range of hills which slope by successive terraces down to the port. The soil immediately around, partly calcareous, partly sandy, is described by Captain Beechey to present a vigorous vegetation and remarkable fertility; though the ancients considered it inferior in this respect both to Barka and Hesperides, and still more inferior to the more westerly region near Kinyps. But the abundant periodical rains, attracted by the lofty heights around, and justifying the expression of the "perforated sky," were even of greater importance under an African sun than extraordinary richness of soil. The maritime regions near Kyrene and Barka, and Hesperides, produced oil and wine as well as corn, while the extensive district between these towns, composed of alternate mountain, wood, and plain, was eminently suited for pasture and cattle-breeding. The ports were secure, presenting conveniences for the intercourse of the Greek trader with northern Africa, such as were not to be found along all the coast of the Great Syrtis westward of Hesperides. Abundance of applicable land—great diversity both of climate and of productive season, between the seaside the low hill, and the upper mountain, within a small space, so that harvest was continually going on, and fresh produce coming in from the earth, during eight months of the year—together with the monopoly of the valuable plant called the Silphium, which grew nowhere except in the Kyrenaic region, and the juice of which was extensively demanded throughout Greece and Italy—led to the rapid growth of Kyrene, in spite of serious and renewed political troubles. And even now, the immense remains which still mark its desolate site, the evidences of past labor and solicitude at the Fountain of Apollo and elsewhere, together with the profusion of excavated and

ornamented tombs, attest sufficiently what the grandeur of the place must have been in the days of Herodotus and Pindar. So much did the Kyrenæans pride themselves on the Silphium, found wild in their back country from the island of Platea on the east to the inner recess of the Great Syrtis westward—the leaves of which were highly salubrious for cattle and the stalk for man, while the root furnished the peculiar juice for export—that they maintained it to have first appeared seven years prior to the arrival of the first Grecian colonists in their city.

But it was not only the properties of the soil which promoted the prosperity of Kyrene. Isokrates praises the well-chosen site of that colony, because it was planted in the midst of indigenous natives apt for subjection, and far distant from any formidable enemies. That the native Libyan tribes were made conducive in an eminent degree to the growth of the Greco-Libyan cities, admits of no doubt; and in reviewing the history of these cities, we must bear in mind that their population was not pure Greek, but more or less mixed, like that of the colonies in Italy, Sicily, or Ionia. Though our information is very imperfect, we see enough to prove that the small force brought over by Battus the Stammerer was enabled first to fraternize with the indigenous Libyans—next, reinforced by additional colonists and availing themselves of the power of native chiefs, to overawe and subjugate them. Kyrene—combined with Barka and Hesperides, both of them having sprung from her root—exercised over the Libyan tribes between the borders of Egypt and the inner recess of the Great Syrtis, for a space of three degrees of longitude, an ascendancy similar to that which Carthage possessed over the more westerly Libyans near the Lesser Syrtis. Within these Kyrenæan limits, and farther westward along the shores of the Great Syrtis, the Libyan tribes were of pastoral habits; westward, beyond the Lake Tritonis and the Lesser Syrtis, they began to be agricultural. Immediately westward of Egypt were the Adyrmachidæ, bordering upon Apis and Marea, the Egyptian frontier towns; they were subject to the Egyptians, and had adopted some of the minute ritual and religious observances which characterized the region of the Nile. Proceeding westward from the Adyrmachidæ were found the Giligammæ, the Asbystæ, the Auschisæ, the Kabales, and the Nasamones—the latter of whom occupied the south-eastern corner of the Great Syrtis—next, the Makæ, Gindanes, Lotophagi, Machlyes, as far as a certain river and lake called Triton and Tritonis, which seems to have been near the Lesser Syrtis. These last-mentioned tribes were not dependent either on Kyrene or on Carthage, at the time of Herodotus, nor probably during the proper period of free Grecian history (600–300 B.C.). But in the third century B.C., the Ptolemaic governors of Kyrene extended their dominion westward, while Carthage pushed her colonies and castles eastward, so that the two powers embraced between them the whole line of coast between the Greater and Lesser

Syrtis, meeting at the spot called the Altars of the Brothers Philæni —celebrated for its commemorative legend. Moreover, even in the sixth century B.C., Carthage was jealous of the extension of Grecian colonies along this coast, and aided the Libyan Makæ (about 510 B.C.) to expel the Spartan prince Dorieus from his settlement near the river Kinyps; near that spot was afterward planted, by Phenician or Carthaginian exiles, the town of Leptis Magna (now Lebida), which does not seem to have existed in the time of Herodotus. Nor does the latter historian notice the Marmaridæ, who appear as the principal Libyan tribe near the west of Egypt between the age of Skylax and the third century of the Christian era. Some migration or revolution subsequent to the time of Herodotus must have brought this name into predominance.

The interior country stretching westward from Egypt (along the thirtieth and thirty-first parallel of latitude) to the Great Syrtis, and then along the southern shore of that gulf, is to a great degree low and sandy, and quite destitute of trees; yet affording in many parts water, herbage, and a fertile soil. But the maritime region north of this, constituting the projecting bosom of the African coast from the island of Platea (Gulf of Bomba) on the east to Hesperides (Bengazi) on the west, is of a totally different character; covered with mountains of considerable elevation, which reach their highest point near Kyrene, interspersed with productive plain and valley, broken by frequent ravines which carry off the winter torrents into the sea, and never at any time of the year destitute of water. It is this latter advantage that causes them to be now visited every summer by the Bedouin Arabs, who flock to the inexhaustible Fountain of Apollo and to other parts of the mountainous region from Kyrene to Hesperides, when their supply of water and herbage fails in the interior; and the same circumstance must have operated in ancient times to hold the nomadic Libyans in a sort of dependence on Kyrene and Barka. Kyrene appropriated the maritime portion of the territory of the Libyan Asbystæ· the Auschisæ occupied the region south of Barka, touching the sea near Hesperides; the Kabales dwelt near Teucheira in the territory of Barka. Over the interior spaces these Libyan Nomads, with their cattle and twisted tents, wandered unrestrained, amply fed upon meat and milk, clothed in goat-skins, and enjoying better health than any people known to Herodotus. Their breed of horses was excellent, and their chariots or wagons with four horses could perform feats admired even by Greeks. It was to these horses that the princes and magnates of Kyrene and Barka owed the frequent successes of their chariots in the games of Greece. The Libyan Nasamones, leaving their cattle near the sea, were in the habit of making an annual journey up the country to the oasis of Augila for the purpose of gathering the date-harvest, or of purchasing dates; and the Bedouin Arabs from Bengazi still make this same journey annually, carrying up their wheat

and barley, for the same purpose. Each of the Libyan tribes was distinguished by a distinct mode of cutting the hair, and by some peculiarities of religious worship, though generally all worshiped the sun and the moon. But in the neighborhood of the lake Tritonis (seemingly the western extremity of Grecian coasting trade in the time of Herodotus, who knows little beyond, except from Carthaginian authorities), the Grecian deities Poseidon and Athene, together with the legend of Jason and the Argonauts, had been localized. There were moreover current prophesies announcing that one hundred Hellenic cities were destined one day to be founded round the lake—and that one city in the island Phla, surrounded by the lake, was to be planted by the Lacedæmonians. These indeed were among the many unfulfilled prophesies which from every side cheated the Grecian ear, proceeding probably from Kyrenæan or Theræan traders who thought the spot advantageous for settlement, and circulated their own hopes under the form of divine assurances. It was about the year 510 B.C. that some of the Theræans conducted the Spartan prince Dorieus to found a colony in the fertile region of Kinyps, belonging to the Libyan Makæ. But Carthage, interested in preventing the extension of Greek settlements westward, aided the Libyans in driving him out.

The Libyans in the immediate neighborhood of Kyrene were materially changed by the establishment of that town. They constituted a large part—at first probably far the largest part—of its constituent population. Not possessing that fierce tenacity of habits which the Mohammedan religion has impressed upon the Arabs of the present day, they were open to the mingled influence of constraint and seduction applied by Grecian settlers; and in the time of Herodotus, the Kabales and the Asbystæ of the interior had come to copy Kyrenæan tastes and customs. The Theræan colonists, having obtained not merely the consent, but even the guidance, of the natives to their occupation of Kyrene constituted themselves like privileged Spartan citizens in the midst of Libyan Periœki. They seem to have married Libyan wives, so that Herodotus describes the women of Kyrene and Barca as following, even in his time, religious observances indigenous and not Hellenic. Even the descendants of the primitive œkist Battus were semi-Libyan, for Herodotus gives us the curious information that Battus was the Libyan word for a king, and deduces from it the just inference that the name Battus was not originally personal to the œkist, but acquired in Lybia first as a title; though it afterward passed to his descendants as a proper name. For eight generations the reigning princes were called Battus and Arkesilaus, the Libyan denomination alternating with the Greek, until the family was finally deprived of its power. Moreover we find the chief of Barka, kinsman of Arkesilaus of Kyrene, bearing the name of Alazir; a name certainly not Hellenic, and probably Libyan. We are therefore to conceive the

first Theræan colonists as established in their lofty fortified post Kyrene, in the center of Libyan Periœki, till then strangers to walls, to arts, and perhaps even to cultivated land. Probably these Periœki were always subject and tributary, in a greater or less degree, though they continued for half a century to retain their own king.

To these rude men the Theræans communicated the elements of Hellenism and civilization, not without receiving themselves much that was non-Hellenic in return; and perhaps the reactionary influence of the Libyan element against the Hellenic might have proved the stronger of the two, had they not been re-enforced by new-comers from Greece. After forty years of Battus the œkist (about 630–590 B.C.) and sixteen years of his son Arkesilaus (about 590–574 B.C.), a second Battus succeeded, called Battus the Prosperous, to mark the extraordinary increase of Kyrene during his presidency. The Kyrenæans under him took pains to invite new settlers from all parts of Greece without distinction—a circumstance deserving notice in Grecian colonization, which usually manifested a preference for certain races, if it did not positively exclude the rest. To every new-comer was promised a lot of land, and the Delphian priestess strenuously seconded the wishes of the Kyrenæans, proclaiming that "whosoever should reach the place too late for the land-division would have reason to repent it." Such promise of new land, as well as the sanction of the oracle, were doubtless made public at all the games and meetings of Greeks. A large number of new colonists embarked for Kyrene: the exact number is not mentioned, but we must conceive it to have been very great, when we are told that during the succeeding generation, not less than 7,000 Grecian hoplites of Kyrene perished by the hands of the revolted Libyans—yet leaving both the city itself and its neighbor Barka still powerful. The loss of so great a number as 7,000 Grecian hoplites has very few parallels throughout the whole history of Greece. In fact, this second migration, during the government of Battus the Prosperous, which must have taken place between 574–554 B.C., ought to be looked upon as the moment of real and effective colonization for Kyrene. It was on this occasion, probably, that the port of Apollonia, which afterward came to equal the city itself in importance, was first occupied and fortified—for the second swarm of immigrants came by sea direct while the original colonists had reached Kyrene by land from the island of Platea through Irasa. The fresh immigrants came from Peloponnesus, Krete, and some other islands of the Ægean.

To furnish so many new plots of land, it was either necessary, or it was found expedient, to dispossess many of the Libyan Periœki, who found their situation, in other respects also, greatly changed for the worse. The Libyan king Adikran, himself among the sufferers, implored aid from Apries, king of Egypt, then in the height of his

power; sending to declare himself and his people Egyptian subjects, like their neighbors the Adyrmachidæ. The Egyptian prince, accepting the offer, despatched a large military force of the native soldier-caste, who were constantly in station at the western frontier-town Marea, by the route along shore to attack Kyrene. They were met at Irâsa by the Greeks of Kyrene, and being totally ignorant of Grecian arms and tactics, experienced a defeat so complete that few of them reached home. The consequences of this disaster in Egypt, where it caused the transfer of the throne from Apries to Amasis, have been noticed in a former chapter.

Of course the Libyan Periœki were put down, and the redivision of lands near Kyrene among the Greek settlers accomplished, to the great increase of the power of the city. And the reign of Battus the Prosperous marks a flourishing era in the town, with a large acquisition of land-dominions, antecedent to years of dissension and distress. The Kyrenæans came into intimate alliance with Amasis, king of Egypt, who encouraged Grecian connection in every way, and who even took to wife Ladike, a woman of the Battiad family of Kyrene; so that the Libyan Periœki lost all chance of Egyptian aid against the Greeks.

New prospects, however, were opened to them during the reign of Arkesilus the Second, son of Battus the Prosperous (about 554–544 B.C.). The behavior of this prince incensed and alienated his own brothers, who raised a revolt against him, seceded with a portion of the citizens, and induced a number of the Libyan Periœki to take part with them. They founded the Greco-Libyan city of Barka, in the territory of the Libyan Auschisæ, about twelve miles from the coast, distant from Kyrene by sea about seventy miles to the westward. The space between the two, and even beyond Barka as far as the more westerly Grecian colony called Hesperides, was in the days of Skylax provided with commodious ports for refuge or landing. At what time Hesperides was founded we do not know, but it existed about 510 B.C. Whether Arkesilaus obstructed the foundation of Barka is not certain; but he marched the Kyrenæan forces against those revolted Libyans who had joined it. Unable to resist, the latter fled for refuge to their more easterly brethren near the borders of Egypt, and Arkesilaus pursued them. At length, in a district called Leukon, the fugitives found an opportunity of attacking him at such prodigious advantage, that they almost destroyed the Kyrenæan army; 7,000 hoplites (as has been before intimated) being left dead on the field. Arkesilaus did not long survive this disaster. He was strangled during sickness by his brother Learchus, who aspired to the throne; but Eryxo, widow of the deceased prince, avenged the crime by causing Learchus to be assassinated.

That the credit of the Battiad princes was impaired by such a series of disasters and enormities, we can readily believe. But it received a still greater shock from the circumstance that Battus the

Third, son and successor of Arkesilaus, was lame and deformed in his feet. To be governed by a man thus personally disabled, was in the minds of the Kyrenæans an indignity not to be borne, as well as an excuse for pre-existing discontents. The resolution was taken to send to the Delphian oracle for advice. They were directed by the priestess to invite from Mantineia a moderator, empowered to close discussions and provide a scheme of government. The Mantineans selected Demonax, one of the wisest of their citizens, to solve the same problem which had been committed to Solon at Athens. By his arrangement, the regal prerogative of the Battiad line was terminated, and a republican government established, seemingly about 543 B.C.; the dispossessed prince retaining both the landed domains and the various sacerdotal functions which had belonged to his predecessors. Respecting the government, as newly framed, however, Herodotus unfortunately gives us hardly any particulars. Demonax classified the inhabitants of Kyrene into three tribes; composed of—1. Theræans with their Libyan Periœki; 2. Greeks who had come from Peloponnesus and Krete; 3. such Greeks as had come from all other islands in the Ægean. It appears, too, that a senate was constituted, taken doubtless from these three tribes, and, we may presume, in equal proportion. It seems probable that there had been before no constitutional classification, nor political privilege, except what was vested in the Theræans—that these latter, the descendants of the original colonists, were the only persons hitherto *known to the constitution*—and that the remaining Greeks, though free landed proprietors and hoplites, were not permitted to act as an integral part of the body politic, nor distributed in tribes at all. The whole powers of government—up to this time vested in the Battiad princes, subject only to such check, how effective we know not, which the citizens of Theræan origin might be able to interpose—were now transferred from the prince to the people, that is, to certain individuals or assemblies chosen somehow from among all the citizens. There existed at Kyrene, as at Thera and Sparta, a board of Ephors, and a band of 300 armed police, analogous to those who were called the Hippeis or horsemen at Sparta. Whether these were instituted by Demonax we do not know, nor does the identity of titular office, in different states, afford safe ground for inferring identity of power. This is particularly to be remarked with regard to the Periœki at Kyrene, who were perhaps more analogous to the Helots than to the Periœki of Sparta. The fact that the Periœki were considered in the new constitution as belonging specially to the Theræan branch of citizens, shows that these latter still continued a privileged order, like the Patricians with their Clients at Rome in relation to the Plebs.

That the re-arrangement introduced by Demonax was wise, consonant to the general current of Greek feeling, and calculated to work well, there is good reason to believe. No discontent within would have subverted it without the aid of extraneous force. Battus the

Lame acquiesced in it peaceably during his life; but his widow and his son, Pheretime and Arkesilaus, raised a revolt after his death and tried to regain by force the kingly privileges of the family. They were worsted and obliged to flee—the mother to Cyprus, the son to Samos—where both employed themselves in procuring foreign arms to invade and conquer Kyrene. Though Pheretime could obtain no effective aid from Euelthon, prince of Salamis in Cyprus, her son was more successful in Samos, by inviting new Greek settlers to Kyrene, under promise of a redistribution of the land. A large body of emigrants joined him on this proclamation; the period seemingly being favorable to it, since the Ionian cities had not long before become subject to Persia, and were discontented with the yoke. But before he conducted this numerous band against his native city, he thought proper to ask the advice of the Delphian oracle. Success in the undertaking was promised to him, but moderation and mercy after success were emphatically enjoined, on pain of losing his life; and the Battiad race was declared by the god to be destined to rule at Kyrene for eight generations, but no longer—as far as four princes named Battus and four named Arkesilaus. "More than such eight generations (said the Pythia), Apollo forbids the Battiads even to aim at." This oracle was doubtless told to Herodotus by Kyrenæan informants when he visited their city after the final deposition of the Battiad princes, which took place in the person of the fourth Arkesilaus, between 460–450 B.C.; the invasion of Kyrene by Arkesilaus the Third, sixth prince of the Battiad race, to which the oracle professed to refer, having occurred about 530 B.C. The words placed in the mouth of the priestess doubtless date from the later of these two periods, and afford a specimen of the way in which pretended prophecies are not only made up by ante-dating after-knowledge, but are also so contrived as to serve a present purpose; for the distinct prohibition of the god "not even to aim at a longer lineage than eight Battiad princes," seems plainly intended to deter the partisans of the dethroned family from endeavoring to reinstate them.

Arkesilaus the Third, to whom this prophecy purports to have been addressed, returned with his mother Pheretime and his army of new colonists to Kyrene. He was strong enough to carry all before him—to expel some of his chief opponents and seize upon others, whom he sent to Cyprus to be destroyed; though the vessels were driven out of their course by storms to the peninsula of Knidus, where the inhabitants rescued the prisoners and sent them to Thera. Other Kyrenæans, opposed to the Battiads, took refuge in a lofty private tower, the property of Aglomachus, wherein Arkesilaus caused them all to be burnt, heaping wood around and setting it on fire. But after this career of triumph and revenge, he became conscious that he had departed from the mildness enjoined to him by the oracle, and sought to avoid the punishment which it had threatened

by retiring from Kyrene. At any rate he departed from Kyrene to Barka, to the residence of the Barkæan prince, his kinsman Alazir, whose daughter he had married. But he found in Barka some of the unfortunate men who had fled from Kyrene to escape him. These exiles, aided by a few Barkæans, watched for a suitable moment to assail him in the market-place, and slew him together with his kinsman, the prince Alazir.

The victory of Arkesilaus at Kyrene, and his assassination at Barka, are doubtless real facts. But they seem to have been compressed together and incorrectly colored, in order to give to the death of the Kyrenæan prince the appearance of a divine judgment. For the reign of Arkesilaus cannot have been very short, since events of the utmost importance occurred within it The Persians under Kambyses conquered Egypt, and both the Kyrenæan and the Barkæan prince sent to Memphis to make their submission to the conqueror —offering presents and imposing upon themselves an annual tribute. These presents of the Kyrenæans, 500 minæ of silver, were considered by Kambyses so contemptibly small, that he took hold of them at once and threw them among his soldiers. And at the moment when Arkesilaus died, Aryandes, the Persian satrap after the death of Kambyses, is found established in Egypt.

During the absence of Arkesilaus at Barka, his mother Pheretime had acted as regent, taking her place at the discussions in the senate. But when his death took place, and the feeling against the Battiads manifested itself strongly at Barka, she did not feel powerful enough to put it down, and went to Egypt to solicit aid from Aryandes. The satrap, being made to believe that Arkesilaus had met his death in consequence of steady devotion to the Persians, sent a herald to Barka to demand the men who had slain him. The Barkæans assumed the collective responsibity of the act, saying that he had done them injuries both numerous and severe—a farther proof that his reign cannot have been very short. On receiving this reply, the satrap immediately dispatched a powerful Persian armament, land-force as well as sea-force, in fulfillment of the designs of Pheretime against Barka. They besieged the town for nine months, trying to storm, to batter, and to undermine the walls; but their efforts were vain, and it was taken at last only by an act of the grossest perfidy. Pretending to relinquish the attempt in despair, the Persian general concluded a treaty with the Barkæans, wherein it was stipulated that the latter should continue to pay tribute to the Great King, but that the army should retire without farther hostilities: "I swear it (said the Persian general), and my oath shall hold good, as long as this earth shall keep its place." But the spot on which the oaths were exchanged had been fraudulently prepared: a ditch had been excavated and covered with hurdles, upon which again a surface of earth had been laid. The Barkæans, confiding in the oath, and overjoyed at their liberation, immediately opened their gates and relaxed their

guard; while the Persians, breaking down the hurdles and letting fall the superimposed earth, so that they might comply with the letter of their oath, assaulted the city and took it without difficulty.

Miserable was the fate which Pheretime had in reserve for these entrapped prisoners. She crucified the chief opponents of herself and her late son around the walls, on which were also affixed the breasts of their wives: then, with the exception of such of the inhabitants as were Battiads and no way concerned in the death of Arkesilaus, she consigned the rest to slavery in Persia. They were carried away captive into the Persian empire, where Darius assigned to them a village in Baktria as their place of abode, which still bore the name of Barka, even in the days of Herodotus.

During the course of this expedition, it appears, the Persian army advanced as far as Hesperides, and reduced many of the Lybian tribes to subjection. These, together with Kyrene and Barka, figure afterward among the tributaries and auxiliaries of Xerxes in his expedition against Greece. And when the army returned to Egypt, by order of Ariandes, they were half inclined to seize Kyrene itself in their way, though the opportunity was missed and the purpose left unaccomplished.

Pheretime accompanied the retreating army to Egypt, where she died shortly of a loathsome disease, consumed by worms; thus showing (says Herodotus) that "excessive cruelty in revenge brings down upon men the displeasure of the gods." It will be recollected that in the veins of this savage woman the Libyan blood was intermixed with the Grecian. In Greece Proper, political enmity kills—but seldom, if ever, mutilates—or sheds the blood of women.

We thus leave Kyrene and Barka again subject to Battiad princes, at the same time that they are tributaries of Persia. Another Battus and another Arkesilaus have to intervene before the glass of this worthless dynasty is run out, between 460–450 B.C. I shall not at present carry the reader's attention to this last Arkesilaus, who stands honored by two chariot victories in Greece, and two fine odes of Pindar.

The victory of the third Arkseilaus, and the restoration of the Battiads, broke up the equitable constitution established by Demonax. His triple classification into tribes must have been completely remodeled, though we do not know how; for the number of new colonists whom Arkesilaus introduced must have necessitated a fresh distribution of land, and it is extremely doubtful whether the relation of the Theræan class of citizens with their Periœki, as established by Demonax, still continued to subsist. It is necessary to notice this fact, because the arrangements of Demonax are spoken of by some authors as if they formed the permanent constitution of Kyrene; whereas they cannot have outlived the restoration of the Battiads, nor can they even have been revived after that dynasty was finally expelled, since the number of new citizens, and the large change of

property, introduced by Arkesilaus the Third, would render them inapplicable to the subsequent city.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PAN-HELLENIC FESTIVALS—OLYMPIC, PYTHIAN, NEMEAN, AND ISTHMIAN.

In the preceding chapters I have been under the necessity of presenting to the reader a picture altogether incoherent and destitute of central effect. I have specified briefly each of the two or three hundred towns which agreed in bearing the Hellenic name, and recounted its birth and early life, as far as our evidence goes—but without being able to point out any action and reaction, exploits or sufferings, prosperity or misfortune, glory or disgrace, common to all. To a great degree, this is a characteristic inseparable from the history of Greece from its beginning to its end; for the only political unity which it ever receives, is the melancholy unity of subjection under all-conquering Rome. Nothing short of force will efface in the mind of a free Greek the idea of his city as an autonomous and separate organization. The village is a fraction, but the city is an unit,—and the highest of all political units, not admitting of being consolidated with others into a ten or a hundred, to the sacrifice of its own separate and individual mark. Such is the character of the race, both in their primitive country and in their colonial settlements—in their early as well as in their late history—splitting by natural fracture into a multitude of self-administering, indivisible cities. But that which marks the early historical period before Peisistratus, and which impresses upon it an incoherence at once so fatiguing and so irremediable, is, that as yet no causes have arisen to counteract this political isolation. Each city, whether progressive or stationary, prudent or adventurous, turbulent or tranquil, follows out its own thread of existence, having no partnership or common purposes with the rest, nor being yet constrained into any active communion with them by extraneous forces. In like manner, the races which on every side surround the Hellenic world appear distinct and unconnected, not yet taken up into any co-operating mass or system.

Contemporaneously with the accession of Peisistratus, this state of things becomes altered both in and out of Hellas—the former as a consequence of the latter. For at that time begins the formation of the great Persian empire, which absorbs into itself not only Upper Asia and Asia Minor, but also Phenicia, Egypt, Thrace, Macedonia, and a considerable number of the Grecian cities themselves; while the common danger, from this vast aggregate, threatening the greater states of Greece proper, drives them, in spite of great reluctance and

jealousy, into active union. Hence arises a new impulse, counterworking the natural tendency to political isolation in the Hellenic cities, and centralizing their proceedings to a certain extent for the two centuries succeeding 650 B.C.; Athens and Sparta both availing themselves of the centralizing tendencies which had grown out of the Persian war. But during the interval between 776–560 B.C., no such tendency can be traced even in commencement, nor any constraining force calculated to bring it about. Even Thucydides, as we may see by his excellent preface, knew of nothing during these two centuries except separate city-politics and occasional wars between neighbors. The only event, according to him, in which any considerable number of Grecian cities were jointly concerned, was the war between Chalkis and Eretria, the date of which we do not know. In that war, several cities took part as allies; Samos, among others, with Eretria—Miletus with Chalkis: how far the alliances of either may have extended, we have no evidence to inform us, but the presumption is that no great number of Grecian cities was comprehended in them. Such as it was, however, this war between Chalkis and Eretria was the nearest approach, and the only approach, to a Pan-Hellenic proceeding, which Thucydides indicates between the Trojan and the Persian wars. Both he and Herodotus present this early period only by way of preface and contrast to that which follows—when the Pan-Hellenic spirit and tendencies, though never at any time predominant, yet counted for a powerful element in history, and sensibly modified the universal instinct of city-isolation. They tell us little about it, either because they could find no trustworthy informants, or because there was nothing in it to captivate the imagination in the same manner as the Persian or the Peloponnesian wars. From whatever cause their silence arises, it is deeply to be regretted, since the phenomena of the two centuries from 776 to 560 B.C., though not susceptible of any central grouping, must have presented the most instructive matter for study, had they been preserved. In no period of history have there ever been formed a greater number of new political communities, under much variety of circumstances, personal as well as local. A few chronicles, however destitute of philosophy, reporting the exact march of some of these colonies from their commencement—amidst all the difficulties attendant on amalgamation with strange natives, as well as on a fresh distribution of land—would have added greatly to our knowledge both of Greek character and Greek social existence.

Taking the two centuries now under review, then, it will appear that there is not only no growing political unity among the Grecian states, but a tendency even to the contrary—to dissemination and mutual estrangement. Not so, however, in regard to the other feelings of unity capable of subsisting between men who acknowledge no common political authority—sympathies founded on common religion, language, belief of race, legends, tastes and customs, intellectual

appetencies, sense of proportion and artistic excellence, recreative enjoyment, etc. On all these points, the manifestations of Hellenic unity become more and more pronounced and comprehensive, in spite of increased political dissemination, throughout the same period. The breadth of common sentiment and sympathy between Greek and Greek, together with the conception of multitudinous periodical meetings as an indispensable portion of existence, appears decidedly greater in 560 B.C. than it had been a century before. It was fostered by the increased conviction of the superiority of Greeks as compared with foreigners—a conviction gradually more and more justified as Grecian art and intellect improved, and as the survey of foreign countries became extended—as well as by the many new efforts of men of genius in the field of music, poetry, statuary, and architecture; each of whom touched chords of feeling, belonging to other Greeks hardly less than to his own peculiar city. At the same time, the life of each peculiar city continues distinct, and even gathers to itself a greater abundance of facts and internal interests; so that during the two centuries now under review there was in the mind of every Greek an increase both of the city-feeling and of the Pan-Hellenic feeling, but on the other hand a decline of the old sentiment of separate race —Doric, Ionic, Æolic.

I have already, in my former volume, touched upon the many-sided character of the Grecian religion, entering as it did into all the enjoyments and sufferings, the hopes and fears, the affections and antipathies of the people—not simply imposing restraints and obligations, but protecting, multiplying and diversifying all the social pleasures and all the decorations of existence. Each city and even each village had its peculiar religious festivals, wherein the sacrifices to the gods were usually followed by public recreations of one kind or other—by feasting on the victims, processional marches. singing and dancing, or competition in strong and active exercises, The festival was originally local, but friendship or communion of race was shown by inviting others, non-residents, to partake in its attractions. In the case of a colony and its metropolis, it was a frequent practice that citizens of the metropolis were honored with a privileged seat at the festivals of the colony, or that one of their number was presented with the first taste of the sacrificial victim. Reciprocal frequentation of religious festivals was thus the standing evidence of friendship and fraternity among cities not politically united. That it must have existed to a certain degree from the earliest days, there can be no reasonable doubt; though in Homer and Hesiod we find only the celebration of funeral games, by a chief at his own private expense, in honor of his deceased father or friend—with all the accompanying recreations, however, of a public festival, and with strangers not only present, but also contending for valuable prizes. Passing to historical Greece during the seventh century B.C., we find evidence of two festivals, even then

very considerable, and frequented by Greeks from many different cities and districts—the festival at Delos, in honor of Apollo, the great place of meeting for Ionians throughout the Ægean—and the Olympic games.

The Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo, which must be placed earlier than 600 B.C., dwells with emphasis on the splendor of the Delian festival, unrivalled throughout Greece. as it would appear, during all the first period of this history, for wealth, finery of attire, and variety of exhibitions as well in poetical genius as in bodily activity—equalling probably at that time, if not surpassing, the Olympic games. The complete and undiminished grandeur of this Delian Pan-Ionic festival is one of our chief marks of the first period of Grecian history, before the comparative prostration of the Ionic Greeks through the rise of Persia. It was celebrated periodically in every fourth year, to the honor of Apollo and Artemis. Moreover it was distinguished from the Olympic games by two circumstances both deserving of notice—first, by including solemn matches not only of gymnastic, but also of musical and poetical excellence, whereas the latter had no place at Olympia; secondly, by the admission of men, women and children indiscriminately as spectators, whereas women were formerly excluded from the Olympic ceremony. Such exclusion may have depended in part on the inland situation of Olympia, less easily approachable by females than the island of Delos; but even making allowance for this circumstance, both the one distinction and other mark the rougher character of the Ætolo-Dorians in Peloponnesus. The Delian festival, which greatly dwindled away during the subjection of the Asiatic and insular Greeks to Persia, was revived afterward by Athens during the period of her empire, when she was seeking in every way to strengthen her central ascendency in the Ægean. But though it continued to be ostentatiously celebrated under her management, it never regained that commanding sanctity and crowded frequentation which we find attested in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo for its earlier period.

Very different was the fate of the Olympic festival— on the banks of the Alpheius in Peloponnesus, near the old oracular temple of the Olympian Zeus—which not only grew up uninterruptedly from small beginnings to the maximum of Pan-Hellenic importance, but even preserved its crowds of visitors and its celebrity for many centuries after the extinction of Greek freedom, and only received its final abolition, after more than 1100 years of continuance, from the decree of the Christian emperor Theodosius in 394 A.D. I have already recounted in the preceding volume of this History, the attempt made Pheidon, despot of Argos, to restore to the Pisatans, or to acquire for himself, the administration of this festival—an event which proves the importance of the festival in Peloponnesus, even so early as 740 B.C. At that time, and for some years afterwards, it seems to have been frequented chiefly, if not exclusively, by the neighboring inhabi-

tants of Central and Western Peloponnesus—Spartans, Messenians, Arkadians, Triphylians, Pisatans, Eleians, and Achæans—and it forms an important link connecting the Ætolo-Eleians, and their privileges as Agonothets, to solemnize and preside over it, with Sparta. From the year 720 B.C., we trace positive evidences of the gradual presence of more distant Greeks—Corinthians, Megarians, Bœotians, Athenians, and even Smyrnæans from Asia. We observe also other proofs of growing importance, in the increased number and variety of matches exhibited to the spectators, and in the substitution of the simple crown of olive, an honorary reward in place of the more substantial present which the Olympic festival and all other Grecian festivals began by conferring upon the victor. The humble constitution of the Olympic games presented originally nothing more than a match of runners in the measured course called the Stadium. A continuous series of the victorious runners was formally inscribed and preserved by the Eleians, beginning with Korœbus in 776 B.C., and was made to serve by chronological inquires from the third century B.C. downwards, as a means of measuring the chronological sequence of Grecian events. It was on the occasion of the seventh Olympiad after Korœbus that Daikles the Messenian first received for his victory in the stadium no farther recompense than a wreath from the sacred olive-tree near Olympia: the honor of being proclaimed victor was found sufficient, without any pecuniary addition. But until the fourteenth Olympiad (724 B.C.) there was no other match for the spectators to witness besides that of simple runners in the stadium, On that occasion a second race was first introduced, of runners in the double stadium, or up and down the course. In the next or fifteenth Olympiad (720 B.C.) a third match, the long course for runners, or several times up and down the stadium. There were thus three races—the simple Stadium, the double Stadium, or Diaulos, and the long course or Dolichos, all for runners—which continued without addition until the eighteenth Olympiad, when the wrestling-match and the complicated Pentathlon (including jumping, running, the quoit, the javelin, and wrestling) were both added. A further novelty appears in the twenty-third Olympiad (688 B.C.), the boxing-match; and another still more important in the twenty-fifth (680 B.C.), the chariot with four full-grown horses. This last-mentioned addition is deserving of special notice, not merely as it diversified the scene by the introduction of horses, but also as it brought in a totally new class of competitors—rich men and women, who possessed the finest horses and could hire the most skillful drivers, without any personal superiority or power of bodily display in themselves. The prodigious exhibition of wealth in which the chariot proprietors indulged, is not only an evidence of growing importance in the Olympic games, but also served materially to increase that importance and to heighten the interest of spectators. Two further matches were added in the thirty-third Olympiad (648

B.C.)—the Pankration, or boxing and wrestling conjoined, with the hand unarmed or divested of that hard leather cestus worn by the pugilist, which rendered the blow of the latter more terrible, but at the same time prevented him from grasping or keeping hold of his adversary—and the single race-horse. Many other novelties were introduced one after the other, which it is unnecessary fully to enumerate—the race between men clothed in full panoply and bearing each his shield—the different matches between boys, analogous to those between full-grown men, and between colts of the same nature as between full-grown horses. At the maximum of its attraction the Olympic solemnity occupied five days, but until the seventy-seventh Olympiad, all the various matches had been compressed into one—beginning at daybreak and not always closing before dark. The seventy-seventh Olympiad follows immediately after the successful expulsion of the Persian invaders from Greece, when the Pan-Hellenic feeling had been keenly stimulated by resistance to a common enemy; and we may easily conceive that this was a suitable moment for imparting additional dignity to the chief national festival.

We are thus enabled partially to trace the steps whereby, during the two centuries succeeding 776 B.C., the festival of the Olympic Zeus in the Pisatid gradually passed from a local to a national character, and acquired an attractive force capable of bringing together into temporary union the dispersed fragments of Hellas, from Marseilles to Trebizond. In this important function it did not long stand alone. During the sixth century B.C., three other festivals, at first local, become successively nationalized—the Pythia near Delphi, the Isthmia near Corinth, the Nemea near Kleone, between Sikyon and Argos.

In regard to the Pythian festival, we find a short notice of the particular incidents and individuals by whom its reconstitution and enlargement were brought about—a notice the more interesting, inasmuch as these very incidents are themselves a manifestation of something like Pan-Hellenic patriotism, standing almost alone in an age which presents little else in operation except distinct city-interests. At the time when the Homeric Hymn to the Delphinian Apollo was composed (probably in the seventh century B.C.), the Pythian festival had as yet acquired little eminence. The rich and holy temple of Apollo was then purely oracular, established for the purpose of communicating to pious inquirers "the counsels of the Immortals." Multitudes of visitors came to consult it, as well as to sacrifice victims and to deposit costly offerings; but while the god delighted in the sound of the harp as an accompaniment to the singing of pæans, he was by no means anxious to encourage horse-races and chariot-races in the neighborhood. Nay, this psalmist considers that the noise of horses would be "a nuisance"—the drinking of mules a desecration to the sacred fountains—and the ostentation of fine-built chariots objectionable, as tending to divert the attention of spectators

away from the great temple and its wealth. From such inconveniences the god was protected by placing his sanctuary "in the rocky Pytho"—a rugged and uneven recess, of no great dimensions, embosomed in the southern declivity of Parnassus, and about 2,000 feet above the level of the sea, while the topmost Parnassian summits reach a height of near 8,000 feet. The situation was extremely imposing, but unsuited by nature for the congregation of any considerable number of spectators—altogether impracticable for chariot-races—and only rendered practicable by later art and outlay for the theater as well as for the stadium; the original stadium, when first established, was placed in the plain beneath. Such a site furnished little means of subsistence, but the sacrifices and presents of visitors enabled the ministers of the temple to live in abundance, and gathered together by degrees a village around it.

Near the sanctuary of Pytho, and about the same altitude, was situated the ancient Phokian town of Krissa, on a projecting spur of Parnassus—overhung above by the line of rocky precipice called the Phædriades, and itself overhanging below the deep ravine through which flows the river Peistus. On the other side of this river rises the steep mountain Kirphis, which projects southward into the Corinthian gulf—the river reaching that gulf through the broad Krissæan, or Kirrhæan plain, which stretches westward nearly to the Lokrian town of Amphissa; a plain for the most part fertile and productive, though least so in its eastern part immediately under the Kirphis, where the seaport Kirrha was placed. The temple, the oracle, and the wealth of Pytho, belong to the very earliest periods of Grecian antiquity. But the octennial solemnity in honor of the god included at first no other competition except that of bards, who sang each a pæan with the harp. It has been already mentioned, in my preceding volume, that the Amphiktyonic assembly held one of its half-yearly meetings near the temple of Pytho, the other at Thermopylæ.

In those early times when the Homeric Hymn to Apollo was composed, the town of Krissa appears to have been great and powerful, possessing all the broad plain between Parnassus, Kirphis, and the gulf, to which latter it gave its name—and possessing also, what was a property not less valuable, the adjoining sanctuary of Pytho itself, which the Hymn identifies with Krissa, not indicating Delphi as a separate place. The Krissæans doubtless derived great profits from the number of visitors who came to visit Delphi, both by land and by sea, and Kirrha was originally only the name for their seaport. Gradually, however, the port appears to have grown in importance at the expense of the town, just as Apollonia and Ptolemais came to equal Kyrene and Barka, and as Plymouth Dock has swelled into Devonport; while at the same time the sanctuary of Pytho with its administrators expanded into the town of Delphi, and came to claim an independent existence of its own. The original relations between

Krissa, Kirrha, and Delphi, were in this manner at length subverted, the first declining and the two latter rising. The Krissæans found themselves dispossessed of the management of the temple, which passed to the Delphians; as well as of the profits arising from the visitors, whose disbursements went to enrich the inhabitants of Kirrha. Krissa was a primitive city of the Phokian name, and could boast of a place as such in the Homeric Catalogue, so that her loss of importance was not likely to be quietly endured. Moreover, in addition to the above facts, already sufficient in themselves as seeds of quarrel, we are told that the Kirrhæans abused their position as masters of the avenue to the temple by sea, and levied exorbitant tolls on the visitors who landed there—a number constantly increasing from the multiplication of the transmarine colonies, and from the prosperity of those in Italy and Sicily. Besides such offence against the general Grecian public, they had also incurred the enmity of their Phokian neighbors by outrages upon women, Phokian as well as Argeian, who were returning from the temple.

Thus stood the case, apparently, about 595 B.C., when the Amphiktyonic meeting interfered—either prompted by the Phokians, or perhaps on their own spontaneous impulse, out of regard to the temple—to punish the Kirrhæans. After a war of ten years, the first sacred war in Greece, this object was completely accomplished, by a joint force of Thessalians under Eurylochus, Sykyonians under Kleisthenes, and Athenians under Alkmæon; the Athenian Solon being the person who originated and enforced in the Amphiktyonic council the proposition of interference. Kirrha appears to have made a strenuous resistance until its supplies from the sea were intercepted by the naval force of the Sikyonian Kleisthenes. Even after the town was taken, its inhabitants defended themselves for some time on the heights of Kirphis. At length, however, they were thoroughly subdued. Their town was destroyed or left to subsist merely as a landing-place; while the whole adjoining plain was consecrated to the Delphian god, whose domains thus touched the sea. Under this sentence, pronounced by the religious feeling of Greece, and sanctified by a solemn oath publicly sworn and inscribed at Delphi, the land was condemned to remain untilled and unplanted, without any species of human care, and serving only for the pasturage of cattle. The latter circumstance was convenient to the temple, inasmuch as it furnished abundance of victims for the pilgrims who landed and came to sacrifice—for without preliminary sacrifice no man could consult the oracle; while the entire prohibition of tillage was the only means of obviating the growth of another troublesome neighbor on the seaboard. The ruin of Kirrha in this war is certain: though the necessity of a harbor for visitors arriving by sea, led to the gradual revival of the town upon a humbler scale of pretension. But the fate of Krissa is not so clear, nor do we know whether it was destroyed, or left subsisting in a position of inferiority with regard to

Delphi. From this time forward, however, the Delphian community appear as substantive and autonomous, exercising in their own right the management of the temple; though we shall find, on more than one occasion, that the Phokians contest this right, and lay claim to the management of it for themselves—a remnant of that early period when the oracle stood in the domain of the Phokian Krissa. There seems, moreover, to have been a standing antipathy between the Delphians and the Phokians.

The Sacred War just mentioned—emanating from a solemn Amphiktyonic decree, carried on jointly by troops of different states whom we do not know to have ever before co-operated, and directed exclusively toward an object of common interest—is in itself a fact of high importance as manifesting a decided growth of Pan-Hellenic feeling. Sparta is not named as interfering—a circumstance which seems remarkable when we consider both her power, even as it then stood, and her intimate connection with the Delphian oracle—while the Athenians appear as the chief movers, through the greatest and best of their citizens. The credit of a large-minded patriotism rests prominently upon them.

But if this sacred war itself is a proof that the Pan-Hellenic spirit was growing stronger, the positive result in which it ended reinforced that spirit still farther. The spoils of Kirrha were employed by the victorious allies in founding the Pythian games. The octennial festival hitherto celebrated at Delphi in honor of the god, including no other competition except in the harp and the pæan, was expanded into comprehensive games on the model of the Olympic, with matches not only of music, but also of gymnastics and chariots—celebrated, not at Delphi itself, but on the maritime plain near the ruined Kirrha—and under the direct superintendence of the Amphiktyons themselves. I have already mentioned that Solon provided large rewards for such Athenians as gained victories in the Olympic and Isthmian games, thereby indicating his sense of the great value of the national games as a means of promoting Hellenic intercommunion. It was the same feeling which instigated the foundation of the new games on the Kirrhæan plain, in commemoration of the vindicated honor of Apollo, and in the territory newly made over to him. They were celebrated in the autumn, or first half of every third Olympic year; the Amphiktyons being the ostensible Agonothets or administrators, and appointing persons to discharge the duty in their names. At the first Pythian ceremony (in 586 B.C.), valuable rewards were given to the different victors; at the second (582 B.C.), nothing was conferred but wreaths of laurel—the rapidly attained celebrity of the games being such as to render any farther recompense superfluous. The Sikyonian despot, Kleisthenes himself, one the leaders in the conquest of Kirrha, gained the prize at the chariot-race of the second Pythia. We find other great personages in Greece frequently mentioned as competitors, and the games long maintained a dignity second only to the

Olympic, over which indeed they had some advantages; first, that they were not abused for the purpose of promoting petty jealousies and antipathies of any administering state, as the Olympic games were perverted by the Eleians, on more than one occasion; next, that they comprised music and poetry as well as bodily-display. From the circumstances attending their foundation, the Pythian games deserved, even more than the Olympic, the title bestowed on them by Demosthenes—"the common Agon of the Greeks."

The Olympic and Pythian games continued always to be the most venerated solemnities in Greece. Yet the Nemea and Isthmia acquired a celebrity not much inferior; the Olympic prize counting for the highest of all. Both the Nemea and Isthmia were distinguished from the other two festivals by occurring not once in four years, but once in two years; the former in the second and fourth years of each Olympiad, the latter in the first and third years. To both is assigned, according to Greek custom, an origin connected with the interesting persons and circumstances of legendary antiquity; but our historical knowledge of both begins with the sixth century B.C. The first historical Nemead is presented as belonging to Olympiad 52 or 53 (572-568 B.C.), a few years subsequent to the Sacred War above-mentioned and to the origin of the Pythia. The festival was celebrated in honor of the Nemean Zeus, in the valley of Nemea between Philus and Kleonæ. The Kleonæans themselves were originally its presidents, until, some period after 460 B.C., the Argeians deprived them of that honor and assumed the honors of administration to themselves. The Nemean games had their Hellanodikæ to superintend, to keep order, and to distribute the prizes, as well as the Olympic.

Respecting the Isthmian festival, our first historical information is a little earlier, for it has already been stated that Solon conferred a premium upon every Athenian citizen who gained a prize at that festival as well as at the Olympian—in or after 594 B.C. It was celebrated by the Corinthians at their isthmus, in honor of Poseidon, and if we may draw any inference from the legends respecting its foundation, which is ascribed sometimes to Theseus, the Athenians appear to have identified it with the antiquities of their own state.

We thus perceive that the interval between 600–560 B.C., exhibits the first historical manifestation of the Pythia, Isthmia, and Nemea—the first expansion of all the three from local into Pan-Hellenic festivals. To the Olympic games, for some time the only great center of union among all the widely dispersed Greeks, are now added three other sacred Agones of the like public, open, national character; constituting visible marks as well as tutelary bonds, of collective Hellenism, and insuring to every Greek who went to compete in the matches, a safe and inviolate transit even through hostile Hellenic states. These four, all in or near Peloponnesus, and one of which occurred in each year, formed the period or cycle of sacred games,

and those who had gained prizes at all the four received the enviable designation of Periodonikes. The honors paid to Olympic victors on their return to their native city, were prodigious even in the sixth century B.C., and became even more extravagant afterwards. We may remark, that in the Olympic games alone, the oldest as well as the most illustrious of the four, the musical and intellectual element was wanting. All the three more recent Agones included crowns for exercises of music and poetry, along with gymnastics, chariots, and horses.

It was not only in the distinguishing national stamp set upon these four great festivals, that the gradual increase of Hellenic family-feeling exhibited itself, during the course of this earliest period of Grecian history. Pursuant to the same tendencies, religious festivals in all the considerable towns gradually became more and more open and accessible, attracting guests as well as competitors from beyond the border. The comparative dignity of the city, as well as the honor rendered to the presiding god, were measured by the numbers, admiration, and envy, of the frequenting visitors. There is no positive evidence indeed of such expansion in the Attic festivals earlier than the reign of Peisistratus, who first added the quadrennial or greater Panathenæa to the ancient annual or lesser Panathenæa. Nor can we trace the steps of progress in regard to Thebes, Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Megara, Sikyon, Pellene, Ægina, Argos, etc., but we find full reason for believing that such was the general reality. Of the Olympic or Isthmian victors whom Pindar and Simonides celebrated, many derived a portion of their renown from previous victories acquired at several of these local contests—victories sometimes so numerous, as to prove how wide-spread the habit of reciprocal frequentation had become: though we find, even in the third century B.C., treaties of alliance between different cities, in which it is thought necessary to confer such mutual right by express stipulation. Temptation was offered, to the distinguished gymnastic or musical competitors, by prizes of great value. Timæus even asserted, as a proof of the overweening pride of Kroton and Sybaris, that these cities tried to supplant the preeminence of the Olympic games, by instituting games of their own with the richest prizes to be celebrated at the same time—a statement in itself not worthy of credit, yet nevertheless illustrating the animated rivalry known to prevail among the Grecian cities, in procuring for themselves splendid and crowded games. At the time when the Homeric hymn to Demeter was composed, the worship of that goddess seems to have been purely local at Eleusis. But before the Persian war, the festival celebrated by the Athenians every year, in honor of the Eleusinian Demeter, admitted Greeks of all cities to be initiated, and was attended by vast crowds of them.

It was thus that the simplicity and strict local application of the primitive religious festival, among the greater states in Greece, gradually expanded, on certain great occasions periodically recurring,

into an elaborate and regulated series of exhibitions—not merely admitting, but soliciting, the fraternal presence of all Hellenic spectators. In this respect Sparta seems to have formed an exception to the remaining states. Her festivals were for herself alone, and her general rudeness towards other Greeks was not materially softened even at the Karneia and Hyakinthia, or Gymnopædiæ. On the other hand, the Attic Dionysia were gradually exalted, from their original rude spontaneous outburst of village feeling in thankfulness to the god, followed by song, dance, and revelry of various kinds—into costly and diversified performances, first by a trained chorus, next by actors superadded to it. And the dramatic compositions thus produced, as they embodied the perfection of Grecian art, so they were eminently calculated to invite a Pan-Hellenic audience and to encourage the sentiment of Hellenic unity. The dramatic literature of Athens however belongs properly to a later period. Previous to the year 560 B.C., we see only those commencements of innovation which drew upon Thespis the rebuke of Solon; who however himself contributed to impart to the Panathenaic festival a more solemn and attractive character, by checking the license of the rhapsodes and insuring to those present a full orderly recital of the Iliad.

The sacred games and festivals, here alluded to as a class, took hold of the Greek mind by so great a variety of feelings, as to counterbalance in a high degree the political disseverance; and to keep alive among their wide-spread cities in the midst of constant jealousy and frequent quarrel, a feeling of brotherhood and congenial sentiment such as must otherwise have died away. The Theors, or sacred envoys who came to Olympia or Delphi from so many different points, all sacrificed to the same god and at the same altar, witnessed the same sports, and contributed by their donatives to enrich or adorn one respective scene. Moreover the festival afforded opportunity for a sort of fair, including much traffic amid so large a mass of spectators; and besides the exhibitions of the games themselves, there were recitations and lectures in a spacious council-room for those who chose to listen to them, by poets, rhapsodes, philosophers and historians—among which last the history of Herodotus is said to have been publicly read by its author. Of the wealthy and great men in the various cities, many contended simply for the chariot-victories and horse-victories. But there were others whose ambition was of a character more strictly personal, and who stripped naked as runners, wrestlers, boxers, or pankratiasts, having gone through the extreme fatigue of a complete previous training. Kylon whose unfortunate attempt to usurp the scepter at Athens has been recounted, had gained the prize in the Olympic stadium: Alexander son of Amyntas, the prince of Macedon, had run for it: the great family of the Diagoridæ at Rhodes, who furnished magistrates and generals to their native city, supplied a still greater number of successful boxers and pankratiasts at Olympia, while other instances also occur of generals named

by various cities from the list of successful Olympic gymnasts; and the odes of Pindar, always dearly purchased, attest how many of the great and wealthy were found in that list. The perfect popularity, and equality of persons, at these great games, is a feature not less remarkable than the exact adherence to predetermined rule, and the self-imposed submission of the immense crowd to a handful of servants armed with sticks, who executed the orders of the Eleian Hellanodikæ. The ground upon which the ceremony took place, and even the territory of the administering state, was protected by a "Truce of God" during the month of the festival, the commencement of which was formally announced by heralds sent round to the different states. Treaties of peace between different cities were often formally commemorated by pillars there erected, and the general impression of the scene suggested nothing but ideas of peace and brotherhood among Greeks. And I may remark that the impression of the games as belonging to all Greeks, and to none but Greeks, was stronger and clearer during the interval between 600—300 B.C., than it came to be afterwards. For the Macedonian conquests had the effect of diluting and corrupting Hellenism, by spreading an exterior varnish of Hellenic tastes and manners over a wide area of incongruous foreigners, who were incapable of the real elevation of the Hellenic character; so that although in later times the games continued undiminished both in attraction and in number of visitors, the spirit of Pan-Hellenic communion which had once animated the scene was gone for ever.

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A

HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT

BY

GEORGE GROTE

IN FOUR VOLUMES.—VOL. II.

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PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXIX.

LYRIC POETRY.—THE SEVEN WISE MEN.

THE interval between 776–560 B.C. presents to us a remarkable expansion of Grecian genius in the creation of their elegiac, iambic, lyric, choric, and nomic poetry, which was diversified in a great many ways and improved by many separate masters. The creators of all these different styles—from Kallinus and Archilochus down to Stesichorus—fall within the two centuries here included; though Pindar and Simonides, "the proud and high-crested bards," who carried lyric and choric poetry to the maximum of elaboration consistent with full poetical effect, lived in the succeeding century, and were contemporary with the tragedian Æschylus. The Grecian drama, comic as well as tragic, of the fifth century B.C., combined the lyric and choric song with the living action of iambic dialogue—thus constituting the last ascending movement in the poetical genius of the race. Reserving this for a future time, and for the history of Athens, to which it more particularly belongs, I now propose to speak only of the poetical movement of the two earlier centuries, wherein Athens had little or no part. So scanty are the remnants, unfortunately, of these earlier poets, that we can offer little except criticisms borrowed at second hand, and a few general considerations on their workings and tendency.

Archilochus and Kallinus both appear to fall about the middle of the seventh century B.C., and it is with them that the innovations in Grecian poetry commence. Before them, we are told, there existed nothing but the Epos, or Dactylic Hexameter poetry of which much has been said in my former volume—being legendary stories or adventures narrated, together with addresses or hymns to the gods. We must recollect, too, that this was not only the whole poetry, but the whole literature of the age. Prose composition was altogether unknown. Writing, if beginning to be employed as an aid to a few superior men, was at any rate generally unused, and found no read-

ing public. The voice was the only communicant, and the ear the only recipient, of all those ideas and feelings which productive minds in the community found themselves impelled to pour out; and both voice and ear were accustomed to a musical recitation or chant, apparently something between song and speech, with simple rhythm and a still simpler occasional accompaniment from the primitive four-stringed harp. Such habits and requirements of the voice and ear were, at that time, inseparably associated with the success and popularity of the poet, and contributed doubtless to restrict the range of subjects with which he could deal. The type was to a certain extent consecrated, like the primitive statues of the gods, from which men only ventured to deviate by gradual and almost unconscious innovations. Moreover, in the first half of the seventh century B.C., that genius which had once created an Iliad and an Odyssey was no longer to be found. The work of hexameter narrative had come to be prosecuted by less gifted persons—by those Cyclic poets of whom I have spoken in the preceding volumes.

Such, as far as we can make it out amidst very uncertain evidence, was the state of the Greek mind immediately before elegiac and lyric poets appeared; while at the same time its experience was enlarging by the formation of new colonies, and the communion among various states tending to increase by the free reciprocity of religious games and festivals. There arose a demand for turning the literature of the age (I use this word as synonymous with the poetry) to new feelings and purposes, and for applying the rich, plastic, and musical language of the old epic, to present passion and circumstance, social as well as individual. Such a tendency had become obvious in Hesiod, even within the range of hexameter verse. Now the same causes which led to an enlargement of the subjects of poetry inclined men also to vary the meter. In regard to this latter point, there is reason to believe that the expansion of Greek music was the immediate determining cause. For it has been already stated that the musical scale and instruments of the Greeks, originally very narrow, were materially enlarged by borrowing from Phyrgia and Lydia, and these acquisitions seem to have been first realized about the beginning of the seventh century B.C., through the Lesbian harper Terpander—the Phrygian (or Greco-Phrygian) flute-player Olympus—and the Arkadian or Bœotion flute-player Klonas. Terpander made the important advance of exchanging the original four-stringed harp for one of seven strings, embracing the compass of one octave or two Greek tetrachords; while Olympus as well as Klonas taught many new nomes or tunes on the flute, to which the Greeks had before been strangers —probably also the use of a flute of more varied musical compass. Terpander is said to have gained the prize at the first recorded celebration of the Lacedæmonian festival of the Karneia, in 676 B.C. This is one of the best-ascertained points among the obscure chronology of the seventh century; and there seem grounds for assigning Olympus

and Klonas to nearly the same period, a little before Archilochus and Kallinus. To Terpander, Olympus, and Klonas are ascribed the formation of the earliest musical nomes known to the inquiring Greek of later times; to the first, nomes on the harp; to the two latter, on the flute—every nome being the general scheme or basis of which the airs actually performed constituted so many variations, within certain defined limits. Terpander employed his enlarged instrumental power as a new accompaniment to the Homeric poems, as well as to certain epic proemia or hymns to the gods of his own composition. But he does not seem to have departed from the hexameter verse and the dactylic rhythm, to which the new accompaniment was probably not quite suitable; and the idea may thus have been suggested of combining the words also according to new rhythmical and metrical laws.

It is certain, at least, that the age (670–600) immediately succeeding Terpander — comprising Archilochus, Kallinus, Tyrtæus, and Alkman, whose relations of time one to another we have no certain means of determining, though Alkman seems to have been the latest—presents a remarkable variety both of new meters and of new rhythms, superinduced upon the previous Dactylic Hexameter. The first departure from this latter is found in the elegiac verse, employed seemingly more or less by all the four above-mentioned poets, but chiefly by the first two, and even ascribed by some to the invention of Kallinus. Tyrtæus in his military march-songs employed the Anapestic meter, while in Archilochus as well as in Alkman we find traces of a much larger range of metrical variety—iambic, trochaic, anapestic, Ionic, etc.—sometimes even asynartetic or compound meters, anapestic or dactylic blended with trochaic or iambic. What we have remaining from Mimnermus who comes shortly after the preceding four is elegiac. His contemporaries Alkæus and Sappho, besides employing most of those meters which they found existing, invented each a peculiar stanza, which is familiarly known under a name derived from each. In Solon, the younger contemporary of Mimnermus, we have the elegiac, iambic, and trochaic: in Theognis, yet later, the elegiac only. Arion and Stesichorus appear to have been innovators in this department, the former by his improvement in the dithyrambic chorus or circular song and dance in honor of Dionysus—the latter by his more elaborate choric compositions, containing not only a strophe and antistrophe, but also a third division or epode succeeding them, pronounced by the chorus standing still. Both Anakreon and Ibykus likewise added to the stock of existing metrical varieties. We thus see that within the century and a half succeeding Terpander, Greek poetry (or Greek literature, which was then the same thing) became greatly enriched in matter as well as diversified in form.

To a certain extent there seems to have been a real connection between the two. New forms were essential for the expression of

new wants and feelings—though the assertion that elegiac meter is especially adapted for one set of feelings, trochaic for a second, and iambic for a third, if true at all, can only be admitted with great latitude of exception, when we find so many of them employed by the poets for very different subjects—gay or melancholy, bitter or complaining, earnest or sprightly—seemingly with little discrimination. But the adoption of some new meter, different from the perpetual series of hexameters, was required when the poet desired to do something more than recount a long story or fragment of heroic legend —when he sought to bring himself, his friends, his enemies, his city, his hopes and fears with regard to matters recent or impending, all before the notice of the hearer, and that too at once with brevity and animation. The Greek hexameter, like our blank verse, has all its limiting conditions bearing upon each separate line, and presents to the hearer no predetermined resting-place or natural pause beyond. In reference to any long composition, either epic and dramatic, such unrestrained license is found convenient, and the case was similar for Greek epos and drama—the single-lined iambic trimeter being generally used for the dialogue of tragedy and comedy, just as the dactylic hexameter had been used for the epic. The metrical changes introduced by Archilochus and his contemporaries may be compared to a change from our blank verse to the rhymed couplet and quatrain. The verse was thrown into little systems of two, three, or four lines, with a pause at the end of each; and the halt thus assured to, as well as expected and relished by, the ear, was generally coincident with a close, entire or partial, in the sense which thus came to be distributed with greater point and effect.

The elegiac verse, or common hexameter and pentameter (this second line being an hexameter with the third and sixth thesis, or the last half of the third and sixth foot suppressed, and a pause left in place of it), as well as the epode (or iambic trimeter followed by an iambic dimeter) and some other binary combinations of verse which we trace among the fragments of Archilochus, are conceived with a view to such increase of effect both on the ear and the mind, not less than to the direct pleasures of novelty and variety. The iambic meter, built upon the primitive iambus or coarse and licentious jesting which formed a part of some Grecian festivals (especially of the festivals of Demeter as well in Attica as in Paros, the native country of the poet), is only one amongst many new paths struck out by this inventive genius. His exuberance astonishes us, when we consider that he takes his start from little more than the simple hexameter, in which too he was a distinguished composer —for even of the elegiac verse he is as likely to have been the inventor as Kallinus, just as he was the earliest popular and successful composer of table-songs or Skolia, though Terpander may have originated some such before him. The entire loss of his poems, excepting some few fragments, enables us to recognize little more than

one characteristic—the intense personality which pervaded them, as well as that coarse, direct, and outspoken license, which afterwards lent such terrible effect to the old comedy at Athens. His lampoons are said to have driven Lykambes, the father of Neobule, to hang himself. Neobule had been promised to Archilochus in marriage, but that promise was broken, and the poet assailed both father and daughter with every species of calumny. In addition to this disappointment, he was poor, the son of a slave-mother, and an exile from his country Paros to the unpromising colony of Thosos. The desultory notices respecting him betray a state of suffering combined with loose conduct which vented itself sometimes in complaint, sometimes in libelous assault. He was at last slain by some whom his muse had thus exasperated. His extraordinary poetical genius finds but one voice of encomium throughout antiquity. His triumphal song to Herakles was still popularly sung by the victors at Olympia, near two centuries after his death, in the days of Pindar; but that majestic and complimentary poet at once denounces the malignity, and attests the retributive suffering of the great Parian iambist.

Amidst the multifarious veins in which Archilochus displayed his genius, moralizing or gnomic poetry is not wanting; while his contemporary Simonides of Amorgos devotes the Iambic meter especially to this destination, afterward followed out by Solon and Theognis. Kallinus, the earliest celebrated elegiac poet, so far as we can judge from his few fragments, employed the elegiac meter for exhortations of warlike patriotism; and the more ample remains which we possess of Tyrtæus are sermons in the same strain, preaching to the Spartans bravery against the foe, and unanimity as well as obedience to the law at home. They are patriotic effusions, called forth by the circumstances of the time, and sung by single voice, with accompaniment of the flute, to those in whose bosoms the flame of courage was to be kindled. For though what we peruse is in verse, we are still in the tide of real and present life, and we must suppose ourselves rather listening to an orator addressing the citizens when danger or dissension is actually impending. It is only in the hands of Mimnermus that elegiac verse comes to be devoted to soft and amatory subjects. His few fragments present a vein of passive and tender sentiment, illustrated by appropriate matter of legend, such as would be cast into poetry in all ages, and quite different from the rhetoric of Kallinus and Tyrtæus.

The poetical career of Alkman is again distinct from that of any of his above-mentioned contemporaries. Their compositions, besides hymns to the gods, were principally expressions of feeling intended to be sung by individuals, though sometimes also suited for the Komus or band of festive volunteers, assembled on some occasion of common interest: those of Alkman were principally choric, intended for the song and accompanying dance of the chorus. He was a native of Sardis in Lydia, or at least his family were so: and he

appears to have come in early life to Sparta, though his genius and mastery of the Greek language discountenance the story that he was brought over to Sparta as a slave. The most ancient arrangement of music at Sparta, generally ascribed to Terpander, underwent considerable alteration, not only through the elegiac and anapestic measures of Tyrtæus, but also through the Kretan Thaletas and the Lydian Alkman. The harp, the instrument of Terpander, was rivaled and in part superseded by the flute or pipe, which had been recently rendered more effective in the hands of Olympus, Klonas, and Polymnestus, and which gradually became, for compositions intended to raise strong emotion, the favorite instrument of the two —being employed as accompaniment both to the elegies of Tyrtæus, and to the hyporchemata (songs or hymns combined with dancing) of Thaletas; also, as the stimulus and regulator to the Spartan military march. These elegies (as has been just remarked) were sung by one person in the midst of an assembly of listeners, and there were doubtless other compositions intended for the individual voice. But in general such was not the character of music and poetry at Sparta; everything done there, both serious and recreative, was public and collective, so that the chorus and its performance received extraordinary development.

It has been already stated, that the chorus, with song and dance combined, constituted an important part of divine service throughout all Greece. It was originally a public manifestation of the citizens generally—a large proportion of them being actively engaged in it, and receiving some training for the purpose as an ordinary branch of education. Neither the song nor the dance under such conditions could be otherwise than extremely simple. But in process of time, the performance at the chief festival tended to become more elaborate and to fall into the hands of persons expressly and professionally trained—the mass of the citizens gradually ceasing to take active part, and being present merely as spectators. Such was the practice which grew up in most parts of Greece, and especially at Athens, where the dramatic chorus acquired its highest perfection. But the drama never found admission at Sparta, and the peculiarity of Spartan life tended much to keep up the popular chorus on its ancient footing. It formed in fact one element in that never-ceasing drill to which the Spartans were subject from their boyhood, and it served a purpose analogous to their military training, in accustoming them to simultaneous and regulated movement —insomuch that the comparison between the chorus, especially in its Pyrrhic or war-dances, and the military enomoty, seems to have been often dwelt upon. In the singing of the solemn pæan in honor of Apollo, at the festival of the Hyakinthia, King Agesilaus was under the orders of the chorus-master, and sang in the place allotted to him; while the whole body of Spartans without exception—the old, the middle-aged, and the youth, the matrons and the virgins—

were distributed in various choric companies, and trained to harmony both of voice and motion, which was publicly exhibited at the solemnities of the Gymnopædia. The word *dancing* must be understood in a larger sense than that in which it is now employed, and as comprising every variety of rhythmical, accentuated, conspiring movements, or gesticulations, or postures of the body, from the slowest to the quickest; cheironomy, or the decorous and expressive movement of the hands, being especially practiced.

We see thus that both at Sparta and in Krete (which approached in respect to publicity of individual life most nearly to Sparta) the choric aptitudes and manifestations occupied a larger space than in any other Grecian city. And as a certain degree of musical and rhythmical variety was essential to meet this want, while music was never taught to Spartan citizens individually, we further understand how strangers like Terpander, Polymnestus, Thaletas, Tyrtæus, Alkman, etc., were not only received, but acquired great influence at Sparta, in spite of the preponderant spirit of jealous seclusion in the Spartan character. All these masters appear to have been effective in their own special vocation—the training of the chorus—to which they imparted new rhythmical action, and for which they composed new music. But Alkman did this, and something more. He possessed the genius of a poet, and his compositions were read afterward with pleasure by those who could not hear them sung or see them danced. In the little of his poems which remains we recognize that variety of rhythm and meter for which he was celebrated. In this respect he (together with the Kretan Thaletas, who is said to have introduced a more vehement style both of music and dance, with the Kretic and Pæonic rhythm, into Sparta) surpassed Archilochus, preparing the way for the complicated choric movements of Stesichorus and Pindar. Some of his fragments, too, manifest that fresh outpouring of individual sentiment and emotion which constitutes so much of the charm of popular poetry. Besides his touching address in old age to the Spartan virgins, over whose song and dance he had been accustomed to preside, he is not afraid to speak of his hearty appetite, satisfied with simple food and relishing a bowl of warm broth at the winter tropic. He has attached to the spring an epithet, which comes home to the real feelings of a poor country more than those captivating pictures which abound in verse, ancient as well as modern. He calls it "the season of short fare"—the crop of the previous year being then nearly consumed, the husbandman is compelled to pinch himself until his new harvest comes in. Those who recollect that in earlier periods of our history, and in all countries where there is little accumulated stock, an exhorbitant difference is often experienced in the price of corn before and after the harvest, will feel the justice of Alkman's description.

Judging from these and from a few other fragments of this poet,

Alkman appears to have combined the life and exciting vigor of Archilochus in the song properly so called, sung by himself individually—with a larger knowledge of musical and rhythmical effect in regard to the choric performance. He composed in the Laconian dialect—a variety of the Doric with some intermixture of Æolisms. And it was from him, jointly with those other composers who figured at Sparta during the century after Terpander, as well as from the simultaneous development of the choric muse in Argos, Sikyon, Arcadia, and other parts of Peloponnesus, that the Doric dialect acquired permanent footing in Greece, as the only proper dialect for choric compositions. Continued by Stesichorus and Pindar, this habit passed even to the Attic dramatists, whose choric songs are thus in a great measure Doric, while their dialogue is Attic. At Sparta, as well as in other parts of Peloponnesus, the musical and rhythmical style appears to have been fixed by Alkman and his contemporaries, and to have been tenaciously maintained, for two or three centuries, with little or no innovation; the more so, as the flute-players at Sparta formed an hereditary profession, who followed the routine of their fathers.

Alkman was the last poet who addressed himself to the popular chorus. Both Arion and Stesichorus composed for a body of trained men, with a degree of variety and involution such as could not be attained by a mere fraction of the people. The primitive Dithyrambus was a round choric dance and song in honor of Dionysus, common to Naxos, Thebes, and seemingly to many other places, at the Dionysiac festival—a spontaneous effusion of drunken men in the hour of revelry, wherein the poet Archilochus, "with the thunder of wine full upon his mind," had often taken the chief part. Its exciting character approached to the worship of the great mother in Asia, and stood in contrast with the solemn and stately pæan addressed to Apollo. Arion introduced into it an alteration such as Archilochus had himself brought about in the scurrilous Iambus. He converted it into an elaborate composition in honor of the god, sung and danced by a chorus of fifty persons, not only sober, but trained with great strictness; though its rhythm and movements, and its equipment in the character of satyrs, presented more or less an imitation of the primitive license. Born at Methymna in Lesbos, Arion appears as a harper, singer, and composer, much favored by Periander at Corinth, in which city he first "composed, denominated, and taught the Dithyramb," earlier than any one known to Herodotus. He did not, however, remain permanently there, but traveled from city to city exhibiting at the festivals for money—especially to Sicilian and Italian Greece, where he acquired large gains. We may here again remark how the poets as well as the festivals served to promote a sentiment of unity among the dispersed Greeks. Such transfer of the Dithyramb, from the field of spontaneous nature into the garden of art,

constitutes the first stage in the refinement of Dionysiac worship; which will hereafter be found still farther exalted in the form of the Attic drama.

The date of Arion seems about 600 B.C., shortly after Alkman: that of Stesichorus is a few years later. To the latter the Greek chorus owed a high degree of improvement, and in particular the final distribution of its performance into the Strophe, the Antistrophe, and the Epodus: the turn, the return, and the rest. The rhythm and meter of the song during each strophe correspoded with that during the antistrophe, but was varied during the epodus, and again varied during the following strophes. Until this time the song had been monostrophic, consisting of nothing more than one uniform stanza, repeated from the beginning to the end of the composition; so that we may easily see how vast was the new complication and difficulty introduced by Stesichorus—not less for the performers than for the composer, himself at that time the teacher and trainer of performers. Both this poet, and his contemporary the flute-player Sakadas of Argos,—who gained the prize at the first three Pythian games founded after the sacred war,—seem to have surpassed their predecessors in the breadth of subject which they embraced, borrowing from the inexhaustible province of ancient legend, and expanding the choric song into a well-sustained epical narrative. Indeed these Pythian games opened a new career to musical composers just at the time when Sparta began to be closed against musical novelties.

Alkæus and Sappho, both natives of Lesbos, appear about contemporaries with Arion B.C. 610–580. Of their once celebrated lyric compositions, scarcely anything remains. But the criticisms which are preserved on both of them place them in strong contrast with Alkman, who lived and composed under the more restrictive atmosphere of Sparta—and in considerable analogy with the turbulent vehemence of Archilochus, though without his intense private malignity. Both Alkæus and Sappho composed for their own local audience, and in their own Lesbian Æolic dialect; not because there was any peculiar fitness in that dialect to express their vein of sentiment, but because it was more familiar to their hearers. Sappho herself boasts of the pre-eminence of the Lesbian bards; and the celebrity of Terpander, Perikleitas, and Arion permits us to suppose that there may have been before her other popular bards in the island who did not attain to a wide Hellenic celebrity. Alkæus included in his songs the fiercest bursts of political feeling, the stirring alternations of war and exile, and all the ardent relish of a susceptible man for wine and love. The love-song seems to have formed the principal theme of Sappho, who, however, also composed odes or songs on a great variety of other subjects, serious as well as satirical, and is said farther to have first employed the Myxolydian mode in music. It displays the tendency of the age to metrical and rhythmical novelty, that Alkæus and Sappho are said to have each invented the peculiar

stanza, well known under their respective names—combinations of the dactyl, trochee, and iambus, analogous to the asynartetic verses of Archilochus. They by no means confined themselves however to Alkaic and Sapphic meter. Both the one and the other composed hymns to the gods; indeed this is a theme common to all the lyric and choric poets, whatever may be their peculiarities in other ways. Most of their compositions were songs for the single voice, not for the chorus. The poetry of Alkæus is the more worthy of note, as it is the earliest instance of the employment of the Muse in actual political warfare, and shows the increased hold which that motive was acquiring on the Grecian mind.

The nomic poets, or moralists in verse, approach by the tone of their sentiments more to the nature of prose. They begin with Simonides of Amorgos or of Samos, the contemporary of Archilochus. Indeed Archilochus himself devoted some compositions to the illustrative fable, which had not been unknown even to Hesiod. In the remains of Simonides of Amorgos we trace nothing relative to the man personally, though he too, like Archilochus, is said to have had an individual enemy, Orodœkides, whose character was aspersed by his Muse. His only considerable poem extant is devoted to a survey of the characters of women, in iambic verse, and by way of comparison with various animals—the mare, the ass, the bee, etc. This poem follows out the Hesiodic vein respecting the social and economical mischief usually caused by women, with some few honorable exceptions. But the poet shows a much larger range of observation and illustration, if we compare him with his predecessor Hesiod; moreover his illustrations come fresh from life and reality. We find in this early iambist the same sympathy with industry and its due rewards, which is observable in Hesiod, together with a still more melancholy sense of the uncertainty of human events.

Of Solon and Theognis I have spoken in former chapters. They reproduce in part the moralizing vein of Simonides, though with a strong admixture of personal feeling and a direct application to passing events. The mixture of political with social morality, which we find in both, marks their more advanced age: Solon bears in this respect the same relation to Simonides, as his contemporary Alkæus bears to Archilochus. His poems, as far as we can judge by the fragments remaining, appear to have been short occasional effusions, with the exception of the epic poem respecting the submerged island of Atlantis; which he began toward the close of his life, but never finished. They are elegiac, trimeter iambic, and trochaic tetrameter; in his hands certainly neither of these meters can be said to have any special or separate character. If the poems of Solon are short, those of Theognis are much shorter, and are indeed so much broken (as they stand in our present collection), as to read like separate epigrams or bursts of feeling, which the poet had not taken the trouble to incorporate in any definite scheme or series. They form a singular

mixture of maxim and passion—of general precept with personal affection toward the youth Kyrnus—which surprises us if tried by the standard of literary composition, but which seems a very genuine manifestation of an impoverished exile's complaints and restlessness. What remains to us of Phokylides, another of the nomic poets nearly contemporary with Solon, is nothing more than a few maxims in verse—couplets with the name of the author in several cases embodied in them.

Amidst all the variety of rhythmical and metrical innovations which have been enumerated, the ancient epic continued to be recited by the rhapsodes as before. Some new epical compositions were added to the existing stock: Eugammon of Kyrene, about the 50th Olympiad (580 B.C.), appears to be the last of the series. At Athens, especially, both Solon and Peisistratus manifested great solicitude as well for the recitation as for the correct preservation of the Iliad. Perhaps its popularity may have been diminished by the competition of so much lyric and choric poetry, more showy and striking in its accompaniments, as well as more changeful in its rhythmical character. Whatever secondary effect, however, this newer species of poetry may have derived from such helps, its primary effect was produced by real intellectual or poetical excellence—by the thoughts, sentiment, and expression, not by the accompaniment. For a long time the musical composer and the poet continued generally to be one and the same person; and besides those who have acquired sufficient distinction to reach posterity, we cannot doubt that there were many known only to their own contemporaries. But with all of them the instrument and the melody constituted only the inferior part of that which was known by the name of *music*—altogether subordinate to the "thoughts that breathe and words that burn." Exactness and variety of rhythmical pronunciation gave to the words their full effect upon a delicate ear; but such pleasure of the ear was ancillary to the emotion of mind arising out of the sense conveyed. Complaints are made by the poets, even so early as 500 B.C., that the accompaniment was becoming too prominent. But it was not until the age of the comic poet Aristophanes, toward the end of the fifth century B.C., that the primitive relation between the instrumental accompaniment and the words was really reversed—and loud were the complaints to which it gave rise. The performance of the flute or harp then became more elaborate, showy, and overpowering, while the words were so put together as to show off the player's execution. I notice briefly this subsequent revolution for the purpose of setting forth, by contrast, the truly intellectual character of the original lyric and choric poetry of Greece; and of showing how much the vague sentiment arising from mere musical sound was lost in the more definite emotion, and in the more lasting and reproductive combinations, generated by poetical meaning.

The name and poetry of Solon, and the short maxims or sayings of

Phokylides, conduct us to the mention of the Seven Wise men of Greece. Solon was himself one of the seven, and most, if not all, of them were poets or composers in verse. To most of them is ascribed also an abundance of pithy repartees, together with one short saying or maxim peculiar to each, serving as a sort of distinctive motto. Indeed, the test of an accomplished man about this time was his talent for singing or reciting poetry, and for making smart and ready answers. Respecting this constellation of Wise men—who in the next century of Grecian history, when philosophy came to be a matter of discussion and argumentation, were spoken of with great eulogy—all the statements are confused, in part even contradictory. Neither the number, nor the names, are given by all authors alike. Dikæarchus numbered ten, Hermippus seventeen: the names of Solon the Athenian, Thales the Milesian, Pittakus the Mitylenean, and Bias the Prienean, were comprised in all the lists—and the remaining names as given by Plato were, Kleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes, Myson of Chenæ, and Cheilon of Sparta. We cannot certainly distribute among them the sayings or mottoes, upon which in later days the Amphiktyons conferred the honor of inscription in the Delphian temple—Know thyself—Nothing too much—Know thy opportunity—Suretyship is the precursor of ruin. Bias is praised as an excellent judge; while Myson was declared by the Delphian oracle to be the most discreet man among the Greeks, according to the testimony of the satirical poet Hipponax—this is the oldest testimony (540 B.C.) which can be produced in favor of any of the Seven. But Kleobulus of Lindus, far from being universally extolled, is pronounced by the poet Simonides to be a fool.

Dikæarchus, however, justly observed, that these seven or ten persons were not Wise Men or Philosophers, in the sense which those words bore in his day, but persons of practical discernment in reference to man and society—of the same turn of mind as their contemporary the fabulist Æsop, though not employing the same mode of illustration. Their appearance forms an epoch in Grecian history, inasmuch as they are the first persons who ever acquired an Hellenic reputation grounded on mental competency apart from poetical genius or effect—a proof that political and social prudence was beginning to be appreciated and admired on its own account. Solon, Pittakus, Bias, and Thales, were all men of influence—the first two even men of ascendency—in their respective cities. Kleobulus was despot of Lindus, and Periander (by some numbered among the seven) of Corinth. Thales stands distinguished as the earliest name in physical philosophy, with which the other contemporary Wise Men are not said to have meddled. Their celebrity rests upon moral, social, and political wisdom exclusively, which came into greater honor as the ethical feeling of the Greeks improved and as their experience became enlarged.

In these celebrated names we have social philosophy in its early

and infantine state—in the shape of homely sayings or admonitions, either supposed to be self-evident, or to rest upon some great authority divine or human, but neither accompanied by reasons nor recognizing any appeal to inquiry and discussion as the proper test of their rectitude. From such incurious acquiescence, the sentiment to which these admonitions owe their force, we are partially liberated even in the poet Simonides of Keos, who (as before alluded to) severely criticises the song of Kleobulus as well as its author. The half-century which followed the age of Simonides (the interval between about 480–430 B.C.) broke down that sentiment more and more, by familiarizing the public with argumentative controversy in the public assembly, the popular judicature, and even on the dramatic stage. And the increased self-working of the Grecian mind, thus created, manifested itself in Sokrates, who laid open all ethical and social doctrines to the scrutiny of reason, and who first awakened among his countrymen that love of dialectics which never left them —an analytical interest in the mental process of inquiring out, verifying, proving and expounding truth. To this capital item of human progress, secured through the Greeks—and through them only—to mankind generally, our attention will be called at a later period of the history. At present it is only mentioned in contrast with the naked, dogmatical, laconism of the Seven Wise Men, and with the simple enforcement of the early poets—a state in which morality has a certain place in the feelings, but no root, even among the superior minds, in the conscious exercise of reason.

The interval between Archilochus and Solon (660–580 B.C.) seems, as has been remarked in my former volume, to be the period in which writing first came to be applied to Greek poems—to the Homeric poems among the number; and shortly after the end of that period, commences the era of compositions without meter or prose. The philosopher Pherekydes of Syros, about 550 B.C., is called by some the earliest prose-writer. But no prose-writer for a considerable time afterward acquired any celebrity—seemingly none earlier than Hekatæus of Miletus, about 510–490 B.C.—prose being a subordinate and ineffective species of composition, not always even perspicuous, and requiring no small practice before the power was acquired of rendering it interesting. Down to the generation preceding Sokrates, the poets continued to be the grand leaders of the Greek mind. Until then, nothing was taught to youth except to read, to remember, to recite musically and rhythmically, and to comprehend, poetical composition. The comments of preceptors addressed to their pupils may probably have become fuller and more instructive, but the text still continued to be epic or lyric poetry. These were the best masters for acquiring a full command of the complicated accent and rhythm of the Greek language, so essential to an educated man in ancient times, and so sure to be detected if not properly acquired. Not to mention the Choliambist Hipponax, who seems to have been possessed with the

devil of Achilochus, and in part also with his genius—Anakreon, Ibykus, Pindar, Bacchylides, Simonides, and the dramatists of Athens, continue the line of eminent poets without intermission. After the Persian war, the requirements of public speaking created a class of rhetorical teachers, while the gradual spread of physical philosophy widened the range of instruction; so that prose composition, for speech or for writing, occupied a larger and larger share of the attention of men, and was gradually wrought up to high perfection, such as we see for the first time in Herodotus. But before it became thus improved, and acquired that style which was the condition of wide-spread popularity, we may be sure that it had been silently used as a means of recording information, and that neither the large mass of geographical matter contained in the Periegesis of Hekatæus, nor the map first prepared by his contemporary Anaximander, could have been presented to the world, without the previous labors of unpretending prose writers, who set down the mere results of their own experience. The acquisition of prose-writing, commencing as it does about the age of Peisistratus, is not less remarkable as an evidence of past, than as a means of future, progress.

Of that splendid genius in sculpture and architecture, which shone forth in Greece after the Persian invasion, the first lineaments only are discoverable between 600–500 B.C., in Corinth, Ægina, Samos, Chios, Ephesus, etc.—enough, however, to give evidence of improvement and progress. Glaukus of Chios is said to have discovered the art of welding iron, and Rhœkus or his son Theodorus of Samos the art of casting copper or brass in a mold. Both these discoveries, as far as can be made out, appear to date a little before 600 B.C. The primitive memorial erected in honor of a god did not even pretend to be an image, but was often nothing more than a pillar, a board, a shapeless stone, a post, etc., fixed so as to mark and consecrate the locality, and receiving from the neighborhood respectful care and decoration as well as worship. Sometimes there was a real statue, though of the rudest character, carved in wood; and the families of carvers—who from father to son, exercised this profession, represented in Attica by the name of Dædalus and in Ægina by the name of Smilis—adhered long with strict exactness to the consecrated type of each particular god. Gradually the wish grew up to change the material, as well as to correct the rudeness, of such primitive idols. Sometimes the original wood was retained as the material, but covered in part with ivory or gold—in other cases marble or metal was substituted. Dipœnus and Skyllis of Krete acquired renown as workers in marble about the 50th Olympiad (580 B.C.). From them downward, a series of names may be traced, more or less distinguished; moreover, it seems about the same period that the earliest temple-offerings, in works of art properly so called, commence—the golden statue of Zeus, and the large carved chest, dedicated by the Kypselids of Corinth at Olympia. The pious associations, however, connected with the old type were so strong, that the hand of the artist was greatly restrained in dealing with statues of the gods. It was in statues of men, especially in those of the victors at Olympia and other sacred games, that genuine ideas of beauty were first aimed at and in part attained, from whence they passed afterward to the statues of the gods. Such statues of the athletes seem to commence somewhere between Olympiad 53–58 (568–548 B.C.).

It is not until the same interval of time (between 600–550 B.C.) that we find any traces of these architectural monuments by which the more important cities in Greece afterward attracted to themselves so much renown. The two greatest temples in Greece known to Herodotus were the Artemision at Ephesus, and the Heræon at Samos. Of these the former seems to have been commenced, by the Samian Theodorus, about 600 B.C.—the latter, begun by the Samian Rhœkus, can hardly be traced to any higher antiquity. The first attempts to decorate Athens by such additions proceeded from Peisistratus and his sons, near the same time. As far as we can judge, too, in the absence of all direct evidence, the temples of Pæstum in Italy and Selinus in Sicily seem to fall in this same century. Of painting during these early centuries, nothing can be affirmed. It never at any time reached the same perfection as sculpture, and we may presume that its years of infancy were at least equally rude.

The immense development of Grecian art, subsequently, and the great perfection of Grecian artists, are facts of great importance in the history of the human race; while in regard to the Greeks themselves, these facts not only acted powerfully on the taste of the people, but were also valuable indirectly as the common boast of Hellenism, and as supplying one bond of fraternal sympathy as well as of mutual pride, among its widely-dispersed sections. It is the paucity and weakness of such bonds which renders the history of Greece, prior to 560 B.C, little better than a series of parallel but isolated threads, each attached to a separate city. The increased range of joint Hellenic feeling and action, upon which we shall presently enter, though arising doubtless in great measure from new and common dangers threatening many cities at once—also springs in part from those other causes which have been enumerated in this chapter, as acting on the Grecian mind. It proceeds from the stimulus applied to all the common feelings in religion, art, and recreation —from the gradual formation of national festivals, appealing in various ways to such tastes and sentiments as animated every Hellenic bosom—from the inspirations of men of genius, poets, musicians, sculptors, architects, who supplied more or less in every Grecian city, education for the youth, training for the chorus, and ornament for the locality—from the gradual expansion of science, philosophy, and rhetoric, during the coming period of this history, which rendered one city the intellectual capital of Greece, and

brought to Isokrates and Plato pupils from the most distant parts of the Grecian world. It was this fund of common tastes, tendencies, and aptitudes, which caused the social atoms of Hellas to gravitate toward each other, and which enabled the Greeks to become something better and greater than an aggregate of petty disunited communities like the Thracians or Phrygians. And the creation of such common, extrapolitical Hellenism is the most interesting phenomenon which the historian has to point out in the early period now under our notice. He is called upon to dwell upon it the more forcibly because the modern reader has generally no idea of national union without political union—an association foreign to the Greek mind. Strange as it may seem to find a song-writer put forward as an active instrument of union among his fellow-Hellens, it is not the less true that those poets, whom we have briefly passed in review, by enriching the common language and by circulating from town to town either in person or in their compositions, contributed to fan the flame of Pan-Hellenic patriotism at a time when there were few circumstances to co-operate with them, and when the causes tending to perpetuate isolation seemed in the ascendant.

CHAPTER XXX.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF PEISISTRATUS AND HIS SONS AT ATHENS.

We now arrive at what may be called the second period of Grecian history, beginning with the rule of Peisistratus at Athens and of Crœsus in Lydia.

It has been already stated that Peisistratus made himself despot of Athens in 560 B.C. He died in 527 B.C., and was succeeded by his son Hippias, who was deposed and expelled in 510 B.C., thus making an entire space of fifty years between the first exaltation of the father and the final expulsion of the son. These chronological points are settled on good evidence. But the thirty-three years covered by the reign of Peisistratus are interrupted by two periods of exile, one of them lasting not less than ten years, the other, five years; and the exact place of the years of exile, being nowhere laid down upon authority, has been differently determined by the conjectures of chronologers. Partly from this half-known chronology, partly from a very scanty collection of facts, the history of the half-century now before us can only be given very imperfectly. Nor can we wonder at our ignorance, when we find that even among the Athenians themselves, only a century afterward, statements the most incorrect and contradictory respecting the Peisistratids were in circulation, as Thucydides distinctly, and somewhat reproachfully, acquaints us.

More than thirty years had now elapsed since the promulgation of the Solonian constitution, whereby the annual Senate of Four Hundred had been created, and the public assembly (preceded in its action as well as aided and regulated by this senate) invested with a power of exacting responsibility from the magistrates after their year of office. The seeds of the subsequent democracy had thus been sown, and no doubt the administration of the archons had been practically softened by it. Yet nothing in the nature of a democratical sentiment yet had been created. A hundred years hence, we shall find that sentiment unanimous and potent among the enterprising masses of Athens and Peiræus, and shall be called upon to listen to loud complaints of the difficulty of dealing with "that angry, waspish, intractable little old man, Demus of Pnyx"—so Aristophanes calls the Athenian people to their faces, with a freedom which shows that he at least counted on their good temper. But between 560–510 B.C. the people are as passive in respect to political rights and securities as the most strenuous enemy of democracy could desire, and the government is transferred from hand to hand by bargains and cross-changes between two or three powerful men, at the head of partisans who echo their voices, espouse their personal quarrels, and draw the sword at their command. It was this ancient constitution—Athens as it stood before the Athenian democracy—which the Macedonian Antipater professed to restore in 322 B.C., when he caused the majority of the poorer citizens to be excluded altogether from the political franchise.

By the stratagem recounted in a former chapter, Peisistratus had obtained from the public assembly a guard which he had employed to acquire forcible possession of the acropolis. He thus became master of the administration; but he employed his power honorably and well, not disturbing the existing forms farther then was necessary to insure to himself full mastery. Nevertheless we may see by the verses of Solon (the only contemporary evidence which we possess), that the prevalent sentiment was by no means favorable to his recent proceeding, and that there was in many minds a strong feeling both of terror and aversion, which presently manifested itself in the armed coalition of his two rivals—Megakles at the head of the Parali or inhabitants of the sea-board, and Lykurgus at the head of those in the neighboring plain. As the conjunction of the two formed a force too powerful for Peisistratus to withstand, he was driven into exile, after no long possession of his despotism. But the time came (how soon we cannot tell) when the two rivals who had expelled him quarreled. Megakles made propositions to Peisistratus, inviting him to resume the sovereignty, promising his own aid and stipulating that Peisistratus should marry his daughter. The conditions being accepted, a plan was laid between the two new allies for carrying them into effect, by a novel stratagem—since the simulated wounds

and pretense of personal danger were not likely to be played off a second time with success. The two conspirators clothed a stately woman, six feet high, named Phye, in the panoply and costume of Athene—surrounded her with the processional accompaniments belonging to the goddess—and placed her in a chariot with Peisistratus by her side. In this guise the exiled despot and his adherents approached the city and drove up to the acropolis, preceded by heralds, who cried aloud to the people,—"Athenians, receive ye cordially Peisistratus, whom Athene has honored above all other men, and is now bringing back into her own acropolis." The people in the city received the reputed goddess with implicit belief and demonstrations of worship, while among the country cantons the report quickly spread that Athene had appeared in person to restore Peisistratus; who thus found himself, without even a show of resistance, in possession of the acropolis and of the government. His own party, united with that of Megakles, were powerful enough to maintain him, when he had once acquired possession. And probably all, except the leaders, sincerely believed in the epiphany of the goddess, which came to be divulged as having been a deception, only after Peisistratus and Megakles had quarreled.

The daughter of Megakles, according to agreement, quickly became the wife of Peisistratus, but she bore him no children. It became known that her husband, having already adult sons by a former marriage, and considering that the Kylonian curse rested upon all the Alkmæonid family, did not intend that she should become a mother. Megakles was so incensed at this behavior, that he not only renounced his alliance with Peisistratus, but even made his peace with the third party, the adherents of Lykurgus—and assumed so menacing an attitude, that the despot was obliged to evacuate Attica. He retired to Eretria in Eubœa, where he remained no less than ten years, employed in making preparations for a forcible return, and exercising, even while in exile, a degree of influence much exceeding that of a private man. He not only lent valuable aid to Lygdamis of Naxos in constituting himself despot of that island, but possessed, we know not how, the means of rendering important service to different cities, Thebes in particular. They repaid him by large contributions of money to aid in his re-establishment: mercenaries were hired from Argos, and the Naxian Lygdamis came himself both with money and with troops. Thus equipped and aided, Peisistratus landed at Marathon in Attica. How the Athenian government had been conducted during his ten years' absence, we do not know; but the leaders of it permitted him to remain undisturbed at Marathon, and to assemble his partisans both from the city and from the country. It was not until he broke up from Marathon and had reached Pallene on his way to Athens, that they took the field against him. Moreover, their conduct, even when the two armies were near together, must have been either extremely negligent or corrupt; for Peisistratus found

means to attack them unprepared, routing their forces almost without resistance. In fact, the proceedings have altogether the air of a concerted betrayal. For the defeated troops, though unpursued, are said to have dispersed and returned to their homes forthwith, in obedience to the proclamation of Peisistratus, who marched on to Athens, and found himself a third time ruler.

On this third successful entry, he took vigorous precautions for rendering his seat permanent. The Alkmæonidæ and their immediate partisans retired into exile: but he seized the children of those who remained and whose sentiments he suspected, as hostages for the behavior of their parents, and placed them in Naxos under the care of Lygdamis. Moreover he provided himself with a powerful body of Thracian mercenaries, paid by taxes levied upon the people: and he was careful to conciliate the favor of the gods by a purification of the sacred island of Delos. All the dead bodies which had been buried within sight of the temple of Apollo, were exhumed and reinterred further off. At this time the Delian festival—attended by the Asiatic Ionians and the islanders, and with which Athens was of course peculiarly connected—must have been beginning to decline from its pristine magnificence; for the subjugation of the continental Ionic cities by Cyrus had been already achieved, and the power of Samos, though increased under the dispot Polykrates, seems to have increased at the expense and to the ruin of the smaller Ionic islands. Partly from the same feelings which led to the purification of Delos—partly as an act of party revenge—Peisistratus caused the houses of the Alkmæonids to be leveled with the ground, and the bodies of the deceased members of that family to be disinterred and cast out of the country.

This third and last period of the rule of Peisistratus lasted several years, until his death in 527 B.C. It is said to have been so mild in its character, that he once even suffered himself to be cited for trial before the senate of Areopagus; yet as we know that he had to maintain a large body of Thracian mercenaries out of the funds of the people, we shall be inclined to construe this eulogium comparatively rather than positively. Thucydides affirms that both he and his sons governed in a wise and virtuous spirit, levying from the people only an income tax of five per cent. This is high praise coming from such an authority, though it seems that we ought to make some allowance for the circumstance of Thucydides being connected by descent with the Peisistratid family. The judgment of Herodotus is also very favorable respecting Peisistratus; that of Aristotle favorable, yet qualified, since he includes these despots among the list of those who undertook public and sacred works with the deliberate view of impoverishing as well as of occupying their subjects. This supposition is countenanced by the prodigious scale upon which the temple of Zeus Olympius at Athens was begun by Peisistratus—a scale much exceeding either the Parthenon or the temple of Athene Polias; both

of which, nevertheless, were erected in later times, when the means of Athens were decidedly larger and her disposition to demonstrative piety certainly no way diminished. It was left by him unfinished, nor was it ever completed until the Roman emperor Hadrian undertook the task. Moreover Peisistratus introduced the greater Panathenaic festival, solemnized every four years, in the third Olympic year: the annual Panathenaic festival, henceforward called the Lesser, was still continued.

I have already noticed, at considerable length, the care which he bestowed in procuring full and correct copies of the Homeric poems, as well as in improving the recitation of them at the Panathenaic festival,—a proceeding for which we owe him much gratitude, but which has been shown to be erroneously interpreted by various critics. He probably also collected the works of other poets—called by Aulus Gellius, in language not well suited to the sixth century B.C., a library thrown open to the public. The service which he thus rendered must have been highly valuable at a time when writing and reading were not widely extended. His son Hipparchus followed up the same taste, taking pleasure in the society of the most eminent poets of the day,—Simonides, Anakreon, and Lasus; not to mention the Athenian mystic Onomakritus, who though not pretending to the gift of prophecy himself, passed for the proprietor and editor of the various prophecies ascribed to the ancient name of Musæus. The Peisistratids, well versed in these prophecies, set great value upon them, and guarded their integrity so carefully, that Onomakritus, being detected on one occasion in the act of interpolating them, was banished by Hipparchus in consequence. The statues of Hermes, erected by this prince or by his personal friends in various parts of Attica, and inscribed with short moral sentences, are extolled by the author of the Platonic dialogue called Hipparchus, with an exaggeration which approaches to irony. It is certain, however, that both the sons of Peisistratus, as well as himself, were exact in fulfilling the religious obligations of the state, and ornamented the city in several ways, especially the public fountain Kallirrhoe. They are said to have maintained the pre existing forms of law and justice, merely taking care always to keep themselves and their adherents in the effective offices of state, and in the full reality of power. They were, moreover, modest and popular in their personal demeanor, and charitable to the poor; yet one striking example occurs of unscrupulous enmity in their murder of Kimon by night through the agency of hired assassins. There is good reason, however, for believing that the government both of Peisistratus and of his sons was in practice generally mild until after the death of Hipparchus by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, after which event the surviving Hippias became alarmed, cruel, and oppressive during his last four years. Hence the harshness of this concluding period left upon the Athenian mind that profound and imperishable

hatred, against the dynasty generally, which Thucydides reluctantly admits: laboring to show that it was not deserved by Peisistratus, nor at first by Hippias.

Peisistratus left three legitimate sons—Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus. The general belief at Athens among the contemporaries of Thucydides was that Hipparchus was the eldest of the three and had succeeded him. Yet the historian emphatically pronounces this to be a mistake, and certifies upon his own responsibility that Hippias was both eldest son and successor. Such an assurance from him, fortified by certain reasons in themselves not very conclusive, is sufficient ground for our belief—the more so as Herodotus countenances the same version; but we are surprised at such a degree of historical carelessness in the Athenian public, and seemingly even in Plato, about a matter both interesting and comparatively recent. In order to abate this surprise, and to explain how the name of Hipparchus came to supplant that of Hippias in the popular talk, Thucydides recounts the memorable story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

Of these two Athenian citizens, both belonging to the ancient gens called Gephyræi, the former was a beautiful youth, attached to the latter by a mutual friendship and devoted intimacy which Grecian manners did not condemn. Hipparchus made repeated propositions to Harmodius, which were repelled, but which, on becoming known to Aristogeiton, excited both his jealousy and his fears lest the disappointed suitor should employ force—fears justified by the proceedings not unusual with Grecian despots, and by the absence of all legal protection against outrage from such a quarter. Under these feelings, he began to look about, in the best way that he could, for some means of putting down the despotism. Meanwhile Hipparchus, though not entertaining any designs of violence, was so incensed at the refusal of Harmodius, that he could not be satisfied without doing something to insult or humiliate him. In order to conceal the motive from which the insult really proceeded, he offered it, not directly to Harmodius, but to his sister. He caused this young maiden to be one day summoned to take her station in a religious procession as one of the Kanephoræ or basket-carriers, according to the practice usual at Athens. But when she arrived at the place where her fellow-maidens were assembled, she was dismissed with scorn as unworthy of so respectable a function, and the summons addressed to her was disavowed.

An insult thus publicly offered filled Harmodius with indignation, and still farther exasperated the feelings of Aristogeiton. Both of them resolving at all hazards to put an end to the despotism, concerted means for aggression with a few select associates. They awaited the festival of the Great Panathenæa, wherein the body of the citizens were accustomed to march up in armed procession, with spear and shield, to the acropolis; this being the only day on which

an armed body could come together without suspicion. The conspirators appeared armed like the rest of the citizens, but carrying concealed daggers besides. Harmodius and Aristogeiton undertook with their own hands to kill the two Peisistratids, while the rest promised to stand forward immediately for their protection against the foreign mercenaries; and though the whole number of persons engaged was small, they counted upon the spontaneous sympathies of the armed bystanders in an effort to regain their liberties, so soon as the blow should once be struck. The day of the festival having arrived, Hippias, with his foreign body-guard around him, was marshaling the armed citizens for procession, in the Kerameikus without the gates, when Harmodius and Aristogeiton approached with concealed daggers to execute their purpose. On coming near, they were thunderstruck to behold one of their own fellow-conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias, who was of easy access to every man. They immediately concluded that the plot was betrayed. Expecting to be seized, and wrought up to a state of desperation, they resolved at least not to die without having revenged themselves on Hipparchus; whom they found within the city gates near the chapel called Leokorion, and immediately slew him. His attendant guards killed Harmodius on the spot; while Aristogeiton, rescued for the moment by the surrounding crowd, was afterward taken, and perished in the tortures applied to make him disclose his accomplices.

The news flew quickly to Hippias in the Kerameikus, who heard it earlier than the armed citizens near him awaiting his order for the commencement of the procession. With extraordinary self-command, he took advantage of this precious instant of foreknowledge, and advanced toward them,—directing them to drop their arms for a short time, and assemble on an adjoining ground. They unsuspectingly obeyed; upon which he ordered his guards to take possession of the vacant arms. Being now undisputed master, he seized the persons of all those citizens whom he mistrusted—especially all those who had daggers about them, which it was not the practice to carry in the Panathenaic procession.

Such is the memorable narrative of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, peculiarly valuable inasmuch as it all comes from Thucydides. To possess great power—to be above legal restraint—to inspire extraordinary fear—is a privilege so much coveted by the giants among mankind, that we may well take notice of those cases in which it brings misfortune even upon themselves. The fear inspired by Hipparchus—of designs which he did not really entertain, but was likely to entertain, and competent to execute without hindrance—was here the grand cause of his destruction.

The conspiracy here detailed happened in 514 B.C., during the thirteenth year of the reign of Hippias, which lasted four years longer, until 510 B.C. These last four years, in the belief of the Athenian public, counted for his whole reign; nay, many persons made

the still greater historical mistake of eliding these last four years altogether, and of supposing that the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton had deposed the Peisistratid government and liberated Athens. Both poets and philosophers shared this faith, which is distinctly put forth in the beautiful and popular Skolion or song on the subject: the two friends are there celebrated as the authors of liberty at Athens—"they slew the despot and gave to Athens equal laws." So inestimable a present was alone sufficient to enshrine in the minds of the subsequent democracy those who had sold their lives to purchase it. Moreover, we must recollect that the intimate connection between the two, though repugnant to the modern reader, was regarded at Athens with sympathy,—so that the story took hold of the Athenian mind by the vein of romance conjointly with that of patriotism. Harmodius and Aristogeiton were afterward commemorated both as the winners and as the protomartyrs of Athenian liberty. Statues were erected in their honor shortly after the final expulsion of the Peisistratids; immunity from taxes and public burdens was granted to the descendants of their families; and the speaker who proposed the abolition of such immunities, at a time when the number had been abusively multiplied, made his only special exception in favor of this respected lineage. And since the name of Hipparchus was universally notorious as the person slain, we discover how it was that he came to be considered by an uncritical public as the predominant member of the Peisistratid family—the eldest son and successor of Peisistratus—the reigning despot—to the comparative neglect of Hippias. The same public probably cherished many other anecdotes, not the less eagerly believed because they could not be authenticated, respecting this eventful period.

Whatever may have been the previous moderation of Hippias, indignation at the death of his brother, and fear for his own safety, now induced him to drop it altogether. It is attested both by Thucydides and Herodotus, and admits of no doubt, that his power was now employed harshly and cruelly—that he put to death a considerable number of citizens. We find also a statement noway improbable in itself and affirmed both in Pausanias and in Plutarch—inferior authorities, yet still in this case sufficiently credible—that he caused Leæna, the mistress of Aristogeiton, to be tortured to death, in order to extort from her a knowledge of the secrets and accomplices of the latter. But as he could not but be sensible that this system of terrorism was full of peril to himself, so he looked out for shelter and support in case of being expelled from Athens. With this view he sought to connect himself with Darius, king of Persia—a connection full of consequences to be hereafter developed. Æantides, son of Hippoklus the despot of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, stood high at this time in the favor of the Persian monarch, which induced Hippias to give him his daughter Archedike in mar-

riage; no small honor to the Lampsakene, in the estimation of Thucydides. To explain how Hippias came to fix upon this town, however, it is necessary to say a few words on the foreign policy of the Peisistratids.

It has already been mentioned that the Athenians, even so far back as the days of the poet Alkæus, had occupied Sigeium in the Troad, and had there carried on war with the Mitylenæans; so that their acquisitions in these regions date much before the time of Peisistratus Owing probably to this circumstance, an application was made to them in the early part of his reign from the Dolonkian Thracians, inhabitants of the Chersonese on the opposite side of the Hellespont, for aid against their powerful neighbors the Absinthian tribe of Thracians. Opportunity was thus offered for sending out a colony to acquire this valuable peninsula for Athens. Peisistratus willingly entered into the scheme, while Miltiades son of Kypselus, a noble Athenian living impatiently under his despotism, was no less pleased to take the lead in executing it: his departure and that of other malcontents as founders of a colony suited the purpose of all parties. According to the narrative of Herodotus—alike pious and picturesque, and doubtless circulating as authentic at the annual games which the Chersonesites, even in his time, celebrated to the honor of their œkist—it is the Delphian god who directs the scheme and singles out the individual. The chiefs of the distressed Dolonkians going to Delphi to crave assistance toward procuring Grecian colonists, were directed to choose for their œkist the individual who should first show them hospitality on their quitting the temple. They departed and marched all along what was called the Sacred Road, through Phokis and Bœotia to Athens, without receiving a single hospitable invitation. At length they entered Athens, and passed by the house of Miltiades while he himself was sitting in front of it. Seeing men whose costume and arms marked them out as strangers, he invited them into his house and treated them kindly: upon which they apprised him that he was the man fixed upon by the oracle, and adjured him not to refuse his concurrence. After asking for himself personally the opinion of the oracle, and receiving an affirmative answer, he consented; sailing as œkist at the head of a body of Athenian emigrants to the Chersonese.

Having reached this peninsula, and having been constituted despot of the mixed Thracian and Athenian population, he lost no time in fortifying the narrow isthmus by a wall reaching all across from Kardia to Paktya, a distance of about four miles and a half; so that the Absinthian invaders were for the time effectually shut out, though the protection was not permanently kept up. He also entered into a war with Lampsakus on the Asiatic side of the strait, but was unfortunate enough to fall into an ambuscade and become a prisoner. Nothing preserved his life except the immediate interference of Crœsus, king of Lydia, coupled with strenuous menaces addressed to

the Lampsakenes, who found themselves compelled to release their prisoner. Miltiades had acquired much favor with Crœsus, in what manner we are not told. He died childless some time afterward, while his nephew Stesagoras, who succeeded him, perished by assassination some time subsequent to the death of Peisistratus at Athens.

The expedition of Miltiades to the Chersonese must have occurred early after the first usurpation of Peisistratus, since even his imprisonment by the Lampsakenes happened before the ruin of Crœsus (546 B.C). But it was not till much later—probably during the third and most powerful period of Peisistratus—that the latter undertook his expedition against Sigeium in the Troad. This place appears to have fallen into the hands of the Mitylenæans: Peisistratus retook it, and placed there his illegitimate son Hegesistratus as despot. The Mitylenæans may have been enfeebled at this time (somewhere between 537–527 B.C.) not only by the strides of Persian conquest on the mainland, but also by the ruinous defeat which they suffered from Polykrates and the Samians. Hegesistratus maintained the place against various hostile attempts, throughout all the reign of Hippias, so that the Athenian possessions in those regions comprehended at this period both the Chersonese and Sigeium. To the former of the two, Hippias sent out Miltiades, nephew of the first œkist, as governor after the death of his brother Stesagoras. The new governor found much discontent in the peninsula, but succeeded in subduing it by entrapping and imprisoning the principal men in each town. He farther took into his pay a regiment of 500 mercenaries, and married Hegesipyle, daughter of the Thracian king Olorus. It must have been about 518 B.C. that this second Miltiades went out to the Chersonese. He seems to have been obliged to quit it for a time, after the Scythian expedition of Darius, in consequence of having incurred the hostility of the Persians; but he was there from the beginning of the Ionic revolt until about 493 B.C., or two or three years before the battle of Marathon, on which occasion we shall find him acting commander of the Athenian army.

Both the Chersonese and Sigeium, however, though Athenian possessions, were now tributary and dependent on Persia. It was to Persia that Hippias, during his last years of alarm, looked for support in the event of being expelled from Athens: he calculated upon Sigeium as a shelter, and upon Æantides as well as Darius as an ally. Neither the one nor the other failed him.

The same circumstances which alarmed Hippias and rendered his dominion in Attica at once more oppressive and more odious, tended of course to raise the hopes of his enemies, the Athenian exiles, with the powerful Alkmæonids at their head. Believing the favorable moment to be come, they even ventured upon an invasion of Attica, and occupied a post called Leipsydrion in the mountain range of Parnes, which separates Attica from Bœotia. But their schemes

altogether failed: Hippias defeated and drove them out of the country. His dominion now seemed confirmed, for the Lacedæmonians were on terms of intimate friendship with him; and Amyntas, king of Macedon, as well as the Thessalians, were his allies. Yet the exiles whom he had beaten in the open field succeeded in an unexpected maneuver, which, favored by circumstances, proved his ruin.

By an accident which had occurred in the year 548 B.C., the Delphian temple was set on fire and burnt. To repair this grave loss was an object of solicitude to all Greece; but the outlay required was exceedingly heavy, and it appears to have been long before the money could be collected. The Amphiktyons decreed that one-fourth of the cost should be borne by the Delphians themselves, who found themselves so heavily taxed by such assessment, that they sent envoys throughout all Greece to collect subscriptions in aid, and received, among other donations, from the Greek settlers in Egypt twenty minæ, besides a large present of alum from the Egyptian king Amasis: their munificent benefactor Crœsus fell a victim to the Persians in 546 B.C., so that his treasure was no longer open to them. The total sum required was 300 talents (equal probably to about £115,000 sterling)—a prodigious amount to be collected from the dispersed Grecian cities, who acknowledged no common sovereign authority, and among whom the proportion reasonable to ask from each was difficult to determine with satisfaction to all parties. At length however the money was collected, and the Amphiktyons were in a situation to make a contract for the building of the temple. The Alkmæonids, who had been in exile ever since the third and final acquisition of power by Peisistratus, took the contract. In executing it, they not only performed the work in the best manner, but even went much beyond the terms stipulated; employing Parian marble for the frontage where the material prescribed to them was coarse stone. As was before remarked in the case of Peisistratus when he was in banishment, we are surprised to find exiles (whose property had been confiscated) so amply furnished with money, unless we are to suppose that Kleisthenes inherited through his mother wealth independent of Attica, and deposited it in the temple of the Samian Here. But the fact is unquestionable, and they gained signal reputation throughout the Hellenic world for their liberal performance of so important an enterprise. That the erection took considerable time, we cannot doubt. It seems to have been finished, as far as we can conjecture, about a year or two after the death of Hipparchus—512 B.C.—more than thirty years after the conflagration.

To the Delphians, especially, the rebuilding of their temple on so superior a scale was the most essential of all services, and their gratitude toward the Alkmæonids was proportionally great. Partly through such a feeling, partly through pecuniary presents, Kleisthenes was thus enabled to work the oracle for political purposes, and to call forth the powerful arm of Sparta against Hippias. Whenever any Spartan presented himself to consult the oracle, either on private or public business, the answer of the priestess was always in one strain—"Athens must be liberated." The constant repetition of that mandate at length extorted from the piety of the Lacedæmonians a reluctant compliance. Reverence for the god overcame their strong feeling of friendship toward the Peisistratids, and Anchimolius, son of Aster, was dispatched by sea to Athens at the head of a Spartan force to expel them. On landing at Phalerum, however, he found them already forewarned and prepared, as well as farther strengthened by 1,000 horse specially demanded from their allies in Thessaly. Upon the plain of Phalerum this latter force was found peculiarly effective, so that the division of Anchimolius were driven back to their ships with great loss, and he himself slain. The defeated armament had probably been small, and its repulse only provoked the Lacedæmonians to send a larger, under the command of their king Kleomenes in person, who on this occasion marched into Attica by land. On reaching the plain of Athens, he was assailed by the Thessalian horse, but repelled them in so gallant a style, that they at once rode of and returned to their native country; abandoning their allies with a faithlessness not unfrequent in the Thessalian character. Kleomenes marched on without farther resistance to Athens, where he found himself, together with the Alkmæonids and the malcontent Athenians generally, in possession of the town. At that time there was no fortification except round the acropolis, into which Hippias retired, with his mercenaries and the citizens most faithful to him; having taken care to provision it well beforehand, so that it was not less secure against famine than against assault. He might have defied the besieging force, which was no way prepared for a long blockade. Yet, not altogether confiding in his position, he tried to send his children by stealth out of the country; in which proceeding the children were taken prisoners. To procure their restoration, Hippias consented to all that was demanded of him, and withdrew from Attica to Sigeium in the Troad within the space of five days.

Thus fell the Peisistratid dynasty in 510 B.C., fifty years after the first usurpation of its founder. It was put down through the aid of foreigners, and those foreigners, too, wishing well to it in their hearts, though hostile from a mistaken feeling of divine injunction. Yet both the circumstances of its fall, and the course of events which followed, conspire to show that it possessed few attached friends in the country, and that the expulsion of Hippias was welcomed unanimously by the vast majority of Athenians. His family and chief partisans would accompany him into exile—probably as a matter of course, without requiring any formal sentence of condemnation. An altar was erected in the acropolis, with a column hard

by, commemorating both the past iniquity of the dethroned dynasty, and the names of all its members.

CHAPTER XXXI.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE PEISISTRATIDS.—REVOLUTION OF KLEISTHENES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS.

With Hippias disappeared the mercenary Thracian garrison, upon which he and his father before him had leaned for defense as well as for enforcement of authority. Kleomenes with his Lacedæmonian forces retired also, after staying only long enough to establish a personal friendship, productive subsequently of important consequences between the Spartan king and the Athenian Isagoras. The Athenians were thus left to themselves, without any foreign interference to constrain them in their political arrangements.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, that the Peisistratids had for the most part respected the forms of the Solonian constitution. The nine archons, and the probouleutic or preconsidering Senate of Four Hundred (both annually changed), still continued to subsist, together with occasional meetings of the people—or rather of such portion of the people as was comprised in the gentes, phratries, and four Ionic tribes. The timocratic classification of Solon (or quadruple scale of income and admeasurement of political franchises according to it) also continued to subsist—but all within the tether and subservient to the purposes of the ruling family, who always kept one of their number as real master among the chief administrators, and always retained possession of the acropolis as well as of the mercenary force.

That overawing pressure being now removed by the expulsion of Hippias, the enslaved forms became at once endued with freedom and reality. There appeared again, what Attica had not known for thirty years, declared political parties, and pronounced opposition between two men as leaders—on one side, Isagoras, son of Tisander, a person of illustrious descent—on the other, Kleisthenes, the Alkmæonid, not less illustrious, and possessing at this moment a claim on the gratitude of his countrymen as the most persevering as well as the most effective foe of the dethroned despots. In what manner such opposition was carried on we are not told. It would seem to have been not altogether pacific; but at any rate, Kleisthenes had the worst of it, and in consequence of his defeat (says the historian) "he took into partnership the people, who had been before excluded from everything." His partnership with the people gave birth to the Athenian democracy; it was a real and important revolution.

The political franchise, or the character of an Athenian citizen, both before and since Solon, had been confined to the primitive four Ionic tribes, each of which was an aggregate of so many close corporations or quasi-families—the gentes and the phratries. None of the residents in Attica, therefore, except those included in some gens or phratry, had any part in the political franchise. Such non-privileged residents were probably at all times numerous, and became more and more so by means of fresh settlers. Moreover they tended most to multiply in Athens and Peiræus, where immigrants would commonly establish themselves. Kleisthenes, breaking down the existing wall of privilege, imparted the political franchise to the excluded mass. But this could not be done by enrolling them in new gentes or phratries, created in addition to the old. For the gentile tie was founded upon old faith and feeling which in the existing state of the Greek mind could not be suddenly conjured up as a bond of union for comparative strangers. It could only be done by disconnecting the franchise altogether from the Ionic tribes as well as from the gentes which constituted them, and by redistributing the population into new tribes with a character and purpose exclusively political. Accordingly Kleisthenes abolished the four Ionic tribes, and created in their place ten new tribes founded upon a different principle, independent of the gentes and phratries. Each of his new tribes comprised a certain number of demes or cantons, with the enrolled proprietors and residents in each of them. The demes taken altogether included the entire surface of Attica, so that the Kleisthenean constitution admitted to the political franchise all the free native Athenians; and not merely these, but also many metics, and even some of the superior order of slaves. Putting out of sight the general body of slaves, and regarding only the free inhabitants, it was in point of fact a scheme approaching to universal suffrage, both political and judicial.

The slight and cursory manner in which Herodotus announces this memorable revolution tends to make us overlook its real importance. He dwells chiefly on the alteration in the number and names of the tribes; Kleisthenes, he says, despised the Ionians so much, that he would not tolerate the continuance in Attica of the four tribes which prevailed in the Ionic cities; deriving their names from the four sons of Ion—just as his grandfather, the Sikyonian Kleisthenes, hating the Dorians, had degraded and nicknamed the three Dorian tribes at Sikyon. Such is the representation of Herodotus, who seems himself to have entertained some contempt for the Ionians, and therefore to have suspected a similar feeling where it had no real existence.

But the scope of Kleisthenes was something far more extensive. He abolished the four ancient tribes, not because they were Ionic,

but because they had become incommensurate with the existing condition of the Attic people, and because such abolition procured both for himself and for his political scheme new as well as hearty allies. And, indeed, if we study the circumstances of the case, we shall see very obvious reasons to suggest the proceeding. For more than thirty years—an entire generation—the old constitution had been a mere empty formality, working only in subservience to the reigning dynasty, and stripped of all real controlling power. We may be very sure, therefore, that both the Senate of Four Hundred and the popular assembly, divested of that free speech which imparted to them not only all their value but all their charm, had come to be of little public estimation, and were probably attended only by a few partisans. Under such circumstances, the difference between qualified citizens and men not so qualified—between members of the four old tribes and men not members—became during this period practically effaced. This in fact was the only species of good which a Grecian despotism ever seems to have done. It confounded the privileged and the non-privileged under one coercive authority common to both, so that the distinction between the two was not easy to revive when the despotism passed away. As soon as Hippias was expelled, the senate and the public assembly regained their efficiency; but had they been continued on the old footing, including none but members of the four tribes, these tribes would have been re-invested with a privilege which in reality they had so long lost, that its revival would have seemed an odious novelty, and the remaining population would probably not have submitted to it. If in addition we consider the political excitement of the moment—the restoration of one body of men from exile, and the departure of another body into exile—the outpouring of long-suppressed hatred, partly against these very forms by the corruption of which the despot had reigned—we shall see that prudence as well as patriotism dictated the adoption of an enlarged scheme of government. Kleisthenes had learnt some wisdom during his long exile; and as he probably continued for some time after the introduction of his new constitution, to be the chief adviser of his countrymen, we may consider their extraordinary success as a testimony to his prudence and skill not less than to their courage and unanimity.

Nor does it seem unreasonable to give him credit for a more generous forward movement than what is implied in the literal account of Herodotus. Instead of being forced against his will to purchase popular support by proposing this new constitution, Kleisthenes may have proposed it before, during the discussions which immediately followed the retirement of Hippias; so that the rejection of it formed the ground of quarrel (and no other ground is mentioned) between him and Isagoras. The latter doubtless found sufficient support, in the existing senate and public assembly, to prevent it from being carried without an actual appeal to the people. His

opposition to it, moreover, is not difficult to understand; for necessary as the change had become, it was not the less a shock to ancient Attic ideas. It radically altered the very idea of a tribe, which now became an aggregation of demes, of gentes—of fellow-demots, not of fellow-gentiles. It thus broke up those associations, religious, social, and political, between the whole and the parts of the old system, which operated powerfully on the mind of every old-fashioned Athenian. The patricians at Rome who composed the gentes and curiæ—and the plebs, who had no part in these corporations—formed for a long time two separate and opposing fractions in the same city, each with its own separate organization. Only by slow degrees did the plebs gain ground, while the political value of the patrician gens was long maintained alongside of and apart from the plebeian tribe. So, too, in the Italian and German cities of the middle ages, the patrician families refused to part with their own separate political identity when the guilds grew up by the side of them; even though forced to renounce a portion of their power, they continued to be a separate fraternity, and would not submit to be regimented anew, under an altered category and denomination, along with the traders who had grown into wealth and importance. But the reform of Kleisthenes effected this change all at once, both as to the name and as to the reality. In some cases, indeed, that which had been the name of a gens was retained as the name of a deme, but even then the old gentiles were ranked indiscriminately among the remaining demots. The Athenian people, politely considered, thus became one homogeneous whole distributed for convenience into parts, numerical, local, and politically equal. It is, however, to be remembered, that while the four Ionic tribes were abolished, the gentes and phratries which composed them were left untouched, continuing to subsist as family and religious associations, though carrying with them no political privilege.

The ten newly-created tribes, arranged in an established order of precedence, were called—Erechtheis, Ægeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Akamantis, Œneis, Kekropis, Hippothoontis, Æantis, Antiochis; names borrowed chiefly from the respected heroes of Attic legend. This number remained unaltered until the year 305 B.C., when it was increased to twelve by the addition of two new tribes, Antigonias and Demetrias, afterward designated anew by the names of Ptolemais and Attalis: the mere names of these last two, borrowed from living kings, and not from legendary heroes, betray the change from freedom to subservience at Athens. Each tribe comprised a certain number of demes—cantons, parishes, or townships—in Attica. But the total number of these demes is not distinctly ascertained; for though we know that in the time of Polemo (the third century B.C.) it was 174, we cannot be sure that it had always remained the same; and several critics construe the words of Herodotus to imply that Kleisthenes at first recognized exactly one hundred demes,

distributed in equal proportion among his ten tribes. Such construction of the words, however, is more than doubtful, while the fact itself is improbable; partly because if the change of number had been so considerable as the difference between one hundred and 174, some positive evidence of it would probably be found—partly because Kleisthenes would indeed have a motive to render the amount of citizen population nearly equal, but no motive to render the number of demes equal, in each of the ten tribes. It is well known how great is the force of local habits, and how unalterable are parochial or cantonal boundaries. In the absence of proof to the contrary, therefore, we may reasonably suppose the number and circumscription of the demes, as found or modified by Kleisthenes, to have subsisted afterward with little alteration, at least until the increase in the number of the tribes.

There is another point, however, which is at once more certain and more important to notice. The demes which Kleisthenes assigned to each tribe were in no case all adjacent to each other; and therefore the tribe, as a whole, did not correspond with any continuous portion of the territory, nor could it have any peculiar local interest, separate from the entire community. Such systematic avoidance of the factions arising out of neighborhood will appear to have been more especially necessary when we recollect that the quarrels of the Parali, the Diakrii, the Pediaki, during the preceding century, had all been generated from local feud, though doubtless artfully fomented by individual ambition. Moreover, it was only by this same precaution that the local predominance of the city, and the formation of a city-interest distinct from that of the country, was obviated; which could hardly have failed to arise had the city by itself constituted either one deme or one tribe. Kleisthenes distributed the city (or found it already distributed) into several demes, and those demes among several tribes; while Peiræus and Phalerum, each constituting a separate deme, were also assigned to different tribes; so that there were no local advantages either to bestow predominance, or to create a struggle for predominance, of one tribe over the rest. Each deme had its own local interests to watch over; but the tribe was a mere aagregate of demes for political, military, and religious purposes, with no separate hopes or fears apart from the whole state. Each tribe had a chapel, sacred rites and festivals, and a common fund for such meetings, in honor of its eponymous hero, administered by members of its own choice: and the statues of all the ten eponymous heroes, fraternal patrons of the democracy, were planted in the most conspicuous part of the agora of Athens. In the future working of the Athenian government, we shall trace no symptom of disquieting local factions—a capital amendment, compared with the disputes of the preceding century, and traceable in part to the absence of border-relations between demes of the same tribe.

The deme now became the primitive constituent element of the commonwealth, both as to persons and as to property. It had its own demarch, its register of enrolled citizens, is collective property, its public meetings and religious ceremonies, its taxes levied and administered by itself. The register of qualified citizens was kept by the demarch, and the inscription of new citizens took place at the assembly of the demots, whose legitimate sons were enrolled on attaining the age of eighteen, and their adopted sons at any time when presented and sworn to by the adopting citizen. The citizenship could only be granted by a public vote of the people, but wealthy non-freemen were enabled sometimes to evade this law and purchase admission upon the register of some poor deme, probably by means of a fictitious adoption. At the meetings of the demots, the register was called over, and it sometimes happened that some names were expunged, in which case the party thus disfranchised had an appeal to the popular judicature. So great was the local administrative power, however, of these demes, that they are described as the substitute, under the Kleisthenean system, for the Naukraries under the Solonian and ante-Solonian. The Trittyes and Naukraries, though nominally preserved, and the latter augmented in number from forty-eight to fifty, appear henceforward as of little public importance.

Kleisthenes preserved, but at the same time modified and expanded, all the main features of Solon's political constitution; the public assembly or Ekklesia—the preconsidering senate composed of members from all the tribes—and the habit of annual election, as well as annual responsibility of magistrates, by and to the Ekklesia. The full value must now have been felt of possessing such pre-existing institutions to build upon, at a moment of perplexity and dissension. But the Kleisthenean Ekklesia acquired new strength, and almost a new character, from the great increase of the number of citizens qualified to attend it; while the annually changed senate, instead of being composed of four hundred members taken in equal proportion from each of the old four tribes, was enlarged to five hundred, taken equally from each of the new ten tribes. It now comes before us, under the name of Senate of Five Hundred, as an active and indispensable body throughout the whole Athenian democracy: moreover the practice now seems to have begun (though the period of commencement cannot be decisively proved) of determining the names of the senators by lot. Both the senate thus constituted, and the public assembly, were far more popular and vigorous than they had been under the original arrangement of Solon.

The new constitution of the tribes, as it led to a change in the annual senate, so it transformed no less directly the military arrangements of the state, both as to soldiers and as to officers. The citizens called upon to serve in arms were now marshalled according to tribes —each tribe having its own taxiarchs as officers for the hoplites, and its own phylarch at the head of the horsemen. Moreover, there were

now created, for the first time, ten strategi or generals, one from each tribe; and two hipparchs, for the supreme command of the horsemen. Under the prior Athenian constitution it appears that the command of the military force had been vested in the third archon or polemarch, no strategi then existing. Even after the strategi had been created, under the Kleisthenean constitution, the polemarch still retained a joint right of command along with them—as we are told at the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only enjoyed an equal vote in the council of war along with the ten strategi, but even occupied the post of honor on the right wing. The ten generals annually changed are thus (like the ten tribes) a fruit of the Kleisthenean constitution, which was at the same time powerfully strengthened and protected by this remodeling of the military force. The functions of the generals became more extensive as the democracy advanced, so that they seem to have acquired gradually not merely the direction of military and naval affairs, but also that of the foreign relations of the city generally—while the nine archons, including the polemarch, were by degrees lowered down from that full executive and judicial competence which they had once enjoyed, to the simple ministry of police and preparatory justice. Encroached upon by the strategi on one side, they were also restricted in efficiency, on the other side, by the rise of the popular dikasteries or numerous jury-courts. We may be sure that these popular dikasteries had not been permitted to meet or to act under the despotism of the Peisistratids, and that the judicial business of the city must then have been conducted partly by the senate of Areopagus, partly by the archons; perhaps with a nominal responsibility of the latter, at the end of their year of office, to an acquiescent Ekklesia. And if we even assume it to be true, as some writers contend, that the habit of direct popular judicature (over and above this annual trial of responsibility) had been partially introduced by Solon, it must have been discontinued during the long coercion exercised by the supervening dynasty. But the outburst of popular spirit, which lent force to Kleisthenes, doubtless carried the people into direct action as jurors in the aggregate Heliæa, not less than as voters in the Ekklesia—and the change was thus begun which contributed to degrade the archons from their primitive character as judges, into the lower function of preliminary examiners and presidents of a jury. Such convocation of numerous juries, beginning first with the aggregate body of sworn citizens above thirty years of age, and subsequently dividing them into separate bodies or panels for trying particular causes, became gradually more frequent and more systematized; until at length, in the time of Perikles, it was made to carry a small pay, and stood out as one of the most prominent features of Athenian life. We cannot particularize the different steps whereby such final development was attained, and whereby the judicial competence of the archon was cut down to the mere power of inflicting a small

fine. But the first steps of it are found in the revolution of Kleisthenes, and it seems to have been consummated after the battle of Platæa. Of the function exercised by the nine archons, as well as by many other magistrates and official persons at Athens, in convoking a dikastery or jury-court, bringing on causes for trial, and presiding over the trial—a function constituting one of the marks of superior magistracy, and called the Hegemony or presidency of a dikastery—I shall speak more at length hereafter. At present I wish merely to bring to view the increased and increasing sphere of action on which the people entered at the memorable turn of affairs now before us.

The financial affairs of the city underwent at this epoch as complete a change as the military. The appointment of magistrates and officers by tens, one from each tribe, seems to have become the ordinary practice. A board of ten, called Apodektæ, were invested with the supreme management of the exchequer, dealing with the contractors as to those portions of the revenue which were farmed, receiving all the taxes from the collectors, and disbursing them under competent authority. Of this board the first nomination is expressly ascribed to Kleisthenes as a substitute for certain persons called Kolakretæ, who had performed the same function before and who were now retained only for subordinate services. The duties of the Apodektæ were afterward limited to receiving the public income, and paying it over to the ten treasurers of the goddess Athene, by whom it was kept in the inner chamber of the Parthenon, and disbursed as needed; but this more complicated arrangement cannot be referred to Kleisthenes. From his time forward too, the Senate of Five Hundred steps far beyond its original duty of preparing matters for the discussion of the Ekklesia. It embraces, besides, a large circle of administrative and general superintendence, which hardly admits of any definition. Its sittings become constant, with the exception of special holidays. The year is distributed into ten portions called Prytanies—the fifty senators of each tribe taking by turns the duty of constant attendance during one prytany, and receiving during that time the title of The Prytanes: the order of precedence among the tribes in these duties was annually determined by lot. In the ordinary Attic year of twelve lunar months, or 354 days, six of the prytanies contained thirty-five days, four of them contained thirty-six: in the intercalated years of thirteen months, the number of days was thirty-eight and thirty-nine respectively. Moreover a farther subdivision of the prytany into five periods of seven days each, and of the fifty tribe-senators into five bodies of ten each, was recognized Each body of ten presided in the senate for one period of seven days, drawing lots every day among their number for a new chairman called Epistates, to whom during his day of office were confided the keys of the acropolis and the treasury, together with the city seal. The remaining senators, not belonging to the prytanising

tribe, might of course attend if they chose. But the attendance of nine among them, one from each of the remaining nine tribes, was imperatively necessary to constitute a valid meeting, and to insure a constant representation of the collective people.

During those later times known to us through the great orators, the Ekklesia, or formal assembly of the citizens, was convoked four times regularly during each prytany, or oftener if necessity required—usually by the senate, though the strategi had also the power of convoking it by their own authority. It was presided over by the prytanes, and questions were put to the vote by their Epistates or chairman. But the nine representatives of the non-pryfanising tribes were always present, as a matter of course, and seem indeed in the days of the orators to have acquired to themselves the direction of it, together with the right of putting questions for the vote—setting aside wholly or partially the fifty prytanes. When we carry our attention back, however, to the state of the Ekklesia, as first organized by Kleisthenes (I have already remarked that expositors of the Athenian constitution are too apt to neglect the distinction of times, and to suppose that what was the practice between 400–330 B.C. had been always the practice), it will appear probable that he provided one regular meeting in each prytany, and no more; giving to the senate and the strategi power of convening special meetings if needful but establishing one Ekklesia during each prytany, or ten in the year, as a regular necessity of state. How often the ancient Ekklesia had been convoked during the interval between Solon and Peisistratus, we cannot exactly say—probably but seldom during the year. Under the Peisistratids, its convocation had dwindled down into an inoperative formality. Hence the re-establishment of it by Kleisthenes, not merely with plenary determining powers, but also under full notice and preparation of matters beforehand, together with the best securities for orderly procedure, was in itself a revolution impressive to the mind of every Athenian citizen. To render the Ekklesia efficient, it was indispensable that its meetings should be both frequent and free. Men were thus trained to the duty both of speakers and hearers, and each man, while he felt that he exercised his share of influence on the decision, identified his own safety and happiness with the vote of the majority, and became familiarized with the notion of a sovereign authority which he neither could nor ought to resist. This was an idea new to the Athenian bosom. With it came the feelings sanctifying free speech and equal law—words which no Athenian citizen ever afterward heard unmoved: together with that sentiment of the entire commonwealth as one indivisible, which always overruled, though it did not supplant, the local and cantonal specialties. It is not too much to say that these patriotic and ennobling impulses were a new product in the Athenian mind, to which nothing analogous occurs even in the time of Solon. They were kindled in part doubtless by the strong reaction against the Peisistratids, but still more by the fact

that the opposing leader, Kleisthenes, turned that transitory feeling to the best possible account, and gave to it a vigorous perpetuity, as well as a well-defined positive object, by the popular elements conspicuous in his constitution. His name makes less figure in history than we should expect, because he passed for the mere renovator of Solon's scheme of government after it had been overthrown by Peisistratus. Probably he himself professed this object, since it would facilitate the success of his propositions: and if we confine ourselves to the letter of the case, the fact is in a great measure true, since the annual senate and the Ekklesia are both Solonian—but both of them under his reform were clothed in totally new circumstances, and swelled into gigantic proportions. How vigorous was the burst of Athenian enthusiasm, altering instantaneously the position of Athens among the powers of Greece, we shall hear presently from the lips of Herodotus, and shall find still more unequivocally marked in the facts of his history.

But it was not only the people formally installed in their Ekklesia, who received from Kleisthenes the real attributes of sovereignty—it was by him also that the people were first called into direct action as dikasts, or jurors. I have already remarked that this custom may be said, in a certain limited sense, to have begun in the time of Solon, since that lawgiver invested the popular assembly with the power of pronouncing the judgment of accountability upon the archons after their year of office. Here again the building, afterward so spacious and stately, was erected on a Solonian foundation, though it was not itself Solonian. That the popular dikasteries, in the elaborate form in which they existed from Perikles downward, were introduced all at once by Kleisthenes, it is impossible to belive. Yet the steps by which they were gradually wrought out are not distinctly discoverable. It would rather seem that at first only the aggregate body of citizens above thirty years of age exercised judicial functions, being specially convoked and sworn to try persons accused of public crimes, and when so employed bearing the name of the Heliæa, or Heliasts; private offenses and disputes between man and man being still determined by individual magistrates in the city, and a considerable judicial power still residing in the Senate of Areopagus. There is reason to believe that this was the state of things established by Kleisthenes, which afterward came to be altered by the greater extent of judicial duty gradually accruing to the Heliasts, so that it was necessary to subdivide the collective Heliæa.

According to the subdivision, as practiced in the times best known, 6,000 citizens above thirty years of age were annually selected by lot out of the whole number, 600 from each of the ten tribes: 5,000 of these citizens were arranged in ten panels or decuries of 500 each, the remaining 1000 being reserved to fill up vacancies in case of death or absence among the former. The whole 6,000 took a prescribed oath, couched in very striking words; after which every man received

a ticket inscribed with his own name as well as with a letter designating his decury. When there were causes or crimes ripe for trial, the Thesmothets or six inferior archons determined by lot, first, which decuries should sit, according to the number wanted—next, in which court, or under the presidency of what magistrate, the decury B or E should sit, so that it could not be known beforehand in what cause each would be judge. In the number of persons who actually attended and sat, however, there seems to have been much variety, and sometimes two decuries sat together. The arrangement here described, we must recollect, is given to us as belonging to those times when the dikasts received a regular pay, after every day's sitting; and it can hardly have long continued without that condition, which was not realized before the time of Perikles. Each of these decuries sitting in judicature was called *the Heliæa*—a name which belongs properly to the collective assembly of the people; this collective assembly having been itself the original judicature. I conceive that the practice of distributing this collective assembly or Heliæa into sections of jurors for judicial duty, may have begun under one form or another soon after the reform of Kleisthenes, since the direct interference of the people in public affairs tended more and more to increase. But it could only have been matured by degrees into that constant and systematic service which the pay of Perikles called forth at last in completeness. Under the last mentioned system the judicial competence of the archons was annulled, and the third archon or polemarch withdrawn from all military functions. But this had not been yet done at the time of the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only commanded along with the strategi, but enjoyed a sort of pre-eminence over them; nor had it been done during the year after the battle of Marathon, in which Aristeides was archon—for the magisterial decisions of Aristeides formed one of the principal foundations of his honorable surname, the Just.

With this question as to the comparative extent of judicial power vested by Kleisthenes in the popular dikastery and the archons, are in reality connected two others in Athenian constitutional law; relating first, to the admissibility of all citizens for the post of archon —next, to the choosing of archons by lot. It is well known that in the time of Perikles, the archons, and various other individual functionaries, had come to be chosen by lot—moreover all citizens were legally admissible, and might give in their names to be drawn for by lot, subject to what was called the Dokimasy, or legal examination into their status of citizen and into various moral and religious qualifications, before they took office; while at the same time the function of the archon had become nothing higher than preliminary examination of parties and witnesses for the dikastery, and presidence over it when afterward assembled, together with the power of

imposing by authority a fine of small amount upon inferior offenders. Now all these three political arrangements hang essentially together. The great value of the lot, according to Grecian democratic ideas, was that it equalized the chance of office between rich and poor: but so long as the poor citizens were legally inadmissible, choice by lot could have no recommendation either to the rich or to the poor. In fact, it would be less democratic than election by the general mass of citizens, because the poor citizen would under the latter system enjoy an important right of interference by means of his suffrage, though he could not be elected himself. Again, choice by lot could never under any circumstances be applied to those posts where special competence, and a certain measure of attributes possessed only by a few, were indispensable—nor was it ever applied throughout the whole history of democratic Athens, to the strategi or generals, who were always elected by show of hands of the assembled citizens. Accordingly, we may regard it as certain, that at the time when the archons first came to be chosen by lot, the superior and responsible duties once attached to that office had been, or were in course of being, detached from it, and transferred either to the popular dikasts or to the ten elected strategi: so that there remained to these archons only a routine of police and administration, important indeed to the state, yet such as could be executed by any citizen of average probity, diligence, and capacity—at least there was no obvious absurdity in thinking so; while the Dokimasy excluded from the office men of notoriously discreditable life, even after they might have drawn the successful lot. Perikles, though chosen strategus year after year successively, was never archon; and it may be doubted whether men of first-rate talents and ambition often gave in their names for the office. To those of smaller aspirations it was doubtless a source of importance, but it imposed troublesome labor, gave no pay, and entailed a certain degree of peril upon any archon who might have given offense to powerful men, when he came to pass through the trial of accountability which followed immediately upon his year of office. There was little to make the office acceptable, either to very poor men, or to very rich and ambitious men; and between the middling persons who gave in their names, any one might be taken without great practical mischief, always assuming the two guarantees of the Dokimasy before, and accountability after office. This was the conclusion—in my opinion a mistaken conclusion, and such as would find no favor at present—to which the democrats of Athens were conducted by their strenuous desire to equalize the chances of office for rich and poor. But their sentiment seems to have been satisfied by a partial enforcement of the lot to the choice of some offices—especially the archons, as the primitive chief magistrates of the state —without applying it to all or to the most responsible and difficult. Hardly would they have applied it to the archons, if it had been

indispensably necessary that these magistrates should retain their original very serious duty of judging disputes and condemning offenders.

I think, therefore, that these three points—1. The opening of the post of archon to all citizens indiscriminately; 2. The choice of archons by lot; 3. The diminished range of the archon's duties and responsibilities, through the extension of those belonging to the popular courts of justice on the one hand and to the strategi on the other—are all connected together, and must have been simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, in the time of introduction: the enactment of universal admissibility to office certainly not coming after the other two, and probably coming a little before them.

Now in regard to the eligibility of all Athenians indiscriminately to the office of archon, we find a clear and positive testimony as to the time when it was first introduced. Plutarch tells us that the oligarchic, but high-principled, Aristeides was himself the proposer of this constitutional change, shortly after the battle of Platæa, with the consequent expulsion of the Persians from Greece, and the return of the refugee Athenians to their ruined city. Seldom has it happened in the history of mankind that rich and poor have been so completely equalized as among the population of Athens in that memorable expatriation and heroic struggle; nor are we at all surprised to hear that the mass of the citizens, coming back with freshly kindled patriotism as well as with the consciousness that their country had only been recovered by the equal efforts of all, would no longer submit to be legally disqualified from any office of state. It was on this occasion that the constitution was first made really "common" to all, and that the archons, strategi, and all functionaries, first began to be chosen from all Athenians without any difference of legal eligibility. No mention is made of the lot, in this important statement of Plutarch, which appears to me everyway worthy of credit, and which teaches us, that down to the invasion of Xerxes, not only had the exclusive principle of the Solonian law of qualification continued in force (whereby the first three classes on the census were alone admitted to all individual offices, and the fourth or Thetic class excluded), but also the archons had hitherto been elected by the citizens—not taken by lot. Now for financial purposes, the quadruple census of Solon was retained long after this period, even beyond the Peloponnesian war and the oligarchy of Thirty; but we thus learn that Kleisthenes in his constitution retained it for political purposes also, in part at least. He recognized the exclusion of the great mass of the citizens from all individual offices—such as the archon, the strategus, etc. In his time, probably, no complaints were raised on the subject. For his constitution gave to the collective bodies—senate, ekklesia, and heliæa or dikastery—a degree of power and importance such as they had never before known or imagined. And we may well suppose that

the Athenian people of that day had no objection even to the proclaimed system and theory of being exclusively governed by men of wealth and station as individual magistrates—especially since many of the newly enfranchised citizens had been before metics and slaves. Indeed it is to be added, that even under the full democracy of later Athens, though the people had then become passionately attached to the theory of equal admissibility of all citizens to office, yet in practice, poor men seldom obtained offices which were elected by the general vote, as will appear more fully in the course of this history.

The choice of the strategi remained ever afterward upon the footing on which Aristeides thus placed it; but the lot for the choice of archon must have been introduced shortly after his proposition of universal eligibility, and in consequence too of the same tide of democratic feeling—introduced as a farther corrective, because the poor citizen, though he had become eligible, was nevertheless not elected. And at the same time, I imagine, that elaborate distribution of the Heliæa, or aggregate body of dikasts or jurors, into separate panels or dikasteries for the decision of judicial matters, was first regularized. It was this change that stole away from the archons so important a part of their previous jurisdiction: it was this change that Perikles more fully consummated by insuring pay to the dikasts.

But the present is not the time to enter into the modifications which Athens underwent during the generation after the battle of Platæa. They have been here briefly noticed for the purpose of reasoning back, in the absence of direct evidence, to Athens, as it stood in the generation before that memorable battle, after the reform of Kleisthenes. His reform, though highly democratical, stopped short of the mature democracy which prevailed from Perikles to Demosthenes, in three ways especially, among various others; and it is therefore sometimes considered by the later writers as an aristocratical constitution:—1. It still recognized the archons as judges to a considerable extent, and the third archon or polemarch as joint military commander along with the strategi. 2 It retained them as elected annually by the body of citizens, not as chosen by lot. 3. It still excluded the fourth class of the Solonian census from all individual office, the archonship among the rest. The Solonian law of exclusion, however, though retained in principle, was mitigated in practice thus far—that whereas Solon had rendered none but members of the highest class on the census (the Pentakosiomedimni) eligible to the archonship, Kleisthenes opened that dignity to all the first three classes, shutting out only the fourth. That he did this may be inferred from the fact that Aristeides, assuredly not a rich man, became archon. I am also inclined to believe that the senate of Five Hundred as constituted by Kleisthenes was taken, not by election, but by lot, from the ten tribes—and that every citizen became eligible to it. Election for this purpose—that is, the privilege of annually electing a batch of fifty senators all at once by each tribe—would probably be thought more troublesome than valu-

able; nor do we hear of separate meetings of each tribe for purposes of election. Moreover the office of senator was a collective, not an individual office; the shock therefore to the feelings of semi-democratized Athens, from the unpleasant idea of a poor man sitting among the fifty prytanes, would be less than if they conceived him as polemarch at the head of the right wing of the army, or as an archon administering justice.

A farther difference between the constitution of Solon and that of Kleisthenes is to be found in the position of the senate of Areopagus. Under the former, that senate had been the principal body in the state, and Solon had even enlarged its powers; under the latter, it must have been treated at first as an enemy and kept down. For as it was composed only of all the past archons, and as during the preceding thirty years every archon had been a creature of the Peisistratids, the Areopagites collectively must have been both hostile and odious to Kleisthenes and his partisans—perhaps a fraction of its members might even retire into exile with Hippias. Its influence must have been sensibly lessened by the change of party, until it came to be gradually filled by fresh archons springing from the bosom of the Kleisthenean constitution. Now during this important interval, the new-modeled senate of Five Hundred and the popular assembly stepped into that ascendency which they never afterward lost. From the time of Kleisthenes forward, the Areopagites cease to be the chief and prominent power in the state. Yet they are still considerable; and when the second fill of the democratical tide took place, after the battle of Platæa, they became the focus of that which was then considered as the party of oligarchical resistance. I have already remarked that the archons during the intermediate time (about 509-477 B.C.) were all elected by the ekklesia, not chosen by lot—and that the fourth or poorest and most numerous class on the census were by law then ineligible; while election at Athens, even when every citizen without exception was an elector and eligible, had a natural tendency to fall upon men of wealth and station. We thus see how it happened that the past archons, when united in the senate of Areopagus, infused into that body the sympathies, prejudices, and interests of the richer classes. It was this which brought them into conflict with the more democratical party headed by Perikles and Ephialtes, in times when portions of the Kleisthenean constitution had come to be discredited as too much imbued with oligarchy.

One other remarkable institution, distinctly ascribed to Kleisthenes, yet remains to be noticed—the ostracism; upon which I have already made some remarks in touching upon the memorable Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition. It is hardly too much to say that without this protective process none of the other institutions would have reach maturity.

By the ostracism a citizen was banished without special accusation, trial, or defense for a term of ten years—subsequently diminished to

five. His property was not taken away, nor his reputation tainted; so that the penalty consisted solely in the banishment from his native city to some other Greek city. As to reputation, the ostracism was a compliment rather than otherwise; and so it was vividly felt to be, when, about ninety years after Kleisthenes, the conspiracy between Nikias and Alkibiades fixed it upon Hyperbolus: the two former had both recommended the taking of an ostracizing vote, each hoping to cause the banishment of the other; but before the day arrived, they accommodated their own quarrel. To fire off the safety-gun of the republic against a person so little dangerous as Hyperbolus, was denounced as the prostitution of a great political ceremony: "It was not against such men as him (said the comic writer Plato) that the shell was intended to be used." The process of ostracism was carried into effect by writing upon a shell or potsherd the name of the person whom a citizen thought it prudent for a time to banish; which shell, when deposited in the proper vessel, counted for a vote toward the sentence.

I have already observed that all the governments of the Grecian cities, when we compare them with that idea which a modern reader is apt to conceive of the measure of force belonging to a government, were essentially weak—the good as well as the bad, the democratical, the oligarchical, and the despotic. The force in the hands of any government, to cope with conspirators or mutineers, was extremely small, with the single exception of a despot surrounded with his mercenary troop. Accordingly, no tolerably sustained conspiracy or usurper could be put down except by direct aid of the people in support of the government; which amounted to a dissolution, for the time, of constitutional authority, and was pregnant with reactionary consequences such as no man could foresee. To prevent powerful men from attempting usurpation was therefore of the greatest possible moment. Now a despot or an oligarchy might exercise at pleasure preventive means, much sharper than the ostracism, such as the assassination of Kimon, mentioned in my last chapter as directed by the Peisistratids. At the very least, they might send away any one, from whom they apprehended attack or danger, without incurring even so much as the imputation of severity. But in a democracy, where arbitrary action of the magistrate was the thing of all others most dreaded, and where fixed laws, with trial and defense as preliminaries to punishment, were conceived by the ordinary citizen as the guarantees of his personal security and as the pride of his social condition—the creation of such an exceptional power presented serious difficulty. If we transport ourselves to the times of Kleisthenes, immediately after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, when the working of the democratical machinery was as yet untried, we shall find this difficulty at its maximum. But we shall also find the necessity of vesting such a power somewhere, absolutely imperative. For the great Athenian nobles had yet to learn the lesson of respect for any

constitution. Their past history had exhibited continual struggles between the armed factions of Megakles, Lykurgus, and Peisistratus, put down after a time by the superior force and alliances of the latter; and though Kleisthenes, the son of Megakles, might be firmly disposed to renounce the example of his father and to act as the faithful citizen of a fixed constitution, he would know but too well that the sons of his father's companions and rivals would follow out ambitious purposes without any regard to the limits imposed by law, if ever they acquired sufficient partisans to present a fair prospect of success. Moreover, when any two candidates for power, with such reckless dispositions, came into a bitter personal rivalry, the motives to each of them, arising as well out of fear as out of ambition, to put down his opponent at any cost to the constitution, might well become irresistible, unless some impartial and discerning interference could arrest the strife in time. "If the Athenians were wise (Aristeides is reported to have said, in the height and peril of his parliamentary struggle with Themistokles), they would cast both Themistokles and me into the barathrum." And whoever reads the sad narrative of the Korkyræan sedition, in the third book of Thucydides, together with the reflections of the historian upon it, will trace the gradual exasperation of these party feuds, beginning even under democratical forms, until at length they break down the barriers of public as well as of private morality.

Against this chance of internal assailants Kleisthenes had to protect the democratical constitution—first, by throwing impediments in their way and rendering it difficult for them to procure the requisite support; next, by eliminating them before any violent projects were ripe for execution To do either the one or the other, it was necessary to provide such a constitution as would not only conciliate the good will, but kindle the passionate attachment, of the mass of citizens, insomuch that not even any considerable minority should be deliberately inclined to alter it by force. It was necessary to create in the multitude, and through them to force upon the leading ambitious men, that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term a constitutional morality—a paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities acting under and within those forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts—combined, too, with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the forms of the constitution will be not less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own. This co-existence of freedom and self-imposed restraint—of obedience to authority with unmeasured censure of the persons exercising it—may be found in the aristocracy of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy of the American United States: and because we are familiar with it, we are apt to suppose it a natural sentiment; though

there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to establish and diffuse among a community, judging by the experience of history. We may see how imperfectly it exists at this day in the Swiss Cantons; while the many violences of the first French revolution illustrate, among various other lessons, the fatal effects arising from its absence, even among a people high in the scale of intelligence. Yet the diffusion of such constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community, but throughout the whole, is the indispensable condition of a government at once free and peaceable; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may render the working of free institutions impracticable, without being strong enough to conquer ascendancy for themselves. Nothing less than unanimity, or so overwhelming a majority as to be tantamount to unanimity, on the cardinal point of respecting constitutional forms, even by those who do not wholly approve of them, can render the excitement of political passion bloodless, and yet expose all the authorities in the state to the full license of pacific criticism.

At the epoch of Kleisthenes, which by a remarkable coincidence is the same as that of the regifuge at Rome, such constitutional morality, if it existed anywhere else, had certainly no place at Athens; and the first creation of it in any particular society must be esteemed an interesting historical fact. By the spirit of his reforms,—equal, popular, and comprehensive, far beyond the previous experience of Athenians —he secured the hearty attachment of the body of citizens. But from the first generation of leading men, under the nascent democracy, and with such precedents as they had to look back upon, no self-imposed limits to ambition could be expected. Accordingly, Kleisthenes had to find the means of eliminating beforehand any one about to transgress these limits, so as to escape the necessity of putting him down afterward, with all that bloodshed and reaction, in the midst of which the free working of the constitution would be suspended at least, if not irrevocably extinguished. To acquire such influence as would render him dangerous under democratical forms, a man must stand in evidence before the public, so as to afford some reasonable means of judging of his character and purposes. Now the security which Kleisthenes provided was to call in the positive judgment of the citizens respecting his future promise purely and simply, so that they might not remain too long neutral between two formidable political rivals—pursuant in a certain way to the Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition, as I have already remarked in a former chapter. He incorporated in the constitution itself the principle of privilegium (to employ the Roman phrase, which signifies not a peculiar favor granted to any one, but a peculiar inconvenience imposed), yet only under circumstances solemn and well-defined, with full notice and discussion beforehand, and by the positive secret vote of a large proportion of the citizens. "No law shall be made against any single citizen,

without the same being made against *all* Athenian citizens; unless it shall so seem good to 6,000 citizens voting secretly." Such was that general principle of the constitution, under which the ostracism was a particular case. Before the vote of ostracism could be taken, a case was to be made out in the senate and the public assembly to justify it. In the sixth prytany of the year, these two bodies debated and determined whether the state of the republic was menacing enough to call for such an exceptional measure. If they decided in the affirmative, a day was named, the agora was railed round, with ten entrances left for the citizens of each tribe, and ten separate casks or vessels for depositing the suffrages, which consisted of a shell or a potsherd with the name of the person written on it whom each citizen designed to banish. At the end of the day the number of votes were summed up, and if 6,000 votes were found to have been given against any one person, that person was ostracized; if not, the ceremony ended in nothing. Ten days were allowed to him for settling his affairs, after which he was required to depart from Attica for ten years, but retained his property, and suffered no other penalty.

It was not the maxim at Athens to escape the errors of the people, by calling in the different errors, and the sinister interest besides, of an extra-popular or privileged few. Nor was any third course open, since the principles of representative government were not understood, nor indeed conveniently applicable to very small communities. Beyond the judgment of the people (so the Athenians felt), there was no appeal. Their grand study was to surround the delivery of that judgment with the best securities for rectitude, and the best preservatives against haste, passion, or private corruption. Whatever measure of good government could not be obtained in that way, could not, in their opinion, be obtained at all. I shall illustrate the Athenian proceedings on this head more fully when I come to speak of the working of their mature democracy. Meanwhile in respect to this grand protection of the nascent democracy—the vote of ostracism—it will be found that the securities devised by Kleisthenes, for making the sentence effectual against the really dangerous man and against no one else, display not less foresight than patriotism. The main object was, to render the voting an expression of deliberate public feeling, as distinguished from mere factious antipathy. Now the large minimum of votes required (one-fourth of the entire citizen population) went far to insure this effect—the more so, since each vote, taken as it was in a secret manner, counted unequivocally for the expression of a genuine and independent sentiment, and could neither be coerced nor bought. Then again, Kleisthenes did not permit the process of ostracizing to be opened against any one citizen exclusively. If opened at all, every one without exception was exposed to the sentence; so that the friends of Themistokles could not invoke it against Aristeides; nor those of the latter against the former, without exposing their own leader

to the same chance of exile. It was not likely to be invoked at all, therefore, until exasperation had proceeded so far as to render both parties insensible to this chance—the precise index of that growing internecive hostility which the ostracism prevented from coming to a head. Nor could it even then be ratified, unless a case was shown to convince the more neutral portion of the senate and the ekklesia; moreover, after all, the ekklesia did not itself ostracize, but a future day was named, and the whole body of the citizens were solemnly invited to vote. It was in this way that security was taken not only for making the ostracism effectual in protecting the constitution, but to hinder it from being employed for any other purpose. We must recollect that it exercised its tutelary influence not merely on those occasions when it was actually employed, but by the mere knowledge that it might be employed, and by the restraining effect which that knowledge produced on the conduct of the great men. Again, the ostracism, though essentially of an exceptional nature, was yet an exception sanctified and limited by the constitution itself; so that the citizen, in giving his ostracizing vote, did not in any way depart from the constitution or lose his reverence for it. The issue placed before him—"Is there any man whom you think vitally dangerous to the state? if so, whom?"—though vague, was yet raised directly and legally. Had there been no ostracism, it might probably have been raised both indirectly and illegally, on the occasion of some special imputed crime of a suspected political leader, when accused before a court of justice—a perversion involving all the mischief of the ostracism, without its protective benefits.

Care was taken to divest the ostracism of all painful consequence except what was inseparable from exile. This is not one of the least proofs of the wisdom with which it was devised. Most certainly it never deprived the public of candidates for political influence; and when we consider the small amount of individual evil which it inflicted—evil, too, diminished in the cases of Kimon and Aristeides, by a reactionary sentiment which augmented their subsequent popularity after return—two remarks will be quite sufficient to offer it the way of justification. First, it completely produced its intended effect; for the democracy grew up from infancy to manhood without a single attempt to overthrow it by force—a result upon which no reflecting contemporary of Kleisthenes could have ventured to calcuate. Next, through such tranquil working of the democratical forms, a constitutional morality quite sufficiently complete was produced among the leading Athenians, to enable the people after a certain time to dispense with that exceptional security which the ostracism offered. To the nascent democracy, it was absolutely indispensable; to the growing, yet militant domocracy it was salutary; but the full-grown democracy both could and did stand without it. The ostracism passed upon Hyperbolus, about ninety years after Kleisthenes, was the last occasion of its employ-

ment. And even this can hardly be considered as a serious instance: it was a trick concerted between two distinguished Athenians (Nikias and Alkibiades) to turn to their own political account a process already coming to be antiquated. Nor would such a maneuver have been possible, if the contemporary Athenian citizens had been penetrated with the same serious feeling of the value of ostracism as a safeguard of democracy, as had been once entertained by their fathers and grandfathers. Between Kleisthenes and Hyperbolus, we hear of about ten different persons as having been banished by ostracism: first of all, Hipparchus of the deme Cholargus, the son of Charmus, a relative of the recently-expelled Peisistratid despots; then Aristeides, Themistokles, Kimon, and Thucydides, son of Melesias, all of them renowned political leaders: also Alkibiades and Megakles (the paternal and maternal grandfathers of the distinguished Alkibiades), and Kallias, belonging to another eminent family at Athens; lastly, Damon, the preceptor of Perikles in poetry and music, and eminent for his acquisitions in philosophy. In this last case comes out the vulgar side of humanity, aristocratical as well as democratical; for with both, the process of philosophy and the persons of philosophers are wont to be alike unpopular. Even Kleisthenes himself is said to have been ostracized under his own law, and Xanthippus; but both upon authority too weak to trust. Miltiades was not ostracized at all, but tried and punished for misconduct in his command.

I should hardly have said so much about this memorable and peculiar institution of Kleisthenes, if the erroneous accusations against the Athenian democracy, of envy, injustice, and ill-treatment of their superior men, had not been greatly founded upon it, and if such criticisms had not passed from ancient times to modern with little examination. In monarchical governments, a pretender to the throne, numbering a certain amount of supporters, is as a matter of course excluded from the country. The Duke of Bordeaux cannot now reside in France—nor could Napoleon after 1815—nor Charles Edward in England during the last century. No man treats this as any extravagant injustice, yet it is the parallel of the ostracism—with a stronger case in favor of the latter, inasmuch as the change from one regal dynasty to another does not of necessity overthrow all the collateral institutions and securities of the country. Plutarch has affirmed that the ostracism arose from the envy and jealousy inherent in a democracy, and not from justifiable fears—an observation often repeated, yet not the less demonstrably untrue. Not merely because ostracism so worked as often to increase the influence of that political leader whose rival it removed—but still more, because, if the fact had been as Plutarch says, this institution would have continued as long as the democracy; whereas it finished with the banishment of Hyperbolus, at a period when the government was more decisively democratical than it had been in the time of Kleisthenes. It was, in truth, a product altogether of fear and insecurity on the

part both of the democracy and its best friends—fear perfectly well grounded, and only appearing needless because the precautions taken prevented attack. So soon as the diffusion of a constitutional morality had placed the mass of the citizens above all serious fear of an aggressive usurper, the ostracism was discontinued. And doubtless the feeling that it might safely be dispensed with must have been strengthened by the long ascendency of Perikles—by the spectacle of the greatest statesman whom Athens ever produced, acting steadily within the limits of the constitution; and by the ill-success of his two opponents, Kimon and Thucydides—aided by numerous partisans, and by the great comic writers, at a period when comedy was a power in the state such as it has never been before or since—in their attempts to get him ostracized. They succeeded in fanning up the ordinary antipathy of the citizens toward philosophers so far as to procure the ostracism of his friend and teacher Damon; but Perikles himself (to repeat the complaint of his bitter enemy the comic poet Kratinus) "holds his head as high as if he carried the Odeion upon it, now that the shell has gone by"—i.e. now that he has escaped the ostracism. If Perikles was not conceived to be dangerous to the constitution, none of his successors were at all likely to be so regarded. Damon and Hyperbolus were the two last persons ostracized. Both of them were cases, and the only cases, of an unequivocal abuse of the institution, because, whatever the grounds of displeasure against them may have been, it is impossible to conceive either of them as menacing to the state—whereas all the other known sufferers were men of such position and power, that the 6,000 citizens who inscribed each name on the shell, or at least a large proportion of them, may well have done so under the most conscientious belief that they were guarding the constitution against real danger. Such a change in the character of the persons ostracized plainly evinces that the ostracism had become dissevered from that genuine patriotic prudence which originally rendered it both legitimate and popular. It had served for two generations an inestimable tutelary purpose—it lived to be twice dishonored—and then passed, by universal acquiescence, into matter of history.

A process analogous to the ostracism subsisted at Argos, at Syracuse, and in some other Grecian democracies. Aristotle states that it was abused for factious purposes: and at Syracuse, where it was introduced after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty, Diodorus affirms that it was so unjustly and profusely applied as to deter persons of wealth and station from taking any part in public affairs for which reason it was speedily discontinued. We have no particulars to enable us to appreciate this general statement. But we cannot safely infer that because the ostracism worked on the whole well at Athens, it must necessarily have worked well in other states—the more so as we do not know whether it was surrounded with the same precautionary formalities, nor whether it even required the same

large minimum of votes to make it effective. This latter guarantee, so valuable in regard to an institution essentially easy to abuse, is not noticed by Diodorus in his brief account of the Petalism—so the process was denominated at Syracuse.

Such was the first Athenian democracy, engendered as well by the reaction against Hippias and his dynasty as by the memorable partnership, whether spontaneous or compulsory, between Kleisthenes and the unfranchised multitude. It is to be distinguished both from the mitigated oligarchy established by Solon before, and from the full-grown and symmetrical democracy which prevailed afterward from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, toward the close of the career of Perikles. It was indeed a striking revolution, impressed upon the citizen not less by the sentiments to which it appealed than by the visible change which it made in political and social life. He saw himself marshaled in the ranks of hoplites alongside of new companions in arms—he was enrolled in a new register, and his property in a new schedule, in his deme and by his demarch, an officer before unknown—he found the year distributed afresh, for all legal purposes, into ten parts bearing the name of prytanies, each marked by a solemn and free-spoken ekklesia at which he had a right to be present—his ekklesia was convoked and presided by senators called prytanes, members of a senate novel both as to number and distribution—his political duties were now performed as member of a tribe, designated by a name not before pronounced in common Attic life, connected with one of ten heroes whose statues he now for the first time saw in the agora, and associating him with fellow-tribemen from all parts of Attica. All these and many others were sensible novelties felt in the daily proceedings of the citizen. But the great novelty of all was the authentic recognition of the ten new tribes as a sovereign Demos or people, apart from all specialties of phratric or gentile origin, with free speech and equal law; retaining no distinction except the four classes of the Solonian property-schedule with their gradations of eligibility. To a considerable proportion of citizens this great novelty was still farther endeared by the fact that it had raised them out of the degraded position of metics and slaves; while to the large majority of all the citizens, it furnished a splendid political idea, profoundly impressive to the Greek mind—capable of calling forth the most ardent attachment as well as the most devoted sense of active obligation and obedience. We have now to see how their newly-created patriotism manifested itself.

Kleisthenes and his new constitution carried with them so completely the popular favor, that Isagoras had no other way of opposing it except by calling in the interference of Kleomenes and the Lacedæmonians. Kleomenes listened the more readily to this call, as he was reported to have been on an intimate footing with the wife of Isagoras. He prepared to come to Athens; but his first aim was to deprive the democracy of its great leader Kleisthenes, who, as belonging to the Alkmæonid family, was supposed to be tainted with the inherited sin of his great-grandfather Megakles, the destroyer of the usurper Kylon. Kleomenes sent a herald to Athens, demanding the expulsion "of the accursed"—so this family were called by their enemies, and so they continued to be called eighty years afterward, when the same maneuver was practiced by the Lacedæmonians of that day against Perikles. This requisition, recommended by Isagoras, was so well-timed, that Kleisthenes, not venturing to disobey it, retired voluntarily; so that Kleomenes, though arriving at Athens only with a small force, found himself master of the city. At the instigation of Isagoras, he sent into exile 700 families, selected from the chief partisans of Kleisthenes. His next attempt was to dissolve the new senate of Five Hundred, and to place the whole government in the hands of 300 adherents of the chief whose cause he espoused. But now was seen the spirit infused into the people by their new constitution. At the time of the first usurpation of Peisistratus, the senate of that day had only not resisted, but even lent themselves to the scheme. Now, the new senate of Kleisthenes resolutely refused to submit to dissolution, while the citizens generally, even after the banishment of the chief Kleisthenean partisans, manifested their feelings in a way at once so hostile and so determined, that Kleomenes and Isagoras were altogether baffled. They were compelled to retire into the acropolis and stand upon the defensive. This symptom of weakness was the signal for a general rising of the Athenians, who besieged the Spartan king on the holy rock. He had evidently come without any expectation of finding, or any means of overpowering, resistance; for at the end of two days his provisions were exhausted, and he was forced to capitulate. He and his Lacedæmonians, as well as Isagoras, were allowed to retire to Sparta; but the Athenians of the party captured along with him were imprisoned, condemned, and executed by the people.

Kleisthenes, with the 700 exiled families, was immediately recalled, and his new constitution materially strengthened by this first success. Yet the prospect of renewed Spartan attack was sufficiently serious to induce him to send envoys to Artaphernes, the Persian Satrap at Sardis, soliciting the admission of Athens into the Persian alliance. He probably feared the intrigues of the expelled Hippias in the same quarter. Artaphernes, having first informed himself who the Athenians were, and where they dwelt, replied that if they chose to send earth and water to the king of Persia, they might be received as allies, but upon no other condition. Such were the feelings of alarm under which the envoys had quitted Athens, that they went the length of promising this unqualified token of submission. But their countrymen on their return disavowed them with scorn and indignation.

It was at this time that the first connection began between Athens and the little Bœotian town of Platæa, situated on the northern slope

of the range of Kithæron, between that mountain and the river Asopus—on the road from Athens to Thebes; and it is upon this occasion that we first become acquainted with the Bœotians and their politics. In one of my preceding volumes, the Bœotian federation has already been briefly described, as composed of some twelve or thirteen autonomous towns under the headship of Thebes, which was, or professed to have been, their mother-city. Platæa had been (so the Thebans affirmed) their latest foundation; it was ill-used by them, and discontented with the alliance. Accordingly, as Kleomenes was on his way back from Athens, the Platæans took the opportunity of addressing themselves to him, craving the protection of Sparta against Thebes, and surrendering their town and territory without reserve. The Spartan king, having no motive to undertake a trust which promised nothing but trouble, advised them to solicit the protection of Athens, as nearer and more accessible for them in case of need. He foresaw that this would embroil the Athenians with Bœotia, and such anticipation was in fact his chief motive for giving the advice, which the Platæans followed. Selecting an occasion of public sacrifice at Athens, they dispatched thither envoys, who sat down as suppliants at the altar, surrendered their town to Athens, and implored protection against Thebes. Such an appeal was not to be resisted, and protection was promised. It was soon needed, for the Thebans invaded the Platæan territory, and an Athenian force marched to defend it, Battle was about to be joined, when the Corinthians interposed with their mediation. which was accepted by both parties. They decided altogether in favor of Platæa, pronouncing that the Thebans had no right to employ force against any seceding member of the Bœotian federation. The Thebans, finding the decision against them, refused to abide by it, and attacked the Athenians on their return, but sustained a complete defeat; a breach of faith which the Athenians avenged by joining to Platæa the portion of Theban territory south of the Asopus, and making that river the limit between the two. By such success, however, the Athenians gained nothing, except the enmity of Bœotia—as Kleomenes had foreseen. Their alliance with Platæa, long-continued, and presenting in the course of this history several incidents touching to our sympathies, will be found, if we except one splendid occasion, productive only of burden to the one party, yet insufficient as a protection to the other.

Meanwhile Kleomenes had returned to Sparta full of resentment against the Athenians, and resolved on punishing them as well as on establishing his friend Isagoras as despot over them. Having been taught, however, by humiliating experience, that this was no easy achievement, he would not make the attempt, without having assembled a considerable force. He summoned allies from all the various states of Peloponnesus, yet without venturing to inform them what he was about to undertake. He at the same time concerted

measures with the Bœotians, and with the Chalkidians of Eubœa, for a simultaneous invasion of Attica on all sides. It appears that he had greater confidence in their hostile dispositions toward Athens than in those of the Peloponnesians, for he was not afraid to acquaint them with his design—and probably the Bœotians were incensed with the recent interference of Athens in the affair of Platæa. As soon as these preparations were completed, the two kings of Sparta, Kleomenes and Demaratus, put themselves at the head of the united Peloponnesian force, marched into Attica, and advanced as far as Eleusis on the way to Athens. But when the allies came to know the purpose for which they were to be employed, a spirit of dissatisfaction manifested itself among them. They had no unfriendly sentiment toward Athens; and the Corinthians especially, favorably disposed rather than otherwise toward that city, resolved to proceed no farther, withdrew their contingent from the camp, and returned home. At the same time, King Demaratus, either sharing in the general dissatisfaction or moved by some grudge against his colleague which had not before manifested itself, renounced the undertaking also. Two such examples, operating upon the pre-existing sentiment of the allies generally, caused the whole camp to break up and return home without striking a blow.

We may here remark that this is the first instance known in which Sparta appears in act as recognized head of an obligatory Peloponnesian alliance, summoning contingents from the cities to be placed under the command of her king. Her headship, previously recognized in theory, passes now into act, but in an unsatisfactory manner, so as to prove the necessity of precaution and concert beforehand—which will be found not long wanting.

Pursuant to the scheme concerted, the Bœotians and Chalkidians attacked Attica at the same time that Kleomenes entered it. The former seized Œnoe and Hysiæ, the frontier demes of Attica on the side toward Platæa; while the latter assailed the north-eastern frontier which faces Eubœa. Invaded on three sides, the Athenians were in serious danger, and were compelled to concentrate all their forces at Eleusis against Kleomenes, leaving the Bœotians and Chalkidians unopposed. But the unexpected breaking up of the invading army from Peloponnesus proved their rescue, and enabled them to turn the whole of their attention to the other frontier. They marched into Bœotia to the strait called Euripus which separates it from Eubœa, intending to prevent the junction of the Bœotians and Chalkidians, and to attack the latter first apart. But the arrival of the Bœotians caused an alteration in their scheme; they attacked the Bœotians first, and gained a victory of the most complete character—killing a large number, and capturing 700 prisoners. On the very same day they crossed over to Eubœa, attacked the Chalkidians, and gained another victory so decisive that it at once terminated the war. Many Chalkidians were taken, as well as Bœotians, and conveyed in

chains to Athens, where after a certain detention they were at last ransomed for two minæ per man. Of the sum thus raised, a tenth was employed in the fabrication of a chariot and four horses in bronze, which was placed in the acropolis to commemorate the victory. Herodotus saw this trophy when he was at Athens. He saw, too, what was a still more speaking trophy, the actual chains in which the prisoners had been fettered, exhibiting in their appearance the damage undergone when the acropolis was burnt by Xerxes: an inscription of four lines described the offerings and recorded the victory out of which they had sprung.

Another consequence of some moment arose out of this victory. The Athenians planted a body of 4,000 of their citizens as Kleruchs (lot-holders) or settlers upon the lands of the wealthy Chalkidian oligarchy called the Hippobotæ—proprietors probably in the fertile plain of Lelantum between Chalkis and Eretria. This is a system which we shall find hereafter extensively followed out by the Athenians in the days of their power; partly with the view of providing for their poorer citizens—partly to serve as garrison among a population either hostile or of doubtful fidelity. These Attic Kleruchs (I can find no other name by which to speak of them) did not lose their birth-right as Athenian citizens. They were not colonists in the Grecian sense, and they are known by a totally different name—but they correspond very nearly to the colonies formerly planted out on the conquered lands by Rome. The increase of the poorer population was always more or less painfully felt in every Grecian city; for though the aggregate population never seems to have increased very fast, yet the multiplication of children in poor families caused the subdivision of the smaller lots of land, until at last they became insufficient for a maintenance; and the persons thus impoverished found it difficult to obtain subsistence in other ways, more especially as the labor for the richer classes was so much performed by imported slaves. Doubtless some families possessed of landed property became extinct. Yet this did not at all benefit the smaller and poorer proprietors, for the lands rendered vacant passed, not to them, but by inheritance or bequest or intermarriage to other proprieters for the most part in easy circumstances—since one opulent family usually intermarried with another. I shall enter more fully at a future opportunity into this question—the great and serious problem of population, as it affected the Greek communities generally, and as it was dealt with in theory by the powerful minds of Plato and Aristotle—at present it is sufficient to notice that the numerous Kleruchies sent out by Athens, of which this to Eubœa was the first, arose in a great measure out of the multiplication of the poorer population, which her extended power was employed in providing for. Her subsequent proceedings with a view to the same object will not be always found so justifiable as this now before us, which grew naturally,

according to the ideas of the time, out of her success against the Chalkidians.

The war between Athens, however, and Thebes with her Bœotian allies, still continued, to the great and repeated disadvantage of the latter, until at length the Thebans in despair sent to ask advice of the Delphian oracle, and were directed to "solicit aid from those nearest to them." "How (they replied) are we to obey? Our nearest neighbors, of Tanagra, Koroneia, and Thespiæ, are now, and have been from the beginning, lending us all the aid in their power." An ingenious Theban, however, coming to the relief of his perplexed fellow-citizens, dived into the depths of legend and brought up a happy meaning. "Those nearest to us (he said) are the inhabitants of Ægina: for Thebe (the eponym of Thebes) and Ægina (the eponym of that island) were both sisters, daughters of Asopus. Let us send to crave assistance from the Æginetans." If his subtle interpretation (founded upon their descent from the same legendary progenitors) did not at once convince all who heard it, at least no one had any better to suggest. Envoys were at once sent to the Æginetans; who, in reply to a petition founded on legendary claims, sent to the help of the Thebans a reinforcement of legendary, but venerated, auxiliaries—the Æakid heroes. We are left to suppose that their effigies are here meant. It was in vain, however, that the glory and the supposed presence of the Æakids Telamon and Peleus were introduced into the Theban camp. Victory still continued on the side of Athens; so that the discouraged Thebans again sent to Ægina, restoring the heroes, and praying for aid of a character more human and positive. Their request was granted, and the Æginetans commenced war against Athens, without even the decent preliminary of a herald and declaration.

This remarkable embassy first brings us into acquaintance with the Dorians of Ægina—oligarchical, wealthy, commercial, and powerful at sea, even in the earliest days; more analogous to Corinth than to any of the other cities called Dorian. The hostility which they now began without provocation against Athens—repressed by Sparta at the critical moment of the battle of Marathon—then again breaking out—and hushed for a while by the common dangers of the Persian invasion under Xerxes, was appeased only with the conquest of the island about twenty years after that event, and with the expulsion and destruction of its inhabitants. There had been indeed, according to Herodotus, a feud of great antiquity between Athens and Ægina—of which he gives the account in a singular narrative blending together religion, politics, exposition of ancient customs, etc. But at the time when the Thebans solicited aid from Ægina, the latter was at peace with Athens. The Æginetans employed their fleet, powerful for that day, in ravaging Phalerum and the maritime demes of Attica; nor had the Athenians as yet any fleet to resist

them. It is probable that the desired effect was produced, of diverting a portion of the Athenian force from the war against Bœotia, and thus partially relieving Thebes; but the war of Athens against both of them continued for a considerable time, though we have no information respecting its details.

Meanwhile the attention of Athens was called off from these combined enemies by a more menacing cloud which threatened to burst upon her from the side of Sparta. Kleomenes and his countrymen, full of resentment at the late inglorious desertion of Eleusis, were yet more incensed by the discovery, which appears to have been then recently made, that the injunctions of the Delphian priestess for the expulsion of Hippias from Athens had been fraudulently procured. Moreover Kleomenes, when shut up in the acropolis of Athens with Isagoras, had found there various prophecies previously treasured up by the Peisistratids, many of which foreshadowed events highly disastrous to Sparta. And while the recent brilliant manifestations of courage and repeated victories, on the part of Athens, seemed to indicate that such prophecies might perhaps be realized—Sparta had to reproach herself, that, from the foolish and mischievous conduct of Kleomenes, she had undone the effect of her previous aid against the Peisistratids, and thus lost that return of gratitude which the Athenians would otherwise have testified. Under such impressions, the Spartan authorities took the remarkable step of sending for Hippias from his residence at Sigeium to Peloponnesus, and of summoning deputies from all their allies to meet him at Sparta.

The convocation thus summoned deserves notice as the commencement of a new era in Grecian politics. The previous expedition of Kleomenes against Attica presents to us the first known example of Spartan headship passing from theory into act: that expedition miscarried because the allies, though willing to follow, would not follow blindly, nor be made the instruments of executing purposes repugnant to their feelings. Sparta had now learnt the necessity, in order to insure their hearty concurrence, of letting them know what she contemplated, so as to ascertain at least that she had no decided opposition to apprehend. Here then is the third stage in the spontaneous movement of Greece toward a systematic conjunction, however imperfect, of its many autonomous units; first we have Spartan headship suggested in theory, from a concourse of circumstances which attract to her the admiration of all Greece—power, unrivaled training, undisturbed antiquity, etc.: next, the theory passes into act, yet rude and shapeless: lastly, the act becomes clothed with formalities and preceded by discussion and determination. The first convocation of the allies at Sparta, for the purpose of having a common object submitted to their consideration, may well be regarded as an important event in Grecian political history: the proceedings at the convocation are no less important, as an indication of the way in

which the Greeks of that day felt and acted, and must be borne in mind as a contrast with times hereafter to be described.

Hippias having been presented to the assembled allies, the Spartans expressed their sorrow for having dethroned him—their resentment and alarm at the newborn insolence of Athens, already tasted by her immediate neighbors, and menacing to every state represented in the convocation—and their anxiety to restore Hippias, not less as a reparation of the past wrong, than as a means, through his rule, of keeping Athens low and dependent. But the proposition, though emanating from Sparta, was listened to by the allies with one common sentiment of repugnance. They had no sympathy for Hippias —no dislike, still less any fear, of Athens—and a profound detestation of the character of a despot. The spirit which had animated the armed contingents at Eleusis now re-appeared among the deputies at Sparta, and the Corinthians again took the initiative. Their deputy Sosikles protested against the project in the fiercest and most indignant strain. No language can be stronger than that of the long harangue which Herodotus puts into his mouth, wherein the bitter recollections prevalent at Corinth respecting Kypselus and Periander are poured forth. "Surely heaven and earth are about to change places—the fish are coming to dwell on dry land, and mankind going to inhabit the sea—when you, Spartans, propose to subvert the popular governments, and to set up in the cities that wicked and bloody thing called a Despot. First try what it is for yourselves at Sparta, and then force it upon others if you can: you have not tasted its calamities as we have, and you take very good care to keep it away from yourselves. We adjure you by the common gods of Hellas—plant not despots in her cities: if you persist in a scheme so wicked, know that the Corinthians will not second you."

This animated appeal was received with a shout of approbation and sympathy on the part of the allies, All with one accord united with Sosikles in adjuring the Lacedæmonians "not to revolutionize any Hellenic city." No one listened to Hippias when he replied, and warned the Corinthians that the time would come, when they, more than any one else, would dread and abhor the Athenian democracy, and wish the Peisistratidæ back again. "He knew well (says Herodotus) that this would be, for he was better acquainted with the prophecies than any man; but no one then believed him, and he was forced to take his departure back to Sigeium; the Spartans not venturing to espouse his cause against the determined sentiment of the allies."

That determined sentiment deserves notice, because it marks the present period of the Hellenic mind; fifty years later it will be found materially altered. Aversion to single-headed rule, and bitter recollection of men like Kypselus and Periander, are now the chords which thrill in an assembly of Grecian deputies. The idea of a revolution (implying thereby an organic and comprehensive change of

which the party using the word disapproves) consists in substituting a permanent One in place of those periodical magistrates and assemblies which were the common attribute of oligarchy and democracy; the antithesis between these last two is as yet in the background, and there prevails neither fear of Athens nor hatred of the Athenian democracy. But when we turn to the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war, we find the order of precedence between these two sentiments reversed. The anti-monarchical feeling has not perished, but has been overlaid by other and more recent political antipathies—the antithesis between democracy and oligarchy having become, not indeed the only sentiment, but the uppermost sentiment, in the minds of Grecian politicians generally, and the soul of active party movement. Moreover, a hatred of the most deadly character has grown up against Athens and her democracy, especially in the grandsons of those very Corinthians who now stand forward as her sympathizing friends. The remarkable change of feeling here mentioned is nowhere so strikingly exhibited as when we contrast the address of the Corinthian Sosikles just narrated, with the speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta immediately antecedent to the Peloponnesian war, as given to us in Thucydides. It will hereafter be fully explained by the intermediate events, by the growth of Athenian power, and by the still more miraculous development of Athenian energy.

Such development, the fruit of the fresh-planted democracy as well as the seed for its sustentation and aggrandizement, continued progressive during the whole period just adverted to; but the first unexpected burst of it, under the Kleisthenean constitution and after the expulsion of Hippias is described by Herodotus in terms too emphatic to be omitted. After narrating the successive victories of the Athenians over both Bœotians and Chalkidians, that historian proceeds—"Thus did the Athenians grow in strength. And we may find proof not merely in this instance but everywhere else, how valuable a thing freedom is; since even the Athenians, while under a despot, were not superior in war to any of their surrounding neighbors, but so soon as they got rid of their despots, became by far the first of all. These things show that while kept down by one man, they were slack and timid, like men working for a master; but when they were liberated, every single man became eager in exertions for his own benefit." The same comparison reappears a short time afterward, where he tells us that "the Athenians, when free, felt themselves a match for Sparta; but while kept down by any man under a despotism, were feeble and apt for submission."

Stronger expressions cannot be found to depict the rapid improvement wrought in the Athenian people by their new democracy. Of course this did not arise merely from suspension of previous cruelties, or from better laws, or better administration. These, indeed, were essential conditions, but the active transforming cause here was,

the principle and system of which such amendments formed the detail: the grand and new idea of the sovereign people, composed of free and equal citizens—or liberty and equality, to use words which so profoundly moved the French nation half a century ago. It was this comprehensive political idea which acted with electric effect upon the Athenians, creating within them a host of sentiments, motives, sympathies, and capacities, to which they had before been strangers. Democracy in Grecian antiquity possessed the privilege, not only of kindling an earnest and unanimous attachment to the constitution in the bosoms of the citizens, but also of creating an energy of public and private action, such as could never be obtained under an oligarchy, where the utmost that could be hoped for was a passive acquiescence and obedience. Mr. Burke has remarked that the mass of the people are generally very indifferent about theories of government; but such indifference (although improvements in the practical working of all governments tend to foster it) is hardly to be expected among any people who exhibit decided mental activity and spirit on other matters; and the reverse was unquestionably true, in the year 500 B.C., among the communities of ancient Greece. Theories of government were there anything but a dead letter: they were connected with emotions of the strongest as well as of the most opposite character. The theory of a permanent ruling One, for example, was universally odious: that of a ruling Few, though acquiesced in, was never positively attractive, unless either where it was associated with the maintenance of peculiar education and habits, as at Sparta, or where it presented itself as the only antithesis to democracy, the latter having by peculiar circumstances become an object of terror. But the theory of democracy was pre-eminently seductive; creating in the mass of the citizens an intense positive attachment, and disposing them to voluntary action and suffering on its behalf, such as no coercion on the part of other governments could extort. Herodotus, in his comparison of the three sorts of government, puts in the front rank of the advantages of democracy "its most splendid name and promise"—its power of enlisting the hearts of the citizens in support of their constitution, and of providing for all a common bond of union and fraternity. This is what even democracy did not always do; but it was what no other government in Greece *could* do; a reason alone sufficient to stamp it as the best government, and presenting the greatest chance of beneficent results, for a Grecian community. Among the Athenian citizens, certainly, it produced a strength and unanimity of positive political sentiment, such as has rarely been seen in the history of mankind, which excites our surprise and admiration the more when we compare it with the apathy which had preceded, and which is even implied as the natural state of the publiic mind in Solon's famous proclamation against neutrality in a sedition. Because democracy happens to be unpalatable to most modern readers, they have been accustomed to look upon the senti-

ment here described only in its least honorable manifestations—in the caricatures of Aristophanes, or in the empty commonplaces of rhetorical declaimers. But it is not in this way that the force, the earnestness, or the binding value of democratic sentiment at Athens is to be measured. We must listen to it as it comes from the lips of Perikles, while he is strenuously enforcing upon the people those active duties for which it both implanted the stimulus and supplied the courage; or from the oligarchic Nikiasin the harbor of Syracuse, when he is endeavoring to revive the courage of his despairing troops for one last death-struggle, and when he appeals to their democratic patriotism as to the only flame yet alive and burning even in that moment of agony. From the time of Kleisthenes downward, the creation of this new mighty impulse makes an entire revolution in the Athenian character; and if the change still stood out in so prominent a manner before the eyes of Herodotus, much more must it have been felt by the contemporaries among whom it occurred.

The attachment of an Athenian citizen to his democratic constitution comprised two distinct veins of sentiment: first, his rights, protection, and advantages derived from it—next, his obligations of exertion and sacrifice toward it and with reference to it. Neither of these two veins of sentiment was ever wholly absent; but according as the one or the other was present at different times in varying proportions, the patriotism of the citizen was a very different feeling. That which Herodotus remarks is, the extraordinary efforts of heart and hand which the Athenians suddenly displayed; the efficacy of the active sentiment throughout the bulk of the citizens. We shall observe even more memorable evidences of the same phenomenon in tracing down the history from Kleisthenes to the end of the Peloponnesian war: we shall trace a series of events and motives eminently calculated to stimulate that self-imposed labor and discipline which the early democracy had first called forth. But when we advance farther down, from the restoration of the democracy after the Thirty Tyrants, to the time of Demosthenes—(I venture upon this brief anticipation, in the conviction that one period of Grecian history can only be thoroughly understood by contrasting it with another)—we shall find a sensible change in Athenian patriotism. The active sentiment of obligation is comparatively inoperative; the citizen, it is true, has a keen sense of the value of the democracy as protecting him and insuring to him valuable rights, and he is, moreover, willing to perform his ordinary sphere of legal duties toward it; but he looks upon it as a thing established, and capable of maintaining itself in a due measure of foreign ascendency, without any such personal efforts as those which his forefathers cheerfully imposed upon themselves. The orations of Demosthenes contain melancholy proofs of such altered tone of patriotism—of that langour, paralysis, and waiting for others to act, which preceded the catastrophe of Chæroneia, notwithstanding an unabated attachment to the democracy as a

source of protection and good government. That same preternatural activity which the allies of Sparta, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, both denounced and admired in the Athenians, is noted by the orator as now belonging to their enemy Philip. Such variations in the scale of national energy pervade history, modern as well as ancient, but in regard to Grecian history, especially, they can never be overlooked. For a certain measure, not only of positive political attachment, but also of active self-devotion, military readiness, and personal effort, was the indispensable condition of maintaining Hellenic autonomy, either in Athens or elsewhere; and became so more than ever when the Macedonians were once organized under an enterprising and semi-Hellenized prince. The democracy was the first creative cause of that astonishing personal and many-sided energy which marked the Athenian character, for a century downward from Kleisthenes; that the same ultra-Hellenic activity did not longer continue, is referable to other causes which will be hereafter in part explained. No system of government, even supposing it to be very much better and more faultless than the Athenian democracy, can ever pretend to accomplish its legitimate end apart from the personal character of the people, or to supersede the necessity of individual virtue and vigor. During the half-century immediately preceding the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians had lost that remarkable energy which distinguished them during the first century of their democracy, and had fallen much more nearly to a level with the other Greeks, in common with whom they were obliged to yield to the pressure of a foreign enemy. I here briefly notice their last period of languor, in contrast with the first burst of democratic fervor under Kleisthenes now opening—a feeling, which will be found, as we proceed, to continue for a longer period than could have been reasonably anticipated, but which was too high-strung to become a perpetual and inherent attribute of any community.

CHAPTER XXXII.

RISE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.—CYRUS.

In the preceding chapter I have followed the history of Central Greece very nearly down to the point at which the history of the Asiatic Greeks becomes blended with it, and after which the two streams begin to flow to a great degree in the same channel. I now revert to the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks, and of the Asiatic kings as connected with them, at the point in which they were left in my seventeenth chapter.

The concluding facts recounted in that chapter were of sad and serious moment to the Hellenic world. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks on the Asiatic coast had been conquered and made tributary by the

Lydian king Crœsus: "Down to that time (says Herodotus) all Greeks had been free." Their conqueror, Crœsus, who ascended the throne in 560 B.C., appeared to be at the summit of human prosperity and power in his unassailable capital, and with his countless treasures at Sardis. His dominions comprised nearly the whole of Asia Minor, as far as the river Halys to the east; on the other side of that river began the Median monarchy under his brother-in-law Astyages, extending eastward to some boundary which we cannot define, but comprising, in a south-eastern direction, Persis proper or Farsistan, and separated from the Kissians and Assyrians on the east by the line of Mount Zagros (the present boundary-line between Persia and Turkey). Babylonia, with its wondrous city, between the Euphrates and the Tigris, was occupied by the Assyrians or Chaldæans, under their king Labynetus: a territory populous and fertile, partly by nature, partly by prodigies of labor, to a degree which makes us mistrust even an honest eye-witness who describes it afterward in its decline—but which was then in its most flourishing condition. The Chaldean dominion under Labynetus reached to the borders of Egypt, including as dependent territories both Judæa and Phenicia. In Egypt reigned the native king Amasis, powerful and affluent, sustained in his throne by a large body of Grecian mercenaries, and himself favorably disposed to Grecian commerce and settlement. Both with Labynetus and with Amasis, Crœsus was on terms of alliance; and, as Astyages was his brother-in-law, the four kings might well be deemed out of the reach of calamity. Yet within the space of thirty years, or a little more, the whole of their territories had become embodied in one vast empire, under the son of an adventurer as yet not known even by name.

The rise and fall of oriental dynasties has been in all times distinguished by the same general features. A brave and adventurous prince, at the head of a population at once poor, warlike, and greedy, acquires dominion; while his successors, abandoning themselves to sensuality and sloth, probably also to oppressive and irascible dispositions, become in process of time victims to those same qualities in a stranger which had enabled their own father to seize the throne. Cyrus, the great founder of the Persian empire, first the subject and afterward the dethroner of the Median Astyages, corresponds to their general description, as far, at least, as we can pretend to know his history. For in truth, even the conquests of Cyrus, after he became ruler of Media, are very imperfectly known, whilst the facts which preceded his rise up to that sovereignty cannot be said to be known at all: we have to choose between different accounts at variance with each other, and of which the most complete and detailed is stamped with all the character of romance. The Cyropædia of Xenophon is memorable and interesting, considered with reference to the Greek mind, and as a philosophical novel. That it should have been quoted so largely as authority on matters of history, is only one proof among

many how easily authors have been satisfied as to the essentials of historical evidence. The narrative given by Herodotus of the relations between Cyrus and Astyages, agreeing with Xenophon in little more than the fact that it makes Cyrus son of Kambyses and Mandane and grandson of Astyages, goes even beyond the story of Romulus and Remus in respect to tragical incident and contrast. Astyages, alarmed by a dream, condemns the newborn infant of his daughter Mandane to be exposed: Harpagus, to whom the order is given, delivers the child to one of the royal herdsmen, who exposes it in the mountains, where it is miraculously suckled by a bitch. Thus preserved, and afterward brought up as the herdsman's child, Cyrus manifests great superiority, both physical and mental, is chosen king in play by the boys of the village, and in this capacity severely chastises the son of one of the courtiers; for which offense he is carried before Astyages, who recognizes him for his grandson, but is assured by the Magi that the dream is out, and that he has no farther danger to apprehend from the boy—and therefore permits him to live. With Harpagus, however, Astyages is extremely incensed, for not having executed his orders: he causes the son of Harpagus to be slain, and served up to be eaten by his unconscious father at a regal banquet. The father, apprised afterward of the fact, dissembles his feelings, but meditates a deadly vengeance against Astyages for this Thyestean meal. He persuades Cyrus, who has been sent back to his father and mother in Persia, to head a revolt of the Persians against the Medes; whilst Astyages—to fill up the Grecian conception of madness as a precursor to ruin—sends an army against the revolters, commanded by Harpagus himself. Of course the army is defeated—Astyages, after a vain resistance, is dethroned—Cyrus becomes king in his place—and Harpagus repays the outrage which he has undergone by the bitterest insults.

Such are the heads of a beautiful narrative which is given at some length in Herodotus. It will probably appear to the reader sufficiently romantic; though the historian intimates that he had heard three other narratives different from it, and that all were more full of marvels, as well as in wider circulation, than his own, which he had borrowed from some unusually sober-minded Persian informants. In what points the other three stories departed from it we do not hear.

To the historian of Halikarnassus we have to oppose the physician of the neighboring town, Knidus—Ktesias, who contradicted Herodotus, not without strong terms of censure, on many points, and especially upon that which is the very foundation of the early narrative respecting Cyrus; for he affirmed that Cyrus was noway related to Astyages. However indignant we may be with Ktesias for the disparaging epithets which he presumed to apply to an historian, whose work is to us inestimable—we must nevertheless admit that, as surgeon in actual attendance on king Artaxerxes Mnemon, and healer of the wound

inflicted on that prince at Kunaxa by his brother Cyrus the younger, he had better opportunities even than Herodotus of conversing with sober-minded Persians; and that the discrepancies between the two statements are to be taken as a proof of the prevalence of discordant, yet equally accredited, stories. Herodotus himself was in fact compelled to choose one out of four. So rare and late a plant is historical authenticity.

That Cyrus was the first Persian conqueror, and that the space which he overran covered no less than fifty degrees of longitude, from the coast of Asia Minor to the Oxus and the Indus, are facts quite indisputable; but of the steps by which this was achieved, we know very little. The native Persians, whom he conducted to an empire so immense, were an aggregate of seven agricultural, and four nomadic tribes—all of them rude, hardy, and brave—dwelling in a mountainous region clothed in skins, ignorant of wine, or fruit, or any of the commonest luxuries of life, and despising the very idea of purchase or sale. Their tribes were very unequal in point of dignity, probably also in respect to numbers and powers, among one another. First in estimation among them stood the Pasargadæ; and the first phratry or clan among the Pasargadæ were the Achæmenidæ, to whom Cyrus himself belonged. Whether his relationship to the Median king whom he dethroned was a matter of fact, or a politic fiction, we cannot well determine. But Xenophon, in noticing the spacious deserted cities, Larissa and Mespila, which he saw in his march with the Ten Thousand Greeks on the eastern side of the Tigris, gives us to understand that the conquest of Media by the Persians was reported to him as having been an obstinate and protracted struggle. However this may be, the preponderance of the the Persians was at last complete: though the Medes always continued to be the second nation in the empire, after the Persians, properly so called; and by early Greek writers the great enemy in the East is often called "the Mede" as well as "the Persian." The Median Ekbatana too remained as one of the capital cities, and the usual summer residence, of the kings of Persia; Susa on the Choaspes, on the Kissian plain farther southward, and east of the Tigris, being their winter abode.

The vast space of country comprised between the Indus on the east, the Oxus and Caspian Sea to the north, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to the south, and the line of Mount Zagros to the west, appears to have been occupied in these times by a great variety of different tribes and people, yet all or most of them belonging to the religion of Zoroaster, and speaking dialects of the Zend language. It was known amongst its inhabitants by the common name of Iran or Aria: it is, in its central parts at least, a high, cold plateau, totally destitute of wood, and scantily supplied with water; much of it indeed is a salt and sandy desert, unsusceptible of culture. Parts of it are eminently fertile, where water can be procured and

irrigation applied. Scattered masses of tolerably dense population thus grew up; but continuity of cultivation is not practicable, and in ancient times, as at present, a large proportion of the population of Iran seems to have consisted of wandering or nomadic tribes with their tents and cattle. The rich pastures, and the freshness of the summer climate, in the region of mountain and valley near Ekbatana, are extolled by modern travelers, just as they attracted the Great King in ancient times during the hot months. The more southerly province called Persis proper (Farsistan) consists also in part of mountain land interspersed with valley and plain, abundantly watered, and ample in pasture, sloping gradually down to low grounds on the sea-coast which are hot and dry: the care bestowed both by Medes and Persians, on the breeding of their horses, was remarkable. There were doubtless material differences between different parts of the population of this vast plateau of Iran. Yet it seems that along with their common language and religion, they had also something of a common character, which contrasted with the Indian population east of the Indus, the Assyrians west of Mount Zagros, and the Massagetæ and other Nomads of the Caspian and the Sea of Aral—less brutish, restless and blood-thirsty than the latter—more fierce, contemptuous, and extortionate, and less capable of sustained industry, than the two former. There can be little doubt, at the time of which we are now speaking, when the wealth and cultivation of Assyria were at their maximum, that Iran also was far better peopled than ever it has been since European observers have been able to survey it; especially the north-eastern portion, Baktria and Sogdiana; so that the invasions of the Nomads from Turkestan and Tartary, which have been so destructive at various intervals since the Mohammedan conquest, were before that period successfully kept back.

The general analogy among the population of Iran probably enabled the Persian conqueror with comparative ease to extend his empire to the east, after the conquest of Ekbatana, and to become the full heir of the Median kings. If we may believe Ktesias, even the distant province of Baktria had been before subject to those kings. At first it resisted Cyrus, but finding that he had become son-in-law of Astyages, as well as master of his person, it speedily acknowledged his authority.

According to the representation of Herodotus, the war between Cyrus and Crœsus of Lydia began shortly after the capture of Astyages, and before the conquest of Baktria. Crœsus was the assailant, wishing to avenge his brother-in-law, to arrest the growth of the Persian conqueror, and to increase his own dominions. His more prudent councilors in vain represented to him that he had little to gain, and much to lose, by war with a nation alike hardy and poor. He is represented as just at that time recovering from the affliction arising out of the death of his son.

To ask advice of the oracle, before he took any final decision, was a step which no pious king would omit. But in the present perilous question, Crœsus did more—he took a precaution so extreme, that if his piety had not been placed beyond all doubt by his extraordinary munificence to the temples, he might have drawn upon himself the suspicion of a guilty scepticism. Before he would send to ask advice respecting the project itself, he resolved to test the credit of some of the chief surrounding oracles—Delphi, Dodona, Branchidæ near Miletus, Amphiaraus at Thebes, Trophonius at Lebadeia, and Ammon in Libya. His envoys started from Sardis on the same day, and were all directed on the hundredth day afterward to ask at the respective oracles how Crœsus was at that precise moment employed. This was a severe trial: of the manner in which it was met by four out of the six oracles consulted we have no information, and it rather appears that their answers were unsatisfactory. But Amphiaraus maintained his credit undiminished, while Apollo at Delphi, more omniscient than Apollo at Branchidæ, solved the question with such unerring precision, as to afford a strong additional argument against persons who might be disposed to scoff at divination. No sooner had the envoys put the question to the Delphian priestess, on the day named, "What is Crœsus now doing?" than she exclaimed in the accustomed hexameter verse, "I know the number of grains of sand, and the measures of the sea: I understand the dumb, and I hear the man who speaks not. The smell reaches me of a hardskinned tortoise boiled in a copper with lamb's flesh—copper above and copper below." Crœsus was awe-struck on receiving this reply. It described with the utmost detail that which he had been really doing, so that he accounted the Delphian oracle and that of Amphiaraus the only trustworthy oracles on earth—following up these feelings with a holocaust of the most munificent character, in order to win the favor of the Delphian god. Three thousand cattle were offered up, and upon a vast sacrificial pile were placed the most splendid purple robes and tunics, together with couches and censers of gold and silver; besides which he sent to Delphi itself the richest presents in gold and silver—ingots, statues, bowls, jugs, etc., the size and weight of which we read with astonishment; the more so as Herodotus himself saw them a century afterwards at Delphi. Nor was Crœsus altogether unmindful of Amphiaraus, whose answer had been creditable, though less triumphant than that of the Pythian priestess. He sent to Amphiaraus a spear and shield of pure gold, which were afterward seen at Thebes by Herodotus: this large donative may help the reader to conceive the immensity of those which he sent to Delphi.

The envoys who conveyed these gifts were instructed to ask at the same time, whether Crœsus should undertake an expedition against the Persians—and if so, whether he should solicit any allies to assist him. In regard to the second question, the answer both of Apollo

and of Amphiaraus was decisive, recommending him to invite the alliance of the most powerful Greeks. In regard to the first and most momentous question, their answer was as remarkable for circumspection as it had been before for detective sagacity: they told Crœsus that if he invaded the Persians, he would subvert a mighty monarchy. The blindness of Crœsus interpreted this declaration into an unqualified promise of success: he sent farther presents to the oracle, and again inquired whether his kingdom would be durable "When a mule shall become king of the Medes (replied the priestess) then must thou run away—be not ashamed."

More assured than ever by such an answer, Crœsus sent to Sparta, under the kings Anaxandrides and Aristo, to tender presents and solicit their alliance. His propositions were favorably entertained—the more so, as he had before gratuitously furnished some gold to the Lacedæmonians, for a statue to Apollo. The alliance now formed was altogether general—no express effort being as yet demanded from them, though it soon came to be. But the incident is to be noted, as marking the first plunge of the leading Grecian state into Asiatic politics; and that too without any of the generous Hellenic sympathy which afterward induced Athens to send her citizens across the Ægean. At this time Crœsus was the master and tribute-exactor of the Asiatic Greeks, whose contingents seem to have formed part of his army for the expedition now contemplated; an army consisting principally, not of native Lydians, but of foreigners.

The river Halys formed the boundary at this time between the Median and Lydian empires: and Crœsus, marching across that river into the territory of the Syrians or Assyrians of Kappadokia, took the city of Pteria, with many of its surrounding dependencies, inflicting damage and destruction upon these distant subjects of Ekbatana. Cyrus lost no time in bringing an army to their defense considerably larger than that of Crœsus; trying at the same time, though unsuccessfully, to prevail on the Ionians to revolt from him. A bloody battle took place between the two armies, but with indecisive result: after which Crœsus, seeing that he could not hope to accomplish more with his forces as they stood, thought it wise to return to his capital, and collect a larger army for the next campaign. Immediately on reaching Sardis he dispatched envoys to Labynetus, king of Babylon; to Amasis, king of Egypt; to the Lacedæmonians, and to other allies; calling upon all of them to send auxiliaries to Sardis during the course of the fifth month. In the mean time he dismissed all the foreign troops who had followed him into Kappadokia.

Had these allies appeared, the war might perhaps have been prosecuted with success. And on the part of the Lacedæmonians at least, there was no tardiness; for their ships were ready and their troops almost on board, when the unexpected news reached them that Crœsus was already ruined. Cyrus had foreseen and forstalled the defensive plan of his enemy. Pushing on with his army to Sardis

without delay, he obliged the Lydian prince to give battle with his own unassisted subjects. The open and spacious plain before that town was highly favorable to Lydian cavalry, which at that time (Herodotus tells us) was superior to the Persian. But Cyrus, employing a stratagem whereby this cavalry was rendered unavailable, placed in front of his line the baggage camels, which the Lydian horses could not endure either to smell or to behold. The horsemen of Crœsus were thus obliged to dismount; nevertheless they fought bravely on foot, and were not driven into the town till after a sanguinary combat.

Though confined within the walls of his capital, Crœsus had still good reason for hoping to hold out until the arrival of his allies, to whom he sent pressing envoys of acceleration. For Sardis was considered impregnable—one assault had already been repulsed, and the Persians would have been reduced to the slow process of blockade. But on the fourteenth day of the siege, accident did for the besiegers that which they could not have accomplished either by skill or force. Sardis was situated on an outlying peak of the northern side of Tmolus; it was well fortified everywhere except toward the mountain; and on that side the rock was so precipitous and inaccessible, that fortifications were thought unnecessary, nor did the inhabitants believe assault to be possible in that quarter. But Hyrœades, a Persian soldier, having accidentally seen one of the garrison descending this precipitous rock to pick up his helmet which had rolled down, watched his opportunity, tried to climb up, and found it not impracticable; others followed his example, the stronghold was thus seized first, and the whole city speedily taken by storm.

Cyrus had given especial orders to spare the life of Crœsus, who was accordingly made prisoner. But preparations were made for a solemn and terrible spectacle; the captive king was destined to be burnt in chains, together with fourteen Lydian youths, on a vast pile of wood. We are even told that the pile was already kindled and the victim beyond the reach of human aid, when Apollo sent a miraculous rain to preserve him. As to the general fact of supernatural interposition, in one way or another, Herodotus and Ktesias both agree, though they describe differently the particular miracles wrought. It is certain that Crœsus, after some time, was released and well treated by his conqueror, and lived to become the confidential adviser of the latter as well as of his son Kambyses: Ktesias also acquaints us that a considerable town and territory near Ekbatana, called Barene, was assigned to him, according to a practice which we shall find not unfrequent with the Persian kings.

The prudent counsel and remarks as to the relations between Persians and Lydians, whereby Crœsus is said by Herodotus to have first earned this favorable treatment, are hardly worth repeating; but the indignant remonstrance sent by Crœsus to the Delphian god is too characteristic to be passed over. He obtained permission from Cyrus

to lay upon the holy pavement of the Delphian temple the chains with which he had at first been bound. The Lydian envoys were instructed, after exhibiting to the god these humiliating memorials, to ask whether it was his custom to deceive his benefactors, and whether he was not ashamed to have encouraged the king of Lydia in an enterprise so disastrous? The god, condescending to justify himself by the lips of the priestess, replied—"Not even a god can escape his destiny. Crœsus has suffered for the sin of his fifth ancestor (Gyges), who, conspiring with a woman, slew his master and wrongfully seized the scepter. Apollo employed all his influence with the Mœræ (Fates) to obtain that this sin might be expiated by the children of Crœsus, and not by Crœsus himself; but the Mœræ would grant nothing more than a postponement of the judgment for three years. Let Crœsus know that Apollo has thus procured for him a reign three years longer than his original destiny, after having tried in vain to rescue him altogether. Moreover he sent that rain which at the critical moment extinguished the burning pile. Nor has Crœsus any right to complain of the prophecy by which he was encouraged to enter on the war; for when the god told him that he would subvert *a great empire*, it was his duty to have again inquired which empire the god meant; and if he neither understood the meaning, nor chose to ask for information, he has himself to blame for the result. Besides, Crœsus neglected the warning given to him, about the acquisition of the Median kingdom by a mule: Cyrus was that mule—son of a Median mother of royal breed, by a Persian father at once of different race and of lower position.

This triumphant justification extorted even from Crœsus himself a full confession that the sin lay with him, and not with the god. It certainly illustrates in a remarkable manner the theological ideas of the time. It shows us how much, in the mind of Herodotus, the facts of the centuries preceding his own, unrecorded as they were by any contemporary authority, tended to cast themselves into a sort of religious drama; the threads of the historical web being in part put together, in part originally spun, for the purpose of setting forth the religious sentiment and doctrine woven in as a pattern. The Pythian priestess predicts to Gyges that the crime which he had committed in assassinating his master would be expiated by his fifth descendant, though, as Herodotus tells us, no one took any notice of this prophecy until it was at last fulfilled: we see thus the history of the first Mermnad king is made up after the catastrophe of the last. There was something in the main facts of the history of Crœsus profoundly striking to the Greek mind. a king at the summit of wealth and power—pious in the extreme and munificent toward the gods—the first destroyer of Hellenic liberty in Asia—then precipitated, at once and on a sudden, into the abyss of ruin. The sin of the first parent helped much toward the solution of this perplexing problem as well as to exalt the credit of the oracle, when made to assume the shape of

an unnoticed prophecy. In the affecting story (discussed in a former chapter) of Solon and Crœsus, the Lydian king is punished with an acute domestic affliction because he thought himself the happiest of mankind—the gods not suffering any one to be arrogant except themselves; and the warning of Solon is made to recur to Crœsus after he has become the prisoner of Cyrus, in the narrative of Herodotus. To the same vein of thought belongs the story, just recounted, of the relations of Crœsus with the Delphian oracle. An account is provided, satisfactory to the religious feelings of the Greeks, how and why he was ruined—but nothing less than the overruling and omnipotent Mœræ could be invoked to explain so stupendous a result. It is rarely that these supreme goddesses—or hyper-goddesses, since the gods themselves must submit to them—are brought into such distinct light and action. Usually they are kept in the dark, or are left to be understood as the unseen stumbling-block in cases of extreme incomprehensibility; and it is difficult clearly to determine (as in the case of some complicated political constitutions) where the Greeks conceived sovereign power to reside, in respect to the government of the world. But here the sovereignty of the Mœræ, and the subordinate agency of the gods, are unequivocally set forth. The gods are still extremely powerful, because the Mœræ comply with their requests up to a certain point, not thinking it proper to be wholly inexorable; but their compliance is carried no farther than they themselves choose; nor would they, even in deference to Apollo, alter the original sentence of punishment for the sin of Gyges in the person of his fifth descendant—a sentence, moreover, which Apollo himself had formerly prophesied shortly after the sin was committed; so that, if the Mœræ had listened to his intercession on behalf of Crœsus, his own prophetic credit would have been endangered. Their unalterable resolution has predetermined the ruin of Crœsus, and the grandeur of the event is manifested by the circumstance, that even Apollo himself cannot prevail upon them to alter it, or to grant more than a three years' respite. The religious element must here be viewed as giving the form—the historical element as giving the matter only, and not the whole matter—of the story. These two elements will be found conjoined more or less throughout most of the history of Herodotus, though as we descend to later times, we shall find the latter element in constantly increasing proportion. His conception of history is extremely different from that of Thucydides, who lays down to himself the true scheme and purpose of the historian, common to him with the philosopher—to recount and interpret the past, as a rational aid toward prevision of the future.

The destruction of the Lydian monarchy, and the establishment of the Persians at Sardis—an event pregnant with consequences to Hellas generally—took place in 546 B.C. Sorely did the Ionic Greeks now repent that they had rejected the propositions made to them by Cyrus for revolting from Crœsus—though at the time when these

propositions were made, it would have been highly imprudent to listen to them, since the Lydian power might reasonably be looked upon as the stronger. As soon as Sardis had fallen, they sent envoys to the conqueror entreating that they might be enrolled as his tributaries, on the footing which they had occupied under Crœsus. The reply was a stern and angry refusal, with the exception of the Milesians, to whom the terms which they asked were granted. why this favorable exception was extended to them, we do not know.

The other continental Ionians and Æolians (exclusive of Miletus, and exclusive also of the insular cities which the Persians had no means of attacking), seized with alarm, began to put themselves in a condition of defense. It seems that the Lydian king had caused their fortifications to be wholly or partially dismantled, for we are told that they now began to erect walls; and the Phokæans especially devoted to that purpose a present which they had received from the Iberian Arganthonius, king of Tartessus. Besides thus strengthening their own cities, they thought it advisable to send a joint embassy entreating aid from Sparta. They doubtless were not unapprised that the Spartans had actually equipped an army for the support of Crœsus. Their deputies went to Sparta, where the Phokæan Pythermus, appointed by the rest to be spokesman, clothing himself in a purple robe in order to attract the largest audience possible, set forth their pressing need of succor against the impending danger. The Lacedæmonians refused the prayer; nevertheless they dispatched to Phokæa some commissioners to investigate the state of affairs—who, perhaps persuaded by the Phokæans, sent Lakrines, one of their number, to the conqueror at Sardis, to warn him that he should not lay hands on any city of Hellas—for the Lacedæmonians would not permit it. "Who are these Lacedæmonians? (inquired Cyrus from some Greeks who stood near him)—how many are there of them, that they venture to send me such a notice?" Having received the answer, wherein it was stated that the Lacedæmonians had a city and a regular market at Sparta, he exclaimed—"I have never yet been afraid of men like these, who have a set place in the middle of their city, where they meet to cheat one another and forswear themselves. If I live they shall have troubles of their own to talk about, apart from the Ionians." To buy or sell appeared to the Persians a contemptible practice: for they carried out consistently one step farther, the principle upon which even many able Greeks condemned the lending of money on interest; and the speech of Cyrus was intended as a covert reproach of Grecian habits generally.

This blank menace of Lakrines, an insulting provocation to the enemy rather than a real support to the distressed, was the only benefit which the Ionic Greeks derived from Sparta. They were left to defend themselves as best they could against the conqueror; who presently however quitted Sardis to prosecute in person his conquest in the

East, leaving the Persian Tabalus with a garrison in the citadel, but consigning the large treasure captured, with authority over the Lydian population, to the Lydian Paktyas. As he carried away Crœsus along with him, he probably considered himself sure of the fidelity of those Lydians whom the deposed monarch recommended. But he had not yet arrived at his own capital, when he received the intelligence that Paktyas had revolted, arming the Lydian population, and employing the treasure in his charge to hire fresh troops. On hearing this news, Cyrus addressed himself to Crœsus (according to Herodotus) in terms of much wrath against the Lydians, and even intimated that he should be compelled to sell them all as slaves. Upon which Crœsus, full of alarm for his people, contended strenuously that Paktyas alone was in fault and deserving of punishment; but he at the same time advised Cyrus to disarm the Lydian population, and to enforce upon them both effeminate attire and habits of playing on the harp and shopkeeping. "By this process (he said) you will soon see them become women instead of men." This suggestion is said to have been accepted by Cyrus, and executed by his general Mazares. The conversation here reported, and the deliberate plan for enervating the Lydian character supposed to be pursued by Cyrus, is evidently an hypothesis imagined by some of the contemporaries or predecessors of Herodotus, to explain the contrast between the Lydian whom they saw before them, after two or three generations of slavery, and the old irresistible horsemen of whom they heard in fame, at the time when Crœsus was lord from the Halys to the Ægean Sea.

To return to Paktyas—he had commenced his revolt, come down to the sea-coast, and employed the treasures of Sardis in levying a Grecian mercenary force, with which he invested the place and blocked up the governor Tabalus. But he manifested no courage worthy of so dangerous an enterprise; for no sooner had he heard that the Median general Mazares was approaching at the head of an army dispatched by Cyrus against him, than he disbanded his force and fled to Kyme for protection as a suppliant. Presently arrived a menacing summons from Mezares, demanding that he should be given up forthwith, which plunged the Kymæans into profound dismay. The idea of giving up a suppliant to destruction was shocking to Grecian sentiment. They sent to solicit advice from the holy temple of Apollo at Branchidæ near Miletus; and the reply directed that Paktyas should be surrendered. Nevertheless, so ignominious did such a surrender appear, that Aristodikus and some other Kymæan citizens denounced the messengers as liars, and required that a more trustworthy deputation should be sent to consult the god. Aristodikus himself, forming one of the second body, stated the perplexity to the oracle, and received a repetition of the same answer; whereupon he proceeded to rob the birds' nests which existed in abundance in and about the temple. A voice from the inner oracular chamber

speedily arrested him, exclaiming—"Most impious of men, how darest thou do such things? Wilt thou snatch my suppliants from the temple itself?" Unabashed by the rebuke, Aristodikus replied—"Master, thus dost *thou* help suppliants thyself: and dost thou command the Kymæans to give up a suppliant?" "Yes, I do command it" (rejoined the god forthwith), in order that the crime may bring destruction upon you the sooner, and that you may not in future come to consult the oracle upon the surrender of suppliants."

The ingenuity of Aristodikus thus completely nullified the oracular response, and left the Kymæans in their original perplexity. Not choosing to surrender Paktyas, nor daring to protect him against a besieging army, they sent him away to Mitylene, whither the envoys of Mazares followed and demanded him; offering a reward so considerable. that the Kymæans became fearful of trusting them, and again conveyed away the suppliant to Chios, where he took refuge in the temple of Athene Poliuchus. But here again the pursuers followed. The Chians were persuaded to drag him from the temple and surrender him, on consideration of receiving the territory of Atarneus (a district on the continent over against the island of Lesbos) as purchase-money. Paktyas was thus seized and sent prisoner to Cyrus, who had given the most express orders for this capture: hence the unusual intensity of the pursuit. But it appears that the territory of Atarneus was considered as having been ignominiously acquired by the Chians: none even of their own citizens would employ any article of its produce for holy or sacrificial purposes.

Mazares next proceeded to the attack and conquest of the Greeks on the coast; an enterprise which, since he soon died of illness, was completed by his successor Harpagus. The towns assailed successively made a gallant but ineffectual resistance. The Persian general by his numbers drove the defenders within their walls, against which he piled up mounds of earth, so as either to carry the place by storm or to compel surrender. All of them were reduced one after the other. With all, the terms of subjection were doubtless harder than those which had been imposed upon them by Crœsus, because Cyrus had already refused to grant these terms to them, with the single exception of Miletus, and because they had since given additional offense by aiding the revolt of Paktyas. The inhabitants of Priene were sold into slavery: they were the first assailed by Mazares, and had perhaps been especially forward in the attack made by Paktyas on Sardis.

Among these unfortunate towns thus changing their master and passing into a harsher subjection, two deserve especial notice—Teos and Phokæa. The citizens of the former, so soon as the mound around their walls had rendered farther resistance impossible, embarked and emigrated, some to Thrace, where they founded Abdera—others to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, where they planted Phanagoria: a portion of them, however, must have remained to take the

chances of subjection, since the town appears in after-times still peopled and still Hellenic.

The fate of Phokæa, similar in the main, is given to us with more striking circumstances of detail, and becomes the more interesting, since the enterprising mariners who inhabited it had been the torch-bearers of Grecian geographical discovery in the west. I have already described their adventurous exploring voyages of former days into the interior of the Adriatic, and along the whole northern and western coasts of the Mediterranean as far as Tartessus (the region around and adjoining to Cadiz)—together with the favorable reception given to them by old Arganthonius, king of the country, who invited them to immigrate in a body to his kingdom, offering them the choice of any site which they might desire. His invitation was declined, though probably the Phokæans may have subsequently regretted the refusal; and he then manifested his good will toward them by a large present to defray the expense of constructing fortifications round their town. The walls, erected in part by this aid, were both extensive and well built. Yet they could not hinder Harpagus from raising his mounds of earth up against them, while he was politic enough at the same time to tempt them with offers of a moderate capitulation; requiring only that they should breach their walls in one place by pulling down one of the towers, and consecrate one building in the interior of the town as a token of subjection. To accept these terms was to submit themselves to the discretion of the besieger, for there could be no security that they would be observed. The Phokæans, while they asked for one day to deliberate upon their reply, entreated that during that day Harpagus should withdraw his troops altogether from the walls. With this demand the latter complied, intimating at the same time that he saw clearly through the meaning of it. The Phokæans, having determined that the inevitable servitude impending over their town should not be shared by its inhabitants, employed their day of grace in preparation for collective exile, putting on shipboard their wives and children as well as their furniture and the movable decorations of their temples. They then set sail for Chios, leaving to the conquerer a deserted town for the occupation of a Persian garrison.

It appears that the fugitives were not very kindly received at Chios. At least when they made a proposition for purchasing from the Chians the neighboring islands of Œnussæ as a permanent abode, the latter were induced to refuse by apprehensions of commercial rivalry. It was necessary to look farther for a settlement; while Arganthonius, their protector, being now dead, Tartessus was no longer inviting. Twenty years before, however, the colony of Alalia in the island of Corsica had been founded from Phokæa by the direction of the oracle, and thither the general body of Phokæans now resolved to repair. Having prepared their ships for this distant voyage, they first sailed back to Phokæa, surprised the Persian garrison whom Harpagus had left in the town, and slew them. They then sunk in the harbor a great lump of iron, binding themselves by a solemn and unanimous oath never again to see Phokæa until that iron should come up to the surface. Nevertheless, in spite of the oath, the voyage of exile had been scarcely begun when more than half of them repented of having so bound themselves—and became homesick. They broke their vow and returned to Phokæa. Yet since Herodotus does not mention any divine judgment as having been consequent on the perjury, we may perhaps suspect that some gray-headed citizen, to whom transportation to Corsica might be little less than a sentence of death, both persuaded himself, and certified to his companions, that he had seen the sunken lump of iron raised up and floating for a while buoyant upon the waves. Harpagus must have been induced to pardon the previous slaughter of his Persian garrison, or at least to believe that it had been done by those Phokæans who still persisted in exile. He wanted tribute-paying subjects, not an empty military post, and the repentant home-seekers were allowed to number themselves among the slaves of the Great King.

Meanwhile the smaller but more resolute half of the Phokæans executed their voyage to Alalia in Corsica, with their wives and children, in sixty pentekonters or armed ships, and established themselves along with the previous settlers. They remained there for five years, during which time their indiscriminate piracies had become so intolerable (even down to this time, piracy committed against a foreign vessel seems to have been practiced frequently and without much disrepute), that both the Tyrrhenian sea-ports along the Mediterranean coast of Italy, and the Carthaginians, united to put them down. There subsisted particular treaties between these two, for the regulation of the commercial intercourse between Africa and Italy, of which the ancient treaty preserved by Polybius between Rome and Carthage (made in 509 B.C.) may be considered as a specimen. Sixty Carthaginian and as many Tuscan ships, attacking the sixty Phokæan ships near Alalia, destroyed forty of them, yet not without such severe loss to themselves that the victory was said to be on the side of the latter; who, however, in spite of this Kadmeian victory (so a battle was denominated in which the victors lost more than the vanquished), were compelled to carry back their remaining twenty vessels to Alalia, and to retire with their wives and families, in so far as room could be found for them, to Rhegium. At last these unhappy exiles found a permanent home by establishing the new settlement of Elea or Velia in the Gulf of Policastro, on the Italian coast (then called Œnotrian), southward from Poseidonia or Pæstum. It is probable that they were here joined by other exiles from Ionia, in particular by the Kolophonian philosopher and poet Xenophanes, from whom what was afterward called the Eleatic school of philosophy, distinguished both for bold consistency and

dialectic acuteness, took its rise. The Phokæan captives, taken prisoners in the naval combat by Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, were stoned to death. But a divine judgment overtook the Tyrrhenian town of Agylla in consequence of this cruelty; and even in the time of Herodotus, a century afterward, the Agyllæans were still expiating the sin by a periodical solemnity and agon, pursuant to the penalty which the Delphian oracle had imposed upon them.

Such was the fate of the Phokæan exiles, while their brethren at home remained as subjects of Harpagus, in common with all the other Ionic and Æolic Greeks, except Samos and Miletus. For even the insular inhabitants of Lesbos and Chios, though not assailable by sea, since the Persians had no fleet, thought it better to renounce their independence and enroll themselves as Persian subjects both of them possessing strips of the main-land which they were unable to protect otherwise. Samos, on the other hand, maintained its independence, and even reached, shortly after this period, under the despotism of Polykrates, a higher degree of power than ever: perhaps the humiliation of the other maritime Greeks around may have rather favored the ambition of this unscrupulous prince, to whom I shall revert presently. But we may readily conceive that the public solemnities in which the Ionic Greeks intermingled, in place of those gay and richly-decked crowds which the Homeric hymn describes in the preceding century as assembled at Delos, presented scenes of marked despondency. One of their wisest men, indeed, Bias of Priene, went so far as to propose, at the Pan-Ionic festival, a collective emigration of the entire population of the Ionic towns to the island of Sardinia. Nothing like freedom (he urged) was now open to them in Asia; but in Sardinia, one great Pan-Ionic city might be formed, which would not only be free herself, but mistress of her neighbors. The proposition found no favor; the reason of which is sufficiently evident from the narrative just given respecting the unconquerable local attachment on the part of the Phokæan majority. But Herodotus bestows upon it the most unqualified commendation and regrets that it was not acted upon. Had such been the case, the subsequent history of Carthage, Sicily, and even Rome, might have been sensibly altered.

Thus subdued by Harpagus, the Ionic and Æolic Greeks were employed as auxiliaries to him in the conquest of the south-western inhabitants of Asia Minor—Karians, Kaunians, Lykians, and Doric Greeks of Knidus and Halikarnassus. Of the fate of the latter town, Herodotus tells us nothing, though it was his native place. The inhabitants of Knidus, a place situated on a long outlying tongue of land, at first tried to cut through the narrow isthmus which joined them to the continent, but abandoned the attempt with a facility which Herodotus explains by referring it to a prohibition of the oracle. Neither Karians nor Kaunians offered any serious resistance. The Lykians only, in their chief town Xanthus, made a desperate

defense. Having in vain tried to repel the assailants in the open field, and finding themselves blocked up in their city, they set fire to it with their own hands; consuming in the flames their women, children, and servants, while the armed citizens marched out and perished to a man in combat with the enemy. Such an act of brave and even ferocious despair is not in the Grecian character. In recounting, however, the languid defense and easy submission of the Greeks of Knidus, it may surprise us to call to mind that they were Dorians and colonists from Sparta. The want of steadfast courage, often imputed to Ionic Greeks as compared to Dorian, ought properly to be charged on Asiatic Greeks as compared with European; or rather upon that mixture of indigenous with Hellenic population, which all the Asiatic colonies, in common with most of the other colonies, presented, and which in Halikarnassus was particularly remarkable; for it seems to have been half Karian, half Dorian, and was even governed by a line of Karian despots.

Harpagus and the Persians thus mastered, without any considerable resistance, the western and southern portions of Asia Minor; probably also, though we have no direct account of it, the entire territory within the Halys which had before been ruled by Crœsus. The tributes of the conquered Greeks were transmitted to Ekbatana instead of to Sardis. While Harpagus was thus employed, Cyrus himself had been making still more extensive conquests in Upper Asia and Assyria, of which I shall speak in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

GROWTH OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.

In the preceding chapter an account has been given, the best which we can pick out from Herodotus, of the steps by which the Asiatic Greeks became subject to Persia. If his narrative is meager, on a matter which vitally concerned not only so many of his brother Greeks, but even his own native city, we can hardly expect that he should tell us much respecting the other conquests of Cyrus. He seems to withhold intentionally various details which had come to his knowledge, and merely intimates in general terms that while Harpagus was engaged on the coast of the Ægean, Cyrus himself assailed and subdued all the nations of Upper Asia "not omitting any one of them." He alludes to the Baktrians and the Sakæ, who are also named by Ktesias as having become subject partly by force, partly by capitulation. But he deems only two of the exploits of Cyrus worthy of special notice—the conquest of Babylon, and the final expedition against the Massagetæ. In the short abstract which we now possess of the lost work of Ktesias, no mention appears of the

important conquest of Babylon. His narrative, indeed, as far as the abstract enables us to follow it, diverges materially from that of Herodotus, and must have been founded on data altogether different.

"I shall mention (says Herodotus) those conquests which gave Cyrus most trouble, and are most memorable: after he had subdued all the rest of the continent, he attacked the Assyrians." Those who recollect the description of Babylon and its surrounding territory, as given in a former chapter, will not be surprised to learn that the capture of it gave the Persian aggressor much trouble. Their only surprise will be, how it could ever have been taken at all—or indeed how a hostile army could have even reached it. Herodotus informs us that the Babylonian queen Nitokris (mother of that very Labynetus who was king when Cyrus attacked the place) apprehensive of invasion from the Medes after their capture of Nineveh, had executed many laborious works near the Euphrates for the purpose of obstructing their approach. Moreover there existed what was called the wall of Media (probably built by her, but certainly built prior to the Persian conquest), one hundred feet high and twenty feet thick, across the entire space of seventy-five miles which joined the Tigris with one of the canals of the Euphrates: while the canals themselves, as we may see by the march of the Ten Thousand Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa, presented means of defense altogether insuperable by a rude army such as that of the Persians. On the east, the territory of Babylonia was defended by the Tigris, which cannot be forded lower than the ancient Nineveh or the modern Mosul. In addition to these ramparts, natural as well as artificial, to protect the territory—populous, cultivated, productive, and offering every motive to its inhabitants to resist even the entrance of an enemy—we are told that the Babylonians were so thoroughly prepared for the inroad of Cyrus that they had accumulated within their walls a store of provisions for many years. Strange as it may seem, we must suppose that the king of Babylon, after all the cost and labor spent in providing defenses for the territory, voluntarily neglected to avail himself of them, suffered the invader to tread down the fertile Babylonia without resistance, and merely drew out the citizens to oppose him when he arrived under the walls of the city—if the statement of Herodotus is correct. And we may illustrate this unaccountable omission by that which we know to have happened in the march of the younger Cyrus to Kunaxa against his brother Artaxerxes Mnemon. The latter had caused to be dug, expressly in preparation for this invasion, a broad and deep ditch (thirty feet wide and eight feet deep) from the wall of Media to the river Euphrates, a distance of twelve parasangs or forty-five English miles, leaving only a passage of twenty feet broad close alongside of the river. Yet when the invading army arrived at this important pass, they found not a man there to defend it, and all of them marched without resistance through the narrow inlet. Cyrus the younger, who had up to that moment felt assured that his

brother would fight, now supposed that he had given up the idea of defending Babylon: instead of which, two days afterward, Artaxerxes attacked him on an open plain of ground where there was no advantage of position on either side; though the invaders were taken rather unawares in consequence of their extreme confidence arising from recent unopposed entrance within the artificial ditch. This anecdote is the more valuable as an illustration, because all its circumstances are transmitted to us by a discerning eye-witness. And both the two incidents here brought into comparison demonstrate the recklessness, changefulness, and incapacity of calculation belonging to the Asiatic mind of that day—as well as the great command of hands possessed by these kings, and their prodigal waste of human labor. We shall see, as we advance in this history, farther evidences of the same attributes, which it is essential to bear in mind, for the purpose of appreciating both Grecian dealing with Asiatics, and the comparative absence of such defects in the Grecian character. Vast walls and deep ditches are an inestimable aid to a brave and well-commanded garrison; but they cannot be made entirely to supply the want of bravery and intelligence.

In whatever manner the difficulties of approaching Babylon may have been overcome, the fact that they were overcome by Cyrus is certain. On first setting out for this conquest, he was about to cross the river Gyndes (one of the affluents from the east which joins the Tigris near the modern Bagdad, and along which lay the high road crossing the pass of Mount Zagros from Babylon to Ekbatana), when one of the sacred white horses, which accompanied him, entered the river in pure wantonness and tried to cross it by himself. The Gyndes resented this insult and the horse was drowned: upon which Cyrus swore in his wrath that he would so break the strength of the river as that women in future should pass it without wetting their knees. Accordingly he employed his entire army, during the whole summer season, in digging three hundred and sixty artificial channels to disseminate the unity of the stream. Such, according to Herodotus, was the incident which postponed for one year the fall of the great Babylon. But in the next spring Cyrus and his army were before the walls, after having defeated and driven in the population who came out to fight. These walls were artificial mountains (three hundred feet high, seventy-five feet thick, and forming a square of fifteen miles to each side), within which the besieged defied attack, and even blockade, having previously stored up several years' provision. Through the midst of the town, however, flowed the Euphrates. That river, which had been so laboriously trained to serve for protection, trade and sustenance to the Babylonians, was now made the avenue of their ruin. Having left a detachment of his army at the two points where the Euphrates enters and quits the city, Cyrus retired with the remainder to the higher part of its course, where an ancient Babylonian queen had prepared one of the great lateral reser-

voirs for carrying off in case of need the superfluity of its water Near this point Cyrus caused another reservoir and another canal o. communication to be dug, by means of which he drew off the water of the Euphrates to such a degree it became not above the height of a man's thigh. The period chosen was that of a great Babylonian festival, when the whole population were engaged in amusement and revelry. The Persian troops left near the town, watching their opportunity, entered from both sides along the bed of the river, and took it by surprise with scarcely any resistance. At no other time, except during a festival, could they have done this (says Herodotus) had the river been ever so low, for both banks throughout the whole length of the town were provided with quays, with continuous walls, and with gates at the end of every street which led down to the river at right angles: so that if the population had not been disqualified by the influences of the moment, they would have caught the assailants in the bed of the river "as in a trap," and overwhelmed them from the walls alongside. Within a square of fifteen miles to each side, we are not surprised to hear that both the extremities were already in the power of the besiegers before the central population heard of it, and while they were yet absorbed in unconscious festivity.

Such is the account given by Herodotus of the circumstances which placed Babylon—the greatest city of Western Asia—in the power of the Persians. To what extent the information communicated to him was incorrect or exaggerated, we cannot now decide. The way in which the city was treated would lead us to suppose that its acquisition cannot have cost the conquerer either much time or much loss. Cyrus comes into the list as king of Babylon, and the inhabitants with their whole territory become tributary to the Persians, forming the richest satrapy in the empire; but we do not hear that the people were otherwise ill-used, and it is certain that the vast walls and gates were left untouched. This was very different from the way in which the Medes had treated Nineveh, which seems to have been ruined and for a long time absolutely uninhabited, though re-occupied on a reduced scale under the Parthian empire; and very different also from the way in which Babylon itself was treated twenty years afterward by Darius, when reconquered after a revolt.

The importance of Babylon, marking as it does one of the peculiar forms of civilization belonging to the ancient world in a state of full development, gives an interest even to the half-authenticated stories respecting its capture. The other exploits ascribed to Cyrus—his invasion of India, across the desert of Arachosia—and his attack upon the Massagetæ, Nomads ruled by queen Tomyris and greatly resembling the Scythians, across the mysterious river which Herodotus calls Araxes—are too little known to be at all dwelt upon. In the latter he is said to have perished, his army being defeated in a bloody battle. He was buried at Pasargadæ, in his native province of Persis proper, where his tomb was honored and watched until the

breaking up of the empire, while his memory was held in profound veneration among the Persians, Of his real exploits we know little or nothing, but in what we read respecting him there seems, though amidst constant fighting, very little cruelty. Xenophon has selected his life as the subject of a moral romance, which for a long time was cited as authentic history, and which even now serves as an authority, express or implied, for disputable and even incorrect conclusions. His extraordinary activity and conquests admit of no doubt. He left the Persian empire extending from Sogdiana and the rivers Jaxartes and Indus eastward, to the Hellespont and the Syrian coast westward, and his successors made no permanent addition to it except that of Egypt. Phenicia and Judæa were dependencies of Babylon, at the time when he conquered it, with their princes and grandees in Babylonian captivity. As they seem to have yielded to him, and became his tributaries, without difficulty; so the restoration of their captives was conceded to them. It was from Cyrus that the habits of the Persian kings took commencement, to dwell at Susa in the winter, and Ekbatana during the summer; the primitive territory of Persis, with its two towns of Persepolis and Pasargadæ, being reserved for the burial-place of the kings and the religious sanctuary of the empire. How or when the conquest of Susiana was made, we are not informed. It lay eastward of the Tigris, between Babylonia and Persis proper, and its people, the Kissians, as far as we can discern, were of Assyrian and not of Arian race. The river Choaspes near Susa was supposed to furnish the only water fit for the palate of the Great King, and it is said to have been carried about with him wherever he went.

While the conquests of Cyrus contributed to assimilate the distinct types of civilization in Western Asia—not by elevating the worse, but by degrading the better—upon the native Persians themselves they operated as an extraordinary stimulus, provoking alike their pride, ambition, cupidity, and warlike propensities. Not only did the territory of Persis proper pay no tribute to Susa or Ekbatana—being the only district so exempted between the Jaxartes and the Mediterranean—but the vast tributes received from the remaining empire were distributed to a great degree among its inhabitants. Empire to them meant—for the great men, lucrative satrapies or pachalics, with powers altogether unlimited, pomp inferior only to that of the Great King, and standing armies which they employed at their own discretion sometimes against each other—for the common soldiers, drawn from their fields or flocks, constant plunder, abundant maintenance, and an unrestrained licence, either in the suite of one of the satraps, or in the large permanent troop which moved from Susa to Ekbatana with the Great King. And if the entire population of Persis proper did not migrate from their abodes to occupy some of those more inviting spots which the immensity of the imperial dominion furnished—a dominion extending (to use the language of Cyrus the

younger before the battle of Kunaxa) from the region of insupportable heat to that of insupportable cold—this was only because the early kings discouraged such a movement, in order that the nation might maintain its military hardihood and be in a situation to furnish undiminished supplies of soldiers. The self-esteem and arrogance of the Persians were no less remarkable than their avidity for sensual enjoyment. They were fond of wine to excess· their wives and their concubines were both numerous; and they adopted eagerly from foreign nations new fashions of luxury as well as of ornament. Even to novelties in religion, they were not strongly averse. For though disciples of Zoroaster, with Magi as their priests and as indispensable companions of their sacrifices, worshiping Sun, Moon, Earth, Fire, etc., and recognizing neither image, temple, nor altar—yet they had adopted the voluptuous worship of the goddess Mylitta from the Assyrians and Arabians. A numerous male offspring was the Persian's boast. His warlike character and consciousness of force were displayed in the education of these youths, who were taught, from five years old to twenty, only three things—to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth. To owe money, or even to buy and sell, was accounted among the Persians disgraceful—a sentiment which they defended by saying that both the one and the other imposed the necessity of telling falsehood. To exact tribute from subjects, to receive pay or presents from the king, and to give away without forethought whatever was not immediately wanted, was their mode of dealing with money. Industrior pursuits were left to the conquered, who were fortunate if by paying a fixed contribution and sending a military contingent when required, they could purchase undisturbed immunity for their remaining concerns. They could not thus purchase safety for the family hearth, since we find instances of noble Grecian maidens torn from their parents for the harem of the satrap.

To a people of this character, whose conceptions of political society went no farther than personal obedience to a chief, a conqueror like Cyrus would communicate the strongest excitement and enthusiasm of which they were capable. He had found them slaves, and made them masters: he was the first and greatest of national benefactors, as well as the most forward of leaders in the field: they followed him from one conquest to another, during the thirty years of his reign, their love of empire growing with the empire itself. And this impulse of aggrandizement continued unabated during the reigns of his three next successors—Kambyses, Darius, and Xerxes—until it was at length violently stifled by the humiliating defeats of Platæa and Salamis; after which the Persians became content with defending themselves at home and playing a secondary game. But at the time when Kambyses son of Cyrus succeeded to his father's scepter, Persian spirit was at its highest point. He was not long in fixing upon a prey both richer and less hazardous than the Massagetæ,

at the opposite extremity of the empire. Phenicia and Judæa being already subject to him, he resolved to invade Egypt, then highly flourishing under the long and prosperous reign of Amasis. Not much pretense was needed to color the aggression; so that the various stories which Herodotus mentions as causes of the war, are only interesting inasmach as they imply a vein of Egyptian party-feeling—affirming that the invasion was brought upon Amasis by a daughter of Apries, and was thus a judgment upon Amasis for having deposed Apries. As to the manner in which the daughter had produced this effect, indeed, the most contradictory stories were circulated.

Kambyses summoned the forces of his empire for this new enterprise, and among them both the Phenicians and the Asiatic Greeks, Æolic as well as Ionic, insular as well as continental—nearly all the maritime force and skill of the Ægean sea. He was apprised by a Greek deserter from the mercenaries in Egypt, named Phanes, of the difficulties of the march, and the best method of surmounting them; especially the three days of sandy desert, altogether without water, which lay between Egypt and Judæa. By the aid of the neighboring Arabians—with whom he concluded a treaty, and who were requited for this service with the title of equal allies, free from all tribute—he was enabled to surmount this serious difficulty, and to reach Pelusium at the eastern mouth of the Nile, where the Ionian and Karian troops in the Egyptian service, as well as the Egyptian military, were assembled to oppose him.

Fortunately for himself the Egyptian king Amasis had died during the interval of the Persian preparations, a few months before the expedition took place—after forty-four years of unabated prosperity. His death, at this critical moment, was probably the main cause of the easy conquest which followed; his son, Psammenitus, succeeding to his crown, but neither to his abilities nor his influence. The result of the invasion was foreshadowed, as usual, by a menacing prodigy—rain falling at Thebes in upper Egypt. It was brought about by a single victory, though bravely disputed, at Pelusium—followed by the capture of Memphis with the person of king Psammenitus, after a siege of some duration. Kambyses had sent forward a Mitylenæan ship to Memphis with heralds to summon the city. The Egyptians, in a paroxysm of fury, rushed out of the walls, destroyed the vessel, and tore the crew into pieces—a savage proceeding which drew upon them severe retribution after the capture. Psammenitus, after being at first treated with harshness and insult, was at length released and even allowed to retain his regal dignity as a dependent of Persia. But being soon detected, or at least believed to be concerned, in raising revolt against the conquerors, he was put to death, and Egypt was placed under a satrap.

There yet lay beyond Egypt territories for the Persians to conquer, though Kyrene and Barka, the Greek colonies near the coast of Libya, placed themselves at once out of the reach of danger by send-

ing to Kambyses tribute and submission at Memphis. He projected three new enterprises: one against Carthage by sea; the other two by land—against the Ethiopians, far to the southward up the course of the Nile—and against the oracle and oasis of Zeus Ammon, amidst the deserts of Libya. Towards Ethiopia he himself conducted his troops but was compelled to bring them back without reaching it, since they were on the point of perishing with famine; while the division which he sent against the temple of Ammon is said to have been overwhelmed by a sand-storm in the desert. The expedition against Carthage was given up for a reason which well deserves to be commemorated. The Phenicians, who formed the most efficient part of his navy, refused to serve against their kinsmen and colonists, pleading the sanctity of mutual oaths as well as the ties both of relationship and traffic. Even the frantic Kambyses was compelled to accept, and perhaps to respect, this honorable refusal, which was not imitated by the Ionic Greeks when Darius and Xerxes demanded the aid of their ships against Athens—we must add, however, that they were then in a situation much more exposed and helpless than that in which the Phenicians stood before Kambyses.

Among the sacred animals so numerous and so different throughout the various nomes of Egypt, the most venerated of all was the bull Apis. Such peculiar conditions were required by the Egyptian religion as to the birth, the age, and the marks of this animal, that when he died it was difficult to find a new calf properly qualified to succeed him. Much time was sometimes spent in the search, and when an unexceptionable successor was at last found the demonstrations of joy in Memphis were extravagant and universal. At the moment when Kambyses returned to Memphis from his Ethiopian expedition, full of humiliation for the result, it so happened that a new Apis was just discovered; and as the population of the city gave vent to their usual festive pomp and delight, he construed it into an intentional insult toward his own recent misfortunes. In vain did the priests and magistrates explain to him the real cause of these popular manifestations. He persisted in his belief, punished some of them with death and others with stripes, and commanded every man seen in holiday attire to be slain. Farthermore—to carry his outrage against Egyptian feeling to the uttermost pitch—he sent for the newly-discovered Apis, and plunged his dagger into the side of the animal, who shortly afterward died of the wound.

After this brutual deed—calculated to efface in the minds of the Egyptian priests the enormities of Cheops and Chephren, and doubtless unparalleled in all the 24,000 years of their anterior history—Kambyses lost every spark of reason which yet remained to him. The Egyptians found in this visitation a new proof of the avenging interference of their gods. Not only did he commit every variety of studied outrage against the conquered people among whom he was tarrying, as well as their temples and their sepulchers—but he also

dealt his blows against his Persian friends and even his nearest blood-relations. Among these revolting atrocities, one of the greatest deserves peculiar notice, because the fate of the empire was afterward materially affected by it. His younger brother, Smerdis, had accompanied him into Egypt, but had been sent back to Susa because the king became jealous of the admiration which his personal strength and qualities called forth. That jealousy was aggravated into alarm and hatred by a dream portending dominion and conquest to Smerdis, and the frantic Kambyses sent to Susa secretly a confidential Persian, Prexaspes, with the express orders to get rid of his brother. Prexaspes fulfilled his commission effectively, burying the slain prince with his own hands, and keeping the deed concealed from all except a few of the chiefs at the regal residence.

Among these few chiefs, however, there was one, the Median Patizeithes, belonging to the order of the Magi, who saw in it a convenient stepping-stone for his own personal ambition, and made use of it as a means of covertly supplanting the dynasty of the great Cyrus. Enjoying the full confidence of Kambyses, he had been left by that prince on departing for Egypt in the entire management of the palace and treasures, with extensive authority, Moreover he happened to have a brother extremely resembling in person the deceased Smerdis. As the open and dangerous madness of Kambyses contributed to alienate from him the minds of the Persians, Patizeithes resolved to proclaim his brother as king in his room, as if it were the younger son of Cyrus succeeding to the disqualified elder. On one important point, the false Smerdis differed from the true. He had lost his ears, which Cyrus himself had caused to be cut off for an offense; but the personal resemblance, after all, was of little importance, since he was seldom or never allowed to show himself to the people. Kambyses heard of this revolt in Syria on his return from Egypt. He was mounting his horse in haste for the purpose of going to suppress it, when an accident from his sword put an end to his life. Herodotus tells us that before his death he summoned the Persians around him, confessed that he had been guilty of putting his brother to death, and apprised them that the reigning Smerdis was only a Median pretender—conjuring them at the same time not to submit to the disgrace of being ruled by any other than a Persian and an Achæmenid. But if it be true that he ever made known the facts, no one believed him. For Prexaspes on his part was compelled by regard to his own safety, to deny that he had imbrued his hands in the blood of a son of Cyrus; and thus the opportune death of Kambyses placed the false Smerdis without opposition at the head of the Persians, who all, or for the most part, believed themselves to be ruled by a genuine son of Cyrus. Kambyses had reigned for seven years and five months.

For seven months did Smerdis reign without opposition, seconded by his brother Patizeithes. If he manifested his distrust of the haughty Persians around him by neither inviting them into his palace

nor showing himself out of it, he at the same time studiously conciliated the favor of the subject-provinces, by remission of tribute and of military service for three years. Such a departure from the Persian principle of government was in itself sufficient to disgust the warlike and rapacious Achæmenids at Susa; but it seems that their suspicions as to his genuine character had never been entirely set at rest, and in the eighth month those suspicions were converted into certainty. According to what seems to have been the Persian usage, he had taken to himself the entire harem of his predecessor, among whose wives was numbered Phædyme, daughter of a distinguished Persian named Otanes. At the instance of her father, Phædyme undertook the dangerous task of feeling the head of Smerdis while he slept, and thus detected the absence of ears. Otanes, possessed of the decisive information, lost no time in concerting, with five other noble Achæmenids, means for ridding themselves of a king who was at once a Mede, a Magian, and a man without ears; Darius, son of Hystaspes the satrap of Persis proper, arriving just in time to join the conspiracy as the seventh. How these seven noblemen slew Smerdis in his palace at Susa—how they subsequently debated among themselves whether they should establish in Persia a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy—how, after the first of the three had been resolved upon, it was determined that the future king, whichever he might be, should be bound to take his wives only from the families of the seven conspirators—how Darius became king from the circumstance of his horse being the first to neigh among those of the conspirators at a given spot, by the stratagem of the groom Œbares—how Otanes, standing aside beforehand from this lottery for the throne, reserved for himself as well as for his descendants perfect freedom and exemption from the rule of the future king, whichsoever might draw the prize—all these incidents may be found recounted by Herodotus with his usual vivacity, but with no small addition of Hellenic ideas as well as of dramatic ornament.

It was thus that the upright tiara, the privileged head-dress of the Persian kings, passed away from the lineage of Cyrus, yet without departing from the great phratry of the Achæmenidæ—to which Darius and his father Hystaspes, as well as Cyrus, belonged. That important fact is unquestionable, and probably the acts ascribed to the seven conspirators are in the main true, apart from their discussions and intentions. But, on this as well as on other occasions, we must guard ourselves against an illusion which the historical manner of Herodotus is apt to create. He presents to us with so much descriptive force the personal narrative—individual action and speech, with all its accompanying hopes, fears, doubts and passions—that our attention is distracted from the political bearing of what is going on; which we are compelled often to gather up from hints in the speeches of performers, or from consequences afterwards indirectly noticed. When we put together all the incidental notices

which he lets drop, it will be found that the change of scepter from Smerdis to Darius was a far larger political event than his direct narrative would seem to announce. Smerdis represents preponderance to the Medes over the Persians, and comparative degradation to the latter; who, by the installation of Darius, are again placed in the ascendant. The Medes and the Magians are in this case identical; for the Magians, though indispensable in the capacity of priests to the Persians, were essentially one of the seven Median tribes. It thus appears that though Smerdis ruled as a son of the great Cyrus, yet he ruled by means of Medes and Magians, depriving the Persians of that supreme privilege and predominance to which they had become accustomed. We see this by what followed immediately after the assassination of Smerdis and his brother in the palace. The seven conspirators, exhibiting the bloody heads of both these victims as an evidence of their deed, instigated the Persians in Susa to a general massacre of the Magians, many of whom were actually slain, and the rest only escaped by flight, concealment, or the hour of night. And the anniversary of this day was celebrated afterward among the Persians by a solemnity and festival, called the Magophonia; no Magian being ever allowed on that day to appear in public. The descendants of the Seven maintained a privileged name and rank, even down to the extinction of the monarchy by Alexander the Great.

Furthermore, it appears that the authority of Darius was not readily acknowledged throughout the empire, and that an interval of confusion ensued before it became so. The Medes actually revolted, and tried to maintain themselves by force against Darius, who, however, found means to subdue them: though when he convoked his troops from the various provinces, he did not receive from the satraps universal obedience. The powerful Orœtes especially, who had been appointed by Cyrus satrap of Lydia and Ionia, not only sent no troops to the aid of Darius against the Medes, but even took advantage of the disturbed state of the government to put to death his private enemy Mitrobates satrap of Phrygia, and appropriate that satrapy in addition to his own. Aryandes also, the satrap nominated by Kambyses in Egypt, comported himself as the equal of Darius rather than as his subject. The subject provinces generally, to whom Smerdis had granted remission of tribute and military service for the space of three years, were grateful and attached to his memory, and noway pleased with the new dynasty. Moreover the revolt of the Babylonians, conceived a year or two before it was executed, took its rise from the feelings of this time. But the renewal of the old conflict between the two principal sections of the empire, Medes and Persians, is doubtless the most important feature in this political revolution. The false Smerdis with his brother, both of them Medes and Magians, had revived the Median nationality to a state of supremacy over the Persian, recalling the memory of what it had been under

Astyages; while Darius—a pure Persian, and not (like the mule Cyrus) half Mede and half Persian—replaced the Persian nationality in its ascendant condition, though not without the necessity of suppressing by force a rebellion of the Medes.

It has already been observed that the subjugation of the recusant Medes was not the only embarrassment of the first years of Darius. Orœtes, satrap of Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia, ruling seemingly the entire western coast of Asia Minor—possessing a large military force and revenue, and surrounded by a body-guard of 1000 native Persians—maintained a haughty independence. He secretly made away with couriers sent to summon him to Susa, and even wreaked his vengeance upon some of the principal Persians who had privately offended him. Darius, not thinking it prudent to attack him by open force, proposed to the chief Persians at Susa the dangerous problem of destroying him by stratagem. Thirty among them volunteered to undertake it, and Bagæus, son of Artontes, to whom on drawing lots the task devolved, accomplished it by a maneuver which might serve as a lesson to the Ottoman government in its embarrassments with contumacious Pashas. Having proceeded to Sardis furnished with many different royal ordinances, formally set forth and bearing the seal of Darius, he was presented to Orœtes in audience, with the public secretary of the satrapy close at hand, and the Persian guards standing around. He presented his ordinances to be read aloud by the secretary, choosing first those which related to matters of no great importance; but when he saw that the guards listened with profound reverence, and that the king's name and seal imposed upon them irresistibly, he ventured upon the real purport of his perilous mission. An ordinance was handed to the secretary, and read by him aloud, as follows: "Persians, king Darius forbids you to serve any longer as guards to Orœtes." The obedient guards at once delivered up their spears, when Bagæus caused the final warrant to be read to them: "King Darius commands the Persians in Sardis to kill Orœtes." The guards drew their swords and killed him on the spot: his large treasure was conveyed to Susa: Darius became undisputed master, and probably Bagæus satrap.

Another devoted adherent, and another yet more memorable piece of cunning, laid prostrate before Darius the mighty walls and gates of the revolted Babylon. The inhabitants of that city had employed themselves assiduously—both during the lax provincial superintendence of the false Smerdis and during the period of confusion and conflict which elapsed before Darius became firmly established and obeyed—in making every preparation both for declaring and sustaining their independence. Having accumulated a large store of provisions and other requisites for a long siege, without previous detection, they at length proclaimed their independence openly. Such was the intensity of their resolution to shake off the yoke, that they had recourse to a proceeding, which, if correctly reported by Herodotus, forms one of the most frightful enormities recorded in his history. To make their provisions last out longer, they strangled all the women in the city, reserving only their mothers, and one woman to each family for the purpose of baking. We cannot but suppose that this has been magnified from a partial into a universal destruction; but taking it even with such allowance, it illustrates that ferocious force of will—and that predominance of strong nationality, combined with antipathy to foreigners, over all the gentler sympathies—which seems to mark the Semitic nations, and which may be traced so conspicuously in the Jewish history of Josephus.

Darius, assembling all the forces in his power, laid siege to the revolted city, but could make no impression upon it either by force or by stratagem. He tried to repeat the proceeding by which Cyrus had taken it at first; but the besieged were found this time on their guard. The siege had lasted twenty months without the smallest progress, and the Babylonians derided the besiegers from the height of their impregnable walls, when a distinguished Persian nobleman, Zopyrus—son of Megabyzus, who had been one of the seven conspirators against Smerdis—presented himself one day before Darius in a state of frightful mutilation. His nose and ears were cut off, and his body misused in every way. He had designedly thus maimed himself, "thinking it intolerable that Assyrians should thus laugh the Persians to scorn," in the intention, which he presently intimated to Darius, of passing into the town as a deserter, with the view of betraying it—for which purpose measures were concerted. The Babylonians, seeing a Persian of the highest rank in so calamitous a condition, readily believed his assurance that he had been thus punished by the king's order, and that he came over to them as the only means of procuring for himself signal vengeance. Intrusted by them with the command of a detachment, he gained several advantages in different sallies, according to previous concert with Darius, until at length the Babylonians, grateful and confident, placed under his charge the principal gates. At the critical moment these gates were thrown open, and the Persians became masters of the city.

Thus was the impregnable Babylon a second time reduced. Darius took precautions on this occasion to put it out of condition for resisting a third time. He caused the walls and gates to be demolished, and three thousand of the principal citizens to be crucified. The remaining inhabitants were left in the dismantled city, fifty thousand women being levied by assessment upon the neighboring provinces, to supply the place of the women strangled when it first revolted. Zopyrus was appointed satrap of the territory for life, with enjoyment of its entire revenues, receiving besides every additional reward which it was in the power of Darius to bestow, and generous assurances from the latter that he would rather have Zopyrus without wounds than the possession of Babylon. I have already intimated in a former chapter that the demolition of the walls here

mentioned is not to be regarded as complete and continuous, nor was there any necessity that it should be so. Partial demolition would be quite sufficient to leave the city without defense; and the description given by Herodotus of the state of things as they stood at the time of his visit, proves that portions of the walls yet subsisted. One circumstance is yet to be added in reference to the subsequent condition of Babylon under the Persian empire. The city, with the territory belonging to it, constituted a satrapy, which not only paid a larger tribute (one thousand Euboic talents of silver) and contributed a much larger amount of provisions in kind for the maintenance of the Persian court, than any other among the twenty satrapies of the empire, but furnished besides an annual supply of five hundred eunuch youths. We may presume that this was intended in part as a punishment for the past revolt, since the like obligation was not imposed upon any other satrapy.

Thus firmly established on the throne, Darius occupied it for thirty-six years. His reign was one of organization, different from that of his two predecessors; a difference which the Persians well understood and noted, calling Cyrus the father, Kambyses the master, and Darius the retail-trader or huckster. In the mouth of the Persians this latter epithet must be construed as no insignificant compliment, since it intimates that he was the first to introduce some methodical order into the imperial administration and finances. Under the two former kings there was no definite amount of tribute levied upon the subject provinces. They furnished what were called presents, subject to no fixed limit except such as might be satisfactory to the satrap in each district. But Darius—succeeding as he did to Smerdis, who had rendered himself popular with the provinces by large financial exemptions, and having farther to encounter jealousy and dissatisfaction from Persians, his former equals in rank—probably felt it expedient to relieve the provinces from the burden of undefined exactions. He distributed the whole empire into twenty departments, imposing upon each a fixed annual tax, and a fixed contribution for the maintenance of the court. This must doubtless have been a great improvement, though the limitation of the sum which the Great King at Susa would require, did not at all prevent the satrap in his own province from indefinite requisitions beyond it. The satrap was a little king, who acted nearly as he pleased in the internal administration of his province, subject only to the necessity of sending up the imperial tribute, of keeping off foreign enemies, and of furnishing an adequate military contingent for the foreign enterprises of the Great King. To every satrap was attached a royal secretary or comptroller of the revenue, who probably managed the imperial finances in the province, and to whom the court of Susa might perhaps look as a watch upon the satrap himself. It is not to be supposed that the Persian authorities in any province meddled with the details of taxation or contribution, as they bore upon individuals. The court having fixed the entire sum payable by the satrapy in the aggregate, the satrap or the secretary apportioned it among the various component districts, towns, or provinces, leaving to the local authorities in each of these latter the task of assessing it upon individual inhabitants. From necessity, therefore, as well as from indolence of temper and political incompetence, the Persians were compelled to respect the authorities which they found standing both in town and country, and to leave in their hands a large measure of genuine influence, frequently overruled indeed by oppressive interference on the part of the satrap, whenever any of his passions prompted—but never entirely superseded. In the important towns and stations, Persian garrisons were usually kept, and against the excesses of the military there was probably little or no protection to the subject people. Yet still the provincial governments were allowed to continue, and often even the petty kings who had governed separate districts during their state of independence prior to the Persian conquest, retained their title and dignity as tributaries to the court of Susa. The empire of the Great King was thus an aggregate of heterogeneous elements, connected together by no tie except that of common fear and subjection—noway coherent nor self-supporting, nor pervaded by any common system or spirit of nationality. It resembled in its main political features, the Turkish and Persian empires of the present day, though distinguished materially by the many differences arising out of Mohammedanism and Christianity, and perhaps hardly reaching the same extreme of rapacity, corruption, and cruelty in detail.

Darius distributed the Persian empire into twenty satrapies, each including a certain continuous territory, and one or more nations inhabiting it, the names of which Herodotus sets forth. The amount of tribute payable by each satrapy was determined; payable in gold, according to the Euboic talent, by the Indians in the easternmost satrapy—in silver, according to the Babylonian or larger talent, by the remaining nineteen. Herodotus computes the ratio of gold to silver as 13 : 1. From the nineteen satrapies which paid in silver, there was levied annually the sum of 7,740 Babylonian talents, equal to something about £2 964,000 sterling: from the Indians, who alone paid in gold, there was received a sum equal (at the rate of 1 : 13) to 4,680 Euboic talents of silver, or to about £1,290,000 sterling. To explain how it happened that this one satrapy was charged with a sum equal to two-fifths of the aggregate charge on the other nineteen, Herodotus dwells upon the vast population, the extensive territory, and the abundant produce in gold, among those whom he calls Indians—the easternmost inhabitants of the earth, since beyond them there was nothing but uninhabitable sand—reaching, as far as we can make it out, from Baktria southward along the Indus to its mouth, but how far eastward we cannot determine. Darius is said to have undertaken an expedition against them and subdued them. Moreover, he

is affirmed to have constructed and dispatched vessels down the Indus, from the city of Kaspatyri and the territory of the Paktyes, in its upper regions, all the way down to its mouth: then into the Indian Ocean, round the peninsula of Arabia, and up the Red Sea to Egypt. The ships were commanded by a Greek—Skylax, of Karyanda on the south-western coast of Asia Minor; who, if this statement be correct, executed a scheme of nautical enterprise not only one hundred and seventy years earlier, but also far more extensive than the famous voyage of Nearchus, admiral of Alexander the Great, who only went from the Indus to the Persian Gulf. The eastern portions of the Persian empire remained so unknown and unvisited until the Macedonian invasion, that we are unable to criticise the isolated statements of Herodotus. None of the Persian kings subsequent to Darius appear to have visited them, and whether the prodigious sum demandable from them according to the Persian rent-roll was ever regularly levied, may reasonably be doubted. At the same time, we may readily believe that the mountains in the northern parts of Persian India (Cabul and Little Thibet) were at that time extremely productive in gold, and that quantities of that metal, such as now appear almost fabulous, may have been often obtained. It seems that the produce of gold in all parts of the earth, as far as hitherto known, is obtained exclusively near the surface; so that a country once rich in that metal may well have been exhausted of its whole supply, and left at a later period without any gold at all.

Of the nineteen silver-paying satrapies, the most heavily imposed was Babylonia, which paid 1000 talents. The next in amount of charge was Egypt, paying 700 talents, besides the produce of the fish from the lake of Mœris: the remaining satrapies varied in amount, down as low as 170 talents, which was the sum charged on the seventh satrapy (in the enumeration of Herodotus) comprising the Sattagydæ, the Gandarii, the Dodikæ, and the Aparytæ. The Ionians, Æolians, Magnesians on the Mæander and on Mount Sipylus, Karians, Lykians, Milyans, and Pamphylians—including the coast of Asia Minor southward of Kanc, and from thence round the southern promontory to Phaselis—were rated as one division, paying 400 talents. Yet we may be sure that much more than this was really taken from the people, when we read that Magnesia alone afterward paid to Themistokles a revenue of 50 talents annually. The Mysians and Lydians were included, with some others, in another division; and the Hellespontine Greeks in a third, with Phrygians, Bithynians, Paphlagonians, Mariandynians, and Syrians, paying 360 talents—nearly the same as was paid by Syria proper, Phenicia and Judæa, with the island of Cyprus. Independent of this regular tribute, with the undefined sums extorted over and above it, there were some dependent nations, which, though exempt from tribute, furnished occasional sums called presents. Further contributions were exacted for the maintenance of the vast suite who always personally attended the king. One entire third of this last burden was borne by Babylonia alone in consequence of its exuberant fertility: it was paid in produce, as indeed the peculiar productions of every part of the empire seem to have been sent up for the regal consumption.

However imperfectly we are now able to follow the geographical distribution of the subject nations as given by Herodotus, it is extremely valuable as the only professed statistics remaining, of the entire Persian empire. The arrangement of satrapies, which he describes, underwent modification in subsequent times; at least it does not harmonize with various statements in the Anabasis of Xenophon, and in other authors who recount Persian affairs belonging to the fourth century B.C. But we find in no other author except Herodotus any entire survey and distribution of the empire. It is indeed a new tendency which now manifests itself in the Persian Darius, compared with his predecessors; not simply to conquer, to extort, and to give away—but to do all this with something like method and system, and to define the obligations of the satraps towards Susa. Another remarkable example of the same tendency is to be found in the fact, that Darius was the first Persian king who coined money. His coin both in gold and silver, the Daric, was the earliest produce of a Persian mint. The revenue, as brought to Susa in metallic money of various descriptions, was melted down separately, and poured in a fluid state in jars or earthenware vessels. When the metal had cooled and hardened, the jar was broken, leaving a standing solid mass from which portions were cut off as the occasion required. And in addition to these administrative, financial, and monetary arrangements, of which Darius was the first originator, we may probably ascribe to him the first introduction of that system of roads, resting-places, and permanent relays of couriers, which connected both Susa and Ekbatana with the distant portions of the empire. Herodotus describes in considerable detail the imperial road from Sardis to Susa, a journey of ninety days, crossing the Halys, the Euphrates, the Tigris, the Greater and Lesser Zab, the Gyndes, and the Choaspes. In his time it was kept in excellent order, with convenience for travelers.

It was Darius also who first completed the conquest of the Ionic Greeks by the acquisition of the important island of Samos. That island had maintained its independence, at the time when the Persian general Harpagus effected the conquest of Ionia, and even when Chios and Lesbos submitted. The Persians had no fleet to attack it; nor had the Phenicians yet been taught to round the Triopian cape. Indeed the depression which overtook the other cities of Ionia tended rather to the aggrandizement of Samos, under the energetic and unscrupulous despotism of Polykrates. That ambitious Samian, about ten years after the conquest of Sardis by Cyrus (seemingly

between 536–532 B.C.), contrived to seize by force or fraud the government of his native island, with the aid of his brothers Pantagnotus and Syloson, and a small band of conspirators. At first the three brothers shared the supreme power; but presently Polykrates put to death Pantagnotus, banished Syloson, and made himself despot alone. In this station, his ambition, his perfidy, and his good fortune were alike remarkable. He conquered several of the neighboring islands, and even some towns on the mainland: he carried on successful war against Miletus, and signally defeated the Lesbian ships which came to assist Miletus: he got together a force of one hundred armed ships called pentekonters, and one thousand mercenary bowmen—aspiring to nothing less than the dominion of Ionia, with the islands in the Ægean. Alike terrible to friend and foe by his indiscriminate spirit of aggression, he acquired a naval power which seems at that time to have been the greatest in the Grecian world. He had been in intimate alliance with Amasis, king of Egypt, who however ultimately broke with him. Considering his behavior towards allies, this rupture is not at all surprising; but Herodotus ascribes it to the alarm which Amasis conceived at the uninterrupted and superhuman good fortune of Polykrates—a degree of good fortune sure to draw down ultimately corresponding intensity of suffering from the hands of the envious gods. Indeed, Herodotus—deeply penetrated with this belief in an ever present Nemesis, which allows no man to be very happy, or long happy, with impunity—throws it into the form of an epistolary warning from Amasis to Polykrates, advising him to inflict upon himself some seasonable mischief or suffering; in order, if possible, to avert the ultimate judgment—to let blood in time, so that the plethora of happiness might not end in apoplexy. Pursuant to such counsel, Polykrates threw into the sea a favorite ring of matchless price and beauty; but unfortunately, in a few days, the ring re-appeared in the belly of a fine fish, which a fisherman had sent to him as a present. Amasis, now forewarned that the final apoplexy was inevitable, broke off the alliance with Polykrates without delay. This well-known story, interesting as evidence of ancient belief, is not less to be noted as showing the power of that belief to beget fictitious details out of real characters, such as I have already touched upon in the history of Solon and Crœsus, and elsewhere.

The facts mentioned by Herodotus rather lead us to believe that it was Polykrates, who, with characteristic faithlessness, broke off his friendship with Amasis; finding it suitable to his policy to cultivate the alliance of Kambyses, when that prince was preparing for his invasion of Egypt. In that invasion the Ionic subjects of Persia were called upon to serve, and Polykrates deeming it a good opportunity to rid himself of some Samian malcontents, sent to the Persian king to tender auxiliaries from himself. Kambyses eagerly caught at the prospect of aid from the first naval potentate in the Ægean; upon

which forty Samian triremes were sent to the Nile, having on board the suspected persons, as well as conveying a secret request to the Persian king that they might never be suffered to return. Either they never went to Egypt, however, or they found means to escape; very contradictory stories have reached Herodotus. But they certainly returned to Samos, attacked Polykrates at home, and were driven off by his superior force without making any impression. Whereupon they repaired to Sparta to entreat assistance.

We may here notice the gradual increasing tendency in the Grecian world to recognize Sparta as something like a head, protector, or referee, in cases either of foreign danger or internal dispute. The earliest authentic instance known to us, of application to Sparta in this character, is that of Crœsus against Cyrus; next, that of the Ionic Greeks against the latter: the instance of the Samians now before us, is the third. The important events connected with, and consequent upon, the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ from Athens, manifesting yet more formally the headship of Sparta, occur fifteen years after the present event; they have been already recounted in a previous chapter, and serve as a farther proof of progress in the same direction. To watch the growth of these new political habits is essential to a right understanding of Grecian history.

On reaching Sparta, the Samian exiles, borne down with despondency and suffering, entered at large into the particulars of their case. Their long speaking annoyed instead of moving the Spartans, who said, or are made to say—"We have forgotten the first part of the speech, and the last part is unintelligible to us." Upon which the Samians appeared the next day simply with an empty wallet, saying—"Our wallet has no meal in it." "Your wallet is superfluous" (said the Spartans); i.e. the words would have been sufficient without it. The aid which they implored was granted.

We are told that both the Lacedæmonians and the Corinthians—who joined them in the expedition now contemplated—had separate grounds of quarrel with the Samians, which operated as a more powerful motive than the simple desire to aid the suffering exiles. But it rather seems that the subsequent Greeks generally construed the Lacedæmonian interference against Polykrates as an example of standing Spartan hatred against despots. Indeed the only facts which we know, to sustain this anti-despotic sentiment for which the Lacedæmonians had credit, are, their proceedings against Polykrates and Hippias: there may have been other cases, but we cannot specify them with certainty. However this may be, a joint Lacedæmonian and Corinthian force accompanied the exiles back to Samos, and assailed Polykrates in the city: they did their best to capture it, for forty days, and were at one time on the point of succeeding, but were finally obliged to retire without any success. "The city would have been taken," says Herodotus, "if all the Lacedæmonians had acted like Archias and Lykopas"—who, pressing closely upon the retreat,

ing Samians, were shut within the town gates, and perished. The historian had heard this exploit in personal conversation with Archias, grandson of the person above-mentioned, in the deme Pitana at Sparta—whose father had been named Samius, and who respected the Samians above any other Greeks, because they had bestowed upon the two brave warriors, slain within their town, an honorable and public funeral. It is rarely that Herodotus thus specifies his informants. had he done so more frequently, the value as well as the interest of his history would have been materially increased.

On the retirement of the Lacedæmonian force, the Samian exiles were left destitute; and looking out for some community to plunder, weak as well as rich, they pitched upon the island of Siphnos. The Siphnians of that day were the wealthiest islanders in the Ægean, from the productiveness of their gold and silver mines,—the produce of which was annually distributed among the citizens, reserving a tithe for the Delphian temple. Their treasure-chamber was among the most richly-furnished of which that holy place could boast, and they themselves probably, in these times of early prosperity, were numbered among the most brilliant of the Ionic visitors at the Delian festival. The Samians, landing at Siphnos, demanded a contribution, under the name of a loan, of ten talents. Upon refusal, they proceeded to ravage the island, inflicting upon the inhabitants a severe defeat, and ultimately extorting from them 100 talents. They next purchased from the inhabitants of Hermione, in the Argolic peninsula, the neighboring island of Hydrea, famous in modern Greek warfare. Yet it appears that their plans must have been subsequently changed, for instead of occupying it, they placed it under the care of the Trœzenians. and repaired themselves to Krete, for the purpose of expelling the Zakynthian settlers at Kydonia. In this they succeeded, and were induced to establish themselves in that place; but after they had remained there five years, the Kretans obtained naval aid from Ægina, whereby the place was recovered, and the Samian intruders finally sold into slavery.

Such was the melancholy end of the enemies of Polykrates. Meanwhile that despot himself was more powerful and prosperous than ever. Samos under him was "the first of all cities, Hellenic or barbaric." The great works admired by Herodotus in the island—an aqueduct for the city, tunneled through a mountain for the length of seven furlongs—a mole to protect the harbor, two furlongs long and twenty fathoms deep—and the vast temple of Here—may probably have been enlarged and completed, if not begun, by him. Aristotle quotes the public works of Polykrates as instances of the profound policy of despots, to occupy as well as to impoverish their subjects. The earliest of all Grecian thalassokrats, or sea-kings—master of the greatest naval force in the Ægean, as well as of many among its islands—he displayed his love of letters by friendship to Anakreon, and his piety by consecrating to the Delian Apollo the

neighboring island of Rhenεia. But while thus outshining all his contemporaries, victorious over Sparta and Corinth, and projecting farther aggrandizement, he was precipitated on a sudden into the abyss of ruin; and that too, as if to demonstrate unequivocally the agency of the envious gods, not from the revenge of any of his numerous victims, but from the gratuitous malice of a stranger whom he had never wronged and never even seen. The Persian satrap Orœtes, on the neighboring main-land, conceived an implacable hatred against him: no one could tell why—for he had no design of attacking the island; and the trifling reasons conjecturally assigned, only prove that the real reason, whatever it might be, was unknown. Availing himself of the notorious ambition and cupidity of Polykrates, Orœtes sent to Samos a messenger, pretending that his life was menaced by Kambyses, and that he was anxious to make his escape with his abundant treasures. He proposed to Polykrates a share in this treasure, sufficient to make him master of all Greece, as far as that object could be achieved by money, provided the Samian prince would come over to convey him away. Mæandrius, secretary of Polykrates, was sent over to Magnesia on the Mæander to make inquiries. He there saw the satrap with eight large coffers full of gold—or rather apparently so, being in reality full of stones, with a layer of gold at the top—tied up ready for departure. The cupidity of Polykrates was not proof against so rich a bait. He crossed over to Magnesia with a considerable suite, and thus came into the power of Orœtes, in spite of the warnings of his prophets and the agony of his terrified daughter, to whom his approaching fate had been revealed in a dream. The satrap slew him and crucified his body; releasing all the Samians who accompanied him, with an intimation that they ought to thank him for procuring them a free government—but retaining both the foreigners and the slaves as prisoners. The death of Orœtes himself, which ensued shortly afterward, has already been described: it is considered by Herodotus as a judgment for his flagitious deed in the case of Polykrates.

At the departure of the latter from Samos, in anticipation of a speedy return, Mæandrius had been left as his lieutenant at Samos; and the unexpected catastrophe of Polykrates filled him with surprise and consternation. Though possessed of the fortresses, the soldiers, and the treasures, which had constituted the machinery of his powerful master, he knew the risk of trying to employ them on his own account. Partly from this apprehension, partly from the genuine political morality which prevailed with more or less force in every Grecian bosom, he resolved to lay down his authority and enfranchise the island. "He wished (says the historian in a remarkable phrase) to act like the justest of men; but he was not allowed to do so." His first proceeding was to erect in the suburbs an altar, in honor of Zeus Eleutherius, and to inclose a piece of ground as precinct, which still existed in the time of Herodotus; he next convened an assembly of the

Samians. "You know (said he) that the whole power of Polykrates is now in my hands, and that there is nothing to hinder me from continuing to rule over you. Nevertheless what I condemn in another I will not do myself, and I have always disapproved of Polykrates, and others like him, for seeking to rule over men as good as themselves. Now that Polykrates has come to the end of his destiny, I at once lay down the command, and proclaim among you equal law; reserving to myself as privileges, first, six talents out of the treasures of Polykrates—next, the hereditary priesthood of Zeus Eleutherius for myself and my descendants forever. To him I have just set apart a sacred precinct, as the God of that freedom which I now hand over to you."

This reasonable and generous proposition fully justifies the epithet of Herodotus. But very differently was it received by the Samian hearers. One of the chief men among them, Telesarchus, exclaimed with the applause of the rest, "*You* rule us, low-born and scoundrel as you are! you are not worthy to rule: don't think of that, but give us some account of the money which you have been handling."

Such an unexpected reply caused a total revolution in the mind of Mæandrius. It left him no choice but to maintain dominion at all hazards, which he resolved to do. Retiring into the acropolis under pretense of preparing his money accounts for examination, he sent for Telesarchus and his chief political enemies, one by one—intimating that the accounts were open to inspection. As fast as they arrived they were put in chains, while Mæandrius remained in the acropolis, with his soldiers and his treasures, as the avowed successor of Polykrates. After a short hour of insane boastfulness, the Samians found themselves again enslaved. "It seemed (says Herodotus) that they were not willing to be free."

We cannot but contrast their conduct on this occasion with that of the Athenians about twelve years afterward, on the expulsion of Hippias, which has been recounted in a previous chapter. The position of the Samians was far the more favorable of the two, for the quiet and successful working of a free government; since they had the advantage of a voluntary as well as a sincere resignation from the actual despot. Yet the thirst for reactionary investigation prevented them even from taking a reasonable estimate of their own power of enforcing it. They passed at once from extreme subjection to overbearing and ruinous rashness. Whereas the Athenians, under circumstances far less promising, avoided the fatal mistake of sacrificing the prospects of the future to recollections of the past; showed themselves both anxious to acquire the rights, and willing to perform the obligations, of a free community; listened to wise counsels, maintained unanimous action, and overcame by heroic effort forces very greatly superior. If we compare the reflections of Herodotus on the one case and on the other, we shall be struck with the difference which those reflections imply between the Athenians and the Samians—a difference partly referable, doubtless, to the pure Hellenism of the former, contrasted with the half-Asiatized Hellenism of the latter—but also traceable in a great degree to the preliminary lessons of the Solonian constitution, overlaid, but not extinguished, during the despotism of the Peisistratids which followed.

The events which succeeded in Samos are little better than a series of crimes and calamities. The prisoners, whom Mæandrius had detained in the acropolis, were slain during his dangerous illness, by his brother Lykaretus, under the idea that this would enable him more easily to seize the scepter. But Mæandrius recovered, and must have continued as despot for a year or two. It was however a weak despotism, contested more or less in the island, and very different from the iron hand of Polykrates. In this untoward condition the Samians were surprised by the arrival of a new claimant for their scepter and acropolis—and what was much more formidable, a Persian army to back him.

Syloson, the brother of Polykrates, having taken part originally in his brother's conspiracy and usurpation, had been at first allowed to share the fruits of it, but quickly found himself banished. In this exile he remained during the whole life of Polykrates, and until the accession of Darius to the Persian throne, which followed about a year after the death of Polykrates. He happened to be at Memphis in Egypt during the time when Kambyses was there with his conquering army, and when Darius, then a Persian of little note, was serving among his guards. Syloson was walking in the agora of Memphis, wearing a scarlet cloak, to which Darius took a great fancy, and proposed to buy it. A divine inspiration prompted Syloson to reply, "I cannot for any price sell it; but I give it to you for nothing, if it must be yours." Darius thanked him and accepted the cloak; and for some years the donor accused himself of a silly piece of good nature. But as events came round, Syloson at length heard with surprise that the unknown Persian, whom he had presented with the cloak at Memphis, was installed as king in the palace at Susa. He went thither, proclaimed himself as a Greek, the benefactor of the new king, and was admitted to the regal presence. Darius had forgotten his person, but perfectly remembered the adventure of the cloak, when it was brought to his mind—and showed himself forward to requite, on the scale becoming the Great King, former favors, though small, rendered to the simple soldier at Memphis. Gold and silver were tendered to Syloson in profusion, but he rejected them—requesting that the island of Samos might be conquered and handed over to him, without slaughter or enslavement of inhabitants. His request was complied with. Otanes, the originator of the conspiracy against Smerdis, was sent down to the coast of Ionia with an army, carried Syloson over to Samos, and landed him unexpectedly on the island.

Mæandrius was in no condition to resist the invasion, nor were the

Samians generally disposed to sustain him. He accordingly concluded a convention with Otanes, whereby he agreed to make way for Syloson, to evacuate the island, and to admit the Persians at once into the city; retaining possession, however, for such time as might be necessary to embark his property and treasures, of the acropolis, which had a separate landing-place, and even a subterranean passage and secret portal for embarkation—probably one of the precautionary provisions of Polykrates. Otanes willingly granted these conditions, and himself with his principal officers entered the town, the army being quartered around; while Syloson seemed on the point of ascending the seat of his deceased brother without violence or bloodshed. But the Samians were destined to a fate more calamitous. Mæandrius had a brother named Charilaus, violent in his temper and half a madman, whom he was obliged to keep in confinement. This man, looking out of his chamber-window, saw the Persian officers seated peaceably throughout the town and even under the gates of the acropolis, unguarded, and relying upon the convention: it seems that these were the chief officers whose rank gave them the privilege of being carried about on their seats. The sight inflamed both his wrath and his insane ambition. He clamored for liberty and admission to his brother, whom he reviled as a coward no less than a tyrant. "Here are you, worthless man, keeping me, your own brother, in a dungeon, though I have done no wrong worthy of bonds; while you do not dare to take your revenge on the Persians, who are casting you out as a houseless exile, and whom it would be so easy to put down. If you are afraid of them, give me your guards: I will make the Persians repent of their coming here, and I will send you safely out of the island forthwith."

Mæandrius, on the point of quitting Samos for ever, had little personal motive to care what became of the population. He had probably never forgiven them for disappointing his honorable intentions after the death of Polykrates, nor was he displeased to hand over to Syloson an odious and blood-stained scepter, which he foresaw would be the only consequence of his brother's mad project. He therefore sailed away with his treasures, leaving the acropolis to his brother Charilaus; who immediately armed the guards, sallied forth from his fortress, and attacked the unsuspecting Persians. Many of the great officers were slain without resistance before the army could be got together; but at length Otanes collected his troops and drove the assailants back into the acropolis While he immediately began the siege of that fortress, he also resolved, as Mæandrius had foreseen, to take a signal revenge for the treacherous slaughter of so many of his friends and companions. His army, no less incensed than himself, were directed to fall upon the Samian people and massacre them without discrimination—man and boy, on ground sacred as well as profane. The bloody order was too faithfully executed, and Samos was handed over to Syloson, stripped of its

male inhabitants. Of Charilaus and the acropolis we hear no farther: perhaps he and his guards may have escaped by sea. Lykaretus, the other brother of Mæandrius, must have remained either in the service of Syloson or in that of the Persians; for we find him some years afterward intrusted by the latter with an important command.

Syloson was thus finally installed as despot of an island peopled chiefly, if not wholly, with women and children: we may however presume, that the deed of blood has been described by the historian as more sweeping than it really was. It seems, nevertheless, to have lain heavily on the conscience of Otanes, who was induced some time afterward, by a dream and by a painful disease, to take measures for repeopling the island. From whence the new population came, we are not told; but wholesale translations of inhabitants from one place to another were familiar to the mind of a Persian king or satrap.

Mæandrius, following the example of the previous Samian exiles under Polykrates, went to Sparta and sought aid for the purpose of re-establishing himself at Samos. But the Lacedæmonians had no disposition to repeat an attempt which had before turned out so unsuccessfully, nor could he seduce king Kleomenes by the display of his treasures and finely wrought gold plate. The king however, not without fear that such seductions might win over some of the Spartan leading men, prevailed with the ephors to send Mæandrius away.

Syloson seems to have remained undisturbed at Samos, as a tributary of Persia, like the Ionic cities on the continent: some years afterward we find his son Æakes reigning in the island. Strabo states that it was the harsh rule of Syloson which caused the depopulation of the island. But the cause just recounted out of Herodotus is both very different, and sufficiently plausible in itself; and a Strabo seems in the main to have derived his account from Herodotus, we may suppose that on this point he has incorrectly remembered his authority.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

DEMOKEDES.—DARIUS INVADES SCYTHIA.

Darius had now acquired full authority throughout the Persian empire, having put down the refractory satrap Orœtes, as well as the revolted Medes and Babylonians. He had moreover completed the conquest of Ionia, by the important addition of Samos; and his dominion thus comprised all Asia Minor with its neighboring islands. But this was not sufficient for the ambition of a Persian king, next but one in succession to the great Cyrus. The conquering impulse was yet unabated among the Persians, who thought it incumbent

upon their king, and whose king thought it incumbent upon himself, to extend the limits of the empire. Though not of the lineage of Cyrus, Darius had taken pains to connect himself with it by marriage: he had married Atossa and Artystone, daughters of Cyrus—and Parmys, daughter of Smerdis, the younger son of Cyrus. Atossa had been first the wife of her brother Kambyses; next, of the Magian Smerdis, his successor; and thirdly of Darius, to whom she bore four children. Of those children the eldest was Xerxes, respecting whom more will be said hereafter.

Atossa, mother of the only Persian king who ever set foot in Greece—the Sultana Validi of Persia during the reign of Xerxes—was a person of commanding influence in the reign of her last husband, as well as in that of her son, and filled no inconsiderable space even in Grecian imagination, as we may see both by Æschylus and Herodotus. Had her influence prevailed, the first conquering appetites of Darius would have been directed not against the steppes of Scythia, but against Attica and Peloponnesus; at least so Herodotus assures us. The grand object of that historian is to set forth the contentions of Hellas with the barbarians or non-Hellenic world. Accordingly with an art truly epical, which manifests itself everywhere to the careful reader of his nine books, he preludes to the real dangers which were averted at Marathon and Platæa by recounting the first conception of an invasion of Greece by the Persians—how it originated and how it was abandoned. For this purpose—according to his historical style, wherein general facts are set forth as subordinate and explanatory accompaniments to the adventures of particular persons—he gives us the interesting, but romantic history, of the Krotoniate surgeon Demokedes.

Demokedes, son of a citizen of Kroton, named Kalliphoi, had turned his attention in early youth to the study and practice of medicine and surgery (for that age, we can make no difference between the two), and had made considerable progress in it. His youth coincides nearly with the arrival of Pythagoras at Kroton (550–520); a time when the science of the surgeon as well as the art of the gymnastic trainer were prosecuted in that city more actively than in any part of Greece. Kalliphon, the father of Demokedes, was a man of such severe temper, that the son ran away from him and resolved to maintain himself by his talents elsewhere. Retiring to Ægina, he there began to practice in his profession. So rapid was his success even in the first year—though very imperfectly equipped with instruments and apparatus—that the citizens of the island made a contract with him to remain there for one year, at a salary of one talent (about £383 sterling, an Æginæan talent). The year afterward he was invited to come to Athens, then under the Peisistratids, at a salary of 100 minæ or $1\frac{2}{3}$ talent; and in the following year, Polykrates of Samos tempted him by the offer of two talents. With that despot he remained, and accompanied him in his last calamitous visit

to the satrap Orœtes; on the murder of Polykrates, being seized among the slaves and foreign attendants, he was left to languish with the rest in imprisonment and neglect. When again, soon after, Orœtes himself was slain, Demokedes was numbered among his slaves and chattels, and sent up to Susa.

He had not been long at that capital, when Darius, leaping from his horse in the chase, sprained his foot badly, and was carried home in violent pain. The Egyptian surgeons, supposed to be the first men in their profession whom he habitually employed, did him no good, but only aggravated his torture. For seven days and nights he had no sleep, and he as well as those around him began to despair. At length, some one who had been at Sardis accidentally recollected that he had heard of a Greek surgeon among the slaves of Orœtes. Search was immediately made, and the miserable slave was brought, in chains as well as in rags, into the presence of the royal sufferer. Being asked whether he understood surgery, he affected ignorance; but Darius, suspecting this to be a mere artifice, ordered out the scourge and the pricking instrument to overcome it. Demokedes now saw that there was no resource, admitted that he had acquired some little skill, and was called upon to do his utmost in the case before him. He was fortunate enough to succeed perfectly, in alleviating the pain, in procuring sleep for the exhausted patient, and ultimately in restoring the foot to a sound state. Darius, who had abandoned all hopes of such a cure, knew no bounds to his gratitude. As a first reward, he presented him with two sets of chains in solid gold—a commemoration of the state in which Demokedes had first come before him. He next sent him into the harem to visit his wives. The conducting eunuchs introduced him as the man who had restored the king to life, upon which the grateful sultanas each gave to him a saucer full of golden coins called staters; in all so numerous, that the slave Skiton, who followed him, was enriched by merely picking up the pieces which dropped on the floor. This was not all. Darius gave him a splendid house and furniture, made him the companion of his table, and showed him every description of favor. He was about to crucify the Egyptian surgeons who had been so unsuccessful in their attempts to cure him. But Demokedes had the happiness of preserving their lives, as well as of rescuing an unfortunate companion of his imprisonment—an Eleian prophet, who had followed the fortunes of Polykrates.

But there was one favor which Darius would on no account grant; yet upon this one Demokedes had set his heart—the liberty of returning to Greece. At length accident, combined with his own surgical skill, enabled him to escape from the splendor of his second detention, as it had before extricated him from the misery of the first. A tumor formed upon the breast of Atossa: at first she said nothing to any one, but it became too bad for concealment, and she was forced

to consult Demokedes. He promised to cure her, but required from her a solemn oath that she would afterward do for him anything which he should ask—pledging himself at the same time to ask nothing indecent. The cure was successful, and Atossa was required to repay it by procuring his liberty. Knowing that the favor would be refused, even to her, if directly solicited, he taught her a stratagem for obtaining under false pretenses the consent of Darius. She took an early opportunity (Herodotus tells us, in bed) of reminding Darius that the Persians expected from him some positive addition to the power and splendor of the empire; and when Darius, in answer, acquainted her that he contemplated a speedy expedition against the Scythians, she entreated him to postpone it and to turn his forces first against Greece—"I have heard (she said) about the maidens of Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Corinth, and I want to have some of them as slaves to serve me—(we may conceive the smile of triumph with which the sons of those who had conquered at Platæa and Salamis would hear this part of the history read by Herodotus)—you have near you the best person possible to give information about Greece—that Greek who cured your foot." Darius was induced by this request to send some confidential Persians into Greece to procure information, along with Demokedes. Selecting fifteen of them, he ordered them to survey the coasts and cities of Greece, under guidance of Demokedes, but with peremptory orders upon no account to let him escape or to return without him. He next sent for Demokedes himself, explained to him what he wanted, and enjoined him imperatively to return as soon as the business had been completed. He farther desired him to carry away all the ample donations which he had already received, as presents to his father and brothers, promising that on his return fresh donations of equal value should make up the loss. Lastly, he directed that a store-ship, "filled with all manner of good things," should accompany the voyage. Demokedes undertook the mission with every appearance of sincerity. The better to play his part, he declined to take away what he already possessed at Susa—saying that he should like to find his property and furniture again on coming back, and that the store-ship alone, with its contents, would be sufficient both for the voyage, and for all necessary presents.

Accordingly he and the fifteen Persian envoys went down to Sidon in Phenicia, where two armed triremes were equipped, with a large store-ship in company. The voyage of survey into Greece was commenced. They visited and examined all the principal places in Greece—probably beginning with the Asiatic and insular Greeks, crossing to Eubœa, circumnavigating Attica and Peloponnesus, then passing to Korkyra and Italy. They surveyed the coasts and cities, taking memoranda of everything worthy of note which they saw. Such a Periplus, if it had been preserved, would have been inestimable, as an account of the actual state of the Grecian world about 518 B.C.

As soon as they arrived at Tarentum, Demokedes—now within a short distance of his own home, Kroton—found an opportunity of executing what he had meditated from the beginning. At his request, Aristophilides, the king of Tarentum, seized the fifteen Persians and detained them as spies, at the same time taking the rudders from off their ships—while Demokedes himself made his escape to Kroton. As soon as he had arrived there, Aristophilides released the Persians; who, pursuing their voyage, went on to Kroton, found Demokedes in the market-place, and laid hands upon him. But his fellow-citizens rescued him, not without opposition from some who were afraid of provoking the Great King—and in spite of remonstrances, energetic and menacing, from the Persians themselves. Indeed the Krotoniates not only protected the restored exile, but even robbed the Persians of their store-ship. The latter, disabled from proceeding farther as well by this loss as by the secession of Demokedes, commenced their voyage homeward, but unfortunately suffered shipwreck near the Iapygian cape, and became slaves in that neighborhood. A Tarentine exile, named Gillus, ransomed them and carried them up to Susa—a service for which Darius promised him any recompense that he chose. Restoration to his native city was all that Gillus asked; and that too, not by force, but by the mediation of the Asiatic Greeks of Knidus, who were on terms of intimate alliance with the Tarentines. This generous citizen—an honorable contrast to Demokedes, who had not scrupled to impel the stream of Persian conquest against his country in order to procure his own release—was unfortunately disappointed of his anticipated recompense. For though the Knidians, at the injunction of Darius, employed all their influence at Tarentum to procure a revocation of the sentence of exile, they were unable to succeed, and force was out of the question. The last words addressed by Demokedes at parting to his Persian companions, exhorted them to acquaint Darius that he (Demokedes) was about to marry the daughter of the Krotoniate Milo—one of the first men in Kroton, as well as the greatest wrestler of his time. The reputation of Milo was very great with Darius—probably from the talk of Demokedes himself: moreover, gigantic muscular force could be appreciated by men who had no relish either for Homer or Solon. And thus did this clever and vain-glorious Greek, sending back his fifteen Persian companions to disgrace and perhaps to death, deposit in their parting ears a braggart message calculated to create for himself a factitious name at Susa. He paid a large sum to Milo as the price of his daughter, for this very purpose.

Thus finishes the history of Demokedes, and of the "first Persians (to use the phrase of Herodotus) who ever came over from Asia into Greece." It is a history well deserving of attention, even looking only to the liveliness of the incidents, introducing us as they do into the full movement of the ancient world—incidents which I see no reason for doubting, with a reasonable allowance for the dramatic

amplification of the historian. Even at that early date, Greek medical intelligence stands out in a surpassing manner, and Demokedes is the first of those many able Greek surgeons who were seized, carried up to Susa, and there detained for the Great King, his court, and harem.

But his history suggests in another point of view far more serious reflections. Like the Milesian Histiæus (of whom I shall speak hereafter), he cared not what amount of risk he brought upon his country in order to procure his own escape from a splendid detention at Susa. Now the influence which he originated was on the point of precipitating upon Greece the whole force of the Persian empire, at a time when Greece was in no condition to resist it. Had the first aggressive expedition of Darius, with his own personal command and fresh appetite for conquest, been directed against Greece instead of against Scythia (between 516–514 B.C.), Grecian independence would have perished almost infallibly. For Athens was then still governed by the Peisistratids. What she was under them, we have had occasion to notice in a former chapter. She had then no courage for energetic self-defense, and probably Hippias himself, far from offering resistance, would have found it advantageous to accept Persian dominion as a means of strengthening his own rule, like the Ionian despots. Moreover, Grecian habit of co-operation was then only just commencing. But fortunately the Persian invader did not touch the shore of Greece until more than twenty years afterward, in 490 B.C.; and during that precious interval, the Athenian character had undergone the memorable revolution which has been before described. Their energy and their organization had been alike improved, and their force of resistance had become decupled; besides which, their conduct had so provoked the Persian that resistance was then a matter of necessity with them, and submission on tolerable terms an impossibility. When we come to the grand Persian invasion of Greece, we shall see that Athens was the life and soul of all the opposition offered. We shall see farther, that with all the efforts of Athens, the success of the defense was more than once doubtful; and would have been converted into a very different result, if Xerxes had listened to the best of his own counselors. But had Darius—at the head of the very same force which he conducted into Scythia, or even an inferior force—landed at Marathon in 514 B.C., instead of sending Datis in 490 B.C., he would have found no men like the victors of Marathon to meet him. As far as we can appreciate the probabilities, he would have met with little resistance except from the Spartans singly, who would have maintained their own very defensible territory against all his efforts, like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, or like the Mainots of Laconia in later days; but Hellas generally would have become a Persian satrapy. Fortunately, Darius, while bent on invading some country, had set his mind on the attack of Scythia, alike perilous and unprofitable. His personal

ardor was wasted on those unconquerable regions, where he narrowly escaped the disastrous fate of Cyrus—nor did he ever pay a second visit to the coasts of the Ægean. Yet the amorous influences of Atossa, set at work by Demokedes, might well have been sufficiently powerful to induce Darius to assail Greece instead of Scythia—a choice in favor of which all other recommendations concurred; and the history of free Greece would then probably have stopped at this point, without unrolling any of the glories which followed. So incalculably great has been the influence of Grecian development, during the two centuries between 500–300 B.C., on the destinies of mankind, that we cannot pass without notice a contingency which threatened to arrest that development in the bud. Indeed, it may be remarked that the history of any nation, considered as a sequence of causes and effects affording applicable knowledge, requires us to study not merely real events, but also imminent contingencies—events which were on the point of occurring, but yet did not occur. When we read the wailings of Atossa in the Persæ of Æschylus, for the humiliation which her son Xerxes had just undergone in his flight from Greece, we do not easily persuade ourselves to reverse the picture, and to conceive the same Atossa twenty years earlier, numbering as her slaves at Susa the noblest Herakleid and Alkmæonid maidens from Greece. Yet the picture would really have been thus reversed—the wish of Atossa would have been fulfilled and the wailings would have been heard from enslaved Greek maidens in Persia—if the mind of Darius had not happened to be preoccupied with a project not less insane even than those of Kambyses against Ethiopia and the Lybian desert. Such, at least, is the moral of the story of Demokedes.

That insane expedition across the Danube into Scythia comes now to be recounted. It was undertaken by Darius for the purpose of avenging the inroad and devastation of the Scythians in Media and Upper Asia, about a century before. The lust of conquest imparted unusual force to this sentiment of wounded dignity, which in the case of the Scythians could hardly be connected with any expectation of plunder or profit. In spite of the dissuading admonition of his brother Artabanus, Darius summoned the whole force of his empire, army and navy, to the Thracian Bosphorus—a force not less than 700,000 horse and foot and 600 ships, according to Herodotus. On these prodigious numbers we can lay no stress. But it appears that the names of all the various nations composing the host were inscribed on two pillars, erected by order of Darius on the European side of the Bosphorus, and afterward seen by Herodotus himself in the city of Byzantium—the inscriptions were bilingual, in Assyrian characters as well as Greek. The Samian architect Mandrokles had been directed to throw a bridge of boats across the Bosphorus, about half-way between Byzantium and the mouth of the Euxine. So peremptory were the Persian kings that their orders for military service should

be punctually obeyed, and so impatient were they of the idea of exemptions, that when a Persian father named Œobazus entreated that one of his three sons, all included in the conscription, might be left at home, Darius replied that all three of them should be left at home—an answer which the unsuspecting father heard with delight. They were indeed all left at home—for they were all put to death. A proceeding similar to this is ascribed afterward to Xerxes; whether true or not as matters of fact, they illustrate the wrathful displeasure with which the Persian kings were known to receive such petitions for exemption.

The naval force of Darius seems to have consisted entirely of subject Greeks, Asiatic and insular; for the Phenician fleet was not brought into the Ægean until the subsequent Ionic revolt. At this time all or most of the Asiatic Greek cities were under despots, who leaned on the Persian government for support, and who appeared with their respective contingents to take part in the Scythian expedition. Of Ionic Greeks were seen—Strattis, despot of Chios; Æakes, son of Syloson, despot of Samos; Laodamas, of Phokæa; and Histiæus, of Miletus. From the Æolic towns, Aristagoras of Kyme; from the Hellespontine Greeks, Daphnis of Abydus, Hippoklus of Lampsakus, Herophantus of Parium, Metrodorus of Prokonnesus, Aristagoras of Kyzikus, and Miltiades of the Thracian Chersonese—all these are mentioned, and there were probably more. This large fleet, assembled at the Bosphorus, was sent forward into the Euxine to the mouth of the Danube—with orders to sail up the river two days' journey, above the point where its channel begins to divide, and to throw a bridge of boats over it. Darius, having liberally recompensed the architect Mandrokles, crossed the bridge over the Bosphorus, and began his march through Thrace, receiving the submission of various Thracian tribes in his way, and subduing others—especially the Getæ north of Mount Hæmus, who were compelled to increase still farther the numbers of his vast army. On arriving at the Danube, he found the bridge finished and prepared for his passage by the Ionians. We may remark, here as on so many other occasions, that all operations requiring intelligence are performed for the Persians either by Greeks or by Phenicians—more usually by the former. He crossed this greatest of all earthly rivers—for so the Danube was imagined to be in the fifth century B.C.—and directed his march into Scythia.

As far as the point now attained, our narrative runs smoothly and intelligibly: we know that Darius marched his army into Scythia, and that he came back with ignominy and severe loss. But as to all which happened between his crossing and recrossing the Danube, we find nothing approaching to authentic statement, nor even what we can set forth as the probable basis of truth on which exaggerating fancy has been at work—all is inexplicable mystery. Ktesias indeed says that Darius marched for fifteen days into the Scythian territory—

that he then exchanged bows with the king of Scythia and discovered the Scythian bow to be the largest—and that being intimidated by such discovery, he fled back to the bridge by which he had crossed the Danube, and recrossed the river with the loss of one-tenth part of his army, being compelled to break down the bridge before all had passed. The length of march is here the only thing distinctly stated; about the direction nothing is said; but the narrative of Ktesias, defective as it is, is much less perplexing than that of Herodotus, who conducts the immense host of Darius as it were through fairy-land—heedless of distance, large intervening rivers, want of all cultivation or supplies, destruction of the country (in so far as it could be destroyed) by the retreating Scythians, etc. He tells us that the Persian army consisted chiefly of foot—that there were no roads nor agriculture; yet his narrative carries it over about twelve degrees of longitude from the Danube to the country east of the Tanais, across the rivers Tyras (Dniester), Hypanis (Bog), Borysthenes (Dnieper), Hypakyris, Gerrhos, and Tanais. How these rivers could have been passed in the face of enemies by so vast a host, we are left to conjecture, since it was not winter-time to convert them into ice: nor does the historian even allude to them as having been crossed either in the advance or in the retreat. What is not less remarkable, is, that in respect to the Greek settlement of Olbia or Borysthenes, and the agricultural Scythians and Mix-hellenes between the Hypanis and the Borysthenes, across whose country it would seem that this march of Darius must have carried him—Herodotus does not say anything; though we should have expected that he would have had better means of informing himself about this part of the march than about any other, and though the Persians could hardly have failed to plunder or put in requisition this, the only productive portion of Scythia.

The narrative of Herodotus in regard to the Persian march north of the Ister seems indeed destitute of all the conditions of reality. It is rather an imaginative description, illustrating the desperate and impracticable character of Scythian warfare, and grouping in the same picture, according to that large sweep of the imagination which is admissible in epical treatment, the Scythians with all their barbarous neighbors from the Carpathian mountains to the river Wolga. The Agathyrsi, the Neuri, the Androphagi, the Melanchlæni, the Budini, the Geloni, the Sarmatians, and the Tauri—all of them bordering on that vast quadrangular area of 4,000 stadia for each side, called Scythia, as Herodotus conceives it—are brought into deliberation and action in consequence of the Persian approach. And Herodotus takes that opportunity of communicating valuable particulars respecting the habits and manners of each. The kings of these nations discuss whether Darius is justified in his invasion, and whether it be prudent in them to aid the Scythians. The latter question is decided in the affirmative by the Sarmatians, the Budini, and the Geloni, all eastward of the Tanais—in the negative by the rest.

The Scythians, removing their wagons with their wives and children out of the way northward, retreat and draw Darius after them from the Danube all across Scythia and Sarmatia to the north-eastern extremity of the territory of the Budini, several days' journey eastward of the Tanais. Moreover they destroy the wells and ruin the herbage as much as they can, so that during all this long march (says Herodotus) the Persians "found nothing to damage, inasmuch as the country was barren." We can hardly understand therefore what they found to live upon. It is in the territory of the Budini, at this easternmost terminus on the borders of the desert, that the Persians perform the only positive acts which are ascribed to them throughout the whole expedition. They burn the wooden wall before occupied, but now deserted, by the Geloni; and they build, or begin to build, eight large fortresses near the river Oarus. For what purposes these fortresses could have been intended Herodotus gives no intimation; but he says that the unfinished work was yet to be seen even in his day.

Having thus been carried all across Scythia and the other territories above-mentioned in a north-easterly direction, Darius and his army are next marched back a prodigious distance in a north-westerly direction, through the territories of the Melanchlæni, the Androphagi, and the Neuri, all of whom flee affrighted into the northern desert, having been thus compelled against their will to share in the consequences of the war. The Agathyrsi peremptorily require the Scythians to abstain from drawing the Persians into *their* territory on pain of being themselves treated as enemies. Accordingly the Scythians, avoiding the boundaries of the Agathyrsi, direct their retreat in such a manner as to draw the Persians again southward into Scythia. During all this long march backward and forward, there are partial skirmishes and combats of horse, but the Scythians steadily refuse any general engagement. And though Darius challenges them formally by means of a herald, with taunts of cowardice, the Scythian king Idanthyrsus not only refuses battle, but explains and defends his policy, and defies the Persian to come and destroy the tombs of their fathers—it will then (he adds) be seen whether the Scythians are cowards or not. The difficulties of Darius have by this time become serious, when Idanthyrsus sends to him the menacing presents of a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows: the Persians are obliged to commence a rapid retreat toward the Danube, leaving, in order to check and slacken the Scythian pursuit, the least effective and the sick part of their army encamped, together with the asses which had been brought with them—animals unknown to the Scythians, and causing great alarm by their braying. However, notwithstanding some delay thus caused, as well as the anxious haste of Darius to reach the Danube, the Scythians, far more rapid in their movements, arrive at the river before him, and open a negotiation with the Ionians left in guard of the bridge, urging them to break it down and

leave the Persian king to his fate—inevitable destruction with his whole army.

Here we re-enter the world of reality, at the north bank of the Danube, the place where we before quitted it. All that is reported to have passed in the interval, if tried by the tests of historical matter of fact, can be received as nothing better than a perplexing dream. It only acquires value when we consider it as an illustrative fiction, including, doubtless, some unknown matter of fact, but framed chiefly to exhibit in action those unattackable Nomads who formed the north-eastern barbarous world of a Greek, and with whose manners Herodotus was profoundly struck. "The Scythians (says he), in regard to one of the greatest of human matters, have struck out a plan cleverer than any that I know. In other respects I do not admire them; but they have contrived this great object, that no invader of their country shall ever escape out of it, or shall ever be able to find out and overtake them, unless they themselves choose. For when men have neither walls nor established cities, but are all house-carriers and horse-bowmen—living, not from the plow, but from cattle, and having their dwellings on wagons—how can they be otherwise than unattackable and impracticable to meddle with?" The protracted and unavailing chase ascribed to Darius—who can neither overtake his game nor use his arms, and who hardly even escapes in safety—embodies in detail this formidable attribute of the Scythian Nomads. That Darius actually marched into the country, there can be no doubt. Nothing else is certain, except his ignominious retreat out of it to the Danube; for of the many different guesses, by which critics have attempted to cut down the gigantic sketch of Herodotus into a march with definite limits and direction, not one rests upon any positive grounds. We can trace the pervading idea in the mind of the historian, but cannot find out what were his substantive data.

The adventures which took place at the passage of that river, both on the out-march and the home-march, wherein the Ionians are concerned, are far more within the limits of history. Here Herodotus possessed better means of information, and had less of a dominant idea to illustrate. That which passed between Darius and the Ionians on his first crossing is very curious: I have reserved it until the present moment, because it is particularly connected with the incidents which happened on his return.

On reaching the Danube from Thrace, he found the bridge of boats ready; and when the whole army had passed over, he ordered the Ionians to break it down, as well as to follow him in his land-march into Scythia, the ships being left with nothing but the rowers and seamen essential to navigate them homeward. His order was on the point of being executed, when, fortunately for him, the Mitylenæan general Koes ventured to call in question the prudence of it, having first asked whether it was the pleasure of the Persian

king to listen to advice. Koes urged that the march on which they were proceeding might prove perilous, and retreat possibly unavoidable; because the Scythians, though certain to be defeated if brought to action, might perhaps not suffer themselves to be approached or even discovered. As a precaution against all contingencies, it was prudent to leave the bridge standing and watched by those who had constructed it. Far from being offended at the advice, Darius felt grateful for it, and desired that Koes would ask him after his return for a suitable reward—which we shall hereafter find granted. He then altered his resolution, took a cord, and tied sixty knots in it. "Take this cord (said he to the Ionians): untie one of the knots in it each day after my advance from the Danube into Scythia. Remain here and guard the bridge until you shall have untied all the knots; but if by that time I shall not have returned, then depart and sail home." With such orders he began his march into the interior. This anecdote is interesting, not only as it discloses the simple expedients for numeration and counting of time then practiced, but also as it illustrates the geographical ideas prevalent. Darius did not intend to come back over the Danube, but to march round the Mæotis, and to return into Persia on the eastern side of the Euxine. No other explanation can be given of his orders. At first, confident of success, he orders the bridge to be destroyed forthwith: he will beat the Scythians, march through their country, and re-enter Media from the eastern side of the Euxine: when he is reminded that possibly he may not be able to find the Scythians, and may be obliged to retreat, he still continues persuaded that this must happen within sixty days, if it happens at all; and that should he remain absent more than sixty days, such delay will be a convincing proof that he will take the other road of return instead of repassing the Danube. The reader who looks at a map of the Euxine and its surrounding territories may be startled at so extravagant a conception; but he should recollect that there was no map of the same or nearly the same accuracy before Herodotus, much less before the contemporaries of Darius. The idea of entering Media by the north from Scythia and Sarmatia over the Caucasus, is familiar to Herodotus in his sketch of the early marches of the Scythians and Cimmerians: moreover, he tell us that after the expedition of Darius, there came some Scythian envoys to Sparta, proposing an offensive alliance against Persia, and offering on their part to march across the Phasis into Media from the north, while the Spartans were invited to land on the shores of Asia Minor, and advance across the country to meet them from the west. When we recollect that the Macedonians and their leader, Alexander the Great, having arrived at the river Jaxartes, on the north of Sogdiana and on the east of the Sea of Aral, supposed that they had reached the Tanais and called the river by that name—we shall not be astonished at the erroneous estimation of distance implied in the plan conceived by Darius.

The Ionians had already remained in guard of the bridge beyond the sixty days commanded, without hearing anything of the Persian army, when they were surprised by the appearance, not of that army, but of a body of Scythians; who acquainted them that Darius was in full retreat and in the greatest distress, and that his safety with the whole army depended upon that bridge. They endeavored to prevail upon the Ionians, since the sixty days included in their order to remain had now elapsed, to break the bridge and retire; assuring them that if this were done, the destruction of the Persians was inevitable—of course the Ionians themselves would then be free. At first the latter were favorably disposed toward the proposition, which was warmly espoused by the Athenian Miltiades, despot or governor of the Thracian Chersonese. Had he prevailed, the victor of Marathon (for such we shall hereafter find him) would have thus inflicted a much more vital blow on Persia than even that celebrated action, and would have brought upon Darius the disastrous fate of his predecessor Cyrus. But the Ionian princes, though leaning at first toward his suggestion, were speedily converted by the representations of Histiæus of Miletus, who reminded them that the maintenance of his own ascendency over the Milesians and that of each despot in his respective city, was assured by means of Persian support alone—the feeling of the population being everywhere against them: consequently, the ruin of Darius would be their ruin also. This argument proved conclusive. It was resolved to stay and maintain the bridge, but to pretend compliance with the Scythians, and prevail upon them to depart, by affecting to destroy it. The northern portion of the bridge was accordingly destroyed, for the length of a bow-shot; while the Scythians departed, under the persuasion that they had succeeded in depriving their enemies of the means of crossing the river. It appears that they missed the track of the retreating host, which was thus enabled, after the severest privation and suffering, to reach the Danube in safety. Arriving during the darkness of the night, Darius was at first terrified to find the bridge no longer joining the northern bank. An Egyptain herald, of stentorian powers of voice, was ordered to call as loudly as possible the name of Histiæus the Milesian. Answer being speedily made, the bridge was re-established, and the Persian army passed over before the Scythians returned to the spot.

There can be no doubt that the Ionians here lost an opportunity eminently favorable, such as never again returned, for emancipating themselves from the Persian dominion. Their despots, by whom the determination was made, especially the Milesian Histiæus, were not induced to preserve the bridge by any honorable reluctance to betray the trust reposed in them, but simply by selfish regard to the maintenance of their own unpopular dominion. And we may remark that the real character of this impelling motive, as well as the deliberation accompanying it, may be assumed as resting upon very good

evidence, since we are now arrived within the personal knowledge of the Milesian historian Hekatæus, who took an active part in the Ionic revolt a few years afterward, and who may perhaps have been personally engaged in this expedition. He will be found reviewing with prudence and sobriety the chances of that unfortunate revolt, and distrusting its success from the beginning; while Histiæus of Miletus will appear on the same occasion as the fomenter of it, in order to procure his release from an honorable detention at Susa near the person of Darius. The selfishness of this despot, having deprived his countrymen of that real and favorable chance of emancipation which the destruction of the bridge would have opened to them, threw them into revolt a few years afterward against the entire and unembarrassed force of the Persian king and empire.

Extricated from the perils of the Scythian warfare, Darius marched southward from the Danube through Thrace to the Hellespont, where he crossed from Sestus into Asia. He left, however, a considerable army in Europe, under the command of Megabazus, to accomplish the conquest of Thrace. Perinthus on the Propontis made a brave resistance, but was at length subdued; after which all the Thracian tribes, and all the Grecian colonies between the Hellespont and the Strymon, were forced to submit, giving earth and water, and becoming subject to tribute. Near the lower Strymon was the Edonian town of Myrkinus, which Darius ordered to be made over to Histiæus of Miletus; for both this Milesian, and Koes of Mitylene, had been desired by the Persian king to name their own reward for their fidelity to him on the passage over the Danube. Koes requested that he might be constituted despot of Mitylene, which was accomplished by Persian authority; but Histiæus solicited that the territory near Myrkinus might be given to him for the foundation of a colony. As soon as the Persian conquests extended thus far, the site in question was presented to Histiæus, who entered actively upon his new scheme. We shall find the territory near Myrkinus eminent hereafter as the site of Amphipolis; it offered great temptation to settlers, as fertile, well-wooded, convenient for maritime commerce, and near to auriferous and argentiferous mountains.

It seems, however, that the Persian dominion in Thrace was disturbed by an invasion of the Scythians, who, in revenge for the aggression of Darius, overran the country as far as the Thracian Chersonese, and are even said to have sent envoys to Sparta, proposing a simultaneous invasion of Persia, from different sides, by Spartans and Scythians. The Athenian Miltiades, who was despot or governor of the Chersonese, was forced to quit it for some time, and Herodotus ascribes his retirement to the incursion of these Nomads. But we may be permitted to suspect that the historian has misconceived the real cause of such retirement. Miltiades could not remain in the Chersonese after he had incurred the deadly enmity of

Darius by exhorting the Ionians to destroy the bridge over the Danube.

The conquests of Megabazus did not stop at the western bank of the Strymon. He carried his arms across that river, conquering the Pæonians, and reducing the Macedonians under Amyntas to tribute. A considerable number of the Pæonians were transported across into Asia, by express order of Darius; whose fancy had been struck by seeing at Sardis a beautiful Pæonian woman carrying a vessel on her head, leading a horse to water, and spinning flax, all at the same time. This woman had been brought over (we are told) by her two brothers Piges and Mantyes for the express purpose of arresting the attention of the Great King. They hoped by this means to be constituted despots of their countrymen; and we may presume that their scheme succeeded, for such part of the Pæonians as Megabazus could subdue were conveyed across to Asia and planted in some villages in Phrygia. Such violent transportations of inhabitants were in the genius of the Persian government.

From the Pæonian lake Prasias, seven eminent Persians were sent as envoys into Macedonia, to whom Amyntas readily gave the required token of submission, inviting them to a splendid banquet. When exhilarated with wine, they demanded to see the women of the regal family, who, being accordingly introduced, were rudely dealt with by the strangers: at length the son of Amyntas, Alexander, resented the insult, and exacted for it a signal vengeance. Dismissing the women under pretense that they should return after a bath, he brought back in their place youths in female attire, armed with daggers. Presently the Persians, proceeding to repeat their caresses, were all put to death. Their retinue, and the splendid carriages and equipment which they had brought, disappeared at the same time, without any tidings reaching the Persian army. And when Bubares, another eminent Persian, was sent into Macedonia to institute researches, Alexander contrived to hush up the proceeding by large bribes, and by giving him his sister Gigæa in marriage.

Meanwhile Megabazus crossed over into Asia, carrying with him the Pæonians from the Strymon. Having become alarmed at the progress of Histiæus with his new city of Myrkinus, he communicated his apprehensions to Darius; who was prevailed upon to send for Histiæus, retaining him about his person, and carrying him to Susa as counselor and friend, with every mark of honor, but with the secret intention of never letting him revisit Asia Minor. The fears of the Persian general were probably not unreasonable; but this detention of Histiæus at Susa became in the sequel an important event.

On departing for his capital, Darius nominated his brother Artaphernes satrap of Sardis, and Otanes general of the forces on the coast in place of Megabazus. The new general dealt very severely

with various towns near the Propontis, on the ground that they had evaded their duty in the late Scythian expedition, and had even harassed the army of Darius in its retreat. He took Byzantium and Chalkedon, as well as Antandrus in the Troad, and Lamponium. With the aid of a fleet from Lesbos, he achieved a new conquest—the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, at that time occupied by a Pelasgic population, seemingly without any Greek inhabitants at all. These Pelasgi were of cruel and piratical character, if we may judge by the tenor of the legends respecting them; Lemnian misdeeds being cited as a proverbial expression for atrocities. They were distinguished also for ancient worship of Hephæstus, together with mystic rites in honor of the Kabeiri, and even human sacrifices to their Great Goddess. In their two cities—Hephæstias on the east of the island and Myrina on the west—they held out bravely against Otanes, and did not submit until they had undergone long and severe hardship. Lykaretus, brother of that Mæandrius whom we have already noticed as despot of Samos, was named governor of Lemnos; but he soon after died. It is probable that the Pelasgic population of the islands was greatly enfeebled during this struggle, and we even hear that their king Hermon voluntarily emigrated from fear of Darius.

Lemnos and Imbros thus became Persian possessions, held by a subordinate prince as tributary. A few years afterward their lot was again changed—they passed into the hands of Athens, the Pelasgic inhabitants were expelled, and fresh Athenian settlers introduced. They were conquered by Miltiades from the Thracian Chersonese; from Elæus at the south of that peninsula to Lemnos being within one day's sail with a north wind. The Hephæsticans abandoned their city and evacuated the island with little resistance; but the inhabitants of Myrina stood a siege, and were not expelled without difficulty: both of them found abodes in Thrace, on and near the peninsula of Mount Athos. Both these islands, together with that of Skyros (which was not taken until after the invasion of Xerxes), remained connected with Athens in a manner peculiarly intimate. At the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.)—which guaranteed universal autonomy to every Grecian city, great and small—they were specially reserved, and considered as united with Athens. The property in their soil was held by men, who, without losing their Athenian citizenship, became Lemnian Kleruchs, and as such were classified apart among the military force of the state; while absence in Lemnos or Imbros seems to have been accepted as an excuse for delay before the courts of justice, so as to escape the penalties of contumacy or departure from the country. It is probable that a considerable number of poorAthenian citizens were provided with lots of land in these islands, though we have no direct information of the fact, and are even obliged to guess the precise time at which Miltiades made the conquest. Herodotus, according to his usual manner, connects the

conquest with an ancient oracle, and represents it as the retribution for ancient legendary crime committed by certain Pelasgi, who, many centuries before, had been expelled by the Athenians from Attica, and had retired to Lemnos. Full of this legend, he tells us nothing about the proximate causes or circumstances of the conquest, which must probably have been accomplished by the efforts of Athens jointly with Miltiades from the Chersonese, during the period that the Persians were occupied in quelling the Ionic revolt, between 502–494 B.C.—since it is hardly to be supposed that Miltiades would have ventured thus to attack a Persian possession during the time that the satraps had their hands free. The acquisition was probably facilitated by the fact, that the Pelasgic population of the islands had been weakened, as well by their former resistance to the Persian Otanes, as by some years passed under the deputy of a Persian satrap.

In mentioning the conquest of Lemnos by the Athenians and Miltiades, I have anticipated a little on the course of events, because that conquest—though coinciding in point of time with the Ionic revolt (which will be recounted in the following chapter), and indirectly caused by it in so far as it occupied the attention of the Persians—lies entirely apart from the operations of the revolted Ionians. When Miltiades was driven out of the Chersonese by the Persians, on the suppression of the Ionic revolt, his fame, derived from having subdued Lemnos, contributed both to neutralize the enmity which he had incurred as governor of the Chersonese, and to procure his election as one of the ten generals for the year of the Marathonian combat.

CHAPTER XXXV.

IONIC REVOLT.

HITHERTO the history of the Asiatic Greeks has flowed in a stream distinct from that of the European Greeks. The present chapter will mark the period of confluence between the two.

At the time when Darius quitted Sardis on his return to Susa, carrying with him the Milesian Histiæus, he left Artaphernes his brother as satrap of Sardis, invested with the supreme command of Western Asia Minor. The Grecian cities on the coast, comprehended under his satrapy, appear to have been chiefly governed by native despots in each; and Miletus especially, in the absence of Histiæus, was ruled by his son-in-law Aristagoras. That city was now in the height of power and prosperity—in every respect the leading city of Ionia. The return of Darius to Susa may be placed seemingly about 512 B.C.,

from which time forward the state of things above described continued, without disturbance, for eight or ten years—"a respite from suffering," to use the significant phrase of the historian.

It was about the year 506 B.C. that the exiled Athenian despot Hippias, after having been repelled from Sparta by the unanimous refusal of the Lacedæmonian allies to take part in his cause, presented himself from Sigeium as a petitioner to Artaphernes at Sardis. He now doubtless found the benefit of the alliance which he had formed for his daughter with the despot Æantides of Lampsakus, whose favor with Darius would stand him in good stead. He made pressing representations to the satrap, with a view of procuring restoration to Athens, on condition of holding it under Persian dominion; and Artaphernes was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to aid him in this design. So thoroughly had he resolved on espousing actively the cause of Hippias, that when the Athenians dispatched envoys to Sardis, to set forth the case of the city against its exiled pretender, he returned to them an answer not merely of denial, but of menace—bidding them receive Hippias back again, if they looked for safety. Such a reply was equivalent to a declaration of war, and so it was construed at Athens. It leads us to infer that the satrap was even then revolving in his mind an expedition against Attica, in conjunction with Hippias; but fortunately for the Athenians, other projects and necessities intervened to postpone for several years the execution of the scheme.

Of these new projects, the first was that of conquering the island of Naxos. Here too, as in the case of Hippias; the instigation arose from Naxian exiles—a rich oligarchy which had been expelled by a rising of the people. This island like all the rest of the Cyclades, was as yet independent of the Persians. It was wealthy, prosperous, possessing a large population both of freemen and slaves, and defended as well by armed ships as by a force of 8000 heavy-armed infantry. The exiles applied for aid to Aristagoras, who saw that he could turn them into instruments of dominion for himself in the island, provided he could induce Artaphernes to embark in the project along with him —his own force not being adequate by itself. Accordingly he went to Sardis, and laid his project before the satrap, intimating that as soon as the exiles should land with a powerful support, Naxos would be reduced with little trouble: that the neighboring islands of Paros, Andros, Tenos, and the other Cyclades, could not long hold out after the conquest of Naxos, nor even the large and valuable island of Eubœa. He himself engaged, if a fleet of 100 ships were granted to him, to accomplish all these conquests for the Great King, and to bear the expenses of the armament besides. Artaphernes entertained the proposition with eagerness, loaded him with praise, and promised him in the ensuing spring 200 ships instead of 100. Messengers dispatched to Susa having brought back the ready consent of Darius, a large armament was forthwith equipped under the command of the

Persian Megabates, to be placed at the disposal of Aristagoras—composed both of Persians and of all the tributaries near the coast.

With this force Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles set sail from Miletus, giving out that they were going to the Hellespont: on reaching Chios, they waited in its western harbor of Kaukasa for a fair wind to carry them straight across to Naxos. No suspicion was entertained in that island of its real purpose, nor was any preparation made for resistance; so that the success of Aristagoras would have been complete, had it not been defeated by an untoward incident ending in dispute. Megabates, with a solicitude which we are surprised to discern in a Persian general, personally made a tour of his fleet, to see that every ship was under proper watch. He discovered a ship from Myndus (an Asiatic Dorian city near Halikarnassus) left without a single man on board. Incensed at such neglect, he called before him Skylax, the commander of the ship, and ordered him to be put in chains, with his head projecting outward through one of the apertures for oars in the ship's side. Skylax was a guest and friend of Aristagoras, who on hearing of this punishment, interceded with Megabates for his release; but finding the request refused, took upon him to release the prisoner himself. He even went so far as to treat the remonstrance of Megabates with disdain, reminding him that according to the instructions of Artaphernes, he was only second—himself (Aristagoras) being first. The pride of Megabates could not endure such treatment: as soon as night arrived, he sent a private intimation to Naxos of the coming of the fleet, warning the islanders to be on their guard. The warning thus fortunately received was turned by the Naxians to the best account. They carried in their property, laid up stores, and made every preparation for a siege, so that when the fleet, probably delayed by the dispute between its leaders, at length arrived, it was met by a stout resistance, remained on the island for four months in prosecution of an unavailing siege, and was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything beyond the erection of a fort, as lodgment for the Naxian exiles. After a large cost incurred, not only by the Persians, but also by Aristagoras himself, the unsuccessful armament was brought back to the coast of Ionia.

The failure of this expedition threatened Aristagoras with entire ruin. He had incensed Megabates, deceived Artaphernes, and incurred an obligation, which he knew not how to discharge, of indemnifying the latter for the costs of the fleet. He began to revolve in his mind the scheme of revolting from Persia, and it so happened that there arrived nearly at the same moment a messenger from his father-in-law Histiæus, who was detained at the court of Susa, secretly instigating him to this very resolution. Not knowing whom to trust with this dangerous message, Histiæus had caused the head of a faithful slave to be shaved—branded upon it the words necessary—and then dispatched him as soon as his hair had grown, to Miletus, with a

verbal intimation to Aristagoras that his head was to be again shaved and examined. Histiæus sought to provoke this perilous rising, simply as a means of procuring his own release from Susa, and in the calculation that Darius would send him down to the coast to re-establish order. His message arriving at so critical a moment, determined the faltering resolution of Aristagoras, who convened his principal partisans at Miletus, and laid before them the formidable project of revolt. All of them approved it, with one remarkable exception—the historian Hekatæus of Miletus; who opposed it as altogether ruinous, and contended that the power of Darius was too vast to leave them any prospect of success. When he found direct opposition fruitless, he next insisted upon the necessity of at once seizing the large treasures in the neighboring temple of Apollo at Branchidæ for the purpose of carrying on the revolt. By this means alone (he said) could the Milesians, too feeble to carry on the contest with their own force alone, hope to become masters at sea—while, if *they* did not take these treasures, the victorious enemy assuredly would. Neither of these recommendations, both of them indicating sagacity and foresight in the proposer, was listened to. Probably the seizures of the treasures—though highly useful for the impending struggle, and though in the end they fell into the hands of the enemy, as Hekatæus anticipated—would have been insupportable to the pious feelings of the people, and would thus have proved more injurious than beneficial: perhaps indeed Hekatæus himself may have urged it with the indirect view of stifling the whole project. We may remark that he seems to have argued the question as if Miletus were to stand alone in the revolt; not anticipating, as indeed no prudent man could then anticipate, that the Ionic cities generally would follow the example.

Aristagoras and his friends resolved forthwith to revolt. Their first step was to conciliate popular favor throughout Asiatic Greece by putting down the despots in all the various cities—the instruments not less than the supports of Persian ascendency, as Histiæus had well argued at the bridge of the Danube. The opportunity was favorable for striking this blow at once on a considerable scale. For the fleet, recently employed at Naxos, had not yet dispersed, but was still assembled at Myus, with many of the despots present at the head of their ships. Accordingly Iatragoras was dispatched from Miletus, at once to seize as many of them as he could, and to stir up the soldiers to revolt. This decisive proceeding was the first manifesto against Darius. Iatragoras was successful: the fleet went along with him, and many of the despots fell into his hands—among them Histiæus (a second person so named) of Termera, Oliatus of Mylasa (both Karians), Koes of Mitylene, and Aristagoras (also a second person so named) of Kyme. At the same time the Milesian Aristagoras himself, while he formally proclaimed revolt against Darius, and invited the Milesians to follow him, laid down his own authority, and affected to place the government in the hands of the

people. Throughout most of the towns of Asiatic Greece, insular and continental, a similar revolution was brought about; the despots were expelled, and the feelings of the citizens were thus warmly interested in the revolt. Such of these despots as fell into the hands of Aristagoras were surrendered into the hands of their former subjects, by whom they were for the most part quietly dismissed, and we shall find them hereafter active auxiliaries to the Persians. To this treatment the only exception mentioned is Koes, who was stoned to death by the Mitylenæans.

By these first successful steps the Ionic revolt was made to assume an extensive and formidable character; much more so, probably, than the prudent Hekatæus had anticipated as practicable. The naval force of the Persians in the Ægean was at once taken away from them, and passed to their opponents, who were thus completely masters of the sea; and would in fact have remained so, if a second naval force had not been brought up against them from Phenicia—a proceeding never before resorted to, and perhaps at that time not looked for.

Having exhorted all the revolted towns to name their generals and to put themselves in a state of defense, Aristagoras crossed the Ægean to obtain assistance from Sparta, then under the government of king Kleomenes; to whom he addressed himself, "holding in his hand a brazen tablet, wherein was engraved the circuit of the entire earth, with the whole sea and all the rivers." Probably this was the first map or plan which had ever been seen at Sparta, and so profound was the impression which it made, that it was remembered there even in the time of Herodotus. Having emphatically entreated the Spartans to step forth in aid of their Ionic brethren, now engaged in a desperate struggle for freedom, he proceeded to describe the wealth and abundance (gold, silver, brass, vestments, cattle and slaves), together with the ineffective weapons and warfare of the Asiatics. Such enemies as the latter (he said) could be at once put down, and their wealth appropriated, by military training such as that of the Spartans—whose long spear, brazen helmet and breastplate, and ample shield, enabled them to despise the bow, the short javelin, the light wicker target, the turban and trowsers, of a Persian. He then traced out on his brazen plan the road from Ephesus to Susa, indicating the intervening nations, all of them affording a booty more or less rich. He concluded by magnifying especially the vast treasures at Susa—"Instead of fighting your neighbors (he concluded), Argeians, Arcadians, and Messenians, from whom you get hard blows and small reward, why do you not make yourself rulers of all Asia, a prize not less easy than lucrative?" Kleomenes replied to these seductive instigations by desiring him to come for an answer on the third day. When that day arrived, he put to him the simple question, how far it was from Susa to the sea? To which Aristagoras answered with more frankness than dexterity, that it

was a three months' journey; and he was proceeding to enlarge upon the facilities of the road when Kleomenes interrupted him—"Quit Sparta before sunset, Milesian stranger: you are no friend to the Lacedæmonians, if you want to carry them a three months' journey from the sea." In spite of this peremptory mandate, Aristagoras tried a last resource. Taking in his hand the bough of supplication, he again went to the house of Kleomenes, who was sitting with his daughter Gorgo, a girl of eight years old. He requested Kleomenes to send away the child, but this was refused, and he was desired to proceed; upon which he began to offer to the Spartan king a bribe for compliance, bidding continually higher and higher from ten talents up to fifty. At length the little girl suddenly exclaimed, "Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you do not at once go away." The exclamation so struck Kleomenes, that he broke up the interview, and Aristagoras forthwith quitted Sparta.

Doubtless Herodotus heard the account of this interview from Lacedæmonian informants. Yet we may be permitted to doubt whether any such suggestions were really made, or any such hopes held out, as those which he places in the mouth of Aristagoras—suggestions and hopes which might well be conceived in 450—440 B.C., after a generation of victories over the Persians, but which have no pertinence in the year 502 B.C. Down even to the battle of Marathon, the name of the Medes was a terror to the Greeks, and the Athenians are highly and justly extolled as the first who dared to look them in the face. To talk about an easy march up to the treasures of Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt, would have been considered as a proof of insanity. Aristagoras may very probably have represented that the Spartans were more than a match for Persians in the field; but even thus much would have been considered, in 502 B.C., rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as the estimate of a sober looker-on.

The Milesian chief had made application to Sparta, as the presiding power of Hellas—a character which we thus find more and more recognized and passing into the habitual feelings of the Greeks. Fifty years previously to this, the Spartans had been flattered by the circumstance that Crœsus singled them out from all other Greeks to invite as allies: now, they accepted such priority as a matter of course.

Rejected at Sparta, Aristagoras proceeded to Athens, now decidedly the second power in Greece. Here he found an easier task, not only as it was the metropolis (or mother-city) of Asiatic Ionia, but also as it had already incurred the pronounced hostility of the Persian satrap, and might look to be attacked as soon as the project came to suit his convenience, under the instigation of Hippias: whereas the Spartans had not only no kindred with Ionia, beyond that of common Hellenism, but were in no hostile relations with Persia, and would have been provoking a new enemy by meddling in the Asiatic war.

The promises and representations of Aristagoras were accordingly received with great favor by the Athenians; who, over and above the claims of sympathy, had a powerful interest in sustaining the Ionic revolt as an indirect protection to themselves—and to whom the abstraction of the Ionic fleet from the Persians afforded a conspicuous and important relief. The Athenians at once resolved to send a fleet of twenty ships, under Melanthius, as an aid to the revolted Ionians—ships which are designated by Herodotus, "the beginning of the mischiefs between Greeks and barbarians"—as the ships in which Paris crossed the Ægean had before been called in the Iliad of Homer. Herodotus further remarks that it seems easier to deceive many men together than one—since Aristagoras, after having failed with Kleomenes, thus imposed upon the 30,000 citizens of Athens. But on this remark two comments suggest themselves. First, the circumstances of Athens and Sparta were not the same in regard to the Ionic quarrel—an observation which Herodotus himself had made a little while before: the Athenians had a material interest in the quarrel, political as well as sympathetic, while the Spartans had none. Secondly, the ultimate result of their interference, as it stood in the time of Herodotus, though purchased by severe intermediate hardship, was one eminently gainful and glorifying, not less to Athens than to Greece.

When Aristagoras returned, he seems to have found the Persians engaged in the siege of Miletus. The twenty Athenian ships soon crossed the Ægean, and found there five Eretrian ships which had also come to the succor of the Ionians; the Eretrians generously taking this opportunity to repay the assistance formerly rendered to them by the Milesians in their ancient war with Chalkis. On the arrival of these allies, Aristagoras organized an expedition from Ephesus up to Sardis, under the command of his brother Charopinus with others. The ships were left at Koressus, a mountain and seaport five miles from Ephesus, while the troops marched up under Ephesian guides, first along the river Kayster, next across the mountain range of Tmolus to Sardis. Artaphernes had not troops enough to do more than hold the strong citadel, so that the assailants possessed themselves of the town without opposition. But he immediately recalled his force near Miletus, and summoned Persians and Lydians from all the neighboring districts, thus becoming more than a match for Charopinus: who found himself moreover obliged to evacuate Sardis owing to an accidental conflagration. Most of the houses in that city were built in great part with reeds or straw, and all of them had thatched roofs. Hence it happened that a spark touching one of them set the whole city in a flame. Obliged to abandon their dwellings by this accident, the population of the town congregated in the market-place—and as reinforcements were hourly crowding in, the position of the Ionians and Athenians became precarious. They evacuated the town, took up a position on Mount

Tmolus, and when night came, made the best of their way to the seacoast. The troops of Artaphernes pursued, overtook them near Ephesis, and defeated them completely. Eualkides the Eretrian general, a man of eminence and celebrated victor at the solemn games, perished in the action, together with a considerable number of troops. After this unsuccessful commencement, the Athenians betook themselves to their vessels and sailed home, in spite of pressing instances on the part of Aristogoras to induce them to stay. They took no farther part in the struggle; a retirement at once so sudden and so complete, that they must probably have experienced some glaring desertion on the part of their Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so much danger upon the Spartan general Derkyllidas, in 396, B.C. Unless such was the case, they seem open to censure rather for having too soon withdrawn their aid, than for having originally lent it.

The burning of a place so important as Sardis, however, including the temples of the local goddess Kybebe, which perished with the remaining buildings, produced a powerful effect on both sides—encouraging the revolters, as well as incensing the Persians. Aristagoras dispatched ships along the coast, northward as far as Byzantium, and southward as far as Cyprus. The Greek cities near the Hellespont and the Propontis were induced, either by force or by inclination, to take part with him; the Karians embraced his cause warmly; even the Kaunians who had not declared themselves before, joined him as soon as they heard of the capture of Sardis; while the Greeks in Cyprus, with the single exception of the town of Amathus, at once renounced the authority of Darius, and prepared for a strenuous contest. Onesilus of Salamis, the most considerable city in the island, finding the population willing, but his brother, the despot Gorgus, reluctant, shut the latter out of the gates, took the command of the united forces of Salamis and the other revolting cities, and laid siege to Amathus. These towns of Cyprus were then, and seem always afterward to have continued, under the government of despots; who however, unlike the despots in Ionia generally, took part along with their subjects in the revolt against Persia.

The rebellion had now assumed a character so serious, that the Persians were compelled to put forth their strongest efforts to subdue it. From the number of different nations comprised in their empire, they were enabled to make use of the antipathies of one against the other; and the old adverse feeling of Phenicians against Greeks was now found extremely serviceable. After a year spent in getting together forces, the Phenician fleet was employed to transport into Cyprus the Persian general Artybius with a Kilikian and Egyptian army; while the force under Artaphernes at Sardis was so strengthened as to enable him to act at once against all the coast of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to the Triopian promontory. On the other side, the common danger had for the moment brought the

Ionians into a state of union foreign to their usual habit; so that we hear now, for the first and the last time, of a tolerably efficient Pan-Ionic authority.

Apprised of the coming of Artybius with the Phenician fleet, Onesilus and his Cyprian supporters solicited the aid of the Ionic fleet, which arrived shortly after the disembarkation of the Persian force in the island. Onesilus offered to the Ionians their choice, whether they would fight the Phenicians at sea or the Persians on land. Their natural determination was in favor of the sea-fight, and they engaged with a degree of courage and unanimity which procured for them a brilliant victory; the Samians being especially distinguished. But the combat on land, carried on at the same time, took a different turn. Onesilus and the Salaminians brought into the field, after the fashion of Orientals rather than of Greeks, a number of scythed chariots, destined to break the enemy's ranks; while on the other hand the Persian general Artybius was mounted on a horse, trained to rise on his hind-legs and strike out with his fore-legs against an opponent on foot. In the thick of the fight, Onesilus and his Karian shield-bearer came into personal conflict with this general and his horse. By previous concert, when the horse so reared as to get his fore-legs over the shield of Onesilus, the Karian with a scythe severed the legs from his body, while Onesilus with his own hand slew Artybius. But the personal bravery of the Cypriots was rendered useless by treachery in their own ranks. Stesenor, despot of Kurium, deserted in the midst of the battle, and even the scythed chariots of Salamis followed his example; while the brave Onesilus, thus weakened, perished in the total rout of his army, along with Aristokyprus despot of Soli on the north coast of the island: this latter was son of that Philokyprus who had been immortalized more than sixty years before in the poems of Solon. No farther hopes now remaining for the revolters, the victorious Ionian fleet returned home. Salamis relapsed under the sway of its former despot Gorgus, while the remaining cities in Cyprus were successively besieged and taken; not without a resolute defense, however, since Soli alone held out five months.

Meanwhile the principal force of Darius having been assembled at Sardis, Daurises, Hymeas, and other generals who had married daughters of the Great King, distributed their efforts against different parts of the western coast. Daurises attacked the towns near the Hellespont—Abydus, Perkote, Lampsakus, and Pæsus—which made little resistance. He was then ordered southward into Karia, while Hymeas, who with another division had taken Kios on the Propontis, marched down to the Hellespont and completed the conquest of the Troad as well as of the Æolic Greeks in the region of Ida. Artaphernes and Otanes attacked the Ionic and Æolic towns on the coast—the former taking Klazomenæ, the latter Kyme.

There remained Karia, which, with Miletus in its neighborhood,

offered a determined resistance to Daurises. Forewarned of his approach, the Karians assembled at a spot called the White Pillars, near the confluence of the rivers Mæander and Marsyas. Pixodarus, one of their chiefs, recommended the desperate expedient of fighting with the river at their back, so that all chance of flight might be cut off; but most of the chiefs decided in favor of a contrary policy—to let the Persians pass the river, in hopes of driving them back into it and thus rendering their defeat total. Victory however, after a sharp contest, declared in favor of Daurises, chiefly in consequence of his superior numbers. Two thousand Persians, and not less than ten thousand Karians, are said to have perished in the battle. The Karian fugitives, re-united after the flight in the grove of noble plane-trees consecrated to Zeus Stratius near Labranda, were deliberating whether they should now submit to the Persians or emigrate for ever, when the appearance of a Milesian re-enforcement restored their courage. A second battle was fought, and a second time they were defeated, the loss on this occasion falling chiefly on the Milesians. The victorious Persians now proceeded to assault the Karian cities, but Herakleides of Mylasa laid an ambuscade for them with so much skill and good fortune, that their army was nearly destroyed, and Daurises with other Persian generals perished. This successful effort, following upon two severe defeats, does honor to the constancy of the Karians, upon whom Greek proverbs generally fasten a mean reputation. It saved for the time the Karian towns, which the Persians did not succeed in reducing until after the capture of Miletus.

On land, the revolters were thus everywhere worsted, though at sea the Ionians still remained masters. But the unwarlike Aristagoras began to despair of success, and to meditate a mean desertion of the companions and countrymen whom he had himself betrayed into danger. Assembling his chief advisers, he represented to them the unpromising state of affairs, and the necessity of securing some place of refuge, in case they were expelled from Miletus. He then put the question to them, whether the island of Sardinia, or Myrkinus in Thrace near the Strymon (which Histiæus had begun some time before to fortify, as I have mentioned in the preceding chapter), appeared to them best adapted to the purpose. Among the persons consulted was Hekatæus the historian, who approved neither the one nor the other scheme, but suggested the erection of a fortified post in the neighboring island of Leros; a Milesian colony, wherein a temporary retirement might be sought, should it prove impossible to hold Miletus, but which permitted an easy return to that city, so soon as opportunity offered. Such an opinion must doubtless have been founded on the assumption, that they would be able to maintain superiority at sea. It is important to note such confident reliance upon this superiority in the mind of a sagacious man, not given to sanguine hopes, like Hekatæus—even under circumstances very unprosperous on land. Emigration to Myrkinus, as proposed by

Aristagoras, presented no hope of refuge at all; since the Persians, if they regained their authority in Asia Minor, would not fail again to extend it to the Strymon. Nevertheless the consultation ended by adopting this scheme, since probably no Ionians could endure the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. Aristagoras set sail for Myrkinus, taking with him all who chose to bear him company. But he perished not long after landing, together with nearly all his company, in the siege of a neighboring Thracian town. Though making profession to lay down his supreme authority at the commencement of the revolt, he had still contrived to retain it in great measure; and on departing for Myrkinus, he devolved it on Pythagoras, a citizen in high esteem. It appears however, that the Milesians, glad to get rid of a leader who had brought them nothing but mischief, paid little obedience to his successor, and made their government from this period popular in reality as well as in profession. The desertion of Aristagoras with the citizens whom he carried away, must have seriously damped the spirits of those who remained. Nevertheless it seems that the cause of the Ionic revolters was quite as well conducted without him.

Not long after his departure, another despot—Histiæus of Miletus his father-in-law and jointly with him the fomenter of the revolt—presented himself at the gates of Miletus for admission. The outbreak of the revolt had enabled him, as he had calculated, to procure leave of departure from Darius. That prince had been thrown into violent indignation by the attack and burning of Sardis, and by the general revolt of Ionia, headed (so the news reached him) by the Milesian Aristagoras, but carried into effect by the active co-operation of the Athenians. "The Athenians (exclaimed Darius)—who are *they?*" On receiving the answer, he asked for his bow, placed an arrow on the string, and shot as high as he could toward the heavens, saying—"Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the Athenians." He at the same time desired an attendant to remind him thrice every day at dinner—"Master, remember the Athenians;" for as to the Ionians he felt assured that their hour of retribution would come speedily and easily enough.

This Homeric incident deserves notice as illustrating the epical handling of Herodotus. His theme is, the invasions of Greece by Persia: he has now arrived at the first eruption, in the bosom of Darius, of that passion which impelled the Persian forces toward Marathon and Salamis—and he marks the beginning of a new phase by act and word both alike significant. It may be compared to the libation and prayer addressed by Achilles in the Iliad to Zeus, at the moment when he is sending forth Patroklus and the Myrmidons to the rescue of the despairing Greeks.

At first Darius had been inclined to ascribe the movement in Ionia to the secret instigation of Histiæus, whom he called into his presence and questioned. But the latter found means to satisfy him, and

even to make out that no such mischief would have occurred, if he (Histiæus) had been at Miletus instead of being detained at Susa. "Send me down to the spot (he asseverated), and I engage not merely to quell the revolt and put into your hands the traitor who heads it —but also not to take off this tunic from my body, before I shall have added to your empire the great island of Sardinia." An expedition to Sardinia, though never realized, appears to have been among the favorite fancies of the Ionic Greeks of that day. By such boasts and assurances he obtained his liberty, and went down to Sardis, promising to return as soon as he should have accomplished them. But on reaching Sardis he found the satrap Artaphernes better informed than the Great King at Susa. Though Histiæus, when questioned as to the causes which had brought on the outbreak, affected nothing but ignorance and astonishment, Artaphernes detected his evasions, and said—"I will tell you how the facts stand, Histiæus: it is you that have stitched this shoe, and Aristagoras has put it on." Such a declaration promised little security to the suspected Milesian who heard it; and accordingly, as soon as night arrived, he took to flight, went down to the coast, and from thence passed over to Chios. Here he found himself seized on the opposite count, as the confidant of Darius and the enemy of Ionia. He was released, however, on proclaiming himself not merely a fugitive escaping from Persian custody, but also as the prime author of the Ionic revolt; and he farther added, in order to increase his popularity, that Darius had contemplated the translation of the Ionian population to Phenicia, as well as that of the Phenician population to Ionia—to prevent which translation he (Histiæus) had instigated the revolt. This allegation, though nothing better than a pure fabrication, obtained for him the good-will of the Chians, who carried him back to Miletus; but before he departed, he dispatched to Sardis some letters, addressed to distinguished Persians, framed as if he were already in established intrigue with them for revolting against Darius, and intended to invite them to actual revolt. His messenger, Hermippus of Atarneus, betrayed him, and carried his letters straight to Artaphernes. The satrap desired that these letters might be delivered to the persons to whom they were addressed, but that the answers sent to Histiæus might be handed to himself. Such was the tenor of the answers, that Artaphernes was induced to seize and put to death several of the Persians around him; but Histiæus was disappointed in his purpose of bringing about a revolt in the place.

On arriving at Miletus, Histiæus found Aristagoras no longer present, and the citizens altogether adverse to the return of their old despot; nevertheless he tried to force his way by night into the town, but was repulsed and even wounded in the thigh. He returned to Chios, but the Chians refused him the aid of any of their ships: he next passed to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he obtained eight triremes, and employed them to occupy Byzantium, pillaging

and detaining the Ionian merchant-ships as they passed into or out of the Euxine. The few remaining piracies of this worthless traitor, mischievous to his countrymen even down to the day of his death, hardly deserve our notice amid the last struggles and sufferings of the subjugated Ionians, to which we are now hastening.

A vast Persian force, both military and naval, was gradually concentrating itself near Miletus, against which city Artaphernes had determined to direct his principal efforts. Not only the whole army of Asia Minor, but also the Kilikian and Egyptian troops fresh from the conquest of Cyprus, and even the conquered Cypriots themselves, were brought up as reinforcements; while the entire Phenician fleet, no less than 600 ships strong, co-operated on the coast. To meet such a land-force in the field was far beyond the strength of the Ionians, and the joint pan-Ionic council resolved that the Milesians should be left to defend their own fortifications, while the entire force of the confederate cities should be mustered on board the ships. At sea they had as yet no reason to despair, having been victorious over the Phenicians near Cyprus, and having sustained no defeat. The combined Ionic fleet, including the Æolic Lesbians, amounting in all to the number of 353 ships, was accordingly mustered at Lade—then a little island near Miletus, but now joined on to the coast, by the gradual accumulation of land in the bay at the mouth of the Mæander. Eighty Milesian ships formed the right wing, one hundred Chian ships the center, and sixty Samian ships the left wing, while the space between the Milesians and the Chians was occupied by twelve ships from Priene, three from Myus, and seventeen from Teos—the space between the Chians and Samians was filled by eight ships from Erythræ, three from Phokæa, and seventy from Lesbos.

The total armament thus made up was hardly inferior in number to that which, fifteen years afterward, gained the battle of Salamis against a far larger Persian fleet than the present. Moreover, the courage of the Ionians, on ship-board, was equal to that of their contemporaries on the other side of the Ægean; while in respect of disagreement among the allies, we shall hereafter find the circumstances preceding the battle of Salamis still more menacing than those before the coming battle of Lade. The chances of success, therefore, were at least equal between the two, and indeed the anticipations of the Persians and Phenicians on the present occasion were full of doubt, so that they thought it necessary to set on foot express means for disuniting the Ionians—it was fortunate for the Greeks that Xerxes at Salamis could not be made to conceive the prudence of aiming at the same object. There were now in the Persian camp all those various despots whom Aristagoras, at the beginning of the revolt, had driven out of their respective cities. At the instigation of Artaphernes, each of these men dispatched secret communications to their citizens in the allied fleet, endeavoring to detach them severally from the general body, by promises of gentle treatment in the event of compliance, and

by threats of extreme infliction from the Persians if they persisted in armed efforts. Though these communications were sent to each without the knowledge of the rest, yet the answer from all was one unanimous negative. The confederates at Lade seemed more one, in heart and spirit, than the Athenians, Spartans, and Corinthians will hereafter prove to be at Salamis.

But there was one grand difference which turned the scale—the superior energy and ability of the Athenian leaders at Salamis, coupled with the fact that they *were* Athenians—that is, in command of the largest and most important contingent throughout the fleet.

At Lade, unfortunately, this was quite otherwise. Each separate contingent had its own commander, but we hear of no joint commander at all. Nor were the chiefs who came from the larger cities —Milesian, Chian, Samian, or Lesbian—men like Themistokles, competent and willing to stand forward as self-created leaders, and usurp for the moment, with the general consent and for the general benefit, a privilege not intended for them. The only man of sufficient energy and forwardness to do this, was the Phokæan Dionysius—unfortunately the captain of the smallest contingent of the fleet, and therefore enjoying the least respect. For Phokæa, once the daring explorer of the western waters, had so dwindled down since the Persian conquest of Ionia, that she could now furnish no more than three ships, and her ancient maritime spirit survived only in the bosom of her captain. When Dionysius saw the Ionians assembled at Lade, willing, eager, full of talk and mutual encouragement, but untrained and taking no thought of discipline, or nautical practice, or co-operation in the hour of battle—he saw the risk which they ran for want of these precautions, and strenuously remonstrated with them: "Our fate hangs on the razor's edge, men of Ionia: either to be freemen or slaves,—and slaves, too, caught after running away. Set yourself at once to work and duty. You will then have trouble indeed at first, with certain victory and freedom afterward; but if you persist in this carelessness and disorder, there is no hope for you to escape the king's revenge for your revolt. Be persuaded and commit yourself to me. I pledge myself, if the gods only hold an equal balance, that your enemies either will not fight, or will be severely beaten."

The wisdom of this advice was so apparent, that the Ionians, quitting their comfortable tents on the shore of Lade, and going on board their ships, submitted themselves to the continuous nautical labors and maneuvers imposed upon them by Dionysius. The rowers, and the hoplites on the deck, were exercised in their separate functions, and even when they were not so employed, the ships were kept at anchor, and the crews on board, instead of on shore; so that the work lasted all day long, under a hot summer's sun. Such labor was new to the Ionian crews. They endured it for seven successive

days, after which they broke out with one accord into resolute mutiny and refusal: "Which of the Gods have we offended, to bring upon ourselves such a retribution as this? madmen as we are, to put ourselves into the hands of this Phokæan braggart, who has furnished only three ships! He has now got us and is ruining us without remedy; many of us are already sick, many others are sickening. We had better make up our minds to Persian slavery, or any other mischiefs, rather than go on with these present sufferings. Come, we will not obey this man any longer." And they forthwith refused to execute his orders, resuming their tents on shore, with the enjoyments of shade, rest, and inactive talk, as before.

I have not chosen to divest this instructive scene of the dramatic liveliness with which it is given in Herodotus—the more so as it has all the air of reality, and as Hekatæus the historian was probably present in the Island of Lade, and may have described what he actually saw and heard. When we see the intolerable hardship which these nautical maneuvers and labors, imposed upon the Ionians, though men not accustomed to ordinary ship-work,—and when we witness their perfect incapacity to submit themselves to such a discipline, even with extreme danger staring them in the face—we shall be able to appreciate the severe and unremitting toil whereby the Athenian seaman afterward purchased that perfection of nautical discipline which characterized him at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It will appear, as we proceed with this history, that the full development of the Athenian democracy worked a revolution in Grecian military marine, chiefly by enforcing upon the citizen seaman a stric continuous training, such as was only supassed by the Lacedæmonian drill on land—and by thus rendering practicable a species of nautical maneuvering, which was unknown even at the time of the battle of Salamis. I shall show this more fully hereafter: at present I contrast it briefly with the incapacity of the Ionians at Lade, in order that it may be understood how painful such training really was. The reader of Grecian history is usually taught to associate only ideas of turbulence and anarchy with the Athenian democracy. But the Athenian navy, the child and champion of that democracy, will be found to display an indefatigable labor and obedience nowhere else witnessed in Greece—of which even the first lessons, as in the case now before us, prove to others so irksome as to outweigh the prospect of extreme and imminent peril. The same impatience of steady toil and discipline, which the Ionians displayed to their own ruin before the battle of Lade, will be found to characterize them fifty years afterward as allies of Athens, as I shall have occasion to show when I come to describe the Athenian empire.

Ending in this abrupt and mutinous manner, the judicious suggestions of the Phokæan leader did more harm than good. Perhaps his manner of dealing may have been unadvisedly rude; but we are

surprised to see that no one among the leaders of the larger contingents had the good sense to avail himself of the first readiness of the Ionians, and to employ his superior influence in securing the continuance of a good practice once begun. Not one such superior man did this Ionic revolt throw up. From the day on which the Ionians discarded Dionysius, their camp became a scene of disunion and mistrust. Some of them grew so reckless and unmangeable, that the better portion despaired of maintaining any orderly battle; and the Samians in particular now repented that they had declined the secret offers made to them by their expelled despot—Æakes, son of Syloson. They sent privately to renew the negotiation, received a fresh promise of the same indulgence; and agreed to desert when the occasion arrived. On the day of battle, when the two fleets were on the point of coming to action, the sixty Samian ships all sailed off, except eleven whose captains disdained such treachery. Other Ionians followed their example; yet amidst the reciprocal crimination which Herodotus had heard, he finds it difficult to determine who was most to blame, though he names the Lesbians as among the earliest deserters. The hundred ships from Chios, constituting the center of the fleet—each ship carrying forty chosen soldiers fully armed—formed a brilliant exception to the rest. They fought with the greatest fidelity and resolution, inflicting upon the enemy, and themselves sustaining, heavy loss. Dionysius the Phokæan also behaved in a manner worthy of his previous language, and captured with his three ships the like number of Phenicians. But such examples of bravery did not compensate the treachery or cowardice of the rest. The defeat of the Ionians at Lade was complete as well as irrecoverable, To the faithful Chians, the loss was terrible both in the battle and after it; for though some of their vessels escaped from the defeat safely to Chios, others were so damaged as to be obliged to run ashore close at hand on the promontory of Mykale, where the crews quitted them, with the intention of marching northward through the Ephesian territory to the continent opposite their own island. We hear with astonishment, that at that critical moment, the Ephesian women were engaged in solemnizing the Thesmophoria,—a festival celebrated at night, in the open air, in some uninhabited portion of the territory, and without the presence of any male person. As the Chian fugitives entered the Ephesian territory by night, their coming being neither known nor anticipated—it was believed that they were thieves or pirates coming to seize the women, and under this error they were attacked by the Ephesians and slain. It would seem from this incident that the Ephesians had taken no part in the Ionic revolt, nor are they mentioned amidst the various contingents; nor is anything said either of Kolophon, or Lebedus, or Eræ.

The Phokæan Dionysius, perceiving that the defeat of Lade was the ruin of the Ionic cause, and that his native city was again doomed

to Persian subjection, did not think it prudent even to return home. Immediately after the battle he set sail, not for Phokæa, but for the Phenician coast, at this moment stripped of its protecting cruisers. He seized several Phenician merchantmen, out of which considerable profit was obtained: then setting sail for Sicily, he undertook the occupation of a privateer against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, abstaining from injury toward Greeks. Such an employment seems then to have been considered perfectly admissible. A considerable body of Samians also migrated to Sicily, indignant at the treachery of their admirals in the battle, and yet more indignant at the approaching restoration of their despot Æakes. How these Samian emigrants became established in the Sicilian town of Zankle, I shall mention as a part of the course of Sicilian events, which will come hereafter.

The victory of Lade enabled the Persians to attack Miletus by sea as well as by land; they prosecuted the siege with the utmost vigor, by undermining the walls, and by various engines of attack. Their resources in this respect seem to have been enlarged since the days of Harpagus. In no long time the city was taken by storm, and miserable was the fate reserved to it. The adult male population was chiefly slain; while such of them as were preserved, together with the women and children, were sent in a body to Susa to await the orders of Darius, who assigned to them a residence at Ampe, not far from the mouth of the Tigris. The temple at Branchidæ was burnt and pillaged, as Hekatæus had predicted at the beginning of the revolt. The large treasures therein contained must have gone far to defray the costs of the Persian army. The Milesian territory is said to have been altegether denuded of its former inhabitants—the Persians retaining for themselves the city with the plain adjoining to it, and making over the mountainous portions to the Karians of Pedasa. Some few of the Milesians found a place among the Samian emigrants to Sicily. It is certain, however, that the new Grecian inhabitants must have been subsequently admitted into Miletus; for it appears ever afterward as a Grecian town, though with diminished power and importance.

The capture of Miletus, in the sixth year from the commencement of the revolt, carried with it the rapid submission of the neighboring towns in Karia: and during the next summer—the Phenician fleet having wintered at Miletus—the Persian forces by sea and land reconquered all the Asiatic Greeks, insular as well as continental. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—the towns in the Chersonese—Selymbria and Perinthus in Thrace—Prokonnesus and Artake in the Propontis—all these towns were taken or sacked by the Persian and Phenician fleet. The inhabitants of Byzantium and Chalkedon fled for the most part, without even awaiting its arrival, to Mesembria; while the Athenian Miltiades only escaped Persian captivity by a rapid flight from his abode in the Chersonese to Athens. His pur-

suers were indeed so close upon him, that one of his ships, with his son Metiochus on board, fell into their hands. As Miltiades had been strenuous in urging the destruction of the bridge over the Danube, on the occasion of the Scythian expedition, the Phenicians were particularly anxious to get possession of his person, as the most acceptable of all Greek prisoners to the Persian king; who, however, when Metiochus, the son of Miltiades, was brought to Susa, not only did him no harm, but treated him with great kindness, and gave him a Persian wife with a comfortable maintenance.

Far otherwise did the Persian generals deal with the reconquered cities on and near the coast. The threats which had been held out before the battle of Lade were realized to the full. The most beautiful Greek youths and virgins were picked out, to be distributed among the Persian grandees as eunuchs or inmates of the harems. The cities, with their edifices sacred as well as profane, were made a prey to the flames; and in the case of the islands, Herodotus even tells us that a line of Persians was formed from shore to shore, which swept each territory from north to south, and drove the inhabitants out of it. That much of this hard treatment is well founded, there can be no doubt. But it must be exaggerated as to extent of depopulation and destruction, for these islands and cities appear ever afterward as occupied by a Grecian population, and even as in a tolerable, though reduced, condition. Samos was made an exception to the rest, and completely spared by the Persians, as a reward to its captains for setting the example of desertion at the battle of Lade; while Æakes, the despot of that island, was reinstated in his government. It appears that several other despots were reinstated at the same time in their respective cities, though we are not told which.

Amid the sufferings endured by so many innocent persons, of every age and of both sexes, the fate of Histiæus excites but little sympathy. He was carrying on his piracies at Byzantium when he learnt the surrender of Miletus; he then thought it expedient to sail with his Lesbian vessels for Chios, where admittance was refused to him. But the Chians, weakened as they had been by the late battle, were in little condition to resist, so that he defeated their troops and despoiled the island. During the present break-up of the Asiatic Greeks, there were doubtless many who (like the Phokæan Dionysius) did not choose to return home to an enslaved city, yet had no fixed plan for a new abode. Of these exiles, a considerable number put themselves under the temporary command of Histiæus, and accompanied him to the plunder of Thasos. While besieging that town, he learnt the news that the Phenician fleet had quitted Miletus to attack the remaining Ionic towns. He therefore left his designs on Thasos unfinished, in order to go and defend Lesbos. But in this latter island the dearth of provisions was such, that he was forced to cross over to the continent to reap the standing corn, around Atarneus and in the fertile plain of Mysia near the river Kaikus. Here

he fell in with a considerable Persian force under Harpagus—was beaten, compelled to flee, and taken prisoner. On his being carried to Sardis, Artaphernes the satrap caused him to be at once crucified: partly no doubt from genuine hatred, but partly also under the persuasion that if he were sent up as a prisoner to Susa, he might again become dangerous, since Darius would even now spare his life, under an indelible sentiment of gratitude for the maintenance of the bridge over the Danube. The head of Histiæus was embalmed and sent up to Susa, where Darius caused it to be honorably buried, condemning this precipitate execution of a man who had once been his preserver.

We need not wonder that the capture of Miletus excited the strongest feeling, of mixed sympathy and consternation, among the Athenians. In the succeeding year (so at least we are led to think, though the date cannot be positively determined) it was selected as the subject of a tragedy)—The Capture of Miletus—by the dramatic poet Phrynichus; which, when performed, so painfully wrung the feelings of the Athenian audience, that they burst into tears in the theater, and the poet was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachmæ, as "having recalled to them their own misfortune." The piece was forbidden to be afterward acted, and has not come down to us. Some critics have supposed that Herodotus has not correctly assigned the real motive which determined the Athenians to impose this fine; for it is certain that the subjects usually selected for tragedy were portions of heroic legend, and not matters of recent history; so that the Athenians might complain of Phrynichus on the double ground—for having violated an established canon of propriety, as well as for touching their sensibilities too deeply. Still, I see no reason for doubting that the cause assigned by Herodotus is substantially the true one. Yet it is very possible that Phrynichus, at an age when tragic poetry had not yet reached its full development, might touch this very tender subject with a rough and offensive hand, before a people who had fair reason to dread the like cruel fate for themselves. Æschylus, in his Persæ, would naturally carry with him the full tide of Athenian sympathy, while dwelling on the victories of Salamis and Platæa. But to interest the audience in Persian success and Grecian suffering, was a task in which much greater poets than Phrynichus would have failed—and which no judicious poet would have undertaken. The sack of Magdeburg by Count Tilly, in the Thirty Years' war, was not likely to be endured as the subject of dramatic representation in any Protestant town of Germany.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM IONIC REVOLT TO BATTLE OF MARATHON.

In the preceding chapter, I indicated the point of confluence between the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history—the commencement of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica; manifested first in the form of a threat by Artaphernes the satrap, when he enjoined the Athenians to take back Hippias as the only condition of safety, and afterward converted into a passion in the bosom of Darius in consequence of the burning of Sardis. From this time forward, therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia come to be in direct relation one with the other, and capable of being embodied, much more than before, into one continuous narrative.

The reconquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernes proceeded to organize the future government of it, with a degree of prudence and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings. Convoking deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them to enter into a permanent convention for the amicable settlement of disputes, so as to prevent all employment of force by any one against the others. Moreover he caused the territory of each city to be measured by parasangs (each parasang was equal to thirty stadia, or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments of tribute according to this measurement; without any material departure, however, for the sums which had been paid before the revolt. Unfortunately, Herodotus is unusually brief in his allusion to this proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able to comprehend perfectly. We may, however, assume it as certain that both the population and the territory of many among the Ionic cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the preceding revolt, and still more in consequence of the cruelties with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In regard to Miletus, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained for themselves the city, with its circumjacent plain, but gave the mountain-portion of the Milesian territory to the Karians of Pedasa. Such a proceeding would naturally call for fresh measurement and assessment of tribute; and there may have been similar transfers of land elsewhere. I have already observed that the statements which we find in Herodotus, of utter depopulation and destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic, afterward. Yet there can be no doubt that they are partially true, and that the miseries of those days, as stated in the work of Hekatæus as well as by contemporary informants with whom Herodotus had probably conversed, must have been

extreme. New inhabitants would probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained; and such infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for the organization introduced by Artaphernes, in order to determine clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian government and toward each other. Herodotus considers that the arrangement was extremely beneficial to the Ionians, and so it must unquestionably have appeared, coming as it did immediately after so much previous suffering. He farther adds that the tribute then fixed remained unaltered until his own day—a statement requiring some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for describing the condition of the Asiatic Greeks after the repulse of Xerxes from Greece proper.

Meanwhile the intentions of Darius for the conquest of Greece were now effectively manifested. Mardonius, invested with the supreme command, at the head of a large force, was sent down in the ensuing spring for the purpose. Having reached Kilikia in the course of the march, he himself got on ship-board and went by sea to Ionia, while his army marched across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. His proceeding in Ionia surprises us, and seems to have appeared surprising as well to Herodotus himself as to his readers. Mardonius deposed the despots throughout the various Greek cities; leaving the people of each to govern themselves, subject to Persian dominion and tribute. This was a complete reversal of the former policy of Persia, and must be ascribed to a new conviction, doubtless wise and well-founded, which had recently grown up among the Persian leaders, that on the whole their unpopularity was aggravated more than their strength was increased, by employing these despots as instruments. The phenomena of the late Ionic revolt were well calculated to teach such a lesson; but we shall not often find the Persians profiting by experience, throughout the course of this history.

Mardonius did not remain long in Ionia, but passed on with his fleet to the Hellespont, where the land force had already arrived. He transported it across into Europe, and began his march through Thrace; all of which had already been reduced by Megabazus, and does not seem to have participated in the Ionic revolt. The island of Thasus surrendered to the fleet without resistance, and the land force was conveyed across the Strymon to the Greek city of Akanthus, on the western coast of the Strymonic Gulf. From hence Mardonius marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable portion of its inhabitants—perhaps some of those not comprised in the dominion of Amyntas, since that prince had before submitted to Megabazus. Meanwhile he sent his fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and to join the land force again at the Gulf of Therma, with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even of prosecuting the march as far as Athens and Eretria; so that the expedition afterward accomplished by Xerxes would have been tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had

not a terrible storm completely disabled the fleet. The sea near Athos was then, and is now, full of peril to navigators. One of the hurricanes so frequent in its neighborhood overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed 300 ships, and drowned or cast ashore not less than 20,000 men. Of those who reached the shore, many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the farther progress of Mardonius, who also sustained considerable loss with his land army, and was himself wounded in a night attack made upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Brygi. Though strong enough to repel and avenge this attack, and to subdue the Brygi, he was yet in no condition to advance farther. Both the land force and the fleet were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and from thence across to Asia, with so much shame of failure, that Mardonius was never again employed by Darius; though we cannot make out that the fault was imputable to him. We shall hear of him again under Xerxes.

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the Thasians, so recently subdued, with the idea of revolting. At least their conduct provoked the suspicion of Darius; for they made active preparations for defense, both by building war-ships, and by strengthening their fortifications. The Thasians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their main-land territory opposite. The mines at Skapte Hyle in Thrace yielded to them an annual income of eighty talents; their total surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government so that the inhabitants were entirely untaxed—was 200 talents (£46,000, if Attic talents; more, if either Euboic or Æginæan). With such large means, they were enabled soon to make preparations which excited notice among their neighbors; many of whom were doubtless jealous of their prosperity, and perhaps inclined to dispute with them possession of the profitable mines of Skapte Hyle. As in other cases, so in this: the jealousies among subject neighbors often procured revelations to the superior power. The proceedings of the Thasians were made known, and they were forced to raze their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to the Persians at Abdera.

Though dissatisfied with Mardonius, Darius was only the more eagerly bent on his project of conquering Greece. Hippias was at his side to keep alive his wrath against the Athenians. Orders were dispatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships of war and horse-transports for a renewed attempt. His intentions were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent march of his army to Macedonia. Nevertheless, he now thought it advisable to send heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, in order to require from each the formal token of submission—earth and water; and thus to ascertain what extent of resistance his projected

expedition was likely to experience. The answers received were to a high degree favorable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission, as well as all those islanders to whom application was made. Among the former we are probably to reckon the Thebans and Thessalians, though Herodotus does not particularize them. Among the latter Naxos, Eubœa, and some of the smaller islands, are not included; but Ægina, at that time the first maritime power of Greece, is expressly included.

Nothing marks so clearly the imminent peril in which the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this abasement on the part of the Æginetans, whose commerce with the Asiatic islands and continent doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy consequences of unsuccessful resistance to the Great King. But on the present occasion their conduct was dictated as much by antipathy to Athens as by fear, so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion of the Persian arm as ally and arbiter in her internal contests—a contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between Ægina and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of Greece, though when it did occur nearly a century afterward, toward the close of the Peloponnesian war and in consequence of the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had become strong enough in her own force to endure it without the loss of substantial independence.

The war between Thebes and Ægina on one side, and Athens on the other—begun several years before, and growing out of the connection between Athens and Platæa—had never yet been terminated. The Æginetans had taken part in that war from gratuitous feeling, either of friendship for Thebes or of enmity to Athens, without any direct ground of quarrel, and they had begun the war even without the formality of notice. Though a period apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 506–492 B.C.) had elapsed, the state of hostility still continued; and we may readily conceive that Hippias, the great instigator of Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the enemies of Athens the prudence of seconding, or at least of not opposing, the efforts of the Persian to reinstate him in that city. It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that both Thebes and Ægina manifested submissive dispositions toward the heralds of Darius.

Among these heralds, some had gone both to Athens and to Sparta, for the same purpose of demanding earth and water. The reception given to them at both places was angry in the extreme. The Athenians cast the herald into the pit called the Barathrum, into which they sometimes precipitated public criminals: the Spartans threw the herald who came to them into a well, desiring the unfortunate messenger to take earth and water from thence to the king. The inviolability of heralds was so ancient and undisputed in Greece, from the

Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the fiercest excitement could have instigated any Grecian community to such an outrage. But to the Lacedæmonians, now accustomed to regard themselves as the first of all Grecian states, and to be addressed always in the character of superiors, the demand appeared so gross an insult as to banish from their minds for the time all recollection of established obligations. They came subsequently, however, to repent of the act as highly criminal, and to look upon it as the cause of misfortunes which overtook them thirty or forty years afterward. How they tried at that time to expiate it, I shall hereafter recount.

But if, on the one hand, the wounded dignity of the Spartans hurried them into the commission of this wrong, it was on the other hand of signal use to the general liberties of Greece, by rousing them out of their apathy as to the coming invader, and placing them with regard to him in the same state of inexpiable hostility as Athens and Eretria. We see at once the bonds drawn closer between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians, for the first time, prefer a complaint at Sparta against the Æginetans for having given earth and water to Darius—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to Athens, and in order to invade Attica conjointly with the Persian. This they represented "as treason to Hellas," calling upon Sparta, as head of Greece, to interfere. In consequence of their appeal, Kleomenes, king of Sparta, went over to Ægina, to take measures against the authors of the late proceeding, "for the general benefit of Hellas."

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta as its chief, and obligations of a certain sort on the part of its members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents, showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance of states, became gradually prepared for this idea of a permanent league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in a permanent chief—an idea never fully carried into practice, but now distinctly manifest and partially operative. First, the great acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her undisturbed political traditions, create an unconscious deference toward her such as was not felt toward any other state. Next, she is seen (in the proceedings against Athens after the expulsion of Hippias) as summoning and conducting to war a cluster of self-obliged Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which give to the alliance an imposing permanence and solemnity. Thirdly, her position becomes recognized as first power or president of Greece, both by foreigners who invite alliance (Crœsus) or by Greeks who seek help, such as the Platæans against Thebes or the Ionians against Persia. But Sparta has not been hitherto found willing to take on herself the performance of

this duty of Protector general. She refused the Ionians and the Samian Mæandrius, as well as the Platæans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic lineage: the expedition which she undertook against Polykrates of Samos was founded upon private motives for displeasure, even in the estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves: moreover, even if all these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against Ægina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens is not a member of the cluster of Spartan allies, nor does she claim the compassion of Sparta, as defenseless against an overpowering Grecian neighbor. She complains of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as having been contravened by the Æginetans to her detriment and danger, and calls upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to these obligations. For the first time in Grecian history, such a call is made; for the first time in Grecian history, it is effectively answered. We may well doubt whether it would have been thus answered—considering the tardy, unimpressible, and home-keeping character of the Spartans, with their general insensibility to distant dangers—if the adventure of the Persian herald had not occurred to gall their pride beyond endurance—to drive them into unpardonable hostility with the Great King—and to cast them into the same boat with Athens for keeping off an enemy who threatened the common liberties of Hellas.

From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a recognized political union of Greece against the Persian—or at least something as near to a political union as Grecian temper will permit—with Sparta as its head for the present. To such a pre-eminence of Sparta, Grecian history had been gradually tending. But the final event which placed it beyond dispute, and which humbled for the time her ancient and only rival—Argos—is now to be noticed.

It was about three or four years before the arrival of these Persian heralds in Greece, and nearly at the time when Miletus was besieged by the Persian generals, that a war broke out between Sparta and Argos—on what grounds Herodotus does not inform us. Kleomenes, encouraged by a promise of the oracle that he should take Argos, led the Lacedæmonian troops to the banks of the Erasinus, the border river of the Argeian territory. But the sacrifices, without which no river could be crossed, were so unfavorable, that he altered his course, extorted some vessels from Ægina and Sikyon, and carried his troops by sea to Nauplia, the sea-port belonging to Argos, and to the territory of Tiryns. The Argeians having marched their forces down to resist him, the two armies joined battle at Sepeia near Tiryns. Kleomenes, by a piece of simplicity on the part of his enemies which we find it difficult to credit in Herodotus, was enabled to attack them unprepared, and obtained a decisive victory. For the Argeians (the historian states) were so afraid of being over-

reached by stratagem, in the post which their army occupied over against the enemy, that they listened for the commands proclaimed aloud by the Lacedæmonian herald, and performed with their own army the same order which they thus heard given. This came to the knowledge of Kleomenes, who communicated private notice to his soldiers, that when the herald proclaimed orders to go to dinner, they should not obey, but immediately stand to their arms. We are to presume that the Argeian camp was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to enable them to hear the voice of the herald—yet not within sight, from the nature of the ground. Accordingly, so soon as the Argeians heard the herald in the enemy's camp proclaim the word to go to dinner, they went to dinner themselves. In this disorderly condition they were attacked and overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick grove consecrated to their eponymous hero Argus. Kleomenes having inclosed them therein, yet thinking it safer to employ deceit rather than force, ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argeians thus shut up, and then invited them out successively by means of a herald—pretending that he had received their ransom, and that they were released. As fast as each man came out he was put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage, until some one climbing to the top of a tree detected and proclaimed the destruction going on—after about fifty of the victims had perished. Unable to entice any more of the Argeians from their consecrated refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them—Kleomenes set fire to the grove and burned it to the ground. The persons within it appear to have been destroyed either by fire or by sword. After the conflagration had begun, he inquired for the first time to whom the grove belonged, and learned that it belonged to the hero Argus. Not less than 6,000 citizens, the flower and strength of Argos, perished in this disastrous battle and retreat. So completely was the city prostrated, that Kleomenes might easily have taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it with vigor. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias, Polyænus, and Plutarch have copied, he did march thither and attack it, but was repulsed by the valor of the Argeian women; who, in the dearth of warriors occasioned by the recent defeat, took arms along with the slaves, headed by the poetess Telesilla, and gallantly defended the walls. This is probably a myth, generated by a desire to embody in detail the dictum of the oracle a little before, about "the female conquering the male." Without meaning to deny that the Argeian women might have been capable of achieving so patriotic a deed, if Kleomenes had actually marched to the attack of their city—we are compelled by the distinct statement of Herodotus to affirm that he never did attack it. Immediately after the burning of the sacred grove of Argos, he dismissed the bulk of his army to

Sparta, retaining only 1000 choice troops—with whom he marched up to the Heræum, or great temple of Here, between Argos and Mykenæ, to offer sacrifice. The priest in attendance forbade him to enter, saying that no stranger was allowed to offer sacrifice in the temple. But Kleomenes had once already forced his way into the sanctuary of Athene on the Athenian acropolis, in spite of the priestess and her interdict—and he now acted still more brutally toward the Argeian priest, for he directed his helots to drag him from the altar and scourge him. Having offered sacrifice, Kleomenes returned with his remaining forces to Sparta.

But the army whom he had sent home returned with a full persuasion that Argos might easily have been taken—that the king alone was to blame for having missed the opportunity. As soon as he himself returned, his enemies (perhaps his colleague Demaratus) brought him to trial before the ephors on a charge of having been bribed, against which he defended himself as follows. He had invaded the hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that he should take Argos; but so soon as he had burnt down the sacred grove of the hero Argus (without knowing to whom it belonged), he became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by *taking Argos*, and therefore that the divine promise had been fully realized. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this view that he sacrificed in the Heræum. There, though his sacrifice was favorable, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar flashed back from the bosom of the statue of Here, and not from her head. If the flame had flashed from her head, he would have known at once that the gods intended him to take the city by storm; but the flash from her bosom plainly indicated that the topmost success was out of his reach, and that he had already reaped all the glories which they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains from criticising this story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not so the Spartan ephors. To them it appeared not less true as a story than triumphant as a defense, insuring to Kleomenes an honorable acquittal.

Though this Spartan king lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his victories already gained had inflicted upon her a blow such as she did not recover for a generation, putting her for a time out of all condition to dispute the primacy of Greece with Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that both in legend and in earliest history, Argos stands forth as the first power in Greece, with legendary claims to headship, and decidedly above Lacedæmon; who gradually usurps from her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of pre-eminence—and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking upon herself both the rights and the duties of a presiding state over a body of allies who are bound both to her and

to each other. Her title to this honor, however, was never admitted at Argos, and it is very probable that the war just described grew in some way or other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances were tending to throw into her hands. Now the complete temporary prostration of Argos was one essential condition to the quiet acquisition of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three years before the above-recounted adventure of the heralds, it removed the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with Sparta—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any Pan-Hellenic ascendency for herself—a rival who would have seconded Ægina in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have lamed incurably the defensive force of Greece. The ships which Kleomenes had obtained from the Æginetans as well as from the Sikyonians, against their own will, for landing his troops at Nauplia, brought upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Æginetans refused to do so. The circumstances of the Kleomenic war had thus the effect not only of enfeebling Argos, but of alienating her from her natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed Spartan primacy.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans against the traitorous submission of Ægina to Darius, we find that king Kleomenes passed immediately over to that island for the purpose of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away as prisoners several of the leading Æginetans, when Krius and some others among them opposed to him a menacing resistance, telling him that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and under the influence of Athenian bribes—that in order to carry authority, both the Spartan kings ought to come together. It was not of their own accord that the Æginetans ventured to adopt so dangerous a course. Demaratus, the colleague of Kleomenes in the junior or Prokleid line of kings, had suggested to them the step, and promised to carry them through it in safety. Dissension between the two co-ordinate kings was no new phenomenon at Sparta. But in the case of Demaratus and Kleomenes, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of the march against Attica. Hence Demaratus, hating his colleague more than ever, entered into the present intrigue with the Æginetans with the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He succeeded, so that Kleomenes was compelled to return to Sparta; not without unequivocal menace against Krius and the other Æginetans who had repelled him, and not without a thorough determination to depose Demaratus.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of Demaratus's birth. His reputed father Aristo, having had no offspring by two successive wives, at last became enamored of the wife of his friend Agetus—a woman of surpassing beauty—and entrapped

him into an agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender anything belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which Agetus asked from Aristo was at once given. In return, the latter demanded to have the wife of Agetus, who was thunderstruck at the request, and indignantly complained of having been cheated into a sacrifice of all others the most painful: nevertheless the oath was peremptory, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Demaratus took place so soon after this change of husbands, that when it was first made known to Aristo, as he sat upon a bench along with the ephors, he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage, and exclaimed with an oath, "The child cannot be mine." He soon, however, retracted his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew up without any question being publicly raised as to his birth, and succeeded his father on the throne. But the original words of Aristo had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished that Demaratus was really the son of his mother's first husband.

Of these suspicions Kleomenes now resolved to avail himself, exciting Leotychides, the next heir in the Prokleid line of kings, to impugn publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus—engaging to second him with all his influence as next in order for the crown—and exacting in return a promise that he would support the intervention against Ægina. Leotychides was animated not merely by ambition, but also by private enmity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him of his intended bride. He warmly entered into the scheme, arraigned Demaratus as no true Herakleid, and produced evidence to prove the original doubts expressed by Aristo. A serious dispute was thus raised at Sparta, wherein Kleomenes, espousing the pretensions of Leotychides, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle. Through the influence of Kobon, a powerful native of Delphi, he procured from the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that Demaratus was not the son of Aristo. Leotychides thus became king of the Prokleid line, while Demaratus descended into a private station, and was elected at the ensuing solemnity of the Gymnopædia to an official function. The new king, unable to repress a burst of triumphant spite, sent an attendant to ask him in the public theater, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king. Stung with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried them both, and that Leotychides might in time come to try them both also: the question (he added) shall bear its fruit—great evil, or great good, to Sparta. So saying he covered his face and retired home from the theater—offered a solemn farewell sacrifice at the altar of Zeus Herkeios, and solemnly adjured his mother to declare to him who his real father was—then at once quitted Sparta for Elis, under pretense of going to consult the Delphian oracle.

Demaratus was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious

man—noted, among other things, as the only Lacedæmonian king down to the time of Herodotus who had ever gained a chariot victory at Olympia. Hence Kleomenes and Leotychides became alarmed at the mischief which he might do them in exile. By the law of Sparta, no Herakleid was allowed to establish his residence out of Sparta, on pain of death. This marks the sentiment of the country, on pain of death. This marks the sentiment of the Lacedæmonians, and Demaratus was not the less likely to give trouble because they had pronounced him illegitimate. Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and seized him in the island of Zakynthus. But the Zakynthians would not consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into Asia, where he presented himself to Darius, and was received with abundant favors and presents. We shall hereafter find him the companion of Xerxes, giving to that monarch advice such as, if it had been acted upon, would have proved the ruin of Grecian independence; to which however he would have been even more dangerous, if he had remained at home as king of Sparta.

Meanwhile Kleomenes, having obtained a consentient colleague in Leotychides, went with him over to Ægina, eager to revenge himself for the affront which had been put upon him. To the requisition and presence of the two kings jointly, the Æginetans did not dare to oppose any resistance. Kleomenes made choice of ten citizens eminent for wealth, station, and influence, among whom were Krius and another person named Kasambus, the two most powerful men in the island. Conveying them away to Athens, he deposited them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians.

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the events just recounted were of material importance, considered in their indirect bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first time a formal Pan-hellenic primacy, her ancient rival Argos being too much broken to contest it—her two kings, at this juncture unanimous, employ their presiding interference in coercing Ægina, and placing Æginetan hostages in the hands of Athens. The Æginetans would not have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbor and rival at the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference only which restrained them from assailing Athens conjointly with the Persian invaders; thus leaving the hands of the Athenians free, and their courage undiminished for the coming trial.

Meanwhile a vast Persian force, brought together in consequence of the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the empire, had assembled in the Aleïan plain of Kilikia near the sea. A fleet of 600 armed triremes, together with many transports both for men and heroes, was brought hither for their embarkation: the

troops were put on board and sailed along the coast of Samos in Ionia. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks constituted an important part of this armament, while the Athenian exile Hippias was on board as guide and auxiliary in the attack of Attica. The generals were Datis, a Median—and Artaphernes son of the satrap of Sardis so named, and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded and marked, as I have noticed in a former chapter, by an outbreak of hostile nationality between the Medes and Persians. Their instructions were, generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them most particularly to conquer Eretria and Athens, and to bring the inhabitants as slaves into his presence. These orders were literally meant, and probably neither the generals nor the soldiers of this vast armament doubted that they would be literally executed; and that before the end of the year, the wives, or rather the widows, of men like Themistokles and Aristeides would be seen among a mournful train of Athenian prisoners on the road from Sardis to Susa, thus accomplishing the wish expressed by queen Atossa at the instance of Demokedes.

The recent terrific storm near Mount Athos deterred the Persians from following the example of Mardonius, and taking their course by the Hellespont and Thrace. It was resolved to strike straight across the Ægean (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like Themistokles most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxes) from Samos to Eubœa, attacking the intermediate islands in the way. Among those islands was Naxos, which ten years before had stood a long seige, and gallantly repelled the Persian Megabates with the Milesian Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Datis to efface this stain on the Persian arms and to take a signal revenge on the Naxians. Crossing from Samos to Naxos, he landed his army on the island, which he found an easier prize than he had expected. The terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families to the highest summits of their mountains; while the Persians, seizing as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the undefended town with its edifices, sacred and profane.

Immense indeed was the difference in Grecian sentiment towards the Persians created by the terror-striking reconquest of Ionia, and by the exhibition of a large Phenician fleet in the Ægean. The strength of Naxos was the same now as it had been before the Ionic revolt, and the successful resistance then made might have been supposed likely to nerve the courage of its inhabitants. Yet such is the fear now inspired by a Persian armament, that the eight thousand Naxian hoplites abandon their towns and their gods without striking a blow, and think of nothing but personal safety for themselves and their families. A sad augury for Athens and Eretria!

From Naxos Datis dispatched his fleet round the other Cyclades islands, requiring from each hostages for fidelity and a contingent to increase his army. With the sacred island of Delos, however, he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The Delians had fled before his approach to Tenos, but Datis sent a herald to invite them back again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate, and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great King to reverence the island in which Apollo and Artemis were born. His acts corresponded with this language; for the fleet was not allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only a few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. As a large portion of his armament consisted of Ionic Greeks, such pronounced respect to the island of Delos may probably be ascribed to the desire of satisfying their religious feelings; for in their days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and demanding re-enforcements as well as hostages from each, Datis at length touched the southernmost portion of Eubœa—the town of Karystus and its territory. The Karystians at first refused either to give hostages or to furnish re-enforcements against their friends and neighbors. But they were speedily compelled to submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders. This was the first taste of resistance which Datis had yet experienced; and the facility with which it was overcome gave him a promising omen as to his success against Eretria, whither he soon arrived.

The destination of the armament was no secret to the inhabitants of this fated city, among whom consternation, aggravated by intestine differences, was the reigning sentiment. They made application to Athens for aid, which was readily and conveniently afforded to them by means of those four thousand kleruchs or out-citizens whom the Athenians had planted sixteen years before in the neighboring territory of Chalkis. Notwithstanding such re-enforcement, however, many of them despaired of defending the city, and thought only of seeking shelter on the unassailable summits of the island, as the more numerous and powerful Naxians had already done before them; while another party, treacherously seeking their own profit out of the public calamity, lay in wait for an opportunity of betraying the city to the Persians. Though a public resolution was taken to defend the city, yet so manifest was the absence of that stoutness of heart which could alone avail to save it, that a leading Eretrian named Æschines was not ashamed to forewarn the four thousand Athenian allies of the coming treason, and urge them to save themselves before it was too late. They followed his advice and passed over to Attica by way of Oropus; while the Persians disembarked their troops, and even their horses, in expectation that the Eretrians would come out and fight, at Tamynæ and other places in the territory. As the

Eretrians did not come out, they proceeded to lay siege to the city, and for some days met with a brave resistance, so that the loss on both sides was considerable. At length two of the leading citizens, Euphorbus and Philagrus, with others, betrayed Eretria to the besiegers; its temples were burnt, and its inhabitants dragged into slavery. It is impossible to credit the exaggerated statement of Plato, which is applied by him to the Persians at Eretria as it had been before applied by Herodotus to the Persians at Chios and Samos—that they swept the territory clean of inhabitants by joining hands and forming a line across its whole breadth. Evidently this is an idea, illustrating the possible effects of numbers and ruinous conquest, which has been woven into the tissue of historical statements, like so many other illustrative ideas in the writings of Greek authors. That a large proportion of the inhabitants were carried away as prisoners, there can be no doubt. But the traitors who betrayed the town were spared and rewarded by the Persians, and we see plainly that either some of the inhabitants must have been left, or new settlers introduced, when we find the Eretrians reckoned ten years afterwards among the opponents of Xerxes.

Datis had thus accomplished with little or no resistance one of the two express objects commanded by Darius, and his army were elated with the confident hope of soon completing the other. After halting a few days at Eretria, and depositing in the neighboring islet of Ægilia the prisoners recently captured, he re-embarked his army to cross over to Attica, and landed in the memorable bay of Marathon on the eastern coast—the spot indicated by the despot Hippias, who now landed along with the Persians, twenty years after his expulsion from the government. Forty-seven years had elapsed since he had made as a young man this same passage, from Eretria to Marathon, in conjunction with his father Peisistratus, on the occasion of the second restoration of the latter. On that previous occasion, the force accompanying the father had been immeasurably inferior to that which now seconded the son. Yet it had been found amply sufficient to carry him in triumph to Athens, with feeble opposition from citizens alike irresolute and disunited. And the march of Hippias from Marathon to Athens would now have been equally easy, as it was doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and in the dream which Herodotus mentions—had not the Athenians whom he found been men radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great renewal of the Athenian character, under the democratical institutions which had subsisted since the dispossession of Hippias, I have already pointed attention in a former chapter. The modifications introduced by Kleisthenes in the constitution had now existed eighteen or nineteen years, without any attempt to overthrow them by violence. The Ten Tribes, each with its constituent demes, had become a part of the established habits of the country; the

citizens had become accustomed to exercise a genuine and self-determined decision, in their assemblies political as well as judicial; while even the senate of Areopagus, renovated by the nine annual archons successively chosen who passed into it after their year of office, had also become identified in feeling with the constitution of Kleisthenes. Individual citizens doubtless remained, partisans in secret, and perhaps correspondents, of Hippias. But the mass of citizens, in every scale of life, could look upon his return with nothing but terror and aversion. With what degree of newly-acquired energy the democratical Athenians could act in defense of their country and institutions, has already been related in a former chapter. But, unfortunately, we possess few particulars of Athenian history, during the decade preceding 490 B.C, nor can we follow in detail the working of the government. The new form, however, which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially manifest when we observe the three leaders who stand prominent at this important epoch—Miltiades, Themistokles, and Aristeides.

The first of the three had returned to Athens three or four years before the approach of Datis, after six or seven years' absence in the Chersonesus of Thrace, whither he had been originally sent by Hippias about the year 517–516 B.C., to inherit the property as well as the supremacy of his uncle the œkist Miltiades. As despot of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had been among the Ionians who accompanied Darius to the Danube in his Scythian expedition. He had been the author of that memorable recommendation which Histiæus and the other despots did not think it their interest to follow—of destroying the bridge and leaving the Persian king to perish. Subsequently he had been unable to remain permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been noticed: but he seems to have occupied it during the period of the Ionic revolt. What part he took in that revolt, we do not know. He availed himself, however, of the period while the Persian satraps were employed in suppressing it, and deprived of the mastery of the sea, to expel, in conjunction with forces from Athens, both the Persian garrison and the Pelasgic inhabitants from the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. But the extinction of the Ionic revolt threatened him with ruin. When the Phenician fleet, in the summer following the capture of Miletus, made its conquering appearance in the Hellespont, he was forced to escape rapidly to Athens with his immediate friends and property, and with a small squadron of five ships. One of these ships, commanded by his son, Metiochus, was actually captured between the Chersonese and Imbros; and the Phenicians were most eager to capture Miltiades himself, inasmuch as he was personally odious to Darius from his strenuous recommendation to destroy the bridge over the Danube. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phenician fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly for alleged misgovernment in the

Chersonese, or for what Herodotus calls "his despotism" there exercised. Probably the Athenian citizens settled in that peninsula may have had good reason to complain of him,—the more so as he had carried out with him the maxims of the government prevalent at Athens under the Peisistratids, and had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries. However the people at Athens honorably acquitted him, probably in part from the reputation which he had obtained as conqueror of Lemnos; and he was one of the ten annually elected generals of the republic, during the year of this Persian expedition—chosen at the beginning of the Attic year, shortly after the summer solstice, at a time when Datis and Hippias had actually sailed, and were known to be approaching.

The character of Miltiades is one of great bravery and decision—qualities pre-eminently useful to his country on the present crisis, and the more useful as he was under the strongest motive to put them forth, from the personal hostility of Darius towards him. Yet he does not peculiarly belong to the democracy of Kleisthenes, like his younger contemporaries Themistokles and Aristeides. The two latter are specimens of a class of men new at Athens since the expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting forcibly with Pesistratus, Lykurgus, and Megakles, the political leaders of the preceding generation. Themistokles and Aristeides, different as they were in disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp, exercising ascendency by and through the people—devoting their time to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discussion in the political and judicial meetings of the people—manifesting those combined powers of action, comprehension, and persuasive speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them as advisers as well as leaders—but always subject to criticism and accusation from unfriendly rivals, and exercising such rivalry towards each other with an asperity constantly increasing. Instead of Attica disunited and torn into armed factions, as it had been forty years before—the Diakrii under one man, and the Parali and Pedieis under others—we have now Attica one and indivisible; regimented into a body of orderly hearers in the Pnyx, appointing and holding to accountability the magistrates, and open to be addressed by Themistokles, Aristeides, or any other citizen who can engage their attention.

Neither Themistokles nor Aristeides could boast a lineage of gods and heroes, like the Æakid Miltiades. Both were of middling station and circumstances. Aristeides, son of Lysimachus, was on both sides of pure Athenian blood; but the wife of Neokles, father of Themistokles, was a foreign woman of Thrace or of Karia; and such an alliance is the less surprising, since Themistokles must have been born during the dynasty of the Peisistratids, when the status of an Athenian citizen had not yet acquired its political value. There was a marked contrast between these two eminent men—those points which stood most conspicuous in the one being comparatively defi-

cient in the other. In the description of Themistokles, which we have the advantage of finding briefly sketched by Thucydides, the circumstance most emphatically brought out is, his immense force of spontaneous invention and apprehension, without any previous aid either from teaching or gradual practice. The might of unassisted nature was never so strikingly exhibited as in him. He conceived the complications of a present embarrassment, and divined the chances of a mysterious future, with equal sagacity and equal quickness. The right expedient seemed to flash upon his mind extempore, even in the most perplexing contingencies, without the least necessity for premeditation. He was not less distinguished for daring and resource in action; when engaged on any joint affairs, his superior competence marked him out as the leader for others to follow, and no business, however foreign to his experience, ever took him by surprise, or came wholly amiss to him. Such is the remarkable picture which Thucydides draws of a countryman whose death nearly coincided in time with his own birth. The untutored readiness and universality of Themistokles probably formed in his mind a contrast to the more elaborate discipline, and careful preliminary study, with which the statesmen of his own day—and Perikles especially, the greatest of them—approached the consideration and discussion of public affairs. Themistokles had received no teaching from philosophers, sophists, and rhetors, who were the instructors of well-born youth in the days of Thucydides, and whom Aristophanes, the contemporary of the latter, so unmercifully derides—treating such instruction as worse than nothing, and extolling, in comparison with it, the unlettered courage, with mere gymnastic accomplishments, of the victors at Marathon. There is no evidence in the mind of Thucydides of any such undue contempt towards his own age. The same terms of contrast are tacitly present to his mind, but he seems to treat the great capacity of Themistokles as the more a matter of wonder, since it sprung up without that preliminary cultivation which had gone to the making of Perikles.

The general character given by Plutarch, though many of his anecdotes are both trifling and apocryphal, is quite consistent with the brief sketch just cited from Thucydides. Themistokles had an unbounded passion—not merely for glory, insomuch that the laurels of Miltiades acquired at Marathon deprived him of rest—but also for display of every kind. He was eager to vie with men richer than himself in showy exhibition—one great source, though not the only source, of popularity at Athens—nor was he at all scrupulous in procuring the means of doing so. Besides being assiduous in attendance at the Ekklesia and the Dikastery, he knew most of the citizens by name, and was always ready with advice to them in their private affairs. Moreover he possessed all the tactics of an expert party-man in conciliating political friends and in defeating political enemies. And though he was in the early part of his life sincerely bent upon

the upholding and aggrandizement of his country, and was on some most critical occasions of unspeakable value to it, yet on the whole his morality was as reckless as his intelligence was eminent. He will be found grossly corrupt in the exercise of power, and employing tortuous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves honorable and patriotic, but sometimes also merely for enriching himself. He ended a glorious life by years of deep disgrace, with the forfeiture of all Hellenic esteem and brotherhood—a rich man, an exile, a traitor, and a pensioner of the Great King, pledged to undo his own previous work of liberation accomplished at the victory of Salamis.

Of Aristeides we possess unfortunately no description from the hand of Thucydides. Yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we may safely accept the brief but unqualified encomium of Herodotus and Plato, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos, however little the details of the latter can be trusted. Aristeides was inferior to Themistokles in resource, quickness, flexibility, and power of coping with difficulties; but incomparably superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in integrity public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary temptations as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenes, the first founder of the democracy—as pursuing a straight and a single-handed course in political life, with no solicitude for party-ties, and with little care either to conciliate friends or to offend enemies—as unflinching in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever committed or upheld—as earning for himself the lofty surname of the Just, not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon, than by his equity in private arbitrations and even his candor in political dispute—and as manifesting, throughout a long public life full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw and beyond all suspicion, recognized equally by his bitter contemporary the poet Timokreon and by the allies of Athens upon whom he first assessed the tribute. Few of the leading men in any part of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity. But whoever became notoriously recognized as possessing this vital quality, acquired by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent talents could confer. Thucydides ranks conspicuous probity among the first of the many ascendent qualities possessed by Perikles; while Nikias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated confidence which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in him. The abilities of Aristeides—though apparently adequate to every occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare him with so remarkable a man as Themistokles—were put in the shade by this incorruptible probity; which procured for him, however, along with

the general esteem, no inconsiderable amount of private enmity from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation. We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his ostracizing vote and expressed his dislike against Aristeides, on the simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called the Just. Now the purity of the most honorable man will not bear to be so boastfully talked of as if he were the only honorable man in the country. The less it is obtruded, the more deeply and cordially will it be felt: and the story just alluded to, whether true or false, illustrates that natural reaction of feeling produced by absurd encomiasts, or perhaps by insidious enemies under the mask of encomiasts, who trumpeted forth Aristeides as *The* Just man of Attica, so as to wound the legitimate dignity of every one else. Neither indiscreet friends nor artful enemies, however, could rob him of the lasting esteem of his countrymen; which he enjoyed, though with intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. He was ostracized during a part of the period between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, at a time when the rivalry between him and Themistokles was so violent that both could not remain at Athens without peril; but the dangers of Athens during the invasion of Xerxes brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired. His fortune, originally very moderate, was still farther diminished during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the state was obliged to lend aid to his children.

Such were the characters of Themistokles and Aristeides, the two earliest leaders thrown up by the Athenian democracy. Half a century before, Themistokles would have been an active partisan in the faction of the Parali or the Pedieis, while Aristeides would probably have remained an unnoticed citizen. At the present period of Athenian history, the characters of soldier, magistrate, and orator were intimately blended together in a citizen who stood forward for eminence, though they tended more and more to divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristeides and Miltiades were both elected among the ten generals, each for his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across the Ægean, and probably even after that expedition was known to be on its voyage. Moreover we are led to suspect from a passage in Plutarch, that Themistokles also was general of his tribe on the same occasion, though this is doubtful; but it is certain that he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day. In addition to the ten, the third archon or polemarch was considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this year was Kallimachus of Aphidnæ.

Such were the chiefs of the military force, and to a great degree the administrators of foreign affairs, at the time when the 4,000 Athenian kleruchs or settlers planted in Eubœa—escaping from Eretria, now invested by the Persians—brought word to their countrymen at home that the fall of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens. A few days afterward Hippias disembarked them at Marathon.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details. But doubtless the alarm was hardly inferior to that which had been felt at Eretria. Opinions were not unanimous as to the proper steps to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Pheidippides the courier was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance; and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed this journey of 150 miles, on foot, in 48 hours. Revealing to the ephors that Eretria was already enslaved, he entreated their assistance to avert the same fate from Athens, the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartan authorities readily promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the moon. Ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in this month at least, during the last quarter before the full moon; but after the full, they engaged to march without delay. Five days' delay at this critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city; yet the reason assigned seems to have been no pretense on the part of the Spartans. It was mere blind tenacity of ancient habit, which we shall find to abate, though never to disappear, as we advance in their history. Indeed their delay in marching to rescue Attica from Mardonius, eleven years afterward, at the imminent hazard of alienating Athens and ruining the Hellenic cause, marks the same selfish dullness. But the reason now given certainly looked very like a pretense, so that the Athenians could indulge no certain assurance that the Spartan troops would start even when the full moon arrived.

In this respect the answer brought by Pheidippides was mischievous, as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for meeting the invaders. Partly, perhaps, in reliance on this expected Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to an immediate engagement with the Persians; while Miltiades, with the remaining four, strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias and to take some active step for paralyzing all united action on the part of the citizens. This most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens hung, is represented by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the Persians; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised before the army quitted the city—upon the question, whether it was prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to confine the defense to the city and the sacred rock. Inaccurate as this latter author generally is, his statement seems more probable here than that of Herodotus. For the ten generals would scarcely

march out of Athens to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight: moreover, the question between fighting in the field or resisting behind the walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural point on which the five mistrustful generals would take their stand. And probably, indeed, Miltiades himself, if debarred from immediate action, would have preferred to hold possession of Athens, and prevent any treacherous movement from breaking out there, rather than to remain inactive on the hills, watching the Persians at Marathon, with the chance of a detachment from their numerous fleet sailing round to Phalerum, and thus distracting by a double attack both the city and the camp.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the ten generals, whether manifested at Marathon or at Athens, is certain. Miltiades had to await the casting vote of the polemarch Kallimachus. To him he represented emphatically the danger of delay, with the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to excite disunion and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing could prevent such treason from breaking out, with all its terrific consequences of enslavement to the Persians and to Hippias, except a bold, decisive, and immediate attack—the success of which he (Miltiades) was prepared to guarantee. Fortunately for Athens, the polemarch embraced the opinion of Miltiades; while the seditious movements which were preparing did not show themselves until after the battle had been gained. Aristeides and Themistokles are both recorded to have seconded Miltiades warmly in this proposal, while all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miltiades their days of command, so as to make him as much as they could the sole leader of the army. It is said that the latter awaited the day of his own regular turn before he fought the battle. Yet considering the eagerness which he displayed to bring on an immediate and decisive action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious postponement upon such a punctilio.

While the army were mustered on the ground sacred to Herakles near Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and shore beneath, and in preparation for immediate action—they were joined by the whole force of the little town of Platæa, consisting of about 1000 hoplites, who had marched directly from their own city to the spot, along the southern range of Kithæron, and passing through Dekeleia. We are not told that they had ever been invited. Very probably the Athenians had never thought of summoning aid from this unimportant neighbor, in whose behalf they had taken upon themselves a lasting feud with Thebes and the Bœotian league. Their coming on this important occasion seems to have been a spontaneous effort of gratitude, which ought not to be the less commended because their interests were really wrapped up in those of Athens—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing could have saved Platæa from being subdued by the Thebans. Yet many a Grecian

town would have disregarded both generous impulse and rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrific enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances of the case—which it requires some effort to do, because our authorities come from the subsequent generations, after Greece had ceased to fear the Persians—we shall be sensible that this volunteer march of the whole Platæan force to Marathon is one of the most affecting incidents of all Grecian history. Upon Athens generally it produced an indelible impression, commemorated ever afterward in the public prayers of the Athenian herald, and repaid by a grant to the Platæans of the full civil rights (seemingly without the political rights) of Athenian citizens. Upon the Athenians then marshalled at Marathon its effect must have been unspeakably powerful and encouraging, as a proof that they were not altogether isolated from Greece, and as an unexpected countervailing stimulus under circumstances so full of hazard.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the Athenians were 10,000 hoplites, either including, or besides, the 1000 who came from Platæa. This statement is no way improbable, though it does not come from Herodotus, who is our only really valuable authority on the case, and who mentions no numerical total. Indeed, the number named may seem smaller than we should have expected, considering that no less than 4,000 kleruchs or out-settled citizens had just come over from Eubœa. A sufficient force of citizens must of course have been left behind to defend the city. The numbers of the Persians we cannot be said to know at all, nor is there anything certain except that they were greatly superior to the Greeks. We hear from Herodotus that their armament originally consisted of six hundred ships of war, but we are not told how many separate transports there were; moreover, reinforcements had been procured as they came across the Ægean from the islands successively conquered. The aggregate crews on board of all their ships must have been between 150,000 and 200,000 men. Yet what proportion of these were fighting-men, or how many actually did fight at Marathon, we have no means of determining. There were a certain proportion of cavalry, and some transports expressly prepared for the conveyance of horses. Moreover, Herodotus tells us that Hippias selected the plain of Marathon for a landing-place, because it was the most convenient spot in Attica for cavalry movements—though it is singular that in the battle the cavalry are not mentioned.

Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a direction E.N.E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is twenty-two miles in length; the southern—longer but more easy, and the only one practicable for chariots—is twenty-six miles in length, or about six and a half hours of computed march.

It passed between Mounts Pentelikus and Hymettus, through the ancient demes of Gargettus and Pallene, and was the road by which Peisistratus and Hippias, when they landed at Marathon, forty-seven years before, had marched to Athens. The bay of Marathon, sheltered by a projecting cape from the northward, affords both deep water and a shore convenient for landing; while "its plain (says a careful modern observer) extends in a perfect level along this fine bay and is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain; the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both, however, leave a broad, firm, sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheater of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which some steep and difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior."

The position occupied by Miltiades before the battle, identified as it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Herakles near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above this plain. Cornelius Nepos tells us that he protected it from the attacks of the Persian cavalry by felled trees obstructing the approach. The Persians occupied a position on the plain; their fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hippias himself marshaled them for the battle. The native Persians and Sakæ, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the center, which they considered as the post of honor, and which was occupied by the Persian king himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by the Greeks, and the polemarch Kallimachus had the command of it. The hoplites were arranged in the order of their respective tribes from right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Platæans. It was necessary for Miltiades to present a front equal or nearly equal to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself from being taken in flank. With this view he drew up the central tribes, including the Leontis and Antiochis, in shallow files and occupying a large breadth of ground; while each of the wings was in stronger and deeper order, so as to make his attack efficient on both sides. His whole army consisted of hoplites, with some slaves as unarmed or light-armed attendants, but without either bowmen or cavalry. Nor could the Persians have been very strong in this latter force, seeing that their horses had to be transported across the Ægean; but the elevated position of Miltiades enabled them to take some measure of the numbers under his command, and the entire absence of cavalry in his army could not but confirm the confidence with which a long career of uninterrupted victory had impressed their generals.

At length the sacrifices in the Greek camp were favorable for battle. Miltiades, who had everything to gain by coming immediately to close quarters, ordered his army to advance at a running step over the interval of one mile which separated the two armies. This rapid forward movement, accompanied by the war-cry or pæan which always animated the charge of the Greek soldier, astounded the Persian army. They construed it as an act of desperate courage little short of insanity, in a body not only small but destitute of cavalry or archers—but they at the same time felt their conscious superiority sink within them. It seems to have been long remembered also among the Greeks as the peculiar characteristic of the battle of Marathon, and Herodotus tells us that the Athenians were the first Greeks who ever charged at a run. It doubtless operated beneficially in rendering the Persian cavalry and archers comparatively innocuous, but we may reasonably suppose that it also disordered the Athenian ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front they were both out of breath and unsteady in that line of presented spears and shields which constituted their force. On the two wings, where the files were deep, such disorder produced no mischievous effect: the Persians, after a certain resistance, were overborne and driven back. But in the center, where the files were shallow, and where moreover the native Persians and other choice troops of the army were posted, the breathless and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in far greater difficulties. The tribes Leontis and Antiochis, with Themistokles and Aristeides among them, were actually defeated, broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Sakæ. Miltiades seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check when he found himself compelled to diminish so materially the depth of his center. For his wings, having routed the enemies opposed to them, were stayed from pursuit until the center was extricated, and the Persians and Sakæ put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships ranged in line along the shore. Some of them became involved in the impassable marsh and there perished. The Athenians tried to set the ships on fire, but the defense here was both vigorous and successful—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain, and only seven ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed. This part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians. They repulsed the Athenians from the sea-shore, so as to secure a safe re-embarkation; leaving few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents and equipments which had been disembarked and could not be carried away.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side in this memorable action at 6,400 men. The number of Athenian dead is accurately known, since all were collected for the last solemn obsequies—they were 192. How many were wounded we do not hear. The brave Kallimachus the polemarch, and Stesilaus one of the ten generals, were among the slain; together with Kynegeirus, son of Euphorion, who, on laying hold on the poop-staff of one of the

vessels, had his hand cut off by an axe, and died of the wound. He was brother of the poet Æschylus, himself present at the fight; to whose imagination this battle at the ships must have emphatically recalled the fifteenth book of the Iliad. Both the slain Athenian generals are said to have perished in the assault of the ships, apparently the hottest part of the combat. The statement of the Persian loss as given by Herodotus appears moderate and reasonable, but he does not specify any distinguished individuals as having fallen.

But the Persians, though thus defeated and compelled to abandon the position of Marathon, were not yet disposed to relinquish altogether their chances against Attica. Their fleet was observed to take the direction of Cape Sunium—a portion being sent to take up the Eretrian prisoners and the stores which had been left in the island of Ægilia. At the same time a shield, discernible from its polished surface afar off, was seen held aloft upon some high point of Attica—perhaps on the summit of Mount Pentelikus, as Colonel Leake supposes with much plausibility. The Athenians doubtless saw it as well as the Persians; and Miltiades did not fail to put the right interpretation upon it, taken in conjunction with the course of the departing fleet. The shield was a signal put up partisans in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiades saw through the plot, and lost not a moment in returning to Athens. On the very day of battle, the Athenian army marched back with the utmost speed from the precinct of Herakles at Marathon to the precinct of the same god at Kynosarges close to Athens, which they reached before the arrival of the Persian fleet. Datis soon came off the port of Phalerum; but the partisans of Hippias had been so dismayed by the rapid return of the Marathonian army, that he did not find those aids and facilities which he had anticipated for a fresh disembarkation in the immediate neighborhood of Athens. Though too late, however, it seems that he was not much too late The Marathonian army had only just completed their forced return-march. A little less quickness on the part of Miltiades in deciphering the treasonable signal, and giving the instant order of march—a little less energy on the part of the Athenian citizens in superadding a fatiguing march to a no less fatiguing combat—and the Persians with the partisans of Hippias might have been found in possession of Athens. As the facts turned out, Datis, finding at Phalerum no friendly movement to encourage him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected presence of the soldiers who had already vanquished him at Marathon—made no attempt again to disembark in Attica, but sailed away, after a short delay, to the Cyclades.

Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger not less terrible than imminent. Nothing could have rescued her except that decisive and instantaneous attack which Miltiades so emphatically urged. The running step on the field of Marathon might

cause some disorder in the ranks of the hoplites; but extreme haste in bringing on the combat was the only means of preventing disunion and distraction in the minds of the citizens. Imperfect as the account is which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we see plainly that the partisans of Hippias had actually organized a conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The bright shield uplifted on Mount Pentelikus, apprising the Persians that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have come to their view before any action had taken place at Marathon, and while the Athenian army were yet detained there, so that Datis might have sent a portion of his fleet round to Phalerum, retaining the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at Phalerum—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in, prior to the building of the Phaleric wall, as had been seen in the defeat of the Spartan Anchimolius by the Thessalian cavalry, in 510 B.C.—that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians, and had perhaps even got possession of the city—their minds would have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified for any unanimous execution of military orders. Generals as well as soldiers would have become incurably divided in opinion—perhaps even mistrustful of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline. But his bravery was not of that equal, imperturbable, uninquiring character, which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon. It was fitful, exalted, or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more sensitive to dangers absent and unseen than to enemies immediately in his front. Hence the advantage, so unspeakable in the case before us, and so well appreciated by Miltiades, of having one undivided Athenian army—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage. But the wisest advisers of Xerxes impressed upon him the prudence of dividing his large force, and of sending detachments to assail separate Greek states—which would infallibly produce the effect of breaking up the combined Grecian host, and leaving no central or co-operating force for the defense of Greece generally. Fortunately for the Greeks, the childish insolence of Xerxes led him to despise all such advice, as implying conscious weakness. Not so Datis and Hippias. Sensible of the prudence of distracting the attention of the Athenians by a double attack, they laid a scheme, while the main army was at Marathon, for rallying the partisans of Hippias, with a force to assist them in the neighborhood of Athens, and the signal was upheld by these partisans as soon as their measures were taken. But the rapidity of Miltiades so precipitated the

battle that this signal came too late, and was only given "when the Persians were already in their ships," after the Marathonian defeat. Even then it might have proved dangerous, had not the movements of Miltiades been as rapid after the victory as before it. If time had been allowed for the Persian movement on Athens before the battle of Marathon had been fought, the triumph of the Athenians might well have been exchanged for a calamitous servitude. To Miltiades belongs the credit of having comprehended the emergency from the beginning, and overruled the irresolution of his colleagues by his own single-hearted energy. The chances all turned out in his favor —for the unexpected junction of the Platæans in the very encampment of Marathon must have wrought up the courage of his army to the highest pitch. Not only did he thus escape all the depressing and distracting accidents, but he was fortunate enough to find this extraneous encouragement immediately preceding the battle, from a source on which he could not have calculated.

I have already observed that the phase of Grecian history best known to us, and amid which the great authors from whom we draw our information lived, was one of contempt for the Persians in the field. It requires some effort of imagination to call back previous feelings after the circumstances have been altogether reversed. Perhaps even Æschylus the poet, at the time when he composed his tragedy of the Persæ to celebrate the disgraceful flight of the invader Xerxes, may have forgotten the emotions with which he and his brother Kynegeirus must have marched out from Athens fifteen years before, on the eve of the battle of Marathon. Again, therefore, the fact must be brought to view, that down to the time when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had never yet been interrupted, and that especially during the ten years immediately preceding, the high handed and cruel extinction of the Ionic revolt had aggravated to the highest pitch the alarm of the Greeks. To this must be added the successes of Datis himself, and the calamities of Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty as an apparent sentence of death to Athens. The extreme effort of courage required in the Athenians, to encounter such invaders, is attested by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting all the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian history. It surpasses even the combat of Thermopylæ, as will appear when I come to describe that memorable event. And the admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals, when outvoted by the decision of the polemarch against them, in co-operating heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated—proves how much the feelings of a constitutional democracy, and that entire acceptance of the pronounced decision of the majority on which it rests, had worked themselves into the Athenian mind. The combat of Marathon was by no means a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat—the first which the Persian had ever received from Greeks in the

field. If the battle of Salamis, ten years afterward, could be treated by Themistokles as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is this true of the battle or Marathon; which first afforded reasonable proof, even to discerning and resolute Greeks, that the Persians might be effectually repelled, and the independence of European Greece maintained against them—a conviction of incalculable value in reference to the formidable trials destined to follow.

Upon the Athenians themselves, the first to face in the field successfully the terrific look of a Persian army, the effect of the victory was yet more stirring and profound. It supplied them with resolution for the far greater actual sacrifices which they cheerfully underwent ten years afterward, at the invasion of Xerxes, without faltering in their pan-Hellenic fidelity. It strengthened them at home by swelling the tide of common sentiment and patriotic fraternity in the bosom of every individual citizen. It was the exploit of Athenians alone, but of all Athenians without dissent or exception—the boast of orators, repeated until it almost degenerated into commonplace, though the people seem never to have become weary of allusions to their single-handed victory over a host of forty-six nations. It had been purchased without a drop of intestine bloodshed—for even the unknown traitors who raised the signal shield on Mount Pentelikus, took care not to betray themselves by want of apparent sympathy with the triumph. Lastly, it was the final guarantee of their democracy, barring all chance of restoration of Hippias for the future. Themistokles is said to have been robbed of his sleep by the trophies of Miltiades, and this is cited in proof of his ambitious temperament. Yet without supposing either jealousy or personal love of glory, the rapid transit from extreme danger to unparalleled triumph might well deprive of rest even the most sober-minded Athenian.

Who it was that raised the treacherous signal shield, to attract the Persians to Athens, was never ascertained. Very probably, in the full exultation of success, no investigation was made. Of course, however, the public belief would not be satisfied without singling out some persons as the authors of such a treason. The information received by Herodotus (probably about 450–440 B.C., forty or fifty years after the Marathonian victory) ascribed the deed to Alkmæonids. He does not notice any other reported authors, though he rejects the allegation against the Alkmæonids upon very sufficient grounds. They were a race religiously tainted, ever since the Kylonian sacrilege, and were therefore convenient persons to brand with the odium of an anonymous crime; while party feud, if it did not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and certifying such rumors. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the political enmity between Perikles, son of Xanthippus, and Kimon, son of Miltiades, was at its height. Perikles belonged by his mother's side to the Alkmæonid race, and we know that such lineage was made subservient to political maneuvers against him by his enemies.

Moreover the enmity between Kimon and Perikles had been inherited by both from their fathers; for we shall find Xanthippus, not long after the battle of Marathon, the prominent accuser of Miltiades. Though Xanthippus was not an Alkmæonid, his marriage with Agariste connected himself indirectly, and his son Perikles directly, with that race. And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmæonids, on that great occasion which founded the glory of Miltiades; for that the reports were false, the intrinsic probabilities of the case, supported by the judgment of Herodotus, afford ample ground for believing.

When the Athenian army made its sudden return march from Marathon to Athens, Aristeides with his tribe was left to guard the field and the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Datis from Attica left the Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene, and discharge the last duties to the dead. A tumulus was erected on the field (such distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case only) to the 192 Athenian citizens who had been slain. Their names were inscribed on ten pillars erected at the spot, one for each tribe: there was also a second tumulus for the slain Platæans, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral monument to Miltiades himself. Six hundred years after the battle, Pausanias saw the tumulus, and could still read on the pillars the names of the immortalized warriors Even now a conspicuous tumulus exists about half a mile from the seashore, which Colonel Leake believes to be the same. The inhabitants of the deme of Marathon worshiped these slain warriors as heroes, along with their own eponymus, and with Herakles.

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the Athenians without marked supernatural aid. The god Pan had met the courier Pheidippides on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta, and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as yet neglected to worship him, in spite of which neglect, however, he promised them effective aid at Marathon. The promise of Pan having been faithfully executed, the Athenians repaid it by a temple with annual worship and sacrifice. Moreover, the hero Theseus was seen strenuously assisting in the battle; while an unknown warrior, in rustic garb and armed only with a plowshare, dealt destruction among the Persian ranks. after the battle he could not be found, and the Athenians, on asking at Delphi who he was, were directed to worship the hero Echetlus. Even in the time of Pausanias, this memorable battle field was heard to resound every night with the noise of combatants and the snorting of horses. "It is dangerous (observes that pious author) to go to the spot with the express purpose of seeing what is passing; but if a man finds himself there by accident, without having heard anything about the matter, the gods will not be angry with him." The gods (it seems) could not pardon the inquisitive mortal who deliberately pried into their secrets.

Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during the free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the compartments of the portico called Pœkile, wherein, amid several figures of gods and heroes—Athene, Herakles, Theseus, Echetlus, and the local patron Marathon—were seen honored and prominent the polemarch Kallimachus and the general Miltiades, while the Platæans were distinguished by their Bœotian leather casques. The sixth of the month Boedromion, the anniversary of the battle, was commemorated by an annual ceremony even down to the time of Plutarch.

Two thousand Spartans started from their city immediately after the full moon, and reached the frontier of Attica on the third day of their march—a surprising effort when we consider that the total distance from Sparta to Athens was about one hundred and fifty miles. They did not arrive, however, until the battle had been fought and the Persians departed. Curiosity led them to the field of Marathon to behold the dead bodies of the Persians; after which they returned home, bestowing well-merited praise on the victors.

Datis and Artaphernes returned across the Ægean with their Eretrian prisoners to Asia; stopping for a short time at the island of Mykonos, where discovery was made of a gilt image of Apollo carried off as booty in a Phenician ship. Datis went himself to restore it to Delos, requesting the Delians to carry it back to the Delium or temple of Apollo on the eastern coast of Bœotia; the Delians however chose to keep the statue until it was reclaimed from them twenty years afterward by the Thebans. On reaching Asia, the Persian generals conducted their prisoners up to the court of Susa and into the presence of Darius. Though he had been vehemently incensed against them, yet when he saw them in his power, his wrath abated, and he manifested no desire to kill or harm them. They were planted at a spot called Arderikka, in the Kissian territory, one of the resting-places on the road from Sardis to Susa, and about twenty-six miles distant from the latter place. Herodotus seems himself to have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in Greek—which we may easily conceive to have made some impression upon him, at a spot distant by nearly three months' journey from the coast of Ionia.

Happy would it have been for Miltiades if he had shared the honorable death of the polemarch Kallimachus—"animam exhalasset opimam"—in seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds. These feelings reached such a pitch that his head was turned, and he lost

both his patriotism and his prudence. He proposed to his countrymen to incur the cost of equipping an armament of seventy ships with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion; giving them no intimation whither he intended to go, but merely assuring them that if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and thus enrich them. Such a promise, from the lips of the recent victor of Marathon, was sufficient. The armament was granted, no man except Miltiades knowing what was its destination. He sailed immediately to the island of Paros, laid siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents on pain of entire destruction. His pretense for this attack was that the Parians had furnished a trireme to Datis for the Persian fleet at Marathon; but his real motive (so Herodotus assures us) was vindictive animosity against a Parian citizen named Lysagoras, who had exasperated the Persian general Hydarnes against him. The Parians amused him at first with evasions, until they had procured a little delay to repair the defective portions of their wall, after which they set him at defiance. In vain did Miltiades prosecute hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six days: he ravaged the island, but his attacks made no impression upon the town. Beginning to despair of success in his military operations, he entered into some negotiation (such at least was the tale of the Parians themselves) with a Parian woman named Timo, priestess or attendant in the temple of Demeter, near the town-gates. This woman, promising to reveal to him a secret which would place Paros in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which no male person was admissible. Having leaped the exterior fence, he approached the sanctuary; but on coming near he was seized with a panic-terror and ran away, almost out of his senses. On leaping the same fence to get back, he strained or bruised his thigh badly, and became utterly disabled. In this melancholy state he was placed on shipboard; the siege being raised, and the whole armament returning to Athens.

Vehement was the indignation both of the armament and of the remaining Athenians against Miltiades on his return. Of this feeling Xanthippus, father of the great Perikles, became the spokesman. He impeached Miltiades before the popular judicature, as having been guilty of deceiving the people and as having deserved the penalty of death. The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand or to say a word in his own defense. He lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case they could in his behalf. Defense, it appears, there was none: all they could do was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit of Marathon, coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lemnos. The assembled dikasts or jurors showed their sense of such powerful appeals by

rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to death; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents "for his iniquity." Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expenses incurred by the state in fitting out the armament. But we may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian dikastery in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor penalty actually proposed by the defenders of Miltiades themselves, as a substitute for the punishment of death.

In those penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to take a choice between these two—no third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration. Of course, under such circumstances, it was the interest of the accused party to name, even in his own case, some real and serious penalty—something which the jurors might be likely to deem not wholly inadequate to his crime just proved; for if he proposed some penalty only trifling, he drove them to prefer the heavier sentence recommended by his opponent. Accordingly, in the case of Miltiades, his friends, desirous of inducing the jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of death, proposed a fine of fifty talents as the self-assessed penalty of the defendant, and perhaps they may have stated, as an argument in the case, that such a sum would suffice to defray the costs of the expedition. The fine was imposed, but Miltiades did not live to pay it: his injured limb mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be paid by his son Kimon.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was put in prison, after having been fined, and there died. But Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, nor does the fact appear to me probable: he would hardly have omitted to notice it, had it come to his knowledge. Immediate imprisonment of a person fined by the dikastery, until his fine was paid, was not the natural and ordinary course of Athenian procedure, though there were particular cases in which such aggravation was added. Usually a certain time was allowed for payment, before absolute execution was resorted to; though the person under sentence became disfranchised, and excluded from all political rights, from the very instant of his condemnation as a public debtor, until the fine was paid. Now, in the instance of Miltiades, the lamentable condition of his wounded thigh rendered escape impossible — so that there would be no special motive for departing from the usual practice, and imprisoning him forthwith: moreover, if he was not imprisoned forthwith, he would not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days after his trial. To carry away the suffering general

in his couch, incapable of raising himself even to plead for his own life, from the presence of the dikasts to a prison—would not only have been a needless severity, but could hardly have failed to imprint itself on the sympathies and the memory of all the beholders; so that Herodotus would have been likely to hear and mention it, if it had really occurred. I incline to believe, therefore, that Miltiades died at home. All accounts concur in stating that he died of the mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment of his trial, and that his son Kimon paid the fifty talents after his death. If *he* could pay them, probably his father could have paid them also. This is an additional reason for believing that there was no imprisonment—for nothing but non-payment could have sent him to prison; and to rescue the suffering Miltiades from being sent thither, would have been the first and strongest desire of all sympathizing friends.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act of it produces an impression so mournful, and even shocking—his descent from the pinnacle of glory to defeat, mean tampering with a temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undefended ignominy, and death under a sentence of heavy fine, is so abrupt and unprepared—that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding some one to blame for it: we must except Herodotus, our original authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavel has long ago observed, is a strain in which every one at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with impunity and without provoking any opponent to reply. In this instance, the hard fate of Militades has been imputed to the vices of the Athenians and their democracy—it has been cited in proof, partly of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however such blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those facts a reasonable criticism.

What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Miltiades; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. To censure them for fickleness is here an abuse of terms; such a change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behavior in the expedition of Paros was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other; what else could ensue except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendency over their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whither, in the confidence of an unknown booty: he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in wreaking a private grudge: in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt,

such behavior, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced a violent and painful revulsion in the feelings of his countrymen. The idea of having lavished praise and confidence upon a person who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest torments of the human bosom; and we may easily understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment without accusing the Athenians of fickleness. If an officer, whose conduct had been such as to merit the highest encomiums, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifests cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided to him, are we to treat the general in command as fickle, because his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous revolution—which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his previous esteem? The question to be determined is, whether there be sufficient ground for such a change; and in the case of Miltiades, that question must be answered in the affirmative.

In regard to the charge of ingratitude against the Athenians, this last-mentioned point—sufficiency of reason—stands tacitly admitted. It is conceded that Miltiades deserved punishment for his conduct in reference to the Parian expedition, but it is nevertheless maintained that gratitude for his previous services at Marathon ought to have exempted him from punishment. But the sentiment, upon which, after all, this exculpation rests, will not bear to be drawn out and stated in the form of a cogent or justifying reason. For will any one really contend, that a man who has rendered great services to the public, is to receive in return a license of unpunished misconduct for the future? Is the general, who has earned applause by eminent skill and important victories, to be recompensed by being allowed the liberty of betraying his trust afterward, and exposing his country to peril, without censure or penalty? This is what no one intends to vindicate deliberately; yet a man must be prepared to vindicate it, when he blames the Athenians for ingratitude toward Miltiades. For if all that be meant is, that gratitude for previous services ought to pass, not as a receipt in full for subsequent crime, but as an extenuating circumstance in the measurement of the penalty, the answer is, that it was so reckoned in the Athenian treatment of Miltiades. His friends had nothing whatever to urge, against the extreme penalty proposed by his accuser, except these previous services—which influenced the dikasts sufficiently to induce them to inflict the lighter punishment instead of the heavier. Now the whole amount of punishment inflicted consisted in a fine which certainly was not beyond his reasonable means of paying, or of prevailing upon friends to pay for him—since his son Kimon actually did pay it. Those who blame the Athenians for ingratitude, unless they are prepared to maintain the doctrine, that previous services are to pass as full acquittal for future crime, have no other ground left except to say that the fine was too high; that instead of being fifty talents, it ought to have been

no more than forty, thirty, twenty, or ten talents. Whether they are right in this, I will not take upon me to pronounce: if the amount was named on behalf of the accused party, the dikastery had no legal power of diminishing it; but it is within such narrow limits that the question actually lies, when transferred from the province of sentiment to that of reason. It will be recollected that the death of Miltiades arose neither from his trial nor his fine, but from the hurt in his thigh.

The charge of ingratitude against the Athenian popular juries really amounts to this—that in trying a person accused of present crime or fault, they were apt to confine themselves too strictly and exclusively to the particular matter of charge, either forgetting, or making too little account of, past services which he might have rendered. Whoever imagines that such was the habit of the Athenian dikasts, must have studied the orators to very little purpose. Their real defect was the very opposite: they were too much disposed to wander from the special issue before them, and to be affected by appeals to previous services and conduct. That which an accused person at Athens usually strives to produce is, an impression in the minds of the dikasts favorable to his general character and behavior: of course he meets the particular allegation of his accuser as well as he can, but he never fails also to remind them emphatically, how well he has performed his general duties of a citizen—how many times he has served in military expeditions—how many trierarchies and liturgies he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency. In fact, the claim of an accused person to acquittal is made to rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. When we come down to the time of the orators, I shall be prepared to show that such indisposition to confine themselves to a special issue was one of the most serious defects of the assembled dikasts at Athens. It is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private, non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion—and which belongs more or less to the system of jury-trial everywhere; but it is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

The fate of Miltiades, then, so far from illustrating either the fickleness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just appreciation of deserts. It also illustrates another moral, of no small importance to the right comprehension of Grecian affairs;—it teaches us the painful lesson, how perfectly maddening were the effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt, that the rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have produced demonstrations toward Miltiades such as were never paid toward any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such unmeasured

admiration unseated his rational judgment. His mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of insolence, and antipathy, and rapacity;—that distempered state, for which (according to Grecian morality) the retributive Nemesis was ever on the watch, and which in his case she visited with a judgment startling in its rapidity as well as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiades been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of a victory. Demosthenes indeed, in speaking of the wealth and luxury of political leaders in his own time, and the profuse rewards bestowed upon them by the people, pointed in contrast to the house of Miltiades as being noway more splendid than that of a private man. But though Miltiades might continue to live in a modest establishment, he received from his countrymen marks of admiration and deference such as were never paid to any citizen before or after him; and, after all, admiration and deference constitute the precious essence of popular reward. No man except Miltiades ever dared to raise his voice in the Athenian assembly, and say—"Give me a fleet of ships: do not ask what I am going to do with them, but only follow me, and I will enrich you." Herein we may read the unmeasured confidence which the Athenians placed in their victorious general, and the utter incapacity of a leading Greek to bear it without mental depravation; while we learn from it to draw the melancholy inference, that one result of success was to make the successful leader one of the most dangerous men in the community. We shall presently be called upon to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistokles.

It is indeed fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiades did not take a turn more noxious to Athens than the comparatively unimportant enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and gratify antipathies against enemies at home, instead of directing his blow against a Parian enemy, the peace and security of his country might have been seriously endangered. Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion began by popular conduct and by rendering good service to their fellow-citizens: having first earned public gratitude, they abused it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger, in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude toward a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment. The person thus exalted acquired a position such that the community found it difficult afterward to shake him off. Now there is a disposition almost universal among writers and readers to side with an individual, especially an eminent individual, against the multitude. Accordingly those who under such circumstances suspect the probable abuse of an exalted position, are denounced as if they harbored an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities; but the truth is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified that suspicion,

and required the community to take precautions against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is no feature which more largely pervades the impressible Grecian character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralized by success: there was no fault from which so few eminent Greeks were free: there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take security—especially the democracies, where the manifestations of enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of those charges which have been urged against the Grecian democracies, that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors. The history of Miltiades illustrates it in a manner no less pointed than painful.

I have already remarked that the fickleness, which has been so largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with him, is nothing more than a reasonable change of opinion on the best grounds: nor can it be said that fickleness was in any case an attribute of the Athenian democracy. It is a well-known fact, that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging, which have once obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; insomuch that the judgments and actions of the many admit of being more clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness. There will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions, on insufficient grounds, more frequently than an unresponsible one or few would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness, without the reality:—First, that the manifestations and changes of opinion were all open, undisguised, and noisy: the people gave utterance to their present impression, whatever it was, with perfect frankness; if their opinions were really changed, they had no shame or scruple in avowing it: Secondly—and this is a point of capital importance in the working of democracy generally—the *present* impression, whatever it might be, was not merely undisguised in its manifestations, but also had a tendency to be exaggerated in its intensity. This arose from their habit of treating public affairs in multitudinous assemblages, the well-known effect of which is, to inflame sentiment in every man's bosom by mere contact with a sympathizing circle of neighbors. Whatever the sentiment might be, fear, ambition, cupidity, wrath, compassion, piety, patriotic devotion, etc.; and whether well-founded or ill-founded—it was constantly influenced more or less by such intensifying cause. This is a defect which of course belongs in a certain degree to all exercise of power by numerous bodies, even though they be representative

bodies—especially when the character of the people, instead of being comparatively sedate and slow to move, like the English, is quick, impressible, and fiery, like Greeks or Italians; but it operated far more powerfully on the self-acting Demos assembled in the Pnyx. It was in fact the constitutional malady of the democracy, of which the people were themselves perfectly sensible—as I shall show hereafter from the securities which they tried to provide against it—but which no securities could ever wholly eradicate. Frequency of public assemblies, far from aggravating the evil, had a tendency to lighten it. The people thus became accustomed to hear and balance many different views as a preliminary to ultimate judgment; they contracted personal interest and esteem for a numerous class of dissentient speakers; and they even acquired a certain practical consciousness of their own liability to error. Moreover the diffusion of habits of public speaking, by means of the sophists and the rhetors, whom it has been so much the custom to disparage, tended in the same direction—to break the unity of sentiment among the listening crowd, to multiply separate judgments, and to neutralize the contagion of mere sympathizing impulse. There were important deductions, still farther assisted by the superior taste and intelligence of the Athenian people: but still the inherent malady remained—excessive and misleading intensity of present sentiment. It was this which gave such inestimable value to the ascendency of Perikles, as depicted by Thucydides: his hold on the people was so firm, that he could always speak with effect against excess of the reigning tone of feeling. "When Perikles (says the historian) saw the people in a state of unreasonable and insolent confidence, he spoke so as to cow them into alarm; when again they were in groundless terror, he combated it, and brought them back to confidence." We shall find Demosthenes, with far inferior ascendency, employed in the same honorable task. The Athenian people often stood in need of such correction, but unfortunately did not always find statesmen, at once friendly and commanding, to administer it.

These two attributes, then, belonged to the Athenian democracy; first, their sentiments of every kind were manifested loudly and openly; next, their sentiments tended to a pitch of great present intensity. Of course, therefore, when they changed, the change of sentiment stood prominent and forced itself upon every one's notice—being a transition from one strong sentiment past to another strong sentiment present. And it was because such alterations, when they did take place, stood out so palpably to remark, that the Athenian people have drawn upon themselves the imputation of fickleness: for it is not all true (I repeat) that changes of sentiment were more frequently produced in them by frivolous or insufficient causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

IONIC PHILOSOPHERS.—PYTHAGORAS.—KROTON AND SYBARIS.

THE history of the powerful Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily, between the accession of Peisistratus and the battle of Marathon, is for the most part unknown to us. Phalaris, despot of Agrigentum in Sicily, made for himself an unenviable name during this obscure interval. His reign seems to coincide in time with the earlier part of the rule of Peisistratus (about 560–540 B.C.), and the few and vague statements which we find respecting it, merely show us that it was a period of extortion and cruelty, even beyond the ordinary license of Grecian despots. The reality of the hollow bull of brass, which Phalaris was accustomed to heat in order to shut up his victims in it and burn them, appears to be better authenticated than the nature of the story would lead us to presume. For it is not only noticed by Pindar, but even the actual instrument of this torture—the brazen bull itself—which had been taken away from Agrigentum as a trophy by the Carthaginians when they captured the town, was restored by the Romans, on the subjugation of Carthage to its original domicile. Phalaris is said to have acquired the supreme command by undertaking the task of building a great temple to Zeus Polieus on the citadel rock; a pretense whereby he was enabled to assemble and arm a number of workmen and devoted partisans, whom he employed at the festival of the Thesmophoria to put down the authorities. He afterward disarmed the citizens by a stratagem, and committed cruelties which rendered him so abhorred that a sudden rising of the people, headed by Telemachus (ancestor of the subsequent despot Theron), overthrew and slew him. A severe revenge was taken on his partisans after his fall.

During the interval between 540–500 B.C., events of much importance occurred among the Italian Greeks—especially at Kroton and Sybaris—events, unhappily, very imperfectly handed down. Between these two periods fall both the war between Sybaris and Kroton and the career and ascendency of Pythagoras. In connection with this latter name it will be requisite to say a few words respecting the other Grecian philosophers of the sixth century B.C.

I have, in a former chapter, noticed and characterized those distinguished persons called the Seven Wise Men of Greece, whose celebrity falls in the first half of this century—men not so much marked by scientific genius as by practical sagacity and foresight in the appreciation of worldly affairs, and enjoying a high degree of political respect from their fellow-citizens. One of them, however, the Milesian Thales, claims our notice, not only on this ground, but also as the earliest known name in the long line of Greek scientific investigators. His life, nearly contemporary with that of Solon, belongs

seemingly to the interval about 640–550 B.C.: the stories mentioned in Herodotus (perhaps borrowed in part from the Milesian Hekatæus) are sufficient to show that his reputation, for wisdom as well as for science, continued to be very great, even a century after his death, among his fellow-citizens. And he marks an important epoch in the progress of the Greek mind as having been the first man to depart both in letter and spirit from the Hesiodic theogony, introducing the conception of substances with their transformations and sequences, in place of that string of persons and quasi-human attributes which had animated the old legendary world. He is the father of what is called the Ionic philosophy, which is considered as lasting from his time down to that of Sokrates. Writers, ancient as well as modern, have professed to trace a succession of philosophers, each one the pupil of the preceding, between these two extreme epochs. But the appellation is in truth undefined and even incorrect, since nothing entitled to the name of a school, or sect, or succession (like that of the Pythagoreans, to be noticed presently) can be made out. There is indeed a certain general analogy in the philosophical vein of Thales, Hippo, Anaximenes, and Diogenes of Apollonia, whereby they all stand distinguished from Xenophanes of Elea, and his successors the Eleatic dialecticians, Parmenides and Zeno; but there are also material differences between their respective doctrines—no two of them holding the same. And if we look to Anaximander (the person next in order of time to Thales), as well as to Herakleitus, we find them departing in a great degree even from that character which all the rest have in common, though both the one and the other are usually enrolled in the list of Ionic philosophers.

Of the old legendary and polytheistic conception of nature, which Thales partially discarded, we may remark that it is a state of the human mind in which the problems suggesting themselves to be solved, and the machinery for solving them, bear a fair proportion one to the other. If the problems be vast, indeterminate, confused, and derived rather from the hopes, fears, love, hatred, astonishment, etc., of men, than from any genuine desire of knowledge—so also does the received belief supply invisible agents in unlimited number and with every variety of power and inclination. The means of explanation are thus multiplied and diversified as readily as the phenomena to be xplained. Though no event or state which has not yet occurred can be predicted, there is little difficulty in rendering a plausible account of everything which has occurred in the past—of any and all things alike. Cosmogony, and the prior ages of the world, were conceived as a sort of personal history with intermarriages, filiation, quarrels, and other adventures, of these invisible agents; among whom some one or more were assumed as unbegotten and self-existent—the latter assumption being a difficulty common to all systems of cosmogony, and from which even this flexible and expansive hypothesis is not exempt. Now when Thales disengaged

Grecian philosophy from the old mode of explanation, he did not at the same time disengage it from the old problems and matters propounded for inquiry. These he retained and transmitted to his successors as vague and vast as they were at first conceived; and so they remained, though with some transformations and modifications, together with many new questions equally insoluble, substantially present to the Greeks throughout their whole history, as the legitimate problems for philosophical investigation. But these problems, adapted only to the old elastic system of polytheistic explanation and omnipresent personal agency, became utterly disproportioned to any impersonal hypothesis such as those of Thales and the philosophers after him—whether assumed physical laws, or plausible moral and metaphysical dogmas, open to argumentative attack, and of course requiring the like defense. To treat the visible world as a whole, and inquire when and how it began, as well as into all its past changes—to discuss the first origin of men, animals, plants, the sun, the stars, etc.—to assign some comprehensive reason, why motion or change in general took place in the universe—to investigate the destinies of the human race, and to lay down some systematic relation between them and the gods—all these were topics admitting of being conceived in many different ways, and set forth with eloquent plausibility; but not reducible to any solution resting on scientific evidence or commanding steady adherence under a free scrutiny.

At the time when the power of scientific investigation was scanty and helpless, the problems proposed were thus such as to lie out of the reach of science in its largest compass. Gradually indeed subjects more special and limited, and upon which experience or deductions from experience could be brought to bear, were added to the list of *quæsita*, and examined with profit and instruction. But the old problems, with new ones alike unfathomable, were never eliminated, and always occupied a prominent place in the philosophical world. Now it was this disproportion, between questions to be solved and means of solution, which gave rise to that conspicuous characteristic of Grecian philosophy—the antagonist force of suspensive scepticism, passing in some minds into a broad negation of the attainability of general truth—which it nourished from its beginning to its end; commencing as early as Xenophanes, continuing to manifest itself seven centuries afterward in Ænesidemus and Sextus Empiricus, and including in the interval between these two extremes some of the most powerful intellects in Greece. The present is not the time for considering these Sceptics, who bear an unpopular name, and have not often been fairly appreciated; the more so, as it often suited the purpose of men themselves more than half sceptical, like Sokrates and Plato, to denounce professed scepticism with indignation. But it is essential to bring them into notice at the first spring of Grecian philosophy under Thales, because the circumstances were then laid which so soon afterward developed them.

Though the celebrity of Thales in antiquity was great and universal, scarcely any distinct facts were known respecting him: it is certain that he left nothing in writing. Extensive travels in Egypt and Asia are ascribed to him, and as a general fact these travels are doubtless true, since no other means of acquiring knowledge were then open. At a time when the brother of the Lesbian Alkæus was serving in the Babylonian army, we may well conceive that an inquisitive Milesian would make his way to that wonderful city wherein stood the temple-observatory of the Chaldæan priesthood. How great his reputation was in his lifetime, the admiration expressed by his younger contemporary Xenophanes assures us; and Herakleitus, in the next generation, a severe judge of all other philosophers, spoke of him with similar esteem. To him were traced by the Grecian inquirers of the fourth century B.C., the first beginnings of geometry, astronomy, and physiology in its large and really appropriate sense, the scientific study of nature: for the Greek word denoting nature (φύσις) first comes into comprehensive use about this time (as I have remarked in an earlier chapter) with its derivatives *physics* and *physiology*, as distinguished from the *theology* of the old poets. Little stress can be laid on those elementary propositions in geometry which are specified as discovered, or as first demonstrated, by Thales—still less upon the solar eclipse respecting which (according to Herodotus) he determined beforehand the year of occurrence. But the main doctrine of his physiology (using that word in its larger Greek sense) is distinctly attested. He stripped Oceanus and Tethys, primeval parents of the gods in the Homeric theogony, of their personality and laid down water, or fluid substance, as the single original element from which everything came and into which everything returned. The doctrine of one eternal element, remaining always the same in its essence, but indefinitely variable in its manifestations to sense, was thus first introduced to the discussion of the Grecian public. We have no means of knowing the reasons by which Thales supported this opinion, nor could even Aristotle do more than conjecture what they might have been; but one of the statements urged on behalf of it—that the earth itself rested on water—we may safely refer to the Milesian himself, for it would hardly have been advanced at a later age. Moreover Thales is reported to have held, that everything was living and full of gods; and that the magnet, especially, was a living thing. Thus the gods, as far as we can pretend to follow opinions so very faintly transmitted, are conceived as active powers and causes of changeful manifestation, attached to the primeval substance; the universe being assimilated to an organized body or system.

Respecting Hippo—who reproduced the theory of Thales with some degree of generalization, substituting, in place of water, moisture, or something common to air and water—we do not know whether he belonged to the sixth or the fifth century B.C.: but both Anaximan-

der, Xenophanes, and Pherekydes belong to the latter half of the sixth century. Anaximander the son of Praxiades was a native of Miletus—Xenophanes, a native of Kolophon; the former among the earliest expositors of doctrine in prose, while the latter committed his opinions to the old medium of verse. Anaximander seems to have taken up the philosophical problem, while he materially altered the hypothesis, of his predecessor Thales. Instead of the primeval fluid of the latter, he supposed a primeval principle, without any actual determining qualities whatever, but including all qualities potentially, and manifesting them in an infinite variety from its continually self-changing nature—a principle, which was nothing in itself, yet had the capacity of producing any and all manifestations, however contrary to each other—a primeval something, whose essence it was to be eternally productive of different phenomena—a sort of mathematical point, which counts for nothing in itself, but is vigorous in generating lines to any extent that may be desired. In this manner Anaximander professed to give a comprehensive explanation of change in general, or Generation or Destruction—how it happened that one sensible thing began and another ceased to exist—according to the vague problems which these early inquirers were in the habit of setting to themselves. He avoided that which the first philosophers especially dreaded, the affirmation that generation could take place out of Nothing; yet the primeval Something which he supposed was only distinguished from Nothing by possessing this power of generation. In his theory he passed from the province of physics into that of metaphysics. He first introduced into Grecian philosophy that important word which signifies a Beginning or a Principle, and first opened that metaphysical discussion, which was carried on in various ways throughout the whole period of Grecian philosophy, as to the One and the Many—the Continuous and the Variable—that which exists eternally, as distinguished from that which comes and passes away in ever-changing manifestations. His physiology or explanation of nature thus conducted the mind into a different route from that suggested by the hypothesis of Thales, which was built upon physical considerations, and was therefore calculated to suggest and stimulate observations of physical phenomena for the purpose of verifying or confuting it—while the hypothesis of Anaximander admitted only of being discussed dialectically, or by reasonings expressed in general language; reasonings, sometimes indeed referring to experience for the purpose of illustration, but seldom resting on it—and never looking out for it as a necessary support. The physical explanation of nature, however, once introduced by Thales, although deserted by Anaximander, was taken up by Anaximenes and others afterward, and reproduced with many divergences of doctrine—yet always more or less entangled and perplexed with metaphysical additions, since the two departments were never clearly parted throughout all Grecian philosophy.

Of these subsequent physical philosophers I shall speak hereafter: at present I confine myself to the thinkers of the sixth century B.C., among whom Anaximander stands prominent, not as the follower of Thales, but as the author of an hypothesis both new and tending in a different direction. It was not merely as the author of this hypothesis, however, that Anaximander enlarged the Greek mind and roused the powers of thought: we find him also mentioned as distinguished in astronomy and geometry. He is said to have been the first to establish a sun-dial in Greece, to construct a sphere, and to explain the obliquity of the ecliptic; how far such alleged authorship really belongs to him, we cannot be certain—but there is one step of immense importance which he is clearly affirmed to have made. He was the first to compose a treatise on the geography of the land and sea within his cognizance, and to construct a chart or map founded thereupon—seemingly a tablet of brass. Such a novelty, wondrous even to the rude and ignorant, was calculated to stimulate powerfully inquisitive minds and from it may be dated the commencement of Grecian rational geography—not the least valuable among the contributions of this people to the stock of human knowledge.

Xenophanes of Kolophon, somewhat younger than Anaximander and nearly contemporary with Pythagoras (seemingly from about 570–480 B.C.), migrated from Kolophon to Zankle and Katana in Sicily and Elea in Italy, soon after the time when Ionia became subject to the Persians (540–530 B.C.). He was the founder of what is called the Eleatic school of philosophers—a real school, since it appears that Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus pursued and developed, in a great degree, the train of speculation which had been begun by Xenophanes—doubtless with additions and variations of their own, but especially with a dialectic power which belongs to the age of Perikles, and is unknown in the sixth century B.C. He was the author of more than one poem of considerable length, one on the foundation of Kolophon and another on that of Elea; besides his poem on Nature, wherein his philosophical doctrines were set forth. His manner appears to have been controversial and full of asperity toward antagonists. But what is most remarkable is the plain-spoken manner in which he declared himself against the popular religion, and in which he denounced as abominable the descriptions of the gods given by Homer and Hesiod. He is said to have controverted the doctrines both of Thales and Pythagoras: this is probable enough; but he seems to have taken his start from the philosophy of Anaximander—not however to adopt it, but to reverse it—and to set forth an opinion which we may call its contrary. Nature, in the conception of Anaximander, consisted of a Something having no other attribute except the unlimited power of generating and canceling phenomenal changes; in this doctrine the Something or Substratum existed only in and for those changes, and could not be said to exist

at all in any other sense: the Permanent was thus merged and lost in the Variable—the One in the Many. Xenophanes laid down the exact opposite: he conceived nature as one unchangeable and indivisible Whole, spherical, animated, endued with reason, and penetrated by or indeed identical with God. He denied the objective reality of all change, or generation, or destruction, which he seems to have considered as only changes or modifications in the percipient, and perhaps different in one percipient and another. That which exists (he maintained) could not have been generated, nor could it ever be destroyed: there was neither real generation nor real destruction of anything; but that which men took for such was the change in their own feelings and ideas. He thus recognized the Permanent without the Variable—the One without the Many. And his treatment of the received religious creed was in harmony with such physical or metaphysical hypothesis; for while he held the whole of nature to be God, without parts or change, he at the same pronounced the popular gods to be entities of subjective fancy, imagined by men after their own model: if oxen or lions were to become religious (he added), they would in like manner provide for themselves gods after their respective shapes and characters. This hypothesis, which seemed to set aside altogether the study of the sensible world as a source of knowledge, was expounded briefly, and, as it should seem, obscurely and rudely, by Xenophanes; at least, we may infer thus much from the slighting epithet applied to him by Aristotle. But his successors, Parmenides and Zeno, in the succeeding century, expanded it considerably, supported it with extraordinary acuteness of dialectics, and even superadded a second part, in which the phenomena of sense—though considered only as appearances, not partaking in the reality of the One Ens—were yet explained by a new physical hypothesis; so that they will be found to exercise great influence over the speculations both of Plato and Aristotle. We discover in Xenophanes, moreover, a vein of skepticism, and a mournful despair as to the attainability of certain knowledge, which the nature of his philosophy was well calculated to suggest, and in which the sillograph Timon of the third century B.C., who seems to have spoken of Xenophanes better than of most of the other philosophers, powerfully sympathized.

The cosmogony of Pherekydes of Syrus, contemporary of Anaximander and among the teachers of Pythagoras, seems, according to the fragments preserved, a combination of the legendary fancies with Orphic mysticism, and probably exercised little influence over the subsequent course of Grecian philosophy. By what has been said of Thales, Anaximander, and Xenophanes, it will be seen that the sixth century B.C. witnessed the opening of several of those roads of intellectual speculation which the later philosophers pursued farther, or at least from which they branched off. Before the year 500 B.C. many interesting questions were thus brought into discussion, which Solon, who died about 558 B.C., had never heard of—just as he may probably never have seen the map of Anaximander. But neither of these two distinguished men—Anaximander or Xenophanes—was anything more than a speculative inquirer. The third eminent name of this century, of whom I am now about to speak, Pythagoras, combined in his character disparate elements which require rather a longer development.

Pythagoras was founder of a brotherhood, originally brought together by a religious influence, and with observances approaching to monastic peculiarity—working in a direction at once religious, political, and scientific, and exercising for some time a real political ascendency,—but afterward banished from government and state affairs into a sectarian privacy with scientific pursuits, not without however still producing some statesmen individually distinguished. Amid the multitude of false and apocryphal statements which circulated in antiquity respecting this celebrated man, we find a few important facts reasonably attested and deserving credence. He was a native of Samos, son of an opulent merchant named Mnesarchus,—or, according to some of his later and more fervent admirers, of Apollo: born, as far as we can make out, about the fiftieth Olympiad, or 580 B.C. On the many marvels recounted respecting his youth it is unnecessary to dwell. Among them may be numbered his wide-reaching travels, said to have been prolonged for nearly thirty years, to visit the Arabians, the Syrians, the Phenicians, the Chaldæans, the Indians, and the Gallic Druids. But there is reason to believe that he really visited Egypt—perhaps also Phenicia and Babylon, then Chaldæan and independent. At the time when he saw Egypt, between 560–540 B.C., about one century earlier than Herodotus, it was under Amasis, the last of its own kings, with its peculiar native character yet unimpaired by foreign conquest, and only slightly modified by the admission during the preceding century of Grecian mercenary troops and traders. The spectacle of Egyptian habits, the conversation of the priests, and the initiation into various mysteries or secret rites and stories not accessible to the general public, may very naturally have impressed the mind of Pythagoras, and given him that turn for mystic observance, asceticism, and peculiarity of diet and clothing, which manifested itself from the same cause among several of his contemporaries, but which was not a common phenomenon in the primitive Greek religion. Besides visiting Egypt, Pythagoras is also said to have profited by the teaching of Thales, of Anaximander, and of Pherekydes of Syros: amid the towns of Ionia he would, moreover, have an opportunity of conversing with many Greek navigators who had visited foreign countries, especially Italy and Sicily. His mind seems to have been acted upon and impelled by this combined stimulus,—partly toward an imaginative and religious vein of speculation, with a life of mystic observance,—partly toward that active exercise, both of mind and body, which

the genius of an Hellenic community so naturally tended to suggest.

Of the personal doctrines or opinions of Pythagoras, whom we must distinguish from Philolaus and the subsequent Pythagoreans, we have little certain knowledge, though doubtless the first germ of their geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, etc., must have proceeded from him. But that he believed in the metempsychosis or transmigration of the souls of deceased men into other men as well as into animals, we know, not only by other evidence, but also by the testimony of his contemporary, the philosopher Xenophanes of Elea. Pythagoras, seeing a dog beaten and hearing him howl, desired the striker to desist, saying—"It is the soul of a friend of mine, whom I recognized by his voice." This—together with the general testimony of Herakleitus, that Pythagoras was a man of extensive research and acquired instruction, but artful for mischief and destitute of sound judgment—is all that we know about him from contemporaries. Herodotus, two generations afterward, while he conceives the Pythagoreans as a peculiar religious order, intimates that both Orpheus and Pythagoras had derived the doctrine of the metempsychosis from Egypt, but had pretended to it as their own without acknowledgment. Pythagoras combines the character of a sophist (a man of large observation, and clever, ascendent, inventive mind—the original sense of the word Sophist, prior to the polemics of the Platonic school, and the only sense known to Herodotus), with that of an inspired teacher, prophet, and worker of miracles,—approaching to and sometimes even confounded with the gods,—and employing all these gifts to found a new special order of brethren bound together by religious rites and observances peculiar to themselves. In his prominent vocation, analogous to that of Epimenides, Orpheus, or Melampus, he appears as a revealer of a mode of life calculated to raise his disciples above the level of mankind, and to recommend them to the favor of the gods; the Pythagorean life, like the Orphic life, being intended as the exclusive prerogative of the brotherhood—approached only by probation and initiatory ceremonies, which were adapted to select enthusiasts rather than to an indiscriminate crowd—and exacting entire mental devotion to the master. In these lofty pretensions the Agrigentine Empedokles seems to have greatly copied him, though with some varieties, about half a century afterward. While Aristotle tells us that the Krotoniates identified Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo, the satirical Timon pronounced him to have been "a juggler of solemn speech, engaged in fishing for men." This is the same character, looked at from the different points of view of the believer and the unbeliever. There is, however, no reason for regarding Pythagoras as an impostor, because experience seems to show, that while in certain ages it is not difficult for a man to persuade others that he is inspired, it is still less difficult for him to contract the same belief himself.

Looking at the general type of Pythagoras, as conceived by witnesses in and nearest to his own age—Xenophanes, Herakleitus, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Isokrates—we find in him chiefly the religious missionary and schoolmaster, with little of the politician. His efficiency in the latter character, originally subordinate, first becomes prominent in those glowing fancies which the later Pythagoreans communicated to Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus. The primitive Pythagoras is inspired by the gods to reveal a new mode of life—the Pythagorean life—and to promise divine favor to a select and docile few as the recompense of strict ritual obedience, of austere self-control, and of laborious training, bodily as well as mental. To speak with confidence of the details of his training, ethical or scientific, and of the doctrines which he promulgated, is impossible; for neither he himself nor any of his disciples anterior to Philolaus (who was separated from him by about one intervening generation) left any memorials in writing. Numbers and lines, studied partly in their own mutual relations, partly under various symbolizing fancies, presented themselves to him as the primary constituent elements of the universe, and as a sort of magical key to phenomena, physical as well as moral. Such mathematical tendencies in his teaching, expanded by Pythagoreans his successors, and coinciding partly also (as has been before stated) with the studies of Anaximander and Thales, acquired more and more development, so as to become one of the most glorious and profitable manifestations of Grecian intellect. Living, as Pythagoras did, at a time when the stock of experience was scanty, the license of hypothesis unbounded, and the process of deduction without rule or verifying test—he was thus fortunate enough to strike into that track of geometry and arithmetic, in which, from data of experience few, simple, and obvious, an immense field of deductive and verifiable investigation may be traveled over. We must at the same time remark, however, that in his mind this track, which now seems so straightforward and well-defined, was clouded by strange fancies which it is not easy to understand, and from which it was but partially cleared by his successors.

Of his spiritual training much is said, though not upon very good authority: we hear of his memorial discipline, his monastic self-scrutiny, his employment of music to soothe disorderly passions, his long novitiate of silence, his knowledge of physiognomy which enabled him to detect, even without trial, unworthy subjects, his peculiar diet, and his rigid care for sobriety as well as for bodily vigor. He is also said to have inculcated abstinence from animal food; a feeling so naturally connected with the doctrine of the metempsychosis, that we may well believe him to have entertained it, as Empedokles also did after him. It is certain that there were peculiar observances, and probably a certain measure of self-denial, embodied in the Pythagorean life. Yet, on the other hand, it seems

equally certain that the members of the order cannot have been all subjected to the same diet, or training, or studies; for Milo the Krotoniate was among them, the strongest man and the unparalleled wrestler of his age—who cannot possibly have dispensed with animal food and ample diet (even setting aside the tales about his voracious appetite), and is not likely to have bent his attention on speculative study. Probably Pythagoras did not enforce the same bodily or mental discipline on all, or at least knew when to grant dispensations. The order, as it first stood under him, consisted of men different both in temperament and aptitude, but bound together by common religious observances and hopes, common reverence for the master, and mutual attachment as well as pride in each other's success. It must thus be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of the fourth century B.C., who had no communion with wrestlers, and comprised only ascetic, studious men, generally recluse, though in some cases rising to political distinction. The succession of these Pythagoreans, never very numerous, seems to have continued until about 300 B.C., and then nearly died out; being superseded by other schemes of philosophy more suited to cultivated Greeks of the age after Sokrates. But during the time of Cicero, two centuries afterward, the orientalizing tendency—then beginning to spread over the Grecian and Roman world, and becoming gradually stronger and stronger—caused the Pythagorean philosophy to be again revived. It was revived, too, with little or none of its scientific tendencies, but with more than its primitive religious and imaginative fanaticism—Apollonius of Tyana constituting himself a living copy of Pythagoras. And thus, while the scientific elements developed by the disciples of Pythagoras had become disjoined from all peculiarity of sect, and passed into the general studious world—the original vein of mystic and ascetic fancy belonging to the master, without any of that practical efficiency of body and mind which had marked his first followers, was takenup a new into the pagan world, along with the disfigured doctrines of Pato. Neo-Pythagorism, passing gradually into Neo-Platonism, outlasted the other more positive and masculine systems of pagan philosophy, as the contemporary and rival of Christianity. A large proportion of the false statements concerning Pythagoras came from these Neo-Pythagoreans, who were not deterred by the want of memorials from illustrating, with ample latitude of fancy, the ideal character of the master.

That an inquisitive man like Pythagoras, at a time when there were hardly any books to study, would visit foreign countries, and converse with all the Grecian philosophical inquirers within his reach, is a matter which we should presume even if no one attested it; and our witnesses carry us very little beyond this general presumption. What doctrines he borrowed, or from whom, we are unable to discover. But in fact his whole life and proceedings bear the stamp of an original mind and not of a borrower—a mind

impressed both with Hellenic and with non-Hellenic habits and religion, yet capable of combining the two in a manner peculiar to himself; and, above all, endued with those talents for religious and personal ascendency over others, which told for much more than the intrinsic merit of his ideas. We are informed that after extensive travels and inquiries he returned to Samos, at the age of about forty. He then found his native island under the despotism of Polykrates, which rendered it an unsuitable place either for free sentiments or for marked individuals. Unable to attract hearers, or found any school or brotherhood, in his native island, he determined to expatriate; and we may presume that at this period (about 535–530 B.C.) the recent subjugation of Ionia by the Persians was not without influence on his determination. The trade between the Asiatic and the Italian Greeks—and even the intimacy between Miletus and Knidus on the one side, and Sybaris and Tarentum on the other—had been great and of long standing, so that there was more than one motive to determine him to the coast of Italy; in which direction also his contemporary Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, emigrated seemingly about the same time—from Kolophon to Zankle, Katana, and Elea.

Kroton and Sybaris were at this time in their fullest prosperity—among the first and most prosperous cities of the Hellenic name. To the former of the two Pythagoras directed his course. A Council of One Thousand persons, taken from among the heirs and representatives of the principal proprietors at its first foundation, was here invested with the supreme authority: in what manner the executive offices were filled, we have no information. Besides a great extent of power, and a numerous population, the large mass of whom had no share in the political franchise, Kroton stood at this time distinguished for two things—the general excellence of the bodily habit of the citizens, attested in part by the number of conquerors furnished to the Olympic games—and the superiority of its physicians or surgeons. These two points were in fact greatly connected with each other; for the therapeutics of the day consisted not so much of active remedies as of careful diet and regimen; while the trainer, who dictated the life of an athlete during his long and fatiguing preparation for an Olympic contest—and the professional superintendent of the youths who frequented the public gymnasia—followed out the same general views and acted upon the same basis of knowledge as the physician who prescribed for a state of positive bad health. Of medical education properly so called, especially of anatomy, there was then little or nothing. The physician acquired his knowledge from observation of men sick as well as healthy, and from a careful notice of the way in which the human body was acted upon by surrounding agents and circumstances: and this same knowledge was not less necessary for the trainer; so that the same place which contained the best men in the latter class was also likely to be distinguished in the

former. It is not improbable that such celebrity of Kroton may have been one of the reasons which determined Pythagoras to go thither. For among the precepts ascribed to him, precise rules as to diet and bodily regulation occupy a prominent place. The medical or surgical celebrity of Demokedes (son-in-law of the Pythagorean Milo), to whom allusion has been made in a former chapter, is contemporaneous with the presence of Pythagoras at Kroton; and the medical men of Magna Græcia maintained themselves in credit, as rivals of the schools of the Asklepiads at Kos and Knidus, throughout all the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

The biographers of Pythagoras tell us that his arrival there, his preaching, and his conduct, produced an effect almost electric upon the minds of the people, with an extensive reform public as well as private. Political discontent was repressed, incontinence disappeared, luxury became discredited, and the women hastened to exchange their golden ornaments for the simplest attire. No less than 2,000 persons were converted at his first preaching. So effective were his discourses to the youth, that the Supreme Council of One Thousand invited him into their assembly, solicited his advice, and even offered to constitute him their Prytanis or president, while his wife and daughter were placed at the head of the religious processions of females. His influence was not confined to Kroton. Other towns in Italy and Sicily—Sybaris, Metapontum, Rhegium, Katana, Himera, etc., all felt the benefit of his exhortations, which extricated some of them even from slavery. Such are the tales of which the biographers of Pythagoras are full: and we see that even the disciples of Aristotle, about the year 300 B.C.—Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, Herakleides of Pontus, etc.—are hardly less charged with them than the Neo-Pythagoreans of three or four centuries later. They doubtless heard these tales from their contemporary Pythagoreans, the last members of a declining sect, among whom the attributes of the primitive founder passed for godlike, but who had no memorials, no historical judgment, and no means of forming a true conception of Kroton as it stood in 530 B.C. To trace these tales to a true foundation is impossible. But we may reasonably believe that the success of Pythagoras, as a person favored by the gods and patentee of divine secrets, was very great—that he procured to himself both the reverence of the multitude, and the peculiar attachment and obedience of many devoted adherents, chiefly belonging to the wealthy and powerful classes—that a select body of these adherents, 300 in number, bound themselves by a sort of vow both to Pythagoras and to each other, adopting a peculiar diet, ritual, and observances, as a token of union—though without anything like community of property, which some have ascribed to them. Such a band of men, standing high in the city for wealth and station, and bound together by this intimate tie, came by almost unconscious tendency to mingle political ambition with religious and scientific pursuits. Political clubs with sworn

members, under one form or another, were a constant phenomenon in the Grecian cities. Now the Pythagorean order at its first formation was the most efficient of all clubs; since it presented an intimacy of attachment among its members, as well as a feeling of haughty exclusiveness against the public without, such as no other fraternity could parallel. The devoted attachment of Pythagoreans toward each other is not less emphatically set forth than their contempt for every one else: in fact these two attributes of the order seem the best ascertained as well as the most permanent of all. Moreover, we may be sure that the peculiar observances of the order passed for exemplary virtues in the eyes of its members, and exalted ambition into a duty, by making them sincerely believe that they were the only persons fit to govern. It is no matter of surprise, then, to learn that the Pythagoreans gradually drew to themselves great ascendency in the government of Kroton. And as similar clubs, not less influential, were formed at Metapontum and other places, so the Pythagorean order spread its net and dictated the course of affairs over a large portion of Magna Græcia. Such ascendency of the Pythagoreans must have procured for the master himself some real, and still more supposed, influence over the march of government at Kroton and elsewhere, of a nature not then possessed by any of his contemporaries throughout Greece. Yet his influence was probably exercised in the background, through the medium of the brotherhood who reverenced him: for it is hardly comformable to Greek manners that a stranger of his character should guide personally and avowedly the political affairs of any Grecian city.

Nor are we to believe that Pythagoras came originally to Kroton with the express design of creating for himself an ascendent political position—still less that he came for the purpose of realizing a great preconceived political idea, and transforming Kroton into a model city of pure Dorism, as has been supposed by some eminent modern authors. Such schemes might indeed be ascribed to him by Pythagoreans of the Platonic age, when large ideas of political amelioration were rife in the minds of speculative men—by men disposed to forego the authorship of their own opinions, and preferring to accredit them as traditions handed down from a founder who had left no memorials. But it requires better evidence than theirs to make us believe that any real Greek born in 580 B.C. actually conceived such plans. We cannot construe the scheme of Pythagoras as going farther than the formation of a private, select, order of brethren, embracing his religious fancies, ethical tone, and germs of scientific idea—and manifesting adhesion by those observances which Herodotus and Plato call the Pythagorean orgies and mode of life. And his private order became politically powerful, because he was skillful or fortunate enough to enlist a sufficient number of wealthy Kortoniates, possessing individual influence which they strengthened immensely by thus regimenting themselves in intimate union. The

Pythagorean orgies or religious ceremonies were not inconsistent with public activity, bodily as well as mental. Probably the rich men of the order may have been rendered even more active, by being fortified against the temptations of a life of indulgence. The character of the order as it first stood, different from that to which it was afterward reduced, was indeed religious and exclusive, but also active and domineering; not despising any of those bodily accomplishments which increased the efficiency of the Grecian citizen, and which so particularly harmonized with the pre-existing tendencies of Kroton. Niebuhr and O. Müller have even supposed that the select Three Hundred Pythagoreans constituted a sort of smaller senate at that city—an hypothesis no way probable; we may rather conceive them as a powerful private club, exercising ascendency in the interior of the senate, and governing through the medium of the constituted authorities. Nor can we receive without great allowance the assertion of Varro, who, assimilating Pythagoras to Plato, tells us that he confined his instructions on matters of government to chosen disciples, who had gone through a complete training, and had reached the perfection of wisdom and virtue. It seems more probable that the political Pythagoreans were those who were most qualified for action, and least for speculation; and that the general of the order possessed that skill in turning to account the aptitudes of individuals, which two centuries ago was so conspicuous in the Jesuits; to whom, in various ways, the Pythagoreans bear considerable resemblance. All that we can be said to know about their political principles is, that they were exclusive and aristocratical, adverse to the control and interference of the people; a circumstance no way disadvantageous to them, since they coincided in this respect with the existing government of the city—had not their own conduct brought additional odium on the old aristocracy, and raised up an aggravated democratical opposition carried to the most deplorable lengths of violence.

All the information which we possess, apocryphal as it is, respecting this memorable club is derived from its warm admirers. Yet even their statements are enough to explain how it came to provoke deadly and extensive enmity. A stranger coming to teach new religious dogmas and observances, with a tincture of science and some new ethical ideas and phrases, though he would obtain some zealous votaries, would also bring upon himself a certain measure of antipathy. Extreme strictness of observances, combined with the art of touching skillfully the springs of religious terror in others, would indeed do much both to fortify and to exalt him. But when it was discovered that science, philosophy, and even the mystic revelations of religion, whatever they were, remained confined to the private talk and practice of the disciples, and were thus thrown into the background, while all that was seen and felt without was the political predominance of an ambitious fraternity—we need not wonder that Pythagorism in all its parts became odious to a large portion of the

community. Moreover we find the order represented not merely as constituting a devoted and exclusive political party, but also as manifesting an ostentatious self-conceit throughout their personal demeanor—refusing the hand of fellowship to all except the brethren, and disgusting especially their own familiar friends and kinsmen So far as we know Grecian philosophy, this is the only instance in which it was distinctly abused for political and party objects. The early days of the Pythagorean order stand distinguished for such perversion, which fortunately for the progress of philosophy, never presented itself afterward in Greece. Even at Athens, however, we shall hereafter see that Sokrates, though standing really aloof from all party intrigue, incurred much of his unpopularity from supposed political conjunction with Kritias and Alkibiades, to which indeed the orator Æschines distinctly ascribes his condemnation, speaking about sixty years after the event. Had Sokrates been known as the founder of a band holding together intimately for ambitious purposes, the result would have been eminently pernicious to philosophy, and probably much sooner pernicious to himself.

It was this cause which brought about the complete and violent destruction of the Pythagorean order. Their ascendency had provoked such widespread discontent, that their enemies became emboldened to employ extreme force against them. Kylon and Ninon—the former of whom is said to have sought admittance into the order, but to have been rejected on account of his bad character—took the lead in pronounced opposition to the Pythagoreans; whose unpopularity extended itself farther to the Senate of One Thousand, through the medium of which their ascendency had been exercised. Propositions were made for rendering the government more democratic, and for constituting a new senate, taken by lot from all the people, before which the magistrates should go through their trial of accountability after office: an opportunity being chosen in which the Senate of One Thousand had given signal offense by refusing to divide among the people the recently conquered territory of Sybaris. In spite of the opposition of the Pythagoreans, this change of government was carried through. Ninon and Kylon, their principal enemies, made use of it to exasperate the people still farther against the order, until they provoked actual popular violence against it. The Pythagoreans were attacked when assembled in their meeting-house near the temple of Apollo, or, as some said, in the house of Milo. The building was set on fire, and many of the members perished; none but the younger and more vigorous escaping. Similar disturbances, and the like violent suppression of the order, with destruction of several among the leading citizens, are said to have taken place in other cities of Magna Græcia—Tarentum, Metapontum, Kaulonia. And we are told that these cities remained for some time in a state of great disquietude and commotion, from which they were only rescued by the friendly mediation of the Peloponnesian Achæ-

ans, the original founders of Sybaris and Kroton—assisted indeed by mediators from other parts of Greece. The cities were at length pacified, and induced to adopt an amicable congress, with common religious festivals, at a temple founded expressly for the purpose and dedicated to Zeus Homarius. Thus perished the original Pythagorean order. Respecting Pythagoras himself, there were conflicting accounts; some representing that he was burnt in the temple with his disciples; others, that he had died a short time previously; others again affirmed, that he was alive at the time, but absent, and that he died not long afterward in exile, after forty days of voluntary abstinence from food. His tomb was still shown at Metapontum in the days of Cicero. As an active brotherhood, the Pythagoreans never revived; but the dispersed members came together as a sect, for common religious observances and common pursuit of science. They were readmitted, after some interval, into the cities of Magna Græcia, from which they had been originally expelled, but to which the sect is always considered as particularly belonging—though individual members of it are found besides at Thebes and in other cities of Greece. Indeed, some of these later Pythagoreans sometimes even acquired great political influence, as we see in the case of the Tarentine Archytas, the contemporary of Plato.

It has already been stated that the period when Pythagoras arrived at Kroton may be fixed somewhere between B.C. 540–530. His arrival is said to have occurred at a time of great depression in the minds of the Krotoniates. They had recently been defeated by the united Lokrians and Rhegians, vastly inferior to themselves in number, at the river Sagra; which humiliation is said to have rendered them docile to the training of the Samian missionary. As the birth of the Pythagorean order is thus connected with the defeat of the Krotoniates at the Sagra, so its extinction is also connected with their victory over the Sybarites at the river Traeis or Trionto, about twenty years afterward.

Of the history of these two great Achæan cities we unfortunately know very little. Though both were powerful, yet down to the period of 510 B.C., Sybaris seems to have been decidedly the greatest. Of its dominion as well as of its much denounced luxury I have spoken in a former chapter. It was at that time that the war broke out between them, which ended in the destruction of Sybaris. It is certain that the Sybaritans were aggressors in the war; but by what causes it had been preceded in their own town, or what provocation they had received, we make out very indistinctly. There had been a political revolution at Sybaris (we are told) not long before, in which a popular leader Telys had headed a rising against the oligarchical government, and induced the people to banish 500 of the leading rich men, as well as to confiscate their properties. He had acquired the sovereignty and become despot of Sybaris. It appears too that he, or his rule at Sybaris, was much abhorred at Kroton; since the Krotoniate Philippus, a man of splendid muscular form and an Olympic victor, was exiled for having engaged himself to marry the daughter of Telys. According to the narrative given by the later Pythagoreans, those exiles, whom Telys had driven from Sybaris, took refuge at Kroton, casting themselves as suppliants on the altars for protection; it may well be, indeed, that they were in part Pythagoreans of Sybaris. A body of powerful exiles, harbored in a town so close at hand, inspired alarm, and Telys demanded that they should be delivered up, threatening war in case of refusal. This demand excited consternation at Kroton, since the military strength of Sybaris was decidedly superior. The surrender of the exiles was much debated, and almost decreed, by the Krotoniates, until at length the persuasion of Pythagoras himself is said to have determined them to risk any hazard sooner than incur the dishonor of betraying suppliants.

On the demand of the Sybarites being refused, Telys marched against Kroton at the head of a force which is reckoned at 300,000 men. He marched, too, in defiance of the strongest religious warnings against the enterprise; for the sacrifices, offered on his behalf by the Iamid prophet Kallias of Elis, were so decisively unfavorable, that the prophet himself fled in terror to Kroton. Near the river Traeis or Trionto, Telys was met by the forces of Kroton, consisting (we are informed) of 100,000 men, and commanded by the great athlete and Pythagorean Milo; who was clothed (we are told) in the costume and armed with the club of Herakles. They were farther reinforced by a valuable ally, the Spartan Dorieus (younger brother of king Kleomenes), then coasting along the Gulf of Tarentum with a body of colonists, intending to found a settlement in Sicily. A bloody battle was fought, in which the Sybarites were totally worsted, with prodigious slaughter; while the victors, fiercely provoked and giving no quarter, followed up the pursuit so warmly that they took the city, dispersed its inhabitants, and crushed its whole power in the short space of seventy days. The Sybarites fled in great part to Laos and Skidros, their settlements planted on the Mediterranean coast, across the Calabrian peninsula. So eager were the Krotoniates to render the site of Sybaris untenable, that they turned the course of the river Krathis so as to overwhelm and destroy it: the dry bed in which the river had originally flowed was still visible in the time of Herodotus, who was among the settlers in the town of Thurii afterward founded nearly adjoining. It appears, however, that the Krotoniates for a long time kept the site of Sybaris deserted, refusing even to allot the territory among the body of their own citizens; from which circumstances (as has been before noticed) the commotion against the Pythagorean order is said to have arisen. They may perhaps have been afraid of the name and recollections of the city. No large or permanent establishment was ever formed there until Thurii was established by Athens about sixty-five years afterward. Nevertheless the name of the Sybarites did not perish; they maintained

themselves at Loas, Skidros, and elsewhere—and afterward formed the privileged old-citizens among the colonists of Thurii; but misbehaved themselves in that capacity, and were mostly either slain or expelled. Even after that, however, the name of Sybaris still remained on a reduced scale in some portion of the territory; Herodotus recounts what he was told by the Sybarites, and we find subsequent indications of them even as late as Theokritus.

The conquest and destruction of the original Sybaris—perhaps in 510 B.C. the greatest of all Grecian cities—appears to have excited a strong sympathy in the Hellenic world. In Miletus especially, with which it had maintained intimate union, the grief was so vehement, that all the Milesians shaved their heads in token of mourning. The event, happening just at the time of the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, must have made a sensible revolution in the relations of the Greek cities on the Italian coast with the rustic population of the interior. The Krotoniates might destroy Sybaris and disperse its inhabitants, but they could not succeed to its wide dominion over dependent territory: and the extinction of this great aggregate power, stretching across the peninsula from sea to sea, lessened the means of resistance against the Oscan movements from the inland. From this time forward, the cities of Magna Græcia, as well as those of Ionia, tend to decline in consequence; while Athens, on the other hand, becomes both more conspicuous and more powerful. At the invasion of Greece by Xerxes thirty years after this conquest of Sybaris, Sparta and Athens send to ask for aid both from Sicily and Korkyra, but not from Magna Græcia.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess fuller information respecting such important changes among the Greco-Italian cities. Yet we may remark that even Herodotus—himself a citizen of Thurii and dwelling on the spot not more than eighty years after the capture of Sybaris—evidently found no written memorials to consult; and could obtain from verbal conversation nothing better than statements both meager and contradictory. The material circumstance, for example, of the aid rendered by the Spartan Dorieus and his colonists, though positively asserted by the Sybarites, was as positively denied by the Krotoniates, who alleged that they had accomplished the conquest by themselves and with their own unaided forces. There can be little hesitation in crediting the affirmative assertion of the Sybarites, who showed to Herodotus a temple and precinct erected by the Spartan prince in testimony of his share in the victory, on the banks of the dry deserted channel out of which the Krathis had been turned, and in honor of the Krathian Athene. This of itself forms a proof, coupled with the positive assertion of the Sybarites, sufficient for the case; but they produced another indirect argument to confirm it, which deserves notice. Dorieus had attacked Sybaris while he was passing along the coast of Italy to go and found a colony in Sicily, under the express mandate and encouragement of the oracle. After tarrying awhile at Sybaris, he pursued his journey to the south-western portion of Sicily, where he and nearly all his companions perished in a battle with the Carthaginians and Egestæans—though the oracle had promised him that he should acquire and occupy permanently the neighboring territory near Mount Eryx. Now the Sybarites deduced from this fatal disaster of Dorieus and his expedition, combined with the favorable promise of the oracle beforehand, a confident proof of the correctness of their own statement that he had fought at Sybaris. For if he had gone straight to the territory marked out by the oracle (they argued), without turning aside for any other object, the prophecy on which his hopes were founded would have been unquestionably realized, and he would have succeeded. But the ruinous disappointment which actually overtook him was at once explained, and the truth of prophecy vindicated, when it was recollected that he had turned aside to help the Krotoniates against Sybaris, and thus set at nought the conditions prescribed to him. Upon this argument (Herodotus tells us) the Sybarites of his day especially insisted. And while we note their pious and literal faith in the communications of an inspired prophet, we must at the same time observe how perfectly that faith supplied the place of historical premises—how scanty thier stock was of such legitimate evidence—and how little they had yet learnt to appreciate its value.

It is to be remarked that Herodotus, in his brief mention of the fatal war between Sybaris and Kroton, does not make the least allusion to Pythagoras or his brotherhood. The least which we can infer from such silence is, that the part which they played in reference to the war, and their general ascendency in Magna Græcia, was in reality less conspicuous and overruling than the Pythagorean historians set forth. Even making such allowance, however, the absence of all allusion in Herodotus, to the commotions which accompanied the subversion of the Pythagoreans, is a circumstance not easily explicable. Nor can I pass over a perplexing statement in Polybius, which seems to show that he too must have conceived the history of Sybaris in a way different from that in which it is commonly represented. He tells us, that after much suffering in Magna Græcia from the troubles which followed the expulsion of the Pythagoreans, the cities were induced by Achæan mediation to come to an accommodation and even to establish something like a permanent league with a common temple and sacrifices. Now the three cities which he specifies as having been the first to do this, are, Kroton, Sybaris, and Kaulonia. But according to the sequence of events and the fatal war (just described) between Kroton and Sybaris, the latter city must have been at that time in ruins; little, if at all, inhabited. I cannot but infer from this statement of Polybius, that he followed different authorities respecting the early history of Magna Græcia in the beginning of the fifth century B.C.

Indeed the early history of these cities gives us little more than a few isolated facts and names. With regard to their legislators, Zaleukus and Charondas, nothing is made out except their existence—and even that fact some ancient critics contested. Of Zaleukus, whom chronologists place in 664 B.C., I have already spoken; the date of Charondas cannot be assigned, but we may perhaps presume that it was at some time between 600–500 B.C. He was a citizen of middling station, born in the Chalkidic colony of Katana in Sicily, and he framed laws not only for his own city, but for the other Chalkidic cities in Sicily and Italy—Leontini, Naxos, Zankle, and Rhegium. The laws and the solemn preamble ascribed to him by Diodorus and Stobæus, belong to a later day, and we are obliged to content ourselves with collecting the brief hints of Aristotle, who tells us that the laws of Charondas descended to great minuteness of distinction and specification, especially in graduating the fine for offenses according to the property of the guilty person fined—but that there was nothing in his laws strictly original and peculiar, except that he was the first to introduce the solemn indictment against perjured witnesses before justice. The perjured witness, in Grecian ideas, was looked upon as having committed a crime half religious, half civil. The indictment raised against him, known by a peculiar name, partook of both characters, approaching in some respects to the procedure against a murderer. Such distinct form of indictment against perjured testimony—with its appropriate name, which we shall find maintained at Athens throughout the best-known days of Attic law—was first enacted by Charondas.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE.

I HAVE recounted, in a preceding chapter, the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ægean to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and Athens; an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested—but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his

empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships both of war and burden. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece. Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises—the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt—when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendency of that queen insured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition. It deserves to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it might well have succeeded altogether, had he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that not only the tribute was increased, but also the numbers of the Persian occupying force, maintained by contributions levied on the natives. Achæmenes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus; who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for him-

self. There were not wanting Grecian counselors to enforce his recommendation both by the promise of help and by the color of religion. The great family of the Aleuadæ, belonging to Larissa and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas; while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus—a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, he was indignantly banished by Hipparchus. The Peisistratids however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offense, and carried Onomakritus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed. When introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically various encouraging predictions, wherein the bridging of the Hellespont, and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece, appeared as predestined; while he carefully kept back all those of a contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus, strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musæus, and other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly assures us. The religious encouragements of Onomakritus, and the political co-operation proffered by the Aleuadæ, enabled Mardonius effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Indeed, it was not difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of Persia was in honor obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire. The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged; and in addition to this double stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an acquisition—"it was the finest land in the world, produced every variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good a possession for any mortal man except the Persian kings." Fifteen years before, the Milesian Aristagoras, when entreating the Spartans to assist the Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece—a contrast less widely removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by Mardonius.

Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and announced

to them his resolution to invade Greece; setting forth the mingled motives of revenge and aggrandizement which impelled him, and representing the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become coextensive with the ether of Zeus and the limits of the sun's course.

On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, toward which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amid those prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear co-ordinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of Crœsus as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full expansion of his theme, "Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello," in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh Book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second Book of the Iliad: probably too, if the lost Grecian epics had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The Dream sent by the gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from his project—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host—have both of them marked parallels in the Iliad: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the Atreidæ against Troy. He enters into the internal feeling of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces "the counsel of Zeus" as not less direct, special, and overruling, than it appears in the Iliad and Odyssey: though the Godhead in Herodotus, compared with Homer, tends to become neuter instead of masculine or feminine, and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler, apart from the appetites, lusts, and caprices of a man: acting, moreover, chiefly as a centralized, or at least as a homogeneous, force, in place of the discordant severalty of agents conspicuous in the Homeric theology. The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus—that the Godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or immoderate desires in man—is worked into his history of Xerxes as the ever-

present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful termination For we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian, with that honorable frankness which Plutarch calls his "malignity," neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve for personal valor, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat which their mismanagement laid open.

I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described as having originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions of Mardonius. This was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally be tranferred from the monarch to some evil counselor. As soon as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced, to the Persian chief men whom he had convoked, his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Mardonius is represented as expressing his warm concurrence in the project, extolling the immense force of Persia, and depreciating the Ionians in Europe (so he denominated them) as so poor and disunited that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this general—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Nestor embolden him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek. It opens with the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision—reproves Mardonius for falsely depreciating the Greeks and seducing his master into personal danger—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont—reminds the latter of the imminent hazard which Darius and his army had undergone in Scythia, from the destruction (averted only by Histiæus and his influence) of the bridge over the Danube: such prudential suggestions being further strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the Godhead toward overgrown human power.

The impatient monarch silences his uncle in a tone of insult and menace: nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasions work upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme. In this latter disposition he falls asleep, when a dream appears: a tall stately man stands over him, denounces his change of opinion, and peremptorily commands him to persist in the enterprise as announced. In spite of this dream, Xerxes still adheres to his altered purpose, assembles his council the next morning, and after apologizing for his angry language toward Artabanus, acquaints them to their great joy that he

adopts the recommendations of the latter, and abandons his project against Greece. But in the following night, no sooner has Xerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and the same figure again appear to him, repeating the previous command in language of terrific menace. The monarch, in a state of great alarm, springs from his bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informs of the twice-repeated vision and divine mandate interdicting his change of resolution. "If (says he) it be the absolute will of God that this expedition against Greece should be executed, the same vision will appear to thee also, provided thou puttest on my attire, sittest in my throne, and sleepest in my bed." Not without reluctance, Artabanus obeys this order (for it was high treason in any Persian to sit upon the regal throne), but he at length complies, expecting to be able to prove to Xerxes that the dream deserved no attention. "Many dreams (he says) are not of divine origin, nor anything better than mere wandering objects such as we have been thinking upon during the day: this dream, of whatever nature it may be, will not be foolish enough to mistake me for the king, even if I be in the royal attire and bed; but if it shall still continue to appear to thee, I shall myself confess it to be divine." Accordingly Artabanus is placed in the regal throne and bed, and as soon as he falls asleep, the very same figure shows itself to him also, saying, "Art thou he who dissuadest Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for his safety, from marching against Greece? Xerxes has already been forewarned of that which he will suffer if he disobeys, and thou, too, shalt nor escape either now or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be." With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot irons, when the sleeper awakens in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. "I have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with that vast actual empire on account of which all mankind think thee happy; but since the divine impulsion is now apparent, and since destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs; so that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts into thy hands."

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes to have originated; partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Platæa—but still more in the influence of "mischievous Oneiros," who is sent by the gods (as in the second book of the Iliad) to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even to overrule by terror both his scruples and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined (as in the instances of Astyages, Polykrates, and others) that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgment. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to Herodotus,

but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry. Modified more or less in each individual narrator, it is made to supply connecting links as well as initiating causes for the great events of history. As a cause for this expedition, incomparably the greatest fact and the most fertile in consequences, throughout the political career both of Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings either of one nation or the other. The story of the dream has its rise (as Herodotus tells us) in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and colored by the Grecian historian, who mentions also a third dream, which appears to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely construed into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially the Persæ of Æschylus, exhibited seven years after the battle of Salamis—in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the jealous enmity of the gods toward vast power and overweening aspirations in man; though without any of that inclination, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.

While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which both the poet and the historian surround this vast conflict of Greeks and barbarians, we need look no farther than ambition and revenge for the real motives of the invasion. Considering that it had been a proclaimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous to his death, there was no probability that his son and successor would gratuitiously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, Xerxes began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war—horse and foot, ships of war, horse-transports, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire could possibly be made to furnish, was now brought to execute the schemes of Xerxes.

The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the Ægean north of Krete and east of Eubœa—including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the coast of Thrace, while Abdera with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa. It is necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at the time when Xerxes mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war—partly that we may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the *medising* Greeks—partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B.C., the vast army thus raised by Xerxes arrived from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritala in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa. From thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kelænæ, Anaua, and Kolossæ, and the Lydian town of Kallatebus, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak farther presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Ægean, as Datis had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once; the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly; while the latter was intended to accompany and co-operate. A fleet of 1207 ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burden, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia; moreover Xerxes, with a degree of forethought much exceeding that of his father Darius in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic gulf. During the four years of military preparation there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.

If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage of men and muniments of war, which Xerxes thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent, experience—they were no less astounded by two enterprises which entered into his scheme—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed, been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be

thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia. Yet this bridge of Darius, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact that the poet Æschylus speaks as if he had never heard of it; while the bridge of Xerxes was ever remembered both by Persians and by Greeks as a most imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—or rather the two separate bridges not far removed from each other,—which Xerxes caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the neighborhood of Abydos on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first intrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phenicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phenicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fiber of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to Xerxes as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprised of this catastrophe, burst all bounds. It was directed partly against the chief engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off, but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that the strait should be scourged with 300 lashes, and that a set of fetters should be let down into it as a farther punishment. Moreover, Herodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he even sent irons for the purpose of branding it. "Thou bitter water (exclaimed the scourgers while inflicting this punishment), this is the penalty which our master inflicts upon thee, because thou hast wronged him though he hath never wronged thee. King Xerxes *will* cross thee, whether thou wilt or not; but thou deservest not sacrifice from any man, because thou art a treacherous river of (useless) salt water."

Such were the insulting terms heaped by order of Xerxes on the rebellious Hellespont. Herodotus calls them "non-Hellenic and blasphemous terms," which, together with their brevity, leads us to believe that he gives them as he heard them, and that they are not of his own invention, like so many other speeches in his work, where he dramatizes, as it were, a given position. It has been common, however, to set aside in this case not merely the words, but even the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont, as a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact; the extreme childishness and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy's calumny. But this reason will not appear sufficient, if we transport ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and widespread

instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion. And although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary fetichism, banishing it from the regions of reality into those of conventional fiction—yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit: and even an intelligent man may be impelled in a moment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered. By the old procedure, never formally abolished, though gradually disused, at Athens—an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border. And the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day's hunting, scourged and pricked the god Pan or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath. The vengeance exercised by Cyrus on the river Gyndes (which he caused to be divided into 360 streamlets, because one of his sacred horses had been drowned in it), affords a fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterward enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were acts necessarily known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified. The decapitation of the unfortunate engineers was an act fearfully impressive, and even the scourging of the Hellespont, while essentially public, appears to Herodotus (as well as to Arrian afterward), not childish, but impious. The more attentively we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phenicians and Egyptians—were immediately directed to recommence the work, which Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was executed with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines of ships—triremes and pentekonters blended together—were moored across the strait breastwise, with their sterns toward the Euxine and their heads toward the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly from the former toward the latter. They were moored by anchors head and stern, and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to carry the bridge nearest to the Euxine was 360; the number in the other, 314. Over each of the two lines

of ships, across from shore to shore, were stretched six vast cables, which discharged the double function of holding the ships together, and of supporting the bridgeway to be laid upon them. They were tightened by means of capstans on each shore: in three different places along the line, a gap was left between the ships for the purpose of enabling small trading vessels without masts, in voyage to or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.

Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, two were of flax and four of papyrus, combined for the sake of increased strength; for it seems that in the bridges first made, which proved too weak to resist the winds, the Phenicians had employed cables of flax for one bridge, the Egyptians those of papyrus for the other. Over these again were laid planks of wood, sawn to the appropriate width, secured above by a second line of cables stretched across to keep them in their places. Lastly, upon this foundation the causeway itself was formed out of earth and wood, with a palisade on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed over from seeing the water.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed, for facilitating his march, was, the cutting through of the isthmus which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos with the mainland. That isthmus near the point where it joins the mainland was about twelve stadia (not quite so many furlongs) across, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic Gulf; and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work too, as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phenicians were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the Greeks from the neigboring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forces of the empire, were brought together to assist. The headquarters of the fleet were first at Kyme and Phokæa, next at Elæus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and Mount Athos. The canal-cutting at the latter was placed under the general directions of two noble Persians—Bubares and Artachæus, and distributed under their measurement as task-work among the contingents of the various nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought for sale in the neighboring plain from various parts of Asia and Egypt.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus respecting this work deserve special notice. First, the superior intelligence of the Phenicians, who, within sight of that lofty island of Thasos which had been occupied three centuries before by their free ancestors, were now laboring as instruments to the ambition of a foreign conqueror. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides. The others dug straight down,

so that the time as well as the toil of their work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides—a remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence then prevalent, since the nations assembled were many and diverse. Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this laborious work from motives of mere ostentation; "for it would have cost no trouble at all" (he observes) to drag all the ships in the fleet across the isthmus; so that the canal was nowise needed. So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B.C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an isthmus; a special groove or slip being seemingly prepared for them; such was the case at the Diolkus across the isthmus of Corinth. Thirdly, it is to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at Mount Athos worked under the lash; and these, be it borne in mind, were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were tributaries of the Persian monarch; perhaps the father of Herodotus, a native of Halikarnassus and a subject of the brave Queen Artemisia, may have been among them. We shall find other examples as we proceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and full conviction of its indispensable necessity, on the part of the Persians—even to drive the troops of their subject-contingents on to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way toward freemen, and especially toward freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling. The Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterward subjects, of Athens; and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact when we appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes excavated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon. These two works, together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter 481–480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring 480 B.C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch dispatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water. The news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most resolute of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare "dinner" for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of

several threatening portents during the course of it—one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its signification—while another was misinterpreted into a favorable omen by the compliant answer of the Magian priests.

On quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two nearly equal columns; a spacious interval being left between the two for the king himself with his guards and select Persians. First of all came the baggage, carried by beasts of burden, immediately followed by one-half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction of nations. Next, the select troops, 1,000 Persian cavalry with 1,000 Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished by carrying their spears with the point downward as well as by the spear itself, which had a golden pomegranate at its other extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty. Behind these troops walked ten sacred horses, of vast power and splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Nisæan plains in Media; next, the sacred chariot of Zeus, drawn by eight white horses—wherein no man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Nisæan horses; the charioteer, a noble Persian named Patiramphes, being seated in it by the side of the monarch—who was often accustomed to alight from the chariot and to enter a litter. Immediately about his person were a chosen body of 1000 horse-guards, the best troops and of the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the reverse extremity of their spears, and followed by other detachments of 1000 horse, 10,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, all native Persians. Of these 10,000 Persian infantry, called the Immortals because their number was always exactly maintained, 9,000 carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining 1000, distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household troops; after whom, with an interval of two furlongs, the remaining host followed pell-mell. Respecting its numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great review at Doriskus.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one-half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man resident at Kelænæ, who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. "I possess

(replied Pythius), besides lands and slaves, 2,000 talents of silver and 3,993,000 of golden darics, wanting only 7,000 of being 4,000,000. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite enough." Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality; at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out of his own treasure the sum of 7,000 darics, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of 4,000,000. The latter was so elated with this mark of favor, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was, that the eldest of them might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining years, and that the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered as sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked. "Wretch! (replied Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about *thy* son, when I am myself on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose duty it is to follow me with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. As, when thou didst good deeds and madest good offers to me, thou canst not boast of having surpassed the king in generosity—so now, when thou hast turned round and become impudent, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality which I received from thee shall serve as protection. But for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty." He forthwith directed that the son of Pythius should be put to death, and his body severed in twain; of which one-half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other on the left hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentiment with which the Persian kings regarded the obligation of universal personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they collected around them, with little or no reference to quality: and the very mention of exemption—the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter—was an offense not to be pardoned. In this as in the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, munificent, or ferocious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating itself into act without any thought of consequences, and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown toward his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Kaikus—then through Aterneus, Karine, and the plain of Thebe. They passed Adramyttium and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder. From hence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals. In spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute. He ascended the holy hill of Ilium,—reviewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have lived and reigned,—sacrificed 1000 oxen to the patron goddess Athene,—and caused the Magian priests to make libations in honor of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details, abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date. And doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under Agamennon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not but fancy that these same Greeks would fall an easy prey before his innumerable host. Another day's march between Rhœteium, Ophryneium, and Dardanus on the left hand, and the Teukrians of Gergis on the right hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly constructed bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis—and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by no less unmeasured calamity—it will appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He surrounds it with much dramatic circumstance, not only mentioning the marble throne erected for Xerxes on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses of land-force covering the shore and his ships sailing and racing in the strait (a race in which the Phœnicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and all the other contingents)—but also superadding to this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth the internal mind of Xerxes. He farther quotes certain supposed exclamations of the Abydenes at the sight of his superhuman power. "Why (said one of these terror-stricken spectators), why dost thou, oh Zeus, under the shape of a Persian man and the name of Xerxes, thus bring together the whole human race for the ruin of Greece? It would have been easy for thee to accomplish *that* without so much ado." Such emphatic ejaculations exhibit the strong feeling which Herodotus or his informants throw into the scene, though we cannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny of historical criticism.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of Orientals, the passage was ordered to begin. The bridges were perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxes himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and offered up prayers to Helios, that he might effect without hindrance his design of conquering Europe even to its farthest extremity. Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar—"I do not exactly know (adds the historian) whether he threw them in as a gift to Helios, or as a mark of repentance and atonement to the Hellespont for the stripes which he had inflicted upon it." Of the two bridges, that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force—the other to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burden. The 10,000 Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were the first to pass over. Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridges after him "under the lash." But in spite of the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over—a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the totals computed by Herodotus.

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardia on his left hand and the tomb of Helle on his right—the eponymous heroine of the strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the Gulf of Melas and the Ægean Sea—crossing the river from which that Gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up (according to Herodotus) with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolic city of Ænus and the harbor called Stentoris, he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus. A fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius. The spacious plain called by this same name reached far along the shore to Cape Serreium, and comprised in it the towns of Sale and Zone, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Kikones on the main-land. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled the southernmost promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval force.

Never probably in the history of mankind has there been brought together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse, for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the

numerical total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety of contingents there is no room for doubt. "What Asiatic nation was there (asks Herodotus, whose conceptions of this expedition seem to outstrip his powers of language) that Xerxes did not bring against Greece?" Nor was it Asiatic nations alone, comprised within the Oxus, the Indus, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the Ægean, and the Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians, the Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and the Libyans from the desert near Kyrene. Not all the expeditions, fabulous or historical, of which Herodotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparable to this of Xerxes, even for total number; much more in respect of variety of component elements. Forty-six different nations, each with its distinct national costume, mode of arming, and local leaders, formed the vast land-force. Eight other nations furnished the fleet, on board of which Persians, Medes, and Sakæ served as armed soldiers or marines. The real leaders, both of the entire army and of all its various divisions, were native Persians of noble blood, who distributed the various native contingents into companies of thousands, hundreds, and tens. The forty-six nations composing the land-force were as follows:—Persians, Medes, Kissians, Hyrkanians, Assyrians, Baktrians, Sakæ, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikæ, Kaspians, Sarangæ, Paktyes, Utii, Myki, Parikanii, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Maryandyni, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kabelians, Mares, Kolchians, Alarodians, Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the fleet were—Phœnicians (300 ships of war), Egyptians (200), Cypriots (150), Kilikians (100), Pamphylians (30), Lykians (50), Karians (70), Ionic Greeks (100), Doric Greeks (30), Æolic Greeks (60), Hellespontic Greeks (100), Greeks from the islands in the Ægean (17): in all 1207 triremes or ships of war with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costumes and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied. But it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots, and Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (i.e., arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge,—for hand combat in line as well as for defense of the person,—but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight). The other nations were armed with missile weapons,—light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all,—turbans or leather caps instead of helmets,—swords and scythes. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them. Their persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter; some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire. A nomadic tribe of

Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of 8,000 horsemen, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Æthiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.

It was at Doriskus that the fighting-men of the entire land-army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted, and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of inclosure built, around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising 10,000 each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of 1,700,000 foot, besides 80,000 horse, many war-chariots from Libya and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of 20,000 additional men. Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the 1207 triremes or war-ships of three banks of oars, but also 3,000 smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised 200 rowers, and thirty fighting men, Persians or Sakæ; that of each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure of 2,317,000 men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylæ, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed; deriving from hence a reinforcement of 120 triremes with aggregate crews of 24,000 men, and of 300,000 new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylæ was 2,640,000 men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burden, etc., so that the male persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to 5,283,220! So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus, who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of "camp-followers" as not only equal to, but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men. We are to reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female cooks, at whose number Herodotus does not pretend to guess;

together with cattle, beasts of burden, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the consumption of the regular army.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible; yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn down upon Herodotus are noway merited. He takes pains to distinguish that which informants told him, from that which he merely guessed. His description of the review at Doriskus is so detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were present at it, and had learnt the separate totals promulgated by the enumerators—infantry, cavalry, and ships of war great and small. As to the number of triremes, his statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the "Persæ" gives the exact number of 1207 Persian ships as having fought at Salamis; but between Doriskus and Salamis, Herodotus has himself enumerated 647 ships as lost or destroyed, and only 120 as added. No exaggeration therefore can well be suspected in this statement, which would imply about 276,000 as the number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or omission in the narrative which we cannot clear up. But the aggregate of 3,000 smaller ships, and still more that of 1,700,000 infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate—an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself—so that the military total of land-force and ship's crews, which Herodotus gives as 2,641,000 on the arrival at Thermopylæ, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions no way admissible. For though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier or attendant for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. A few grandees and leaders might be richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great mass of the army would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that the only way in which we can render the military total, which must at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions of possible subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption, and habitual patience as to hardship, of Orientals in all ages. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his compaign upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European. And while we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much previous pains been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of march; in addition to which, the cities in Thrace were required to furnish such an amount of provisions when the army passed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise how provisions could have

been provided for so vast a multitude, and were we to admit his estimate literally, the difficulty would be magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum of effort throughout the vast empire,—that a great numerical total was the thing chiefly demanded, —and that prayers for exemption were regarded by the Great King as a capital offense—and that provisions had been collected for three years before along the line of march—we may well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than were ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number, in the entire absence of ascertained data. When we learn from Thucydides that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantineia, we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus. We may remark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcements received afterward in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever afterward increased. For Herodotus takes no account of desertions, which yet must have been very numerous, in a host disorderly, heterogeneous, without any interest in the enterprise; and wherein the numbers of each separate contingent were unknown.

Ktesias gives the total of the host at 800,000 men, and 1000 triremes, independent of the war chariots; if he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the 800,000 men (as seems probable), the total will then be considerably above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate of 700,000 men; Diodorus appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly other authorities. None of these witnesses enable us to correct Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him. He is in some sort an original witness, having evidently conversed with persons actually present at the muster of Doriskus, giving us their belief as to the numbers, together with the computation, true or false, circulated among them by authority. Moreover, the contemporary Æschylus, while agreeing with him exactly as to the number of triremes, gives no specific figure as to the land-force, but conveys to us in his "Persæ" a general sentiment of vast number, which may seem in keeping with the largest statement of Herodotus: the Persian empire is drained of men—the women of Susa are left without husbands or brothers—the Baktrian territory has not been allowed to retain even its old men. The terror-striking effect of this crowd was probably quite as great as if its numbers had really corresponded to the ideas of Herodotus.

After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes passed in his chariot by each of the several contingents, observed their equipment, and put questions to which the royal scribes noted down the answers. He then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme (which had been already fitted up with a gilt tent), and sailed along the prows of his

immense fleet, moored in line about 400 feet from the shore, and every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence. It was in this spirit that he sent forthwith for Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries—to ask whether resistance on the part of the Greeks, to such a force, was even conceivable. The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one of the most impressive manfestations of sentiment in the Greek language. Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will resist him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxes receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of displeasure: an honorable contrast to the treatment of Charidemus a century and a half afterward, by the last monarch of Persia.

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies. All was still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from each as he passed. the Thracian Satræ were preserved from this levy by their unassailable seats amidst the woods and snows of Rhodope. The islands of Samothrace and Thasus, with their subject towns on the mainland—and the Grecian colonies Dikæa, Maroneia, and Abdera—were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or men. What was still more ruinous—they were constrained to provide a day's meal for the immense host as it passed: on the day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch—in grinding flour of wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls; together with a decent display of gold and silver plate for the regal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate companions, while the army received their rations in the open region around. on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had furnished it. Of course so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge, of each one among the cities, so that the cost brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them to abandon house and home. The cost incurred by the city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the main-land, for this purpose was no less than 400 talents (£92,800)· while at Abdera, the witty Megakreon recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required

breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destitution. A stream called Lissus, which seems to have been of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Pistyrus.

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians, between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi or Nine-Roads, afterward memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honors by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream. Moreover, the religious feelings of Xerxes were not satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians. He here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the spot: he also left, under the care of the Pæonians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus, which had been brought from the seat of empire, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic Gulf, passing through the territory of the Bisaltæ near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus, hard by the isthmus of Athos which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bisaltæ refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodope for safety, and forbade his six sons to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities which Xerxes had passed by, obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an armament. But the inhabitants of Akanthus had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of the canal and had probably made considerable profits during the operation: Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents; though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athos, to double the two south-western capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic Gulf, and to await his arrival at Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallene, as well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic Gulf, in the region called Krusis or Krossæa, on the continental side of the isthmus of Pallene. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance. Near Therma (Salonichi) in Mygdonia, in the interior of the Gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axius, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland, through

Pæonia and Krestonia—a wild, woody, and untrodden country, where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls of prodigious size and fierceness. At length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of the Haliakmon.

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called Hellas; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army—with additional contingents levied in his course—and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus. The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself—together with the Thessalian Aleuadæ—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him shall be related in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.

Our information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.

Kleomenes and Leotychides, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder or Eurystheneid, the latter to the younger or the Prokleid race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Prokleid king Demaratus: and Kleomenes had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His maneuver being betrayed shortly afterward, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long. His habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation: yet which, among the

misdeeds of his life, had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priestess. But the Athenians and Argeians were each disposed to an hypothesis of their own—the former believed that the gods had thus punished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis—the latter recognized the avenging hand of the hero Argus, whose grove Kleomenes had burnt, along with so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it. Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Kleomenes was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine agency, recognized on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Kleomenes had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intoxication, learnt from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta.

The death of Kleomenes, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their ten hostages, whom Kleomenes and Leotychides had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychides was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenes in the requisition of these hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece, yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychides was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasides, pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the regal person. The Spartans (he observed) had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence executed.

Accordingly the Æginetans contented themselves with stipulating that Leotychides should accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred obligation of restoring a deposit. They justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone. But they probably recollected that the hostages were placed with them less as a deposit than as a security against Æginetan hostility—which security they were not disposed to forego.

Leotychides having been obliged to retire without success, the

Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves. They waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at Sunium; on which occasion a ship, peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theors or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know. But the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and Ægina, beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B.C., and lasting until 481 B.C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island. Having been before banished (as he thought unjustly), he now organized a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan. Accordingly on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the seashore, less protected though more convenient. But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing. He was obliged to make his escape from the island, after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans; a large body of whom, 706 in number, fell into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone among these prisoners burst his chains, fled to the sanctuary of Demeter Thesmophorus, and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp. His pursuers did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the 700 prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the Æginetan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or censure from their contemporaries. But the violation of sanctuary, in the case of that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess Demeter never forgave. More than fifty years afterward, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Æginetans, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgment upon them for this ancient impiety, which half a century of continued expiatory sacrifice had not been sufficient to wipe out.

The Athenians who were to have assisted Nikodromus arrived at Ægina one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition to fifty of their own: with these seventy sail they defeated the

Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number—and then landed on the island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the defeat sustained from the Spartan Kleomenes, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers, under a distinguished champion of the pentathlon named Eurybates, came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the Athenian armament.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. The general of the latter, Eurybates, confiding in his great personal strength and skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single combat. He slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth, Sophanes of Dekeleia, was victorious, and proved fatal to him. At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides—in which Nikodromus and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sunium, took an active part; the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerted with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency toward maritime activity, which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in a preceding chapter. Miltiades, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristeides and Themistokles became the chief men at Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions insured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival, Themistokles, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into co-operation. The rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and menacing that even Aristeides himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise they would cast both of us into the barathrum." Under such circumstances it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism, the true character of which I have already explained. After three or four years of continued political

rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristeides was banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was the important change of policy above alluded to—the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power—the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistokles. On that account, if for no other reason, Aristeides would probably be found opposed to it: but it was moreover a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life, and narrow range of active duty and experience—which Aristeides seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas, and the quickness of his intelligence. The land-service was a type of steadiness and inflexible ranks; the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers: though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman. His training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete, than that of the Athenian hoplite or horseman: a training beginning with Themistokles, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistokles displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time for which Thucydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristeides, though the honester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbor—but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased thirst for revenge; and Themistokles knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon; against which the best defense would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistokles, who now prevailed upon his

countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia. Not only were 200 new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen—but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistokles was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbor for Athens at Peiræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalerum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus with its three separate natural ports, admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus—that the Æginetan "war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power." The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organization of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes at his first accession toward Hellenic matters—postponed until 480 B.C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B.C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built—a considerable amount of public money—was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not very far from the promontory of Sunium, amid a district of low hills which extended across much of the space between the eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Anaphlystus. At what time they first began to be worked, we have no information; but it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result, until after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratic constitution of Kleisthenes. Neither the strong local factions, by which different portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of Peisistratus—nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons—were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the democracy of Kleisthenes first brought Attica into one systematic and comprehensive whole, with equal rights assigned to each part, and with a common center at Athens—the power of that central government over the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people to respect agreements concluded with individual undertakers, would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was

the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies; on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the time when Themistokles made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens—ten drachmas to each man. This great amount in hand must probably have been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have been accumulated during many successive years. New and enlarged enterprises in mines must be supposed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the government: otherwise there could hardly have been at the moment so overflowing an exchequer, or adequate means for the special distribution contemplated. Themistokles availed himself of this precious opportunity—set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina, and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia—and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy. One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution; insomuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Immense indeed was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper; especially the vast labor bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition. The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance. Other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without mischief; so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds dispatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the

different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defense. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle; while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organizing resistance against the expected invader.

I have in the preceding chapters pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-hellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Poloponnesian states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: moreover it seeks to combine every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it—even the Kretans, Korkyræans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states do not actually come,—but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come. The dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are entreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose—the defense of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas alike to anything which has gone before—enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage—and thus introducing increased habits of co-operation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralizing tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realized.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of *medising* (i.e., embracing the cause of the Persians), which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius. But her present conduct afforded no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defense and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with Athens. In this work of reconcil-

ing feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistokles took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of Tegea in Arcadia. The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit co-operation from such cities as were yet either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan and Sicilian Greeks; and at the same time to dispatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected, and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous—Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and, indeed, something more than human. Of course, such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace the manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonike, when she at once exclaimed—"Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten; fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only *your* city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods—which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow."

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here as elsewhere the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: "O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here, until death." Upon which the priestess replied—"Athene with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot

propitiate Olympian Zeus. But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant. When everything else in the land of Kekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athene that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest."

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first. It left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark, and unintelligible: and the envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing probably the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by "the wooden wall?" Some supposed that the acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out; but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica forever. The last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat.

Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will. It harmonized completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle. Emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistokles, the great originator of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to insure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as "wretched Salamis:" but the fact that it was termed "divine Salamis," indicated that the parties destined to perish there were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen, therefore, to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board. Great, indeed, were the consequences which turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers: nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real savior of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired by most of the Grecian states—he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologizes for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence. Not only did the Athenians dare to stay and fight against immense odds: they, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed, as will appear farther in the sequel.

But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognize some one commanding city. With regard to the land-force, no one dreamt of contesting the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honor of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force at this moment of peril would be compromised. To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of pre-eminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character; a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honor and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance—prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive—furnishing two-thirds of the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last moment—sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into

united action. Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or were at least lukewarm in the cause of independence: so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Platæans fifty-three ears afterward) was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.

Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, setting forth the common danger and soliciting co-operation. The result is certain, that no co-operation was obtained—the Argeians did nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle—exacting only as conditions that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honors of headship with Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the headship. But the Spartans added, that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians (who considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their ancient right) as nothing better than insolent encroachment, and incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their territory before sunset; preferring even a tributary existence under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.

Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks, or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding with Xerxes. It was even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection to themselves and of vengeance against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenes. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they *medised*, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards. It is certain that in act the Argeians were neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was, that they did not choose to join any Pan-hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs. But probably the more powerful reason was, that they shared the impression, then so widely diffused throughout Greece, as to the irresistible force of the approaching host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending. Nor is it improbable, in

their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be termed, *medising*.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Krete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle; the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round Cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretense of being weather-bound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence. Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies.

The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelon the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defense of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.

The endeavors of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other re-enforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Korkyræans. It was about the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen—yet it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted The Aleuadæ were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peisistratidæ: while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxes—for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus, intimating the necessity of guarding

the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defense, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly a body of 10,000 Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistokles, were dispatched by the sea to Alus in Achæa Phthiotis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly. Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempe, through which the river Peneius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempe formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from Lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly. The lofty mountain precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host. But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold,—first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from Upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defile of Tempe begins to narrow. It was in fact by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempe, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander king of Macedon, tributary to them and active in their service. That prince sent a communication of the fact to the Greeks at Tempe, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position. He passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such, in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter. On the present occasion the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempe, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying or seeming to justify the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempe, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the Isthmus of Corinth—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of Mount Kithæron and of the Megarid territory without defense, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states, north of that boundary, to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them had already begun to do before. When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thermaic Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name—the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænianes, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Lokrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiotid Achæans, and Bœotians. Among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Platæa. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Aleuadæ, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempe and arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defense was yet thoroughly organized; for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus, that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.

CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign punishment; to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favor of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity. Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed. It was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies. The pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defense, next to that of Tempe —leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians,

Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Phthiotid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænianes, Malians, etc., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempe; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between Mount Knemis and Cape Kenæum. On the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Phthiotis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium; a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous feature, belonging to the town of Histiæa. It was arranged that the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to co-operate with the land force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space was supposed favorable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number and heavier in sailing than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa to the north and west from the mainland, and which, between Chalkis and Bœotia, becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defense; but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what was then called the Maliac Gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured itself—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Othrys to the north, and Mounta Œta to the south—near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiotis: the southernmost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—enclosed between Mount Œta and the sea. From Trachis the range of Œta stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Maliac Gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylæ. On the road from Trachis to Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of the little streams called the Phœnix and the Asopus, was placed the town of Anthela, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic Demeter, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

Immediately near to Anthela, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of Œta approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow

entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ. At some little distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated—thus forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first town of the Lokrians, called Alpeni. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which procured for the place the appellation of Chytri or the Pans: but the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud, and deposited its crust over all the adjacent ground; and the Phokians, some time before, had designedly endeavored so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs here, as in other parts of Greece, were consecrated to Herakles, whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding region—Mount Œta, Trachis, Cape Kenæum, the Lichades islands, the river Dyras. Some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and adorned by the genius of Sophokles, in his drama of the Trachinian Maidens.

Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates; or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit: while at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of Mount Œta was steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into Lokris and the territories south-east of Œta, only through the straight gate; save and except an unfrequented as well as circuitous mountain path which will be presently noticed. The wall originally built across the path by the Phokians was now half ruined by age and neglect; but the Greeks easily re-establishing it, determined to wait in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Tempe—the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing; but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpeni was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.

Though a general resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been taken seemingly not long after the retreat from Tempe, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these

positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermaic Gulf. Both were then put in motion: the land force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiades, apparently about the latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenes, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenes, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of 300 Spartans—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places. Along with them were 200 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantineia, 120 from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 1000 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 200 from Philus, and 80 from Mykenæ. There were also doubtless Helots and other light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Bœotia they were joined by 700 hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in the cause, and by 400 Thebans of more equivocal fidelity under Leontiades. It appears, indeed, that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly *medised*, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defense of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of 400 men, chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed, the Theban people and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of Thespiæ and Platæa, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phokians and the Lokrians of Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken probably only from fear, which at this particular moment prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious: while the Phokians, if originally disposed to *medise*, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies, the Thessalians, were active in the cause of Xerxes, and influential in guiding his movements. The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encouragements in their power. "The troops now at Thermopylæ (they said) were a mere advanced body, preced-

ing the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already on guard. Moreover, there was no cause for fear, since the invader was, after all, not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in pre-eminent condition." Such arguments prove but too evidently the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind. Whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian Lokrians, and 1000 Phokians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the Greek character —it was the time of celebrating the Olympic festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states. Even at a moment when their whole freedom and existence were at stake, the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks, among whom this force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenes, when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall find them, too, postponing the military necessities of the state to the complete and splendid fulfillment of their religious festival obligations—starving all their measures of foreign policy in order that the Theoric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates, remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath. The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas, with his detachment, would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force. They engaged to assemble in Bœotia for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain path starting from the neighborhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asopus and the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Œta and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of

Alpeni. This path—then hardly used, though its ascending half now serves as the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the Corinthian Gulf, the ancient Amphissa—was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who, in former days, had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phokis, after the Phokians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phokians: it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and defend it. But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defense, for the mountain path as well as for the defile, as that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempe; and so insufficient did their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them. The Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defense at the Isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phokians and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements. So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisium, on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiades. It was composed as follows:—100 Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Platæa, in spite of their total want of practice on shipboard, 40 Corinthian, 20 Megarian, 20 Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis and lent to them by Athens, 18 Æginetan, 12 Sikyonian, 10 Lacedæmonian, 8 Epidaurian, 7 Eretrian, 5 Trœzenian, 2 from Styris in Eubœa, and 2 from the island of Keos. There were thus in all 271 triremes; together with 9 pentekonters, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus. Themistokles was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adeimanthus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing. Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan, and a Trœzenian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to

Athens, leaving the vessels to the enemy: the other two ships were overtaken and captured afloat—not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites, Pythes, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.

On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship's head and slain, as a presaging omen in the approaching contest: perhaps (observes the historian) his name may have contributed to determine his fate. The ten Persian ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmex, between Skiathos and the main-land, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence, communicated by fire signals from Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out ships, inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand. They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the narrowest and most defensible passage, leaving scouts on the high lands to watch the enemy's advance.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by the panic of their troops, similar to that which King Leonidas, more powerful than Eurybiades and Themistokles, had found means to arrest at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the whole scheme of defense, by laying open the rear of the army at Thermopylæ to the operations of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host, land force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend with. Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece, the Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by announcing that divine succor was at hand. On entreating advice from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover, the Athenian seamen, in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their ancient king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for his help in need. Never was help

more effective, or more opportune, than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at Delphi.

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic Gulf for several days, employing a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods, and clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from Upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as preferable to the defile of Tempe. Not intending to march through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake. His march from Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiotis, into the territory of the Malians and the neighborhood of Thermopylæ, occupied eleven or twelve days: the people through whose towns he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host was still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that the river Onochonus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achæa Phthiotis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up, according to the information given to Herodotus, At Alus in Achæa, he condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with the temple of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family. He respected and protected these sacred places: an incident which shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Miletus, etc., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious feeling. Along the shore of the Malian Gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine his farther movements in advance, now that the enemy were immediately in his front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned (which captured the three Grecian guard-ships) that the channel between Skiathos and the main-land was safe, the Persian admiral Magabates sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna, his station in the Thermaic Gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his land march; and reached in one long day's sail the eastern coast of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable; but south of the town called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the Sepias Akte. The first line of ships were moored to the land, but

the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane—a wind called by the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as of property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defense, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers. Though the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in prayer and sacrifice—not merely to the Winds but also to Thetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sepias Akte—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day: thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length on the fourth day calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia to Aphetæ at the entrance of the Gulf of Pagasæ. Little indeed had Xerxes gained by the laborious cutting through Mount Athos, in hopes to escape the unseen atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory; the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land-army, and would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen ships of that fleet having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Sandokes, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kyme—Aridolis, despot of

Alabanda in Karia—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus—the leaders of this squadron, were sent prisoners to the Isthmus of Corinth, after having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself aboard.

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered four days to pass without making any attack. A probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different cause. Xerxes could not believe (according to him) that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist. He had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under a Herakleid leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman—whom he sent to reconnoiter them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without exciting any attention among them by his presence—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defense, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more astonished and puzzled. It happened, too, that at the moment when this horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such madness: upon which the latter reminded him of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the smallness of their number, and adding, that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes—Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wroth at the impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality. We rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Crœsus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable.

The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied—an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus that the Lokrians, when they first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides of Xerxes, together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Tempe. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet meanwhile would be arrived at Alphetæ after the dangers of the storm. We may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon, manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as armor. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading shields, steady ranks, and practiced fighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favor, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves, and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even the Immortals, or 10,000 choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him: "Thrice (says the historian, with Homeric vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army."

At the end of two days' fighting no impression had been made. The pass appeared impracticable, and the defense not less triumphant than courageous—when a Malian named Ephialtes revealed to Xerxes the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was

the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer of the fatal secret. After the final repulse of the Persians he fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the Amphiktyonic assembly for his head; having returned to his country too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians honored as a patriot. There were, however, other Greeks who were also affirmed to have earned the favor of Xerxes by the same valuable information; and very probably there may have been more than one informant—indeed the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already occupied by the Phokians. At nightfall Hydarnes with a detachment of Persians proceeded along the gorge of the river Asopus, ascended the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Œtæans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the Phokian guard of 1000 men. In the stillness of daybreak the noise of his army trampling through the wood aroused the defenders; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnes in alarm asked his guides whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Phokians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain. Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.

Hydarnes, not troubling himself to pursue the Phokians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday. But before he had yet completed his descent the fatal truth had already been made known to Leonidas that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, especially a Kymæan named Tyrastiadas, had both come in with the news. And even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended. There was, however, ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the

circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honor, together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself, forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or die in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority of number on the part of the enemy: moreover, we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king of Sparta, must fall victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed; while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

The 300 Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment: but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension. The same order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who, however, refused to obey it and staid, though he sent away his only son. None of the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the Theban. The former, under their general, Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint which arises from the necessity of acting up to a pre-established fame and superiority. But retreat to them presented no prospect better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by the invaders; while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the Isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent we are much perplexed; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having staid along with the Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebans. All things considered, it seems probable that the Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer—being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Peloponnesians than to remain, suspected as they were of *medism*. But when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavored to save their lives by taking credit for *medism*, and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ consisted of the 300 Spartans, with a certain number of Helots attending them, together with 700 Thespians and apparently 400 Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedæmonians (not Spartans) present, they must have retired with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide Ephialtes, Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnes might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive, but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighboring sea and morass, and even trodden down by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat altogether on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnes, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades—300 Spartans and 700 Thespians. Amid such equal heroism, it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished: nevertheless Herodotus mentions the Spartan Dienekes, Alpheus, and Maron—and the Thespian Dithyrambus—as standing pre-eminent. The reply ascribed to the first became renowned. "The Persian host (he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the sun." "So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them in the shade." Herodotus had asked and learnt the name of every individual among this memorable three hundred. And even six hundred years afterward, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on a column at Sparta. One alone among them—Aristodemus—returned home, having taken

no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus, another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and both were lying at Alpeni suffering from a severe complaint in the eyes. Eurytus, apprised that the fatal hour of the detachment was come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armor, and desired his attendant Helot to lead him to his place, in the ranks; where he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed and survived. Aristodemus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade: overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens. He was denounced as "the coward Aristodemus;" no one would speak or communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire. After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honor at the battle of Platæa, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valor.

Amid the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thespians, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with outstretched hands and entreated quarter. They now loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylæ against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy slaves—an indignity to which their commander Leontiades was compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Bœotian author, who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiades, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ. Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind. He was farther impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible. He now learnt to be anxious respecting the farther resistance which remained behind. "Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions

have turned out true: now tell me how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?" "O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is great; in Sparta alone there are 8,000 adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers." "Tell me (rejoined Xerxes), what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?" Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythera, and from thence to make war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from co-operating in any combined scheme of defense against his land-force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes the brother of Xerxes interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action; not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who (he affirmed) like other Greeks, hated all power, and envied all good fortune above his own. The fleet (added he), after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminuition of number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and co-operating mass.

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number. Yet while rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent storm; and that on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still mustering an overwhelming number at the opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiades to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe and was refused. He was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their

envoy Pelagon to Themistokles with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defense of the island. Themistokles employed the money adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiades, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs. The most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillized, by a present of three talents.

However Plutarch may be scandalized at such inglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery here described. But Themistokles doubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money, that which he would have wished, and had probably tried, to accomplish, without the money—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defense, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet; and the Greeks could not expect any more favorable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that Themistokles, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium. But his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome—yet still more welcome to him, perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral. It was finally determined therefore to remain, and if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait; but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles (says Herodotus) they would have packed up and removed long before; for a text of Bakis gave them express warning: but having neglected the sacred writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the Greek fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape. Accordingly they detached 200 ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear of the Greeks; postponing their own attack in front until this

squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the maneuver was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter—Skyllias of Skione. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both particulars of the late destructive storm, and the dispatch of the intercepting squadron.

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of 200 ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistokles, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ. Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet handled and maneuvered their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained. Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries. To both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshaled in a circle, with their sterns in the interior, and presenting their prows in front, at all points of the circumference. In this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them: but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them: in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus, despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who, however, rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks. But the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station; the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to Artemisium.

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties, and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on

the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sepias Akte, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril; the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island (called the Hollows of Eubœa), were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who re-enforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such such insults—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half-moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of valor among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments—still they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total: and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one half of their number out of condition to renew it. The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders—and Themistokles, as it seems, among them—determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force farther into Greece: though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistokles to give them convoy for their boats and their persons; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks

were thus employed in organizing their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abronychus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistokles, conducting the latter, staid long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe, on some neighboring stones, invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes; whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible—or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistokles hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus to diminish their efficiency. With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histiæa to the Persians at Aphetæ, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiæa and the neighboring territory; from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except 1,000 whose bodies were left out—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylæ, 4,000 in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover the bodies of the slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few. According to the statement of Herodotus, 20,000 men were slain on the side of the Persians—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they wore little defensive armor, and that they were three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as 4,000: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the 300 Spartans, the 700 Thespians, and the 400 Thebans. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days' battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defense of the pass seems to have been about 7,000: but the

epigram composed shortly afterward and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast that 4,000 warriors "from Peloponnesus had here fought with 300 myriads or 3,000,000 of enemies." Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of 4,000 warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of merit fully equal; especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan dead separately: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here, in obedience to their orders." On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honor of Leonidas; decorated apparently with an epigram by the poet Simonides. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ: besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, "who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs."

CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant. It was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion; the season of the festival-games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken. Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations—and what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss

sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians, and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Platæa, now joined him. Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader Attaginus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns, as well to protect them from plunder as to insure their fidelity. The Thespians on the other hand abandoned their city and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Platæans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium, were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city and removing their families. It was not only the land force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened. His fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades—so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sepias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him: a reproach true almost to the letter. It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the Isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them. Thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of 10,000 each) working and bringing materials night and day. As a defense to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position; they considered it as their last chance, abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes, while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus arose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ; no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the sepa-

rate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, that there would be a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to co-operate in the defense of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property. But they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defense of their own isthmus and their own separate existence. The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbor of Trœzen, there to await such re-enforcements as could be got together; but the Athenians entreated Eurybiades to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiades was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.

Meanwhile Themistokles and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalerum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion, and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Oropus, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where, indeed, he might have arrived even sooner. The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind of reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens) —but in part also to Ægina: there were, however, many who could not or would not go farther than Salamis. Themistokles impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athene Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was

placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched; the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the acropolis, and it behoved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution.

The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city. Some few individuals, too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere—confiding, moreover in their own interpretation of the wooden wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades. When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterward, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens, lost their energy: arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended; Themistokles proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover he not only included, but even specially designated among them, his own great opponent Aristeides, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiades, were partners in the same emigration. The latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback. It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles, but still more for the equipment of the fleet: yet there were no funds in the public treasury. But the senate of Areiopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others, and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resource of Themistokles, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon's head from the statue of

Athene was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying away, available to the public service. By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners. Moreover the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of 366 ships—a force greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than 200 were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakia and as many from Eretria, five from Trœzen, three from Hermione, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, dispatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games. The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force (358 ships) collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Lade, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt, however, whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterward at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of 300 sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted country; his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalerum with the coast adjoining. His land force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylæ; and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was nothing more than a wreath of the wild olive, Tritan-

tæchmes son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders—"Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honor!" Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phokians disposed to refuse submission; and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favorable terms. Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to insure lenient treatment to the territory of Phokis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them. The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which *medised* and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephisus, among the towns of the inflexible Phokians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phokian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders. Even Abæ, with its temple and oracle of Apollo, was no better treated than the rest; all the sacred treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Platæa; both of them had been deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi. Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Crœsus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus and for their families by transport across the gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to

take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Akeratus, the religious superior; but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schiste up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athene Pronæa,—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard—two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athene. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also (as they themselves affirmed) by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the heroes Phylakus and Autonoüs, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus himself, when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athene the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians. Thus did the god repel these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which remained inviolate until 130 years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of the Phokian Philomelus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis and Platæa.

Four months had elapsed, since the departure from Asia, when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain—and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him; nor could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender. The Athenian acropolis—a craggy rock rising abruptly about 150 feet with a flat summit of about 1000 feet long from east to west, by 500 feet broad from north to south—had no practicable access except on the western side: moreover in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obliged to take the place by force, the Persian army were posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the northwest, called Areopagus: from whence they bombarded (if we may venture upon the expression) with hot missiles the wood-work before the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to

the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time, the great king seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified: moreover the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party were enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison; who deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames. The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately dispatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting seemingly the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus. On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground. They discovered that the sacred olive tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the especial gift of the goddess Athene, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long: at least the piety of restored Athens afterward believed this encouraging portent, as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus (an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids) in the Thriasian plan. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. Yet whatever may have been received in

after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city; not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigor. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalerum, re-enforced by ships from Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sepias Akte; an estimate certainly not admissible.

Soon after their arrival Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the King of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favor of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis—predicting that if the land force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return to the protection of their own homes, and that thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island —and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That Queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested. But I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia; an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just—though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote, and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterward. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly; though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon. Orders were accordingly issued for the fleet to attack the next day, and for the land force to move forward toward Peloponnesus.

Whilst, on the shore of Phalerum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation—great indeed was the contrast presented by the neighboring Greek armament at Salamis; among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiades convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the Isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore and the men would join in land service—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be enclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape. In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians. Such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority came to a formal vote for removing to the Isthmus; but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs—the Corinthians in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favorable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contignents of each would immediately retire for the defense of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one

body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermione, &c., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiades to keep them together. Hence the order of quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defense: and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also lead by their own separate safety to cling to the defense of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistokles, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistokles returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron—he found an Athenian friend named Mnesiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnesiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistokles. On learning what had been resolved, Mnesiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for. He vehemently urged Themistokles again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote in favor of retreat, as well as for a positive resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistokles had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but though he was disheartened by ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiades, asked permission to speak to him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiades alone, Themistokles was enable to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiades had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistokles addressed himself to each of the chiefs separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying—"Themistokles, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged." "True (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns."

Eurybiades then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistokles began the debate. He vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus—as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina; contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defense of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus; whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Moreover, he did not omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs; who were even exasperated at being again summoned, to reopen a debate already concluded,—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistokles, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent—Athens being in the power of the enemy. Nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiades had no right to count the vote of Themistokles until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus. It provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistokles, who reminded them that while he had around him 200 well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiades, and addressing him personally, he said—"If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well; but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin. For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying."

Eurybiades had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistokles. But this last downright menace clinched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without

the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution, and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling. The succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistokles, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messenger from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their cross-wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were *they* not there also, to join hands and to help in the defense,—even if worsted at sea,—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defense of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiades: at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked. Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamoring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians were equally urgent in favor of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistokles that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiades; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defense, appeared imminent—when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he dispatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals, Sikinnus his slave—seemingly an Asiatic Greek who understood Persian and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master—was instructed to acquaint them privately in the name of Themistokles, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity (it was added) was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail

themselves of it without delay, first to inclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.

Such was the important communication dispatched by Themistokles across the narrow strait (only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part) which divides Salamis from the neighboring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honor from it in the eyes of the Greeks as a stratagem, Themistokles lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days, as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch. It is not improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night, to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape. The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica—its headquarters were in the bay of Phalerum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbors, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus—and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalerum; while the Greek fleet was in the harbor of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing Mount Ægaleos in Attica. During the night, a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbor of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis; while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the south-eastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia near to that corner. These measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbor, the next morning.

Meanwhile that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistokles had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote, until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible. Such prolongation was nowise difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side, and

that of naval force on the other—especially as Eurybiades himself was favorable to the view of Themistokles. Accordingly the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning—when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. The ostracized Aristeides arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence—a revocation proposed by Themistokles himself—he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel in coming from Ægina had only eluded under favor of night. He caused Themistokles to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs; and after a generous exordium wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprised him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus, and rendered farther debate useless. Themistokles expressed his joy at the intelligence; communicating his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis even against their own consent. He, moreover, desired Aristeides to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news; for if it came from the lips of Themistokles, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate, indeed, was their incredulity that they would not accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeides: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.

Having caused his land force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of Mount Ægaleos—near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea—from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valor: moreover, his royal scribes stood ready by his side to record the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phœnicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians—approaching from the side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on

ship-board all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position; while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistokles and the other leaders. Just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the trireme which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æakus with the other Æakid heroes. Honored with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack, with the usual pæan or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians. Indeed, the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight. The Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate—and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore; until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet—"Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?" The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle. The brave Athenian captains Ameinias and Lykomedes (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardor; though, according to the version current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid heroes, which first set this honorable example. The Naxian Demokritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phœnician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general.

Herodotus, with his usual candor, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom (apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge) were lukewarm, and some even averse—the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phenicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behavior. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they

had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion and caused them to run foul of each other. Those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance: the oar-blades were broken by collision—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalerum: Demokritus, the Naxian captain, was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral Ariabignes, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared the his fate was very great; the more so, as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand.

It appears that the Phœnician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down byaan Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phenicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off. His wrath and vexation (Herodotus tells us) were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent the feelings.

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable. She then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she charged the

trireme of the Karian prince Damasithymus of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit—for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a female invader assailing their city. But knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognized the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him: "Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?" Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied: "My men have become women; my women, men." Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships; among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia. As soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeides carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves—immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies—made ready for a second engagement. But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and distrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations—Phenicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphilians, Ionic Greeks, etc., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well-suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service

except fear; while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects. He fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube. Against the Phenicians, from whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward. Such a capital desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalerum in the night—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board. They were directed to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes dispatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch: it was farther imbittered by anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general new full well that there was no safety for him in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head. It was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently pala table to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly he began to reassure his master by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phenicians, Egyptians, etc., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army, if he were disposed, and that he (Mardonius) would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of 300,000 chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person. His confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had

every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of farther service. "If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked contemptuously) by all means let him have the troops· should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer; should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, while adopting this counsel and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen by intrusting to her some of his children, with directions to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learnt with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalerum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistokles and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiades and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistokles readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he (Themistokles) had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontic bridge—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat. Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistokles fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingencies.

Such crafty maneuvers, and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested—since Themistokles lived to claim as well as to receive fulfillment of the obligation thus conferred. Though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistokles knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover, a clever man tainted with such constant guilt might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persians. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that "Athens was a great city and blest with excellent gods: but that *they* were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island—Poverty and Helplessness. In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability." While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistokles sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals, but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence the fleet was brought back to Salamis.

The intimation sent by Themistokles perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained the Persians, Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents; making in all, according to Herodotus, 300,000 men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as 60,000 out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to winter in Thessaly, and to postpone farther military operations until the ensuing spring.

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat a plentiful stock of stories were circulated—inconsistent with each other, fanciful, and even incredible. Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal, delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow; magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the super-human pride of the advance, and illustrating that antithesis with unbounded license of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing. The magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed—an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food.

Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After forty-five days' march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him. But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdera still showed the gilt scimitar and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction. They even went the length of affirming that never since his departure from Attica had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader! who re-entered Sardis with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it as the presumed conqueror of the western world.

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed. At the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phenician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athene at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the Isthmus of Corinth. Farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honor was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenes and Ameinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants. Respecting the behavior of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavorable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a

battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable. Yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus son of Adeimantus was among the most efficient enemies of the former.

Besides the first and second prizes of valor, the chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistokles had a large majority of votes for the second. The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistokles was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly after to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honors such as were never paid before nor afterward, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiades as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistokles as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the city afforded. Moreover on his departure, the 300 select youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honor to the frontiers of Tegea. Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immoveable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistokles should be offended by being deprived of the general prize: and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was displaced from his place of general, to which Xanthippus was nominated. Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus. The fact that Xanthippus became general of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in regular course of the Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistokles.

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE.—FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

THOUGH the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kyme and Samos; in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomestor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theomestor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection. Early in the spring they were reassembled—to the number of 400 sail, but without the Phenicians—at the naval station of Samos, intending however only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of 110 ships, under the Spartan king Leotychides, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, dispatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychides to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the eastern waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Herakles: not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared, fifty-two years afterward, to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadæ, and the Bœotian leaders, still remained in hearty co-operation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phokians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallene, as well as the neighboring towns in the long tongue of Pallene, declared themselves independent: and the neighboring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks under Critobulus of Torone. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterward a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defense of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallene. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skionæan auxiliaries

in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breath of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallenæan peninsula to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius in Thessaly.

Mardonius, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Bœotia and Phokis. He sent a Karian named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophonius at Lebadeia, Amphiaraus, and the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at Mount Ptoon near Akræphiæ, and Apollo at the Phokian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect toward the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent. But neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public. The only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard, was, that the priests of the Ptoian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself. It appears, however, that at this period, when Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus. The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens—Alexander king of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers—to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King—and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance. The Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them as a sincere friend to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honorable: especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defense as Peloponnesus was protected by its Isthmus.

This offer, dispatched in the spring, found the Athenians re-established wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if dispatched by Xerxes from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have gone far to detach them from the cause of Hellas: and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would insure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens her-

self protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing a winning game: while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer together with the seed of the past autumn. The prudential view of the case being thus favorable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned in Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succor during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: "Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours: we too know *that*, as well as thou: but we nevertheless love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defense, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burnt. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands."

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor; protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprised that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to assist in the defense of Attica. The Spartan envoys, promising fulfillment of this request, and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants and the frequent theme of applause by their orators. But among

the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference toward all Greeks outside of their own isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing and on which they had relied for drotection against the land force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defense was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defense and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Bœotia and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius. Indeed their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died. Besides these two reasons—indifference and unfavorable omens—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object (says the historian) to fulfill "the exigences of the god." As the Olympia and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia prevail over the necessities of defense, putting out of sight qoth the duties of fidelity toward an exposed ally and the bond of an express promise.

Meanwhile Mardonius, informed of the unfavorable reception which his proposals had received in Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavored to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice. About ten months after the retreat of Xerxes he entered the country without resistance, and again established the Persian headquarters in Athens (May or June—479 B.C.).

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfillment of the Spartan promise that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Bœotia for the defense of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis. The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them. But it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Platæa two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and dispatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon. He thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage as an additional temptation. Murychides, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal not less resolute than what had been returned to Alexander of Macedon, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lydikas, made an exception to this unanimity, venturing to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychides. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death; while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor; unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings. Murychides, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys conjointly with Megara and Platæa, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica; not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the Spartan Ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the meantime they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the Isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer —such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus—had not a Tegean named Chileos, whom they much esteemed and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defense of Peloponnesus, if the

Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea.

The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the Ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies; and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; so that they dispatched forth within the night 5,000 Spartan citizens to the Isthmus—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification—the Ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory. Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise—the Ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter; who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theater of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to 5,000 being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: 5,000 Lacedæmonian Periœki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also dispatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders. If they ever made such a promise, the suddenness of the march, as well as the greatness of the force, prevented them from fulfilling it, and may perhaps have been so intended by the Ephors, under the apprehension that resistance might possibly be offered by the Argeians. At any rate, the latter were forced to content themselves with apprising Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Bœotia—a country in every way more favorable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians

might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of 1000 Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara, he withdrew all his army into Bœotia, not taking either the stratght road to Platæa, through Eleutheræ, or to Thebes through Phyle, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the north-easterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asopus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself after a route longer but easier, in Bœotia, on the plain of the Asopus; along which river he next day marched westward to Skolus, a town in the territory of Thebes seemingly near to that of Platæa. He then took up a position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asopus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his center over against Hysiæ, and his right in the territory of Platæa: and he employed his army in constructing a fortified camp of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favorable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible—the fortified city of Thebes in his rear—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success: even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries.

A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attaginus invited Mardonius, along with fifty Persian and fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterward recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present—an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted in Greek by his Persian neighbor, who inquired to what city he belonged; and upon learning that he was an Orchomenian, continued thus: "Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions; the rather in order that thou mayest be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these thou shalt behold but few surviving." Thersander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied—"Surely thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers:" but the Persian rejoined—"My friend, man cannot avert that which

God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings—to be full of knowledge and at the same time to have no power over any result."—"This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him even before the battle of Platæa." It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign—but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack, but jealous of his superior. Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phokians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of 1000 hoplites, under Harmokydes, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phokians even remained behind in the neighborhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavorable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he brought up his numerous cavalry all around them; while the Pheme, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phokians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down. The general Harmokydes, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins—when the cavalry rode up apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phokians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phokians on their

courage, and to assure them by means of a herald that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them. He at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behavior should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain—difficult as the supposition is to entertain—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phokians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tega, 1500; from Corinth, 5,000, besides a small body of 300 from the Corinthian colony of Potidæ; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 600; from Sikyon, 3,000; from Epidaurus, 800; from Trœzen, 1000; from Lepreon, 200; from Mykenæ and Tiryns, 400; from Phlius, 1000; from Hermione, 300; from Eretria and Styra, 600; from Chalkis, 400; from Ambrakia, 500; from Leukas and Anaktorium, 800; from Pale in Kephallenia, 200; from Ægina, 500. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up 3,000 Megarian hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of 8,000 Athenian hoplites, and 600 Platæan, under Aristeides, who passed over from Salamis. The total force of hoplites or heavy-armed troops was thus 38,700 men. There were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen—but if we add those who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armor—the grand total was not less than 110,000 men. Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5,000 Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attendance on the other hoplites; together with 1800 Thespians who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Platæa, which took place some little time afterward. But it seemed that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis. At Eleusis as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then

advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupy the line of the Asopus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, dispatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach; but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain. So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially 300 chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general Masistius—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armor, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in his side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defenses of his helmet and breastplate, however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass, to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a while to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailing so loud as to echo over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand,

overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart and paraded it round the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions.

So much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiæ, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Platæan territory along the Asopus and on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia, and their left wing near the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Platæan hero Androkrates. In this position they were marshaled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post which, as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens. In the field even Lacedæmonians followed those democratic forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

Mardonius, apprised of this change of position, marched his army also a little further to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asopus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the center; and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at 50,000: nor can we place any confidence in the total of 300,000 which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asopus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic families in Elis—the latter invited one from Leukas. All received large pay,

and the prophet of Pausanias had, indeed, been honored with a recompense above all pay—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices: favorable for resistance if attacked—unfavorable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Platæa had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asopus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed by Aristeides, with a hand at once gentle and decisive.

The annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant. Their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asopus, prevented the Greeks from using the river for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position, near the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover, the Theban leader Timegenidas, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful. A train of 500 beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp; so that it became unsafe for any further convoys to approach the Greeks. Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed this maneuver; which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith. In vain did Artabazus endeavor to dissuade him from the step; taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian

army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them. He recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned; so as to allow time of distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persians as well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected to arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of unfavorable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent; some did not know the prophecies, but others (Herodotus intimates) knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said: "Since ye either do not know, or will not tell, I who know well will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterward all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it; on that ground, therefore, we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye, therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians—we shall get the better of the Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies sunk into men's minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus knew (though he does not cite it) the particular prophecy to which Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone, that it had no reference to the Persians; it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis (from whom he quotes four lines) and Musæus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermodon and Asopus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out; it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise; but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander, king of Macedon, who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aris-

teides and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit; he apprised them that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favorable sacrifices, but was nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. "Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he), remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke; I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved."

The communication of this important message, made by Aristeides to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. "We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar." The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed. It was not yet quite completed, when day broke and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians; upon which Pausanias, seeing that his maneuver had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well-calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized. It is at the same time no mean compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops—a reputation recognized by Herodotus, and well-sustained at least by their personal bravery. Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style, casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a "single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians." This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by

the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter (as has been before stated) had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asopus, this fountain has been of late the only watering-place; and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable—while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them.

In this dilemma Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent. After an anxious debate, the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the Island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Platæa, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant. This island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroe; both of which flow from Kithæron, and after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a north-westerly direction towards one of the recesses of the Gulf of Corinth—quite distinct from the Asopus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When encamped in this so-called island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asopus. It was farther resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march was to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack. But his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering; insomuch that the center of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, etc., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour

arrived for retiring to the island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Platæa, and took up a position in front of the Heræum or temple of Here, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (i.e., between the course of Asopus and that of the Oeroe), there appear to have been a range of low hills. The Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side. Pausanias, apprised that the divisions of the center had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honor of a Spartan: nevertheless most of the taxiarchs or leaders of companies obeyed without murmuring, but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana, obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring "that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner." Pausanias, with the second in command Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance. But they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions. For in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised. The movement of the central division having become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behavior of the Spartans toward Athens, is visible in this proceeding; yet it proved fortunate in its results—for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the Island, the Grecian army would have been

severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus, who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying—"This is *my* pebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run away from the strangers." Pausanias denounced him as a madman—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the meantime the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the Island, he commanded a halt; either to await Amompharetus if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Demeter. The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march toward the Island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians, on the contrary, marching without halt, and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuadæ—"These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth!" With that he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asopus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush

forward: but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appeared to have maintained somewhat better order.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighborhood of the Demetrion or temple of Eleusinian Demeter, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprise the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. The Athenians were prompt in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him. Accordingly the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans had to encounter the Persians single-handed without any assistance from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha (or long wicker shields), forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows: their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle-sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavorable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks, among them the brave Kallikrates, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Platæans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Here to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favorable: but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge and having no defensive armor, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks. They threw themselves upon the Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger. Mardonius, himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Aeimnestus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn

out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp, constructed by Mardonius behind the Asopus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of 300 of their best troops. The Theban cavalry however still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp. With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other *medising* Greeks rendered any real service. Instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that in point of fact the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were, the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right; the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of 40,000 men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprised that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marched his division and led them out toward the scene of action, though despairing of success and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be proved false. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to insure the concerted action of his whole army. Accordingly before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat; not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phokis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned

that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Platæa instead of to the island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle was, that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honor, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order: the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians, and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills, and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asopodorus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously and drove them back, to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of 600 men. But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the general defeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of the defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterward exhibited in their temple of Athene Alea—while his silver-footed throne, and scimitar, were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only 3,000 men out of the 300,000 which had composed the army of Mardonius—save and except the 40,000 men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.

Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports without any pretense of computation: about the Grecian loss his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein however is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified: while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than 1360 Greeks were slain in the action appears probable: all doubtless hoplites—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any

active part in the battle. Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery, while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. The general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (thought it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other *medising* Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia. The interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterward Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast. It will be seen that Artabazus subsequently rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians, and the Phliasians each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikrates—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians—and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighborhood of Platæa by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honor, with the connivance and aid of the Platæans. The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas. On the morrow the body was stolen away and buried; by whom was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntes, the son of Mardonius. The funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of Pausanias.

The spoil was rich and multifarous—gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, etc., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included. By order of the

general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers. The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed: there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetorides of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandates; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father. Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platæan inhabitants afterward discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Platæa were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Tegeans. The Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognized, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece. It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantineia, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius—the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the *medising* leaders should be delivered up, especially Timegenidas and Attaginus. On receiving a refusal, he begun to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory; giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the chiefs at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attaginus,

who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous, that they were nowise implicated in the *medism* of their father. Timegenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal—indeed the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation. It is remarkable that Pausanias himself only a few years afterward, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money. In this hope, indeed, he found himself deceived, as Timegenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognized untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valor at the battle of Platæa may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize—that Aristeides appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Platæans, to which proposition both Aristeides and Pausanias acceded. But it seems that the general opinion recognized the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan, however, who had surpassed them all—Aristodemus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Platæa he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valor and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funereal honors as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any

previous taint such as to render life a burden to them. Subsequent valor might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodemus to a level with the most honored citizens.

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch that the Platæans received by general vote the prize of valor, it is certain that they were largely honored and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and center of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Platæan territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of the ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied. The Platæans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honorable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athene—the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious honors every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece. In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias and the whole body of allies bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platæa, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Platæa, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent. An aggregate force of 10,000 hoplites, 1000 cavalry, and 100 triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified. Moreover, the town of Platæa was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.

This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeides, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it

might reassemble, or be reinforced. Indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykale had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable; nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterward organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still *medising*, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendency in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeides and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defense which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus; and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their Isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage of this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Platæa, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment; though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Platæa, projected by Aristeides, from taking effect.

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered at Platæa the naval armaments under Leotychides and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important at Mykale on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet (which numbered 110 triremes), having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of Ionia—although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychides that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomestor, whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to the community of religion and race, Leotychides was long deaf to the entreaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, "Hegesistratus," i.e., army-leader. "I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychides, struck with the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany us—let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will go forthwith." Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther encouraged by favorable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the prophet Deiphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia.

When they reached the Heræum near Kalami in Samos, and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that the enemy's fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the

neighboring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phœnician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykale near Miletus. Here they were under the protection of a land-force of 60,000 men, under the command of Tigranes—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defense of Ionia. The ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet and again offer battle at Mykale. On reaching that point they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea-force before them. But since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychides was to copy the previous maneuver of Themistokles, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops and marshaled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land: while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation and suspecting, either from his maneuver, or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykale—with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day —the fourth of the month Boedromion (about September), 479 B.C. By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Platæa in Bœotia had

been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, a divine Phemie or message flew into the camp. While a herald's staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Ægean—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodotus, and doubtless universally accepted in his time, when the combatants of Mykale were alive to tell their own story. He, moreover, mentions another of those coincidences which the Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity: there was a chapel of the Eleusinian Demeter close to the field of battle at Mykale, as well as at Platæa. Diodorus and other later writers, who wrote when the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals for the purpose of encouraging their army.

The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Platæa, employed their gerrha, or wicker bucklers planted by spikes in the ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they discharged their arrows; and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defense from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it; driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardor of their pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpracticed in line and drill, and acting only in small knots, with disadvantages of armor such as had been felt severely at Platæa, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack that the defense was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat. First, the disarmed Samians —next, other Ionians and Æolians—lastly, the Milesians, who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear—not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack. The Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykale, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pur-

suers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranes and Mardontes, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntes and Ithamithres, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and were burnt. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless. Among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with their commander Perilaus. The honors of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians; the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykale, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntes, whom Masistes, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat. The general was at length so maddened by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his scimitar and would have slain Masistes, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras, who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government of Kilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistes. The consequences of his passion entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amestris. But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast; so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet, having full confidence in their power of defending the islands, willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Strattis and Theomestor were expelled from Chios and Samos. But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the medising Greeks from their sea-port towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing

the metropolitan dignity of Athens. The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honorable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently difficult to execute—yet at the same time to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionians, and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendency and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos—next, Athenian maritime empire.

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge. For so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September, 479 B.C., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before (about November, 480 B.C.). Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychides and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiades down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia. From the flight of the second Miltiades to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493–480 B.C.), a period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykale were now naturally eager both to re-establish the ascendency of Athens, and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese. Probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon, son of Miltiades, had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alkibiades had in after days, with private forts of his own. To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added another—the importance of its corn-produce, as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina. Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the co-operation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus—the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the center in which all the neighboring Persian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together under Œobazus and Artayktes.

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defense. But of

all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elæus—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the seashore, was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighboring Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings and probably deposits for security—money, gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes, and various other presents. The story ran that when Xerxes was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktes, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him—"Master, here is the house of a Greek, who in invading thy territory met his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order that people may learn for the future not to invade *thy* land"—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: upon which, Artayktes, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. He was not content without still farther outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, plowed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines. Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Cheresonesite Greeks, who now crowded to re-enforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison; which nevertheless still held out by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well-nigh exhausted. It was with difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktes and Œobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Œobazus found his way into Thrace, where, however, he was taken captive by the Abysinthian natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistorus: Artayktes fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Ægospotami, after a strenuous

resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of 100 talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of 200 talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus, and the citizens of Elæus, disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktes, after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxeian bridge had been fixed. There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

After the capture of Sestus the Athenian fleets returned home with their plunder, toward the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens.

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I HAVE already mentioned, in the preceding volume of this history, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact, that in the sixth century before the Christian era, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens named Phalaris; a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make himself despot seemingly about the year 570 B.C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæonids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretense to assemble therein a considerable number of men; whom he armed, and availed himself

of the opportunity of a festival of Demeter to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the petty Sikan communities in the neighborhood: but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims inclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated: the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of the animal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which period, a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life. Whether Telemachus became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterward, we shall find his descendant Thero established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusans reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the south-east of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory. With the exception of this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenes.

The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among the cities of Greece proper in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical. We do not know under what particular modifications they were kept up, but probably all more or less resembled that of Syracuse, where the Gamori (or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonizing chiefs), possessing large landed properties tilled by a numerous Sikel serf population called Kyllyrii, formed the qualified citizens—out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen; while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, comprised, first, the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual labor and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens—next, the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty, and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were amply materials for discontent. Ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, and made themselves despots; democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. The

general fact of this change, preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves, is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Toward or near the year 500 B.C., we find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythes at Zankle, Terillus at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at Leontini. It was about the year 509 B.C. that the Spartan prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx and Egesta, near the north-western corner of the island, in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and found a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya, now lent such vigorous assistance to the Egestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions. Such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia—a colony and dependency of the neighboring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny.

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phœnicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian era, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe—and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighboring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander despot of Gela began to raise his city to ascendency over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes, did not preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled his brother and successor Hippokrates to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers, Gelo and Ænesidemus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the conspicuous family of the Emmenidæ, and descended from Telemachus the deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Telos near the Triopian Cape, one of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphemus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Telines, had first raised the family to distinction

by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been worsted in a struggle and forced to seek shelter in the neighboring town of Maktorium. Telines was possessed of certain peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial acts and formalities of divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating the Subterranean Goddesses, Demeter and Persephone: "from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus), I cannot say;" but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gela at the head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power—deterring the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Phye-Athene in the chariot along with Peisistratus. The extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed that Telines was of an unwarlike temperament. The restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the two goddesses—a function certainly honorable, and probably lucrative, connected with the administration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers, sons of Deinomenes—Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus: and he further ennobled himself by such personal exploits, in the army of the despot Hippokrates, as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to the activity of Gelo that the despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini, and Zankle were successively reduced to dependence.

The fate of Zankle—seemingly held by its despot Skythes in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokrates, and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium on the opposite side of the strait of Messina—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Miletus reconquered by the Persians (B.C. 494, 493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in Sicily toward the sufferers of the same race on the east of the Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode; and the Zanklæans especially invited them to form a new pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kale Akte, on the north coast of Sicily; a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Grecian colony—Himera. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Miletus, who accordingly put themselves on shipboard for Zankle; steering, as was usual, along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that

when they reached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythes, the despot of Zankle, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force on an expedition against the Sikels—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kale Akte. His enemy, the Rhegian prince Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zankle. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the families and property of the absent Zanklæans; who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythes farther invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokrates. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythes, whom he considered as the cause of it, at Inykus, in the interior of the island. But he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zanklæans whom he had come to aid. By a convention ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokrates should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to the Zanklæans, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the person of those Zanklæans whom Hippokrates had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves: excepting, however, from this lot, three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterward disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were, however, spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippokrates, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Skythes found means to escape to Darius, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter: imperfect compensation for the iniquity of his fellow-Greeks. The Samians, however, did not long retain possession of their conquest, but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to seize it—Anaxilaus of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian race, recolonizing it under the name of Messene—a name which it ever afterward bore; and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophron, until his death about B.C 476.

Besides the conquests above mentioned, Hippokrates of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helorus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having repeopled this territory, which became thus annexed

to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Geloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokrates, and seized the scepter himself.

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendency enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became the most powerful man in the island; but an incident which occurred a few years afterward (B.C. 485), while it aggrandized him still farther, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical order of proprietary families, probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helorus, were dispossessed of the government by a combination between their serf-cultivators called the Kyllyrii, and the smaller freemen called the Demos; they were forced to retire to Kasmenæ, where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people, probably unable to resist their political opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him without striking a blow. But instead of restoring the place to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, leaving Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications: probably it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include a larger space of the adjacent main-land (or rather island of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina. To people this enlarged space he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which town he dismantled—and more than half of those in Gela; which was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from the neighboring towns of Megara and Eubœa.

Both these towns, Megara and Eubœa, like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf-cultivators dependent upon them, and a Demos or body of smaller freemen excluded from the political franchise: both were involved in war with Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments: both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders of the war, anticipated nothing but ruin at the hands of the conqueror; while the Demos, who had not been consulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured that no harm would be done to them. His behavior disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold the Demos as slaves under covenant that they should be exported from Sicily.

"His conduct (says Herodotus) was dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to live with." It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs; something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestæ or dependent cultivators occupying and tilling the land on their account—but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a recognized class. And since Gelo was removing the free population from these conquered towns, leaving in or around the towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others: but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the small free proprietors as "troublesome yoke-fellows"—a sentiment perfectly natural to a Grecian despot, unless where he found them useful aids to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy—we must add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the neighborhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.

So large an accession of size, walls, and population rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities on the east and south-east of the island from the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zankle or Messene, together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messene was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thero, son of Ænesidemus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possession, had its own government, free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage. A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute, besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed many landed proprietors and having recolonized Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense adherents. Hence he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippokrates, and to form a naval force besides. Phormis the Mænalian, who took service under him and became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to Olympia—and Agesias, the Iamid prophet from Stymphalus—are doubtless not the only examples of emigrants joining him from Arcadia. For the Arcadian population were poor, brave, and ready

for mercenary soldiership; while the service of a Greek despot in Sicily must have been more attractive to them than that of Xerxes. Moreover during the ten years between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper—the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.

These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, toward the autumn of 481 B.C., when the Greeks from the Isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greeks (so the historian tells us) 20,000 hoplites, 200 triremes, 2,000 cavalry, 2,000 archers, 2,000 slingers, 2,000 light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last. If this numerical statement could be at all trusted (which I do not believe), Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that of Gelo: and we may well assume such general superiority to be substantially true, though the numbers above-mentioned may be an empty boast rather than a reality.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans, either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the Spartan prince Dorieus—that he even attempted, though in vain, to induce the Spartans and other central Greeks to co-operate in this plan—and that upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with the Sicilian forces alone. We have nothing but a brief and vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily—the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathokles. But he had already begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognized by others, in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens, Corinth, etc., reached him from the Isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B.C., to intreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one condition only—that he should be recognized as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy; and Gelo then

so far abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of the land force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest—"We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and thou givest us the army, only in order to make thyself general. Know that, even if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, *we* would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the oldest nation in Greece—the only Greeks who have never migrated from home—whose leader before Troy stands proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshaling and keeping order in an army—we, who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet—*we* will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan."

"Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring."

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed: but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece; and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for pre-eminence and command which Herodotus has dramatized. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defending himself.

The same spring which brought Xerxes across the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo had already been engaged in war against them (as has been above stated) and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of Greece, organized for three years before, and drawing contingents not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to encourage them: and there seems good reason for believing that the simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxes—probably by the Phœnicians on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless this alliance does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative Thero; while Rhegium and Mes-

sene under the government of Anaxilaus,—Himera under that of his father-in-law Terillus—and Selinus,—seems to have formed an imposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks; at variance with Gelo and Thero, but in amity and correspondence with Carthage. It was seemingly about the year 481 B.C., that Thero, perhaps invited by an Himeræan party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage; backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilkar the Carthaginian Suffet or general, the personal friend or guest of Terillus. The application was favorably entertained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B.C., with a fleet of 3,000 ships of war and a still larger number of store ships, disembarked a land-force of 300,000 men: which would even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms. These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land-force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious: it included Phœnicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans. This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language, in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general.

Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town; while the Himerians, re-enforced by Thero, and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an obstinate defense, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were dispatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to 50,000 foot and 5,000 horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the afternoon; and its success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo—a communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to personate this re-enforcement from Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships; while the Greek army, brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, 150,000 men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled—partly to the

Sikanian mountains, where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines—partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion. Twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm on the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings. Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast) to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed. The Carthaginians erected funereal monuments to him, graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal colonies: on the field of battle itself also, a monument was raised to him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years afterward, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of 3,000 Grecian prisoners.

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greeks besides. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, which was granted to them without any harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation. Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained mainly by the solicitation of Damarete wife of Gelo, on condition of paying 2,000 talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded. If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship. But such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know moreover that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage. Indeed, we may considerably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus and Timæus, long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amercement of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm: and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war, together with a large plunder. Splendid offerings

of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi; while the epigram of Simonides, composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and Platæa. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending re-enforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus to Delphi with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse. When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians toward Sicily, which was already sufficiently imperiled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at Himera cleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution. Among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest shares must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigentum; while the number acquired by the latter was still farther increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigentine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last-mentioned, were thus put in possession of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains to work, and were either employed on public undertakings for defense, ornament, and religious solemnity—or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians—there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the island; while Thero governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera.

In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thero. His conduct, both at Syracuse and toward the cities dependent upon him was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot; and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. The respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera never afterward died out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was defaced first by the Carthaginians, and afterward by the despot of Agathokles. And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse that Gelo was thus solemnly worshiped. The size, the strength, and the population, of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of the new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæn Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than 10,000 mercenary soldiers. It will moreover appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia—the interior stronghold of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of new-comers: but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzelus and Hiero; the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force—while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero; a man of energy and determination, and munificent as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonides, Bacchylides, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others; but the victim of a painful internal complaint—jealous in his temper—cruel and rapacious in his gov-

ernment—and noted as an organizer of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyzelus, who was very popular in the city, he dispatched him on a military expedition against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction. But Polyzelus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protection from his brother-in-law the despot Thero; from whom Hiero redemanded him, and on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place. It is interesting to hear that Simonides the poet, esteemed and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them.

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between these two powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thero, was administered by his son Thrasydæus—a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Himeræans, knowing that they had little chance of redress from Thero against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokrates, cousins of Thero, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Thero. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Thero both the schemes and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokrates collected some forces to resist Thero, but were defeated by him at the river Himera: his victory was followed up by seizing and putting to death a large number of Himeræan citizens. So great was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished. Thero invited and enrolled a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood.

The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Thero and with his brother Polyzelus, is marked by several circumstances as noway inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest, not merely in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received from him a squadron which defeated and drove off their enemies: he even settled a Syracusan colony in the neighboring island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messene, had attacked, and might probably have overpowered, his neighbors the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to desist. Those heroic honors, which in Greece belonged to the Œkist of a new city, were yet wanting to him. He procured them by the foundation of the new city of Ætna

on the site and in the place of Katana, the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While these Naxians and Katanæans were directed to take up their abode at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hiero planted 10,000 new inhabitants in his adopted city of Ætna; 5,000 of them from Syracuse and Gela—with an equal number from Peloponnesus. They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before belonged to Katana, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighboring Sikel tribes. His son Deinomenes, and his friend and confidant Chromius, enrolled as an Ætnæan, became joint administrators of the city, whose religious and social customs were assimilated to the Dorian model. Pindar dreams of future relations between the despot and citizens of Ætna, analogous to those between king and citizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius were proclaimed as Ætnæans at the Pythian and Nemean games, when their chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of Ætna. We see, by the compliments of Pindar, that Hiero was vain of his new title of founder. But we must remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who seem to have given no ground of offense. Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities.

Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which had compelled him to spare the Lokrians. Such was the esteem entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium and Messene were preserved for his children, yet minors. But a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death of the Agrigentine Thero, which took place seemingly about 472 B.C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laureate strains of Pindar: and his memory doubtless became still farther endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked robellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries that he became master of a force of 20,000 men, horse and foot. And in

his own territory, perhaps he might long have trodden with impunity in the footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbor Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, 2,000 men were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and 4,000 on that of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries. But the defeat of Thrasydæus was so complete that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Megara in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished. The Agrigentines, thus happily released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero. They are said to have established a democratic government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as well as from Gela, nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Theronian.

The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which we hear of him is, his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably showed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the property as well as the scepter. Mikythus complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves intreated him to remain and govern—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterward, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisans of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself. This family division—a curse often resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities—coupled with the conduct of Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but without his accompanying energy, in Thrasybulus; who put to death many citizens, and banished still more, for the purpose of seizing their property, until at length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among

the Syracusan population. By summoning those cities which Hiero had planted in his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, he found himself at the head of 15,000 men, and master of the inner city; that is, the islet of Ortygia, which was the primitive settlement of Syracuse, and was not only distinct and defensible in itself, but also contained the docks, the shipping, and command of the harbor. The revolted people on their side were masters of the outer city, better known under its latter name of Achradina, which lay on the adjacent mainland of Sicily, was surround by a separate wall of its own, and was divided from Ortygia by an intervening space of low ground used for burials. Though superior in number, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of Thrasybulus, they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot like the powerful Thero to espouse the cause of Thrasybulus. Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to re-enforce the Syracusans; and Thrasybulus, being totally defeated, first in naval action, next on land, was obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unmolested. The expelled Thrasybulus afterward lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri—a very different fate from that which had befallen Thrasydæus (son of Thero) at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years. Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratic were established everywhere. The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a little longer at Rhegium and Messene, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire, and began their era of freedom.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free governments established in their place were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, Thero, Thrasydæus, Thrasybulus, etc., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property; and had planted on the soil new citizens and mercenaries, in numbers no less consider-

able. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of Ætna, from whence they had been brought. But there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero; the former alone having enrolled 10,000, of whom more than 7,000 yet remained. What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Thrasybulus as a body, and probably many of them took part against him.

After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution, and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty—that the whole body of new citizens, who had been domiciliated under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honor. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favored partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner section of Syracuse—Ortygia—placed themselves in open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of the outer city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position. But they contrived to block it up nearly altogether, and to intercept both its supplies and its communication with the country, by means of a new fortification carried out from the outer city toward the Great Harbor, and stretching between Ortygia and Epipolæ. The garrison within could thus only obtain supplies at the cost of perpetual conflicts. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial engagements both by land and sea: whereby the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of 600 trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of 600, who had eminently contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honor, and a reward of one mina per head.

The meager annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably many of the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that they were deprived of the dangerous privilege of a separate residence in the inner stronghold or islet Ortygia.

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanæans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikel prince Duketius, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighborhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory (seemingly Sikel) of Ennesia or Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of Ætna, with monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants.

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to readmit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere: but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Messene. It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by re-establishing the city of Kamarina, which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippokrates, despot of Gela, but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it—a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela. For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may farther presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an independent city, with

Dorian rites and customs: its lands were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it had hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their transplantations and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrollments of citizens took place without any rightful claim, probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos or aggregate of small self-working proprietors was considered as "a troublesome yokefellow," fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation. It is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger numbers than ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enrollments of Kleisthenes at Athens. In spite of all the confusion, however, with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B.C. 473, that the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbors the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, dispatched 3,000 of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of 20,000 men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them. The battle having taken place in a hostile country, it seems that the larger portion both of Rhegians and Tarentines perished, insomuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge. Of the Tarentines slain a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the government of the city; strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical.

In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES.

After having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central Greeks and the Persians—a case in which the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human improvement generally.

The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both a contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks, now that the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient. The men indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organization were wretched—and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms: but here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are forced to deal harshly with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends. That witness intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ, than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness, of Xerxes. Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus, or the judgment of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force. But it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of co-operation, than that which they actually manifested.

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval—that the scheme of defense under Darius Codomannus labors under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes—that there is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers—that the advice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia—that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity as that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis—and that the Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Platæa. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be esteemed a sort of creation during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages—Demosthenes and Brasidas—the Cyreian army and Xenophon—Agesilaus—Iphikrates—Epaminondas—Philip of Macedon—Alexander: for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that of Alexander, we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe—with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for a war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during the next century and more, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and character of the Athenians—improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and maneuvering in Greece—and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organizing and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents: thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon—ability in command, with vigor in execution.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member. The post of second dignity in the line at Platæa had indeed been adjudged to her, yet only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and

feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together. Even on land at Platæa, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry, superior even to the Spartans. No Athenian officer had committed so perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mykale, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals, gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous contest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistokles; next, Aristeides. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unreserved Pan-Hellenic patriotism which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept within their Isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably—but the second time by a culpable neglect in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had left Attica unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistokles and to the imposing Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their movable property irrecoverably destroyed—we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the selfishness again prevalent among them. Ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an admiration which they could not help feeling, overlays all their gratitude and sympathy.

The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle of Platæa, found a desolate home to harbor them. Their country was laid waste—their city burnt or destroyed, so that there remained but a few houses standing, wherein the Persian officers had taken up their quarters—and their fortifications for the most part razed or overthrown. It was their first task to bring home their families and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Trœzen, Ægina, and Salamis. After providing what was indispensably necessary for immediate wants, they began to rebuild their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction. But as soon as they were seen to been employed on this indispensable work, without which neither political existence nor personal safety was practicable, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints to Sparta, and urged

her to arrest the work. In the front of these complainants probably stood the Æginetans, as the old enemies of Athens, and as having most to apprehend from her might at sea. The Spartans, perfectly sympathizing with the jealousy and uneasiness of their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry their dislike of fortifications still farther, so that they would have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities systematically defenseless like Sparta itself. But while sending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendly remonstrance against the project of refortifying the city, they could not openly and peremptorily forbid the exercise of a right common to every autonomous community. Nor did they even venture, at a moment when the events of the past months were fresh in every one's remembrance, to divulge their real jealousies as to the future. They affected to offer prudential reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion; in which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the invader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to further his operations, as Thebes had recently seconded Mardonius. They proposed to the Athenians, therefore, not merely to desist from their own fortifications, but also to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus—promising shelter within the Isthmus, in case of need, to all exposed parties.

A statesman like Themistokles was not likely to be imposed upon by this diplomacy: but he saw that the Spartans had the power of preventing the work if they chose, and that it could only be executed by the help of successful deceit. By his advice the Athenians dismissed the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves send to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly Themistokles himself was presently dispatched thither, as one among three envoys instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities. But his two colleagues, Aristeides and Abronichus, by previous concert, were tardy in arriving—and he remained inactive at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding an audience, yet affecting surprise that their coming was so long delayed. But while Aristeides and Abronichus, the other two envoys, were thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens labored unremittingly at the walls. Men, women, and children all tasked their strength to the utmost during this precious interval. Neither private houses nor sacred edifices were spared to furnish materials; and such was their ardor in the enterprise, that before the three envoys were united at Sparta, the wall had already attained a height sufficient at least to attempt defense. Yet the interval had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even in the slow mind of the Spartans; while the more watchful Æginetans sent them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing

Themistokles, on hearing this allegation, peremptorily denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained toward him was at

that time so great, that his assurance obtained for some time unqualified credit, until fresh messengers again raised suspicions in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistokles urged the Ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince themselves of the state of the facts. They unsuspectingly acted upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, which he feared might be denied them when his trick came to be divulged. Aristeides and Abronichus had now arrived—the wall was announced to be of a height at least above contempt—and Themistokles at once threw off the mask. He avowed the statagem practiced—told the Spartans that Athens was already fortified sufficiently to insure the safety and free will of its inhabitants—and warned them that the hour of constraint was now passed, the Athenians being in a condition to define and vindicate for themselves their own rights and duties in reference to Sparta and the allies. He reminded them that the Athenians had always been found competent to judge for themselves, whether in joint consultation, or in any separate affair such as the momentous crisis of abandoning their city and taking to their ships. They had now, in the exercise of this self-judgment, resolved on fortifying their city, as a step indispensable to themselves and advantageous even to the allies generally. No equal or fair interchange of opinion could subsist, unless all the allies had equal means of defense: either all must be unfortified, or Athens must be fortified as well as the rest.

Mortified as the Spartans were by a revelation which showed that they had not only been detected in a dishonest purpose, but completely outwitted—they were at the same time overawed by the decisive tone of Themistokles, whom they never afterward forgave. To arrest beforehand erection of the walls, would have been practicable, though not perhaps without difficulty; to deal by force with the fact accomplished, was perilous in a high degree. Moreover the inestimable services just rendered by Athens became again predominant in their minds, so that sentiment and prudence for the time coincided. They affected therefore to accept the communication without manifesting any offense, nor had they indeed put forward any pretense which required to be formally retracted. The envoys on both sides returned home, and the Athenians completed their fortifications, without obstruction—yet not without murmurs on the part of the allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta afterward for having let slip this golden opportunity of arresting the growth of the giant.

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the mixture of audacity, invention, and deceit, whereby she had just eluded the hindrance opposed to her fortifications, was well calculated to aggravate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the Athenians, the mere hint of intervention to debar them from that common right of self-

defense which was exercised by every autonomous city except Sparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice—aggravated by the fact that it was brought upon them by their peculiar sufferings in the common cause, and by the very allies who without their devoted forwardness would now have been slaves of the Great King. And the intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of hands required to hurry the work and escape interference; just as it was proclaimed to after-generations by the shapeless fragments and irregular structure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and inscribed columns were seen imbedded. Assuredly the sentiment connected with this work—performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak—men, women, and children—must have been intense as well as equalizing. All had endured the common miseries of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for the defense of their recovered city, in order to counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies. We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been nursed in democracy for a quarter of a century and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon—if we would understand that still stronger burst of aggressive activity, persevering self-confidence, and aptitude as well as thirst for command—together with that still wider spread of democratical organization—which marks their character during the age immediately following.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of the city. Its circuit was sixty stadia or about seven miles, with the acropolis nearly in the center: but the circuit of the previous walls is unknown, so that we are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Thucydides testifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within the town the three hills of the Areopagus, Pnyx, and the Museum; while on the south of the town it was carried for a space even on the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountain Kallirhoe. In spite of the excessive hurry in which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against every external enemy: but there is reason to believe that its very large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with their property, were eminently useful to a Grecian city-community; to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large proportion in their separate demes throughout Attica.

The first indispensable step in the renovation of Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished: the city was made secure against external enemies. But Themistokles, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, and whose influence must have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had so recently proved their salvation. He saw in that force both the only chance of salvation for the future, in case the Persians should renew their attack by sea—a contingency at that time seemingly probable—and boundless prospects of future ascendency over the Grecian coasts and islands. It was the great engine of defense, of offense, and of ambition. To continue this movement required much less foresight and genius than to begin it. Themistokles, the moment that the walls of the city had been finished, brought back the attention of his countrymen to those wooden walls which had served them as a refuge against the Persian monarch. He prevailed upon them to provide harbor-room at once safe and adequate, by the enlargement and fortification of the Peiræus. This again was only the prosecution of an enterprise previously begun; for he had already, while in office two or three years before, made his countrymen sensible that the open roadstead of Phalerum was thoroughly insecure, and had prevailed upon them to improve and employ in part the more spacious harbor of Peiræus and Munychia—three natural basins, all capable of being closed and defended. Something had then been done toward the enlargement of this port, though it had probably been subsequently ruined by the Persian invaders. But Themistokles now resumed the scheme on a scale far grander than he could then have ventured to propose—a scale which demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respecting the destinies of Athens.

Peiræus and Munychia, in his new plan, constituted a fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and with a wall far more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit, was intended by him to be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as to render assault hopeless, and to enable the whole military population to act on shipboard, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison. We may judge how vast his project was, when we learn that the wall, though in practice always found sufficient, was only carried up to half the height which he had contemplated. In respect to thickness however his ideas were exactly followed: two carts meeting one another brought stones which were laid together right and left on the outer side of each, and thus formed two primary parallel walls, between which the interior space (of course at least as broad as the joint breadth of the two carts) was filled up, "not with rubble, in the usual manner of the Greeks, but constructed, throughout the whole thickness, of squared stones, cramped together with metal." The result was a solid wall, probably not less than fourteen or fifteen feet thick, since it was intended to carry so very unusual a height. In the exhortations whereby he animated the

people to this fatiguing and costly work, he labored to impress upon them that Peiræus was of more value to them than Athens itself, and that it afforded a shelter into which, if their territory should be again overwhelmed by a superior land-force, they might securely retire, with full liberty of that maritime action in which they were a match for all the world. We may even suspect that if Themistokles could have followed his own feelings, he would have altered the site of the city from Athens to Peiræus; the attachment of the people to their ancient and holy rock doubtless prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those long walls which in a few years afterward consolidated the two cities into one.

Forty-five years afterward, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall hear from Perikles, who espoused and carried out the large ideas of Themistokles, this same language about the capacity of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon maritime action. But the Athenian empire was then an established reality, whereas in the time of Themistokles it was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, surpassed as they were by the future reality, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which Thucydides so emphatically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people, when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, undertaking a new enterprise of so much toil and expense; and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of private distress and public impoverishment.

However, Peiræus served other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military marine. Its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy were well calculated to call back those metics or resident foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of Xerxes, and who might feel themselves insecure in returning unless some new and conspicuous means of protection were exhibited. To invite them back, and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistokles proposed to exempt them from the Metoikion or non-freeman's annual tax: but this exemption can only have lasted for a time, and the great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous metics was profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly. Much of the trading, professional, and handicraft business was in their hands: and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded them from the political franchise, was in other respects equitable and protective to them. In regard to trading-pursuits, the metics had this advantage over the citizens—that they were less frequently carried away for foreign military service. The great increase of their numbers, from this period forward, while it tended materially to increase the value of property all throughout Attica, but

especially in Peiræus and Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us to explain the extraordinary prosperity, together with the excellent cultivation, prevalent throughout the country before the Peloponnesian war. The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts of the territory—the charcoal prepared in the flourishing deme of Acharnæ—and the fish obtained in abundance near the coast—all found opulent buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town population.

We are farther told that Themistokles prevailed on the Athenians to build every year twenty new ships of the line—so we may designate the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it is impossible to say: but to repair the ships as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable obligations of the executive government.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the fortification of the Peiræus, though it was an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing than that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themistokles thought it necessary to send an embassy to Sparta, intimating that his scheme was to provide a safe harbor for the collective navy of Greece, in the event of future Persian attack.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a considerable time, and absorbed much of the Athenian force: yet they did not prevent Athens from lending active aid toward the expedition which, in the year after the battle of Platæa (B.C. 478), set sail for Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the various cities of Peloponnesus were under his command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty, under the orders of Aristeides and Kimon: other triremes also came from the Ionian and insular allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Grecian cities from the Persian government. Next they turned to the Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which, like Sestus in the Chersonese, was a post of great moment as well as of great strength —occupied by a considerable Persian force, with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured, seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might probably hold out even longer than Sestus, as being taken less unprepared. The line of communication between the Euxine sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and unexpected change in the relations of the various Grecian cities; a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of Pausanias, but toward which other causes, deep-seated as well as various, also tended. In recounting the history of Miltiades, I noticed the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading men to be spoiled by success. This distemper worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror of Platæa, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in

Grecian experience, together with a prodigious share of the plunder. The concubines, horses, camels, and gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were well calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of Spartan life irksome, while his power also, though great on foreign command, became subordinate to that of the Ephors when he returned home. His newly-acquired insolence was manifested immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an unseemly boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the tripod. Nevertheless he was still sent on the command against Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Mysia), to whom he intrusted his new acquisition of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it.

These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent away underhand to Xerxes; together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following effect: "Pausanias the Spartan commander having taken these captives, sends them back in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond." Xerxes, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Artabazus (the same who had been second in command in Bœotia), to supersede Megabates in the satrapy of Daskylium. The new satrap, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal, was instructed to promote actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter was to this purport: "Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. Thy name stands for ever recorded in my house as a well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium; and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Relax not either night or day in accomplishing that which thou promisest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them; but transact in confidence thy business and mine jointly with Artabazus, the good man whom I have now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us."

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias had been insolent and domineering; degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans,

and treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even in a Spartan Herakleid and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Xerxes, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabazus, as well as supplied with funds for corruption, his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans were neither deliberately laid, nor veiled until ripe for execution, but manifested with childish impatience. He clothed himself in Persian attire (a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and a half afterward, could not tolerate even in Alexander the Great)—he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards—he copied the Persian chiefs both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct toward the free women of Byzantium. Kleonike, a Byzantine maiden of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he happened to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed, but seized his sword and slew her. Moreover his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behavior, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and seemingly the Spartan vessels along with him.

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the Lacedæmonians acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong; yet mistrusting his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the minds of the allies. The headship, or hegemony, was in the hands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan, found the allies not disposed to recognize his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been raised, whether Athens was not entitled to the command at sea, in consequence of the preponderance of her naval contingent. The repugnance of the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece; while the armament now serving, differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained a large proportion of the newly-enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every ground—as well from kindred race, as from the certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this expedition. Aristeides and Kimon, were personally just and conciliating, forming

a striking contrast with Pausanias. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that the behavior of the latter was not only oppressive toward themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment generally—addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders for protection and redress, on the plausible ground of kindred race; entreating to be allowed to serve under Athens, as leader instead of Sparta.

Plutarch tells us that Aristeides not only tried to remonstrate with Pausanias, who repelled him with arrogance—which is exceedingly probable—but that he also required, as a condition of his compliance with the Ionic allies, that they should personally insult Pausanias, so as to make reconciliation impracticable: upon which a Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attacked and damaged the Spartan admiral-ship in the harbor of Byzantium. The historians from whom Plutarch copied this latter statement must have presumed in the Athenians a disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously; but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story—which is moreover unnoticed by Thucydides. To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation, would have been glaring imprudence on the part of Aristeides. Yet having every motive to entertain the request of the allies, he began to take his measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings were much facilitated by the circumstance that the Spartan government about this time recalled Pausanias to undergo an examination, in consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him—even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home: so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for insuring to themselves and exercising that command which the allies besought them to undertake. So effectually did they improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy; while Dorkis, having only a small force and being in no condition to employ constraint, found himself obliged to return home.

This incident, though not a declaration of war against Sparta, was the first open renunciation of her authority as presiding state among the Greeks; the first avowed manifestation of a competitor for that dignity, with numerous and willing followers; the first separation of Greece (considered in herself alone and apart from foreign solicitations such as the Persian invasion) into two distinct organized camps, each with collective interests and projects of its own. In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained, and even in some points of view not indisposed, to patient acquiescence. She had no means of forcing the dispositions of the Ionic allies, while the war with Persia altogether—having now become no longer strictly defensive, and being withal maritime as well as distant from her own territory—had ceased to be in harmony with her home-routine and

strict discipline. Her grave senators, especially an ancient Herakleid named Hetœmaridas, reproved the impatience of the younger citizens, and discountenanced the idea of permanent maritime command as a dangerous innovation. They even treated it as an advantage, that Athens should take the lead in carrying on the Persian war, since it could not be altogether dropped; nor had the Athenians as yet manifested any sentiments positively hostile to excite their alarm. Nay, the Spartans actually took credit in the eyes of Athens, about a century afterward, for having themselves advised this separation of command at sea from command on land. Moreover, if the war continued under Spartan guidance, there would be a continued necessity for sending out their kings or chief men to command. and the example of Pausanias showed them the depraving effect of such military power, remote as well as unchecked.

The example of their king Leotychides, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Leotychides was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the Aleuadæ and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on his person; in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians condemned him to banishment and razed his house to the ground. He died afterward in exile at Tegea. Two such instances were well calculated to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Herakleid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship in favor of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were induced to submit to that loss of command which the misconduct of Pausanias had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take place in Grecian politics.

According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and more the president of something like a Pan-hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point toward which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and important pretensions of Argos.

The preceding volumes of this history have shown that Sparta had risen to such ascendancy, not from her superior competence on the management of collective interests, nor even, in the main, from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it—but from the converging tendencies of Grecian feeling which required some such

presiding state—and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed constitution, which attracted that feeling toward Sparta. The necessities of common defense against Persia greatly strengthened these tendencies; and the success of the defense, whereby so many Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their former master, seemed destined to have the like effect still more. For an instant, after the battles of Platæa and Mykale—when the town of Platæ was set apart as a consecrated neutral spot for an armed confederacy against the Persian, with periodical solemnities and meetings of deputies—Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a full Pan-hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal members. And had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy, of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the requisite flexibility of dealing, embracing distant Greeks as well as near—her position was now such, that her own ascendency, together with undivided Pan-hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the larger the union became, the more her deficiency stood manifest. On the other hand, Athens, now entering into rivalry as a sort of leader of opposition, possessed all those qualities in a remarkable degree, over and above that actual maritime force which was the want of the day; so that the opening made by Spartan incompetence and crime (so far as Pausanias was concerned) found her in every respect prepared.

But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians still clung to Sparta, while those of the Ionian Greeks had turned to Athens: and thus not only the short-lived symptoms of an established Pan-hellenic union, but even all tendencies toward it, from this time disappear. There now stands out a manifest schism, with two pronounced parties, toward one of which nearly all the constituent atoms of the Grecian world gravitate: the marititime states, newly enfranchised from Persia, toward Athens—the land-states, which had formed most part of the confederate army at Platæa, toward Sparta. Along with this national schism, and called into action by it, appears the internal political schism in each separate city between oligarchy and democracy. Of course the germ of these parties had already previously existed in the separate states. But the energetic democracy of Athens, and the pronounced tendency of Sparta to rest upon the native oligarchies in each separate city as her chief support, now began to bestow, on the conflict of the internal political parties, an Hellenic importance, and an aggravated bitterness, which had never before belonged to it.

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left the Athenian generals at liberty; and their situation imposed upon them the duty of organizing the new confederacy which they had been chosen to conduct. The Ionic allies at this time were not merely willing and unanimous, but acted as the forward movers in the enterprise; for they stood in obvious need of protection against the attacks of Persia, and had no

farther kindness to expect from Sparta or the Peloponnesians. But even had they been less under the pressure of necessity, the conduct of Athens, and of Aristeides as the representative of Athens, might have sufficed to bring them into harmonious co-operation. The new leader was no less equitable towards the confederates than energetic against the common enemy. The general conditions of the confederacy were regulated in a common synod of the members, appointed to meet periodically for deliberative purposes, in the temple of Apollo and Artemis at Delos—of old the venerated spot for the religious festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient center for the members. A definite obligation, either in equipped ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city, and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contribution should be made by each. Their assessment must of course have been reviewed by the synod. They had no power at this time to enforce any regulation not approved by that body.

It had been the good fortune of Athens to profit by the genius of Themistokles on two recent critical occasions (the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls), where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extraordinary measure, and where pecuniary probity was of less necessity. It was no less her good fortune now—in the delicate business of assessing a new tax and determining how much each state should bear, when unimpeachable honesty in the assessor was the first of all qualties—*not* to have Themistokles; but to employ in his stead the well-known, we might almost say the ostentatious, probity of Aristeides. This must be accounted good fortune, since at the moment when Aristeides was sent out, the Athenians could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve upon him. His assessment not only found favor at the time of its original proposition, when it must have been freely canvassed by the assembled allies—but also maintained its place in general esteem, as equitable and moderate, after the once responsible headship of Athens had degenerated into an unpopular empire.

Respecting this first assessment we scarcely know more than one single fact—the aggregate in money was 460 talents (=about £106,000, sterling). Of the items composing such aggregate—of the individual cities which paid it—of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to furnish money—we are entirely ignorant. The little information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the uncontrolled empire then exercised by Athens. Thucydides in his brief sketch makes us clearly understand the difference between *presiding* Athens with her autonomous and regularly assembled allies in 476 B.C., and *imperial* Athens with her subject allies in 432 B.C. The Greek word equivalent to *ally* left either of these epithets to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful states. From the same author, too, we learn the general causes of

the change: but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first start.* He tells us only that the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers called the Hellenotamiæ, to receive and administer the common fund—that Delos was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept—and that the payment thus levied was called the *phorus;* a name which appears then to have been first put into circulation, though afterward usual—and to have conveyed at first no degrading import, though it afterward became so odious as to be exchanged for a more innocent synonym.

Endeavoring as well as we can to conceive the Athenian alliance in its infancy, we are first struck with the magnitude of the total sum contributed, which will appear the more remarkable when we reflect that many of the contributing cities furnished ships besides. We may be certain that all which was done at first was done by general consent, and by a freely determining majority. For Athens, at the time when the Ionic allies besought her protection against arrogance, could have had no power of constraining parties, especially when the loss of supremacy, though quietly borne, was yet fresh and rankling among the countrymen of Pausanias. So large a total implies, from the very first, a great number of contributing states, and we learn from hence to appreciate the powerful, wide-spread, and voluntary movement which then brought together the maritime and insular Greeks distributed throughout the Ægean sea and the Hellespont.

The Phœnician fleet, and the Persian land-force, might at any moment re-appear, and there was no hope of resisting either except by confederacy: so that confederacy under such circumstances became with these exposed Greeks not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather than Athenian ambition, which gave birth to the alliance; and they were grateful to Athens for organizing it. The public import of the name Hellenotamiæ, coined for the occasion—the selection of Delos as a center—and the provision for regular meetings of the members —demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth the protection of the Ægean sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution. Any island or sea-port which might refrain from contributing was a gainer at the cost of others. The general feeling of this common danger, as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet serious, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shame into concurrence such as were more backward. How the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time: but in its origin it was an

equal alliance, in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal—not an Athenian empire. Nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenseless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection than Athens. We have here in truth one of the few moments in Grecian history wherein a purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent brought together spontaneously many fragments of this disunited race, and overlaid for a time that exclusive bent towards petty and isolated autonomy which ultimately made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable and prudent, in principle as well as in detail; promising at the time the most beneficent consequences—not merely protection against the Persians, but a standing police of the Ægean sea, regulated by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not realized, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much chargeable with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add, that in selecting Delos as a center, the Ionic allies were conciliated by a renovation of the solemnities which their fathers, in the days of former freedom, had crowded to witness in that sacred island.

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic peninsula—Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, etc.—which we know to have joined under the first assessment of Aristeides, were not less anxious to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Miletus and Byzantium: by all of whom adhesion to this alliance must have been contemplated, in 477 or 476 B.C., as the sole condition of emancipation from Persia. Nothing more was required, for the success of a foreign enemy against Greece generally, than complete autonomy of every Grecian city, small as well as great—such as the Persian monarch prescribed and tried to enforce ninety years afterwards, through the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas, in the pacification which bears the name of the latter. Some sort of union, organized and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Indeed, even with that aid, at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed, it was by no means certain the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states—traitors within, as well as exiles without.

Among these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium

to Sparta, in order that the loud complaints against him might be examined, he had been acquitted of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals. Yet the presumptions of medism (or treacherous correspondence with the Persians) appeared so strong, that, though not found guilty, he was still not re-appointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece; for which purpose he came out to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Hermione, under pretense of aiding as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus. His great station and celebrity still gave him so strong a hold on men's opinions, that he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, already recognized heads of the confederacy, were constrained to expel him by force. And we may be sure that the terror excited by his presence, as well as by his known designs, tended materially to accelerate the organization of the confederacy under Athens. He then retired to Kolonæ in the Troad, where he continued for some time in the farther prosecution of his schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta to impede the formation of the new confederacy: until at length the Spartan authorities, apprised of his proceedings, sent a herald out to him with peremptory orders that he should come home immediately along with the herald: if he disobeyed, "the Spartans would declare war against him," or constitute him a public enemy.

As the execution of this threat would have frustrated all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought it prudent to obey; the rather, as he felt entire confidence of escaping all the charges against him at Sparta by the employment of bribes, the means for which were doubtless abundantly furnished to him through Artabazus. He accordingly returned along with the herald, and was, in the first moments of indignation, imprisoned by order of the Ephors—who, it seems, were legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own requisition and under a private arrangement with friends and partisans, to take his trial against all accusers. Even to stand forth as accuser against so powerful a man was a serious peril: to undertake the proof of specific matter of treason against him was yet more serious: nor does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was known that nothing short of the most manifest and invincible proof would be held to justify his condemnation, and amidst a long chain of acts carrying conviction when taken in the aggregate, there was no single treason sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still audaciously persisting both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded side

of Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots, and instigating them to revolt; promising them both liberation and admission to political privilege; with a view, first to destroy the board of Ephors and render himself despot in his own country—next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of those Helots to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the Ephors, who nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take measures against Pausanias upon no better information—so imposing was still his name and position. But though some few Helots might inform, probably many others both gladly heard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret: we shall find, by what happened a few years afterward, that there were a large number of them who had their spears in readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pausanias was, yet by the fears of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last letters to Artabazus, intimating that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted between them, were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta was saved from an outbreak of the most formidable kind, not by the prudence of her authorities, but by a mere accident—or rather by the fact that Pausanias was not only a traitor to his country, but also base and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were intrusted was a native of Argilus in Thrace, a favorite and faithful slave of Pausanias; once connected with him by that intimate relation which Grecian manners tolerated—and admitted even to the full confidence of his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of this Argilian to betray his master. But on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected with some uneasiness that none of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly he broke the seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to its destination if he found nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had farther taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that he could easily reclose the letter. On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express injunction that the bearer was to be put to death—a discovery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the Ephors. But those magistrates, who had before disbelieved the Helot informers, still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his master's autograph and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not omitting copies of those letters between Pausanias and Xerxes which I have already cited from Thucydides—for in no other way can they have become public. Partly from the suspicion which in antiquity always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture—partly from the peril of dealing with so exalted a criminal—the

Ephors would not be satisfied with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They directed the Argilian slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tænarus, under the shelter of a double tent or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Apprised of this unexpected mark of alarm, Pausanias hastened to the temple, and demanded the reason: upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the contents of the letter, and complained bitterly that after long and faithful service, with a secrecy never once betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence,—he was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. Pausanias, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary; urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the schemes in progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed Ephors; who at length, thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest Pausanias immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public street not far from the temple of Athene Chalkiœkus (or of the Brazen House). But as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their purpose. He fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that he reached it before they could overtake him. He planted himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless than the Argilian slave whom he had so recently talked over at Tænarus, in a narrow roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building; where the Ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story—not recognized by Thucydides, yet consistent with Spartan manners—his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the Ephors was to cast his body into the ravine or hollow called the Kæadas, the usual place of punishment for criminals; probably his powerful friends averted this disgrace, and he was buried not far off, until some time afterward, under the mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed and transported to the exact spot where he had died. However, the oracle, not satisfied even with this reinterment, pronounced the whole proceeding to be a profanation of the sanctity of Athene, enjoining that two bodies should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away. In the very early days of Greece—or among the Carthaginians, even at this period—such an injunction would probably have produced the slaughter of two human victims: on the present occasion, Athene, or Hikesius, the tutelary god of suppliants,

was supposed to be satisfied by two brazen statues; not however without some attempts to make out that the expiation was inadequate.

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of renown simply from the accidents of his lofty descent and of his being general at Platæa, where it does not appear that he displayed any superior qualities. His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself—the Athenian Themistokles.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully known as to enable us to make out the precise dates of particular events. But we are obliged (in consequence of the subsequent incidents connected with Themistokles, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well marked as to date) to admit an interval of about nine years between the retirement of Pausanias from his command at Byzantium, and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in treasonable correspondence, is perplexing; and we can only explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and that the suspected regent may perhaps have communicated with partisans, real or expected, in many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplices was Themistokles, still in great power—though, as it would seem, in declining power—at Athens. The charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistokles and Aristeides had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of co-operation against a common enemy. And apparently it was not resumed during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both, in effective service and in prominent posts. Themistokles stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiræus: Aristeides is commander of the fleet, and first organizer of the confederacy of Delos. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistokles as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact; a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. During the expatriation at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the time a seaman: and the anecdote of Kimon, who dedicated the bridle of his horse in the acropolis as a token that he was about to pass from the cavalry to service on shipboard, is a type of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. We

ought to add, at the same time, that this change was attended with no detriment either to the land-force or to the landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be found to acquire extraordinary development during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Still the triremes, and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state. Moreover the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. Such predominance of the maritime impulse having become pronounced immediately after the return from Salamis, was further greatly strengthened by the construction and fortification of the Peiræus—a new maritime Athens as large as the old inland city—as well as by the unexpected formation of the confederacy at Delos, with all its untried prospects and stimulating duties

The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the military. "The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis," and instruments of the new vocation of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognized political inequalities. In fact, during the struggle at Salamis, the whole city of Athens had been nothing else than "a maritime multitude," among which the proprietors and chief men had been confounded, until, by the efforts of all, the common country had been reconquered. Nor was it likely that this multitude, after a trying period of forced equality, during which political privilege had been effaced, would patiently acquiesce in the full restoration of such privilege at home. We see by the active political sentiment of the German people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how much an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large, blended with endurance of serious hardship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship: and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty years under the democracy of Kleisthenes. At the time when that constitution was first established, it was perhaps the most democratical in Greece. It had worked extremely well, and had diffused among the people a sentiment favorable to equal citizenship and unfriendly to avowed privilege: so that the impressions made by the struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to receive them.

Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census, including the considerable majority of the freemen, were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest: no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled, and eligibility extended to all the citizens. We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded, when we find that it was proposed by Aristeides, a man the reverse of what is called a demagogue, and a strenuous friend of the Kleisthenean constitution. No political system would work, after the Persian war, which formally excluded "the maritime multitude" from holding magistracy. I rather imagine (as has been stated in my preceding volume) that election of magistrates was still retained, and not exchanged for drawing lots until a certain time, though not a long time afterward. That which the public sentiment first demanded was the recognition of the equal and open principle; after a certain length of experience it was found that poor men, though legally qualified to be chosen, were in point of fact rarely chosen: then came the lot, to give them an equal chance with the rich. The principle of sortition, or choice by lot, was never applied (as I have before remarked) to all offices at Athens—never for example to the Strategi or Generals, whose functions were more grave and responsible than those of any other person in the service of the state, and who always continued to be elected by show of hands.

In the new position into which Athens was now thrown, with so great an extension of what may be termed her foreign relations, and with a confederacy which imposed the necessity of distant military service, the functions of the Strategi naturally tended to become both more absorbing and complicated; while the civil administration became more troublesome if not more difficult, from the enlargement of the city and the still greater enlargement of Peiræus—leading to an increase of town population, and especially to an increase of the metics or resident non-freemen. And it was probably about this period, during the years immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis—when the force of old habit and tradition had been partially enfeebled by so many stirring novelties—that the Archons were withdrawn altogether from political and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial administration. At the battle of Marathon, the Polemarch is a military commander, president of the ten Strategi: we know him afterward only as a civil magistrate, administering justice to the metics or non-freemen, while the Strategi perform military duties without him: a change not unlike that which took place at Rome, when the Prætor was created to undertake the judicial branch of the large original duties of the Consul. I conceive that this alteration, indicating as it does a change in the character of the Archons generally, must have taken place at the time which we have now reached—a time when the Athenian establishments on all sides required a more elaborate distribution of functionaries. The distri-

bution of so many Athenian boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and part in the Peiræus, cannot have commenced until after this period, when Peiræus had been raised by Themistokles to the dignity of town, fortress, and state-harbor. Such boards were the Astynomi and Agoranomi, who maintained the police of streets and markets—the Metronomi, who watched over weights and measures—the Sitophylakes, who carried into effect various state regulations respecting the custody and sale of corn—with various others who acted not less in Peiræus than in the city. We may presume that each of these boards was originally created as the exigency appeared to call for it, at a period later than that which we have now reached; most of these duties of detail having been at first discharged by the Archons, and afterward (when these latter became too full of occupation) confided to separate administrators. The special and important change which characterized the period immediately succeeding the battle of Salamise was the more accurate line drawn between the Archons and the Strategi; assigning the foreign and military department entirely to the Strategi, and rendering the Archons purely civil magistrates, administrative as well as judicial: while the first creation of the separate boards above named was probably an ulterior enlargement, arising out of increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was by some such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which it exhibts in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian war downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

With this expansion both of democratical feeling and of military activity at Athens, Aristeides appears to have sympathized. And the popularity thus insured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his function as assessor to the new Delian confederacy.

On the other hand, the ascendency of Themistokles, though so often exalted by his unrivaled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathizing with Aristeides and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristeides himself. Of these the chief were Kimon (son of Miltiades) and Alkmæon: moreover it seems that the Lacedæmonians, though full of esteem for Themistokles immediately after the battle of Salamis, had now become extremely hostile to him—a change which may be sufficiently explained from his stratagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent ambitious projects in reference to the Periæus. The Lacedæmonian influence, then not inconsiderable in

Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him. He is said to have given offense by manifestations of personal vanity—by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honor of Artemis Aristobule, or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausanias had irritated the Lacedæmonians by inscribing his own single name on the Delphian tripod, and as the friends of Aristeides had displeased the Athenians by endless encomiums upon his justice.

But the main cause of his discredit was the prostitution of his great influence for abitrary and corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of so many different Grecian communities, recently emancipated from Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge, wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and all the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy, the influence of the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. Themistokles, placed at the head of an Athenian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the purposes of war against Persia, partly for organizing the new confederacy, is affirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust—restoring some citizens, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of Themistokles—the poet Timokreon of Ialysus in Rhodes, who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of medism, The assertions of Timokreon, personally incensed on this ground against Themistokles, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless they are a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony with the general character of this eminent man to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. Timokreon is as emphatic in his admiration of Aristeides as in his censure of Themistokles, whom he denounces as "a lying and unjust traitor."

Such conduct as that described by this new Archilochus, even making every allowance for exaggeration, must have caused Themistokles to be both hated and feared among the insular allies, whose opinion was now of considerable importance to the Athenians. A similar sentiment grew up partially against him in Athens itself, and appears to have been connected with suspicions of treasonable inclinations toward the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations toward their cause; and if Themistokles had rendered pre-eminent service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose conduct had undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It was the treason of Pausanius—suspected and believed against him by the Athenians even when he was in command at Byzantium, though not

proved against him at Sparta until long afterward—which first seems to have raised the presumption of medism against Themistokles also, when combined with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct. We must recollect also that Themistokles had given some color to these presumptions even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxes, which wore a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedæmonians, hostile to Themistokles since the time when he had outwitted them respecting the walls of Athens—and fearing him also as a supposed accomplice of the suspected Pausanias—procured the charge of medism to be preferred against him at Athens, by secret instigations and, as it is said, by bribes to his political opponents. But no satisfactory proof could be furnished of the accusation, which Themistokles himself strenuously denied, not without emphatic appeals to his illustrious services. In spite of violent invectives against him from Alkmæon and Kimon, tempered indeed by a generous moderation on the part of Aristeides, his defense was successful. He carried the people with him and was acquitted of the charge. Nor was he merely acquitted, but, as might naturally be expected, a reaction took place in his favor. His splendid qualities and exploits were brought impressively before the public mind, and he seemed for the time to acquire greater ascendency than ever.

Such a charge, and such a failure, must have exasperated to the utmost the animosity between him and his chief opponents—Aristeides, Kimon, Alkmæon, and others; and we can hardly wonder that they were anxious to get rid of him by ostracism. In explaining this peculiar process, I have already stated that it could never be raised against any one individual separately and ostensibly; and that it could never be brought into operation at all, unless its necessity were made clear, not merely to violent party men, but also to the assembled senate and people, including of course a considerable proportion of the more moderate citizens. We may reasonably conceive that the conjuncture was deemed by many dispassionate Athenians well suited for the tutelary intervention of ostracism, the express benefit of which consisted in its separating political opponents when the antipathy between them threatened to push one or the other into extra-constitutional proceedings—especially when one of those parties was Themistokles, a man alike vast in his abilities and unscrupulous in his morality. Probably also there were not a few who wished to revenge the previous ostracism of Aristeides: and lastly the friends of Themistokles himself, elated with his acquittal and his seeming augmented popularity, might indulge hopes that the vote of ostracism would turn out in his favor, and remove one or other of his chief political opponents. From all these circumstances we learn without astonishment that a vote of ostracism was soon after resorted to. It ended in the temporary banishment of Themistokles.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, whither he carried

a considerable property, yet occasionally visiting other parts of Peloponnesus—when the exposure and death of Pausanias, together with the discovery of his correspondence, took place at Sparta. Among this correspondence were found proofs, which Thucydides seems to have considered as real and sufficient, of the privity of Themistokles. By Ephorus and others, he is admitted to have been solicited by Pausanias, and to have known his plans—but to have kept them secret while refusing to co-operate in them. Probably after his exile he took a more decided share in them than before; being well-placed for that purpose at Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but strongly believed to have been in collusion with Xerxes at his invasion of Greece. On this occasion the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens publicly to prefer a formal charge of treason against him, and to urge the necessity of trying him as a Pan-hellenic criminal before the synod of the allies assembled at Sparta.

Whether this latter request would have been granted or whether Themistokles would have been tried at Athens, we cannot tell: for no sooner was he apprised that joint envoys from Sparta and Athens had been dispatched to arrest him, than he fled forthwith from Argos to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that island, though owing gratitude to him and favorably disposed, could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighboring continent. Here however, being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy—Admetus, king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admetus was not at home; and Themistokles, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placed her child in his arms and planted him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admetus returned, Themistokles revealed his name, his pursuers, and his danger—entreating protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity. He appealed to the generosity of the Epirotic prince not to take revenge on a man now defenseless, for offense given under such very different circumstances; and for an offense, too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection now entreated was to the suppliant a matter of life or death. Admetus raised him up from the hearth with the child in his arms—an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him; refusing to give him up to the envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression of his own wish to visit the King of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted him across the mountains to Pydna in the Thermaic gulf, where he found a merchantship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board; neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament. Had he been forced to

land there, he would of course have been recognized and seized, but his wonted subtlety did not desert him. Having communicated both his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land; menacing that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistokles: on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat about during a day and a night off the coast without seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.

Thus did Themistokles, after a series of perils, find himself safe on the Persian side of the Ægean. At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated: nevertheless (as it frequently happened in cases of confiscation), his friends secreted a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore actually seized, was found to amount to eighty talents, according to Theophrastus—to 100 talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political career with a property not greater than three talents. The poverty of Aristeides at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

The escape of Themistokles, and his adventures in Persia, appear to have formed a favorite theme for the fancy and exaggeration of authors a century afterward. We have thus many anecdotes which contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of Thucydides. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed a reward of 200 talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was forced to conceal himself strictly near the coast, until means were found to send him up to Susa, in a closed litter, under pretense that it was a woman for the king's harem: that Mandane, sister of Xerxes, insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis: that he learnt Persian so well, and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to procure for himself an acquittal from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through the importunity of Mandane: that the officers of the king's household at Susa, and the satraps in his way back, threatened him with still farther perils: that he was admitted to see the king in person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable

duty of falling down before him to do homage, etc., with several other uncertified details, which make us value more highly the narrative of Thucydides. Indeed Ephorus, Deino, Kleitarchus, and Herakleides, from whom these anecdotes appear mostly to be derived, even affirmed that Themistokles had found Xerxes himself alive and seen him; whereas Thucydides and Charon, the two contemporary authors (for the former is *nearly* contemporary), asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artaxerxes on the throne.

According to Thucydides, the eminent exile does not seem to have been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such: moreover—what is more strange, though it seems true—he was received as an actual benefactor of the Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account of such dispositions—in consequence of his communications made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellespontine bridge. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast up to Susa, where he addressed a letter to the king couched in the following terms, such as probably no modern European king would tolerate except from a Quaker:—"I, Themistokles, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, as long as I was compelled in my own defense to resist the attack of thy father—but having also done him yet greater good, when I could do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing to me for my past service: moreover, I am now here, chased away by the Greeks in consequence of my attachment to thee, but able still to serve thee with great effect. I wish to wait a year, and then to come before thee in person to explain my views."

Whether the Persian interpreters, who read this letter to Artaxerxes Longimanus, exactly rendered its brief and direct expression, we cannot say. But it made a strong impression upon him, combined with the previous reputation of the writer—and he willingly granted the prayer for delay: though we shall not readily believe that he was so transported as to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to the gods, by an unusual measure of convivial indulgence, and by crying out thrice in his sleep, "I have got Themistokles the Athenian"—as some of Plutarch's authors informed him. In the course of the year granted, Themistokles had learned so much of the Persian language and customs as to be able to communicate personally with the king, and acquire his confidence. No Greek (says Thucydides) had ever before attained such a commanding influence and position at the Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laying out schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which were evidently captivating to the monarch, who rewarded him with a Persian wife and large presents, sending him down to Magnesia on the Mæander, not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenues of the district round that town, amounting to the large sum of fifty talents

yearly, were assigned to him for bread; those of the neighboring seaport of Myus, for articles of condiment to his bread, which was always accounted the main nourishment: those of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for wine. Not knowing the amount of these two latter items, we cannot determine how much revenue Themistokles received altogether; but there can be no doubt, judging from the revenues of Magnesia alone, that he was a great pecuniary gainer by his change of country. After having visited various parts of Asia, he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, in which place his family joined him from Athens.

How long his residence at Magnesia lasted, we do not know, but seemingly long enough to acquire local estimation and leave mementos behind him. He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five years old, without having taken any step toward the accomplishment of those victorious campaigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes. That sickness was the real cause of his death, we may believe on the distinct statement of Thucydides; who at the same time notices a rumor partially current in his own time, of poison voluntarily taken, from painful consciousness on the part of Themistokles himself that the promises made could never be performed—a farther proof of the general tendency to surround the last years of this distinguished man with impressive adventures, and to dignify his last moments with a revived feeling not unworthy of his earlier patriotism. The report may possibly have been designedly circulated by his friends and relatives, in order to conciliate some tenderness toward his memory; since his sons still continued citizens at Athens, and his daughters were married there. These friends farther stated that they had brought back his bones to Attica at his own express command, and buried them privately without the knowledge of the Athenians; no condemned traitor being permitted to be buried in Attic soil. If, however, we even suppose that this statement was true, no one could point out with certainty the spot wherein such interment had taken place. Nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions of Thucydides, that he himself was satisfied of the fact. Moreover, we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Magnesia, when they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honor of Themistokles in their own market-place, were persuaded that his bones were really inclosed within it.

Aristeides died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistokles; but respecting the place and manner of his death, there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in the Euxine sea; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal esteem and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single statement of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristeides as having been falsely accused before the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ, on

the allegation of having taken bribes during the assessment of the tribute upon the allies—which fine he was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one fact—but that fact at the same time the most honorable of all—that he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave enough to pay funeral expenses—that a sepulcher was provided for him at Phalerum at the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lysimachus and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, and even at that remote day some of them received aid out of the public purse, from the recollection of their incorruptible ancestor. Nearly a century and a half afterwards, a poor man named Lysimachus, descendant of the Just Aristeides, was to be seen at Athens near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and obtaining his scanty fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of the passers-by: Demetrius the Phalerean procured from the people, for the mother and aunt of this poor man, a small daily allowance. On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristeides with Themistokles. The latter, having distinguished himself by ostentatious cost at Olympia, and by a choragic victory at Athens, with little scruples as to the means of acquisition—ended his life at Magnesia in dishonorable affluence greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant, the Athenian Themistokles attended the lectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens, as the comrade and friend of Plutarch himself.

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD.—FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

I HAVE already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to organize a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city (Vorort)—and how this confederacy, framed not only for common and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insular or maritime, near the Ægean sea. I also noticed this event as giving commencement to a new era in Grecian politics. For whereas there had been before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady and increasing, toward something like one Pan-hellenic league under Sparta as

president—from henceforward that tendency disappears, and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide the Grecian world between them, and bring a much larger number of its members into co-operation either with one or the other, than had ever been so arranged before.

Thucydides marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the character of the new confederacy during the first years after its commencement. But unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts; and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477 B.C. and 405 B.C. (the latter date is that of the battle of Ægos-potami) as constituting "the Athenian empire." This word denotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the last forty years, of the seventy-two years indicated; but it is misleading when applied to the first part: nor indeed can any single word be found which faithfully characterizes as well the one part as the other. A great and serious change had taken place, and we disguise the fact of that change if we talk of the Athenian hegemony or headship as a portion of the Athenian empire. Thucydides carefully distinguishes the two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and of the Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship or hegemony.

The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine precisely where the former ends and the latter begins; but it had been consummated before the thirty years' truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war—and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by Athens —partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects—partly as a corollary from necessity of union combined with her superior force: while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more forward both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the Persians: an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphemus at Kamarina in 415 B.C. to have been heard by Themistokles or Aristeides fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and to the justice of the other.

The imperial condition of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies (except Chios and Lesbos) were tributary subjects, and when the Ægean sea was an Athenian lake—was of course the period of her greatest splendor and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers—suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion over the Ægean, as

the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta—holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror—and even bringing up by association into men's fancies the mythical Minos of Krete, and others, as having been rulers of the Ægean in times anterior to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the incidents between 479–450 B.C. For we may gather from the intimation of Thucydides, as well as from his barrenness of facts, that while there were chroniclers both for the Persian invasion and for the times before it, no one cared for the time immediately succeeding. Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this blank has all been borrowed (if we except the careful Thucydides) from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire. Credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian war downwards at results, which perhaps Themistokles may have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation of subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be explained from the circumstances preceding and actually present, with some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with that which was then an unknown future. When Aristeides and Kimon dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second arrival, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them. They had to complete the defeat of the Persian power, still formidable—and to create and organize a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian war, which Thucydides introduces as "the digression from this narrative," he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B.C.—and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B.C.—he recites three incidents only: first, the siege and capture of Eion on the Strymon with its Persian garrison—next, the capture of Skyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens—thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubœa, and reduction of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten or eleven years. Considering what Thucydides states respecting the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they were all which he could learn about it on good authority: and they are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens herself—for Eion was the first stepping-

stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros in the time of Thucydides was the property of outlying Athenian citizens or kleruchs. Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly-established confederate force: for it is certain that the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active warfare against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions that "before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont, all of whom were conquered by the Greeks after that invasion, with the single exception of Maskames governor of Doriskus, who could never be taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress."

Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defense sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Boges governor of Eion. Boges, after bravely defending himself, and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted, and farther resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile—slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them into it—threw his precious effects over the wall into the Strymon—and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames. His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This capture of Eion, effected by Kimon, has been mentioned (as already stated) by Thucydides; but Herodotus here gives us to understand that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed by Thucydides, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his language that Maskames maintained himself in Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxes, and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be itself a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. And in truth this is what we should expect. The battles of Salamis, Platæa, and Mykale, drove the Persians out of Greece and overpowered their main armaments, but did not remove them at once from all the various posts which they occupied throughout the Ægean and Thrace. Without doubt the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a great number of different Persian detachments; an operation neither short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see by the cases of Sestus and Eion; nor indeed always practicable, as the case of Doriskus teaches us. The fear of these Persians, yet remaining in the neighborhood, and even the chance of a renewed Persian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for Grecian cities to join the new confederacy; while the expulsion of the enemy added to it those places which he had occupied. It was by these years of active operations at sea against the common enemy that the Athenians first established that constant, systematic, and

laborious training, among their own ships' crews, which transmitted itself with continual improvements down to the Peloponnesian war. It was by these, combined with present fear, that they were enabled to organize the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known among Greeks—to bring together deliberative deputies—to plant their own ascendency as enforcers of the collective resolutions—and to raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was by the same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical training would never have been acquired—the confederacy would never have become a working reality—the fatigue and discontent among its members would never have arisen—unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organized operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B.C.

As to these ten years, then, we are by no means to assume that the particular incidents mentioned by Thucydides about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, and Naxos constitute the sum total of events. To contradict this assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part of the stock of a very busy period—the remaining details of which, indicated in outline by the large general language of Thucydides, we are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the synod of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical meetings: though it would have been highly interesting to trace the steps whereby an institution which at first promised to protect not less the separate rights of the members than the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite rights, and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristeides on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetuity—marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of iron into the sea, never again to be seen. As this confederacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding each member to the rest and not allowing either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction. The determining authority was provided by the synod at Delos: the enforcing sanction was exercised by Athens as president. And there is every reason to presume that Athens, for a long time, performed this duty in a legitimate and honorable manner, acting in execution of the resolves of the synod, or at least in full harmony with its general purposes. She exacted from every member the regulated quota of men or money, employ-

ing coercion against recusants, and visiting neglect of military duty with penalties. In all these requirements she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the confederacy. There can be no reasonable doubt that the general synod went cordially along with her in strictness of dealing toward those defaulters who obtained protection without bearing their share of the burden.

But after a few years, several of the confederates, becoming weary of personal military service, prevailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men in their place, and imposed upon themselves in exchange a money-payment of suitable amount. This commutation, at first probably introduced to meet some special case of inconvenience, was found so suitable to the taste of all parties, that it gradually spread through the larger portion of the confederacy. To unwarlike allies, hating labor and privation, it was a welcome relief: while to the Athenians, full of ardor, and patient of labor as well as discipline for the aggrandizement of their country, it afforded constant pay for a fleet more numerous than they could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plain from the statement of Thucydides that this altered practice was introduced from the petition of the confederates themselves, not from any pressure or stratagem on the part of Athens. But though such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient—but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens were less and less paralyzed by the contentions and irregularity of a synod: so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.

Under such circumstances, several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute—and averse to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede: but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the other—conquering, fining, and disarming the revolters; which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years

—the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolters continually increasing—so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy. The allies slid unconsciously into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against revolters, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power—and that, too, without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined. It would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practiced by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendency as well as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendency was both passion and patriotism. But though the Athenians were both disposed, and qualified, to push all the advantages offered and even to look out for new—we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honorable causes: voluntary invitation—efforts both unwearied and successful against a common enemy—unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty—and inability to break up the confederacy, without endangering themselves as well as laying open the Ægean sea to the Persians.

There were two other causes, besides that which has been just adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending toward separate political autonomy of each city—as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod of Delos on its first large and equal basis. Next—and this is the great cause of all—Athens, having defeated the Persians and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success—everything to apprehend from defeat—and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head the subject allies had great reason to complain, throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance. But on the point of practical grievances or oppressions they had little ground for discontent, and little feeling of actual discontent, as I shall show more fully hereafter. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied cities, the feeling toward Athens was

rather indifference than hatred. The movement of revolt against her proceeded from small parties of leading men, acting apart from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of ambition for themselves. The positive hatred toward her was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money-payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form, and vanished. Nothing however can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact that while the former shrank from personal service and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it, the latter were "ready enough with their bodies," but uncomplying and impracticable as to contributions. The contempt felt by these Dorian landsmen for the military efficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and appears even to exceed what the reality justified. But when we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Lade, in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia—we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity of personal effort and labor, as that which broke up the Confederacy of Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate fully the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterized the Athenians of that day—we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amid such glaring inequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible. It was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an Athenian empire.

I have already mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristeides and adopted by the synod at Delos, was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money, but in ships. But this practice gradually diminished, as the commutations above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute of course became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy; from whence we may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred admits of being fully explained by the numerous commutations of service for money as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its maximum number at the date

of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like Sinope and Ægina, subsequently added.

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony or headship, and ending with the Athenian empire, the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount; events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action, and not well authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity (whether the first absolutely or not we cannot determine) between 476 B.C. and 466 B.C. was the conquest of the important post of Eion on the Strymon, where the Persian governor Boges, starved out after a desperate resistance, destroyed himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and precious effects, as has already been stated. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros (seemingly about 470 B.C.) and the Dryopes in the town and district of Karystus in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it except a good maritime position and an excellent harbor; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphictyonic synod, which condemned the island to make restitution. The mass of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime: and these men, in order to evade payment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament. He conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy: but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos (which the Athenians had doubtless reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians), and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognized adjunct or outlying portion of Attica. Moreover there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus; whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favor at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 476 B.C. that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city. They had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had pre-

vented a search, and it was only after Kimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended to find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 469 B.C., and after being welcomed by the people in solemn and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, was deposited in the interior of the city. On the spot was built the monument called the Theseium with its sacred precinct, invested with the privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor condition who might feel ground for dreading the oppressions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in case of cruel usage. Such were the protective functions of the mythical hero of democracy, whose installation is interesting as marking the growing intensity of democratical feeling in Athens since the Persian war.

It was about two years or more after this incident that the first breach of union in the Confederacy of Delos took place. The important island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades—an island which thirty years before had boasted a large marine force and 8,000 hoplites—revolted; on what special ground we do not know: but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller—at the same time that they were more jealous of Athens. After a siege of unknown duration, by Athens and the confederate force, it was forced to surrender, and reduced to the condition of a tributary subject; its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed. Whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have no information.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however untoward in its effects upon the equal and self-maintained character of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the whole Naxian fleet with new pecuniary contributions in the hands of the chief. Nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the late act of severity, by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but the expedition under Kimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having under him 200 triremes from Athens, and 100 from the various confederates, was dispatched to attack the Persians on the south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian settlements, both in Karia and Lykia; among others, the important trading city of Phaselis, though at first resisting and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Kimon's armament to pay a contribution of ten talents and join the expedition. From the length of time occupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon

in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustes and Pherendates, both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phœnician, seems to have consisted of 200 ships, but a farther re-enforcement of eighty Phœnician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, so that the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival Kimon, anxious for the same reason to hasten on the combat, attacked them vigorously. Partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destrooed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the re-enforcement of eighty Phœnician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription of the commemorative offering to Apollo; set up out of the tithe of the spoils. The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the region eastward of Phaselis, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them. But it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularize her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos; but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post Eion on the Strymon, the most convenient post for the neighboring region of Thrace, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring

grants, or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land with various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Skapte Hyle, as well as from others in the neighborhood. The condition of Thasos at this time (about 465 B.C.) indicates to us the progress which the Grecian states in the Ægean had made since their liberation from Persia. It had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, by order of Darius, about 491 B.C., and must have remained in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes; but we now find it well fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasians of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace, we are not informed. But it reached such a height that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against the island, under the command of Kimon. Having vanquished the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles, and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same time they undertook—what seems to have been part and parcel of the same scheme—the establishment of a larger and more powerful colony on Thracian ground not far from Eion. On the Strymon, about three miles higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river narrows itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature of a lake, was situated the Edonian town or settlement called Ennea Hodoi (Nine Ways), a little above the bridge, which here served as an important communication for all the people of the interior. Both Histiæus and Aristagoras, the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the advantages of this place to commence a settlement there: both of them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was now about to be added. The Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists, 10,000 in number, partly from their own citizens, partly collected from their allies; the temptations of the site probably rendering volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned, they were successful in conquering it and driving away the Edonian possessors. But on trying to extend themselves farther to the eastward, to a spot called Drabekus, convenient for the mining region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to aid the Edonians in decisive hostility against the new colony—probably not without instigation from the inhabitants of Thasos. All or most of the 10,000 colonists were slain in this warfare, and the new colony was for the time completely abandoned. We shall find it resumed hereafter.

Disappointed as the Athenians were in this enterprise, they did not abandon the blockade of Thasos, which held out more than two

years, and only surrendered in the third year. Its fortifications were razed; its ships of war, thirty-three in number, were taken away; its possessions and mining establishments on the opposite continent were relinquished. Moreover an immediate contribution in money was demanded from the inhabitants, over and above the annual payment assessed upon them for the future. The subjugation of this powerful island was another step in the growing dominion of Athens over her confederates.

The year before the Thasians surrendered, however, they had taken a step which deserves particular notice, as indicating the newly-gathering clouds in the Grecian political horizon. They had made secret application to the Lacedæmonians for aid, entreating them to draw off the attention of Athens by invading Attica; and the Lacedæmonians, without the knowledge of Athens, having actually engaged to comply with this request, were only prevented from performing their promise by a grave and terrible misfortune at home. Though accidentally unperformed, this hostile promise is a most significant event. It marks the growing fear and hatred on the part of Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens, merely on general grounds of the magnitude of her power, and without any special provocation. Nay, not only had Athens given no provocation, but she was still actually included as a member of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and we shall find her presently both appealed to and acting as such. We shall hear so much of Athens, and that too with truth, as pushing and aggressive—and of Sparta as home-keeping and defensive—that the incident just mentioned becomes important to remark. The first intent of unprovoked and even treacherous hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian war—is conceived and reduced to an engagement by Sparta.

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, after the surrender of Thasos and the liberation of the armament, had expected from Kimon some farther conquests in Macedonia—and even that he had actually entered upon that project with such promise of success, that its farther consummation was certain as well as easy. Having under these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was accused by Perikles and others of having been bought off by bribes from the Macedonian king Alexander; but was acquitted after a public trial.

During the period which had elapsed between the first formation of the confederacy of Delos and the capture of Thasos (about thirteen or fourteen years, B.C. 477–463), the Athenians seem to have been occupied almost entirely in their maritime operations, chiefly against the Persians—having been free from embarrassments immediately round Attica. But this freedom was not destined to last much longer. During the ensuing ten years, their foreign relations near home become both active and complicated; while their strength expands so wonderfully, that they are found competent at once to

obligations on both sides of the Ægean sea, the distant as well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the twelve or fifteen years immediately succeeding the battle of Platæa, we have scarcely any information. The feelings of the time, between those Greeks who had supported and those who had resisted the Persian invader, must have remained unfriendly even after the war was at an end; while the mere occupation of the Persian numerous host must have inflicted severe damage both upon Thessaly and Bœotia. At the meeting of the Amphiktyonic synod which succeeded the expulsion of the invaders, a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Melian Ephialtes, who had betrayed to Xerxes the mountain-path over Œta, and thus caused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Moreover, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed by Lacedæmon that all the *medising* Greeks should be expelled from the synod—a proposition which the more long-sighted views of Themistokles successfully resisted. Even the stronger measure of razing the fortifications of all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested itself to the Lacedæmonians—as we see from their language on the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens. In regard to Bœotia, it appears that the headship of Thebes as well as the coherence of the federation was for the time almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Platæa and Thespiæ were restored, and the latter in part repeopled, under Athenian influence. The general sentiment of Peloponnesus as well as of Athens would have sustained these towns against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of "ancient Bœotian right and usage." The Theban government was then in discredit for its previous *medism*—even in the eyes of Thebans themselves; while the party opposed to Thebes in the other towns was so powerful, that many of them would probably have been severed from the federation to become allies of Athens like Platæa, if the interference of Lacedæmon had not arrested such a tendency. Lacedæmon was in every other part of Greece an enemy to organized aggregation of cities, either equal or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping the little autonomous communities separate; whence she sometimes became by accident the protector of the weaker cities against compulsory alliance imposed upon them by the stronger. The interest of her own ascendency was in this respect analogous to that of the Persians when they dictated the peace of Antalkidas—of the Romans in administering their extensive conquests—and of the kings of Medieval Europe in breaking the authority of the barons over their vassals. But though such was the policy of Sparta elsewhere, her fear of Athens, which grew up during the ensuing twenty years, made her act differently in regard to Bœotia. She had no other means of maintaining that country as her own ally and as the enemy of

Athens, except by organizing the federation effectively, and strengthening the authority of Thebes. It is to this revolution in Spartan politics that Thebes owed the recovery of her ascendency—a revolution so conspicuously marked, that the Spartans even aided in enlarging her circuit and improving her fortifications. It was not without difficulty that she maintained this position even when recovered, against the dangerous neighborhood of Athens—a circumstance which made her not only a vehement partisan of Sparta, but even more furiously anti-Athenian than Sparta, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics toward Bœotia, did not manifest itself until about twenty years after the commencement of the Athenian maritime confederacy. During the course of those twenty years, we know that Sparta had had more than one battle to sustain in Arcadia, against the towns and villages of that country, in which she came forth victorious; but we have no particulars respecting these incidents. We also know that a few years after the Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concentrated themselves from many dispersed townships into the one main city of Elis: and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia, and one or two of the towns of Achaia, were either formed or enlarged by a similar process near about the same time. Such aggregation of towns out of the pre-existing separate villages was not conformable to the views, nor favorable to the ascendency of Lacedæmon. But there can be little doubt that her foreign policy after the Persian invasion was both embarrassed and discredited by the misconduct of her two contemporary kings, Pausanias (who though only regent was practically equivalent to a king) and Leotychides—not to mention the rapid development of Athens and Peiræus.

Moreover, in the year B.C. 464 (the year preceding the surrender of Thasos to the Athenian armament), a misfortune of yet more terrific moment befell Sparta. A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighborhood of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town, and a vast number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgment of the earth-shaking god Poseidon (according to the view of the Lacedæmonians themselves) for a recent violation of his sanctuary at Tænarus, from whence certain suppliant Helots had been dragged away not long before for punishment: not improbably some of those Helots whom Pausanias had instigated to revolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity toward their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusually inflammable: so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them at once into revolt, together with some even of the Perioeki. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta, which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments of consternation, had not the bravery and presence of mind

of the young king Archidamus reanimated the surviving citizens and repelled the attack. But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued. They maintained the field against the Spartan force, sometimes with considerable advantage, since Aeimnestus (the warrior by whose hand Mardonius had fallen at Platæa) was defeated and slain with 300 followers in the plain of Stenyklerus, overpowered by superior numbers. When at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memorable hill of Ithome, the ancient citadel of their Messenian forefathers. Here they made a long and obstinate defense, supporting themselves doubtless by incursions throughout Laconia. Defense indeed was not difficult, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were at that time confessedly incapable of assailing even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had lasted some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the Lacedæmonians, beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for the undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we find specified the Æginetans, the Athenians, and the Platæans. The Athenian troops are said to have consisted of 4,000 men, under the command of Kimon; Athens being still included in the list of Lacedæmonian allies.

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no immediate impression on the fortified hill of Ithome. And when the Lacedæmonians saw that their Athenian allies were not more successful than they had been been themselves, they soon passed from surprise into doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground for such a feeling, while Kimon their general was notorious for his attachment to Sparta. Yet the Lacedæmonians could not help suspecting the ever-wakeful energy and ambition of these Ionic strangers whom they introduced into the interior of Laconia. Calling to mind their own promise—though doubtless a secret promise—to invade Attica not long before, for the benefit of the Thasians—they even began to fear that the Athenians might turn against them, and listen to solicitations for espousing the cause of the besieged. Under the influence of such apprehensions, they dismissed the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretense of having no farther occasion for them; while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as before.

This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme and probably rendered even more offensive by the habitual roughness of Spartan dealing, excited the strongest exasperation both among the Athenian soldiers and the Athenian people—an exasperation heightened by circumstances immediately preceding. For the resolution to send auxiliaries into Laconia, when the Lacedæmonians first applied for them, had not been taken without considerable debate at Athens. The party of Perikles and Ephialtes, habitually in opposition to Kimon, and partisans of the forward democratical movement, had strongly

discountenanced it, and conjured their countrymen not to assist in renovating and strengthening their most formidable rival. Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the Thasians may have become known to them, though not so formally as to exclude denial. And even supposing this engagement to have remained unknown at that time to every one, there were not wanting other grounds to render the policy of refusal plausible. But Kimon—with an earnestness which even the philo-Laconian Kritias afterward characterized as a sacrifice of the grandeur of Athens to the advantage of Lacedæmon—employed all his credit and influence in seconding the application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta on equal footing—peace among the great powers of Greece and common war against Persia—together with the prevention of all further democratical changes in Athens—were the leading points of his political creed. As yet, both his personal and political ascendency were predominant over his opponents. As yet, there was no manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show itself in the case of Thasos, between the maritime power of Athens and the union of land-force under Sparta; and Kimon could still treat both of these phenomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being. Though noway distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. "Consent not to see Hellas lamed of one leg and Athens drawing without her yoke-fellow;"—such was his language, as we learn from his friend and companion the Chion poet Ion: and in the lips of Kimon it proved effective. It is a speech of almost melancholy interest, since ninety years passed over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to an Athenian assembly. The dispatch of the auxiliaries was thus dictated by a generous sentiment, to the disregard of what might seem political prudence. And we may imagine the violent reaction which took place in Athenian feeling when the Lacedæmonians repaid them by singling out their troops from all the other allies as objects of insulting suspicion. We may imagine the triumph of Perikles and Ephialtes, who had opposed the mission—and the vast loss of influence to Kimon, who had brought it about—when Athens received again into her public assembly the hoplites sent back from Ithome.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed (of which more presently), and in the external policy, of Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was pregnant with results. The Athenians immediately passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance between themselves and Lacedæmon against the Persians. They did more: they looked out for land-enemies of Lacedæmon, with whom to ally themselves.

Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian invasion, had now recovered the effects of the destructive defeat suffered about

thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenes. The sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, and the temporary predominance of the Periœki, acquired in consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put down. In the neighborhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were situated Mykenæ, Tiryns, and Midea—small in power and importance, but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos at the period of danger, these towns had furnished contingents both to Thermopylæ and Platæa, which their powerful neighbor had been unable either to prevent at the time or to avenge afterward, from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmon. But so soon as the latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, with a formidable Messenian revolt, the Argeians availed themselves of the opportunity to attack not only Mykenæ and Tiryns, but also Orneæ, Midea, and other semi-dependent towns around them. Several of these were reduced; and the inhabitants, robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the domain of Argos: but the Mykenæans, partly from the superior gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy of their mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven into banishment. Through these victories Argos was now more powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made to her by Athens, while strengthening both the two against Lacedæmon, opened to her a new chance of recovering her lost headship in Peloponnesus. The Thessalians became members of this new alliance, which was a defensive alliance against Lacedæmon: and hopes were doubtless entertained of drawing in some of the habitual allies of the latter.

The new character which Athens had thus assumed, as a competitor for landed alliances not less than for maritime ascendency, came opportunely for the protection of the neighboring town of Megara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated like Argos by the helplessness of the Lacedæmonians, had been making border encroachments on the one side upon Kleonæ—on the other side upon Megara: on which ground the latter, probably despairing of protection from Lacedæmon, renounced the Lacedæmonian connection, and obtained permission to enroll herself as an ally of Athens. This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it both opened to them the whole range of territory across the outer Isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Krissæan Gulf, on which the Megarian port of Pegæ was situated—and placed them in possession of the passes of Mount Geraneia, so that they could arrest the march of a Peloponnesian army over the Isthmus, and protect Attica from invasion. It was moreover of great importance in its effects on Grecian politics: for it was counted as a wrong by Lacedæmon, gave deadly offense to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames of war between them and Athens; their allies the Epidaurians and Æginetans taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and

energy had inspired universal awe; while the maritime states in the neighborhood, such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina, saw these terror-striking qualities threatening them at their own doors, through her alliance with Argos and Megara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud between the Athenians and Æginetans, though dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been appeased or forgotten: so that the Æginetans, dwelling within sight of Peiræus, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by Athens. Perikles was wont to call Ægina the eyesore of Peiræus: but we may be sure that Peiræus, grown into a vast fortified port within the existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the eyesore of Ægina.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the Phenician coast. Moreover the revolt of the Egyptians under Inaros (about 460 B.C.) opened to them new means of action against the Great King. Their fleet, by invitation of the revolters, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their military operations near home were conducted with unabated vigor: and the inscription which remains—a commemoration of their citizens of the Erechtheid tribe who were slain in one and the same year in Cyprus, Egypt, Phenicia, the Halieis, Ægina, and Megara—brings forcibly before us that energy which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries.

Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the superiority of Peloponnesian land-force, and to insure a constant communication with it by sea. But the city (like most of the ancient Hellenic towns) was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with Nisæa; so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress, wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means of succor from Athens in case of need. These "Long Walls," though afterward copied in other places and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth however were not directed against Megara. The Athenians, having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halieis (the population of the southern Argolic peninsula, bordering on Trœzen and Hermione), were defeated on land by the

Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Trœzen, which we find afterward in their dependence, without knowing when it became so. But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kekryphaleia (between Ægina and the Argolic peninsula) the Athenians gained the victory. After this victory and defeat—neither of them apparently very decisive—the Æginetans began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force together with that of their allies—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians: while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Ægina, the superiority of the new nautical tactics acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian war—over the old Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where at the time of the battle of Marathon the maritime strength of Greece had resided—was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The Peloponnesian and Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience of the improved seacraft of Athens, and when we find how much they were disconcerted with it even twenty-eight years afterward at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power of Ægina was irrecoverably ruined. The Athenians captured seventy ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.

If the Lacedæmonians had not been occupied at home by the blockade of Ithome, they would have been probably induced to invade Attica as a diversion to the Æginetans; especially as the Persian Megabazus came to Sparta at this time on the part of Artaxerxes to prevail upon them to do so, in order that the Athenians might be constrained to retire from Egypt. This Persian brought with him a large sum of money, but was nevertheless obliged to return without effecting his mission. The Corinthians and Epidaurians however, while they carried to Ægina a re-enforcement of 300 hoplites, did their best to aid her farther by an attack upon Megara; which place, it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three exigencies at one and the same time—to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myronides marched from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes of military age, old and young; these being the only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but debatable, advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter, when they arrived at home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, for not having vanquished the

refuse of the Athenian military force, that they returned back at the end of twelve days and erected a trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; for a body of them, missing their road, became entangled in a space of private ground inclosed on every side by a deep ditch, and having only one narrow entrance. Myronides, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded the inclosure with his light-armed troops, who with their missile weapons slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow to the city.

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account—partly also from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Perikles, which were now becoming ascendent in the city—the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls, though for so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Nisæa; for without such an intermediate stepping-stone, the project of a wall forty stadia (=about 4½ Engl. miles) to join Athens with Peiræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (=nearly 4 Eng. miles) to join it with Phalerum, would have appeared extravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athenians—as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistokles himself. Coming as an immediate sequal of great recent victories, and while, Ægina, the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians—being regarded as the second great stride, at once conspicious and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Peiræus.

But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable contention of political parties then going on at Athens. Kimon had been recently ostracized; and the democratical movement pressed by Perikles and Ephialtes (of which more presently) was in its full tide of success; yet not without a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the existing constitution. Now the long walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Perikles, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistokles when he first schemed the Peiræus. They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of landed attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force of Peloponnesus. But though thus calculated for

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contingencies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, obnoxious to a considerable number of Athenians; to the party recently headed by Kimon, who were attached to the Lacedæmonian connection, and desired above all things to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-Persian enterprise: to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of their territorial possession: to the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, averse to a still closer contact and amalgamation with the maritime multitude in Peiræus: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with the separate demes of Peiræus and Phalerum as effacing the special associations connected with the holy rock of Athene. When to all these grounds of opposition, we add, the expense and trouble of the undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the peculiar violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt—we shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both for Athens and her democracy. If any farther proof were wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the fact that their destruction was the prominent mark of Athenian humiliation after the battle of Ægospotami, and their restoration the immediate boon of Pharnabazus and Konon after the victory of Knidus.

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to undertake an expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithome were not yet reduced to surrender. Their force consisted of 1500 troops of their own, and 10,000 of their various allies, under the regent Nikomedes. The ostensible motive, or the pretense, for this march, was the protection of the little territory of Doris against the Phokians, who had recently invaded it and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so large a force immediately compelled the Phokians to relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that her main purpose, under instigation of the Corinthians, was, to arrest the aggrandizement of Athens. It could not escape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians might presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Bœotia in their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to their previous ally Platæa: for the Bœotian federation was at this time much disorganized, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered her ascendency since the discredit of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes and to render her ascendency effective over the Bœotian cities, was the best way of providing a neighbor at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to prevent their farther aggrandizement by land: it

was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued eighty years afterward, in organizing Arcadia and Messene against Sparta. Accordingly the Peloponnesian force was now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Bœotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy; probably by placing their governments in the hands of citizens of known oligarchical politics, and perhaps banishing suspected opponents. To this scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness; promising to keep down for the future their border neighbors, so as to spare the necessity of armies coming from Sparta.

But there was also a farther design, yet more important, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchic opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Perikles, and to the Democratic movement, that several of them opened a secret negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders; inviting them into Attica, and entreating their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls, but also of subverting the democracy. The Peloponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations in Bœotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian malcontents in arms, and encamped at Tanagra on the very borders of Attica for the purpose of immediate co-operation with them. The juncture was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially as the ostracized Kimon and his remaining friends in the city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Bœotia, knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their immediate borders—and took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having obtained a re-enforcement of 1000 Argeians and some Thessalian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian force then at home; which must of course have consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myronides at Megara; for the blockade of Ægina was still going on Nor was it possible for the Lacedæmonian army to return into Peloponnesus without fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in possession of the difficult high lands of Geraneia, the road or march along the isthmus; while the Athenian fleet, by means of the harbor of Pegæ, was prepared to intercept them if they tried to come by sea across the Krissæan Gulf, by which way it would appear that they had come out. Near Tanagra a bloody battle took place between the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly from the desertion of the Thessalian horse who passed over to them in the very heat of the engagement. But though the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to favor the contemplated rising in Attica. Nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it except an undisturbed retreat over the high lands of Geraneia, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The ostracized Kimon presented himself on the field, as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica, requesting to be allowed to occupy his station as a Hoplite and fight in the ranks of his tribe—the Œneis. But such was the belief, entertained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was refused and he was forced to retire. In departing he conjured his personal friends, Euthippus (of the deme Anaphlystus) and others, to behave in such a manner as might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon theirs. His friends retained his panoply and assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then entered the engagement with desperate resolution and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Perikles on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe the Akamantis, aware of this application and repulse of Kimon, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual recklessness of life and safety, though it happened that he escaped unwounded. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens; while the unshaken patriotism of Kimon and his friends discountenanced and disarmed those conspirators who had entered into correspondence with the enemy, at the same time that it roused a repentant admiration toward the ostracized leader himself. Such was the happy working of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and carried—proposed too by Perikles himself—to abridge the ten years of Kimon's ostracism, and permit his immediate return. We may recollect that under circumstances partly analogous, Themistokles had himself proposed the restoration of his rival Aristeides from ostracism, a little before the battle of Salamis; and in both cases, the suspension of enmity between the two leaders was partly the sign, partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconciliation and renewed fraternity among the general body of citizens. It was a moment analogous to that salutary impulse of compromise, and harmony of parties, which followed the extinction of the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, forty-six years afterward, and on which Thucydides dwells emphatically as the salvation of Athens in her distress—a moment rare in free communities generally, not less than among the jealous competitors for political ascendency at Athens.

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, which produced the recall of Kimon and appears to have overlaid the pre-existing conspiracy, that the Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second day after the battle that they undertook an aggressive march under Myronides into Bœotia: the extreme precision of this date—being the single case throughout the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars wherein Thucydides is thus precise—marks how strong an impression it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Œnophyta, engaged against the aggregate Theban and Bœotian forces—or, if Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Œnophyta was the last—Myronides was completely victorious. The Athenians became masters of Thebes as well as of the remaining Bœotian towns: reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta—establishing democratic governments—and forcing the aristocratic leaders, favorable to Theban ascendency and Lacedæmonian connection, to become exiles. Nor was it only Bœotia which the Athenians thus acquired: Phokis and Lokris were both successively added to the list of their dependent allies—the former being in the main friendly to Athens and not disinclined to the change, while the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of their chiefs were detained and sent to Athens as hostages. The Athenians thus extended their influence—maintained through internal party management, backed by the dread of interference from without in case of need—from the borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara and Pegæ, to the strait of Thermopylæ.

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of Ægina. That island, doubtless starved out its protracted blockade, was forced to capitulate on condition of destroying its fortifications, surrendering all its ships of war, and submitting to annual tribute as a dependent ally of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less than on the Ægian. Her admiral Tolmides displayed her strength by sailing round Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of burning the Lacedæmonian ports of Methone and of Gythium. He took Chalkis, a possession of the Corinthians, and Naupaktus, belonging to the Ozolian Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinthin Gulf, disembarked troops near Sikyon, with some advantage in a battle against opponents from that town, and either gained or forced into the Athenian alliance not only Zakynthus and Kephallenia, but also some of the towns of Achaia; for we afterward find these latter attached to Athens without knowing when the connection began. During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon Sikyon with a force of 1000 hoplites under Perikles himself, sailing from the Megarian harbor of Pegæ in the Krissæan Gulf. This eminent man, however, gained no greater advantage than Tolmides—defeating the Sikyonian forces in the field and driving them within their walls. He afterward made an expedition into Akarnania, taking the Achæan allies in addition to his own forces, but miscarried in his attack on Œniadæ and accomplished nothing. Nor were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same year

against Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the exiled princes or nobles of Pharsalus. Though they took with them an imposing force, including their Bœotian and Phokian allies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites: while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of internal rising were disappointed.

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would have acquired to their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece. But even without Thessaly their power was prodigious, and had now attained a maximum height from which it never varied except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against so many successes, we have to reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (B.C. 460–455). At first they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent prince Inaros; expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the strongest part called the White Fortress. And such was the alarm of the Persian king Artaxerxes at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Megabyzus with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This envoy however failed, and an augmented Persian force, being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, drove the Athenians and their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosopitis. Here they were blocked up for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kyrene: the rest were either slain or made captive, and Inaros himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens was further aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Persians and Phœnicians; very few either of the ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyrtæus, who contrived by retiring into the inaccessible fens still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolmides, that the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians against the Helots or Messenians at Ithome, ended. These besieged men, no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced to abandon this last fortress of ancient Messenian independence, stipulating for a safe retreat from Peloponnesus with their wives and families; with the proviso that if any one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, he should become the slave of the first person who seized him. They were established by Tolmides at Naupaktus

(recently taken by the Athenians from the Ozolian Lokrians), where they will be found rendering good service to Athens in the following wars.

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedæmonians made no further expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several succeeding years, not even to prevent Bœotia and Phokis from being absorbed into the Athenian alliance. The reason of this remissness lay, partly, in their general character; partly in the continuance of the siege of Ithome, which occupied them at home; but still more, perhaps, in the fact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in occupation of the road over the high lands of Geraneia, and could therefore obstruct the march of any army out from Peloponnesus. Even after the surrender of Ithome, the Lacedæmonians remained inactive for three years, after which time a formal truce was concluded with Athens by the Peloponnesians generally, for five years longer. This truce was concluded in a great degree through the influence of Kimon, who was eager to resume effective operations against the Persians; while it was not less suitable to the political interest of Perikles that his most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service, so as not to interfere with his influence at home. Accordingly Kimon, having equipped a fleet of 200 triremes from Athens and her confederates, set sail for Cyprus, from whence he dispatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against the Persians amidst the fens—while with the remaining armament he laid siege to Kitium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died either of disease or of a wound. The armament, under his successor Anaxikrates, became so embarrassed for want of provisions, that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phœnician and Kilikian fleet near Salamis in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on sea and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Eurymedon; after which they returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus.

From this time forward no further operations were undertaken by Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things: To leave free, undisturbed, and untaxed the Asiatic maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast: To refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Phaselis (others place the boundary at the Chelidonean islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Kyanean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. On their side the Athenians agreed to leave him in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. Kallias, an Athenian of distinguished family, with some others of his countrymen, went up to Susa to negotiate this convention: and certain envoys from Argos,

then in alliance with Athens, took the opportunity of going thither at the same time to renew the friendly understanding which their city had established with Xerxes at the period of his invasion of Greece.

As is generally the case with treaties after hostility, this convention did little more than recognize the existing state of things, without introducing any new advantage or disadvantage on either side, or calling for any measures to be taken in consequence of it. We may hence assign a reasonable ground for the silence of Thucydides, who does not even notice the convention as having been made: we are to recollect always that in the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars he does not profess to do more than glance briefly at the main events. But the boastful and inaccurate authors of the ensuing century, orators, rhetors, and historians, indulged in so much exaggeration and untruth respecting this convention, both as to date and as to details, and extolled as something so glorious the fact of having imposed such hard conditions on the Great King, that they have raised a suspicion against themselves. Especially they have occasioned critics to ask the very natural question, how this splendid achievement of Athens came to be left unnoticed by Thucydides? Now the answer to such question is, that the treaty itself was really of no great moment: it is the state of facts and relations implied in the treaty, and existing substantially before it was concluded, which constitutes the real glory of Athens. But to the later writers the treaty stood forth as the legible evidence of facts which in their time were past and gone: while Thucydides and his contemporaries, living in the actual fullness of the Athenian empire, would certainly not appeal to the treaty as an evidence, and might well pass it over even as an event, when studying to condense the narrative. Though Thucydides has not mentioned the treaty, he says nothing which disproves its reality, and much which is in full harmony with it. For we may show even from him—1. That all open and direct hostilities between Athens and Persia ceased after the last mentioned victories of the Athenians near Cyprus: that this island is renounced by Athens, not being included by Thucydides in his catalogue of Athenian allies prior to the Peloponnesian war; and that no further aid is given by Athens to the revolted Amyrtæus in Egypt. 2. That down to the time when the Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinous failure at Syracuse, no tribute was collected by the Persian satraps in Asia Minor from the Greek cities on the coast, nor were Persian ships of war allowed to appear in the waters of the Ægean, nor was the Persian king admitted to be sovereign of the country down to the coast. Granting, therefore, that we were even bound from the silence of Thucydides to infer that no treaty was concluded, we should still be obliged also to infer, from his positive averments, that a state of historical fact, such as the treaty acknowledged and prescribed, became actually realized. But when

we reflect, further, that Herodotus certifies the visit of Kallias and other Athenian envoys to the court of Susa, we can assign no other explanation of such visit so probable as the reality of this treaty. Certainly no envoys would have gone thither during a state of recognized war; and though it may be advanced as possible that they may have gone with the view to conclude a treaty, and yet not have succeeded—this would be straining the limits of possibility beyond what is reasonable.

We may, therefore, believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the Kimonian treaty: improperly, since not only was it concluded after the death of Kimon, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on were gained after his death. Nay more—the probability is, that if Kimon had lived, it would not have been concluded at all. For his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Perikles either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it—victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death insured more complete ascendency to Perikles, whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite: while even Thucydides, son of Milesias, who succeeded Kimon his relation as leader of the anti-Periklean party, was also a man of the senate and public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enterprises and precarious acquisitions, Perikles was only anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenic ascendency of Athens, now at its very maximum. He was well aware that the undivided force and vigilance of Athens would not be too much for this object—nor did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which excluded the Persians from all the coasts of Asia Minor westward of the Chelidoneans, as well as from all the waters of the Ægean, under the simple condition of renouncing on the part of Athens further aggressions against Cyprus, Phœnicia, Kilikia, and Egypt. The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such aggressions, if prosecuted. He did not lose much by relinquishing formally a tribute which at the time he could have little hope of realizing, and which of course he intended to resume on the first favorable opportunity. Weighing all these circumstances, we shall find that the peace, improperly called Kimonian, results naturally from the position and feelings of the contracting parties.

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the administration of Perikles, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the acropolis at Athens. At what precise time such transfer took place, we cannot state Nor

are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, chiefly with the free-will of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute-payers defended by the military force of Athens: from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining, into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time. Some of the more resolute of the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers without ships or defense. Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an armed ally into a tributary—every subjugation of a seceder—tended of course to cut down the numbers and enfeeble the authority of the Delian synod. And what was still worse, it altered the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies—exalting the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.

Of course the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the confederate fund from Delos to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer is, that it was proposed by the Samians—the second power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favor any job or sinister purpose of the Athenians. It is further said that when the Samians proposed it, Aristeides characterized it as a motion unjust, but useful: we may reasonably doubt, however, whether it was made during his life-time. When the synod at Delos ceased to be so fully attended as to command respect—when war was lighted up not only with Persia, but with Ægina and Peloponnesus—the Samians might not unnaturally feel that the large accumulated fund, with its constant annual accessions, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to insure it against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the transfer, we may fairly infer that it was not displeasing, and did not appear unjust, to the larger members of the confederacy, and that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

After the conclusion of the war with Ægina, and the consequences of the battle of Œnophyta, the position of Athens became altered more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly tributary, like Ægina—partly in the same relation as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign policy and to military service. In this last category were Megara, the Bœotian cities, the Phokians, Lokrians, etc. All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accordingly that confederacy passed insensibly into

a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of imperial Athens with her extensive list of allies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state in Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta even in land-power—possessing in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, together with Achæa and Trœzen in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase. Occupying the Megarian harbor of Pegæ, the Athenians had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian Isthmus: but what was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid and of the high lands of Geraneia, they could restrain any land-force from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were thus (considering besides their mastery at sea) completely unassailable in Attica.

Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Athens had been advancing in an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendency abroad—to which there was no exception except the ruinous enterprise in Egypt. Looking at the position of Greece therefore about 488 B.C.,—after the conclusion of the five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Kimonian peace between Persia and Athens, a discerning Greek might well calculate upon farther aggrandizement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age. And accustomed as every Greek was to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential to a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but inspire terror and aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders and ultra-maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not considerable. But when the Dorian island of Ægina was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defenseless tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. The ancient celebrity, and eminent service rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this memorable island, had not been able to protect it; while those great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint and indignation throughout their numerous "guests" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Athenian feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states who had been engaged in actual hostility with Athens—Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, etc., as well as Sparta, the once-recognized head of Hellas, but now tacitly degraded from her pre-eminence, baffled in her projects respecting Bœotia, and exposed to the burning of her port at Gythium without being able even to retaliate upon

Attica. Putting all those circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the upstart despot city; whose ascendency, newly acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognized as legitimate — threatened nevertheless still farther increase. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war. But it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war. We can hardly explain or appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as handed down from the earlier date of the five years' truce (about 451–446 B.C.).

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this wide-spread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies; for during the five years' truce, Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War—expelled the Phokians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple—and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition: but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phokians, who were then their allies. The Delphians were members of the Phokian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple—whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phokians collectively. The favor of those who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies of the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Phokis. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any ulterior step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendency over Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, and Eubœa was maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties favorable to Athens, and a suitable form of government—just in the same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her Peloponnesian allies. After the victory of Œnophyta, the Athenians had broken up the governments in the Bœotian cities established by Sparta before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies at Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men had thus been sent into exile: and as the same process had taken place in Phokis and Lokris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate

body of exiles, Bœotian, Phokian, Lokrian, Eubœan, Æginetan, etc., all bitterly hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. We learn farther that the democracy established at Thebes after the battle of Œnophyta was ill-conducted and disorderly: which circumstance laid open Bœotia still farther to the schemes of assailants on the watch for every weak point.

These various exiles, all joining their forces and concerting measures with their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mastering Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some other less important places in Bœotia. The Athenian general Tolmides marched to expel them, with 1000 Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that this march was undertaken in haste and rashness. The hoplites of Tolmides, principally youthful volunteers and belonging to the best families of Athens, disdained the enemy too much to await a larger and more commanding force: nor would the people listen even to Perikles, when he admonished them that the march would be full of hazard, and adjured them not to attempt it without greater numbers as well as greater caution. Fatally indeed were his predictions justified. Though Tolmides was successful in his first enterprise—the recapture of Chæroneia, wherein he placed a garrison —yet in his march, probably incautious and disorderly, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked unawares, near Koroneia, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. No defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tolmides himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Bœotia altogether. In all the cities of that country the exiles were restored, the democratical government overthrown, and Bœotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy. Long indeed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians, and inspire them with an apprehension of Bœotian superiority in heavy armor on land. But if the hoplites under Tolmides had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged and Bœotia would not have been lost—whereas in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to redeem them. We shall discover hereafter in the Lacedæmonians a feeling very similar respecting their brethren captured at Sphakteria.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Bœotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phokis and Lokris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Eubœa. To this important island Perikles himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the reconquest, he was summoned home by news of a still

more formidable character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens. By a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sikyon, and Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the long walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified port of Nisæa. As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Geraneia—Pleistoanax king of Sparta was announced as already on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did in truth conduct an army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica, as far as the neighborhood of Eleusias and the Thriasian plain. He was a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleandrides, had been attached to him by the Ephors as adjutant and counselor. Perikles (it is said) persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We may fairly doubt whether they had force enough to adventure so far into the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions with which Archidamus thought it necessary to conduct his invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, though at the head of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the Lacedæmonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Kleandrides never came back, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long time in sanctuary near the temple of Athene at Tegea, until at length he procured his restoration by tampering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringing her bought admonitions to act upon the authorities at Sparta.

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Perikles returned with his forces to Eubœa, and reconquered the island completely. With that caution which always distinguished him as a military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tolmides, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and 5000 hoplites. He admitted most of the Eubœan towns to surrender, altering the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the Hippobotæ. But the inhabitants of Histiæa at the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchantman and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt with—the free population being all or in great part expelled, and the land distributed among Athenian kleruchs or out-settled citizens.

Yet the reconquest of Eubœa was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the fatal engagement of Koroneia. Her land-empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle; and she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime potentate. For though she still continued to hold Nisæa and Pegæ, yet her communication with the latter harbor was now cut off by the loss of Megara and its appertaining territory, so that she thus lost her means of

acting in the Corinthian gulf, and of protecting as well as of constraining her allies in Achaia. Nor was the port of Nisæa of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for annoying that city.

Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects; attempts which would now be seconded by Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy carrying ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Perikles, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterward, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difficulty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion—even in defense of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of misfortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Perikles would doubtless counsel the surrender of their remaining landed possessions or alliances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase peace. But we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary despondency could have induced the Athenian assembly to listen to such advice, and to accept the inglorious peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was concluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginning of 445 B.C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisæa, Pegæ, Achaia, and Trœzen—thus abandoning Peloponnesus altogether, and leaving the Megarians (with their full territory and their two ports) to be included among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered position of Athens after this truce was owing: it was their secession from Attica and junction with the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to invasion. Hence arose the deadly hatred on the part of the Athenians towards Megara, manifested during the ensuing years—a sentiment the more natural, as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians, and had then afterward, without any known ill-usage on the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy of the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, insomuch that the system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations of Athens down to this thirty years' truce, we must notice the important inter-

nal and constitutional changes which she had experienced during the same interval.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES.

THE period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in which the democratical cast of Athenian public life was first brought into its fullest play and development, as to judicature, legislation, and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the methodical distribution of a large proportion of the citizens into distinct judicial divisions, by the great extension of their direct agency in that department, and by the assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged. It has been already mentioned, that even under the democracy of Kleisthenes, and until the time succeeding the battle of Platæa, large powers still remained vested both in the individual archons and in the senate of Areopagus (which latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after their year of office, sitting in it for life); though the check exercised by the general body of citizens, assembled for law-making in the Ekklesia and for judging in the Heliæa, was at the same time materially increased. We must farther recollect, that the distinction between powers administrative and judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments of modern Europe, since the political speculations of the last century, was in the early history of Athens almost unknown. Like the Roman kings, and the Roman consuls before the appointment of the Prætor, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also exercised jurisdiction, voluntary as well as contentious—decided disputes, inquired into crimes, and inflicted punishment. Of the same mixed nature were the functions of the senate of Areopagus, and even of the annual senate of Five Hundred, the creation of Kleisthenes. The Strategi, too, as well as the archons, had doubtless the double competence, in reference to military, naval, and foreign affairs, of issuing orders and of punishing by their own authority disobedient parties: the imperium of the magistrates, generally, enabled them to enforce their own mandates as well as to decide in cases of doubt whether any private citizen had or had not been guilty of infringement. Nor was there any appeal from these magisterial judgments: though the magistrates were subject, under the Kleisthenian constitution, to personal responsibility for their general behavior, before the people judicially assembled, at the expiration of their year of office—and to the farther animadversion of the Ekklesia (or public deliberative assembly) meeting periodically during the course of that year; in some of which assemblies, the question might formally be raised for deposing any magistrate even before his year was expired. Still, in spite of such partial checks, the accumulation, in the same hand, of powers to administer, judge, punish, and decide civil disputes, without any other canon than the few laws then existing, and without any appeal—must have been painfully felt, and must have often led to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing. And if this be true of individual magistrates, exposed to annual accountability, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life.

I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the expatriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristeides had been impelled by the strong democratical sentiment which he found among his countrymen to propose the abolition of all pecuniary qualification for magistracies, so as to render every citizen legally eligible. This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable as a victory and as an index of the predominant sentiment. Notwithstanding the enlarged promise of eligibility, little change probably took place in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates, possessing the large powers administrative and judicial above described—and still more the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life—still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class, remained animated more or less with the same oligarchical interests and sympathies, which manifested themselves in the abuse of authority. At the same time the democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing from the time of Aristeides to that of Perikles: Athens became more and more maritime, the population of Peiræus augmented in number as well as in importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated by that collective aggrandizement of his city to which he himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Platæa, this new fervor of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able champions in Perikles and Ephialtes, rivals of what may be called the conservative party headed by Kimon.

We have no positive information that it was Perikles who introduced the lot, in place of election, for the choice of archons and various other magistrates. But the change must have been introduced nearly at this time, and with a view of equalizing the chances of office to every candidate, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in his name and who fulfilled certain personal and family conditions ascertained in the dokimasy or preliminary examination. But it was certainly to Perikles and Ephialtes that Athens owed the elaborate constitution of her popular Dikasteries or Jury-courts regularly paid, which exercised so important an influence upon the character of the

citizens. These two eminent men deprived both the magistrates, and the senate of Areopagus, of all the judicial and penal competence which they had hitherto possessed, save and except the power of imposing a small fine. This judicial power, civil as well as criminal, was transferred to numerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected from the citizens; 6,000 of whom were annually drawn by lot, sworn, and then distributed into ten panels of 500 each; the remainder forming a supplement in case of vacancies. The magistrate, instead of deciding causes or inflicting punishment by his own authority, was now constrained to impanel a jury—that is, to submit each particular case, which might call for a penalty greater than the small fine to which he was competent, to the judgment of one or other among these numerous popular dikasteries. Which of the ten he should take was determined by lot, so that no one knew beforehand what dikastery would try any particular cause. The magistrate himself presided over it during the trial and submitted to it the question at issue, together with the results of his own preliminary examination; after which came the speeches of accuser and accused, with the statements of their witnesses. So also the civil judicature, which had before been exercised in controversies between man and man by the archons, was withdrawn from them and transferred to these dikasteries under the presidence of an archon. It is to be remarked that the system of reference to arbitration, for private causes, was extensively applied at Athens. A certain number of public arbitrators were annually appointed, to one of whom (or to some other citizen adopted by mutual consent of the parties), all private disputes were submitted in the first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision, either party might afterward carry the matter before the dikastery; but it appears that in many cases the decision of the arbitrator was acquiesced in without this ultimate resort.

I do not here mean to affirm that there never was any trial by the people before the time of Perikles and Ephialtes. I doubt not that before their time the numerous judicial assembly, called Heliæa, pronounced upon charges against accountable magistrates as well as upon various other accusations of public importance; and perhaps in some cases separate bodies of them may have been drawn by lot for particular trials. But it is not the less true that the systematic distribution and constant employment of the numerous dikasts of Athens cannot have begun before the age of these two statesmen, since it was only then that the practice of paying them began. For so large a sacrifice of time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Boeckh states (in somewhat exaggerated language) that "nearly one-third of the citizens sat as judges every day," cannot be conceived without an assured remuneration. From and after the time of Perikles, these dikasteries were the exclusive assemblies for trial of all causes civil as well as criminal, with some special exceptions, such as cases of homicide and a few others: but before his time, the greater number of such causes

had been adjudged either by individual magistrates or by the senate of Areopagus. We may therefore conceive how great and important was the revolution wrought by that statesman, when he first organized these dikastic assemblies into systematic action, and transferred to them nearly all the judicial power which had before been exercised by magistrates and senate. The position and influence of these latter became radically altered. The most commanding functions of the archon were abrogated, so that he retained only the power of receiving complaints, inquiring into them, exercising some small preliminary interference with the parties for the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing the day for trial, and presiding over the dikastic assembly by whom peremptory verdict was pronounced. His administrative functions remained unaltered, but his powers, inquisitorial and determining, as a judge, passed away.

In reference to the senate of Areopagus, also, the changes introduced were not less considerable. That senate, anterior to the democracy in point of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life tenure, appears to have exercised an undefined and extensive control which long continuance had gradually consecrated. It was invested with a kind of religious respect, and believed to possess mysterious traditions emanating from a divine source. Especially, the cognizance which it took of intentional homicide was a part of old Attic religion not less than of judicature. Though put in the background for a time after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, it had gradually recovered itself when recruited by the new archons under the Kleisthenian constitution; and during the calamitous sufferings of the Persian invasion, its forwardness and patriotism had been so highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased sphere of ascendency. Trials for homicide were only a small part of its attributions. It exercised judicial competence in many other cases besides: and what was of still greater moment, it maintained a sort of censorial police over the lives and habits of the citizens—it professed to enforce a tutelary and paternal discipline beyond that which the strict letter of the law could mark out, over the indolent, the prodigal, the undutiful, and the deserters from old rite and custom. To crown all, the senate of Areopagus also exercised a supervision over the public assembly, taking care that none of the proceedings of those meetings should be such as to infringe the established laws of the country. These were powers immense as well as undefined, not derived from any formal grant of the people, but having their source in immemorial antiquity and sustained by general awe and reverence. When we read the serious expressions of this sentiment in the mouths of the later orators—Demosthenes, Æchines, or Deinarchus—we shall comprehend how strong it must have been a century and a half before them, at the period of the Persian invasion. Isokrates, in his discourse usually called Areopagiticus, written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws a picture of what the senate of Areopagus had been while

its competence was yet undiminished, and ascribes to it a power of interference little short of paternal despotism, which he asserts to have been most salutary and improving in its effect. That the picture of this rhetoric is inaccurate—and to a great degree indeed ideal, insinuating his own recommendations under the color of past realities—is sufficiently obvious. But it enables us to presume generally the extensive regulating power of the senate of Areopagus, in affairs both public and private, at the time which we are now describing.

Such powers were pretty sure to be abused. When we learn that the Spartan senate was lamentably open to bribery, we can hardly presume much better of the life-sitting elders at Athens. But even if their powers had been guided by all that beneficence of intention which Isokrates affirms, they were in their nature such as could only be exercised over a passive and stationary people: while the course of events at Athens, at that time peculiarly, presented conditions altogether the reverse. During the pressure of the Persian invasion, indeed, the senate of Areopagus had been armed with more than ordinary authority, which it had employed so creditably as to strengthen its influence and tighten its supervision during the period immediately following. But that same trial had also called forth in the general body of the citizens a fresh burst of democratical sentiment, and an augmented consciousness of force, both individual and national. Here then were two forces, not only distinct but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action at the same time. Nor was this all: a novel cast was just then given to Athenian life and public habits by many different circumstances—the enlargement of the city, the creation of the fortified port and new town of Peiræus, the introduction of an increased nautical population, the active duty of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, etc. All these circumstances tended to open new veins of hope and feeling, and new lines of action, in the Athenians between 480–460 B.C., and by consequence to render the interference of the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned and conservative as it was, more and more difficult. But at the time when prudence would have counseled that it should have been relaxed or modified, the senate appear to have rendered it stricter, or at least to have tried to do so; which could not fail to raise against them a considerable body of enemies. Not merely the democratical innovators, but also the representatives of the new interests generally at Athens, became opposed to the senate as an organ of vexatious repression, employed for oligarchical purposes.

From the character of the senate of Areopagus and the ancient reverence with which it was surrounded, it served naturally as a center of action to the oligarchial or conservative party; that party which desired to preserve the Kleisthenean constitution unaltered—with undiminished authority, administrative as well as judicial, both to individual magistrates and to the collective Areopagus. Of this

sentiment, at the time of which we are now speaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader. His brilliant victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other warlike enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his political influence at home. The same party also probably included the large majority of rich and old families at Athens; who, so long as the magistrates were elected and not chosen by lot, usually got themselves chosen, and had every interest in keeping the power of such offices as high as they could. Moreover the party was farther strengthened by the pronounced support of Sparta, imparted chiefly through Kimon, proxenus of Sparta at Athens. Of course such aid could only have been indirect, yet it appears to have been of no inconsiderable moment—for when we consider that Ægina had been in ancient feud with Athens, and Corinth in a temper more hostile than friendly, the good feeling of the Lacedæmonians might well appear to Athenian citizens eminently desirable to preserve; and the philo-Laconian character of the leading men at Athens contributed to disarm the jealousy of Sparta during that critical period while the Athenian maritime ascendency was in progress.

The political opposition between Perikles and Kimon was hereditary, since Xanthippus the father of the former had been the accuser of Miltiades, the father of the latter. Both were of the first families in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kimon and the great statesmanlike superiority of Perikles, placed both the one and the other at the head of the two political parties which divided Athens. Perikles must have begun his political career very young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and afterward of unparalleled moral and political ascendency, for the long period of forty years, against distinguished rivals, bitter assailants, and unscrupulous libelers (about 467–428 B.C.). His public life began about the time when Themistokles was ostracized, and when Aristeides was passing off the stage, and he soon displayed a character which combined the pecuniary probity of the one with the resource and large views of the other; superadding to both, a discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed—an excellent musical and lettered education received from Pythokleides—an eloquence such as no one before had either heard or conceived—and the best philosophy which the age afforded. His military duties as a youthful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but he was timid in his first political approaches to the people—a fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his temperament, but which some of his biographers explained by saying that he was afraid of being ostracized, and that his countenance resembled that of the despot Peisistratus. We may be pretty sure, however, that this personal resemblance (like the wonderful dream ascribed to his mother when pregnant of him) was an after-thought of enemies when his ascendency was already established—and that young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The complexion of political parties in Athens

had greatly changed since the days of Themistokles and Aristeides. For the Kleisthenean constitution, though enlarged by the latter after the return from Salamis to the extent of making all citizens without exception eligible for magistracy, had become unpopular with the poorer citizens and to the keener democratical feeling which now ran through Athens and Peiræus.

It was to this democratical party—the party of movement against that of resistance, or of reformers against conservatives, if we are to employ modern phraseology—that Perikles devoted his great rank, character, and abilities. From the low arts, which it is common to ascribe to one who espouses the political interests of the poor against the rich, he was remarkably exempt. He was indefatigable in his attention to public business, but he went little into society, and disregarded almost to excess the airs of popularity. His eloquence was irresistibly impressive; yet he was by no means prodigal of it, taking care to reserve himself, like the Salaminian trireme, for solemn occasions, and preferring for the most part to employ the agency of friends and partisans. Moreover he imbibed from his friend and teacher Anaxagoras a tinge of physical philosophy which greatly strengthened his mind and armed him against many of the reigning superstitions—but which at the same time tended to rob him of the sympathy of the vulgar, rich as well as poor. The arts of demagogy were in fact much more cultivated by the oligarchic Kimon, whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was extolled, by his personal friend the poet Ion, in contrast with the reserved and stately demeanor of his rival Perikles. Kimon employed the rich plunder, procured by his maritime expeditions, in public decorations as well as in largesses to the poorer citizens; throwing open his fields and fruits to all the inhabitants of his deme, and causing himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves, directed to tender their warm tunics in exchange for the threadbare garments of those who seemed in want. But the property of Perikles was administered with a strict though benevolent economy, by his ancient steward Evangelus—the produce of his lands being all sold, and the consumption of his house supplied by purchase in the market. It was by such regularity that his perfect and manifest independence of all pecuniary seduction was sustained. In taste, in talent, and in character, Kimon was the very opposite of Perikles: a brave and efficient commander, a lavish distributor, a man of convivial and amorous habits—but incapable of sustained attention to business, untaught in music or letters, and endued with Laconian aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while the ascendency of Perikles was founded on his admirable combination of civil qualities—probity, firmness, diligence, judgment, eloquence, and power of guiding partisans. As a military commander, though no way deficient in personal courage, he rarely courted distinction and was principally famous for his care of the lives of the citizens, discountenancing all

rash or distant enterprises. His private habits were sober and recluse. his chief conversation was with Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Zeno, the musician Damon, and other philosophers—while the tenderest domestic attachment bound him to the engaging and cultivated Aspasia.

Such were the two men who stood forward at this time as most conspicuous in Athenian party-contest—the expanding democracy against the stationary democracy of the past generation, which now passed by the name of oligarchy—the ambitious and talkative energy, spread even among the poor population, which was now forming more and more the characteristic of Athens, against the unlettered and uninquiring valor of the conquerors of Marathon. Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, was at this time the leading auxiliary, seemingly indeed the equal of Perikles, and no way inferior to him in personal probity, though he was a poor man. As to aggressive political warfare, he was even more active than Perikles, who appears throughout his long public life to have manifested but little bitterness against political enemies. Unfortunately our scanty knowledge of the history of Athens brings before us only some general causes and a few marked facts. The details and the particular persons concerned are not within our sight: yet the actual course of political events depends everywhere mainly upon these details, as well as upon the general causes. Before Ephialtes advanced his main proposition for abridging the competence of the senate of Areopagus, he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the practical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought against the magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial powers, Ephialtes and Perikles were at last conducted to the proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an altered system.

Such proceedings naturally provoked extreme bitterness of party feeling. It is probable that this temper may have partly dictated the accusation preferred against Kimon (about 463 B.C.) after the surrender of Thasos, for alleged reception of bribes from the Macedonian prince Alexander—an accusation of which he was acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimonian party was decidedly the most powerful: and when the question was proposed for sending troops to aid the Lacedæmonians in reducing the revolted Helots on Ithome, Kimon carried the people along with him to comply, by an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Ephialtes. But when Kimon and the Athenian hoplites returned home, having been dismissed by Sparta under circumstances of insulting suspicion (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter), the indignation of the citizens was extreme. They renounced their alliance with Sparta, and entered into amity with Argos. Of course the influence of Kimon, and the position of the oligarchical party, was materially changed by this incident. And in the existing bitterness of political parties it is not surprising that his opponents should take the opportunity for

proposing soon afterward a vote of ostracism—a challenge, indeed, which may perhaps have been accepted not unwillingly by Kimon and his party, since they might still fancy themselves the strongest, and suppose that the sentence of banishment would fall upon Ephialtes or Perikles. However, the vote ended in the expulsion of Kimon, a sure proof that his opponents were now in the ascendant. On this occasion, as on the preceding, we see the ostracism invoked to meet a period of intense political conflict, the violence of which it would at least abate, by removing for the time one of the contending leaders.

It was now that Perikles and Ephialtes carried their important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagus was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial competence, except that which related to homicide. The individual magistrates, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judicial attributes (except the power of imposing a small fine), which were transferred to the newly-created panels of salaried dikasts, lotted off in ten divisions from the aggregate Heliæa. Ephialtes first brought down the laws of Solon from the acropolis to the neighborhood of the market-place, where the dikasteries sat—a visible proof that the judicature was now popularized.

In the representations of many authors, the full bearing of this great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we are commonly told is that Perikles was the first to assign a salary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens. He bribed the people with the public money (says Plutarch), in order to make head against Kimon, who bribed them out of his own private purse as if the pay were the main feature in the case, and as if all which Perikles did was to make himself popular by paying the dikasts for judicial service which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is that this numerous army of dikasts, distributed into ten regiments, and summoned to act systematically throughout the year, was now for the first time organized: the commencement of their pay is also the commencement of their regular judicial action. What Perikles really effected was to sever for the first time from the administrative competence of the magistrates that judicial authority which had originally gone along with it. The great men who had been accustomed to hold these offices were lowered both in influence and authority: while on the other hand a new life, habit, and sense of power sprung up among the poorer citizens. A plaintiff having cause of civil action, or an accuser invoking punishment against citizens guilty of injury either to himself or to the state, had still to address himself to one or other of the archons, but it was only with a view of ultimately arriving before the dikastery by whom the cause was to be tried. While the magistrates acting individually were thus restricted to simple administration and preliminary police, they experienced a still more serious loss of power in their capacity of members of the Areopagus, after the year of archonship was expired. Instead of their

previous unmeasured range of supervision and interference, they were now deprived of all judicial sanction beyond that small power of fining which was still left both to individual magistrates and to the senate of Five Hundred. But the cognizance of homicide was still expressly reserved to them—for the procedure, in this latter case religious not less than judicial, was so thoroughly consecrated by ancient feeling, that no reformer could venture to disturb or remove it.

It was upon this same ground probably that the stationary party defended *all* the prerogatives of the senate of Areopagus—denouncing the curtailments proposed by Ephialtes as impious and guilty innovations. How extreme their resentment became, when these reforms were carried—and how fierce was the collision of political parties at this moment—we may judge by the result. The enemies of Ephialtes caused him to be privately assassinated, by the hand of a Bœotian of Tanagra named Aristodikus. Such a crime—rare in the political annals of Athens, for we come to no known instance of it afterward until the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C.—marks at once the gravity of the change now introduced, the fierceness of the opposition offered, and the unscrupulous character of the conservative party. Kimon was in exile and had no share in the deed. Doubtless the assassination of Ephialtes produced an effect unfavorable in every way to the party who procured it. The popular party in their resentment must have become still more attached to the judicial reforms just assured to them, while the hands of Perikles, the superior leader left behind and now acting singly, must have been materially strengthened.

It is from this point that the administration of that great man may be said to date: he was now the leading adviser (we might almost say Prime Minister) of the Athenian people. His first years were marked by a series of brilliant successes—already mentioned—the acquisition of Megara as an ally, and the victorious war against Corinth and Ægina. But when he proposed the great and valuable improvement of the Long Walls, thus making one city of Athens and Peiræus, the same oligarchic party, which had opposed his judicial changes and assassinated Ephialtes, again stood forward in vehement resistance. Finding direct opposition unavailing, they did not scruple to enter into treasonable correspondence with Sparta—invoking the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy: so odious had it become in their eyes, since the recent innovations. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted; together with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties after that battle, principally owing to the generous patriotism of Kimon and his immediate friends. Kimon was restored from ostracism on this occasion, before his full time had expired; while the rivalry between him and Perikles henceforward becomes mitigated, or even converted into a compromise, whereby the internal affairs of the city were left to the one, and the conduct

of foreign expeditions to the other. The successes of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power: which doubtless had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as well as to the administration of Perikles—and enabled both the one and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed alliances, during the interval between the defeat of Koroneia and the thirty years' truce.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by Perikles, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme and system.

Thus a general power of supervision, both over the magistrates and over the public assembly, was vested in seven magistrates, now named for the first time, called Nomophylakes, or Law-Guardians, and doubtless changed every year. These Nomophylakes sat alongside of the Proedri or presidents both in the senate and in the public assembly, and were charged with the duty of interposing whenever any step was taken or any proposition made contrary to the existing laws. They were also empowered to constrain the magistrates to act according to law. We do not know whether they possessed the presidency of a dikastery—that is, whether they could themselves cause one of the panels of jurors to be summoned, and put an alleged delinquent on his trial before it, under their presidency—or whether they were restricted to entering a formal protest, laying the alleged illegality before the public assembly. To appoint magistrates, however, invested with this special trust of watching and informing, was not an unimportant step; for it would probably enable Ephialtes to satisfy many objectors who feared to abolish the superintending power of the Areopagus without introducing any substitute. The Nomophylakes were honored with a distinguished place at the public processions and festivals, and were even allowed (like the Archons) to enter the senate of Areopagus after their year of office had expired: but they never acquired any considerable power such as that senate had itself exercised. Their interference must have been greatly superseded by the introduction and increasing application of the Graphe Paranomon, presently to be explained. They are not even noticed in the description of that misguided assembly which condemned the six generals, after the battle of Arginusæ, to be tried by a novel process which violated legal form not less than substantial justice. After the expulsion of the Thirty, the senate of Areopagus was again invested with a supervision over magistrates, though without anything like its ancient ascendency.

Another important change, which we may with probability refer to Perikles, is the institution of the Nomothetæ. These men were in point of fact dikasts, members of the 6,000 citizens annually sworn in that capacity. But they were not, like the dikasts for trying causes, distributed into panels or regiments known by a particular letter and

acting together throughout the entire year: they were lotted off to sit together only on special occasions and as the necessity arose. According to the reform now introduced, the Ekklesia or public assembly, even with the sanction of the senate of Five Hundred, became incompetent either to pass a new law or to repeal a law already in existence; it could only enact a *psephism*—that is, properly speaking, a decree applicable only to a particular case; though the word was used at Athens in a very large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well as permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial procedure was established. The Thesmothetæ were directed annually to examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or double laws on the same matter; and in the first prytany (tenth part) of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an Ekklesia was held, in which the first business was to go through the laws seriatim, and submit them for approval or rejection; first beginning with the laws relating to the senate, next coming to those of more general import, especially such as determined the functions and competence of the magistrates If any law was condemned by the vote of the public assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third assembly of the Prytany was employed, previous to any other business, in the appointment of Nomothetæ and in the provision of means to pay their salary Previous notice was required to be given publicly by every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to make, in order that the time necessary for the sitting of the Nomothetæ might be measured according to the number of matters to be submitted to their cognizance. Public advocates were farther named to undertake the formal defense of all the laws attacked, and the citizen who proposed to repeal them had to make out his case against this defense, to the satisfaction of the assembled Nomothetæ. These latter were taken from the 6,000 sworn dikasts, and were of different numbers according to circumstances: sometimes we hear of them as 500, sometimes as 1000—and we may be certain that the number was always considerable.

The effect of this institution was, to place the making or repealing of laws under the same solemnities and guarantees as the trying of causes or accusations in judicature. We must recollect that the citizens who attended the Ekklesia or public assembly were not sworn like the dikasts; nor had they the same solemnity of procedure, nor the same certainty of hearing both sides of the question set forth, nor the same full preliminary notice. How much the oath sworn was brought to act upon the minds of the dikasts, we may see by the frequent appeals to it in the orators, who contrast them with the unsworn public assembly. And there can be no doubt that the Nomothetæ afforded much greater security than the public assembly, for a proper decision. That security depended upon the same principle as we see to pervade all the constitutional arrangements of Athens; upon a fraction of the people casually taken, but sufficiently numerous to have

the same interest with the whole—not permanent but delegated for the occasion—assembled under a solemn sanction—and furnished with a full exposition of both sides of the case. The power of passing psephism, or special decrees, still remained with the public assembly, which was doubtless much more liable to be surprised into hasty or inconsiderate decision than either the Dikastery or the Nomothetæ—in spite of the necessity of previous authority from the senate of Five Hundred, before any proposition could be submitted to it.

As an additional security both to the public assembly and the Nomothetæ against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing law, another remarkable provision has yet to be mentioned—a provision probably introduced by Perikles at the same time as the formalities of law-making by means of specially delegated Nomothetæ. This was the Graphe Paranomon—indictment for informality or illegality—which might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer of any law or any psephism, and rendered him liable to punishment by the dikastery. He was required in bringing forward his new measure to take care that it should not be in contradiction with any pre-existing law—or if there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was—in order that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution under the Graphe Paranomon, which any Athenian citizen might bring against him before the dikastery, through the intervention and under the presidency of the Thesmothetæ.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was originally confined to the special ground of formal contradiction between the new and the old. But it had a natural tendency to extend itself: the citizen accusing would strengthen his case by showing that the measure which he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, but the spirit and purpose of existing laws—and he would proceed from hence to denounce it as generally mischievous and disgraceful to the state. In this unmeasured latitude we find the Graphe Paranomon at the time of Demosthenes. The mover of a new law or psephism, even after it had been regularly discussed and passed, was liable to be indicted, and had to defend himself not only against alleged informalities in his procedure, but also against alleged mischiefs in the substance of his measure. If found guilty by the dikastery, the punishment inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but variable according to circumstances. For the indictment belonged to that class wherein, after the verdict of guilty, first a given amount of punishment was proposed by the accuser, next another and lighter amount was named by the accused party against himself—the dikastery being bound to make their option between one and the other, without admitting any third modification—so that it was the interest even of the accused party to name against

himself a measure of punishment sufficient to satisfy the sentiment of the dikasts, in order that they might not prefer the more severe proposition of the accuser. At the same time, the accuser himself (as in other public indictments) was fined in the sum of 1000 drachms, unless the verdict of guilty obtained at least one-fifth of the suffrages of the dikastery. The personal responsibility of the mover, however, continued only one year after the introduction of his new law. If the accusation was brought at a greater distance of time than one year, the accuser could invoke no punishment against the mover, and the sentence of the dikasts neither absolved nor condemned anything but the law. Their condemnation of the law with or without the author, amounted *ipso facto* to a repeal of it.

Such indictment against the author of a law or of a decree might be preferred either at some stage prior to its final enactment—as after its acceptance simply by the senate, if it was a decree, or after its approval by the public assembly, and prior to its going before the Nomothetæ, if it was a law—or after it had reached full completion by the verdict of the Nomothetæ. In the former case the indictment staid its farther progress until sentence had been pronounced by the dikasts.

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly conservative spirit, to guard the existing laws against being wholly or partially nullified by a new proposition. As, in the procedure of the Nomothetæ, whenever any proposition was made for distinctly repealing any existing law, it was thought unsafe to intrust the defense of the law so assailed to the chance of some orator gratuitously undertaking it. Paid advocates were appointed for the purpose. So also, when any citizen made a new positive proposition, sufficient security was not supposed to be afforded by the chance of opponents rising up at the time. Accordingly a farther guarantee was provided in the personal responsibility of the mover. That the latter, before he proposed a new decree or a new law, should take care that there was nothing in it inconsistent with existing laws—or, if there were, that he should first formally bring forward a direct proposition for the repeal of such pre-existing law—was in no way unreasonable. It imposed upon him an obligation such as he might perfectly well fulfill. It served as a check upon the use of that right, of free speech and initiative in the public assembly, which belonged to every Athenian without exception, and which was cherished by the democracy as much as it was condemned by oligarchical thinkers. It was a security to the dikasts, who were called upon to apply the law to particular cases, against the perplexity of having conflicting laws quoted before them, and being obliged in their verdict to set aside either one or the other. In modern European governments, even the most free and constitutional, laws have been both made and applied either by select persons or select assemblies, under an organization so different as to put out of sight the idea of personal responsibility on the proposer of a new law. Moreover, even in such assem-

blies, private initiative has either not existed at all, or has been of comparatively little effect, in law-making; while in the application of laws when made, there has always been a permanent judicial body exercising an action of its own, more or less independent of the legislature, and generally interpreting away the text of contradictory laws so as to keep up a tolerably consistent course of forensic tradition. But at Athens, the fact that the proposer of a new decree, or of a new law, had induced the senate or the public assembly to pass it, was by no means supposed to cancel his personal responsibility, if the proposition was illegal. He had deceived the senate or the people, in deliberately keeping back from them a fact which he knew, or at least might and ought to have known.

But though a full justification may thus be urged on behalf of the Graphe Paranomon as originally conceived and intended, it will hardly apply to that indictment as applied afterward in its plenary and abusive latitude. Thus Æschines indicts Ktesiphon under it for having under certain circumstances proposed a crown to Demosthenes. He begins by showing that the proposition was illegal—for this was the essential foundation of the indictment: he then goes on further to demonstrate, in a splendid harangue, that Demosthenes was a vile man and a mischievous politician: accordingly (assuming the argument to be just) Ktesiphon had deceived the people in an aggravated way—first by proposing a reward under circumstances contrary to law, next by proposing it in favor of an unworthy man. The first part of the argument only is of the essence of the Graphe Paranomon: the second part is in the nature of an abuse growing out of it—springing from that venom of personal and party enmity which is inseparable, in a greater or less degree, from free political action, and which manifested itself with virulence at Athens, though within the limits of legality. That this indictment, as one of the most direct vents for such enmity, was largely applied and abused at Athens, is certain. But though it probably deterred unpracticed citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the same effect upon those orators who made politics a regular business, and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people and reckon upon support from a certain knot of friends. Aristophon, toward the close of his political life, made it a boast that he had been thus indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably the worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, even in its most illustrious manifestations; turning deliberative into judicial eloquence, and interweaving the discussion of a law or decree along with a declamatory harangue against the character of its mover. We may at the same time add that the Graphe Paranomon was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a psephism repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore

out of danger—the indictment being then brought only against the law or decree, as in the case which forms the subject of the harangue of Demosthenes against Leptines. If the speaker of this harangue obtained a verdict, he procured at once the repeal of the law or decree, without proposing any new provision in its place; which he would be required to do—if not peremptorily, at least by common usage—if he carried the law for repeal before the Nomothetæ.

The dikasteries provided under the system of Perikles varied in number of members: we never hear of less than 200 members—most generally of 500—and sometimes also of 1000, 1500, 2,000 members, on important trials. Each man received pay from the treasurers called Kolakretæ, after his day's business was over, of three oboli or half a drachma: at least this was the amount paid during the early part of the Peloponnesian war. M. Boeckh supposes that the original pay proposed by Perikles was one obolus, afterward tripled by Kleon; but his opinion is open to much doubt. It was indispensable to propose a measure of pay sufficient to induce citizens to come, and come frequently, if not regularly. Now one obolus seems to have proved afterward an inadequate temptation even to the ekklesiasts (or citizens who attended the public assembly), who were less frequently wanted, and must have had easier sittings than the dikasts: much less therefore would it be sufficient in the case of the latter. I incline to the belief that the pay originally awarded was three oboli: the rather, as these new institutions seem to have nearly coincided in point of time with the transportation of the confederate treasure from Delos to Athens—so that the Exchequer would then appear abundantly provided. As to the number of dikasts actually present on each day of sitting, or the minimum number requisite to form a sitting, we are very imperfectly informed. Though each of the ten panels or divisions of dikasts included 500 individuals, seldom probably did all of them attend. But it also seldom happened, probably, that all the ten divisions sat on the same day: there was therefore an opportunity of making up deficiencies in division A—when its lot was called and when its dikasts did not appear in sufficient numbers—from those who belonged to division B or Δ, besides the supplementary dikasts who were not comprised in any of the ten divisions: though on all these points we cannot go beyond conjecture. Certain it is, however, that the dikasteries were always numerous, and that none of the dikasts could know in what causes they would be employed, so that it was impossible to tamper with them beforehand.

Such were the great constitutional innovations of Perikles and Ephialtes—changes full of practical results—the transformation, as well as the complement, of that democratical system which Kleisthenes had begun and to which the tide of Athenian feeling had been gradually mounting up during the preceding twenty years. The entire force of these changes is generally not perceived, because the

popular dikasteries and the Nomothetæ are so often represented as institutions of Solon, and as merely supplied with pay by Perikles. This erroneous supposition prevents all clear view of the growth of the Athenian democracy by throwing back its last elaborations to the period of its early and imperfect start. To strip the magistrates of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine, and the Areopagus of all its jurisdiction except in cases of homicide—providing popular, numerous, and salaried dikasts to decide all the judicial business at Athens as well as to repeal and enact laws—this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy. No serious constitutional alteration (I except the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty) was afterward made until the days of Macedonian interference. As Perikles made it, so it remained in the days of Demosthenes—though with a sensible change in the character, and abatement in the energies, of the people, rich as well as poor.

In appreciating the practical working of these numerous dikasteries at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might have been expected from individual magistrates, we have to consider, first—That personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have been a common vice among the leading men of Athens and Sparta, when acting individually or in boards of a few members, and not uncommon even with the kings of Sparta,—next, That in the Grecian cities generally, as we know even from the oligarchical Xenophon (he particularly excepts Sparta), the rich and great men were not only insubordinate to the magistrates, but made a parade of showing that they cared nothing about them. We know also from the same unsuspected source, that while the poorer Athenian citizens who served on shipboard were distinguished for the strictest discipline, the hoplites or middling burghers who formed the infantry were less obedient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the most disobedient of all. To make rich and powerful criminals effectively amenable to justice has indeed been found so difficult everywhere, until a recent period of history, that we should be surprised if it were otherwise in Greece. When we follow the reckless demeanor of rich men like Kritias, Alkibiades, and Meidias, even under the full-grown democracy of Athens, we may be sure that their predecessors under the Kleisthenean constitution would have been often too formidable to be punished or kept down by an individual archon of ordinary firmness, even assuming him to be upright and well-intentioned. Now the dikasteries established by Perikles were inaccessible both to corruption and intimidation: their number, their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of knowing beforehand what individuals would sit in any particular cause, prevented both the one and the other. And besides that, the magnitude of their number, extravagant according to our ideas of judicial business, was essential to this tutelary effect—it served farther to render the trial solemn and the verdict imposing on

the minds of parties and spectators, as we may see by the fact, that in important causes the dikastery was doubled or tripled. Nor was it possible by any other means than numbers to give dignity to an assembly of citizens, of whom many were poor, some old, and all were despised individually by rich accused persons who were brought before them—as Aristophanes and Xenophon give us plainly to understand. If we except the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous dikasteries afforded the only organ which Grecian polities could devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for obtaining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience—and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, as compared with decision by trained and professional judges. All the encomiums, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found predicable of the Athenian dikasteries in a still greater degree; all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground to the dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a less degree. Such parallel is not less just, though the dikasteries, as the most democratical feature of democracy itself, have been usually criticised with marked disfavor—every censure or sneer or joke against them which can be found in ancient authors, comic as well as serious, being accepted as true almost to the letter; while juries are so popular an institution, that their merits have been overstated (in England at least) and their defects kept out of sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial as it has prevailed in England since the Revolution of 1688, are one and the same: recourse to a certain number of private citizens, taken by chance or without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff and defendant, accuser and accused, and to find a true verdict according to their consciences upon a distinct issue before them. But in Athens this theory was worked out to its natural consequences; while English practice, in this respect as in so many others, is at variance with English theory. The jury, though an ancient and a constant portion of the judicial system, has never been more than a portion—kept in subordination, trammels, and pupilage, by a powerful crown and by judges presiding over an artificial system of law. In the English state trials, down to a period not long before the Revolution of 1688, any jurors who found a verdict contrary to the dictation of the judge were liable to fine; and at an earlier period (if a second jury on being summoned found an opposite verdict) even to the terrible punishment of attaint. And though, for the last century and a half, the verdict of the jury has been free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken

the place of the old attaint—yet the ascendency of the presiding judge over their minds, and his influence over the procedure as the authority on matters of law, has always been such as to overrule the natural play of their feelings and judgment as men and citizens—sometimes to the detriment, much oftener to the benefit (always excepting political trials), of substantial justice. But in Athens the dikasts judged of the law as well as of the fact. The laws were not numerous, and were couched in few, for the most part familiar, words. To determine how the facts stood, and whether, if the facts were undisputed, the law invoked was properly applicable to them, were parts of the integral question submitted to them, and comprehended in their verdict. Moreover, each dikastery construed the law for itself without being bound to follow the decisions of those which had preceded it, except in so far as such analogy might really influence the convictions of the members. They were free, self-judging persons—unassisted by the schooling, but at the same time untrammeled by the awe-striking ascendency, of a professional judge—obeying the spontaneous inspirations of their own consciences, and recognizing no authority except the laws of the city, with which they were familiar.

Trial by jury, as practiced in England since 1688, has been politically most valuable, as a security against the encroachments of an anti-popular executive. Partly for this reason, partly for others not necessary to state here, it has had greater credit as an instrument of judicature generally, and has been supposed to produce much more of what is good in English administration of justice, then really belongs to it. Amidst the unqualified encomiums so frequently bestowed upon the honesty, the unprejudiced rectitude of appreciation, the practical instinct for detecting falsehood and resisting sophistry, in twelve citizens taken by hazard and put into a jury-box—comparatively little account is taken either of the aids, or of the restrictions, or of the corrections in the shape of new trials, under which they act, or of the artificial forensic medium into which they are plunged for the time of their service: so that the theory of the case presumes them to be more of spontaneous agents, and more analogous to the Athenian dikasts, than the practice confirms. Accordingly, when we read these encomiums in modern authors, we shall find that both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in insuring pure and even-handed justice, and still more its indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizens generally—might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a laudatory harangue of Perikles about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an impartial and uncorrupt verdict from a jury of his country than from a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the archon. The juror hears and judges under full persuasion that

he himself individually stands in need of the same protection or redress invoked by others: so also did the dikast. As to the effects of jury-trial in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution—in giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former and maintaining the latter—in imparting a sentiment of dignity to small and poor men, through the discharge of a function exalted as well as useful—in calling forth the patriotic sympathies, and exercising the mental capacities of every individual—all these effects were produced in a still higher degree by the dikasteries at Athens; from their greater frequency, numbers, and spontaneity of mental action, without any professional judge, upon whom they could throw the responsibility of deciding for them.

On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury-trial were likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the Athenian system. Both juror and dikast represent the average man of the time and of the neighborhood, exempt indeed from pecuniary corruption or personal fear,—deciding according to what he thinks justice or to some genuine feeling of equity, mercy, religion, or patriotism, which in reference to the case before him he thinks as good as justice—but not exempt from sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because there is often no consciousness of their presence, and because they even appear essential to his idea of plain and straightforward good sense. According as a jury is composed of Catholics or Protestants, Irishmen or Englishmen, tradesmen, farmers, or inhabitants of a frontier on which smuggling prevails,—there is apt to prevail among them a corresponding bias. At the time of any great national delusion, such as the Popish Plot—or of any powerful local excitement, such as that of the Church and King mobs at Birmingham in 1791 against Dr. Priestley and the Dissenters—juries are found to perpetrate what a calmer age recognizes to have been gross injustice. A jury who disapprove of the infliction of capital punishment for a particular crime, will acquit prisoners in spite of the clearest evidence of guilt. It is probable that a delinquent, indicted for any state offense before the dikastery at Athens,—having only a private accuser to contend against, with equal power of speaking in his own defense, of summoning witnesses and of procuring friends to speak for him—would have better chance of a fair trial than he would now have anywhere except in England and the United States of America; and better than he would have had in England down to the seventeenth century. Juries bring the common feeling as well as the common reason of the public—or often, indeed, only the separate feeling of particular fractions of the public—to dictate the application of the law to particular cases. They are a protection against anything worse—especially against such corruption or servility as are liable to taint permanent official persons—but they cannot possibly reach anything better. Now, the dikast-trial at Athens effected the same object, and had in it only the same ingre

dients of error and misdecision as the English jury: but it had them in stronger dose, without the counteracting authority of a judge, and without the benefit of a procedure such as has now been obtained in England. The feelings of the dikasts counted for more, and their reason for less: not merely because of their greater numbers, which naturally heightened the pitch of feeling in each individual—but also because the addresses of orators or parties formed the prominent part of the procedure, and the depositions of witnesses only a very subordinate part. The dikast, therefore, heard little of the naked facts, the appropriate subjects for his reason—but he was abundantly supplied with the plausible falsehoods, calumnies, irrelevant statements and suggestions, etc., of the parties, and that too in a manner skillfully adapted to his temper. To keep the facts of the case before the jury, apart from the falsehood and coloring of parties, is the most useful function of the modern judge, whose influence is also considerable as a restraint upon the pleader. The helps to the reason of the dikast were thus materially diminished, while the action upon his feelings, of anger as well as of compassion, was sharpened, as compared with the modern juror. We see in the remaining productions of the Attic orators how much there is of plausible deception, departure from the true issue, and appeals to sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices of every kind, addressed to the dikasteries. Of course, such artifices were resorted to by opposite speakers in each particular trial. We have no means of knowing to what extent they actually perverted the judgment of the hearers. Probably the frequent habit of sitting in dikastery gave them a penetration in detecting sophistry not often possessed by non-professional citizens. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that, in a considerable proportion of cases, success depended less upon the intrinsic merits of a case than upon apparent airs of innocence and truth telling, dexterity of statement, and good general character, in the parties, their witnesses, and the friends who addressed the court on their behalf. The accusatory speeches in Attic oratory, wherein punishment is invoked upon an alleged delinquent, are expressed with a bitterness which is now banished from English criminal judicature, though it was common in the state trials of two centuries ago. Against them may be set the impassioned and emphatic appeals made by defendants and their friends to the commiseration of the dikasts; appeals the more often successful, because they came last, immediately before decision was pronounced. This is true of Rome as well as of Athens.

As an organ for judicial purposes, the Athenian dikasteries were thus a simple and plenary manifestation of jury-trial, with its inherent excellences and defects both brought out in exaggerated relief. They insured a decision at once uncorrupt, public-minded, and imposing—together with the best security which the case admitted against illegal violences on the part of the rich and great. Their extreme publicity—as well as their simple and oral procedure, divest-

ed of that verbal and ceremonial technicality which marked the law of Rome even at its outset—was no small benefit. And as the verdicts of the dikasts, even when wrong, depended upon causes of misjudgment common to them with the general body of the citizens, so they never appeared to pronounce unjustly, nor lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens generally. But whatever may have been their defects as judicial instruments, as a stimulus both to thought and speech, their efficacy was unparalleled, in the circumstances of Athenian society. Doubtless they would not have produced the same effect if established at Thebes or Argos. The susceptibilities of the Athenian mind, as well as the previous practice and expansive tendencies of democratical citizenship, were also essential conditions—and that genuine taste for sitting in judgment and hearing both sides fairly, which, however Aristophanes may caricature and deride it, was alike honorable and useful to the people. The first establishment of the dikasteries is nearly coincident with the great improvement of Attic tragedy in passing from Æschylus to Sophokles. The same development of the national genius, now preparing splendid manifestations both in tragic and comic poetry, was called with redoubled force into the path of oratory, by the new judicial system. A certain power of speech now became necessary, not merely for those who intended to take a prominent part in politics, but also for private citizens to vindicate their rights or repel accusations, in a court of justice. It was an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility, even apart from ambitious purposes; hardly less so than the use of arms or the practice of the gymnasium. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar and rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be delivered by others, now began to multiply and to acquire an unprecedented importance—as well at Athens as under the contemporary democracy of Syracuse, in which also some form of popular judicature was established. Style and speech began to be reduced to a system, and so communicated; not always happily, for several of the early rhetors adopted an artificial, ornate, and conceited manner, from which Attic good taste afterward liberated itself. But the very character of a teacher of rhetoric as an art—a man giving precepts and putting himself forward in show-lectures as a model for others, is a feature first belonging to the Periklean age, and indicates a new demand in the minds of the citizens.

We begin to hear, in the generation now growing up, of the rhetor and the sophist, as persons of influence and celebrity. These two names denoted persons of similar moral and intellectual endowments, or often indeed the same person, considered in different points of view; either as professing to improve the moral character—or as communicating power and facility of expression—or as suggesting premises for persuasion, illustrations on the common-places of morals and politics, argumentative abundance on matters of ordinary experience,

dialectical subtlety in confuting an opponent, etc. Antipho of the deme Rhamnus in Attica, Thrasymachus of Chalkedon, Tisias of Syracuse, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodikus of Keos, Theodorus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elea, were among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments of teaching. Antipho was the author of the earliest composed speech really spoken in a dikastery and preserved down to the later critics. These men were mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them belonged to towns comprehended in the Athenian empire, at a time when important judicial causes belonging to these towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens—while all of them looked to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term *Sophist*, which Herodotus applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras, etc., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conversation, and disputation; many of whom professed acquaintance with the whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral (then narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any portion of it plausibly and effectively, and to answer any question which might be proposed to them. Though they passed from one Grecian town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from their fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to numerous hearers, with much renown and large gain—they appear to have been viewed with jealousy and dislike by a large portion of the public. For at a time when every citizen pleaded his own cause before the dikastery, they imparted, to those who were rich enough to purchase it, a peculiar skill in the common weapons, which made them like fencing-masters or professional swordsmen amidst a society of untrained duellists. Moreover Sokrates—himself a product of the same age, a disputant on the same subjects, and bearing the same name of a *Sophist*—but despising political and judicial practice, and looking to the production of intellectual stimulus and moral impressions upon his hearers—Sokrates—or rather, Plato speaking through the person of Sokrates—carried on throughout his life a constant polemical warfare against the sophists and rhetors, in that negative vein in which he was unrivalled. And as the works of these latter have not remained, it is chiefly from the observations of their opponents that we know them; so that they are in a situation such as that in which Sokrates himself would have been, if we had been compelled to judge of him only from the Clouds of Aristophanes, or from those unfavorable impressions respecting his character which we know, even from the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, to have been generally prevalent at Athens.

This is not the opportunity however for trying to distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors. At present it is enough that they were the natural product of the age; supplying those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from the deliberations of the Ekklesia, but still more from the

contentions before the dikastery—in which latter a far greater number of citizens took active part, with or without their own consent. The public and frequent dikasteries constituted by Perikles opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement which was best suited to its natural aptitude. They were essential to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary products, the speculative moral and political philosophy, and the didactic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed away. And it was one of the first measures of the oligarchy of Thirty, to forbid, by an express law, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristophanes derides the Athenians for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had enfeebled their military energy; but in his time most undoubtedly, that reproach was not true—nor did it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortunes which marked the close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that war, restless and energetic action was the characteristic of Athens even in a greater degree than oratory or political discussion, though before the time of Demosthenes a material alteration had taken place.

The establishment of these paid dikasteries at Athens was thus one of the most important and prolific events in all Grecian history. The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta, and as it seems, in heroic Greece. Nevertheless, we need not suppose that *all* the dikasts were either old or poor, though a considerable proportion of them were so, and though Aristophanes selects these qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his ridicule. Perikles has been often censured for this institution, as if he had been the first to insure pay to dikasts who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens above poverty. But in the first place, this supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no such constant dikasteries previously acting without pay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning sentiment at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay to those who thus rendered regular service. It was indeed an essential item in the whole scheme and purpose, so that the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have suspended the dikasteries, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred was established—and it can only be discussed in that light. As the fact stands, we may suppose that the 6,000 Heliasts who filled the dikasteries were composed of the middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately; though there was nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose to serve.

CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE judicial alterations effected at Athens by Perikles and Ephialtes, described in the preceding chapter, gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed; the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical sentiment during the past, and a cause of its further development during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for personal exertion in all directions. Military service on land or sea was not less conformable to their dispositions than attendance in the ekklesia or in the dikastery at home. The naval service especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought about continual improvement in skill and efficiency; while the poorer citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more exact in obedience and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the infantry or the cavalry were drawn. The maritime multitude, in addition to self-confidence and courage, acquired by this laborious training an increased skill, which placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above the rest of Greece. And the perfection of this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was now again confined to the sea and sea port towns; the reverses immediately preceding the Thirty years' truce having broken up all Athenian land ascendency over Megara, Bœotia, and the other continental territories adjoining to Attica.

The maritime confederacy—originally commenced at Delos under the headship of Athens, but with a common synod and deliberative voice on the part of each member—had now become transformed into a confirmed empire on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as foreign dependencies; all of them rendering tribute except Chios, Samos, and Lesbos. These three still remained on their original footing of autonomous allies, retaining their armed force, ships, and fortifications, with the obligation of furnishing military and naval aid when required, but not of paying tribute. The discontinuance of the deliberative synod, however, had deprived them of their original security against the encroachments of Athens. I have already stated generally the steps (we do not know them in detail) whereby this important change was brought about, gradually and without any violent revolution—for even the transfer of the common treasure from Delos to Athens, which was the most palpable symbol and evidence of the change, was not an act of Athenian violence, since it was adopted on the proposition of the Samians. The change resulted in fact almost inevitably from the circumstances of the case, and from the eager activity of the Athenians contrasted with the backwardness and aversion to personal service on the part of the allies. We must recollect that the confederacy, even in its original structure, was contracted for permanent objects, and was permanently binding by the vote of its majority, like the Spartan confederacy, upon every individual member. It was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, and to maintain the police of the Ægean. Consistently with these objects, no individual member could be allowed to secede from the confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection at the cost of the remainder: so that when Naxos and other members actually did secede, the step was taken as a revolt, and Athens only performed her duty as president of the confederacy in reducing them. By every such reduction, as well as by that exchange of personal service for money-payment, which most of the allies voluntarily sought, the power of Athens increased until at length she found herself with an irresistible navy in the midst of disarmed tributaries, none of whom could escape from her constraining power—and mistress of the sea, the use of which was indispensable to them. The synod of Delos, even if it had not before become partially deserted, must have ceased at the time when the treasure was removed to Athens—probably about 460 B.C., or shortly afterward.

The relations between Athens and her allies were thus materially changed, by proceedings which gradually evolved themselves and followed one upon the other without any preconcerted plan. She became an imperial or despot city, governing an aggregate of dependent subjects all without their own active concurrence, and in many cases doubtless contrary to their own sense of political right. It was not likely that they should conspire unanimously to break up the confederacy, and discontinue the collection of contribution from each of the members; nor would it have been at all desirable that they should do so: for while Greece generally would have been a great loser by such a proceeding, the allies themselves would have been the greatest losers of all, inasmuch as they would have been exposed without defense to the Persian and Phœnican fleets. But the Athenians committed the capital fault of taking the whole alliance into their own hands, and treating the allies purely as subjects, without seeking to attach them by any form of political incorporation or collective meeting and discussion—without taking any pains to maintain community of feeling or idea of a joint interest—without admitting any control, real or even pretended, over themselves as managers. Had they attempted to do this, it might have proved difficult to accomplish, so powerful was the force of geographical dissemination, the tendency to isolated civic life, and the repugnance to any permanent extramural obligations, in every

Grecian community. But they do not appear to have ever made the attempt. Finding Athens exalted by circumstances to empire, and the allies degraded into subjects, the Athenian statesmen grasped at the exaltation as a matter of pride as well as profit. Even Perikles, the most prudent and far-sighted of them, betrayed no consciousness that an empire without the cement of some all-pervading interest or attachment, although not practically oppressive, must nevertheless have a natural tendency to become more and more unpopular, and ultimately to crumble in pieces. Such was the course of events which, if the judicious counsels of Perikles had been followed, might have been postponed, though it could not have been averted.

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal alliance, Perikles formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy and maintaining the safety of the Ægean waters. This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had undertaken; and provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or exercise control. That it was faithfully discharged no one could deny. No ship of war except from Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and western shores of the Ægean. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was kept on duty in these waters, chiefly managed by Athenian citizens, and beneficial as well from the protection afforded to commerce as for keeping the seamen in constant pay and training. And such was the effective superintendence maintained, that in the disastrous period preceding the Thirty years' truce, when Athens lost Megara and Bœotia, and with difficulty recovered Eubœa, none of her numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt.

The total of these distinct tributary cities is said to have amounted to 1000, according to a verse of Aristophanes which cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The total annual tribute collected at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and probably also for the years preceding it, is given by Thucydides at about 600 talents. Of the sums paid by particular states, however, we have little or no information. It was placed under the superintendence of the Hellenotamiæ; originally officers of the confederacy but now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting altogether as an Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of the Athenian revenue from all sources, including this tribute, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war is stated by Xenophon at 1000 talents. Customs, harbor and market dues, receipt from the silver-mines at Laurium, rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, a tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by each metic, etc., may have made up a larger sum than 400 talents: which sum added to the 600 talents from tribute would make the total named by Xenophon. But a verse of Aristophanes during the

ninth year of the Peloponnesian war (B.C. 422) gives the general total of that time as "nearly 2,000 talents:" this is in all probability much above the truth, though we may reasonably imagine that the amount of tribute-money levied upon the allies had been augmented during the interval. I think that the alleged duplication of the tribute by Alkibiades, which Thucydides nowhere notices, is not borne out by any good evidence, nor can I believe that it ever reached the sum of 1200 talents. Whatever may have been the actual magnitude of the Athenian budget, however, prior to the Peloponnesian war, we know that during the larger part of the administration of Perikles, the revenue including tribute was so managed as to leave a large annual surplus; insomuch that a treasure of coined money was accumulated in the Acropolis during the years preceding the Peloponnesian war —which treasure when at its maximum reached the great sum of 9,700 talents (=£2,230,000), and was still at 6,000 talents after a serious drain for various purposes, at the moment when that war began. This system of public economy, constantly laying by a considerable sum year after year, in which Athens stood alone, since none of the Peloponnesian states had any public reserve whatever, goes far of itself to vindicate Perikles from the charge of having wasted the public money in mischievous distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity; and also to exonerate the Athenian Demos from that reproach of a greedy appetite for living by the public purse which it is common to advance against them. After the death of Kimon, no further expeditions were undertaken against the Persians. Even for some years before his death, not much appears to have been done. The tribute-money thus remained unexpended, and kept in reserve, as the presidential duties of Athens prescribed, against future attack, which might at any time be renewed.

Though we do not know the exact amount of the other sources of Athenian revenue, however, we know that tribute received from allies was the largest item in it. And altogether the exercise of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian life, and a necessity in Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy at home. Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with Attica for her territory. She was a capital or imperial city—a despot-city, was the expression used by her enemies, and even sometimes by her own citizens—with many dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her orders. Such was the manner in which not merly Perikles and the other leading statesmen, but even the humblest Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens. The sentiment was one which carried with it both personal pride and stimulus to active patriotism. To establish Athenian interests among the dependent territories was one important object in the eyes of Perikles. While discouraging all distant and rash enterprises, such as invasion of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many kleruchies, and colonies of Athenian citizens intermingled with allies, on islands and parts of

the coast. He conducted 1000 citizens to the Thracian Chersonese, 500 to Naxos, and 250 to Andros. In the Chersonese, he further repelled the barbarous Thracian invaders from without, and even undertook the labor of carrying a wall of defense across the isthmus which connected the peninsula with Thrace; since the barbarous Thracian tribes, though expelled some time before by Kimon, had still continued to renew their incursions from time to time. Ever since the occupation of the elder Miltiades about eighty years before, there had been in this peninsula many Athenian proprietors, apparently intermingled with half-civilized Thracians: the settlers now acquired both greater numerical strength and better protection, though it does not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. The maritime expeditions of Perikles even extended into the Euxine sea, as far as the important Greek city of Sinope, then governed by a despot named Timesilaus, against whom a large proportion of the citizens were in active discontent. Lamachus was left with thirteen Athenian triremes to assist in expelling the despot, who was driven into exile along with his friends and party. The properties of these exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance of six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellowship and residence with the Sinopians. We may presume that on this occasion, Sinope became a member of the Athenian tributary alliance, if it had not been so before: but we do not know whether Kotyora and Trapezus, dependencies of Sinope further eastward, which the 10,000 Greeks found on their retreat fifty years afterward, existed in the time of Perikles or not. Moreover, the numerous and well-equipped Athenian fleet under the command of Perikles produced an imposing effect upon the barbarous princes and tribes along the coast, contributing certainly to the security of Grecian trade, and probably to the acquisition of new dependent allies.

It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many detachments of Athenian citizens became settled in various portions of the maritime empire of the city—some rich, investing their property in the islands as more secure (from the incontestable superiority of Athens at sea) even than Attica, which since the loss of the Megarid could not be guarded against a Peloponnesian land invasion—others poor, and hiring themselves out as laborers. The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, as well as the territory of Estiæa, on the north of Eubœa, were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and citizens: other places were partially so occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally for the commerce of her dependent allies, as we see by the fact that shortly before the Peloponnesian war she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The commercial relations between Peiræus and the Ægean reached their maximum during the interval immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. These relations were not confined to the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western regions. The most important settlements founded by Athens during this period were Amphipolis in Thrace and Thurii in Italy.

Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian Agnon, in 437 B.C. It was situated near the river Strymon in Thrace, on the eastern bank, and at the spot where the Strymon resumes its river-course after emerging from the lake above. It was originally a township or settlement of the Edonian Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways—in a situation doubly valuable, both as being close upon the bridge over the Strymon and as a convenient center for the ship timber and gold and silver mines of the neighboring region. It was distant about three English miles from the Athenian settlement of Eion at the mouth of the river. The previous unsuccessful attempts to form establishments at Ennea Hodoi have already been noticed—first that of Histiæus the Milesian, followed up by his brother Aristagoras (about 497–496 B.C.), next that of the Athenians about 465 B.C. under Leagrus and others—on both which occasions the intruding settlers had been defeated and expelled by the native Thracian tribes, though on the second occasion the number sent by Athens was not less than 10,000. So serious a loss deterred the Athenians for a long time from any repetition of the attempt. But it is highly probable that individual Athenian citizens, from Eion and from Thasus, connected themselves with powerful Thracian families and became in this manner actively engaged in mining—to their own great profit, as well as to the profit of the city collectively, since the property of the kleruchs, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers we may number the historian Thucydides himself, seemingly descended from Athenian parents intermarrying with Thracians, and himself married to a wife either Thracian or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in that region, through whom he became possessed of a large property in the mines, as well as of great influence in the districts around. This was one of the various ways in which the collective power of Athens enabled her chief citizens to enrich themselves individually.

The colony under Agnon, dispatched from Athens in the year 437 B.C., appears to have been both numerous and well sustained, inasmuch as it conquered and maintained the valuable position of Ennea Hodoi in spite of those formidable Edonian neighbors who had baffled the two preceding attempts. Its name of Ennea Hodoi was exchanged for that of Amphipolis—the hill on which the new town was situated being bounded on three sides by the river. The settlers seem to have been of mixed extraction, comprising no large proportion of Athenians. Some were of Chalkidic race, others came from

Argilus, a Grecian city colonized from Andros, which possessed the territory on the western bank of the Strymon immediately opposite to Amphipolis, and which was included among the subject allies of Athens. Amphipolis, connected with the sea by the Strymon and the port of Eion, became the most important of all the Athenian dependencies in reference to Thrace and Macedonia.

The colony of Thurii on the coast of the Gulf of Tarentum in Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, not long after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce with Sparta, B.C. 443. Since the destruction of the old Sybaris by the Krotoniates, in 509 B.C., its territory had for the most part remained unappropriated. The descendants of the former inhabitants, dispersed at Laus and in other portions of the territory, were not strong enough to establish any new city: nor did it suit the views of the Krotoniates themselves to do so. After an interval of more than sixty years, however, during which one unsuccessful attempt at occupation had been made by some Thessalian settlers, these Sybarites at length prevailed upon the Athenians to undertake and protect the re-colonization; the proposition having been made in vain to the Spartans. Lampon and Xenokritus, the former a prophet and interpreter of oracles, were sent by Perikles with ten ships as chiefs of the new colony of Thurii, founded under the auspices of Athens. The settlers, collected from all parts of Greece, included Dorians, Ionians, islanders, Bœotians, as well as Athenians. But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites procured themselves to be treated as privileged citizens, monopolizing for themselves the possession of political powers as well as the most valuable lands in the immediate vicinity of the walls; while their wives also assumed an offensive pre-eminence over the other women of the city in the public religious processions. Such spirit of privilege and monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation among the ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their tranquillity or to their growth; sometimes to both. In the case of Thurii, founded under the auspices of the democratical Athens, it was not likely to have any lasting success. And we find that after no very long period, the majority of the colonists rose in insurrection against the privileged Sybarites, either slew or expelled them, and divided the entire territory of the city upon equal principles among the colonists of every different race. This revolution enabled them to make peace with the Krontoniates, who had probably been unfriendly so long as their ancient enemies, the Sybarites, were masters of the city, and likely to turn its powers to the purpose of avenging their conquered ancestors. And the city from this time forward, democratically governed, appears to have flourished steadily and without internal dissension for thirty years, until the ruinous disasters of the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow of the Athenian party at Thurii. How miscellaneous the population of Thurii was,

we may judge from the denominations of the ten tribes—such was the number of tribes established, after the model of Athens—Arkas, Achais, Eleia, Bœotia, Amphiktyonis, Doris, Ias, Athenais, Eubois, Nesiotis. From this mixture of race they could not agree in recognizing or honoring an Athenian Œkist, or indeed any Œkist except Apollo. The Spartan general Kleandridas, banished a few years before for having suffered himself to be bribed by Athens along with king Pleistoanax, removed to Thurii and was appointed general of the citizens in their war against Tarentum. That war was ultimately adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city of Herakleia halfway between the two—in the fertile territory called Siritis.

The most interesting circumstance respecting Thurii is, that the rhetor Lysias, and the historian Horodotus, were both domiciliated there as citizens. The city was connected with Athens, yet seemingly only by a feeble tie; it was not numbered among the tributary subject allies. From the circumstance that so small a proportion of the settlers at Thurii were native Athenians, we may infer that not many of the latter at that time were willing to put themselves so far out of connection with Athens—even though tempted by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile and promising territory. And Perikles was probably anxious that those poor citizens, for whom emigration was desirable, should rather become kleruchs in some of the islands or ports of the Ægean, where they would serve (like the colonies of Rome) as a sort of garrison for the maintenance of the Athenian empire.

The fourteen years between the Thirty years' truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, are a period of full maritime empire on the part of Athens—partially indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period of peace with all cities extraneous to her own empire; and of splendid decorations to the city itself, emanating from the genius of Pheidias and others, in sculpture as well as in architecture.

Since the death of Kimon, Perikles had become, gradually but entirely, the first citizen in the commonwealth. His qualities told far more, the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses which preceded the Thirty years' truce had not overthrown him, since he had protested against that expedition of Tolmides into Bœotia out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence of Perikles had increased, the party opposed to him seems also to have become stronger and better organized than before; and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective than Kimon—Thucydides, son of Melesias. The new chief was a near relative of Kimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to that of Perikles; a statesman and orator rather than a general, though competent to both functions if occasion demanded, as every leading man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydides, the political and parliamentary opposition against Perikles assumed a constant char-

acter and organization, such as Kimon with his exclusively military aptitudes had never been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the commonwealth—the "honorable and respectable" citizens, as we find them styled, adopting their own nomenclature—now imposed upon themselves the obligation of undeviating regularity in their attendance on the public assembly, sitting together in a particular section so as to be conspicuously parted from the Demos. In this manner their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to each other, their distribution of parts to different speakers, was made more conducive to the party purposes than it had been before when these distinguished persons were intermingled with the mass of citizens. Thucydides himself was eminent as a speaker, inferior only to Perikles—perhaps hardly inferior even to him. We are told that in reply to a question put to him by Archidamus, whether Perikles or he were the better wrestler, Thucydides replied—"Even when I throw him, he denies that he has fallen, gains his point, and talks over those who actually saw him fall."

Such an opposition, made to Perikles in all the full license which a democratic constitution permitted, must have been both efficient and embarrassing. But the pointed severance of the aristocratic chiefs, which Thucydides son of Milesias introduced, contributed probably at once to rally the democratic majority round Perikles, and to exasperate the bitterness of party conflict. As far as we can make out the grounds of the opposition, it turned partly upon the pacific policy of Perikles toward the Persians, partly upon his expenditure for home ornament. Thucydides contended that Athens was disgraced in the eyes of the Greeks by having drawn the confederate treasure from Delos to her own acropolis, under pretense of greater security—and then employing it, not in prosecuting war against the Persians, but in beautifying Athens by new temples and costly statues. To this Perikles replied that Athens had undertaken the obligation, in consideration of the tribute money, to protect her allies and keep off from them every foreign enemy—that she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for the future—that under such circumstances, she owed no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty to employ it for purposes useful and honorable to the city. In this point of view it was an object of great public importance to render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by improved fortifications,—by accumulated embellishment, sculptural and architectural,—and by religious festivals, frequent, splendid, musical, and poetical.

Such was the answer made by Perikles in defense of his policy against the opposition headed by Thucydides. And considering the grounds of the debate on both sides, the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look at the very large sum which Perikles

continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so far as to encroach upon the exigencies of defense. What Thucydides and his partisans appear to have urged, was that this common fund should still continue to be spent in aggressive warfare against the Persian king, in Egypt and elsewhere—conformably to the projects pursued by Kimon during his life. But Perikles was right in contending that such outlay would have been simply wasteful; of no use either to Athens or her allies, though risking all the chances of distant defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. The Persian force was already kept away both from the waters of the Ægean and the coast of Asia, either by the stipulations of the treaty of Kallias, or (if that treaty be supposed apocryphal) by a conduct practically the same as those stipulations would have enforced. The *allies*, indeed, might have had some ground of complaint against Perikles, either for not reducing the amount of tribute required from them, seeing that it was more than sufficient for the legitimate purposes of the confederacy,—or for not having collected their positive sentiment as to the disposal of it. But we do not find that this was the argument adopted by Thucydides and his party; nor was it calculated to find favor either with aristocrats or democrats in the Athenian assembly.

Admitting the injustice of Athens—an injustice common to both the parties in that city, not less to Kimon than to Perikles—in acting as despot instead of chief, and in discontinuing all appeal to the active and hearty concurrence of her numerous allies; we shall find that the schemes of Perikles were nevertheless eminently pan-Hellenic. In strengthening and ornamenting Athens, in developing the full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious offerings, works of art, solemn festivals, all of surpassing attraction,—he intended to exalt her into something greater than an imperial city with numerous dependent allies. He wished to make her the center of Grecian feeling, the stimulus of Grecian intellect, and the type of strong democratic patriotism combined with full liberty of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely to retain the adherence of the subject states, but to attract the admiration and spontaneous deference of independent neighbors, so as to procure for Athens a moral ascendency much beyond the range of her direct power. And he succeeded in elevating the city to a visible grandeur, which made her appear even much stronger than she really was—and which had the farther effect of softening to the minds of her subjects the humiliating sense of obedience; while it served as a normal school, open to strangers from all quarters, of energetic action even under full license of criticism—of elegant pursuits economically followed—and of a love for knowledge without enervation of character. Such were the views of Perikles in regard to his country, during the years which preceded the Peloponnesian war. We find them recorded in his celebrated

Funeral Oration pronounced in the first year of that war—an exposition forever memorable of the sentiment and purpose of Athenian democracy, as conceived by its ablest president.

So bitter, however, was the opposition made by Thucydides and his party to this projected expenditure—so violent and pointed did the scission of aristocrats and democrats become—that the dispute came after no long time to that ultimate appeal which the Athenian constitution provided for the case of two opposite and nearly equal party-leaders—a vote of ostracism. Of the particular details which preceded this ostracism, we are not informed; but we see clearly that the general position was such as the ostracism was intended to meet. Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Thucydides, in order to procure the banishment of Perikles, the more powerful person of the two and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The challenge was accepted by Perikles and his friends, and the result of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned Thucydides to ostracism. And it seems that the majority must have been very decisive, for the party of Thucydides was completely broken by it. We hear of no other single individual equally formidable, as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of Perikles.

The ostracism of Thucydides apparently took place about two years after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce (443–442 B.C.), and it is to the period immediately following, that the great Periklean works belong. The southern wall of the acropolis had been built out of the spoils brought by Kimon from his Persian expeditions; but the third of the long walls connecting Athens with the harbor was the proposition of Perikles, at what precise time we do not know. The long walls originally completed (not long after the battle of Tanagra, as has already been stated) were two, one from Athens to Peiræus, another from Athens to Phalerum: the space between them was broad, and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Peiræus would be interrupted. Accordingly Perikles now induced the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the first wall to Peiræus, and within a short distance (seemingly near one furlong) from it: so that the communication between the city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming an enemy to have got within the Phaleric wall. It was seemingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal in Peiræus, alleged by Isokrates to have cost 1000 talents, were constructed; while the town itself of Peiræus was laid out anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently this was something new in Greece—the towns generally, and Athens itself in particular, having been built without any symmetry, or width, or continuity of streets. Hippodamus the Milesian, a man of considerable attainments in the physical philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for having laid out the Peiræus on a regular plan. The market-place, or one of them at least, permanently bore his name—the Hippodamian agora. At a time when so many great architects were displaying their genius in the construction of temples, we are not surprised to hear that the structure of towns began to be regularized also. Moreover we are told that the new colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to straight and wide streets.

The new scheme upon which the Peiræus was laid out was not without its value as one visible proof of the naval grandeur of Athens. But the buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed the real glory of the Periklean age. A new theater, termed the Odeon, was constructed for musical and poetical representations at the great Panathenaic solemnity. Next, the splendid temple of Athene, called the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces of decorative sculpture, friezes, and reliefs: lastly, the costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of the acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon were both finished between 445 and 437 B.C.: the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 431 B.C., in which latter year the Peloponnesian war began. Progress was also made in restoring or reconstructing the Erechtheion, or ancient temple of Athene Polias, the patron goddess of the city—which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxes. But the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great temple of Demeter at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries—that of Athene at Sunium—and that of Nemesis at Rhamnus. Nor was the sculpture less memorable than the architecture. Three statues of Athene, all by the hand of Pheidias, decorated the acropolis—one colossal, 47 feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon—a second of bronze, called the Lemnian Athene—a third of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Athene Promachos, placed between the Propylæa and the Parthenon, and visible from afar off, even to the navigator approaching Peiræus by sea.

It is not of course to Perikles that the renown of these splendid productions of art belongs. But the great sculptors and architects, by whom they were conceived and executed, belonged to that same period of expanding and stimulating Athenian democracy, which likewise called forth creative genius in oratory, in dramatic poetry, and in philosophical speculation. One man especially, of immortal name,—Pheidias,—born a little before the battle of Marathon, was the original mind in whom the sublime ideal conceptions of genuine art appear to have disengaged themselves from that stiffness of execution, and adherence to a consecrated type, which marked the efforts of his predecessors. He was the great director and superintendent of all those decorative additions, whereby Perikles imparted to Athens a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city. The architects of the Parthenon and the other buildings—

Iktinus, Kallikrates, Korœbus, Mnesikles, and others—worked under his instructions: and he had besides a school of pupils and subordinates to whom the mechanical part of his labors was confided. With all the great contributions which Pheidias made to the grandeur of Athens, his last and greatest achievement was far away from Athens—the colossal statue of Zeus, in the great temple of Olympia, executed in the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. This stupendous work was sixty feet high, of ivory and gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the grandest conceptions of Grecian poetry and religion. Its effect upon the minds of all beholders, for many centuries successively, was such as never has been, and probably never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or profane.

Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only as they bear upon Athenians and Grecian history, they are phenomena of extraordinary importance. When we learn the profound impression which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw them both begun and finished. In the year 480 B.C., Athens had been ruined by the occupation of Xerxes. Since that period, the Greeks had seen, first the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged scale—next, the addition of Peiræus with its docks and magazines—thirdly, the junction of the two by the long walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, arms, ships, etc., in Greece—lastly the rapid creation of so many new miracles of art—the sculptures of Pheidias as well as the paintings of the Thasian painter Polygnotus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the portico called Pœkile. Plutarch observes that the celerity with which the works were completed was the most remarkable circumstance connected with them; and so it probably might be, in respect to the effect upon the contemporary Greeks. The gigantic strides by which Athens had reached her maritime empire were now immediately succeeded by a series of works which stamped her as the imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of power even greater than the reality, and especially put to shame the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta. The cost was doubtless prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there was a large treasure in the acropolis, as well as a considerable tribute annually coming in. If we may trust a computation which seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less than 3,000 talents in the aggregate (about £690,000). The expenditure of so large a sum was of course a source of great private gain to contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artisans of various descriptions, etc., concerned in it. In one way or another, it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. And it appears that the materials employed for much of the work were designedly of the most costly description, as being most consistent with the reverence due to the gods. Marble was rejected as too common for the statue of Athene, and ivory employed

in its place. Even the gold with which it was surrounded weighed not less than forty talents. A large expenditure for such purposes, considered as pious toward the gods, was at the same time imposing in reference to Grecian feeling, which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and magnificence, and repaid with grateful deference the rich men who indulged in it. Perikles knew well that the visible splendor of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would cause her great power to appear greater still, and would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged influence—perhaps even an ascendency—over all cities of the Grecian name. And it is certain that even among those who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of involuntary deference.

A step taken by Perikles, apparently not long after the commencement of the thirty years' truce, evinces how much this ascendency was in his direct aim, and how much he connected it with views both of harmony and usefulness for Greece generally. He prevailed upon the people to send envoys to every city of the Greek name, great and small, inviting each to appoint deputies for a congress to be held at Athens. Three points were to be discussed in this intended congress. 1. The restitution of those temples which had been burnt by the Persian invaders. 2. The fulfillment of such vows, as on that occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The safety of the sea and of maritime commerce for all.

Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round to obtain the convocation of this congress at Athens—a pan-Hellenic congress for pan-Hellenic purposes. But those who were sent to Bœotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their object, from the jealousy, noway astonishing, of Sparta and her allies. Of the rest we hear nothing, for this refusal was quite sufficient to frustrate the whole scheme. It is to be remarked that the dependent allies of Athens appear to have been summoned just as much as the cities perfectly autonomous; so that their tributary relation to Athens was not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret that such congress did not take effect, as it might have opened some new possibilities of converging tendency and alliance for the dispersed fractions of the Greek name—a comprehensive benefit not likely to be entertained at Sparta even as a project, but which might perhaps have been realized under Athens, and seems in this case to have been sincerely aimed at by Perikles. The events of the Peloponnesian war, however, extinguished all hopes of any such union.

The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning of the thirty years' truce and that of the Peloponnesian war, was by no means one of undisturbed peace to Athens. In the sixth year of that period occurred the formidable revolt of Samos.

That island appears to have been the most powerful of all the allies of Athens. It surpassed even Chios or Lesbos, standing on the

same footing as these two: that is, paying no tribute-money—a privilege when compared with the body of the allies,—but furnishing ships and men when called upon, and retaining, subject to this condition, its complete autonomy, its oligarchic government, its fortifications, and its military force. Like most of the other islands near the coast, Samos possessed a portion of territory on the Asiatic mainland, between which and the territory of Miletus lay the small town of Priene, one of the twelve original members contributing to the pan-Ionic solemnity. Respecting the possession of this town of Priene, a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians, in the sixth year of the thirty years' truce (B.C. 440–439). Whether the town had before been independent, we do not know, but in this war the Milesians were worsted, and it fell into the hands of the Samians. The defeated Milesians, enrolled as they were among the tributary allies of Athens, complained to her of the conduct of the Samians, and their complaint was seconded by a party in Samos itself, opposed to the oligarchy and its proceedings. The Athenians required the two disputing cities to bring the matter before discussion and award at Athens. But the Samians refused to comply: whereupon an armament of forty ships was dispatched from Athens to the island, and established in it a democratic government; leaving in it a garrison and carrying away to Lemnos fifty men and as many boys from the principal oligarchic families, to serve as hostages. Of these families, however, a certain number retired to the mainland, where they entered into negotiations with Pissuthnes the satrap of Sardes, to procure aid and restoration. Obtaining from him seven hundred mercenary troops, and passing over in the night to the island, by previous concert with the oligarchic party, they overcame the Samian democracy as well as the Athenian garrison, who were sent over as prisoners to Pissuthnes. They were farther lucky enough to succeed in stealing away from Lemnos their own recently deposited hostages, and they then proclaimed open revolt against Athens, in which Byzantium also joined. It seems remarkable, that though by such a proceeding they would of course draw upon themselves the full strength of Athens, yet their first step was to resume aggressive hostilities against Miletus, whither they sailed with a powerful force of seventy ships, twenty of them carrying troops.

Immediately on the receipt of this grave intelligence, a fleet of sixty triremes—probably all that were in complete readiness—was dispatched to Samos under ten generals, two of whom were Perikles himself and the poet Sophokles, both seemingly included among the ten ordinary Strategi of the year. But it was necessary to employ sixteen of these ships, partly in summoning contingents from Chios and Lesbos, to which islands Sophokles went in person; partly in keeping watch off the coast of Karia for the arrival of the Phœnician fleet, which report stated to be approaching; so that Perikles had only forty-four ships remaining in his squadron. Yet he did not hesitate

to attack the Samian fleet of seventy ships on his way back from Miletus, near the island of Tragia, and was victorious in the action. Presently he was re-enforced by forty ships from Athens and by twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, so as to be able to disembark at Samos, where he overcame the Samian land-force and blocked up the harbor with a portion of his fleet, surrounding the city on the land-side with a triple wall. Meanwhile the Samians had sent Stesagoras with five ships to press the coming of the Phœnician fleet, and the report of their approach became again so prevalent that Perikles felt obliged to take sixty ships (out of the total 125) to watch for them off the coast of Kaunus and Karia, where he cruised for about fourteen days. The Phœnician fleet never came in sight, though Diodorus affirms that it was actually on its voyage. Pissuthnes certainly seems to have promised, and the Samians to have expected it. Yet I incline to believe that, though willing to hold out hopes and encourage revolt among the Athenian allies, the satrap did not choose openly to violate the convention of Kallias, whereby the Persians were forbidden to send a fleet westward of the Chelidonian promontory. The departure of Perikles, however, so much weakened the Athenian fleet off Samos, that the Samians, suddenly sailing out of their harbor in an opportune moment, at the instigation and under the command of one of their most eminent citizens, the philosopher Melissus—surprised and disabled the blockading squadron, and even gained a victory over the remaining fleet before the ships could be fairly got clear of the land. For fourteen days they remained masters of the sea, carrying in and out all that they thought proper. It was not until the return of Perikles that they were again blockaded. Re-enforcements, however, were now multiplied to the investing squadron—from Athens, forty ships under Thucydides, Agnon, and Phormion, and twenty under Tlepolemus and Antikles, besides thirty from Chios and Lesbos—making altogether near two hundred sail. Against this overwhelming force Melissus and the Samians made an unavailing attempt at resistance, but were presently quite blocked up, and remained so for nearly nine months until they could hold out no longer. They then capitulated, being compelled to raze their fortifications, to surrender all their ships of war, to give hostages for their future conduct, and to make good by stated installments the whole expense of the enterprise, said to have reached 1000 talents. The Byzantines, too, made their submission at the same time.

Two or three circumstances deserve notice respecting this revolt, as illustrating the existing condition of the Athenian empire. First, that the whole force of Athens, together with the contingents from Chios and Lesbos, was necessary in order to crush it, so that Byzantium, which joined in the revolt, seems to have been left unassailed. Now it is remarkable that none of the dependent allies near Byzantium, or anywhere else, availed themselves of so favorable an opportunity to revolt also: a fact which seems plainly to imply that there

was little positive discontent then prevalent among them. Had the revolt spread to other cities, probably Pissuthnes might have realized his promise of bringing up the Phœnician fleet, which would have been a serious calamity for the Ægean Greeks, and was only kept off by the unbroken maintenance of the Athenian empire.

Next, the revolted Samians applied for aid, not only to Pissuthnes, but also to Sparta and her allies; among whom at a special meeting the question of compliance or refusal was formally debated. Notwithstanding the thirty years' truce then subsisting, of which only six years had elapsed, and which had been noway violated by Athens —many of the allies of Sparta voted for assisting the Samians. What part Sparta herself took, we do not know—but the Corinthians were the main and decided advocates for the negative. They not only contended that the truce distinctly forbade compliance with the Samian request, but also recognized the right of each confederacy to punish its own recusant members. And this was the decision ultimately adopted, for which the Corinthians afterward took credit, in the eyes of Athens, as its chief authors. Certainly, if the contrary policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire might have been in great danger—the Phœnician fleet would probably have been brought in also—and the future course of events greatly altered.

Again, after the reconquest of Samos, we should assume it almost as a matter of certainty that the Athenians would renew the democratical government which they had set up just before the revolt. Yet if they did so, it must have been again overthrown, without any attempt to uphold it on the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Samos again, until twenty-seven years aftreward, the latter division of the Peloponnesian war, in 412 B.C., and it then appears with an established oligarchical government of Geomori or landed proprietors, against which the people make a successful rising during the course of that year. As Samos remained during the interval between 439 B.C. and 412 B.C., unfortified, deprived of its fleet, and enrolled among the tribute-paying allies of Athens—and as it nevertheless either retained, or acquired, its oligarchical government; so we may conclude that Athens cannot have systematically interfered to democratize by violence the subject-allies, in cases where the natural tendency of parties ran toward oligarchy. The condition of Lesbos at the time of its revolt (hereafter to be related) will be found to confirm this conclusion.

On returning to Athens after the reconquest of Samos, Perikles was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over the citizens slain in the war, to whom, according to custom, solemn and public obsequies were celebrated in the suburb called Kerameikus. This custom appears to have been introduced shortly after the Persian war, and would doubtless contribute to stimulate the patriotism of the citizens, especially when the speaker elected to deliver it was possessed of the personal dignity as well as the oratorical powers of Perikles. He

was twice public funeral orator by the choice of the citizens; once after the Samian success, and a second time in the first year of the Peloponnesian war. His discourse on the first occasion has not reached us, but the second has been fortunately preserved (in substance at least) by Thucydides, who also briefly describes the funeral ceremony—doubtless the same on all occasions. The bones of the deceased warriors were exposed in tents three days before the ceremony, in order that the relatives of each might have the opportunity of bringing offerings. They were then placed in coffins of cypress and carried forth on carts to the public burial-place at the Kerameikus; one coffin for each of the ten tribes, and one empty couch, formally laid out, to represent those warriors whose bones had not been discovered or collected. The female relatives of each followed the carts, with loud wailings, and after them a numerous procession both of citizens and strangers. So soon as the bones had been consigned to the grave, some distinguished citizen, specially chosen for the purpose, mounted on an elevated stage and addressed to the multitude an appropriate discourse. Such was the effect produced by that of Perikles after the Samian expedition, that when he had concluded, the audience present testified their emotion in the liveliest manner, and the women especially crowned him with garlands like a victorious athlete. Only Elpinike, sister of the deceased Kimon, reminded him that the victories of her brother had been more felicitous, as gained over Persians and Phœnicians, and not over Greeks and kinsmen. And the contemporary poet Ion, the friend of Kimon, reported what he thought an unseemly boast of Perikles—to the effect that Agamemnon had spent ten years in taking a foreign city, while *he* in nine months had reduced the first and most powerful of all the Ionic communities. But if we possessed the actual speech pronounced, we should probably find that he assigned all the honor of the exploit to Athens and her citizens generally, placing their achievement in favorable comparison with that of Agamemnon and his host—not himself with Agamemnon.

Whatever may be thought of this boast, there can be no doubt that the result of the Samian war not only rescued the Athenian empire from great peril, but rendered it stronger than ever: while the foundation of Amphipolis, which was effected two years afterward, strengthened it still farther. Nor do we hear, during the ensuing few years, of any farther tendencies to disaffection among its members, until the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war. The feeling common among them toward Athens, seems to have been neither attachment nor hatred, but simple indifference and acquiescence in her supremacy. Such amount of positive discontent as really existed among them, arose, not from actual hardships suffered, but from the general political instinct of the Greek mind—desire of separate autonomy; which manifested itself in each city, through the oligarchical party, whose power was kept down by

Athens—and was stimulated by the sentiment communicated from the Grecian communities without the Athenian empire. According to that sentiment, the condition of a subject-ally of Athens was treated as one of degradation and servitude. In proportion as fear and hatred of Athens became predominant among the allies of Sparta, these latter gave utterance to the sentiment more and more emphatically, so as to encourage discontent artificially among the subject allies of the Athenian empire. Possessing complete mastery of the sea, and every sort of superiority requisite for holding empire over islands, Athens had yet no sentiment to appeal to in her subjects, calculated to render her empire popular, except that of common democracy, which seems at first to have acted without any care on her part to encourage it, until the progress of the Peloponnesian war made such encouragement a part of her policy. And even had she tried to keep up in the allies the feeling of a common interest and the attachment to a permanent confederacy, the instinct of political separation would probably have baffled all her efforts. But she took no such pains. With the usual morality that grows up in the minds of the actual possessors of power, she conceived herself entitled to exact obedience as her right. Some of the Athenian speakers in Thucydides go so far as to disdain all pretense of legitimate power, even such as might fairly be set up; resting the supremacy of Athens on the naked plea of superior force. As the allied cities were mostly under democracies—through the indirect influence rather than the systematic dictation of Athens—yet each having its own internal aristocracy in a state of opposition; so the movements for revolt against Athens originated with the aristocracy or with some few citizens apart; while the people, though sharing more or less in the desire for autonomy, had yet either a fear of their own aristocracy or a sympathy with Athens, which made them always backward in revolting, sometimes decidedly opposed to it. Neither Perikles nor Kleon, indeed, lays stress on the attachment of the people as distinguished from that of the Few, in these dependent cities. But the argument is strongly insisted on by Diodotus in the discussion respecting Mitylene after its surrender: and as the war advanced, the question of alliance with Athens or Sparta became more and more identified with the internal preponderance of democracy or oligarchy in each.

We shall find that in most of those cases of actual revolt where we are informed of the preceding circumstances, the step is adopted or contrived by a small number of oligarchical malcontents, without consulting the general voice; while in those cases where the general assembly is consulted beforehand, there is manifested indeed a preference for autonomy, but nothing like a hatred of Athens or decided inclination to break with her. In the case of Mitylene, in the fourth year of the war, it was the aristocratical government which revolted, while the people, as soon as they obtained arms, actually declared in favor of Athens. And the secession of Chios, the greatest of all the

allies, in the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war—even after all the hardships which the allies had been called upon to bear in that war, and after the ruinous disasters which Athens had sustained before Syracuse—was both prepared beforehand and accomplished by secret negotiations of the Chian oligarchy, not only without the concurrence but against the inclination of their own people. In like manner, the revolt of Thasos would not have occurred, had not the Thasian democracy been previously subverted by the Athenian Peisander and his oligarchical confederates. So in Akanthus, in Amphipolis, in Mende, and those other Athenian dependencies which were wrested from Athens by Brasidas—we find the latter secretly introduced by a few conspirators. The bulk of the citizens do not hail him at once as a deliverer, like men sick of Athenian supremacy: they acquiesce, not without debate, when Brasidas is already in the town, and his demeanor, just as well as conciliating, soon gains their esteem. But neither in Akanthus nor in Amphipolis would he have been omitted by the free decision of the citizens, if they had not been alarmed for the safety of their friends, their properties, and their harvest, still exposed in the lands without the walls. These particular examples warrant us in affirming that though the oligarchy in the various allied cities desired eagerly to shake off the supremacy of Athens, the people were always backward in following them, sometimes even opposed, and hardly ever willing to make sacrifices for the object. They shared the universal Grecian desire for separate autonomy, and felt the Athenian empire as an extraneous pressure which they would have been glad to shake off, whenever the change could be made with safety. But their condition was not one of positive hardship, nor did they overlook the hazardous side of such a change—partly from the coercive hand of Athens—partly from new enemies against whom Athens had hitherto protected them—and not least from their own oligarchy. Of course the different allied cities were not all animated by the same feelings, some being more averse to Athens than others.

The particular modes in which Athenian supremacy pressed upon the allies and excited complaints, appear to have been chiefly three. 1. The annual tribute. 2. The encroachments or other misdeeds committed by individual Athenians, taking advantage of their superior position: citizens either planted out by the city as Kleruchs (outsettlers), on the lands of those allies who had been subdued—or serving in the naval armaments—or sent round as inspectors—or placed in occasional garrison—or carrying on some private speculation. 3. The obligation under which the allies were laid of bringing a large proportion of their judicial trials to be settled before the dikasteries at Athens.

As to the tribute, I have before remarked that its amount had been but little raised from its first settlement down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, at which time it was 600 talents yearly. It appears to have been reviewed, and the apportionment corrected, in

every fifth year, at which period the collecting officers may probably have been changed. Afterward, probably, it became more burdensome, though when, or in what degree, we do not know: but the alleged duplication of it (as I have already remarked) is both uncertified and improbable. The same gradual increase may probably be affirmed respecting the second head of inconvenience—vexation caused to the allies by individual Athenians, chiefly officers of armaments or powerful citizens. Doubtless this was always more or less a real grievance, from the moment when the Athenians became despots in place of chiefs. But it was probably not very serious in extent until after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, when revolt on the part of the allies became more apprehended, and when garrisons, inspectors, and tribute-gathering ships became more essential in the working of the Athenian empire.

But the third circumstance above noticed—the subjection of the allied cities to the Athenian dikasteries—has been more dwelt upon as a grievance than the second, and seems to have been unduly exaggerated. We can hardly doubt that the beginning of this jurisdiction exercised by the Athenian dikasteries dates with the synod of Delos, at the time of the first formation of the confederacy. It was an indispensable element of that confederacy, that the members should forego their right of private war among each other, and submit their differences to peaceable arbitration—a covenant introduced even into alliances much less intimate than this was, and absolutely essential to the efficient maintenance of any common action against Persia. Of course many causes of dispute, public as well as private, must have arisen among these wide-spread islands and sea-ports of the Ægean, connected with each other by relations of fellow-feeling, of trade, and of common apprehensions. The synod of Delos, composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board of arbitration for such disputes. A habit must thus have been formed, of recognizing a sort of federal tribunal, to decide peaceably how far each ally had faithfully discharged its duties, both toward the confederacy collectively and toward other allies with their individual citizens separately, as well as to enforce its decisions and punish refractory members, pursuant to the right which Sparta and her confederacy also claimed and exercised. Now from the beginning the Athenians were the guiding and enforcing presidents of this synod. When it gradually died away, they were found occupying its place as well as clothed with its functions. It was in this manner that their judicial authority over the allies appears first to have begun as the confederacy became changed into an Athenian empire, the judicial functions of the synod being transferred along with the common treasure to Athens, and doubtless much extended. And on the whole, these functions must have been productive of more good than evil to the allies themselves, especially to the weakest and most defenseless among them.

Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to Athens (taking this numerical statement of Aristophanes not in its exact meaning, but simply as a great number), if a small town, or one of its citizens, had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no channel except the synod of Delos, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not to be supposed that *all* the private complaints and suits between citizen and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried up for trial to Athens; yet we do not know distinctly how the line was drawn, between matters carried up thither, and matters tried at home. The subject cities appear to have been interdicted from the power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after previous trial and condemnation at Athens: so that the latter reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes—or what may be called "the higher justice" generally. And the political accusations preferred by citizen against citizen, in any subject city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfillment of public duty, etc., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial—perhaps the most important part of her jurisdiction.

But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by Athens for the substantive object of amending the administration of justice in each separate allied city. It went rather to regulate the relations between city and city—between citizens of different cities—between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these allied cities with which they had relations—between each city itself, as a dependent government with contending political parties, and the imperial head Athens. All these being problems which imperial Athens was called on to solve, the best way of solving them would have been through some common synod emanating from all the allies. Putting this aside, we shall find that the solution provided by Athens was perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more induced to think so when we compare it with the proceedings afterward adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Under Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the dependent cities under the government of a Dekarchy (or oligarchical council of ten) among its chief citizens, together with a Spartan harmost or governor having a small garrison under his orders. It will be found when we come to describe the Spartan maritime empire that the arrangements exposed each dependent city to very great violence and extortion, while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem. They served only to maintain each separate city under the dominion of Sparta without contributing to regulate the dealings between the citizens of one and those of another, or to bind together the empire as a whole. Now the Athenians did not, as a system, place in their dependent cities governors analogous to the harmosts, though they did so occasionally under special need. But their fleets and their officers were in frequent relation with these cities; and as the principal officers were noways indisposed to abuse their position, so the facility of com-

plaint, constantly open, to the Athenian popular dikastery, served both as redress and guarantee against misrule of this description. It was a guarantee which the allies themselves sensibly felt and valued, as we know from Thucydides. The chief source from whence they had to apprehend evil was, the misconduct of the Athenian officials and principal citizens, who could misemploy the power of Athens for their own private purposes—but they looked up to the "Athenian Demos as a chastener of such evil-doers and as a harbor of refuge to themselves." If the popular dikasteries at Athens had not been thus open, the allied cities would have suffered much more severely from the captains and officials of Athens in their individual capacity. And the maintenance of political harmony, between the imperial city and the subject ally, was ensured by Athens through the jurisdiction of her dikasteries with much less cost of injustice and violence than by Sparta. For though oligarchical leaders in these allied cities might sometimes be unjustly condemned at Athens, yet such accidental wrong was immensely overpassed by the enormities of the Spartan harmosts and Dekarchies, who put numbers to death without any trial at all.

So again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private citizens, not officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire as kleruchs, proprietors, or traders. Of course, therefore, disputes would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties did not belong to the same city. Now in such cases the Spartan imperial authority was so exercised as to afford little or no remedy, since the action of the harmost or the Dekarchy was confined to one separate city; while the Athenian dikasteries, with universal competence and public trial, afforded the best redress which the contingency admitted. If a Thasian citizen believed himself aggrieved by the historian Thucydides, either as commander of the Athenian fleet on that station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thrace,—he had his remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian dikasteries, to which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not less than the meanest Thasian. To a citizen of any allied city it might be an occasional hardship to be sued before the courts at Athens; but it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be able to sue, before those courts, others whom else he could not have reached. He had his share of the benefit as well as of the hardship. Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independence, at least gave them in exchange the advantage of a central and common judiciary authority; thus enabling each of them to enforce claims of justice against the rest, in a way which would not have been practicable (to the weaker at least) even in a state of general independence.

Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted anything of the kind with regard to her subject-allies, being content to keep them under the rule of a harmost and a partisan oligarchy. And we read anec-

dotes which show that no justice could be obtained at Sparta even for the grossest outrages committed by the harmost, or by private Spartans out of Laconia. The two daughters of a Bœotian named Skedasus (of Leuktra in Bœotia) had been first violated and then murdered by two Spartan citizens: the son of a citizen of Oreus in Eubœa had been also outraged and killed by the harmost Aristodemus: in both cases the fathers went to Sparta to lay the enormity before the ephors and other authorities, and in both cases a deaf ear was turned to their complaints. But such crimes, if committed by Athenian citizens or officers, might have been brought to a formal exposure before the public sitting of the dikastery, and there can be no doubt that both would have been severely punished. We shall see hereafter that an enormity of this description, committed by the Athenian general Paches at Mitylene, cost him his life before the Athenian dikasts. Xenophon, in the dark and one-sided representation which he gives of the Athenian democracy, remarks, that if the subject-allies had not been made amenable to justice at Athens, they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and would have paid court only to those individual Athenians, generals, trierarchs, or envoys, who visited the islands on service; but under the existing system, the subjects were compelled to visit Athens either as plaintiffs or defendants, and were thus under the necessity of paying court to the bulk of the people also—that is, to those humbler citizens out of whom the dikasteries were formed; they supplicated the dikasts in court for favor or lenient dealing. But this is only an invidious manner of discrediting what was really a protection to the allies, both in purpose and in reality. For it was a lighter lot to be brought for trial before the dikastery, than to be condemned without redress by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off his condemnation by a bribe. Moreover the dikastery was open not merely to receive accusations against citizens of the allied cities, but also to entertain complaints which they preferred against others.

Assuming the dikasteries at Athens to be ever so defective as tribunals for administering justice, we must recollect that they were the same tribunals under which every Athenian citizen held his own fortune or reputation, and that the native of any subject city was admitted to the same chance of justice as the native of Athens. Accordingly we find the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war, taking peculiar credit to the imperial city on this ground, for equal dealing with her subject-allies. "If our power (he says) were to pass into other hands, the comparison would presently show how moderate we are in the use of it: but as regards us, our very moderation is unfairly turned to our disparagement rather than to our praise. For even though we put ourselves at disadvantage in matters litigated with our allies, and though we have appointed such matters to be judged among ourselves, and under laws equal to both parties, we are represented as animated by

nothing better than a love of litigation." "Our allies (he adds) would complain less if we made open use of our superior force with regard to them; but we discard such maxims, and deal with them upon an equal footing: and they are so accustomed to this that they think themselves entitled to complain at every trifling disappointment of their expectations. They suffered worse hardship under the Persians before our empire began, and they would suffer worse under you (the Spartans) if you were to succeed in conquering us and making our empire yours."

History bears out the boast of the Athenian orator, both as to the time preceding and following the empire of Athens. And an Athenian citizen indeed might well regard it not as a hardship, but as a privilege to the subject allies, that they should be allowed to sue him before the dikastery, and to defend themselves before the same tribunal either in case of wrong done to him, or in case of alleged treason to the imperial authority of Athens: they were thereby put upon a level with himself. Still more would he find reason to eulogize the universal competence of these dikasteries in providing a common legal authority for all disputes of the numerous distinct communities of the empire one with another, and for the safe navigation and general commerce of the Ægean. That complaints were raised against it among the subject-allies is noway surprising. For the empire of Athens generally was inconsistent with that separate autonomy to which every town thought itself entitled; and this central judicature was one of its prominent and constantly operative institutions, as well as a striking mark of dependence to the subordinate communities. Yet we may safely affirm that if empire was to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be found at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the superintending competence of the dikasteries—a system not taking its rise in the mere "love of litigation" (if, indeed, we are to reckon this a real feature in the Athenian character, which I shall take another opportunity of examining), much less in those petty collateral interests indicated by Xenophon, such as the increased customs duty, rent of houses, and hire of slaves at Peiræus, and the larger profits of the heralds, arising from the influx of suitors. It was nothing but the power, originally inherent in the confederacy of Delos, of arbitration between members and enforcement of duties toward the whole—a power inherited by Athens from that synod, and enlarged to meet the political wants of her empire; to which end it was essential, even in the view of Xenophon himself. It may be that the dikastery was not always impartial between Athenian citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collectively, and the subject-allies—and in so far the latter had goo dreason to complain. But on the other hand we have no ground for suspecting it of deliberate or standing unfairness, or of any other defects than such as were inseparable

from its constitution and procedure, whoever might be the parties under trial.

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the Peloponnesian war; before the increased exactions and the multiplied revolts, to which that war gave rise—before the cruelties which accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply stained the character of Athens—before that aggravated fierceness, mistrust, contempt of obligation, and rapacious violence, which Thucydides so emphatically indicates as having been infused into the Greek bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest. There had been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies, from the earliest at Naxos down to the latest at Samos. All had been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed the same unrelenting rigor as we shall find hereafter manifested toward Mitylene, Skione, and Melos. The policy of Perikles, now in the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, averse to forced extension of empire as well as to those increased burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce in the Ægean by which all of them must have been gainers—not without a conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read in Thucydides the speech of the envoy from Mitylene at Olympia, delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city from Athens—a speech imploring aid and setting forth the strongest impeachment against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish—we shall be surprised how weak the case is and how much the speaker is conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical grievances and oppressions to urge against the imperial city. He does not dwell upon enormity of tribute, unpunished misconduct of Athenian officers, hardship of bringing causes for trial to Athens, or other sufferings of the subjects generally. He has nothing to say except that they were defenseless and degraded subjects, and that Athens held authority over them without and against their own consent: and in the case of Mitylene, not so much as this could be said, since she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous ally. Of course this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or such of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever they had an opportunity. But the negative evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylenæan orator, goes far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta immediately before the war—that, beyond the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city like Mitylene might be strong enough to protect itself and its

own commerce without the help of Athens. But to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.

Nearly the whole of the Grecian world (putting aside Italian, Sicilian, and African Greek) was at this time included either in the alliance of Lacedæmon or in that of Athens, so that the truce of thirty years insured a suspension of hostilities everywhere. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian confederates had determined by a majority of votes to refuse the request of Samos for aid in her revolt against Athens: whereby it seemed established, as practical international law, that neither of these two great aggregate bodies should intermeddle with the other, and that each should restrain or punish its own disobedient members.

Of this refusal, which materially affected the course of events, the main advisers had been the Corinthians, in spite of that fear and dislike of Athens which prompted many of the allies to vote for war. The position of the Corinthians was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from early times maritime, commercial, and colonizing. She had, indeed, once possessed the largest navy in Greece, along with Ægina; but either she had not increased it at all during the last forty years, or, if she had, her comparative naval importance had been sunk by the gigantic expansion of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and colonies—Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, etc., along or near the coast of Epirus: they had also their colony Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallene in Thrace, and intimately connected with them: and the interest of their commerce made them averse to collision with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the Lacedæmonian allies toward war on behalf of Samos. For though their feelings both of jealousy and hatred against Athens were even now strong, arising greatly out of the struggle a few years before the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance—prudence indicated that in a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were sure to be the greatest losers.

So long as the policy of Corinth pointed toward peace, there was every probability that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only in a case of grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency, distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and not only extinguished the dispositions of Corinth toward peace, but even transformed her into the forward instigator of war.

Amid the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony or supremacy. What extent of real power and interference

this acknowledgment implied, in addition to the honorary dignity, we are not in a condition to say. But the Corinthians were popular, and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the colonists themselves found acceptable. To these amicable relations, however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception—having been generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tributes of honorary and filial respect. It was amid such relations of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra that a dispute grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus (known afterward in the Roman times as Dyrrhachium, hard by the modern Durazzo)—a colony founded by the Korkyræans on the coast of Illyria in the Ionic Gulf, considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the foundation of colonies, that the Korkyræans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been obliged to select the Œkist (or Founder-in-Chief) of Epidamnus from that city—a citizen of Herakleid descent named Phalius—along with whom there had also come some Corinthian settlers. And thus Epidamnus, though a Korkyræan colony, was nevertheless a recognized grand-daughter (if the expression may be allowed) of Corinth, the recollection of which was perpetuated by the solemnities periodically celebrated in honor of the Œkist.

Founded on the isthmus of an outlying peninsula on the seacoast of the Illyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at first prosperous, and acquired a considerable territory as well as a numerous population. But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses. Internal sedition between the oligarchy and the people, aggravated by attacks from the neighboring Illyrians, had crippled its power; and a recent revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had reduced it still farther—since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, harassed the city grievously both by sea and land. The Epidamnian democracy was in such straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid. Their envoys sat down as suppliants at the temple of Here, cast themselves on the mercy of the Korkyræans, and besought them to act both as mediators with the exiled oligarchy, and as auxiliaries against the Illyrians. Though the Korkyræans, themselves democratically governed, might have been expected to sympathize with these suppliants and their prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite. For it was the Epidamnian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra, from whence their forefathers had emigrated, and where their family burial-places as well as their kinsmen were still to be found: while the Demos, or small proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus, may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island. Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed con-

dition insupportable, the Epidamnians next thought of applying to Corinth. But as this was a step of questionable propriety, their envoys were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphian god. His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as their unavailing application at Korkyra—tendering Epidamnus to the Corinthians as to its Œkists and chiefs, with the most urgent entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin—and not omitting to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus as a joint colony from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not only authorized, but bound, to undertake its defense—a resolution much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, partly of a protecting military force—Corinthian, Leukadian, and Ambrakiotic: which combined body, in order to avoid opposition from the powerful Korkyræan navy, was marched by land as far as Apollonia, and transported from thence by sea to Epidamnus.

The arrival of such a re-enforcement rescued the city for the moment, but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyræans; who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. Their feelings were farther inflamed by the Epidamnian oligarchical exiles, who, coming to the island with petitions for succor and appeals to the tombs of their Korkyræan ancestors, found a ready sympathy. They were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterward strengthened by a farther re-enforcement, which was sent to Epidamnus with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith restored and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No attention being paid to such demands, the Korkyræans commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships and with an auxiliary land-force of Illyrians—making proclamation that any person within, citizen or not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this permission we do not know; but at least enough to convey to Corinth the news that their troops in Epidamnus were closely besieged. The Corinthians immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition—sufficient not only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resistance which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty triremes, and 3,000 hoplites, of their own, they solicited aid both in ships and money from many of their allies. Eight ships fully manned were furnished bp Megara, four by Pales in the island of Kephallania, five by Epidaurus, two by Trœzen, one by Hermione, ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia—together with pecuniary contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. They farther proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers to Epidamnus, promising equal political rights to all; an option being allowed to any

one, who wished to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to insure future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas. Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, yet such was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the fleet, as to pay down the deposit for liberty of future junction.

All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though undertaken with intentional hostility towards Korkyra, had not been preceded by any formal proposition such as was customary among Grecian states—a harshness of dealing arising not merely from her hatred toward Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that island, which stood alone and isolated, not enrolled either in the Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Korkyræans, well aware of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth and of the union among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force of 120 triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to Corinth; where, while they required that the forces and settlers recently dispatched to Epidamnus should be withdrawn, denying all right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony—they at the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city, or to the Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine to which of the two cities Epidamnus as a colony really belonged—and the decision to be obeyed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, if persisted in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the Corinthians answered that they could entertain no proposition until the Korkyræan besieging force was withdrawn from Epidamnus. Whereupon the Korkyræans rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or the Korkyræans would acquiesce in the *statu quo* on both sides, until the arbiters should have decided.

Although the Korkyræans had been unwarrantably harsh in rejecting the first supplication from Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at Corinth, right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive, to admit of listening to arbitration. Accordingly, so soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidamnus, dispatching a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyræans. When the armament, consisting of seventy-five triremes under Aristeus, Kallikrates, and Timanor, with 2,000 hoplites under Archetimus and Isarchidas, had reached Cape Aktium at the mouth of the Am-

brakian Gulf, it was met by a Korkyræan herald in a little boat forbidding all farther advance—a summons of course unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Korkyræan fleet. Out of the 120 triremes which constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus, but all the remaining eighty were now brought into service; the older ships being specially repaired for the occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen Corinthian ships and taking a considerable number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidamnus surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant that the Corinthians within it should be held as prisoners, and that the other new-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyræans remained undisputed masters of the neighboring sea. Having erected a trophy on Leukimme, the adjoining promontory of their island, they proceeded, according to the melancholy practice of Grecian warfare, to kill all their prisoners, except the Corinthians, who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those allies of Corinth who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burnt Kyllene the seaport of Elis, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were compelled toward the end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape Aktium, for the defense of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. The Korkyræan fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimme, but no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded.

Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought together: and though their original project was frustrated by the loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves for two entire years after the battle in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purposes: and in particular, they sent round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the battle. The entire fleet, when re-enforced by the allies, amounted to not less than 150 sail; twenty-seven triremes from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elias, as many from Leukas, and one from Anaktorium. Each of these allied squadrons had officers of its own, while the Corinthian Xenokleides and four others were commanders-in-chief.

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to the Korkyræans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies

which that city could command, and her extensive influence throughout Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmon. It had been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in the Ægean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any real independence if that empire had been broken up. But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of isolation up to the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy, wherein her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionic Gulf; she was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amicable relations with the Dorian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there anything to forbid it; for in the truce between Athens and Sparta, it had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at pleasure. While the proposition of alliance was thus formally open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave contingencies to all parties. The Korkyræan envoys, who now for the first time visited Athens for the purpose of making it, came thither with doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the question was one of life or death.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be intrusted to the executive government apart from the representative assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of the people: and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under governments only partially democratical; much more, of course, under the complete democracy of Athens. The Korkyræan envoys on reaching that city would first open their business to the Strategi or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citizens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyræans had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration. Even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their *proxeni* at Athens (Athe-

nian citizens who watched over Corinthian interests public and private, in confidential correspondence with that government—and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern times) would communicate to them the arrival of the Korkyræan envoys. So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Thucydides has given in his History the speeches of both; that is, speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the plainest and most business-like in his whole work; bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation; which was one of doubt and difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of the opposite sides.

The Korkyræans, after lamenting their previous improvidence which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as claimants for the friendship of Athens on the strongest grounds of common interest and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and need of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon them in an unjust quarrel or by disgraceful conduct. They had proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidamnus, and their application had been refused—which showed where the right of the case lay; moreover they were now exposed single-handed, not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy organized under her auspices, including choice mariners hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting their prayer, Athens would in the first place neutralize this misemployment of her own mariners, and would at the same time confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and secure to herself an important re-enforcement. For next to her own, the Korkyræan naval force was the most powerful in Greece, and this was now placed within her reach. If by declining the present offer, she permitted Korkyra to be overcome, that naval force would pass to the side of her enemies: for such were Corinth and the Peloponnesian alliance—and such they would soon be openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that alliance and Athens could not long be postponed. It was with a view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to seize Korkyra along with her naval force. The policy of Athens therefore imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by now assisting the Korkyræans. She was permitted to do this by the terms of the Thirty years' truce. And although some might contend that in the present critical conjuncture acceptance of Korkyra was tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predictions; for Athens would so strengthen herself that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her. She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful, but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian Dorians from sending re-enforcements to the Peloponnesians.

To these representations on the part of the Korkyræans, the Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the selfish and iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less in the matter of Epidamnus than in all former time—which was the real reason why she had ever been ashamed of honest allies. Above all things, she had always acted undutifully and wickedly toward Corinth her mother city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial allegiance which Grecian morality recognized, and which the other Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed. Epidamnus was not a Korkyræan, but a Corinthian colony. The Korkyræans, having committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending: they now impudently came to ask Athens to become accessory after the fact, in such injustice. The provision of the Thirty years' truce might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies: but that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere—still less the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel, where any countenance to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a declaration of war against the opposite. If either party had a right to invoke the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth had a better right than Korkyra. For the latter had never had any transactions with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under covenant of amity with them, through the Thirty years' truce, but had also rendered material service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, the Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian international law, that each alliance was entitled to punish its own refractory members. They now called upon Athens to respect this principle by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies, especially as the violation of it would recoil inconveniently upon Athens herself with her numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an impending war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a contingency was as yet uncertain—and might possibly never occur at all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conciliate Corinth on this critical occasion. But it would assuredly occur if she refused such conciliation, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would be far greater than the promised naval co-operation of Korkyra would compensate.

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the contending envoys before the Athenian public assembly, in this momentous

debate. For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned over to the morrow; so considerable was the number of speakers, and probably also the divergence of their views. Unluckily Thucydides does not give us any of these Athenian discourses—not even that of Perikles, who determined the ultimate result.

Epidamnus with its disputed question of metropolitan right occupied little the attention of the Athenian assembly. But the Korkyræan naval force was indeed an immense item, since the question was whether it should stand on their side or against them—an item which nothing could counterbalance except the dangers of a Peloponnesian war. "Let us avoid this last calamity (was the opinion of many), even at the sacrifice of seeing Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and seamen in the service of the Peloponnesian league." "You will not really avoid it, even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of others). The generating causes of war are at work—and it will infallibly come whatever you may determine respecting Korkyra: avail yourselves of the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake the war at great comparative disadvantage." Of these two views, the former was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly; but they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformably to the steady conviction of Perikles. It was however resolved to take a sort of middle course, so as to save Korkyra, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Korkyræans, by adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if required—which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce. Accordingly nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case they were attacked: nor was any greater force equipped to back this resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedæmonius son of Kimon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it would save Korkyra from ruin, and would in fact feed the war so as to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties—which was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to Lacedæmonius and his two colleagues were express: not to engage in fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching Korkyra or some Korkyræan possession with a view to attack; but in that case to do his best on the defensive.

The great Corinthian armament of 150 sail soon took its departure from the Gulf, and reached a harbor on the coast of Epirus at the Cape called Cheimerium, nearly opposite to the southern extremity of Korkyra. They there established a naval station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from the friendly Epirotic tribes in the neighborhood. The Korkyræan fleet of 110 sail, under Meikiades and two others, together with the ten Athenian ships, took

station at one of the adjoining islands called Sybotha, while the land force and 1000 Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the Korkyræan Cape Leukimme. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on board three days' provisions, sailed by night from Cheimerium, and encountered in the morning the Korkyræan fleet advancing toward them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians, occupying the left of their aggregate fleet: next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle. But the tactics and maneuvering were not commensurate to the numbers. The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the Korkyræan side at least, were in great part slaves. The ships on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct impact prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they were on land—or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those improvements introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, and the steersman were of much greater importance than the armed soldiers on deck. By strength and exactness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of his enemy—side, oars, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, which was intended first to disable the enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water; and not until this was done did the armed men on deck begin their operations. Lacedæmonius with his ten Athenian ships, though forbidden by his instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by taking position at the extremity of the line and by making motions as if about to attack; while his seamen had full leisure to contemplate what they would despise as lubberly handling of the ships on both sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined. The ships on both sides became entangled, the oars broken and unmanageable, orders could neither be heard nor obeyed, and the individual valor of the hoplites and bowmen on deck became the decisive point on which victory turned.

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Korkyræans was victorious. Their twenty ships drove back the Ambrakiot allies of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so long out of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their total number was inferior; for their right wing, opposed to the best ships

of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat as they could —a retreat which the victorious ships on the other wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten Athenian ships under Lacedæmonius. Though at first they obeyed the instructions from home in abstaining from actual blows, yet—when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the Corinthians were pressing their victory—the Athenians could no longer keep aloof, but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the defeated Korkyræans, As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was covered with crippled and water-logged ships, of their own and their enemies, as well as with seamen, soldiers, and wounded men, either helpless aboard the wrecks or keeping above water as well as they could—among the number, many of their own citizens and allies, especially on their defeated right wing. Through these disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, but putting the greater number to death. Some even of their own allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguishable. The Corinthians, having picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus; after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume the attack against the Korkyræans on their own coast. The latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the small reserve which had remained in harbor, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the coast: and the Athenian ships, now within the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to co-operate with full energy in the defense. It was already late in the afternoon: but the Corinthian fleet, though their pæan had already been shouted for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; presently they pulled round, and steered direct for the Epirotic coast. The Korkyræans did not comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching, under Glaukon and Andokides; which the Corinthians had been the first to descry, and had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet. It was already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Leukimme, having traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies. At first the Korkyræans even mistook them for enemies. The re-enforcement had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information of the comparative force of Corinth and Korkyra, under the impression that the original ten ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of defense—an impression more than verified by the reality.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding action the Korkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled—the Corinthians only thirty—so that the superiority of numbers was still on the side of the latter, who were however encumbered with the care of 1000 prisoners (800 of them slaves) captured, not easy either to lodge or to guard in the narrow accommodations of an ancient trireme. Even apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second battle against thirty Athenian ships in addition to the remaining Korkyræan. And when their enemies sailed across to offer them battle on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of nothing but immediate retreat—with serious alarm lest the Athenians should now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the day before. Having ranged their fleet in line not far from shore, they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following remonstrance. The men carried no herald's staff (*we* should say, no flag of truce), and were therefore completely without protection against an enemy. "Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are using arms to oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention to hinder us from sailing against Korkyra or anywhere else that we choose, in breach of the truce, take first of all us who now address you, and deal with us as enemies." It was not the fault of the Korkyræans that this last idea was not instantly realized: for such of them as were near enough to hear, instigated the Athenians by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far from listening to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer: "We neither begin the war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians; we have come simply to aid these Korkyræans our allies. If ye wish to sail anywhere else, we make no opposition: but if ye are about to sail against Korkyra or any of her possessions, we shall use our best means to prevent you." Both the answer, and the treatment of the men in the boat, satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could get ready, staying however to erect a trophy at Sybota on the Epirotic coast, in commemoration of their advantage on the preceding day. In their voyage homeward they surprised Anaktorium at the mouth of the Ambrakiotic Gulf, which they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Korkyræans, planting in it a re-enforcement of Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the armament was dismissed, and the great majority of the prisoners taken, 800 slaves, were sold; but the remainder, 250 in number, were detained, and treated with peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest families in Korkyra, and the Corinthians designed to gain them over,

so as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in the island. The calamitous incidents arising from their subsequent return will appear in another chapter.

Relieved now from all danger, the Korkyræans picked up the dead bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their island, and even found sufficient pretense to erect a trophy, chiefly in consequence of their partial success on the left wing. In truth, they had been only rescued from ruin by the unexpected coming of the last Athenian ships: but the last result was as triumphant to them, as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this time forward they considered the Thirty years' truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pallene (which forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater Thracian peninsula called Chalkidike, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic Gulfs), was situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally colonized from Corinth and still maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance toward the latter: insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates under the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the neighboring coast also there were several small towns belonging to the Chalkidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighboring inland territory, Mygdonia and Chalkidike, was held by the Macedonian king Perdikkas, son of that Alexander who had taken part fifty years before in the expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers Axius and Strymon. Now Perdikkas had been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip, and Derdas, holding independent principalities in the upper country (apparently on the higher course of the Axius near the Fæonian tribes), with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, Perdikkas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the sea-ports on the mainland than over the islands. For the former were always more or less dependent on any powerful land neighbor, sometimes more dependent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens herself cultivating assiduously the favor of Sitalkes and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the sea-ports. Perdikkas immediately began to incite and aid the Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens; and the violent enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the recent events at Korkyra, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidæa. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration of war against Athens. And he further prevailed on many of the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small towns on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdikkas further assigned some territory near Lake Bolbe to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth. Immediately after the Korkyræan sea-fight they sent to take precautions against the revolt of Potidæa; requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pallene, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea side, and fortified only toward the mainland—requiring them further both to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and 1000 hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, dispatched to act against Perdikkas in the Thermaic Gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighboring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving the requisitions, the Potidæans sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time, and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the Thirty years' truce still subsisting. At Athens they had no success, and they accordingly openly revolted (seemingly about Midsummer 432 B.C.), at the same time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians and Bottiæans revolted also, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance. Archestratus, with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdikkas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, in co-operation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country under Philip and the brothers of Derdas; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have been wiser had he

turned his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidæa; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidæa a re-enforcement of 1600 hoplites and 400 light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians hired for the occasion, under Aristeus son of Adeimantus, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put in a state of complete defense shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament, however, was speedily sent forth—40 triremes and 2,000 Athenian hoplites under Kallias, son of Kalliades, with four other commanders—who, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, joined the former body at the seige of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic Gulf—next attacking, though without effect, the town of Berœa—and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the gulf, in the direction of Potidæa. On the third day of easy march, the reached the sea-port called Gigonus, near which they encamped.

In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdikkas, whose character for faithlessness we shall have more than one occasion to notice, was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, and sent 200 horse to join them under the command of Iolaus. Aristeus posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, providing a market without the walls in order that they might not stray in quest of provisions. His position was on the side toward Olynthus—which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here awaited the approach of the Athenians, calculating that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would, upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus; while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and pursuing for a considerable distance. But the remaining Potidæans and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative either of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the

Athenians, wading into the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus with a mole running out at each end into the water. He effected this daring enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could make any effective diversion: nor did the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only 300 men, while the Athenians lost 150, together with the general Kallias.

The victory was however quite complete, and the Athenians, after having erected their trophy and given up the enemy's dead for burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side toward Pallene: but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time they were joined by Phormio with 1600 fresh hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at Aphytis in the peninsula of Pallene, marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle. But the challenge not being accepted, he undertook and finished without obstruction the blockading wall on the side of Pallene, so that the town was now completely inclosed and the harbor watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalkidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa being now only a question of more or less time, Aristeus, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favorable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the harbor, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only 500 defenders behind. Though he offered himself to be among those left, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and therefore sallied forth, in the way proposed, with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without—especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chalkidians, and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of Sermylus, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town. It had however been so well provisioned that it held out for two whole years—a period full of important events elsewhere.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprang those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

EVEN before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidæa, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that prolonged observance of the Thirty years' truce was becoming uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration which Athens inspired throughout Greece would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize any favorable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence, and general slowness in resolving, might postpone the moment of carrying it into effect. Accordingly not only the Samians when they revolted had applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific interests then animating the Corinthians, but also the Lesbians had endeavored to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though the authorities to whom alone the proposition could have been communicated, since it long remained secret and was never executed, had given them no encouragement.

The affairs of Athens had been administered, under the ascendency of Perikles, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant reference to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it. But even the splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time acquired, were probably not without their effect in provoking jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her ultimate views.

The only known incident, wherein Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy prior to the Korkyræan dispute, was her decree passed in regard to Megara—prohibiting the Magarians, on pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact that the Megarians had harbored runaway slaves from Athens, and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon her border; partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis, partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent inclosure. In reference to this latter point, the Athenian herald Anthemokritus had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterward was imputed to the Megarians. We may reasonably suppose that ever since the revolt of Megara fourteen years before—which caused to Athens an irreparable

mischief—the feeling prevalent between the two cities had been one of bitter enmity, manifesting itself in many ways, but so much exasperated by recent events as to provoke Athens to a signal revenge. Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Ægean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the Thirty years' truce; though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce, and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta, with which Perikles compared it.

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Korkyra and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Corinthians toward Athens had now become angry and warlike in the highest degree. It was not simply resentment for the past which animated them, but also the anxiety further to bring upon Athens so strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison from capture. Accordingly they lost no time in endeavoring to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to invite to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that city. Not merely the Megarians, but several other confederates, came thither as accusers; while the Æginetans, though their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others, complaining that Athens withheld from them the autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce.

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against themselves or against Peloponnesus—either in violation of the Thirty years' truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the allies. But if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be convoked to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy—if the majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates as concurred. Each allied city, great or small, had an equal right of suffrage. It thus appears that Sparta herself did not vote as a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as leader, and that the only question ever submitted to the allies was whether they would or would not go along with her previous decision. Such was the course of proceeding now followed. The Corinthians, together with such other of the confederates as felt either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken the truce and were going on in a course of wrong toward Peloponnesus.

Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the public mess, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had been inflamed by the previous speakers.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of Greece turned, Thucydides has preserved an account unusually copious. First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the Ephor Sthenelaidas, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydides himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed. Neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different point of view.

The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom they were about to address had been favorably prepared for them—for the Lacedæmonian authorities had already given an actual promise, to them and to the Potidæans at the moment before Potidæa revolted, that they would invade Attica. Great was the revulution in sentiment of the Spartans, since they had declined lending aid to the much more powerful island of Lesbos when it proposed to revolt—a revolution occasioned by the altered interests and sentiments of Corinth. Nevertheless, the Corinthians also knew that their positive grounds of complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the existing truce, were both few and feeble. Neither in the dispute about Potidæa nor about Korkyra had Athens infringed the truce or wronged the Peloponnesian alliance. In both she had come into collision with Corinth, singly and apart from the confederacy. She had a right, both according to the truce and according to the received maxims of international law, to lend defensive aid to the Korkyræans, at their own request: she had a right also, according to the principles laid down by the Corinthians themselves, on occasion of the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidæans from revolting. She had committed nothing which could fairly be called an aggression. Indeed the aggression both in the case of Potidæa and that of Korkyra was decidedly on the side of the Corinthians: and the Peloponnesian confederacy could only be so far implicated as it was understood to be

bound to espouse the separate quarrels, right or wrong, of Corinth. All this was well known to the Corinthian envoys; and accordingly we find that in their speech at Sparta they touch but lightly and in vague terms on positive or recent wrongs. Even that which they do say completely justifies the proceedings of Athens about the affair of Korkyra, since they confess without hesitation the design of seizing the large Korkyræan navy for the use of the Peloponnesian alliance: while in respect of Potidæa, if we had only the speech of the Corinthian envoy before us without any other knowledge, we should have supposed it to be an independent state, not connected by any permanent bonds with Athens—we should have supposed that the siege of Potidæa by Athens was an unprovoked aggression upon an autonomous ally of Corinth—we should never have imagined that Corinth had deliberately instigated and aided the revolt of the Chalkidians as well as of the Potidæans against Athens. It might be pretended that she had a right to do this, by virtue of her undefined metropolitan relations with Potidæa. But at any rate the incident was not such as to afford any decent pretext for charge against the Athenians either of outrage toward Corinth, or of wrongful aggression against the Peloponnesian confederacy.

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have suited the purpose of the Corinthian envoy; for against such the Thirty years' truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable arbitration—to which recourse he never once alludes. He knew that as between Corinth and Athens, war had already begun at Potidæa; and his business, throughout nearly all of a very emphatic speech is to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the unwearied activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the quick resolves, the sanguine hopes never dashed by failure—of Athens: as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches the Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable height: especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes and afterward to build the long walls from the city to the sea. The Spartans (he observes) stood alone among all Greeks in the notable system of keeping down an enemy not by acting, but by delaying to act—not arresting his growth, but putting him down when his force was doubled. Falsely indeed had they acquired the reputation of being sure, when they were in reality merely slow. In resisting Xerxes, as in resisting Athens, they had always been behind-hand, disappointing and leaving their friends to ruin; while both these enemies had only failed of complete success through their own mistakes.

After half apologizing for the tartness of these reproofs—which,

however, as the Spartans were now well-disposed to go to war forthwith, would be well-timed and even agreeable—the Corinthian orator vindicates the necessity of plain speaking by the urgent peril of the emergency and the formidable character of the enemy who threatened them. "You do not reflect (he says) how thoroughly different the Athenians are from yourselves. *They* are innovators by nature, sharp both in devising, and in executing what they have determined: *you* are sharp only in keeping what you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less than absolute necessity requires. *They* again dare beyond their means, run risks beyond their own judgment, and keep alive their hopes in desperate circumstances: *your* peculiarity is that your performance comes short of your power—you have no faith even in what your judgment guarantees—when in difficulties, you despair of all escape. *They* never hang back—*you* are habitual laggards: *they* love foreign service—*you* cannot stir from home: for *they* are always under the belief that their movements will lead to some farther gain, while *you* fancy that new products will endanger what you already have. When successful, they make the greatest forward march; when defeated they fall back the least. Moreover they task their bodies on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of others—while their minds are most of all their own, for exertion in her services. When their plans for acquisition do not come successfully out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them: yet the acquisitions when realized appear like trifles compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want: for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at is almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment in the continual thirst for increase—knowing no other festival recreation except the performance of active duty—and deeming inactive repose a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak the truth in two words, such is their inborn temper, that they will neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest to others.

"Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians—yet ye still hang back from action. . . . . Your continual scruples and apathy would hardly be safe, even if ye had neighbors like yourselves in character: but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure to come out victorious: and though unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act—yet multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance. It is through these numerous trials that the means of Athens have acquired so much more new development than yours."

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect her allies against Athens—if she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potidæans of immediately invading Attica—they (the Corinthians) would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, which they felt themselves fully justified in doing. They admonished her to look well to the case, and to carry forward Peloponnesus, with undiminished dignity, as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her fiercest enemy before the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was imputed to Athens during the past—and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future to the utter ruin of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy (staying in Sparta about some other negotiation and now present in the assembly) address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up: and what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.

He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his native city against the charges of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing truce. This was no part of his mission; nor did he recognize Sparta as a competent judge in dispute between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy toward which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that the empire of Athens had been honorably earned and amply deserved—that it had been voluntarily ceded, and even pressed upon her—and that she could not abdicate it without imperiling her own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with pride, as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of that city which the Spartan congress now seemed disposed to run down as an enemy. He then dwelt upon the circumstances attending the Persian invasion, setting forth the superior forwardness and the unflinching endurance of Athens, in spite of ungenerous neglect from the Spartans and other Greeks—the preponderance of her naval force in the entire armament—the directing genius of her general Themistokles, complimented even by Sparta herself—and the title of Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as the principal saviour of Greece. This alone ought to save

her empire from reproach; but this was not all—for that empire had been tendered to her by the pressing instance of the allies, at a time when Sparta had proved herself both incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against Persia. By simple exercise of the constraining force inseparable from her presidential obligations, and by the reduction of various allies who revolted, Athens had gradually become unpopular, while Sparta too had become her enemy instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon her allies would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against her; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of ambition and revenue, in inducing Athens to maintain her imperial dominion by force. In her position, no Grecian power either would or could have acted otherwise:—no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with so much equity and moderation, or given so little ground of complaint to her subjects. Worse they *had* suffered, while under Persia; worse they *would* suffer, if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under the thraldom of an oligarchical party in each city: and if they hated Athens, this was only because subjects always hated the *present* dominion, whatever that might be.

Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian empire, the envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, before she took a step from which there was no retreat, and which exposed the future to chances such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her not to break the truce mutually sworn to, but to adjust all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that truce provided. Should she begin war, the Athenians would follow her lead and resist her, calling to witness those gods under whose sanction the oaths were taken.

The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will have shown, that the account given by the Athenian envoy at Sparta of the origin and character of the empire exercised by his city (though doubtless the account of a partisan) is in substance correct and equitable. The envoys of Athens had not yet learned to take the tone which they assumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth years of the coming war, at Melos and Kamarina. At any time previous to the affair of Korkyra, the topics insisted upon by the Athenian would probably have been profoundly listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all "strangers," and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one language—expatiating on the wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There was however one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion; the ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, looks

at the question with a view to the interests and honor of Sparta only—not, however, omitting her imperial as well as her separate character. The preceding native speakers, indignant against Athens, had probably appealed to Spartan pride, treating it as an intolerable disgrace that almost the entire land-force of Dorian Peloponnesus should be thus bullied by one single Ionic city, and should hesitate to commence a war which one invasion of Attica would probably terminate. As the Corinthians had tried to excite the Spartans by well-timed taunts and reproaches, so the subsequent speakers had aimed at the same objects by panegyric upon the well-known valor and discipline of the city. To all these arguments Archidamus set himself to reply. Invoking the experience of the elders, his contemporaries, around him, he impressed upon the assembly the grave responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, and perils of the war into which they were hurrying without preparation. He reminded them of the wealth, the population (greater than that of any other Grecian city), the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens,—and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down? Ships, they had few; trained seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could, indeed, invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land-force. But the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end, would be a deplorable error: such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps for a whole generation. Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their allies not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also. While this was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians granted this—which they very probably would do, when they saw the preparations going forward, and when the ruin of the highly cultivated soil of Attica was held over them in terrorem without being actually consummated—so much the better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded his countrymen that their allies would hold *them* responsible for the good or bad issue of what was now determined; admonishing them, in the true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that cautious policy which had been ever the characteristic of the state, despising both taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on their valor. "We Spartans owe both our bravery and our prudence to our admirable public discipline: it makes us warlike, because the sense of shame is most closely connected with discipline, as valor is with the sense of shame: it makes us prudent,

because our training keeps us too ignorant to set ourselves above our own institutions, and holds us under sharp restraint so as not to disobey them. And thus, not being overwise in unprofitable accomplishments, we Spartans are not given to disparage our enemy's strength in clever speech, and then meet him with shortcomings in reality. We think that the capacity of neighboring states is much on a par, and that the chances in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our enemies, as if they were proceeding wisely on their side: we must count upon security through our own precautions, not upon the chance of their errors. Indeed, there is no great superiority in one man as compared with another: he is the stoutest who is trained in the severest trials. Let us for our parts not renounce this discipline, which we have received from our fathers and which we still continue, to our very great profit: let us not hurry on in one short hour a resolution upon which depend so many lives, so much property, so many cities, and our own reputation besides. Let us take time to consider, since our strength puts it fully in our power to do so. Send envoys to the Athenians on the subject of Potidæa and of the other grievances alleged by our allies—and that, too, the rather as they are ready to give us satisfaction: against one who offers satisfaction, custom forbids you to proceed, without some previous application, as if he were a proclaimed wrong-doer. But at the same time make preparation for war; such will be the course of policy at once the best for your own power and the most terror-striking to your enemies."

The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain reason and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. Sthenelaidas—one of the five Ephors, to whom it fell to put the question for voting—closed the debate. His few words mark at once the character of the man—the temper of the assembly—and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgment, for which Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen.

"I don't understand (he said) these long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted what is laid to their charge—that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now if in former days they were good men against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against us, they deserve double punishment as having become evil-doers instead of good. But *we* are the same now as we were then: we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering wrong: we shall not adjourn our aid, while they cannot adjourn their sufferings. Others have in abundance wealth, ships, and horses—but *we*

have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the mercy of the Athenians: nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Let no one tell us that we can with honor deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong: it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta. Suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are: let us not betray our allies to ruin, but march with the aid of the gods against the wrong-doers."

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential admonitions of Archidamus, Sthenelaidas put the question for the decision of the assembly—which at Sparta was usually taken neither by show of hands, nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries analogous to the Ay or No of the English House of Commons—the presiding Ephor declaring which of the cries predominated. On this occasion the cry for war was manifestly the stronger. Yet Sthenelaidas affected inability to determine which of the two was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a stronger apparent majority—since a portion of the minority would probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals openly. He, therefore, directed a division—like the Speaker of the English House of Commons when his decision in favor of Ay or No is questioned by any member—"Such of you as think that the truce has been violated and that the Athenians are doing us wrong, go to *that* side; such as think the contrary, to the other side." The assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important decision, was to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war. The answer brought back (Thucydides seems hardly certain that it was really given) was—that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that the god would help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies to Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all.

To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the decision to be given by this congress was not less important than that which the Spartans had just taken separately. They sent round envoys to each of the allies, entreating them to authorize war without reserve. Through such instigations, acting upon the general impulse then prevalent, the congress came together in a temper decidedly warlike. Most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens and impatient for action, while the Corinthians, waiting as before to speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated to insure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to shame, exasperate, and alarm the Lacedæmonians; this point having

now been carried, they had to enforce, upon the allies, generally, the dishonor as well as the impolicy of receding from a willing leader. The cause was one in which all were interested, the inland states not less than the maritime, for both would find themselves ultimately victims of the encroaching despot-city. Whatever efforts were necessary for the war, ought cheerfully to be made, since it was only through war that they could arrive at a secure and honorable peace. There were good hopes that this might soon be attained, and that the war would not last long—so decided was the superiority of the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal heart and obedience of all its members. The naval superiority of Athens depended chiefly upon hired seamen—so that the confederacy, by borrowing from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, would soon be able to overbid her, take into pay her best mariners, and equal her equipment at sea. They would excite revolt among her allies and establish a permanent fortified post for the ruin of Attica. To make up a common fund for this purpose, was indispensably necessary; for Athens was far more than a match for each of them single-handed. Nothing less than hearty union could save them all from successive enslavement—the very supposition of which was intolerable to Peloponnesian freemen, whose fathers had liberated Greece from the Persian. Let them not shrink from endurance and sacrifice in such a cause—it was their hereditary pride to purchase success by laborious effort. The Delphian god had promised them his co operation; and the whole of Greece would sympathize in the cause, either from fear of the despotism of Athens, or from hopes of profit. They would not be the first to break the truce, for the Athenians had already broken it, as the declaration of the Delphian god distinctly implied. Let them lose no time in sending aid to the Potidæans, a Dorian population now besieged by Ionians, as well as to those other Greeks whom Athens had enslaved. Every day the necessity for effort was becoming stronger, and the longer it was delayed, the more painful it would be when it came. "Be ye persuaded then (concluded the orator), that this city, which has constituted herself despot of Greece, had her means of attack prepared against all of us alike, some for present rule, others for future conquest. Let us assail and subdue her, that we may dwell securely ourselves hereafter, and may emancipate those Greeks who are now in slavery."

If there were any speeches delivered at this congress in opposition to the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein even Archidamus had failed. After the Corinthian had concluded, the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and small indiscriminately: and the majority decided for war. This important resolution was adopted about the end of 432 B.C., or the beginning of January, 431 B.C.: the previous decision of the Spartans separately may have been taken about two months earlier, in the preceding October or November, 432 B.C.

Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the Thirty years' truce: while for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which the truce itself prescribed. The Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest. If Sparta, usually so backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are to ascribe it partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians.

Thucydides, recognizing these two as the grand determining motives, and indicating the alleged infractions of truce as simple occasions or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of her allies. That the extraordinary aggrandizement of Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was well calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is indisputable. But if we take Athens as she stood in 432 B.C., it deserves notice that she had neither made, nor (so far as we know) tried to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce,—and moreover that that truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained, though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling out of which war was likely to grow. We see that even before the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere anticipated war as not far distant. It was near breaking out even on occasion of the revolt of Samos; peace being then preserved partly by the commercial and nautical interests of Corinth, partly by the quiescence of Athens. But the quarrel of Corinth and Korkyra, which Sparta might have appeased beforehand had she thought it her interest to do so,—and the junction of Korkyra with Athens—exhibited the latter as again in a career of aggrandizement, and thus again brought into play the warlike feelings of Sparta; while they converted Corinth from the advocate of peace into a clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidæa—fomented by Corinth and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade Attica—was, in point of fact, the first distinct violation of the truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war. The Spartan meeting, and the subsequent congress of allies at Sparta, served no other purpose than to provide such formalities as were requisite to insure the concurrent and hearty action of numbers, and to clothe with imposing sanction a state of war already existing in reality, though yet unproclaimed.

The sentiment in Peloponnesus at this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens—and the confident hope of subduing her. And indeed such confidence was justified by plausible grounds. Men might well think that the Athenians could never endure the entire devastation of their highly cultivated soil—or at least that they would certainly come forth to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians desired. Nothing except the unparalleled ascendency and unshaken resolution of Perikles induced the Athenians to persevere in a scheme of patient defense, and to trust to that naval superiority which the enemies of Athens, save and except the judicious Archidamus, had not yet learned fully to appreciate. Moreover the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by the widespread sympathy in favor of their cause, proclaiming as it did the intended liberation of Greece from a despot city.

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect; holding out nothing less than the certainty of prodigious loss and privation—even granting that at this heavy cost, her independence and union at home, and her empire abroad, could be upheld. By Perikles, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Korkyræan dispute. But Perikles was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed, trusted, and listened to, more than any one else, by the body of citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens—and even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must of course have been made known at Athens, by those Athenian envoys who had entered an unavailing protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald, or make any formal declaration. They dispatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war; but with the contrary purpose—of multiplying demands, and enlarging the grounds of quarrel. Meanwhile the deputies, retiring home from the congress to their respective cities, carried with them the general resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made with as little delay as possible.

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political maneuver aimed at Perikles, their chief opponent in that city. His mother Agariste belonged to the great family of the Alkmæonids, who were supposed to be under an inexpiable hereditary taint, in consequence of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor Megakles nearly two centuries before, in the slaughter of the Kylonian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddesses.

Ancient as this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a political maneuver. About seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by the Spartan king Kleomenes, who at that time exacted from the Atheniansa clearance of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment of Kleisthenes (the founder of the democracy) and his chief partisans. This demand, addressed by Kleomenes to the Athenians at the instance of Isagoras the rival of Kleisthenes, had been then obeyed, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it. A similar blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Perikles (the grand-nephew of Kleisthenes), and doubtless at the instance of his political enemies. Religion required, it was pretended, that "the abomination of the goddess should be driven out." If the Athenians complied with this demand, they would deprive themselves, at this critical moment, of their ablest leader. But the Lacedæmonians, not expecting compliance, reckoned at all events upon discrediting Perikles with the people, as being partly the cause of the war through family taint of impiety—and this impression would doubtless be loudly proclaimed by his political opponents in the assembly.

The influence of Perikles with the Athenian public had become greater and greater as their political experience of him was prolonged. But the bitterness of his enemies appears to have increased along with it. Not long before this period, he had been indirectly assailed through the medium of accusations against three different persons, all more or less intimate with him—his mistress Aspasia, the philosopher Anaxagoras, and the sculptor Pheidias.

We cannot make out either the exact date, or the exact facts of either of these accusations. Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, was a native of Miletus, beautiful, well-educated, and aspiring. She resided at Athens, and is affirmed (though upon very doubtful evidence) to have kept slave-girls to be let out as courtezans. Whatever may be the case with this report, which is most probably one of the scandals engendered by political animosity against Perikles, it is certain that so remarkable were her own fascinations, her accomplishments, and her powers not merely of conversation, but even of oratory and criticism—that the most distinguished Athenians of all ages and characters, Sokrates among the number, visited her, and several of them took their wives along with them to hear her also. The free citizen women of Athens lived in strict and almost oriental recluseness, as well after being married as when single. Everything which concerned their lives, their happiness, or their rights, was determined or managed for them by male relatives: and they seem to have been destitute of all mental culture and accomplishments. Their society presented no charm nor interest, which men accordingly sought for in the company of a class of women called Hetæræ or Courtezans, literally Female Companions, who lived a free life,

managed their own affairs, and supported themselves by their powers of pleasing. These women were numerous, and were doubtless of every variety of personal character The most distinguished and superior among them, such as Aspasia and Theodote, appear to have been the only women in Greece, except the Spartan, who either inspired strong passion or exercised mental ascendency.

Perikles had been determined in his choice of a wife by those family considerations which were held almost obligatory at Athens, and had married a woman very nearly related to him, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. But the marriage having never been comfortable, was afterward dissolved by mutual consent, according to that full liberty of divorce which the Attic law permitted. Perikles concurred with his wife's male relations (who formed her legal guardians) in giving her away to another husband. He then took Aspasia to live with him, had a son by her who bore his name, and continued ever afterward on terms of the greatest intimacy and affection with her. Without adopting those exaggerations which represent Aspasia as having communicated to Perikles his distinguished eloquence, or even as having herself composed orations for public delivery, we may reasonably believe her to have been qualified to take interest and share in that literary and philosophical society which frequented the house of Perikles, and which his unprincipled son Xanthippus—disgusted with his father's regular expenditure, as withholding from him the means of supporting an extravagant establishment—reported abroad with exaggerated calumnies, and turned into derision. It was from that worthless young man, who died of the Athenian epidemic during the lifetime of Perikles, that his political enemies and the comic writers of the day obtained the pretended revelations, which served them as matter for scandalous libel on the privacy of this distinguished man.

While the comic writers attacked Perikles himself for alleged intrigues with different women, they treated the name of Aspasia as public property without any mercy or reserve: she was the Omphale, the Deianeira, or the Here, to this great Herakles or Zeus of Athens. At length one of these comic writers, Hermippus, not contented with scenic attacks, indicted her before the dikastery for impiety, as participant in the philosophical discussions held, and the opinions professed, among the society of Perikles, by Anaxagoras and others. Against Anaxagoras himself, too, a similar indictment is said to have been preferred, either by Kleon or by Thucydides son of Melesias, under a general resolution recently passed in the public assembly at the instance of Diopeithes. And such was the sensitive antipathy of the Athenian public, shown afterward fatally in the case of Sokrates, and imbittered in this instance by all the artifices of political faction, against philosophers whose opinions conflicted with the received religious dogmas—that Perikles did not dare to place Anaxagoras on his trial. The latter retired from Athens, and a sentence of banish-

ment was passed against him in his absence. But Perikles himself defended Aspasia before the dikastery. In fact, the indictment was as much against him as against her: one thing alleged against her (and also against Pheidias) was, the reception of free women to facilitate the intrigues of Perikles. He defended her successfully and procured a verdict of acquittal: but we are not surprised to hear that his speech was marked by the strongest personal emotions and even by tears. The dikasts were accustomed to such appeals to their sympathies, sometimes even to extravagant excess, from ordinary accused persons. In Perikles, however, so manifest an outburst of emotion stands out as something quite unparalleled; for constant self-mastery was one of the most prominent features in his character. And we shall find him, near the close of his political life, when he had become for the moment unpopular with the Athenian people, distracted as they were at the moment with the terrible sufferings of the pestilence,—bearing up against their unmerited anger not merely with dignity, but with a pride of conscious innocence and desert which rises almost into defiance; insomuch that the rhetor Dionysius, who criticises the speech of Perikles as if it were simply the composition of Thucydides, censures that historian for having violated dramatic propriety by a display of insolence where humility would have been becoming.

It appears also, as far as we can judge amid very imperfect data, that the trial of the great sculptor Pheidias, for alleged embezzlement in the contract for his celebrated gold and ivory statue of Athene, took place nearly at this period. That statue had been finished and dedicated in the Parthenon in 437 B.C., since which period Pheidias had been engaged at Olympia in his last and great masterpiece, the colossal statue of the Olympian Zeus. On his return to Athens from the execution of this work, about 433 or 432 B.C., the accusation of embezzlement was instituted against him by the political enemies of Perikles. A slave of Pheidias, named Menon, planted himself as a suppliant at the altar, professing to be cognizant of certain facts which proved that his master had committed peculation. Motion was made to receive his depositions and to insure to his person the protection of the people; upon which he revealed various statements so greatly impeaching the pecuniary probity of Pheidias, that the latter was put in prison, awaiting the day for his trial before the dikastery. The gold employed and charged for in the statue, however, was all capable of being taken off and weighed, so as to verify its accuracy, which Perikles dared the accusers to do. Besides the charge of embezzlement, there were other circumstances which rendered Pheidias unpopular. It had been discovered that, in the reliefs on the frieze of the Parthenon, he had introduced the portraits of himself and Perikles in conspicuous positions. It seems that Pheidias died in prison before the day of trial; and some even said that he had been poisoned by the enemies of Perikles, in order that the sus-

picions against the latter, who was the real object of attack, might be aggravated. It is said also that Drakontides proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that Perikles should be called on to give an account of the money which he had expended, and that the dikasts, before whom the account was rendered, should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner from the altar. This latter provision was modified by Agnon, who, while proposing that the dikasts should be 1500 in number, retained the vote by pebbles in the urn according to ordinary custom.

If Perikles was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that he was honorably acquitted: for the language of Thucydides respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could not have been employed if a verdict of guilty on charge of peculation had been publicly pronounced. But we cannot be certain that he ever was tried. Indeed, another accusation urged by his enemies, and even by Aristophanes in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, implies that no trial took place: for it was alleged that Perikles, in order to escape this danger, "blew up the Peloponnesian war;" and involved his country in such confusion and peril as made his own aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her; especially, that he passed the degree against the Megarians by which the war was really brought on. We know enough, however, to be certain that such a supposition is altogether inadmissible. The enemies of Perikles were far too eager, and too expert in Athenian political warfare, to have let him escape by such a stratagem. Moreover, we learn from the assurance of Thucydides that the war depended upon far deeper causes—that the Megarian decree was in no way the real cause of it—that it was not Perikles, but the Peloponnesians, who brought it on, by the blow struck at Potidæa.

All that we can make out, amid these uncertified allegations, is, that in the year or two immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war, Perikles was hard-pressed by the accusations of political enemies —perhaps even in his own person, but certainly in the persons of those who were most in his confidence and affection. And it was in this turn of his political position, that the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens the above-mentioned requisition that the ancient Kylonian sacrilege might be at length cleared out; in other words, that Perikles and his family might be banished. Doubtless his enemies, as well as the partisans of Lacedæmon at Athens, would strenuously support this proposition. And the party of Lacedæmon at Athens was always strong, even during the middle of the war:—to act as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians was accounted an honor even by the greatest Athenian families. On this occasion, however, the maneuver did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requisition for banishing the sacrilegious Alkmæonids. On the contrary, they replied that the Spartans, too, had an account of sacrilege to clear off; for they had violated the sanctuary of Poseidon at Cape Tænarus,

in dragging from it some helot suppliants to be put to death—and the sanctuary of Athene Chalkiœkus at Sparta, in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To require that Laconia might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege—was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for the banishment of Perikles. Probably the actual effect of that demand was, to strengthen him in the public esteem: very different from the effect of the same maneuver when practiced before by Kleomenes against Kleisthenes.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterward arrived with fresh demands. The Athenians were now required—1. To withdraw their troops from Potidæa. 2. To replace Ægina in its autonomy. 3. To repeal the decree of exclusion against the Megarians.

It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid; an intimation being held out that war might be avoided if such repeal were granted. We see plainly from this proceeding that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the anti-Periklean leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue of the Corinthian troops now blocked up in Potidæa. But, on the other hand, the party opposed to Perikles would have a much better chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the Megarians: and his advantage, if gained, would serve to enfeeble his influence generally. No concession was obtained, however, on either of the three points: even in respect to Megara the decree of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians—who had already resolved upon war and had sent these envoys in mere compliance with the exigences of ordinary practice, not with any idea of bringing about an accommodation—sent a third batch of envoys with a proposition which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without disguise. Rhamphias and two other Spartans announced to the Athenians the simple injunction: "The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand; and it *may* stand, if you will leave the Greeks autonomous." Upon this demand, so very different from the preceding, the Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine once for all on a peremptory answer.

The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which went to nothing less than the entire extinction of the Athenian empire—combined with the character, alike wavering and insincere, of the demands previously made, and with the knowledge that the Spartan confederacy had pronounced peremptorily in favor of war—seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring together this important assemby under the universal conviction that war was inevitable. Such, however, was not the fact. The reluctance to go to war was sincere amid the large majority of the assembly; while among a considerable portion of them it was so preponderant that they even

now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if they were the chief cause of war. There was much difference of opinion among the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of this decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war about, and denouncing the obstinacy of Perikles for refusing to concede such a trifle. Against this opinion Perikles entered his protest, in a harangue decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of Halikarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thucydides. The latter historian may probably himself have heard the original speech.

"I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same conviction, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians—though I know that men are in one mood, when they sanction the resolution to go to war, and in another, when actually in the contest—their judgments then depending upon the turn of events. I have only to repeat now what I have said on former occasions—and I adjure you who follow my views to adhere to what we jointly resolve, though the result should be partially unfavorable; or else not take credit for wisdom in the event of success. For it is very possible that the contingencies of events may depart more from all reasonable track than the counsels of man: such are the unexpected turns which we familiarly impute to Fortune. The Lacedæmonians have before now manifested their hostile aims against us, but on this last occasion more than ever. While the truce prescribes that we are to give and receive amicable satisfaction for our differences, and each to retain what we possess—they not only have not asked for such satisfaction, but repudiate it when tendered. They choose to settle complaints by war and not by discussion: they have got beyond the tone of complaint, and are here already with that of command. For they enjoin us to withdraw from Potidæa, to leave Ægina free, and to rescind the decree against the Megarians: nay, these last envoys are even come to proclaim to us, that we must leave all the Greeks free. Now, let none of you believe, that we shall be going to war about a trifle, if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—which they chiefly put forward, as if its repeal would avert the war. Let none of you take blame to yourselves as if we had gone to war about a small matter. For this small matter contains in itself the whole test and trial of your mettle: if ye yield it, ye will presently have some other greater exaction put upon you, like men who have already truckled on one point from fear: whereas if ye hold out stoutly, ye will make it clear to them that they must deal with you more upon a footing of equality."

Perikles then examined the relative strength of parties and the chances of war. The Peloponnesians were a self-working population, with few slaves, and without wealth, either private or public: they had no means of carrying on distant or long-continued war. They were ready to expose their persons, but not at all ready to contribute from their very narrow means. In a border-war or a single land-battle,

they were invincible, but for systematic warfare against a power like Athens, they had neither competent headship, nor habits of concert and punctuality, nor money to profit by opportunities, always rare and accidental, for successful attack. They might perhaps establish a fortified post in Attica, but it would do little serious mischief; while at sea, their inferiority and helplessness would be complete, and the irresistible Athenian navy would take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on tempting away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means of funds borrowed from Olympia or Delphi. For besides that the mariners of the dependent islands would find themselves losers even by accepting a higher pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance afterward—Athens herself would suffice to man her fleet in case of need, with her own citizens and metics: she had within her own walls steersmen and mariners better, as well as more numerous, than all Greece besides. There was but one side on which Athens was vulnerable: Attica unfortunately was not an island—it was exposed to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit, without committing the imprudence of engaging a land-battle to avert it. They had abundant lands out of Attica, insular as well as continental, to supply their wants, while they could in their turn, by means of their navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary lands to recur to.

"Mourn not for the loss of land and houses (continued the orator). Reserve your mourning for men: houses and land acquire not men, but men acquire them. Nay, if I thought I could prevail upon you, I would exhort you to march out and ravage them yourselves, and thus show to the Peloponnesians that for them at least ye will not truckle, And I could exhibit many further grounds for confidently anticipating success, if ye will only be willing not to aim at increased dominion when we are in the midst of war, and not to take upon yourselves new self-imposed risks; for I have ever been more afraid of our own blunders than of the plans of our enemy. But these are matters for future discussion, when we come to actual operations: for the present, let us dismiss these envoys with the answer:—That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets and harbors, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their (xenelasy or) summary expulsions of ourselves and our allies from their own territory—for there is nothing in the truce to prevent either one or the other: That we will leave the Grecian cities autonomous, if we *had* them as autonomous at the time when the truce was made—and as soon as the Lacedæmonians shall grant to *their* allied cities autonomy such as each of them shall freely choose, not such as is convenient to Sparta: That while we are ready to give satisfaction according to the truce, we will not begin war, but will repel those who do begin it. Such is the reply at once just and suitable to the dignity of this city. We ought to make up our minds that war is inevitable: the more

cheerfully we accept it, the less vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack: and where the danger is greatest, there also is the final honor greatest, both for a state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they bore up against the Persians—having no such means as we possess to start from, and even compelled to abandon all that they did possess—both repelled the invader and brought matters forward to our actual pitch, more by advised operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater than their real power. We ought not to fall short of them: we must keep off our enemies in every way, and leave an unimpaired power to our successors."

These animating encouragements of Perikles carried with them the majority of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced to them, moreover, on the general question of peace or war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against them, pursuant to the truce, by equal and amicable arbitration—but that they would do nothing under authoritative demand. With this answer the envoys returned to Sparta, and an end was put to negotiation.

It seems evident, from the account of Thucydides, that the Athenian public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance, and great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of property in Attica; and that a considerable minority took opposition on the Megarian decree—the ground skillfully laid by Sparta for breaking the unanimity of her enemy, and strengthening the party opposed to Perikles. But we may also decidedly infer from the same historian—especially from the proceedings of Corinth and Sparta as he sets them forth—that Athens could not have avoided the war without such an abnegation both of dignity and power as no nation under any government will ever submit to, and as would even have left her without decent security for her individual rights. To accept the war tendered to her was a matter not merely of prudence but of necessity: the tone of exaction assumed by the Spartan envoys would have rendered concession a mere evidence of weakness and fear. As the account of Thucydides bears out the judgment of Perikles on this important point, so it also shows us that Athens was not less in the right upon the received principles of international dealing. It was not Athens (as the Spartans themselves afterward came to feel), but her enemies, who broke the provisions of the truce, by encouraging the revolt of Potidæa, and by promising invasion of Attica; it was not Athens, but her enemies, who after thus breaking the truce, made a string of exorbitant demands, in order to get up as good a case as possible for war. The case made out by Perikles, justifying the war on grounds both of right and prudence, is in all its main points borne out by the impartial voice of Thucydides. And though it is perfectly true that the ambition of Athens had been

great, and the increase of her power marvelous, during the thirty five years between the repulse of Xerxes and the Thirty years' truce, it is not less true that by that truce she lost very largely, and that she acquired nothing to compensate such loss during the fourteen years between the truce and the Korkyræan alliance. The policy of Perikles had not been one of foreign aggrandizement, or of increasing vexation and encroachment toward other Grecian powers. Even the Korkyræan alliance was noway courted by him, and was in truth accepted with paramount regard to the obligations of the existing truce; while the circumstances, out of which that alliance grew, testify a more forward ambition on the part of Corinth than on that of Athens, to appropriate to herself the Korkyræan naval force. It is common to ascribe the Peloponnesian war to the ambition of Athens, but this is a partial view of the case. The aggressive sentiment, partly fear, partly hatred, was on the side of the Peloponnesians, who were not ignorant that Athens desired the continuance of peace, but were resolved not to let her stand as she was at the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce. It was their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every Grecian state to autonomy, against Athens: partly a contest of power, wherein Spartan and Corinthian ambition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the beginning, than Athenian.

Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was struck, not by Athens, but against her. After the decisive answer given to the Spartan envoys, taken in conjunction with the previous proceedings, and the preparations actually going on, among the Peloponnesian confederacy, the truce could hardly be said to be still in force, though there was no formal proclamation of rupture. A few weeks passed in restricted and mistrustful intercourse; though individuals who passed the borders did not yet think it necessary to take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the excess of ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course great probability of success, before their preparations were completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, while the disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the entrails of Hellas, was opened by her enemy and her neighbor.

The little town of Platæa, still hallowed by the memorable victory over the Persians as well as by the tutelary consecration received from Pausanias, was the scene of this unforeseen enterprise. It stood in Bœotia, immediately north of Kithæron; with the borders of Attica on one side, and the Theban territory (from which it was separated by the river Asopus) on the other: the distance between Platæa and Thebes being about seventy stadia, or eight miles. Though

Bœotian by descent, the Platæans were completely separated from the Bœotian league, and in hearty alliance (as well as qualified communion of civil rights) with the Athenians, who had protected them against the bitter enmity of Thebes for a period of now nearly three generations. But in spite of this long proscription the Thebans, as chiefs of the Bœotian league, still felt themselves wronged by the separation of Platæa. An oligarchical faction of wealthy Platæans espoused their cause with a view of subverting the democratical government of the town—of destroying its leaders, their political rivals—and of establishing an oligarchy with themselves as the chiefs. Naukleides, and others of this faction, entered into a secret conspiracy with Eurymachus and the oligarchy of Thebes. To both it appeared a tempting prize, since war was close at hand, to take advantage of this ambiguous interval before watches had been placed and the precautions of a state of war commenced. They resolved to surprise the town of Platæa in the night, during a period of religious festival, in order that the population might be most completely off their guard. Accordingly, on a rainy night towards the close of March 431 B.C., a body of rather more than 300 Theban hoplites, commanded by two of the Bœotarchs, Pythangelus and Diemporus, and including Eurymachus in the ranks, presented themselves at the gate of Platæa during the first sleep of the citizens. Naukleides and his partisans opened the gate and conducted them to the agora, which they reached and occupied in military order without the least resistance. The best part of the Theban military force was intended to arrive at Platæa by break of day in order to support them.

Naukleides and his friends, following the instincts of political antipathy, were eager to conduct the Thebans to the houses of their opponents, the democratical leaders, in order that the latter might be seized or dispatched. But to this the Thebans would not consent. Believing themselves now masters of the town, and certain of a large re-enforcement at daylight, they thought they could overawe the citizens into an apparently willing acquiescence in their terms, without any actual violence. They wished, moreover, rather to soften and justify than to aggravate the gross public wrong already committed. Accordingly their herald was directed to invite by public proclamation all Platæans who were willing to return to their ancient sympathies of race and to the Bœotian confederacy, that they should come forth and take station as brethren in the armed ranks of the Thebans. And the Platæans, suddenly roused from sleep by the astounding news that their great enemy was master of the town, supposed amidst the darkness that the number of assailants was far greater than the reality: so that in spite of their strong attachment to Athens, they thought their case hopeless, and began to open negotiations. But finding out soon, in spite of the darkness, as the discussion proceeded, that the real numbers of the Thebans were not greater than could be dealt with, they speedily took courage and

determined to attack them; establishing communication with each other by breaking through the walls of their private houses, in order that they might not be detected in moving about in the streets or ways, and forming barricades with wagons across such of these ways as were suitable.

A little before daybreak, when their preparations were fully completed, they sallied forth from their houses to the attack, and immediately came to close quarters with the Thebans. The latter, still fancying themselves masters of the town and relying upon a satisfactory close to the discussions when daylight should arrive, now found themselves surprised in their turn, and under great disadvantages. Having been out all night under a heavy rain, they were inclosed in a town which they did not know, with narrow, crooked, and muddy ways, such as they would have had difficulty in tracking out even by daylight. Nevertheless, on finding themselves suddenly assailed they got as well as they could into close order, and repelled the Platæans two or three times. The attack was repeated with loud shouts, while the women also screamed, howled, and threw tiles from the flat-roofed houses, until at length the Thebans became dismayed and broken. But flight was not less difficult than resistance; for they could not find their way out of the city, and even the gate by which they entered, the only one open, had been closed by a Platæan citizen who thrust into it the point of a javelin in place of the peg whereby the bar was commonly held fast. Dispersed about the city and pursued by men who knew every inch of the ground, some ran to the top of the wall and jumped down on the outside, most of them perishing in the attempt—a few others escaped through an unguarded gate by cutting through the bar with a hatchet which a woman gave to them—while the greater number ran into the open doors of a large barn or building in conjunction with the wall, mistaking these doors for an approach to the town-gate. They were here blocked up without a chance to escape, and the Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building. But at length a convention was concluded, whereby they, as well as the other Thebans in the city, agreed to surrender at discretion.

Had the re-enforcements from Thebes arrived at the expected hour, this disaster would have been averted. But the heavy rain and dark night retarded their whole march, while the river Asopus was so much swollen as to be with difficulty fordable: so that before they reached the gates of Platæa, their comrades within were either slain or captured. Which fate had befallen them, the Thebans without could not tell: but they immediately resolved to seize what they could find, persons as well as property, in the Platæan territory (no precautions having been taken as yet to guard against the perils of war by keeping within the walls) in order that they might have something to exchange for such Thebans as were prisoners. Before this step could be executed, however, a herald came forth from the

town to remonstrate with them upon their unholy proceeding in having so flagrantly violated the truce, and especially to warn them not to do any wrong without the walls. If they retired without inflicting farther mischief, their prisoners within should be given up to them; if otherwise, these prisoners would be slain immediately. A convention having been concluded and sworn to on this basis, the Thebans retired without any active measures.

Such at least was the Theban account of what preceded their retirement. But the Platæans gave a different statement; denying that they had made any categorical promise or sworn any oath—and affirming that they had engaged for nothing except to suspend any decisive step with regard to the prisoners, until discussion had been entered into to see if a satisfactory agreement could be concluded.

As Thucydides records both of these statements, without intimating to which of the two he himself gave the preference, we may presume that both of them found credence with respectable persons. The Theban story is undoubtedly the most probable: but the Platæans appear to have violated the understanding, even upon their own construction of it. For no sooner had the Thebans retired, than they (the Platæans) hastily brought in their citizens and the best of their movable property within the walls, and then slew all their prisoners forthwith, without even entering into the formalities of negotiation. The prisoners thus put to death, among whom was Eurymachus himself, were 180 in number.

On the first entrance of the Theban assailants at night, a messenger had started from Platæa to carry the news to Athens: a second messenger followed him to report the victory and capture of the prisoners, as soon as it had been achieved. The Athenians sent back a herald without delay, enjoining the Platæans to take no step respecting the prisoners until consultation should be had with Athens. Perikles doubtless feared what turned out to be the fact; for the prisoners had been slain before his messenger could arrive. Apart from the terms of the convention, and looking only to the received practice of ancient warfare, their destruction could not be denounced as unusually cruel, though the Thebans afterward, when fortune was in their favor, chose to designate it as such. But impartial contemporaries would notice, and the Athenians in particular would deeply lament, the glaring impolicy of the act. For Thebes, the best thing of all would of course be to get back her captured citizens forthwith: but next to that, the least evil would be, to hear that they had been put to death. In the hands of the Athenians and Platæans, they would have been the means of obtaining from her much more valuable sacrifices than their lives, considered as a portion of Theban power, were worth: so strong was the feeling of sympathy for imprisoned citizens, several of them men of rank and importance,—as may be seen by the past conduct of Athens after the battle of Koroneia, and by that of Sparta (hereafter

to be recounted) after the taking of Sphakteria. The Platæans, obeying the simple instinct of wrath and vengeance, threw away this great political advantage, which the more long-sighted Perikles would gladly have turned to account.

At the time when the Athenians sent their herald to Platæa, they also issued orders for seizing all Bœotians who might be found in Attica; while they lost no time in sending forces to provision Platæa and placing it on the footing of a garrison town, removing to Athens the old men and sick, with the women and children. No complaint or discussion respecting the recent surprise, was thought of by either party. It was evident to both that the war was now actually begun—that nothing was to be thought of except the means of carrying it on—and that there could be no farther personal intercourse except under the protection of heralds. The incident at Platæa, striking in all its points, wound up all parties to the full pitch of warlike excitement. A spirit of resolution and enterprise was abroad everywhere, especially among those younger citizens, yet unacquainted with the actual bitterness of war, whom the long truce but just broken had raised up. And the contagion of high-strung feeling spread from the leading combatants into every corner of Greece, manifesting itself partly in multiplied oracles, prophecies, and religious legends adapted to the moment. A recent earthquake at Delos, too, as well as various other extraordinary physical phenomena, were construed as prognostics of the awful struggle impending—a period fatally marked not less by eclipses, earthquakes, drought, famine, and pestilence, than by the direct calamities of war.

An aggression so unwarrantable as the assault on Platæa tended doubtless to strengthen the unanimity of the Athenian assembly, to silence the opponents of Perikles, and to lend additional weight to those frequent exhortations whereby the great statesman was wont to sustain the courage of his countrymen. Intelligence was sent around to forewarn and hearten up the numerous allies of Athens, tributary as well as free. The latter, with the exception of the Thessalians, Akarnanians, and Messenians at Naupaktus, were all insular—Chians, Lesbians, Korkyræans, and Zakynthians. To the island of Kephallenia, the Athenians sent envoys, but it was not actually acquired to their alliance until a few months afterward. With the Akarnanians, too, their connection had only been commenced a short time before, seemingly during the preceding summer, arising out of the circumstances of the town of Argos in Amphilochia.

That town, situated on the southern coast of the Ambrakian Gulf, was originally occupied by a portion of the Amphilochi, a non-Hellenic tribe, whose lineage apparently was something intermediate between Akarnanians and Epirots. Some colonists from Ambrakia, having been admitted as co-residents with the Amphilochian inhabitants of this town, presently expelled them, and retained the town

with its territory exclusively for themselves. The expelled inhabitants, fraternizing with their fellow-tribes around as well as with the Akarnanians, looked out for the means of restoration; and in order to obtain it, invited the assistance of Athens. Accordingly, the Athenians sent an expedition of thirty triremes under Phormio, who, joining the Amphilochians and Akarnanians, attacked and carried Argos, reduced the Ambrakiots to slavery, and restored the town to the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. It was on this occasion that the alliance of the Akarnanians with Athens was first concluded, and that their personal attachment to the Athenian admiral Phormio commenced.

The numerous subjects of Athens, whose contributions stood embodied in the annual tribute, were distributed all over and around the Ægean, including all the islands north of Krete, with the exception of Melos and Thera. Moreover the elements of force collected in Athens itself were fully worthy of the metropolis of so great an empire. Perikles could make a report to his countrymen of 300 triremes fit for active service; 1200 horsemen and horse-bowmen; 1600 bowmen; and the great force of all, not less than 29,000 hoplites—mostly citizens, but in part also metics. The chosen portion of these hoplites, both as to age and as to equipment, were 13,000 in number; while the remaining 16,000, including the elder and younger citizens and the metics, did garrison duty on the walls of Athens and Peiræus—on the long line of wall which connected Athens both with Peiræus and Phalerum—and in the various fortified posts both in and out of Attica. In addition to these large military and naval forces, the city possessed in the acropolis an accumulated treasure of coined silver amounting to not less than 6,000 talents, or about £1,400,000, derived from annual laying by of tribute from the allies and perhaps of other revenues besides. The treasure had at one time been as large as 9,700 talents, or about £2,230,000, but the cost of the recent religious and architectural decorations at Athens, as well as the siege of Potidæa, had reduced it to 6,000. Moreover the acropolis and the temples throughout the city were rich in votive offerings, deposits, sacred plate, and silver implements for the processions and festivals, etc., to an amount estimated at more than 500 talents, while the great statue of the goddess recently set up by Pheidias in the Parthenon, composed of ivory and gold, included a quantity of the latter metal not less than 40 talents in weight—equal in value to more than 400 talents of silver—and all of it so arranged that it could be taken off from the statue at pleasure. In alluding to these sacred valuables among the resources of the state, Perikles spoke of them only as open to be so applied in case of need, with the firm resolution of replacing them during the first season of prosperity, just as the Corinthians had proposed to borrow from Delphi and Olympia. Besides the hoard thus actually in hand, there came in a large annual revenue, amounting under the single head of tribute from the subject allies, to 600 talents, equal to about £138,000; besides all other items, making up a general total of at least 1000 talents, or about £230,000.

To this formidable catalogue of means for war, were to be added other items not less important, but which did not admit of being weighed and numbered; the unrivalled maritime skill and discipline of the seamen—the democratical sentiment, alike fervent and unanimous, of the general mass of citizens—and the superior development of directing intelligence. And when we consider that the enemy had indeed on his side an irresistible land-force, but scarcely anything else—few ships, no trained seamen, no funds, no powers of combination or headship—we may be satisfied that there were ample materials for an orator like Perikles to draw an encouraging picture of the future. He could depict Athens as holding Peloponnesus under siege by means of her navy and a chain of insular posts, and he could guarantee success as the sure reward of persevering, orderly, and well-considered exertion, combined with firm endurance under a period of temporary, but unavoidable suffering; and combined too with another condition hardly less difficult for Athenian temper to comply with—abstinence from seductive speculations of distant enterprise while their force was required by the necessities of war near home. But such prospects were founded upon a long-sighted calculation, looking beyond immediate loss and therefore ill-calculated to take hold of the mind of an ordinary citizen—or at any rate likely to be overwhelmed for the moment by the pressure of actual hardship. Moreover the best which Perikles could promise was a successful resistance—the unimpaired maintenance of that great empire to which Athens had become accustomed; a policy purely conservative, without any stimulus from the hope of positive acquisition—and not only without the sympathy of other states, but with feelings of simple acquiescence on the part of most of her allies—of strong hostility everywhere else.

On all these latter points the position of the Peloponnesian alliance was far more encouraging. So powerful a body of confederates had never been got together—not even to resist Xerxes. Not only the entire strength of Peloponnesus (except Argeians and Achæans, both of whom were neutral at first, though the Achæan town of Pellene joined even at the beginning, and all the rest subsequently) was brought together, but also the Megarians, Bœotians, Phokians, Opuntian Lokrians, Ambrakiots, Leukadians, and Anaktorians. Among these, Corinth, Megara, Sikyon, Pellene, Elis, Ambrakia, and Leukas furnished maritime force, while the Bœotians, Phokians, and Lokrians supplied cavalry. Many of these cities however supplied hoplites besides; but the remainder of the confederates furnished hoplites only. It was upon this latter force, not omitting the powerful Bœotian cavalry, that the main reliance was placed; especially for the first and most important operation of the war—the devastation

of Attica. Bound together by the strongest common feeling of active antipathy to Athens, the whole confederacy was full of hope and confidence for this immediate forward march—gratifying at once both to their hatred and to their love of plunder, by the hand of destruction laid upon the richest country in Greece—and presenting a chance even of terminating the war at once, if the pride of the Athenians should be so intolerably stung as to provoke them to come out and fight. Certainty of immediate success, at the first outset—a common purpose to be accomplished and a common enemy to be put down, with favorable sympathies throughout Greece—all these circumstances filled the Peloponnesians with sanguine hopes at the beginning of the war. And the general persuasion was, that Athens, even if not reduced to submission by the first invasion, could not possibly hold out more than two or three summers against the repetition of this destructive process. Strongly did this confidence contrast with the proud and resolute submission to necessity, not without desponding anticipations of the result, which reigned among the auditors of Perikles.

But though the Peloponnesians entertained confident belief of carrying their point by simple land campaign, they did not neglect auxiliary preparations for naval and prolonged war. The Lacedæmonians resolved to make up the naval force already existing among themselves and their allies to an aggregate of 500 triremes; chiefly by the aid of the friendly Dorian cities on the Italian and Sicilian coast. Upon each of them a specific contribution was imposed, together with a given contingent; orders being transmitted to them to make such preparations silently without any immediate declaration of hostility against Athens, and even without refusing for the present to admit any single Athenian ship into their harbors. Besides this, the Lacedæmonians laid their schemes for sending envoys to the Persian king and to other barbaric powers—a remarkable evidence of melancholy revolution in Grecian affairs, when that potentate whom the common arm of Greece had so hardly repulsed a few years before, was now invoked to bring the Phœnician fleet again into the Ægean for the purpose of crushing Athens.

The invasion of Attica however without delay was the primary object to be accomplished; and for that the Lacedæmonians issued circular orders immediately after the attempted surprise of Platæa. Though the vote of the allies was requisite to sanction any war, yet when that vote had once been passed, the Lacedæmonians took upon themselves to direct all the measures of execution. Two thirds of the hoplites of each confederate city—apparently two thirds of a certain assumed rating for which the city was held liable in the books of the confederacy, so that the Bœotians and others who furnished cavalry, were not constrained to send two thirds of their entire force of hoplites—were summoned to be present on a certain day at the isthmus of Corinth, with provisions and equipment for an expedition

of some length. On the day named, the entire force was found duly assembled. The Spartan king Archidamus, on taking the command, addressed to the commanders and principal officers from each city a discourse of solemn warning as well as encouragement. His remarks were directed chiefly to abate the tone of sanguine over-confidence which reigned in the army. After adverting to the magnitude of the occasion, the mighty impulse agitating all Greece, and the general good wishes which accompanied them against an enemy so much hated—he admonished them not to let their great superiority of numbers and bravery seduce them into a spirit of rash disorder. "We are about to attack (he said) an enemy admirably equipped in every way, so that we may expect certainly that they will come out and fight, even if they be not now actually on the march to meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory ravaging and destroying their property. All men exposed to any unusual indignity become incensed, and act more under passion than under calculation, when it is actually brought under their eyes: much more will the Athenians do so, accustomed as they are to empire, and to ravage the territory of others rather than to see their own so treated."

Immediately on the army being assembled, Archidamus sent Melesippus as envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been already adopted, at the instance of Perikles, to receive neither herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when once their army was on its march: so that Melesippus was sent back without even being permitted to enter the city. He was ordered to quit the territory before sunset, with guides to accompany him and prevent him from addressing a word to any one. On parting from his guides at the border, Melesippus exclaimed, with a solemnity but too accurately justified by the event—"This day will be the beginning of many calamities to the Greeks."

Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the isthmus into Attica—which territory he entered by the road of Œnoe, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica toward Bœotia. His march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of Œnoe, which had been put into so good a state of defense, that after all the various modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skillful, had been tried in vain—and after a delay of several days before the place—he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

The want of enthusiasm on the part of the Spartan king—his multiplied delays, first at the isthmus, next in the march, and lastly before Œnoe—were all offensive to the fiery impatience of the army, who were loud in their murmurs against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta—that the highly cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more

likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending and at their doors. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail.

Nor can we doubt that it was a moment full of difficulty to Perikles at Athens. He had to proclaim to all the proprietors in Attica the painful truth, that they must prepare to see their lands and houses overrun and ruined; and that their persons, families, and movable property must be brought in for safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory—or carried across to one of the neighboring islands. It would indeed make a favorable impression when he told them that Archidamus was his own family friend, yet only within such limits as consisted with duty to the city: in case therefore the invaders, while ravaging Attica, should receive instruction to spare his own lands, he would forthwith make them over to the state as public property. Such a case was likely enough to arise, if not from the personal feeling of Archidamus, at least from the deliberate maneuver of the Spartans, who would seek thus to set the Athenian public against Perikles, as they had tried to do before by demanding the banishment of the sacrilegious Alkmæonid race. But though this declaration from Perikles would doubtless provoke a hearty cheer, yet the lesson which he had to inculcate—not simply for admission as prudent policy, but for actual practice—was one revolting alike to the immediate interest, the dignity, and the sympathies of his countrymen. To see their lands all ravaged, without raising an arm to defend them—to carry away their wives and families, and to desert and dismantle their country residences, as they had done during the Persian invasion—all in the confidence of compensation in other ways and of remote ultimate success—were recommendations which probably no one but Perikles could have hoped to enforce. They were, moreover, the more painful to execute, inasmuch as the Athenian citizens had very generally retained the habits of residing permanently, not in Athens, but in the various demes of Attica; many of which still preserved their temples, their festivals, their local customs, and their limited municipal autonomy, handed down from the day when they had once been independent of Athens. It was but recently that the farming, the comforts, and the ornaments, thus distributed over Attica, had been restored from the ruin of the Persian invasion, and brought to a higher pitch of improvement than ever. Yet the fruits of this labor, and the scenes of these local affections, were now to be again deliberately abandoned to a new aggressor, and exchanged for the utmost privation and discomfort. Archidamus might well doubt whether the Athenians would nerve themselves up to the pitch of resolution necessary for this distressing step, when it came to the actual crisis; and whether they would not constrain Perikles against his will to make propositions for peace. His delay on the border, and postponement of actual devastation, gave the best chance for such propositions to be made; though, as this calculation was not realized, the army raised plausible complaints against him for having allowed the Athenians time to save so much of their property.

From all parts of Attica the residents flocked within the spacious walls of Athens, which now served as shelter for the houseless, like Salamis forty-nine years before—entire families with all their movable property, and even with the woodwork of their houses. The sheep and cattle were conveyed to Eubœa and the other adjoining islands. Though a few among the fugitives obtained dwellings or reception from friends, the greater number were compelled to encamp in the vacant spaces of the city and Peiræus, or in and around the numerous temples of the city—always excepting the acropolis and the Eleusinion, which were at all times strictly closed to profane occupants. But even the ground called *the Pelasgikon* immediately under the acropolis, which by an ancient and ominous tradition was interdicted to human abode was made use of under the present necessity. Many too placed their families in the towers and recesses of the city walls, or in sheds, cabins, tents, or even tubs, disposed along the course of the long walls to Peiræus. In spite of so serious an accumulation of losses and hardships, the glorious endurance of their fathers in the time of Xerxes was faithfully copied, and copied too under more honorable circumstances, since at that time there had been no option possible; whereas the march of Archidamus might perhaps now have been arrested by submissions, ruinous indeed to Athenian dignity, yet not inconsistent with the security of Athens, divested of her rank and power. Such submissions, if suggested as they probably may have been by the party opposed to Perikles, found no echo among the suffering population.

After having spent several days before Œnoe without either taking the fort or receiving any message from the Athenians, Archidamus marched onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain—about the middle of June, eighty days after the surprise of Platæa. His army was of irresistible force, not less than 60,000 hoplites, according to the statement of Plutarch, or of 100,000 according to others. Considering the number of constituent allies, the strong feeling by which they were prompted, and the shortness of the expedition combined with the chance of plunder—even the largest of these two numbers is not incredibly great, if we take it to include not hoplites only, but cavalry and light-armed also. But since Thucydides, though comparatively full in his account of this march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had heard none upon which he could rely.

As the Athenians had made no movement toward peace, Archidamus anticipated that they would come forth to meet him in the fertile plain of Eleusis and Thria, which was the first portion of territory

that he sat down to ravage. Yet no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except a detachment of cavalry, who were repulsed in a skirmish near the small lakes called Rheiti. Having laid waste this plain without any serious opposition, Archidamus did not think fit to pursue the straight road which from Thria conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount Ægaleos, but turned off to the eastward, leaving that mountain on his right hand until he came to Kropeia, where he crossed a portion of the line of Ægaleos over to Acharnæ. He was here about seven miles from Athens, on a declivity sloping down into the plain which stretches westerly and north-westerly from Athens, and visible from the city walls. Here he encamped, keeping his army in perfect order for battle, but at the same time intending to damage and ruin the place and its neighborhood. Acharnæ was the largest and most populous of all the demes in Attica, furnishing no less than 3,000 hoplites to the national line, and flourishing as well by its corn, vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal-burning from the forests of ilex on the neighboring hills. Moreover, if we are to believe Aristophanes, the Acharnian proprietors were not merely sturdy "hearts of oak," but peculiarly vehement and irritable. It illustrates the condition of a Grecian territory under invasion, when we find this great deme—which could not have contained less than 12,000 free inhabitants of both sexes and all ages, with at least an equal number of slaves—completely deserted. Archidamus calculated that when the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest canton, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and they would march out forthwith to battle. The Acharnian proprietors especially (he thought) would be foremost in inflaming this temper and insisting upon protection to their own properties—or if the remaining citizens refused to march out along with them, they would, after having been thus left undefended to ruin, become discontented and indifferent to the general weal.

Though his calculation was not realized, it was nevertheless founded upon most rational grounds. What Archidamus anticipated was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it except the personal ascendency of Perikles, strained to its very utmost. So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thriasian plain, the Athenians had some faint hope that it might (like Pleistoanax fourteen years before) advance no farther into the interior. But when it came to Acharnæ, within sight of the city walls—when the ravagers were actually seen destroying buildings, fruit-trees, and crops in the plain of Athens, a sight strange to every Athenian eye, except to those very old men who recollected the Persian invasion—the exasperation of the general body of citizens rose to a pitch never before known. The Acharnians first of all—next the youthful citizens generally—became madly clamorous for arming and going forth to fight. Knowing well their own great strength, but less correctly informed

of the superior strength of the enemy, they felt confident that victory was within their reach. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered together, angrily debating the critical question of the moment; while the usual concomitants of excited feeling—oracles and prophecies of diverse tenor, many of them doubtless promising success against the enemy at Acharnæ—were eagerly caught up and circulated.

In this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, Perikles was naturally the great object of complaint and wrath. He was denounced as the cause of all the existing suffering. He was reviled as a coward for not leading out the citizens to fight, in his capacity of general. The rational convictions as to the necessity of the war and the only practicable means of carrying it on, which his repeated speeches had implanted, seemed to be altogether forgotten. This burst of spontaneous discontent was, of course, fomented by the numerous political enemies of Perikles, and particularly by Kleon, now rising into importance as an opposition speaker; whose talent for invective was thus first exercised under the auspices of the high aristocratical party, as well as of an excited public. But no manifestations, however violent, could disturb either the judgment or the firmness of Perikles. He listened unmoved to all the declarations made against him, resolutely refusing to convene any public assembly, or any meeting invested with an authorized character, under the present irritated temper of the citizens. It appears that he as general, or rather the Board of the Generals among whom he was one, must have been invested constitutionally with the power not only of calling the Ekklesia when they thought fit, but also of preventing it from meeting, and of postponing even those regular meetings which commonly took place at fixed times, four times in the prytany. No assembly accordingly took place, and the violent exasperation of the people was thus prevented from realizing itself in any rash public resolution. That Perikles should have held firm against this raging force, is but one among the many honorable points in his political character; but it is far less wonderful than the fact that his refusal to call the Ekklesia was efficacious to prevent the Ekklesia from being held. The entire body of Athenians were now assembled within the walls, and if he refused to convoke the Ekklesia, they might easily have met in the Pynx without him; for which it would not have been difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms of their democratical constitution—assisted doubtless by their long-established esteem for Perikles, yet opposed to an excitement alike intense and pervading, and to a demand apparently reasonable, in so far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion—is one of the most memorable incidents in their history.

While Perikles thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle, he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the

compressed eagerness of the citizens. The cavalry were sent forth, together with the Thessalian cavalry, their allies, for the purpose of restraining the excursions of the enemy's light troops, and protecting the lands near the city from plunder. At the same time he fitted out a powerful expedition, which sailed forth to ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders were yet in Attica. Archidamus, after having remained engaged in the devastation of Acharnæ long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a north-westerly direction toward the demes between Mount Brilessus and Mount Parnes, on the road passing through Dekeleia. The army continued ravaging these districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attica by the north-western road near Oropus, which brought them into Bœotia. As the Oropians, though not Athenians, were yet dependent upon Athens—the district of Græa, a portion of their territory, was laid waste; after which the army dispersed and retired back to their respective homes. It would seem that they quitted Attica toward the end of July, having remained in the country between thirty and forty days.

Meanwhile the Athenian expedition, under Karkinus, Proteas, and Sokrates, joined by fifty Korkyræan ships and by some other allies, sailed round Peloponnesus, landing in various parts to inflict damage, and among other places at Methone (Modon), on the south-western peninsula of the Lacedæmonian territory. The place, neither strong nor well-garrisoned, would have been carried with little difficulty, had not Brasidas, the son of Tellis—a gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but destined to great celebrity afterward—who happened to be on guard at a neighboring post, thrown himself into it with 100 men by a rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be brought together to prevent him. He infused such courage into the defenders of the place that every attack was repelled, and the Athenians were forced to re-embark—an act of prowess which procured for him the first public honors bestowed by the Spartans during this war. Sailing northward along the western coast of Peloponnesus, the Athenians landed again on the coast of Elis, a little south of the promontory called Cape Ichthys: they ravaged the territory for two days, defeating both the troops in the neighborhood and 300 chosen men from the central Eleian territory. Strong winds on a harborless coast now induced the captains to sail with most of the troops round Cape Ichthys, in order to reach the harbor of Pheia on the northern side of it; while the Messenian hoplites, marching by land across the promontory, attacked Pheia and carried it by assault. When the fleet arrived, all were re-embarked—the full force of Elis being under march to attack them. They then sailed northward, landing on various other spots to commit devastation, until they reached Sollium, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Akarnania. They captured this place, which they

handed over to the inhabitants of the neighboring Akarnanian town of Palærus—as well as Astakus, from whence they expelled the despot Euarchus, and enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. From hence they passed over to Kephallenia, which they were fortunate enough also to acquire as an ally of Athens without any compulsion—with its four distinct towns or districts, Pales, Kranii, Same, and Prone. These various operations took up near three months from about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens toward the close of September—the beginning of the winter half of the year, according to the distribution of Thucydides.

This was not the only maritime expedition of the summer. Thirty more triremes, under Kleopompus, were sent through the Euripus to the Lokrian coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some disembarkations were made, whereby the Lokrian towns of Thronium and Alope were sacked, and farther devastation inflicted; while a permanent garrison was planted, and a fortified post erected, in the uninhabited island of Atalanta opposite to the Lokrian coast, in order to restrain privateers from Opus and the other Lokrian towns in their excursions against Eubœa. It was farther determined to expel the Æginetan inhabitants from Ægina, and to occupy the island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attica and Peloponnesus. But a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy, and revenge against a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Æginetans with their wives and children were all put on shipboard and landed in Peloponnesus—where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the maritime district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos: some of them, however, found shelter in other parts of Greece. The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian kleruchs, or citizen proprietors sent thither by lot.

To the sufferings of the Æginetans, which we shall hereafter find still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the Megarians. Both had been most zealous in kindling the war, but upon none did the distress of war fall so heavily. Both probably shared the premature confidence felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy, that Athens could never hold out more than a year or two—and were thus induced to overlook their own undefended position against her. Toward the close of September, the full force of Athens, citizens and metics, marched into the Megarid, under Perikles, and laid waste the greater part of the territory: while they were in it, the hundred ships which had been circumnavigating Peloponnesus, having arrived at Ægina on their return, went and joined their fellow-citizens in the Megara, instead of going straight home. The junction of the two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been seen together: there were 10,000 citizen hoplites, (independent of 3,000

others who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa), and 3,000 metic hoplites—besides a large number of light troops. Against so large a force the Megarians could of course make no head, so that their territory was all laid waste, even to the city walls. For several years of the war, the Athenians inflicted this destruction once, and often twice in the same year. A decree was proposed in the Athenian Ekklesia by Charinus, though perhaps not carried, to the effect that the Strategi every year should swear, as a portion of their oath of office, that they would twice invade and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the port of Nisæa blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and of the neighboring coast of Salamis, the privations imposed on the Megarians became extreme and intolerable. Not merely their corn and fruits, but even their garden vegetables near the city, were rooted up and destroyed and their situation seems often to have been that of a besieged city hard pressed by famine. Even in the time of Pausanias, five centuries afterward, the miseries of the town during these years were remembered and communicated to him, being assigned as the reason why one of their most memorable statues had never been completed.

To the various military operations of Athens during the course of this summer, some other measures of moment are to be added. Moreover Thucydides notices an eclipse of the sun, which modern astronomical calculations refer to the third of August: had this eclipse happened three months earlier, immediately before the entrance of the Peloponnesians into Attica, it might probably have been construed as an unfavorable omen, and caused the postponement of the scheme.

Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing Attica in a permanent state of defense, both by sea and land. What these arrangements were, we are not told in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one thousand talents out of the treasure in the acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the single contingency—of a hostile naval force about to assail the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the public assembly, to make a different application of this reserve, he should be punishable with death. Moreover they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and trierarchs to command and equip them, for the same special necessity. It may be doubted whether this latter provision was placed under the same stringent sanction, or observed with the same rigor, as that concerning the money; which latter was not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all the disasters of the Sicilian expedition, and on the terrible news of the revolt of Chios. It was on that occasion that the Athenians, having first repealed the sentence of capital punishment against any proposer of the forbidden change,

appropriated the money to meet the then imminent peril of the commonwealth.

The resolution here taken about this sacred reserve, and the rigorous sentence interdicting contrary propositions, is pronounced by Mr. Mitford to be an evidence of the indelible barbarism of the democratical government. But we must recollect, first, that the sentence of capital punishment was one which could hardly by possibility come into execution; for no citizen would be so mad as to make the forbidden proposition, while this law was in force. Whoever desired to make it, would first begin by proposing to repeal the prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no danger, whether the assembly decided in the affirmative or negative. If he obtained an affirmative decision, he would then, and then only, proceed to move the re-appropriation of the fund. To speak the language of English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension or abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was forbidden—next, he would move the proposition itself. In fact such was the mode actually pursued, when the thing at last came to be done. But though the capital sentence could hardly come into effect, the proclamation of it *in terrorem* had a very distinct meaning. It expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about the reserve—it forewarned all assemblies and all citizens to come, of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose—it surrounded the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced every man who aimed at the re-appropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treasonable. The proclamation of a lighter punishment, or a simple prohibition without any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same emphatic conviction, nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly of 431 B.C. could not in any way enact laws which subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in cases of peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the judgment of its successors, and to prevent them from entertaining motions for repeal except under necessity at once urgent and obvious.

Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism, either in the end or in the means, I consider it principally remarkable for its cautious and long-sighted view of the future—qualities the exact reverse of barbarism—and worthy of the general character of Perikles, who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly. To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them under a necessity of reserving something against extreme casualties, was an object of immense importance. Now the particular casualty, which

Perikles (assuming him to be the proposer) named as the sole condition of touching this 1000 talents, might be considered as of all others the most improbable, in the year 431 B.C. So immense was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Peiræus, was a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution to look forward to, and which it is wonderful that the people generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency. We shall find the actual employment of it incalculably beneficial to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have protected herself without some such special resource. The people would scarcely have sanctioned so rigorous an economy, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve was still much larger. But it will be forever to the credit of their foresight as well as constancy, that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and afterward adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure for money, until at length a case arose which rendered farther abstinence really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by disembarking and ravaging parts of Peloponnesus, was doubtless of much importance to Athens during this first summer of the war: though it might seem that the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidæa, which still remained under blockade—and of the neighboring Chalkidians in Thrace, still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer that a prospect opened to Athens of subduing these towns, through the assistance of Sitalkes king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodorus, a citizen of Abdera, who engaged to render him and his son Sadokus allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed proxenus of Athens at Abdera, which was one of the Athenian subject allies, Nymphodorus made this alliance, and promised in the name of Sitalkes that a sufficient Thracian force should be sent to aid Athens in the re-conquest of her revolted towns: the honor of Athenian citizenship was at the same time conferred upon Sadokus. Nymphodorus farther established a good understanding between Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Thesma, which they had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of powerful aid against the Chalkidians and Potidæans: yet the latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender. Moreover the town of Astakus in Akarnania, which the Athenians had captured during the summer in the course of their expedition round Peloponnesus, was recovered during the autumn by the deposed despot Euarchus, assisted by forty Corinthian triremes and 1000 hoplites. This Corinthian armament, after restoring Euarchus, made some unsuccessful descents both upon other parts of Akarnania

and upon the island of Kephallenia. In the latter they were entrapped into an ambuscade and obliged to return home with considerable loss.

It was toward the close of autumn also that Perikles, chosen by the people for the purpose, delivered the funeral oration at the public interment of those warriors who had fallen during the campaign. The ceremonies of this public token of respect have already been described in a former chapter, on occasion of the conquest of Samos. But that which imparted to the present scene an imperishable interest, was the discourse of the chosen statesman and senator; probably heard by Thucydides himself, and in substance reproduced. A large crowd of citizens and foreigners, of both sexes and all ages, accompanied the funeral possession from Athens to the suburb called the outer Kerameikus, where Perikles, mounted upon a lofty stage prepared for the occasion, closed the ceremony with his address. The law of Athens not only provided this public funeral and commemorative discourse, but also assigned maintenance at the public expense to the children of the slain warriors until they attained military age: a practice which was acted on throughout the whole war, though we have only the description and discourse belonging to this single occasion.

The eleven chapters of Thucydides which comprise this funeral speech are among the most memorable relics of antiquity; considering that under the language and arrangement of the historian—always impressive, though sometimes harsh and peculiar, like the workmanship of a powerful mind misled by a bad or unattainable model—we possess the substance and thoughts of the illustrious statesman. A portion of it, of course, is and must be commonplace, belonging to all discourses composed for a similar occasion. Yet this is true only of a comparatively small portion. Much of it is peculiar, and every way worthy of Perikles—comprehensive, rational, and full not less of sense and substance than of earnest patriotism. It thus forms a strong contrast with the jejune, though elegant, rhetoric of other harangues, mostly not composed for actual delivery. And it deserves, in comparison with the funeral discourses remaining to us from Plato, and the pseudo-Demosthenes, and even Lysias, the honorable distinction which Thucydides claims for his own history—an ever-living possession, not a mere show-piece for the moment.

In the outset of his speech Perikles distinguishes himself from those who had preceded him in the same function of public orator, by dissenting from the encomiums which it had been customary to bestow on the law enjoining these funeral harangues. He thinks that the publicity of the funeral itself, and the general demonstrations of respect and grief by the great body of citizens, tell more emphatically in token of gratitude to the brave dead, when the scene passes in silence—than when it is translated into the words of a

speaker, who may easily offend either by incompetency or by apparent feebleness, or perhaps even by unseasonable exaggeration. Nevertheless, the custom having been embodied in law, and elected as he has been by the citizens, he comes forward to discharge the duty imposed upon him in the best manner he can.

One of the remarkable features in this discourse is, its business-like, impersonal character. It is Athens herself who undertakes to commend and decorate her departed sons, as well as to hearten up and admonish the living.

After a few words on the the magnitude of the empire and on the glorious efforts as well as endurance whereby their forefathers and they had acquired it—Perikles proceeds to sketch the plan of life, the constitution, and the manners, under which such achievements were brought about.

"We live under a constitution such as noway to envy the laws of our neighbors—ourselves an example to others, rather than mere imitators. It is called a democracy, since its permanent aim tends toward the Many and not toward the Few. As to private matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every man: while in regard to public affairs and to claims of individual influence, every man's chance of advancement is determined not by party favor but by real worth, according as his reputation stands in his own particular department. Neither poverty, nor obscure station, keep him back, if he really has the means of benefiting the city. Moreover our social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, but also in regard to intolerance of each other's diversity of daily pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbor for what he may do to please himself, nor do we ever put on those sour looks, which, though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure to offend. Thus conducting our private social intercourse with reciprocal indulgence, we are restrained from wrong on public matters by fear and reverence of our magistrates for the time being and of our laws—especially such laws as are instituted for the protection of wrongful sufferers, and even such others as, though not written, are enforced by a common sense of shame. Besides this, we have provided for our minds numerous recreations from toil, partly by our customary solemnities of sacrifice and festival throughout the year, partly by the elegance of our private establishments—the daily charm of which banishes the sense of discomfort. From the magnitude of our city, the products of the whole earth are brought to us, so that our enjoyment of foreign luxuries is as much our own and assured as those which we grow at home. In respect to training for war, we differ from our opponents (the Lacedæmonians) on several material points. First, we lay open our city as a common resort: we apply no xenelasy to exclude even an enemy either from any lesson or any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to him. For military efficiency, we trust less to maneuvers and quackery than to our own native

bravery. Next, in regard to education, while the Lacedæmonians even from their earliest youth subject themselves to an irksome exercise for the attainment of courage, we with our easy habits of life are not less prepared than they, to encounter all perils within the measure of our strength. The proof of this is, that the Peloponnesian confederates do not attack us one by one, but with their whole united force; while we, when we attack them at home, overpower for the most part all of them who try to defend their own territory. None of our enemies has ever met and contended with our entire force; partly in consequence of our large navy—partly from our dispersion in different simultaneous land-expeditions. But when they chance to be engaged with any part of it, if victorious, they pretend to have vanquished us all—if defeated, they pretend to have been vanquished by all.

"Now, if we are willing to brave danger, just as much under an indulgent system as under constant toil, and by spontaneous courage as much as under force of law—we are gainers in the end by not vexing ourselves beforehand with sufferings to come, yet still appearing in the hour of trial not less daring than those who toil without ceasing.

"In other matters, too, as well as in these, our city deserves admiration. For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of life, and we pursue knowledge without being enervated: we employ wealth not for talking and ostentation, but as a real help in the proper season: nor is it disgraceful to any one who is poor to confess his poverty, though he *may* rather incur reproach for not actually keeping himself out of poverty. The magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic duties also—the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: for we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from these latter not as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders—or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasoning about them: far from accounting discussion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. For in truth we combine in the most remarkable manner these two qualities—extreme boldness in execution with full debate beforehand on that which we are going about: whereas with others, ignorance alone imparts boldness—debate introduces hesitation. Assuredly those men are properly to be regarded as the stoutest of heart, who, knowing most precisely both the terrors of war and the sweets of peace, are still not the less willing to encounter peril.

"In fine, I affirm that our city, considered as a whole, is the schoolmistress of Greece; while viewed individually, we enable the same man to furnish himself out and suffice to himself in the greatest variety of ways and with the most complete grace and refinement. This is no empty boast of the moment, but genuine reality:

and the power of the city, acquired through the dispositions just indicated, exists to prove it. Athens alone of all cities stands forth in actual trial greater than her reputation: her enemy when he attacks her will not have his pride wounded by suffering defeat from feeble hands—her subjects will not think themselves degraded as if their obedience were paid to an unworthy superior. Having thus put forth our power, not uncertified, but backed by the most evident proofs, we shall be admired not less by posterity than by our contemporaries. Nor do we stand in need either of Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose words may for the moment please, though the truth if known would confute their intended meaning. We have compelled all land and sea to become accessible to our courage, and have planted everywhere imperishable monuments of our kindness as well as of our hostility.

"Such is the city on behalf of which these citizens, resolved that it should not be wrested from them, have nobly fought and died—and on behalf of which all of us here left behind must willingly toil. It is for this reason that I have spoken at length concerning the city, at once to draw from it the lesson that the conflict is not for equal motives between us and enemies who possess nothing of the like excellence—and to demonstrate by proofs the truth of my encomium pronounced upon her."

Perikles pursues, at considerable additional length, the same tenor of mixed exhortation to the living and eulogy of the dead; with many special and emphatic observations addressed to the relatives of the latter, who were assembled around and doubtless very near him. But the extract which I have already made is so long, that no further addition would be admissible: yet it was impossible to pass over lightly the picture of the Athenian commonwealth in its glory, as delivered by the ablest citizen of the age. The effect of the democratical constitution, with its diffused and equal citizenship, in calling forth not merely strong attachment, but painful self-sacrifice, on the part of all Athenians—is nowhere more forcibly insisted upon than in the words above cited of Perikles, as well as in others afterward—"Contemplating as you do daily before you the actual power of the state, and becoming passionately attached to it, when you conceive its full greatness, reflect that it was all acquired by men daring, acquainted with their duty, and full of an honorable sense of shame in their actions"—such is the association which he presents between the greatness of the state as an object of common passion, and the courage, intelligence, and mutual esteem, of individual citizens, as its creating and preserving causes; poor as well as rich being alike interested in the partnership.

But the claims of patriotism, though put forward as essentially and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the democratical activity. Subject to these, and to those laws and sanctions which protect both the

public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied fund of human impulse—an unrestrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuit, coupled with a reciprocity of cheerful indulgence between one individual and another—and an absence even of those "black looks" which so much imbitter life, even if they never pass into enmity of fact. This portion of the speech of Perikles deserves peculiar attention, because it serves to correct an assertion, often far too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern societies—an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free to the proper extent. This is pre-eminently true of Sparta:—it is also true in a great degree of the ideal societies depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities.

I shall hereafter return to this point when I reach the times of the great speculative philosophers: at present, I merely bespeak attention to the speech of Perikles as negativing the supposition, that exorbitant interference of the state with individual liberty was universal among the ancient Greek republics. There is no doubt that he has present to his mind a comparison with the extreme narrowness and rigor of Sparta, and that therefore his assertions of the extent of positive liberty at Athens must be understood as partially qualified by such contrast. But even making allowance for this, the stress which he lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive restraint of law, but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual dissenters in taste and pursuit—deserves serious notice, and brings out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulse. The peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion or trained into forced conformity with some assumed standard: antipathies against any of them formed no part of the habitual morality of the citizen. While much of the generating causes of human hatred was thus rendered inoperative, and while society was rendered more comfortable, more instructive, and more stimulating—all its germs of productive fruitful genius, so rare everywhere, found in such an atmosphere the maximum of encouragement. Within the limits of the law, assuredly as faithfully observed in Athens as anywhere in Greece, individual impulse, taste, and even eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbors or of the public. This remarkable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter to explain the striking career of Sokrates, and it far-

ther presents to us, under another face, a great part of that which the censors of Athens denounced under the name of "democratical license." The liberty and diversity of individual life in that city were offensive to Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle—attached either to the monotonous drill of Sparta, or to some other ideal standard, which, though much better than the Spartan in itself, they were disposed to impress upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Perikles depicts in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no select One or Few to receive worship and set the fashion, than to any other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies. None of the governments of modern times, democratical, aristocratical, or monarchical, presents anything like the picture of generous tolerance towards social dissent, and spontaneity of individual taste, which we read in the speech of the Athenian statesman. In all of them, the tolerance of the national opinion cuts down individual character to one out of a few set types, to which every person, or every family, is constrained to adjust itself, and beyond which all exceptions meet either with hatred or with derision. To impose upon men such restraints either of law or of opinion as are requisite for the security and comfort of society, but to encourage rather than repress the free play of individual impulse subject to those limits—is an ideal, which, if it was ever approached at Athens, has certainly never been attained, and has indeed comparatively been little studied or cared for, in any modern society.

Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual diversity, was not only the hospitable reception of all strangers at Athens, which Perikles contrasts with the xenelasy or jealous expulsion practiced at Sparta—but also the many-sided activity, bodily and mental, visible in the former, so opposite, to that narrow range of thought, exclusive discipline of the body, and never-ending preparation for war, which formed the system of the latter. His assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta even in her own solitary excellence —efficiency on the field of battle—is doubtless untenable. But not the less impressive is his sketch of that multitude of concurrent impulses which at this same time agitated and impelled the Athenian mind—the strength of one not implying the weakness of the remainder: the relish for all pleasures of art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, coinciding in the same bosom with energetic promptitude as well as endurance: abundance of recreative spectacles, yet no way abating the cheerfulness of obedience even to the hardest calls of patriotic duty: that combination of reason and courage which encountered danger the more willingly from having discussed and calculated it beforehand: lastly, an anxious interest, as well as a competence of judgment, in public discussion and public action, common to every citizen rich and poor, and combined with every man's own

private industry. So comprehensive an ideal of many-sided social development, bringing out the capacities for action and endurance, as well as those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher: but it becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it at least were drawn from the fellow-citizens of the speaker. It must be taken, however, as belonging peculiarly to the Athens of Perikles and his contemporaries. It would not have suited either the period of the Persian war fifty years before, or that of Demosthenes seventy years afterward. At the former period, the art, the letters, and the philosophy, adverted to with pride by Perikles, were as yet backward, while even the active energy and democratical stimulus, though very powerful, had not been worked up to the pitch which they afterward reached: at the latter period, although the intellectual manifestations of Athens subsist in full or even increased vigor, we shall find the personal enterprise and energetic spirit of her citizens materially abated. As the circumstances, which I have already recounted, go far to explain the previous upward movement, so those which fill the coming chapters, containing the disasters of the Peloponnesian war, will be found to explain still more completely the declining tendency shortly about to commence. Athens was brought to the brink of entire ruin, from which it is surprising that she recovered at all—but no way surprising that she recovered at the expense of a considerable loss of personal energy in the character of her citizens.

And thus the season at which Perikles delivered his discourse lends to it an additional and peculiar pathos. It was at a time when Athens was as yet erect and at her maximum. For though her real power was doubtless much diminished compared with the period before the Thirty years' truce, yet the great edifices and works of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, in so far as the sense of greatness was concerned; and no one, either citizen or enemy, considered Athens as having at all declined. It was at the commencement of the great struggle with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the coming hardships of which Perikles never disguised either to himself or to his fellow-citizens, though he fully counted upon eventual success. Attica had been already invaded; it was no longer "the unwasted territory," as Euripides had designated it in his tragedy "Medea," represented three or four months before the march of Archidamus. A picture of Athens in her social glory was well calculated both to rouse the pride and nerve the courage of those individual citizens, who had been compelled once, and would be compelled again and again, to abandon their country residence and fields for a thin tent or confined hole in the city. Such calamities might indeed be foreseen: but there was one still greater calamity, which, though actually then impending, could not be foreseen—the terrific pestilence which will be recounted in the coming chapter. The bright colors and tone of

cheerful confidence, which pervade the discourse of Perikles, appear the more striking from being in immediate antecedence to the awful description of this distemper: a contrast, to which Thucydides was doubtless not insensible, and which is another circumstance enhancing the interest of the composition.

CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR DOWN TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

At the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece remained in an unaltered position as to relative strength. Nothing decisive had been accomplished on either side, either by the invasion of Attica, or by the flying descents round the coast of Peloponnesus. In spite of mutual damage inflicted—doubtless in the greatest measure upon Attica—no progress was yet made toward the fulfillment of those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to go to war. Especially the most pressing among all their wishes—the relief of Potidæa—was no way advanced; for the Athenians had not found it necessary to relax the blockade of that city. The result of the first year's operations had thus been to disappoint the hopes of the Corinthians and the other ardent instigators of war, while it justified the anticipations both of Perikles and of Archidamus.

A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the commencement of spring; and measures were taken for carrying it all over that territory, since the settled policy of Athens not to hazard a battle with the invaders was now ascertained. About the end of March or beginning of April, the entire Peloponnesian force (two-thirds from each confederate city as before) was assembled under the command of Archidamus and marched into Attica. This time they carried the work of systematic destruction not merely over the Thriasian plain and the plain immediately near to Athens, as before; but also to the more southerly portions of Attica, down even as far as the mines of Laurium. They traversed and ravaged both the eastern and the western coast, remaining not less than forty days in the country. They found the territory deserted as before, all the population having retired within the walls.

In regard to this second invasion, Perikles recommended the same defensive policy as he had applied to the first; and apparently the citizens had now come to acquiesce in it, if not willingly, at least with a full conviction of its necessity. But a new visitation had now occurred, diverting their attention from the invader, though enormously aggravating their sufferings. A few days after Archidamus entered Attica, a pestilence or epidemic sickness broke out unexpectedly at Athens.

It appears that this terrific disorder had been raging for some time throughout the regions round the Mediterranean; having begun, as was believed, in Ethiopia—thence passing into Egypt and Libya, and overrunning a considerable portion of Asia under the Persian government. About sixteen years before, too, there had been a similar calamity in Rome and in various parts of Italy. Recently, it had been felt in Lemnos and some other islands of the Ægean, yet seemingly not with such intensity as to excite much notice generally in the Grecian world: at length it passed to Athens, and first showed itself in the Peiræus. The progress of the disease was as rapid and destructive as its appearance had been sudden; while the extraordinary accumulation of people within the city and long walls, in consequence of the presence of the invaders in the country, was but too favorable to every form of contagion. Families crowded together in close cabins and places of temporary shelter—throughout a city constructed (like most of those in Greece) with little regard to the conditions of salubrity—and in a state of mental chagrin from the forced abandonment and sacrifice of their properties in the country, transmitted the disorder with fatal facility from one to the other. Beginning as it did about the middle of April, the increasing heat of summer farther aided the disorder, the symptoms of which, alike violent and sudden, made themselves the more remarked because the year was particularly exempt from maladies of every other description.

Of this plague—or (more properly) eruptive typhoid fever, distinct from, yet analogous to, the small-pox—a description no less clear than impressive has been left by the historian Thucydides, himself not only a spectator but a sufferer. It is not one of the least of his merits, that his notice of the symptoms, given at so early a stage of medical science and observation, is such as to instruct the medical reader of the present age, and to enable the malady to be understood and identified. The observations with which that notice is ushered in, deserve particular attention. "In respect to this distemper (he says), let every man, physician or not, say what he thinks respecting the source from whence it may probably have arisen, and respecting the causes which he deems sufficiently powerful to have produced so great a revolution. But I, having myself had the distemper, and having seen others suffering under it, will state *what it actually was*, and will indicate in addition such other matters as will furnish any man, who lays them to heart, with knowledge and the means of calculation beforehand, in case the same misfortune should ever again occur." To record past facts, as a basis for rational prevision in regard to the future—the same sentiment which Thucydides mentions in his preface, as having animated him to the composition of his history—was at that time a duty so little understood, that we have

reason to admire not less the manner in which he performs it in practice, than the distinctness with which he conceives it in theory. We infer from his language that specula ion in his day was active respecting the causes of this plague, according to the vague and fanciful physics, and scanty stock of ascertained facts, which was all that could then be consulted. By resisting the itch of theorizing from one of those loose hypotheses which then appeared plausibly to explain everything, he probably renounced the point of view from which most credit and interest would be derivable at the time. But his simple and precise summary of observed facts carries with it an imperishable value, and even affords grounds for imagining that he was no stranger to the habits and training of his contemporary Hippokrates, and the other Asklepiads of Kos.

It is hardly within the province of an historian of Greece to repeat after Thucydides the painful enumeration of symptoms, violent in the extreme and pervading every portion of the bodily system, which marked this fearful disorder. Beginning in Peiræus, it quickly passed into the city, and both the one and the other was speedily filled with sickness and suffering, the like of which had never before been known. The seizures were sudden, and a large proportion of the sufferers perished after deplorable agonies on the seventh or on the ninth day. Others, whose strength of constitution carried them over this period, found themselves the victims of exhausting and incurable diarrhea afterward: with others again, after traversing both these stages, the distemper fixed itself in some particular member, the eyes, the genitals, the hands, or the feet, which were rendered permanently useless, or in some cases amputated, even where the patient himself recovered. There were also some whose recovery was attended with a total loss of memory, so that they no more knew themselves or recognized their friends. No treatment or remedy appearing, except in accidental cases, to produce any beneficial effect, the physicians or surgeons whose aid was invoked became completely at fault. While trying their accustomed means without avail, they soon ended by catching the malady themselves and perishing. The charms and incantations, to which the unhappy patient resorted, were not likely to be more efficacious. While some asserted that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns of water, others referred the visitation to the wrath of the Gods, and especially to Apollo, known by hearers of the Iliad as author of pestilence in the Greek host before Troy. It was remembered that this Delphian god had promised the Lacedæmonians, in reply to their application immediately before the war, that he would assist them whether invoked or uninvoked—and the disorder now raging was ascribed to the intervention of their irresistible ally; while the elderly men farther called to mind an oracular verse sung in the time of their youth—"The Dorian war will come, and pestilence along with it." Under the distress which suggested, and was

reciprocally aggravated by, these gloomy ideas, prophets were consulted, and supplications with solemn procession were held at the temples, to appease the divine wrath.

When it was found that neither the priest nor the physician, could retard the spread, or mitigate the intensity, of the disorder the Athenians abandoned themselves to despair, and the space within the walls became a scene of desolating misery. Every man attacked with the malady at once lost his courage—a state of depression itself among the worst features of the case, which made him lie down and die, without any attempt to seek for preservatives. And though at first friends and relatives lent their aid to tend the sick with the usual family sympathies, yet so terrible was the number of these attendants who perished, "like sheep," from such contact, that at length no man would those expose himself; while the most generous spirits, who persisted longest in the discharge of their duty, were carried off in the greatest numbers. The patient was thus left to die alone and unheeded. Sometimes all the inmates of a house were swept away one after the other, no man being willing to go near it: desertion on the one hand, attendance on the other, both tended to aggravate the calamity. There remained only those who, having had the disorder and recovered, were willing to tend the sufferers. These men formed the single exception to the all-pervading misery of the time—for the disorder seldom attacked any one twice, and when it did, the second attack was never fatal. Elate with their own escape, they deemed themselves out of the reach of all disease, and were full of compassionate kindness for others whose sufferings were just beginning. It was from them too that the principal attention to the bodies of deceased victims proceeded: for such was the state of dismay and sorrow, that even the nearest relatives neglected the sepulchral duties, sacred beyond all others in the eyes of a Greek. Nor is there any circumstance which conveys to us so vivid an idea of the prevalent agony and despair, as when we read, in the words of an eye-witness, that the deaths took place among this close-packed crowd without the smallest decencies of attention—that the dead and the dying lay piled one upon another not merely in the public roads, but even in the temples, in spite of the understood defilement of the sacred building—that half-dead sufferers were seen lying round all the springs, from insupportable thirst—that the numerous corpses thus unburied and exposed were in such a condition, that the dogs which meddled with them died in consequence, while no vultures or other birds of the like habits ever came near. Those bodies which escaped entire neglect were burnt or buried without the customary mourning, and with unseemly carelessness. In some cases, the bearers of a body, passing by a funeral pile on which another body was burning, would put their own there to be burnt also; or perhaps, if the pile was prepared ready for a body not yet arrived, would deposit their own upon it, set fire to the pile, and

then depart. Such indecent confusion would have been intolerable to the feelings of the Athenians, in any ordinary times.

To all these scenes of physical suffering, death, and reckless despair was superadded another evil, which affected those who were fortunate enough to escape the rest. The bonds both of law and morality became relaxed, amid such total uncertainty of every man both for his own life and that of others. Men cared not to abstain from wrong, under circumstances in which punishment was not likely to overtake them—nor to put a check upon their passions, and endure privations, in obedience even to their strongest conviction, when the chance was so small of their living to reap reward or enjoy any future esteem. An interval, short and sweet, before their doom was realized—before they became plunged in the wide-spread misery which they witnessed around, and which affected indiscriminately the virtuous and the profligate—was all that they looked to enjoy; embracing with avidity the immediate pleasures of sense, as well as such positive gains, however ill-gotten, as could be made the means of procuring them, and throwing aside all thought both of honor or of long-sighted advantage. Life and property being alike ephemeral, there was no hope left but to snatch a moment of enjoyment, before the outstretched hand of destiny should fall upon its victims.

The picture of society under the pressure of a murderous epidemic, with its train of physical torments, wretchedness, and demoralization, has been drawn by more than one eminent author, but by none with more impressive fidelity and conciseness than by Thucydides, who had no predecessor, nor anything but the reality, to copy from. We may remark that amidst all the melancholy accompaniments of the time, there are no human sacrifices, such as those offered up at Carthage during pestilence to appease the anger of the gods—there are no cruel persecutions against imaginary authors of the disease, such as those against the Untori (anointers of doors) in the plague of Milan in 1630.

Three years altogether did this calamity desolate Athens: continuously, during the entire second and third years of the war—after which followed a period of marked abatement for a year and a half: but it then revived again, and lasted for another year, with the same fury as at first. The public loss, over and above the private misery, which this unexpected enemy inflicted upon Athens, was incalculable. Out of 1200 horsemen, all among the rich men of the state, 300 died of the epidemic; besides 4,400 hoplites out of the roll formally kept, and a number of the poorer population, so great as to defy computation. No efforts of the Peloponnesians could have done so much to ruin Athens, or to bring the war to a termination such as they desired: and the distemper told the more in their favor, as it never spread at all into Peloponnesus, though it passed from Athens to some of the more populous islands. The Lacedæmonian army

was withdrawn from Attica somewhat earlier than it would otherwise have been, for fear of taking the contagion.

But it was while the Lacedæmonians were yet in Attica, and during the first freshness of the terrible malady, that Perikles equipped and conducted from Peiræus an armament of 100 triremes and 4,000 hoplites to attack the coasts of Peloponnesus. 300 horsemen were also carried in some horse-transports, prepared for the occasion out of old triremes. To diminish the crowd accumulated in the city was doubtless of beneficial tendency, and perhaps those who went aboard might consider it as a chance of escape to quit an infected home. But unhappily they carried the infection along with them, which desolated the fleet not less than the city, and crippled all its efforts. Re-enforced by fifty ships of war from Chios and Lesbos, the Athenians first landed near Epidaurus in Peloponnesus, ravaging the territory and making an unavailing attempt upon the city. next they made like incursions on the more southerly portions of the Argolic peninsula—Trœzen, Halieis, and Hermione; and lastly attacked and captured Prasiæ, on the eastern coast of Laconia. On returning to Athens, the same armament was immediately conducted under Agnon and Kleopompus, to press the siege of Potidæa, the blockade of which still continued without any visible progress. On arriving there, an attack was made on the walls by battering engines and by the other aggressive methods then practiced: but nothing whatever was achieved In fact, the armament became incompetent for all serious effort, from the aggravated character which the distemper here assumed, communicated by the soldiers fresh from Athens even to those who had before been free from it at Potidæa. So frightful was the mortality, that out of the 4,000 hoplites under Agnon, no less than 1050 died in the short space of forty days. The armament was brought back in this distressed condition to Athens, while the reduction of Potidæa was left as before to the slow course of blockade.

On returning from the expedition against Peloponnesus, Perikles found his countrymen almost distracted with their manifold sufferings. Over and above the raging epidemic, they had just gone over Attica and ascertained the devastations committed by the invaders throughout all the territory (except the Marathonian Tetrapolis and Dekeleia—districts spared, as we are told, through indulgence founded on an ancient legendary sympathy) during their long stay of forty days. The rich had found their comfortable mansions and farms, the poor their modest cottages, in the various demes, torn down and ruined. Death, sickness, loss of property, and despair of the future, now rendered the Athenians angry and intractable to the last degree. They vented their feelings against Perikles as the cause not merely of the war, but also of all that they were now enduring. Either with or without his consent, they sent envoys to Sparta to open negotiations for peace, but the Spartans turned a deaf

ear to the proposition. This new disappointment rendered them still more furious against Perikles, whose long-standing political enemies now doubtless found strong sympathy in their denunciations of his character and policy. That unshaken and majestic firmness, which ranked first among his many eminent qualities, was never more imperiously required and never more effectively manifested.

In his capacity of Strategus or General, Perikles convoked a formal assembly of the people, for the purpose of vindicating himself publicly against the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line of policy. The speeches made by his opponents, assuredly very bitter, are not given by Thucydides; but that of Perikles himself is set down at considerable length, and a memorable discourse it is. It strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and the impress of actual circumstances—an impregnable mind conscious not only of right purposes but of just and reasonable anticipations, and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of incalculable misfortune. He had foreseen, while advising the war originally, the probable impatience of his countrymen under its first hardships, but he could not foresee the epidemic by which that impatience had been exasperated into madness. and he now addressed them not merely with unabated adherence to his own deliberate convictions, but also in a tone of reproachful remonstrance against their unmerited change of sentiment toward him—seeking at the same time to combat that uncontrolled despair which for the moment overlaid both their pride and their patriotism. Far from humbling himself before the present sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his titles to their esteem in the most direct and unqualified manner, and claims the continuance of that which they had so long accorded, as something belonging to him by acquired right.

His main object, through this discourse, is to fill the minds of his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, so as to counterbalance the absorbing sense of private woe. If the collective city flourishes (he argues), private misfortunes may at least be borne: but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if the collective city falls (a proposition literally true in ancient times and under the circumstances of ancient warfare—though less true at present). "Distracted by domestic calamity, ye are now angry both with me who advised you to go to war, and with yourselves who followed the advice. Ye listened to me, considering me superior to others in judgment, in speech, in patriotism, and in incorruptible probity—nor ought I now to be treated as culpable for giving such advice, when in point of fact the war was unavoidable and there would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the same man, still unchanged—but ye in your misfortunes cannot stand to the convictions which ye adopted when yet unhurt. Extreme and unforeseen, indeed, are the sorrows which have fallen upon you: yet

inhabiting as ye do a great city, and brought up in dispositions suitable to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the utmost pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than before, and even with a degree of ostentation suitable as a stimulus to your present unnatural depression—that your naval force makes you masters not only of your allies, but of the entire sea—one-half of the visible field for action and employment. Compared with so vast a power as this, the temporary use of your houses and territory is a mere trifle—an ornamental accessory not worth considering: and this too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It was your fathers who first gained this empire, without any of the advantages which ye now enjoy; ye must not disgrace yourselves by losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the honor and empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby alone that honor is sustained: moreover ye now fight, not merely for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire against loss of empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial unpopularity. It is not safe for you now to abdicate, even if ye chose to do so; for ye hold your empire like a despotism—unjust perhaps in the original acquisition, but ruinous to part with when once acquired. Be not angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them: still less on account of this unforeseen distemper: I know that this makes me an object of your special present hatred, though very unjustly, unless ye will consent to give me credit also for any unexpected good luck which may occur. Our city derives its particular glory from unshaken bearing up against misfortune: her power, her name, her empire of Greeks over Greeks, are such as have never before been seen· and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence of that temporary envy and hatred which is the necessary price of permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory: display that courage which is essential to protect you against disgrace at present, as well as to guarantee your honor for the future. Send no further embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortunes without showing symptoms of distress."

The irresistible reason, as well as the proud and resolute bearing of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not possible for Thucydides to reproduce—together with the age and character of Perikles—carried the assent of the assembled people; who when in the Pnyx and engaged according to habit on public matters, would for a moment forget their private sufferings in considerations of the safety and grandeur of Athens. Possibly, indeed, those sufferings, though still continuing, might become somewhat alleviated when the invaders quitted Attica, and when it was no longer indispensable for all the population to confine itself within the walls. Accordingly,

the assembly resolved that no further propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be prosecuted with vigor.

But though the public resolution thus adopted showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Perikles, the sentiments of individuals taken separately were still those of anger against him as the author of that system which had brought them into so much distress. His political opponents—Kleon, Simmias, or Lakratidas, perhaps all three in conjunction—took care to provide an opportunity for this prevalent irritation to manifest itself in act, by bringing an accusation against him before the dikastery. The accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary malversation, and ended by his being sentenced to pay a considerable fine, the amount of which is differently reported—fifteen, fifty, or eighty talents, by different authors. The accusing party thus appeared to have carried their point, and to have disgraced, as well as excluded from re-election, the veteran statesman. The event, however, disappointed their expectations. The imposition of the fine not only satiated all the irritation of the people against him, but even occasioned a serious reaction in his favor, and brought back as strongly as ever the ancient sentiment of esteem and admiration. It was quickly found that those who had succeeded Perikles as generals neither possessed nor deserved in an equal degree the public confidence. He was accordingly soon re-elected, with as much power and influence as he had ever in his life enjoyed.

But that life, long, honorable, and useful, had already been prolonged considerably beyond the sixtieth year, and there were but too many circumstances, besides the recent fine, which tended to hasten as well as to embitter its close. At the very moment when Perikles was preaching to his countrymen, in a tone almost reproachful, the necessity of manful and unabated devotion to the common country in the midst of private suffering, he was himself among the greatest of sufferers, and most hardly pressed to set the example of observing his own precepts. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons (the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus), but also his sister, several other relatives, and his best and most useful political friends. Amid this train of domestic calamities, and in the funeral obsequies of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of his grief, and maintained his habitual self-command, until the last misfortune —the death of his favorite son Paralus, which left his house without any legitimate representative to maintain the family and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove to command himself as before, yet at the obsequies of the young man, when it became his duty to place a wreath on the dead body, his grief became uncontrollable, and he burst out, for the first time in his life, into profuse tears and sobbing.

In the midst of these several personal trials he received the intimation, through Alkibiades and some other friends, of the restored confidence of the people toward him, and of his re-election to the office of Strategus. But it was not without difficulty that he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, and resume the direction of affairs. The regret of the people was formally expressed to him for the recent sentence—perhaps, indeed, the fine may have been repaid to him, or some evasion of it permitted, saving the forms of law—in the present temper of the city; which was farther displayed toward him by the grant of a remarkable exemption from a law of his own original proposition. He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers, under which restriction several thousand persons, illegitimate on the mother's side, are said to have been deprived of the citizenship, on occasion of a public distribution of corn. Invidious as it appeared to grant, to Perikles singly, an exemption from a law which had been strictly enforced against so many others, the people were now moved not less by compassion than by anxiety to redress their own previous severity. Without a legitimate heir, the house of Perikles, one branch of the great Alkmæonid Gens by his mother's side, would be left deserted, and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken—a misfortune painfully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated to wrong all the deceased members, and provoke their posthumous displeasure toward the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to Perikles to legitimize, and to inscribe in his own gens and phratry, his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.

It was thus that Perikles was reinstated in his post of Strategus as well as in his ascendency over the public counsels—seemingly about August or September—430 B.C. He lived about one year longer, and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to a slow and wearing fever, which undermined his strength as well as his capacity. To a friend who came to ask after him when in this disease, Perikles replied by showing a charm or amulet which his female relations had hung about his neck—a proof how low he was reduced, and how completely he had become a passive subject in the hands of others. And according to another anecdote which we read, yet more interesting and equally illustrative of his character—it was during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and insensible, that the friends around his bed were passing in review the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had erected at different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, though they fancied that he was past hearing, and interrupted them by remarking—"What you praise in my life, belongs partly to good fortune—and is, at best, common to me with many other generals. But the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed

—no Athenian has ever put on mourning through any action of mine."

Such a cause of self-gratulation, doubtless more satisfactory to recall at such a moment than any other, illustrates that long-sighted calculation, aversion to distant or hazardous enterprise, and economy of the public force, which marked his entire political career; a career long, beyond all parallel in the history of Athens—since he maintained a great influence, gradually swelling into a decisive personal ascendency, for between thirty and forty years. His character has been presented in very different lights by different authors both ancient and modern, and our materials for striking the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and long-continued supremacy, as well as his unparalleled eloquence, are facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends—nay, even more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, who hated him, and whose trade it was to deride and hunt down every leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth both the one and the other: Telekleides, Kratinus, Eupolis, Aristophanes, all hearers and all enemies, speak of him like Olympian Zeus hurling thunder and lightning—like Herakles and Achilles—as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion sat and who left his sting in the minds of his audience: while Plato the philosopher, who disapproved of his political working and of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless extols his intellectual and oratorical ascendency—"his majestic intelligence"—in language not less decisive than Thucydides. There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the testimony appears uncontradicted: throughout his long career, amid the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Perikles toward opponents was always mild and liberal. The conscious self-esteem and arrogance of manner, with which the contemporary poet Ion reproached him, contrasting it with the unpretending simplicity of his own patron Kimon—though probably invidiously exaggerated, is doubtless in substance well-founded, and those who read the last speech given above out of Thucydides will at once recognize in it this attribute. His natural taste, his love of philosophical research, and his unwearied application to public affairs, all contributed to alienate him from ordinary familiarity, and to make him careless, perhaps improperly careless, of the lesser means of conciliating public favor.

But admitting this latter reproach to be well-founded, as it seems to be, it helps to negative that greater and graver political crime which has been imputed to him, of sacrificing the permanent well-being and morality of the state to the maintenance of his own political power—of corrupting the people by distributions of the public money. "He gave the reins to the people (in Plutarch's words) and shaped his administration for their immediate favor, by always providing at home some public spectacle or festival or procession,

thus nursing up the city in elegant pleasures—and by sending out every year sixty triremes manned by citizen-seamen on full pay, who were thus kept in practice and acquired nautical skill."

Now, the charge here made against Perikles, and supported by allegations in themselves honorable rather than otherwise—of a vicious appetite for immediate popularity, and of improper concessions to the immediate feelings of the people against their permanent interests—is precisely that which Thucydides in the most pointed manner denies; and not merely denies, but contrasts Perikles with his successors in the express circumstance that *they* did so, while *he* did not. The language of the contemporary historian well deserves to be cited—"Perikles, powerful from dignity of character as well as from wisdom, and conspicuously above the least tinge of corruption, held back the people with a free hand, and was their real leader instead of being led by them. For not being a seeker of power from unworthy sources, he did not speak with any view to present favor, but had sufficient sense of dignity to contradict them on occasion, even braving their displeasure. Thus, whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, he shaped his speeches in such manner as to alarm and beat them down: when again he saw them unduly frightened, he tried to counteract it and restore their confidence: so that the government was in name a democracy, but in reality an empire exercised by the first citizen in the state. But those who succeeded after his death, being more equal one with another, and each of them desiring pre-eminence over the rest, adopted the different course of courting the favor of the people and sacrificing to that object even important state-interests. From whence arose many other bad measures, as might be expected in a great and imperial city, and especially the Sicilian expedition," etc.

It will be seen that the judgment here quoted from Thucydides contradicts, in an unqualified manner, the reproaches commonly made against Perikles of having corrupted the Athenian people—by distributions of the public money, and by giving way to their unwise caprices—for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining his own political power. Nay, the historian particularly notes the opposite qualities—self-judgment, conscious dignity, indifference to immediate popular applause or wrath when set against what was permanently right and useful—as the special characteristic of that great statesman. A distinction might indeed be possible, and Plutarch professes to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later part of his political career. Perikles began (so that biographer says) by corrupting the people in order to acquire power; but having acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, so that the judgment of Thucydides, true respecting the later part of his life, would not be applicable to the earlier. This distinction may be to a certain degree well founded, inasmuch as the power of

opposing a bold and successful resistance to temporary aberrations of the public mind necessarily implies an established influence, and can hardly ever be exercised even by the firmest politician during his years of commencement. He is at that time necessarily the adjunct of some party or tendency which he finds already in operation, and has to stand forward actively and assiduously before he can create for himself a separate personal influence. But while we admit the distinction to this extent, there is nothing to warrant us in restricting the encomium of Thucydides exclusively to the later life of Perikles, or in representing the earlier life as something in pointed contrast with that encomium. Construing fairly what the historian says, he evidently did not so conceive the earlier life of Perikles. Either those political changes which are held by Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, to demonstrate the corrupting effect of Perikles and his political ascendency—such as the limitation of the functions of the Areopagus, as well as of the power of the magistrates, the establishment of the numerous and frequent popular dikasteries with regular pay, and perhaps also the assignment of pay to those who attended the Ekklesia, the expenditure for public works, religious edifices and ornaments, the Diobely (or distribution of two oboli per head to the poorer citizens at various festivals, in order that they might be able to pay for their places in the theater), taking it as it then stood, etc.—did not appear to Thucydides mischievous and corrupting, as these other writers thought them; or else he did not particularly refer them to Perikles.

Both are true, probably, to some extent. The internal political changes at Athens, respecting the Areopagus and the dikasteries, took place when Perikles was a young man, and when he cannot be supposed to have yet acquired the immense personal weight which afterward belonged to him (Ephialtes in fact seems in those early days to have been a greater man than Perikles, if we may judge by the fact that he was selected by his political adversaries for assassination)—so that they might with greater propriety be ascribed to the party with which Perikles was connected, rather than to that statesman himself. But next, we have no reason to presume that Thucydides considered these changes as injurious, or as having deteriorated the Athenian character. All that he does say as to the working of Perikles on the sentiment and actions of his countrymen is eminently favorable. He represents the presidency of that statesman as moderate, cautious, conservative, and successful; he describes him as uniformly keeping back the people from rash enterprises, and from attempts to extend their empire—as looking forward to the necessity of a war, and maintaining the naval, military, and financial forces of the state in constant condition to stand it—as calculating, with long-sighted wisdom, the conditions on which ultimate success depended. If we follow the elaborate funeral harangue of Perikles (which Thucydides, since he produces it at length, probably considered as faithfully illustrating the political point of view of that statesman), we shall discover a conception of democratical equality no less rational than generous; an anxious care for the recreation and comfort of the citizens, but no disposition to emancipate them from active obligation, either public or private—and least of all, any idea of dispensing with such activity by abusive largesses out of the general revenue. The whole picture, drawn by Perikles, of Athens "as the schoolmistress of Greece," implies a prominent development of private industry and commerce not less than of public citizenship and soldiership—of letters, arts, and recreative varieties of taste.

Though Thucydides does not directly canvass the constitutional changes effected in Athens under Perikles, yet everything which he does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that statesman, upon the whole, on Athenian power as well as on Athenian character, eminently valuable, and his death as an irreparable loss. And we may thus appeal to the judgment of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Perikles of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public treasure upon religious edifices and ornaments, and upon stately works for the city, yet the sum which he left untouched, ready for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was such as to appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defense, or public safety, or military honor. It cannot be shown of Perikles that he ever sacrificed the greater object to the less—the permanent and substantially valuable to the transitory and showy—assured present possessions to the lust of new, distant, or uncertain conquests. If his advice had been listened to, the rashness which brought on the defeat of the Athenian Tolmides at Koroneia in Bœotia would have been avoided, and Athens might probably have maintained her ascendency over Megara and Bœotia, which would have protected her territory from invasion, and given a new turn to the subsequent history. Perikles is not to be treated as the author of the Athenian character. he found it with its very marked positive characteristics and susceptibilities, among which those which he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The lust of expeditions against the Persians, which Kimon would have pushed into Egypt and Cyprus, he repressed, after it had accomplished all which could be usefully aimed at. The ambition of Athens he moderated rather than encouraged: the democratical movement of Athens he regularized, and worked out into judicial institutions which ranked among the prominent features of Athenian life, and worked, in my judgment, with a very large balance of benefit to the national mind as well as to individual security, in spite of the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that point in which there was the greatest difference between Athens, as Perikles found it and as he left it, is unquestionably the pacific and intellectual development—rhetoric, poetry, arts, philosophical re-

search, and recreative variety. To which if we add great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic soil—extension of Athenian trade—attainment and laborious maintenance of the maximum of maritime skill (attested by the battles of Phormio)—enlargement of the area of complete security by construction of the Long Walls—lastly, the clothing of Athens in her imperial mantle, by ornaments architectural and sculptural—we shall make out a case of genuine progress realized during the political life of Perikles, such as the evils imputed to him, far more imaginary than real, will go but a little way to alloy. How little, comparatively speaking, of the picture drawn by Perikles in his funeral harangue of 431 B.C. would have been correct, if the harangue had been delivered over those warriors who fell at Tanagra twenty-seven years before!

It has been remarked by M. Boeckh, that Perikles sacrificed the landed proprietors of Attica to the maritime interests and empire of Athens. This is of course founded on the destructive invasions of the country during the Peloponnesian war; for down to the commencement of that war the position of Attic cultivators and proprietors was particularly enviable: and the censure of M. Boeckh therefore depends upon the question, how far Perikles contributed to produce, or had it in his power to avert, this melancholy war, in its results so fatal not merely to Athens, but to the entire Grecian race. Now here again, if we follow attentively the narrative of Thucydides, we shall see that, in the judgment of that historian, not only Perikles did not bring on the war, but he could not have averted it without such concessions as Athenian prudence as well as Athenian patriotism peremptorily forbade. Moreover we shall see, that the calculations on which Perikles grounded his hopes of success if driven to war, were (in the opinion of the historian) perfectly sound and safe. We may even go farther, and affirm, that the administration of Perikles during the fourteen years preceding the war, exhibits a "moderation" (to use the words of Thucydides) dictated chiefly by anxiety to avoid raising causes of war. If in the months immediately preceding the breaking out of the war, after the conduct of the Corinthians at Potidæ, and the resolutions of the Congress at Sparta, he resisted strenuously all compliance with special demands from Sparta—we must recollect that these were demands essentially insincere, in which partial compliance would have lowered the dignity of Athens without insuring peace. The stories about Pheidias, Aspasia, and the Megarians, even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of them, must, according to Thucydides, be looked upon at worst as concomitants and pretexts, rather than as real causes, of the war: though modern authors in speaking of Perikles are but too apt to use expressions which tacitly assume these stories to be well-founded.

Seeing then that Perikles did not bring on, and could not have averted, the Peloponnesian war—that he steered his course in reference to that event with the long-sighted prudence of one who knew that the safety and the dignity of imperial Athens were essentially interwoven—we have no right to throw upon him the blame of sacrificing the landed proprietors of Attica. These proprietors might, indeed, be excused for complaining, where they suffered so ruinously. But the impartial historian, looking at the whole of the case, cannot admit their complaints as a ground for censuring the Athenian statesman.

The relation of Athens to her allies, the weak point of her position, it was beyond the power of Perikles seriously to amend; probably also beyond his will, since the idea of political incorporation, as well as that of providing a common and equal confederate bond sustained by effective federal authority, between different cities, was rarely entertained even by the best Greek minds. We hear that he tried to summon at Athens a congress of deputies from all cities of Greece, the allies of Athens included; but the scheme could not be brought to bear, in consequence of the reluctance, no way surprising, of the Peloponnesians. Practically, the allies were not badly treated during his administration: and if among the other bad consequences of the prolonged war, they as well as Athens and all other Greeks come to suffer more and more, this depends upon causes with which he is not chargeable, and upon proceedings which departed altogether from his wise and sober calculations. Taking him altogether, with his powers of thought, speech, and action—his competence civil and military, in the council as well as in the field—his vigorous and cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community in pacific and many-sided development—his incorruptible public morality, caution, and firmness, in a country where all those qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of course much rarer—we shall find him without a parallel throughout the whole course of Grecian history.

Under the great mortality and pressure of sickness at Athens, operations of war naturally languished; while the enemies also, though more active, had but little success. A fleet of 100 triremes with 1000 hoplites on board, was sent by the Lacedæmonians under Knemus to attack Zakynthus, but accomplished nothing beyond devastation of the open parts of the island; and then returned home. And it was shortly after this, toward the month of September, that the Ambrakiots made an attack upon the Amphilochian town called Argos, situated on the southern coast of the Gulf of Ambrakia; which town, as has been recounted in the preceding chapter, had been wrested from them two years before by the Athenians under Phormio and restored to the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. The Ambrakiots, as colonists and allies of Corinth, were at the same time animated by active enmity to the Athenian influence in Akarnania, and by desire to regain the lost town of Argos. Procuring aid from the Chaonians and some other Epirotic tribes, they marched against

Argos, and after laying waste the territory, endeavored to take the town by assault, but were repulsed and obliged to retire. This expedition appears to have impressed the Athenians with the necessity of a standing force to protect their interest in those parts; so that in the autumn Phormio was sent with a squadron of twenty triremes to occupy Naupaktus (now inhabited by the Messenians) as a permanent naval station, and to watch the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. We shall find in the events of the succeeding year ample confirmation of this necessity.

Though the Peloponnesians were too inferior in maritime force to undertake formal war at sea against Athens, their single privateers, especially the Megarian privateers from the harbor of Nisæa, were active in injuring her commerce—and not merely the commerce of Athens, but also that of other neutral Greeks, without scruple or discrimination. Several merchantmen and fishing-vessels, with a considerable number of prisoners, were thus captured. Such prisoners as fell into the hands of the Lacedæmonians—even neutral Greeks as well as Athenians—were all put to death, and their bodies cast into clefts of the mountains. In regard to the neutrals, this capture was piratical, and the slaughter unwarrantably cruel, judged even by the received practice of the Greeks, deficient as that was on the score of humanity. But to dismiss these neutral prisoners, or to sell them as slaves, would have given publicity to a piratical capture and provoked the neutral towns; so that the prisoners were probably slain as the best way of getting rid of them and thus suppressing evidence.

Some of these Peloponnesian privateers ranged as far as the south-western coast of Asia Minor, where they found temporary shelter, and interrupted the trading-vessels from Phaselis and Phenicia to Athens; to protect which the Athenians dispatched in the course of the autumn a squadron of six triremes under Melesander. He was farther directed to insure the collection of the ordinary tribute from Athenian subject-allies, and probably to raise such contributions as he could elsewhere. In the prosecution of this latter duty, he undertook an expedition from the sea-coast against one of the Lykian towns in the interior, but his attack was repelled with loss, and he himself slain.

An opportunity soon afforded itself to the Athenians of retaliating on Sparta for this cruel treatment of the maritime prisoners. In execution of the idea projected at the commencement of the war, the Lacedæmonians sent Aneristus and two others as envoys to Persia, for the purpose of soliciting from the Great King aids of money and troops against Athens; the dissensions among the Greeks thus gradually paving the way for him to regain his ascendency in the Ægean. Timagoras of Tegea, together with an Argeian named Pollis without any formal mission from his city, and the Corinthian Aristeus, accompanied them. As the sea was in the power of Athens, they traveled overland through Thrace to the Hellespont. Aristeus, eager to leave nothing untried for the relief of Potidæa, prevailed upon them to make application to Sitalkes, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince was then in alliance with Athens, and his son Sadokus had even received the grant of Athenian citizenship. Yet the envoys thought it possible not only to detach him from the Athenian alliance, but even to obtain from him an army to act against the Athenians and raise the blockade of Potidæa. On being refused, they lastly applied to him for a safe escort to the banks of the Hellespont, in their way toward Persia. But Learchus and Ameiniades, then Athenian residents near the person of Sitalkes, had influence enough not only to cause rejection of these requests, but also to induce Sadokus, as a testimony of zeal in his new character of Athenian citizen, to assist them in seizing the persons of Aristeus and his companions in their journey through Thrace. Accordingly, the whole party were seized and conducted as prisoners to Athens, where they were forthwith put to death, without trial or permission to speak—and their bodies cast into rocky chasms, as a reprisal for the captured seamen slain by the Lacedæmonians.

Such revenge against Aristeus, the instigator of the revolt of Potidæa, relieved the Athenians from a dangerous enemy; and that blockaded city was now left to its fate. About midwinter it capitulated, after a blockade of two years, and after going through the extreme of suffering from famine to such a degree, that some of those who died were even eaten by the survivors. In spite of such intolerable distress, the Athenian generals, Xenophon, son of Euripides, and his two colleagues, admitted them to favorable terms of capitulation—allowing the whole population and the Corinthian allies to retire freely, with a specified sum of money per head, as well as with one garment for each man and two for each woman—so that they found shelter among the Chalkidic townships in the neighborhood. These terms were singularly favorable, considering the desperate state of the city, which must very soon have surrendered at discretion. But the hardships, even of the army without, in the cold of winter, were very severe, and they had become thoroughly tired both of the duration and the expense of the siege. The cost to Athens had been not less than 2,000 talents; since the assailant force had never been lower than 3,000 hoplites, during the entire two years of the siege, and for a portion of the time considerably greater—each hoplite receiving two drachmas per diem. The Athenians at home, when they learnt the terms of the capitulation, were displeased with the generals for the indulgence shown,—since a little additional patience would have constrained the city to surrender at discretion; in which case the expense would have been partly made good by selling the prisoners as slaves—and Athenian vengeance

probably gratified by putting the warriors to death. A body of 1000 colonists were sent from Athens to occupy Potidæa and its vacant territory.

Two full years had now elapsed since the actual commencement of war by the attack of the Thebans on Platæa. Yet the Peloponnesians had accomplished no part of what they expected. They had not rescued Potidæa, nor had their twice-repeated invasion, although assisted by the unexpected disasters arising from the epidemic, as yet brought Athens to any sufficient humiliation—though perhaps the envoys which she had sent during the foregoing summer with propositions for peace (contrary to the advice of Perikles) may have produced an impression that she could not hold out long. At the same time the Peloponnesian allies had on their side suffered little damage, since the ravages inflicted by the Athenian fleet on their coast may have been nearly compensated by the booty which their invading troops gained in Attica. Probably by this time the public opinion in Greece had contracted an unhappy familiarity with the state of war, so that nothing but some decisive loss and humiliation on one side at least, if not on both, would suffice to terminate it. In this third spring, the Peloponnesians did not repeat their annual march into Attica—deterred, partly, we may suppose, by fear of the epidemic yet raging there—but still more, by the strong desire of the Thebans to take their revenge on Platæa.

To this ill-fated city, Archidamus marched forthwith at the head of the confederate army. No sooner had he entered and begun to lay waste the territory than the Platæan heralds came forth to arrest his hand, and accosted him in the following terms: "Archidamus, and ye men of Lacedæmon, ye act wrong and in a manner neither worthy of yourselves nor of your fathers, in thus invading the territory of Platæa. For the Lacedæmonian Pausanias, son of Kleombrotus, after he had liberated Greece from the Persians, in conjunction with those Greeks who stood forward to bear their share of the danger, offered sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherius in the market-place of Platæa; and there, in presence of all the allies, assigned to the Platæans their own city and territory to hold in full autonomy, so that none should invade them wrongfully or with a view to enslave them: should such invasion occur, the allies present pledged themselves to stand forward with all their force as protectors. While your fathers made to us this grant in consideration of our valor and forwardness in that perilous emergency, ye are now doing the precise contrary: ye are come along with our worst enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us. And we on our side now adjure you, calling to witness the gods who sanctioned that oath, as well as your paternal and our local gods, not to violate the oath by doing wrong to the Platæan territory, but to let us live on in that autonomy which Pausanias guaranteed."

Whereunto Archidamus replied—"Ye speak fairly, men of Platæa, if your conduct shall be in harmony with your words. Remain autonomous yourselves, as Pausanias granted, and help us to liberate those other Greeks, who, after having shared in the same dangers and sworn the same oath along with you, have now been enslaved by the Athenians. It is for their liberation and that of the other Greeks that this formidable outfit of war has been brought forth. Pursuant to your oaths, ye ought by rights, and we now invite you, to take active part in this object. But if ye cannot act thus, at least remain quiet, conformably to the summons which we have already sent to you. Enjoy your own territory, and remain neutral—receiving both parties as friends, but neither party for warlike purposes. With this we shall be satisfied."

The reply of Archidamus discloses by allusion a circumstance which the historian had not before directly mentioned; that the Lacedæmonians had sent a formal summons to the Platæans to renounce their alliance with Athens and remain neutral. At what time this took place, we know not, but it marks the peculiar sentiment attaching to the town. But the Platæans did not comply with the invitation thus repeated. The heralds, having returned for instructions into the city, brought back for answer, that compliance was impossible, without the consent of the Athenians, since their wives and families were now harbored at Athens: besides, if they should profess neutrality, and admit both parties as friends, the Thebans might again make an attempt to surprise their city. In reply to their scruples, Archidamus again addressed them—"Well then, hand over your city and houses to us, Lacedæmonians: mark out the boundaries of your territory: specify the number of your fruit-trees, and all your other property which admits of being numbered; and then retire whithersoever ye choose, as long as the war continues. As soon as it is over, we will restore to you all that we have received—in the interim we will hold it in trust, and keep it in cultivation, and pay you such an allowance as shall suffice for your wants."

The proposition now made was so fair and tempting, that the general body of the Platæans were at first inclined to accept it, provided the Athenians would acquiesce. They obtained from Archidamus a truce long enough to enable them to send envoys to Athens. After communication with the Athenian assembly, the envoys returned to Platæa bearing the following answer—"Men of Platæa, the Athenians say they have never yet permitted you to be wronged since the alliance first began,—nor will they now betray you, but will help you to the best of their power. And they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore to them, not to depart in any way from the alliance."

This message awakened in the bosoms of the Platæans the full force of ancient and tenacious sentiment. They resolved to maintain, at all cost, and even to the extreme of ruin, if necessity should

require it, their union with Athens. It was, indeed, impossible that they could do otherwise (considering the position of their wives and families) without the consent of the Athenians. Though we cannot wonder that the latter refused consent, we may yet remark, that, in their situation, a perfectly generous ally might well have granted it. For the forces of Platæa counted for little as a portion of the aggregate strength of Athens; nor could the Athenians possibly protect it against the superior land-force of enemies. In fact, so hopeless was the attempt, that they never even tried, throughout the whole course of the long subsequent blockade.

The final refusal of the Platæans was proclaimed to Archidamus by word of mouth from the walls, since it was not thought safe to send out any messenger. As soon as the Spartan prince heard the answer, he prepared for hostile operations,—apparently with very sincere reluctance, attested in the following invocation emphatically pronounced:

"Ye Gods and Heroes, who hold the Platæan territory, be ye my witnesses, that we have not in the first instance wrongfully—not until these Platæans have first renounced the oaths binding on all of us—invaded this territory, in which our fathers defeated the Persians after prayers to you, and which ye granted as propitious for Greeks to fight in: nor shall we commit wrong in what we may do farther, for we have taken pains to tender reasonable terms, but without success. Be ye now consenting parties: may those who are beginning the wrong receive punishment for it—may those who are aiming to inflict penalty righteously, obtain their object."

It was thus that Archidamus, in language delivered probably under the walls, and within hearing of the citizens who manned them, endeavored to conciliate the gods and heroes of that town which he was about to ruin and depopulate. The whole of this preliminary debate, so strikingly and dramatically set forth by Thucydides, illustrates the respectful reluctance with which the Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail this scene of the glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, their direct sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Platæan people, but only to the Platæan territory. It is purely local, though it becomes partially transferred to the people, as tenants of this spot, by secondary association. We see, indeed, that nothing but the long-standing antipathy of the Thebans induced Archidamus to undertake the enterprise; for the conquest of Platæa was of no avail toward the main objects of the war, though the exposed situation of the town caused it to be crushed between the two great contending forces in Greece.

Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith, in full hopes that his numerous army, the entire strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy, would soon capture a place, of no great size, and probably not very well fortified—yet defended by a resolute garrison of 400 native citizens, with eighty Athenians. There was no one else in

the town, except 110 female slaves for cooking. The fruit trees, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, sufficed to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to inclose the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of timber near at hand in the forests of Kithæron, began to erect a mound against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to scale it by an inclined plane, and thus take the place by assault. Wood, stones, and earth were piled up in a vast heap—cross palings of wood being carried on each side of it, in parallel lines at right angles to the town wall, for the purpose of keeping the loose mass of materials between them together. For seventy days and as many nights did the army labor at this work, without any intermission, taking turns for food and repose; and through such unremitting assiduity, the mound approached near to the height of the town wall. But as it gradually mounted up, the Platæans were not idle on their side: they constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the top of their own town wall so as to heighten the part in contact with the enemy's mound; sustaining it by brickwork behind, for which the neighboring houses furnished materials. Hides, raw as well as dressed, were suspended in front of it, in order to protect the workmen against missiles, and the wood-work against fire-carrying arrows. And as the besiegers still continued heaping up materials, to raise their mound to the height even of this recent addition, the Platæans met them by breaking a hole in the lower part of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion of the mound; which then fell in at the top, and left a vacant space near the wall. This the besiegers filled up by letting down quantities of stiff clay rolled up in wattled reeds, which could not be pulled away in the same manner. Again, the Platæans dug a subterranean passage from the interior of their town to the ground immediately under the mound, and thus carried away unseen its earthy foundation; so that the besiegers saw their mound continually sinking down, in spite of fresh additions at the top—yet without knowing the reason. Nevertheless it was plain that these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Platæans accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, in the shape of a crescent, taking its start from the old town wall on each side of the mound. The besiegers were thus deprived of all benefit from the mound, assuming it to be successfully completed; since when they had marched over it, there stood in front of them a new town wall requiring to be carried in like manner.

Nor was this the only method of attack employed. Archidamus farther brought up battering engines, one of which greatly shook and endangered the additional height of wall built by the Platæans against the mound; while others were brought to bear on different portions of the circuit of the town wall. Against these new assailants, various means of defense were used. The defenders on the walls let down ropes, got hold of the head of the approaching engine,

and pulled it by main force out of the right line, either upwards or sideways; or they prepared heavy wooden beams on the wall, each attached at both ends by long iron chains to two poles projecting at right angles from the wall, by means of which poles it was raised and held aloft: so that at the proper moment when the battering machine approached the wall, the chain was suddenly let go, and the beam fell down with great violence directly upon the engine, breaking off its projecting beak. However rude these defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months' unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town in any other way than by the process of blockade and famine—a process alike tedious and costly.

Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had recourse to one farther stratagem—that of trying to set the town on fire. From the height of their mound, they threw down large quantities of fagots, partly into the space between the mound and the newly built crescent wall—partly, as far as they could reach, into other parts of the city: pitch and other combustibles were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration was tremendous, such as had never been before seen: a large portion of the town became unapproachable, and the whole of it narrowly escaped destruction. Nothing could have preserved it, had the wind been rather more favorable. There was, indeed, a further story of an opportune thunder-storm coming to extinguish the flames, which Thucydides does not seem to credit. In spite of much partial damage, the town remained still defensible and the spirit of the inhabitants unsubdued.

There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of circumvallation round Platæa, and trust to the slow process of famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of September, a little before the autumnal equinox. Two distinct walls were constructed, with sixteen feet of intermediate space all covered in, so as to look like one very thick wall. There were, moreover, two ditches, out of which the bricks for the wall had been taken—one on the inside toward Platæa, and the other on the outside against any foreign relieving force. The interior covered space between the walls was intended to serve as permanent quarters for the troops left on guard, consisting half of Bœotians and half of Peloponnesians.

At the same time that Archidamus began the siege of Platæa, the Athenians on their side dispatched a force of 2,000 hoplites and 200 horsemen to the Chalkidic peninsula, under Xenophon son of Euripides (with two colleagues), the same who had granted so recently the capitulation of Potidæa. It was necessary doubtless to convoy and establish the new colonists who were about to occupy the deserted site of Potidæa. Moreover, the general had acquired some knowledge of the position and parties of the Chalkidic towns, and hoped to be able to act against them with effect. He first invaded the territory belonging to the Bottæian town of Spartolus, not without hopes that the city itself would be betrayed to him by intelligences within. But this was prevented by the arrival of an additional force from Olynthus, partly hoplites, partly peltasts. Such peltasts, a species of troops between heavy-armed and light-armed, furnished with a pelta (or light shield) and short spear or javelin, appear to have taken their rise among these Chalkidic Greeks, being equipped in a manner half Greek and half Thracian: we shall find them hereafter much improved and turned to account by some of the ablest Grecian generals. The Chalkidic hoplites are generally of inferior merit: on the other hand, their cavalry and their peltasts are very good. In the action which now took place under the walls of Spartolus, the Athenian hoplites defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops were completely worsted by the Chalkidic. These latter, still further strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage. During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but attacked them on all sides when on their march, and employed missiles so effectively that the retreating hoplites could no longer maintain a steady order, but took to flight and sought refuge at Potidæa. Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force, together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, while the expedition returned in dishonor to Athens.

In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies were more successful. The Ambrakiots, exasperated by their repulse from the Amphilochian Argos, during the preceding year, had been induced to conceive new and larger plans of aggression against both the Akarnanians and Athenians. In concert with their mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of Akarnania, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the Akarnanians from concentrating their forces in any one point, and would put each of their townships upon an isolated self-defense: so that all of them might be overpowered in succession, and detached, together with Kephallenia and Zakynthus (Zante), from the Athenian alliance. The fleet of Phormio at Naupaktus, consisting only of twenty triremes, was accounted incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hope that the important station at Naupaktus might itself be taken, so as to expel the Athenians completely from those parts.

The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land-force

of the Ambrakiots, together with their neighbors and fellow-colonists the Leukadians and Anaktorians, assembled near their own city; while their maritime force was collected at Leukas, on the Akarnanian coast. The force at Ambrakia was joined, not only by Knemus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, with 1000 Peloponnesian hoplites, who found means to cross over from Peloponnesus, eluding the vigilance of Phormio, but also by a numerous body of Epirotic and Macedonian auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost tribes. A thousand Chaonians were present, under the command of Photyus and Nikanor, two annual chiefs chosen from the regal gens. Neither this tribe, nor the Thesprotians who came along with them, acknowledged any hereditary king. The Molossians and Atintanes, who also joined the force, were under Sabylinthus, regent on behalf of the young prince Tharypas. There came, besides, the Parauæi, from the banks of the river Aous, under their king Oræbus, together with 1000 Orestæ, a tribe rather Macedonian than Epirot, sent by their king Antiochus. Even king Perdikkas, though then nominally in alliance with Athens, sent 1000 of his Macedonian subjects, who however arrived too late to be of any use. This large and diverse body of Epirotic invaders, a new phenomenon in Grecian history, and got together doubtless by the hopes of plunder, proves the extensive relations of the tribes of the interior with the city of Ambrakia—a city destined to become in later days the capital of the Epirotic king Pyrrhus.

It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth should join that already assembled at Leukas, and act upon the coast of Akarnania at the same time that the land-force marched into that territory. But Knemus, finding the land-force united and ready near Ambrakia, deemed it unnecessary to await the fleet from Corinth, and marched straight into Akarnania, through Limnæa, a frontier village territory belonging to the Amphilochian Argos. He directed his march upon Stratus—an interior town, the chief place in Akarnania—the capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of the rest; especially as the Akarnanians, distracted by the presence of the ships at Leukas, and alarmed by the large body of invaders on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate homes, so that Stratus was left altogether to its own citizens. Nor was Phormio, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition to help them; since he could not leave Naupaktus unguarded, when the large fleet from Corinth was known to be approaching. Under such circumstances, Knemus and his army indulged confident hopes of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three divisions: the Epirots in the center—the Leukadians and Anaktorians on the right—the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots, together with Knemus himself, on the left. So little expectation was entertained of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near, or even in sight of each other. Both the Greek divisions,

indeed, maintained a good order of march, and kept proper scouts on the lookout; but the Epirots advanced without any care or order; especially the Chaonians, who formed the van. These men, accounted the most warlike of all the Epirotic tribes, were so full of conceit and rashness, that when they approached near to Stratus, they would not halt to encamp and assail the place conjointly with the Greeks; but marched along with the other Epirots right forward to the town, intending to attack it single-handed, and confident that they should carry it at the first assault before the Greeks came up, so that the entire glory would be theirs. The Stratians watched and profited by this imprudence. Planting ambuscades in convenient places, and suffering the Epirots to approach without suspicion near to the gates, they then suddenly sallied out and attacked them, while the troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The Chaonians who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were routed with great slaughter; while the other Epirots fled, after but little resistance. So much had they hurried forward in advance of their Greek allies, that neither the right nor the left division were aware of the battle, until the flying barbarians, hotly pursued by the Akarnanians, made it known to them. The two divisions then joined, protected the fugitives, and restrained further pursuit—the Stratians declining to come to hand-combat with them until the other Akarnanians should arrive. They seriously annoyed the forces of Knemus, however, by distant slinging, in which the Akarnanians were pre-eminently skillful. Knemus did not choose to persist in his attack under such discouraging circumstances. As soon as night arrived, so that there was no longer any fear of slingers, he retreated to the river Anapus, a distance of between nine and ten miles. Well aware that the news of the victory would attract other Akarnanian forces immediately to the aid of Stratus, he took advantage of the arrival of his own Akarnanian allies from Œniadæ (the only town in the country which was attached to the Lacedæmonian interest) and sought shelter near their city. From thence his troops dispersed, and returned to their respective homes

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth, which had been destined to co-operate with Knemus off the coast of Akarnania, had found difficulties in its passage alike unexpected and insuperable. Mustering forty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other places, with a body of soldiers on board and with accompanying store vessels, it departed from the harbor of Corinth and made its way along the northern coast of Achaia. Its commanders, not intending to meddle with Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupaktus, never imagined that he would venture to attack a number so greatly superior. The triremes were accordingly fitted out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to naval combat, and with little attention to the choice of skillful rowers.

Except in the combat near Korkyra, and there only partially, the

Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime efficiency at the point of excellence which it had now reached. Themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the Athenians, on the contrary, not only the seamen generally had a confirmed feeling of their own superiority, but Phormio especially, the ablest of all their captains, always familiarized his men with the conviction, that no Peloponnesian fleet, be its number ever so great, could possibly contend against them with success. Accordingly the Corinthian admirals, Machaon and his two colleagues, were surprised to observe that Phormio with his small Athenian squadron, instead of keeping safe in Naupaktus, was moving in parallel line with them and watching their progress until they should get out of the Corinthian Gulf into the more open sea. Having advanced along the northern coast of Peloponnesus as far as Patræ in Achaia, they then altered their course, and bore to the north-west in order to cross over toward the Ætolian coast in their way to Akarnania. In doing this, however, they perceived that Phormio was bearing down upon them from Chalkis and the mouth of the river Euenus; and they now discovered for the first time that he was going to attack them. Disconcerted by the incident, and not inclined for a naval combat in the wide and open sea, they altered their plan of passage, returned to the coast of Peloponnesus, and brought to for the night at some point near to Rhium, the narrowest breadth of the strait. Their bringing to was a mere feint intended to deceive Phormio and induce him to go back for the night to his own coast: for during the course of the night, they left their station, and tried to get across the breadth of the Gulf, where it was near the strait and comparatively narrow, before Phormio could come down upon them. And if the Athenian captain had really gone back to take night-station on his own coast, they would probably have got across to the Ætolian or northern coast without any molestation in the wide sea. But he watched their movements closely, kept the sea all night, and was thus enabled to attack them in midchannel, even during the shorter passage near the strait, at the first dawn of morning. On seeing his approach, the Corinthian admirals ranged their triremes in a circle with the prows outward—like the spokes of a wheel. The circle was made as large as it could be without leaving opportunity to the Athenian assailing ships to practice the maneuver of the diekplus, and the interior space was sufficient not merely for the store-vessels, but also for five chosen triremes, which were kept as a reserve to dart out when required through the intervals between the outer triremes.

In this position they were found and attacked shortly after daybreak by Phormio, who bore down upon them with his ships in single file, all admirable sailers, and his own ship leading; all being strictly forbidden to attack until he should give the signal. He rowed swiftly round the Peloponnesian circle, nearing the prows of their ships as closely as he could, and making constant semblance of being about to come to blows. Partly from the intimidating effect of this maneuver, altogether novel to the Peloponnesians—partly from the natural difficulty, well known to Phormio, of keeping every ship in its exact stationary position—the order of the circle, both within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long before a new ally came to his aid, on which he calculated, postponing his actual attack until this favorable incident occurred. The strong land-breeze out of the Gulf of Corinth, always wont to begin shortly after daybreak, came down upon the Peloponnesian fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the steadiness of their order was already somewhat giving way, and forced their ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The triremes began to run foul of each other, or become entangled with the store-vessels: so that in every ship the men on board were obliged to keep pushing off their neighbors on each side with poles—not without loud clamor and mutual reproaches, which prevented both the orders of the captain, and the cheering sound or song whereby the keleustes animated the rowers and kept them to time, from being audible. Moreover, the fresh breeze had occasioned such a swell, that these rowers, unskillful under all circumstances, could not get their oars clear of the water, and the pilots thus lost command over their vessels. The critical moment was now come, and Phormio gave the signal for attack. He first drove against and disabled one of the admiral's ships—his comrades next assailed others with equal success—so that the Peloponnesians, confounded and terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patræ, partly to Dyme, in Achaia, pursued by the Athenians; who, with scarcely the loss of a man, captured twelve triremes, carried away almost the entire crews, and sailed off with them to Molykreium or Antirrhium, the northern cape at the narrow mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, opposite to the corresponding cape called Rhium in Achaia. Having erected at Antirrhium a trophy for the victory, dedicating one of the captured triremes to Poseidon, they returned to Naupaktus; while the Peloponnesian ships sailed along the shore from Patræ to Kyllene, the principal port in the territory of Elis. They were here soon afterward joined by Knemus, who passed over with his squadron from Leukas.

These two incidents, just recounted, with their details—the repulse of Knemus and his army from Stratus, and the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet by Phormio—afford ground for some interesting remarks. The first of the two displays the great inferiority of the Epirots to the Greeks—and even to the less advanced portion of the Greeks—in the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power of co-operation for a joint purpose. Confidence of success with them

is exaggerated into childish rashness, so that they despise even the commonest precautions either in march or attack; while the Greek divisions on their right and on their left are never so elate as to omit either. If, on land, we thus discover the inherent superiority of Greeks over Epirots involuntarily breaking out—so in the sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing superiority of the Athenians over their opponents; a superiority, indeed, no way inherent, such as that of Greeks over Epirots, but depending in this case on previous toil, training, and inventive talent, on the one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned routine on the other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of that seamanship, which the Athenians had been gaining by years of improved practice, stand so clearly marked as in these first battles of Phormio. It gradually becomes less conspicuous as we advance in the war, since the Peloponnesians improve, learning seamanship as the Russians under Peter the Great learnt the art of war from the Swedes under Charles XII. —while the Athenian triremes and their crews seem to become less choice and effective, even before the terrible disaster at Syracuse, and are irreparably deteriorated after that misfortune.

To none did the circumstances of this memorable sea fight seem so incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians. They had heard indeed of the seamanship of Athens, but had never felt it, and could not understand what it meant; so that they imputed the defeat to nothing but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignant orders to Knemus at Kylene, to take the command, equip a larger and better fleet, and repair the dishonor. Three Spartan commissioners—Brasidas, Timokrates, and Lykophron—were sent down to assist him with their advice and exertions in calling together naval contingents from the different allied cities. By this means, under the general resentment occasioned by the recent defeat, a large fleet of seventy-seven triremes was speedily mustered at Panormus, a harbor of Achaia near to the promontory of Rhium and immediately within the interior gulf. A land-force was also collected at the same place ashore, to aid the operations of the fleet.

Such preparations did not escape the vigilance of Phormio, who transmitted to Athens news of his victory, at the same time urgently soliciting re-enforcements to contend with the increasing strength of the enemy. The Athenians immediately sent twenty fresh ships to join him. Yet they were induced by the instances of a Kretan named Nikias, their proxenus at Gortyn, to allow him to take the ships first to Krete, on the faith of his promise to reduce the hostile town of Kydonia. He had made this promise as a private favor to the inhabitants of Polichna, border enemies of Kydonia; but when the fleet arrived he was unable to fulfill it: nothing was effected except ravage of the Kydonian lands, and the fleet was long prevented by adverse winds and weather from getting away. This ill-advised diversion of the fleet from its straight course to join Phormio is a proof how much

the counsels of Athens were beginning to suffer from the loss of Perikles, who was just now in his last illness and died shortly afterward. That liability to be seduced by novel enterprises and projects of acquisition, against which he so emphatically warned his countrymen, was even now beginning to manifest its disastrous consequences.

Through the loss of this precious interval, Phormio found himself, with no more than his original twenty triremes, opposed to the vastly increased forces of the enemy—seventy-seven triremes with a large force on land to back them: the latter no mean help in ancient warfare. He took up his station near the Cape Antirrhium, or the Molykric Rhium as it was called—the northern headland, opposite to the other headland also called Rhium, on the coast of Achaia. The line between these two capes, seemingly about an English mile in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. The Messenian force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the Gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian maneuvering; while his adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape, from the corresponding reason—feeling that to them the narrow sea was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, effacing all superiority of nautical skill. If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protection for a smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system of maneuvering introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea-room is now not less coveted by Phormio than dreaded by his enemies. The improved practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare.

For six or seven days successively the two fleets were drawn out against each other—Phormio trying to entice the Peloponnesians to the outside of the Gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it. To him every day's postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his re-enforcements arriving: for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and reluctance prevailing among their seamen—many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat—that Knemus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations. They insisted on the favorable prospect before them—pointing out that the late battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which would be for the future corrected—and appealing to the inherent bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint that while those who behaved well in the coming battle would receive due honor, the laggards would assuredly be punished: a topic

rarely touched upon by ancient generals in their harangues on the eve of battle, and demonstrating conspicuously the reluctance of many of the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to this second engagement chiefly by the ascendency and strenuous commands of Sparta. To such reluctance Phormio pointedly alluded, in the encouraging exhortations which he on his side addressed to his men: for they too, in spite of their habitual confidence at sea, strengthened by the recent victory, were dispirited by the smallness of their numbers. He reminded them of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially with an enemy conscious of his own weakness, could overbalance. He called upon them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect silence during the actual battle—useful in all matters of war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea of entire silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was going on, is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control and military habits among these citizen-seamen.

The habitual position of the Peloponnesian fleet off Panormus was within the strait, but nearly fronting the breadth of it—opposite to Phormio, who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the opposite cape: in the Peloponnesian line, therefore, the right wing occupied the north or north-east side toward Naupaktus. Knemus and Brasidas now resolved to make a forward movement up the Gulf, as if against that town, which was the main Athenian station. Knowing that Phormio would be under the necessity of coming to the defense of the place, they hoped to pin him up and force him to action close under the land, where Athenian maneuvering would be unavailing. Accordingly they commenced this movement early in the morning, sailing in line of four abreast toward the northern coast of the Inner Gulf. The right squadron, under the Lacedæmonian Timokrates, was in the van, according to its natural position, and care had been taken to place in it twenty of the best-sailing ships, since the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio, the moment he saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the Messenians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Naupaktus, with their wives and families, and a long circuit of wall, was utterly undefended. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead, probably his own the leading ship: and sailed close along the land toward Naupaktus, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to him.

Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and toward the same point—the Athenian close along shore—the Peloponnesian somewhat farther off. The latter had now got Phormio into the position

which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet, facing to the left, changed from column into line, and instead of continuing to move along the coast, rowed rapidly with their prows shoreward to come to close quarters with the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians, occupying the side toward Naupaktus, was especially charged with the duty of cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither; the best ships having been placed on the right for that important object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action completely succeeded: the Athenians were caught in a situation where resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the twenty, just found means to run by, before the right wing of the enemy closed in upon the shore; and made the best of their way to Naupaktus. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore with serious damage—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire crew, and some others empty. But more than one of them was rescued by the bravery of the Athenian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been actually made fast, and the process of towing off had begun.

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured. While their left and center were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of these got clear away into the harbor of Naupaktus, and there posted themselves in an attitude of defense near the temple of Apollo, before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh, somewhat less swift, was neared by the Lacedæmonian admiral, who, on board a Leukadian trireme, pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. There happened to lie moored a merchant-vessel at the entrance of the harbor of Naupaktus. The Athenian captain in his flight observing that the Leukadian pursuer was for the moment alone, seized the opportunity for a bold and rapid maneuver. He pulled swiftly round the trader-vessel, directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Leukadian, and drove his beak against her, amidships, with an impact so violent as to disable her an once. Her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral Timokrates, was so stung with anguish at this unexpected catastrophe, that he slew himself forthwith, and fell overboard into the harbor. The pursuing vessels coming up behind, too, were so astounded and dismayed by it, that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance; while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes

in the harbor were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward motion, and to make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy, whose ships, disordered by the heat of pursuit, and having been just suddenly stopped, could not be speedily got again under weigh, and expected nothing less than renewed attack. First, the Athenians broke the twenty pursuing ships on the right wing, next they pursued their advantage against the left and center, who had probably neared to the right; so that after a short resistance, the whole were completely routed, and fled across the Gulf to their original station at Panormus. Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break, terrify, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes—but they also rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and taken in the early part of the action. Moreover the Peloponnesian crews sustained a considerable loss both in killed and in prisoners.

Thus in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at first, Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory; a victory to which even the Lacedæmonians were forced to bear testimony, since they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action, to erect a trophy on the Rhium of Achaia, where they also dedicated the single Athenian trireme which they had been able to carry off. Yet they were so completely discomfited—and further so much in fear of the expected re-enforcement from Athens—that they took advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the Gulf to Corinth; all except the Leukadians, who returned to their own home.

Presently the re-enforcement arrived, after that untoward detention which had well nigh exposed Phormio and his whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of the Gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn an expedition, landing at Astakus, and marching into the Akarnanian inland country with 400 Athenian hoplites and 400 Messenians. Some of the leading men of Stratus and Koronta, who were attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into exile, while a chief named Kynes, of Koronta, who seems to have been hitherto in exile, was re-established in his native town. The great object was, to besiege and take the powerful town of Œniadæ, near the mouth of the Achelous; a town at variance with the other Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But as the great spread of the waters of the Achelous rendered this siege impracticable during the winter, Phormio returned to the station at Naupaktus. From hence he departed to Athens

toward the end of the winter, carrying home both his prize-ships and such of his prisoners as were freemen. The latter were exchanged man for man against Athenian prisoners in the hands of Sparta.

After abandoning the naval contest at Rhium, and reriring to Corinth, Knemus and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden inroad upon Peiræus. Such was the confessed superiority of the Athenians at sea, that while they guarded amply the coasts of Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of an attack upon their own main harbor. Accordingly, Peiræus was not only unprotected by any chain across the entrance, but destitute even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The seamen of the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next to Megara—each man carrying his seat-cloth, and his oar, together with the loop whereby the oar was fastened to the oar-hole in the side and thus prevented from slipping.

There lay forty triremes in Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, which, though old and out of condition, were sufficient for so short a trip; and the seamen, immediately on arriving, launched these and got aboard. Yet such was the awe entertained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed, though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching Peiræus. Pretending that the wind was adverse, they contented themselves with passing across to the station of Budorum, in the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbor of Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as well as goods. Fire-signals immediately made known this unforeseen aggression both at Peiræus and at Athens, occasioning in both the extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the citizens in Athens, not conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, fancied that Peiræus itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole population rushed down to the Peiræus at break of day, and put to sea with all the triremes that were ready. But the Peloponnesians, aware of the danger which menaced them, made haste to quit Salamis with their booty and the three captured guard-ships. The lesson was salutary to the Athenians: from henceforward Peiræus was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard, down to the end of the war. Forty years afterward, however, we shall find it just as negligently watched, and surprised with much more boldness and dexterity by the Lacedæmonian captain Teleutias.

As, during the summer of this year, the Ambrakiots had brought down a numerous host of Epirotic tribes to the invasion of Akarnania, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians—so during the autumn the Athenians obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thrace from

the powerful barbaric prince before mentioned, Sitalkes king of the Odrysian Thracians.

Amidst the numerous tribes, between the Danube and the Ægean sea—who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though each had a special name besides—the Odrysians were at this time the most warlike and powerful. The Odrysian king Teres, father of Sitalkes, had made use of this power to subdue and render tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His dominion, the largest existing between the Ionian sea and the Euxine, extended from Abdera or the mouth of the Nestus in the Ægean sea, to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine; though it seems that this must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes, especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. Sitalkes himself had invaded and conquered some of the Pæonian tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the Axius and the Strymon. Dominion, in the sense of the Odrysian king, meant tribute, presents, and military force when required. With the two former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since his nephew and successor Seuthes (under whom the revenue increased and attained its maximum) received 400 talents annually in gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents, over and above many other presents of manufactured articles and ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast, which contributed moreover largely to the tribute, though in what proportions we are not informed. Even Grecian cities, not in Thrace, sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchasers for the produce, the plunder, and the slaves, acquired by Thracian chiefs or tribes. The residence of the Odrysians properly so called, and of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining tribes, appears to have been about twelve days' journey inland from Byzantium, in the upper regions of the Hebrus and Strymon, south of Mount Hæmus, and north-east of Rhodope. The Odrysian chiefs were connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes north of the Danube: the Scythian prince Ariapeithes had married the daughter of the Odrysian Teres, the first who extended the dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thrace.

The natural state of the Thracian tribes—in the judgment of Herodotus, permanent and incorrigible—was that of disunion and incapacity of political association; were such association possible (he says), they would be strong enough to vanquish every other nation—though Thucydides considers them as far inferior to the Scythians. The Odrysian dominion had probably not reached, at the period when Herodotus made his inquiries, the same development which Thucydides describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, and which imparted to these tribes a union, partial indeed, and temporary, but

such as they never reached either before or afterward. It has been already mentioned that the Odrysian prince Sitalkes had taken for his wife (or rather for one of his wives) the sister of Nymphodorus, a Greek of Abdera; by whose mediation he had been made the ally, and his son Sadokus even a citizen, of Athens. He had further been induced to promise that he would reconquer the Chalkidians of Thrace for the benefit of the Athenians—his ancient kinsmen, according to the myth of Tereus as interpreted by both parties. At the same time, Perdikkas king of Macedonia had offended him by refusing to perform a promise made of giving him his sister in marriage—a promise made as consideration for the interference of Sitalkes and Nymphodorus in procuring for Perdikkas peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling in his own name (and seemingly independent of Perdikkas) over a portion of the Macedonians along the upper course of the Axius, had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge with Sitalkes. He was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas received from the Odrysian prince the promise of restoration. The Athenians, though they had ambassadors resident with Sitalkes, nevertheless sent Agnon as special envoy to concert arrangements for his march against the Chalkidians, with which an Athenian armament was destined to cooperate. In treating with Sitalkes, it was necessary to be liberal in presents both to himself and to the subordinate chieftains who held power dependent upon him. Nothing could be accomplished among the Thracians except by the aid of bribes, and the Athenians were more competent to supply this exigency than any other people in Greece. The joint expedition against the Chalkidians was finally resolved.

But the forces of Sitalkes, collected from many different portions of Thrace, were tardy in coming together. He summoned all the tribes under his dominion between Hæmus, Rhodope, and the two seas: the Getæ between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, equipped like the Scythians (their neighbors on the other side of the river) with bow and arrow on horseback, also joined him, as well as the Agrianes, the Lææi, and the other Pæonian tribes subject to his dominion. Lastly, several of the Thracian tribes called Dii, distinguished by their peculiar short swords, and maintaining a fierce independence on the heights of Rhodope, were tempted by the chance of plunder, or the offer of pay, to flock to his standard Altogether his army amounted, or was supposed to amount, to 150,000 men—one-third of it cavalry, who were for the most part Getæ and Odrysians proper. The most formidable warriors in his camp were the independent tribes of Rhodope. The whole host, alike numerous, warlike, predatory, and cruel, spread terror amidst all those who were within even the remote possibilities of its march.

Starting from the central Odrysian territory, and bringing with him

Agnon and the other Athenian envoys, he first crossed the uninhabited mountain called Kerkine, which divided the Pæonians on the west from the Thracian tribes called Sinti and Mædi on the east, until he reached the Pæonian town or district called Doberus; it was here that many troops and additional volunteers reached him, making up his full total. From Doberus, probably marching down along one of the tributary streams of the Axius, he entered into that portion of Upper Macedonia which lies along the higher Axius, and which had constituted the separate principality of Philip. The presence in his army of Amyntas, son of Philip, induced some of the fortified places, Gortynia, Atalante, and others, to open their gates without resistance, while Eidomene was taken by storm, and Europus in vain attacked. From hence he passed still further southward into Lower Macedonia, the kingdom of Perdikkas, ravaging the territory on both sides of the Axius even to the neighborhood of the towns Pella and Kyrrhus, and apparently down as far south as the mouth of the river and the head of the Thermaic Gulf. Further south than this he did not go, but spread his force over the districts between the left bank of the Axius and the head of the Strymonic Gulf—Mygdonia, Krestonia, and Anthemus—while a portion of his army was detached to overrun the territory of the Chalkidians and Bottiæans. The Macedonians under Perdikkas, renouncing all idea of contending on foot against so overwhelming a host, either fled or shut themselves up in the small number of fortified places which the country presented. The cavalry from Upper Macedonia, indeed, well-armed and excellent, made some orderly and successful charges against the Thracians, lightly armed with javelins, short swords, and the pelta or small shield—but it was presently shut in, harassed on all sides by superior numbers, and compelled to think only of retreat and extrication.

Luckily for the enemies of the Odrysian king, his march was not made until the beginning of winter—seemingly about November or December. We may be sure that the Athenians, when they concerted with him the joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a better time of the year. Having probably waited to hear that his army was in motion, and waited long in vain, they began to despair of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to dispatch any force of their own to the spot. Some envoys and presents only were sent as compliments, instead of the co-operating armament. And this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather, the nakedness of the country, and the privations of his army at that season, induced Sitalkes soon to enter into negotiations with Perdikkas; who, moreover, gained over Seuthes, nephew of the Odrysian prince, by promising his sister Stratonike in marriage, together with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracian host should be speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been distributed for thirty days over Macedonia, during eight of

which days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidic lands. But the interval had been quite long enough to diffuse terror all around. Such a host of fierce barbarians had never before been brought together, and no one knew in what direction they might be disposed to carry their incursions. The independent Thracian tribes (Panæi, Odomantes, Droi, and Dersæi) in the plains on the north-east of the Strymon, and near Mount Pangærus, not far from Amphipolis, were the first to feel alarm lest Sitalkes should take the opportunity of trying to conquer them. On the other side, the Thessalians, Magnetes, and other Greeks north of Thermopylæ, apprehensive that he would carry his invasion further south, began to organize means for resisting him. Even the general Peloponnesian confederacy heard with uneasiness of this new ally whom Athens was bringing into the field, perhaps against them. All such alarms were dissipated when Sitalkes, after remaining thirty days, returned by the way he came, and the formidable avalanche was thus seen to melt away. The faithless Perdikkas, on this occasion, performed his promise to Seuthes, having drawn upon himself much mischief by violating his previous similar promise to Sitalkes.

APPENDIX.

Thucyd. ii. 90. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενά, βουλόμενοι ἄκοντας ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτούς, ἀναγόμενοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς, ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιῷ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὥρμουν· ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῷ εἴκοσι νῆας ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ παραπλέοι, μὴ διαψύλοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, ἀλλ' αὗται αἱ νῆες περικλήσειαν.

The above passage forms the main authority for my description (given above) of the movement of the Peloponnesian fleet, previous to the second battle against Phormio. The annexed plan will enable my reasoning to be understood.

The main question for consideration here is, What is the meaning of *τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν*? Does it mean the land of the Peloponnesians, south of the Gulf—or the land of the Athenians, north of the Gulf? The commentators affirm that it must mean the former. I thought that it might mean the latter: and in my previous editions, I adduced several examples of the use of the pronoun *ἑαυτοῦ*, tending to justify that opinion.

Finding that on this question of criticism, my opinion is opposed to the best authorities, I no longer insist upon it, nor do I now reprint the illustrative passages. As to the facts, however, my conviction remains unchanged. The land here designated by Thucydides must be "the land of the Athenians north of the Strait:" it cannot be "the land of the Peloponnesians south of the Strait." The pronoun *ἑαυτῶν* must therefore be wrong, and ought to be altered into *αὐτῶν*, as Mr. Bloomfield proposes, or *ἐκείνων*.

The Scholiast says that *ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν* is here equivalent to *παρὰ τὴν γῆν*. Dr. Arnold thoroughly approving the description of Mitford, who states that the Peloponnesian fleet were "moving eastward *along the Achaic coast*," says: "The Scholiast says that *ἐπὶ* is here used for *παρὰ*. It would be better to say that it has a mixed signification of motion toward a place and neighborhood to it: express-

ing that the Peloponnesians sailed toward their own land (i.e., toward Corinth, Sicyon, and Pellene, to which place the greater number of the ships belonged), instead of standing over to the opposite coast belonging to their enemies; and at the same time kept close *upon* their own land, in the sense of ἐπὶ with a dative case."

To discuss this interpretation first with reference to the verbal construction. Surely the meaning which the Scholiast puts upon ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν is one which cannot be admitted without examples to justify it. No two propositions can be more distinct than the two πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν—and πλεῖν παρὰ τὴν γῆν? The Peloponnesian fleet, before it made any movement, was already moored close upon its own land—at the headland Rhium near Panormus where its land-force stood (Thucyd. ii. 86). In this position, if it moved at all, it must either sail away from the Peloponnesian coast, or along the Peloponnesian coast: and neither of these movements would be expressed by Thucydides under the words πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν.

To obviate this difficulty, while the Scholiast changes the meaning of ἐπὶ, Dr. Arnold changes that of τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν; which words, according to him, denote, not the Peloponnesian coast as opposed to the northern shore occupied by Phormio, but Corinth, Sicyon, and Pellene; to which places (he says) the greater number of the ships belonged. But I submit that this is a sense altogether unnatural. Corinth and Sicyon are so far off that any allusion to them here is most improbable. Thucydides is describing the operations of two hostile fleets, one occupying the coast northward, the other the coast southward, of the Strait. The *own land* of the Peloponnesians was that southern line of coast which they occupied and on which their land-force was encamped: it is distinguished from the *enemies' land*, on the opposite side of the Strait. If Thucydides had wished to intimate that the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in the direction of Corinth and Sicyon, he would hardly have used such words as ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν.

Professor Dunbar (in an article among the Critical Remarks annexed to the third edition of his Greek and English Lexicon) has contested my interpretation of this passage of Thucydides. He says: "The Peloponnesian fleet must have *proceeded along their own coast*—ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἀσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου. In this passage we find ἐπὶ with two cases: the first with the accusative, the other with the genitive. The first appears to me to indicate *the locality to which* they were sailing: and that evidently was the headland on the Achæan coast, nearly opposite Naupactus."

The headland, to which Mr. Dunbar alludes, will be seen on the annexed plan, marked Drepanum. It is sufficiently near not to be open to the objection which I have urged against Dr. Arnold's hypothesis of Corinth and Sicyon. But still I contend that it cannot be indicated by the words as they stand in Thucydides. On Mr. Dunbar's interpretation, the Peloponnesians must have moved from one point of their own land to another point of their own land. Now if Thucydides had meant to affirm this, he surely would not have used such words as ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν. He would either have specified by name the particular point of land (as in c. 86 παρέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸ Ῥίον)—or if he had desired to bring to our view that "they proceeded *along* their own coast," he would have said παρα instead of ἐπὶ.

Thus far I have been discussing simply the verbal interpretation of ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, for the purpose of showing that though these words be admitted to mean the land of the Peloponnesians—still, in order to reconcile such meaning with the facts, the commentators are obliged to advance suppositions highly improbable, and even to identify ἐπὶ with παρὰ. I now turn from the verbal construction to the facts, in order to show that the real movement of the Peloponnesian fleet *must have been* toward the Athenian coast and toward Naupaktus. Therefore, since ἑαυτῶν cannot have that meaning, ἑαυτῶν must be an error of the text.

The purpose of the Peloponnesians in effecting the movement was to make Phormio believe that they were going to attack Naupaktus; to constrain him to come within the Gulf with a view of protecting that place; and at the same time, if Phormio did come within the Gulf, to attack him in a narrow space where his ships would have no room for maneuvering. This was what the Peloponnesians not only intended, but actually accomplished.

Now I ask how this purpose could be accomplished by a movement along the coast of Peloponnesus from the headland of Rhium to the headland of Drepanum—which last point the reader will see on the plan annexed? How could such movement induce Phormio to think that the Peloponnesians were going to attack Naupaktus, or throw him into alarm for the safety of that place? When arrived at Drepanum, they would hardly be nearer to Naupaktus than they were at Rhium: they would still have the whole breadth of the Gulf to cross. Let us, however, suppose that their movement toward Drepanum did really induce Phormio to come into the Gulf for the protection of Naupaktus. If they attempted to cross the breadth of the Gulf from Drepanum toward Naupaktus, they would expose themselves to be attacked by Phormio midway in the open sea; the very contingency which he desired, and which they were maneuvering to avoid.

Again, let us approach the question from another point of view. It is certain, from the description of Thucydides, that the actual attack of the Peloponnesians upon Phormio, in which they cut off nine out of his twenty ships, took place on the *northern coast of the Gulf*, at some spot between the headland Antirrhium and Naupaktus; somewhere near the spot which I have indicated on the annexed plan. The presence of the Messenian soldiers (who had come out from Naupaktus to assist Phormio, and who waded into the water to save the captured ships) would of itself place this beyond a doubt—if indeed any doubt could arise. It is farther certain that when the Peloponnesian fleet wheeled from column into line to attack Phormio, they were so near to this northern land that Phormio was in the greatest danger of having his whole squadron driven ashore: only eleven out of his twenty ships could escape. The plan will illustrate what is here said.

Now I ask how these facts are to be reconciled with the supposition that the Peloponnesian fleet, on quitting their moorings at Rhium, coasted along their own land toward Drepanum? If they did so, how did they afterward get across the Gulf to the place where the battle was fought? Every yard that they moved in the direction of Drepanum only tended to widen the breadth of open gulf to be crossed afterward. With the purpose which they had in view, to move from Rhium along their own coast in the direction of Drepanum would have been absurd. Supposing, however, that they did so, it could only have been preliminary to a second movement, in another direction across the Gulf. But of this second movement, Thucydides says not one word. All that he tells us about the course of the Peloponnesians is contained in this phrase—ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξίῳ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὥρμουν. If these words really designate a movement along the southern coast, we must assume, first, that the historian has left unnoticed the second movement across the Gulf, which, nevertheless, must have followed—next, that the Peloponnesians made a first move for no purpose except to increase the distance and difficulty of the second.

Considering therefore the facts of the case, the localities and the purpose of the Peloponnesians, all of which are here clear—I contend that ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου must denote a movement of the Peloponnesian fleet toward the land of the Athenians, or the northern shore of the Gulf; and that as ἑαυτῶν will not bear that sense, it must be altered to αὐτῶν or ἐκείνων.

It remains to explain ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, which bear a very distinct and important meaning. The land of the Athenians, on the northern side of the Strait, comprises the headland of Antirrhium with both the lines of coast which there terminate and make an angle; that is, one line of coast *fronting inside toward the Corinthian Gulf*—the other, *fronting outside toward the Gulf of Patras.* The reader who looks at the annexed plan will see this at a glance. Now when Thucydides says that the Peloponnesians sailed "*upon the land of the Athenians inward fronting the Gulf*," these last words are essential to make us understand toward which of the two Athenian lines of coast the movement was turned. We learn from the words that the Peloponnesians did not sail toward that outer side of the headland where Phormio was moored, but toward the inner side of it, on the line which conducted to Naupaktus.

CHAPTER L.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMOTIONS AT KORKYRA.

THE second and third years of the war had both been years of great suffering with the Athenians, from the continuance of the epidemic, which did not materially relax until the winter of the third year (B.C. 429–428). It is no wonder that under the pressure of such a calamity their military efforts were enfeebled, although the victories of Phormio had placed their maritime reputation at a higher point than ever. To their enemies, the destructive effects of this epidemic—effects still felt, although the disorder itself was suspended during the fourth year of the war—afforded material assistance as well as encouragement to persevere. The Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, again repeated during this year their invasion and ravage of Attica, which had been intermitted during the year preceding. As before, they met with no serious resistance. Entering the country about the beginning of May, they continued the process of devastation until their provisions were exhausted. To this damage the Athenians had probably now accustomed themselves: but they speedily received, even while the invaders were in their country, intelligence of an event far more embarrassing and formidable—the revolt of Mitylene and of the greater part of Lesbos.

This revolt, indeed, did not come even upon the Athenians wholly unawares. Yet the idea of it was of longer standing than they suspected, for the Mitylenæan oligarchy had projected it before the war and had made secret application to Sparta for aid, but without success. Some time after hostilities broke out, they resumed the design, which was warmly promoted by the Bœotians, kinsmen of the Lesbians in Æolic lineage and dialect. The Mitylenæan leaders appear to have finally determined on revolt during the preceding autumn or winter. But they thought it prudent to make ample preparations before they declared themselves openly; and moreover they took measures for constraining three other towns in Lesbos—Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha—to share their fortunes, to merge their own separate governments, and to become incorporated with Mitylene. Methymna, the second town in Lesbos, situated on the north of the island, was decidedly opposed to them and attached to Athens. The Mitylenæans built new ships—put their walls in an improved state of defense—carried out a mole in order to narrow the entrance of their harbor and render it capable of being closed with a chain—dispatched emissaries to hire Scythian bowmen and purchase corn in the Euxine—and took such other measures as were necessary for an effective resistance.

Though the oligarchical character of their government gave them much means of secrecy, and, above all, dispensed with the necessity of consulting the people beforehand,—still, measures of such importance could not be taken without provoking attention. Intimation was sent to the Athenians by various Mitylenæan citizens, partly from private feeling, partly in their capacity of *proxeni* (or *consuls*, to use a modern word which approaches to the meaning) for Athens—especially by a Mitylenæan named Doxander, incensed with the government for having disappointed his two sons of marriage with two orphan heiresses. Not less communicative were the islanders of Tenedos, animated by ancient neighborly jealousy toward Mitylene; so that the Athenians were thus forewarned both of the intrigues between Mitylene and the Spartans, and of her certain impending revolt unless they immediately interfered.

This news seems to have become certain about February or March 428 B.C. But such was then the dispirited condition of the Athenians—arising from two years' suffering under the epidemic, and no longer counteracted by the wholesome remonstrances of Perikles—that they could not at first bring themselves to believe what they were so much afraid to find true. Lesbos, like Chios, was their ally upon an equal footing, still remaining under those conditions which had been at first common to all the members of the confederacy of Delos. Mitylene paid no tribute to Athens: it retained its walls, its large naval force, and its extensive landed possessions on the opposite Asiatic continent: its government was oligarchical, administering all internal affairs without reference to Athens. Its obligations as an ally were, that in case of war, it was held bound to furnish armed ships, whether in determinate number or not, we do not know. It would undoubtedly be restrained from making war upon Tenedos, or any other subject-ally of Athens: and its government or its citizens would probably be held liable to answer before the Athenian dikasteries, in case of any complaint of injury from the government or citizens of Tenedos or of any other ally of Athens—these latter being themselves also accountable before the same tribunals under like complaints from Mitylene. That city was thus in practice all but independent, and so extremely powerful that the Athenians, fearful of coping with it in their actual state of depression, were loath to believe the alarming intelligence which reached them. They sent envoys with a friendly message to persuade the Mitylenæans to suspend their proceedings, and it was only when these envoys returned without success that they saw the necessity of stronger measures. Ten Mitylenæan triremes, serving as contingent in the Athenian fleet, were seized, and their crews placed under guard; while Kleippides, then on the point of starting (along with two colleagues) to conduct a fleet of forty triremes round Peloponnesus, was directed to alter his destination and to proceed forthwith to Mitylene. It was expected that he would reach that town about the time of the approaching festival

of Apollo Maloeis, celebrated in its neighborhood—on which occasion the whole Mitylenæan population was in the habit of going forth to the temple: so that the town, while thus deserted, might easily be surprised and seized by the fleet. In case this calculation should be disappointed, Kleippides was instructed to require that the Mitylenæans should surrender their ships of war and raze their fortifications, and in the event of refusal to attack them immediately.

But the publicity of debate at Athens was far too great to allow such a scheme to succeed. The Mitylenæans had their spies in the city, and the moment the resolution was taken, one of them set off to communicate it at Mitylene. Crossing over to Geræstus in Eubœa, and getting aboard a merchantman on the point of departure, he reached Mitylene with a favorable wind on the third day from Athens: so that when Kleippides arrived shortly afterward, he found the festival adjourned and the government prepared for him. The requisition which he sent in was refused, and the Mitylenæan fleet even came forth from the harbor to assail him, but was beaten back with little difficulty: upon which, the Mitylenæan leaders, finding themselves attacked before their preparations were completed, and desiring still to gain time, opened negotiations with Kleippides, and prevailed on him to suspend hostilities until ambassadors could be sent to Athens—protesting that they had no serious intention of revolting. This appears to have been about the middle of May, soon after the Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica.

Kleippides was induced, not very prudently, to admit this proposition, under the impression that his armament was not sufficient to cope with a city and island so powerful. He remained moored off the harbor at the north of Mitylene until the envoys (among whom was included one of the very citizens of Mitylene who had sent to betray the intended revolt, but who had since changed his opinion) should return from Athens. Meanwhile the Mitylenæan government, unknown to Kleippides, and well aware that the embassy would prove fruitless, took advantage of the truce to send secret envoys to Sparta imploring immediate aid. And on the arrival of the Lacedæmonian Meleas and the Theban Hermæondas (who had been dispatched to Mitylene earlier, but had only come in by stealth since the arrival of Kleippides), a second trireme was sent along with them, carrying additional envoys to reiterate the solicitation. These arrivals and dispatches were carried on without the knowledge of the Athenian admiral; chiefly in consequence of the peculiar site of the town, which had originally been placed upon a little islet divided from Lesbos by a narrow channel or euripus, and had subsequently been extended across into the main island—like Syracuse and so many other Grecian settlements. It had consequently two harbors, one north, the other south of the town: Kleippides was anchored off the former, but the latter remained unguarded.

During the absence of the Mitylenæan envoys at Athens, re-enforcements reached the Athenian admiral from Lemnos, Imbros, and some other allies, as well as from the Lesbian town of Methymna: so that when the envoys returned, as they presently did with an unfavorable reply, war was resumed with increased vigor. The Mitylenæans, having made a general sally with their full military force, gained some advantage in the battle; yet not feeling bold enough to maintain the field, they retreated back behind their walls. The news of their revolt, when first spread abroad, had created an impression unfavorable to the stability of the Athenian empire. But when it was seen that their conduct was irresolute and their achievements disproportionate to their supposed power, a reaction of feeling took place. The Chians and other allies came in with increased zeal, in obedience to the summons of Athens for re-enforcements. Kleïppides soon found his armament large enough to establish two separate camps, markets for provision, and naval stations, north and south of the town, so as to watch and block up both the harbors at once. But he commanded little beyond the area of his camp, and was unable to invest the city by land; especially as the Mitylenæans had received reenforcements from Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, the other towns of Lesbos which acted with them. They were even sufficiently strong to march against Methymna, in hopes that it would be betrayed to them by a party within. But this expectation was not realized, nor could they do more than strengthen the fortifications, and confirm the Mitylenæan supremacy, in the other three subordinate towns; in such manner that the Methymnæans, who soon afterward attacked Antissa, were repulsed with considerable loss. In this undecided condition, the island continued, until (somewhere about the month of August B.C. 428) the Athenians sent Paches to take the command, with a reenforcement of 1000 hoplites, who rowed themselves thither in triremes. The Athenians were now in force enough not only to keep the Mitylenæans within their walls, but also to surround the city with a single wall of circumvallation strengthened by separate forts in suitable positions. By the beginning of October, Mitylene was thus completely blockaded, by land as well as by sea.

Meanwhile the Mitylenæan envoys, after a troublesome voyage, had reached Sparta a little before the Olympic festival, about the middle of June. The Spartans directed them to come to Olympia at the festival, where all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy would naturally be present—and there to set forth their requests, after the festival was concluded, in presence of all.

Thucydides has given us, at some length, his version of the speech wherein this was done—a speech not a little remarkable. Pronounced, as it was, by men who had just revolted from Athens, having the strongest interest to raise indignation against her as well as sympathy for themselves—and before an audience exclusively composed of the enemies of Athens, all willing to hear, and none present to refute, the bitterest calumnies against her—we should have

expected a confident sense of righteous and well-grounded, though perilous effort, on the part of the Mitylenæans, and a plausible collection of wrongs and oppressions alleged against the common enemy. Instead of which the speech is apologetic and embarrassed. The speaker not only does not allege any extortion or severe dealing from Athens toward the Mitylenæans, but even admits the fact that they had been treated by her with marked honor; and that too, throughout a long period of peace, during which she stood less in awe of her allies generally, and would have had much more facility in realizing any harsh purposes toward them, than she could possibly enjoy now that the war had broken out, when their discontents would be likely to find powerful protectors. According to his own showing, the Mitylenæans, while they had been perfectly well treated by Athens during the past, had now acquired, by the mere fact of war, increased security for continuance of the like treatment during the future. It is upon the necessity of acquiring security for the future, nevertheless, that he rests the justification of the revolt, not pretending to have any subject of positive complaint. The Mitylenæans (he contends) could have no prospective security against Athens: for she had successively and systematically brought into slavery all her allies, except Lesbos and Chios, though all had originally been upon an equal footing: and there was every reason for fearing that she would take the first convenient opportunity of reducing the two last remaining to the same level—the rather as their position was now one of privilege and exception, offensive to her imperial pride and exaggerated ascendency. It had hitherto suited the policy of Athens to leave these two exceptions as a proof that the other allies had justly incurred their fate, since otherwise Lesbos and Chios, having equal votes, would not have joined forces in reducing them. But this policy was now no longer necessary, and the Mitylenæans, feeling themselves free only in name, were imperatively called upon by regard for their own safety to seize the earliest opportunity for emancipating themselves in reality. Nor was it merely regard for their own safety, but a farther impulse of Pan-hellenic patriotism; a desire to take rank among the opponents, and not among the auxiliaries, of Athens, in her usurpation of sovereignty over so many free Grecian states. The Mitylenæans had however been compelled to revolt with preparations only half completed, and had therefore a double claim upon the succor of Sparta—the single hope and protectress of Grecian autonomy. And Spartan aid—if now lent immediately and heartily, in a renewed attack on Attica during this same year, by sea as well as by land—could not fail to put down the common enemy, exhausted as she was by pestilence as as well as by the cost of three years' war, and occupying her whole maritime force either in the siege of Mitylene or round Peloponnesus. The orator concluded by appealing not merely to the Hellenic patriotism and sympathies of the Peloponnesians, but also to the

sacred name of the Olympic Zeus, in whose precinct the meeting was held, that his pressing entreaty might not be disregarded.

In following the speech of the orator, we see the plain confession that the Mitylenæans had no reason whatever to complain of the conduct of Athens toward themselves. She had respected alike their dignity, their public force, and their private security. This important fact helps us to explain, first, the indifference which the Mitylenæan people will be found to manifest in the revolt; next, the barbarous resolution taken by the Athenians after its suppression.

The reasons given for the revolt are mainly two. 1. The Mitylenæans had no security that Athens would not degrade them into the condition of subject-allies like the rest. 2. They did not choose to second the ambition of Athens, and to become parties to a war for the sake of maintaining an empire essentially offensive to Grecian political instincts.

In both these two reasons there is force; and both touch the sore point of the Athenian empire. That empire undoubtedly contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind—the right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs apart from external control. The Peloponnesian alliance recognized this autonomy in theory, by the general synod and equal voting of all the members at Sparta, on important occasions; though it was quite true (as Perikles urged at Athens) that in practice nothing more was enjoyed than an autonomy confined by Spartan leading-strings—and though Sparta held in permanent custody hostages for the fidelity of her Arcadian allies, summoning their military contingents without acquainting them whither they were destined to march. But Athens proclaimed herself a despot, effacing the autonomy of her allies not less in theory than in practice. Far from being disposed to cultivate in them any sense of a real common interest with herself, she did not even cheat them with those forms and fictions which so often appease discontent in the absence of realities. Doubtless the nature of her empire, at once widely extended, maritime, and unconnected (or only partially connected) with kindred of race, rendered the forms of periodical deliberation difficult to keep up; at the same time that it gave to her as naval chief an ascendency much more despotic than could have been exercised by any chief on land. It is doubtful whether she could have overcome—it is certain that she did not try to overcome—these political difficulties; so that her empire stood confessed as a despotism, opposed to the political instinct of the Greek mind; and the revolts against it, like this of Mitylene—in so far as they represented a genuine feeling and were not merely movements of an oligarchical party against their own democracy—were revolts of this offended instinct, much more than consequences of actual oppression.

The Mitylenæans might certainly affirm that they had no security against being one day reduced to the common condition of subject-allies like the rest. Yet an Athenian speaker, had he been here pres-

ent, might have made no mean reply to this portion of their reasoning. He would have urged that had Athens felt any dispositions toward such a scheme, she would have taken advantage of the Fourteen years' truce to execute it; and he would have shown that the degradation of the allies by Athens, and the change in her position from president to despot, had been far less intentional and systematic than the Mitylenæan orator affirmed.

To the Peloponnesian auditors, however, the speech of the latter proved completely satisfactory. The Lesbians were declared members of the Peloponnesian alliance, and a second attack upon Attica was decreed. The Lacedæmonians, foremost in the movement, summoned contingents from their various allies, and were early in arriving with their own at the Isthmus. They there began to prepare carriages or trucks, for dragging across the Isthmus the triremes which had fought against Phormio, from the harbor of Lechæum into the Saronic Gulf, in order to employ them against Athens. But the remaining allies did not answer to the summons, remaining at home occupied with their harvest; while the Lacedæmonians, sufficiently disappointed with this languor and disobedience, were still farther confounded by the unexpected presence of 100 Athenian triremes off the coast of the Isthmus.

The Athenians, though their own presence at the Olympic festival was forbidden by the war, had doubtless learned more or less thoroughly the proceedings which had taken place there respecting Mitylene. Perceiving the general belief entertained of their depressed and helpless condition, they determined to contradict this by a great and instant effort. They accordingly manned forthwith 100 triremes, requiring the personal service of all men, citizens as well as metics, and excepting only the two richest classes of the Solonian census, i.e., the Pentakosiomedimni, and the Hippeis or Horsemen. With this prodigious fleet they made a demonstration along the Isthmus in view of the Lacedæmonians, and landed in various parts of the Peloponnesian coast to inflict damage. At the same time thirty other Athenian triremes, dispatched some time previously to Akarnania under Asopius, son of Phormio, landed at different openings in Laconia for the same purpose. This news reached the Lacedæmonians at the Isthmus, while the other great Athenian fleet was parading before their eyes. Amazed at so unexpected a demonstration of strength, they began to feel how much they had been misled respecting the exhaustion of Athens, and how incompetent they were, especially without the presence of their allies, to undertake any joint effective movement by sea and land against Attica. They therefore returned home, resolving to send an expedition of forty triremes under Alkidas to the relief of Mitylene itself; at the same time transmitting requisitions to their various allies, in order that these triremes might be furnished.

Meanwhile Asopius with his thirty triremes had arrived in Akarnania, from whence all the ships except twelve were sent home. He had been nominated commander as the son of Phormio, who appears either to have died, or to have become unfit for service, since his victories of the preceding year. The Akarnanians had preferred a special request that a son, or at least some relative, of Phormio should be invested with the command of the squadron; so beloved was his name and character among them. Asopius, however, accomplished nothing of importance, though he again undertook conjointly with the Akarnanians a fruitless march against Œniadæ. Ultimately he was defeated and slain, in attempting a disembarkation on the territory of Leukas.

The sanguine announcement made by the Mitylenæans at Olympia, that Athens was rendered helpless by the epidemic, had indeed been strikingly contradicted by her recent display; since, taking numbers and equipment together, the maritime force which she had put forth this summer, manned as it was by a higher class of seamen, surpassed all former years; although, in point of number only, it was inferior to the 250 triremes which she had sent out during the first summer of the war. But the assertion that Athens was impoverished in finances was not so destitute of foundation: for the whole treasure in the acropolis, 6,000 talents at the commencement of the war, was now consumed, with the exception of that reserve of 1000 talents which had been solemnly set aside against the last exigences of defensive resistance. This is not surprising when we learn that every hoplite engaged for near two years and a half in the blockade of Potidæa received two drachmas per day, one for himself and a second for an attendant. There were during the whole time of the blockade 3,000 hoplites engaged there,—and for a considerable portion of the time, 4,600; besides the fleet, all the seamen of which received one drachma per day per man. Accordingly, the Athenians were now for the first time obliged to raise a direct contribution among themselves, to the amount of 200 talents, for the purpose of prosecuting the siege of Mitylene: and they at the same time dispatched Lysikles (with four colleagues) in command of twelve triremes to collect money. What relation these money-gathering ships bore to the regular tribute paid by the subject allies, or whether they were allowed to visit these latter, we do not know. In the present case, Lysikles landed at Myus, near the mouth of the Mæander, and marched up the country to levy contributions on the Karian villages in the plain of that river: but he was surprised by the Karians, perhaps aided by the active Samian exiles at Anæa in the neighborhood, and slain with a considerable number of his men.

While the Athenians thus held Mitylene under siege, their faithful friends the Platæans had remained closely blockaded by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians for more than a year, without any possibility of relief. At length provisions began to fail, and the general Eupompides, backed by the prophet Theænetus (these prophets were often

among the bravest soldiers in the army), persuaded the garrison to adopt the daring, but seemingly desperate, resolution of breaking out over the blockading wall and in spite of its guards. So desperate, indeed, did the project seem, that at the moment of execution, one-half of the garrison shrank from it as equivalent to certain death: the other half, about 212 in number, persisted and escaped. Happy would it have been for the remainder had they even perished in the attempt, and thus forestalled the more melancholy fate in store for them!

It has been already stated that the circumvallation of Platæa was accomplished by a double wall and a double ditch, one ditch without the encircling walls, another between them and the town; the two walls being sixteen feet apart, joined together, and roofed all round, so as to look like one thick wall, and to afford covered quarters for the besiegers. Both the outer and inner circumference were furnished with battlements, and after every ten battlements came a roofed tower, covering the whole breadth of the double wall—allowing a free passage inside, but none outside. In general, the entire circuit of the roofed wall was kept under watch night and day; but on wet nights the besiegers had so far relaxed their vigilance as to retire under cover of the towers, leaving the intermediate spaces unguarded: and it was upon this omission that the plan of escape was founded. The Platæans prepared ladders of a proper height to scale the blockading double wall, ascertaining its height by repeatedly counting the ranges of bricks, which were near enough for them to discern, and not effectually covered with whitewash. On a cold and dark December night, amidst rain, sleet, and a roaring wind, they marched forth from the gates, lightly armed, some few with shields and spears, but most of them with breastplates, javelins, and bows and arrows. The right foot was naked, but the left foot shod, so as to give to it a more assured footing on the muddy ground. Taking care to sally out with the wind in their faces and at such a distance from each other as to prevent any clattering of arms, they crossed the inner ditch and reached the foot of the wall without being discovered. The ladders, borne in the van, were immediately planted, and Ammeas son of Korœbus, followed by eleven others armed only with a short sword and breastplate, mounted the wall: others armed with spears followed him, their shields being carried and handed to them when on the top by comrades behind. It was the duty of this first company to master and maintain the two towers right and left, so as to keep the intermediate space free for passing over. This was successfully done, the guards in both towers being surprised and slain, without alarming the remaining besiegers. Many of the Platæans had already reached the top of the wall, when the noise of a tile accidentally knocked down by one of them betrayed what was passing. Immediately a general clamor was raised, alarm was given, and the awakened garrison rushed up from beneath to the top of the wall,

yet not knowing where the enemy was to be found, a perplexity further increased by the Platæans in the town, who took this opportunity of making a false attack on the opposite side. Amid such confusion and darkness, the blockading detachment could not tell where to direct their blows, and all remained at their posts, except a reserve of 300 men, kept constantly in readiness for special emergencies, who marched out and patrolled the outside of the ditch to intercept any fugitives from within. At the same time, fire-signals were raised to warn their allies at Thebes. But here, again, the Platæans in the town had foreseen and prepared fire-signals on their part, which they hoisted forthwith in order to deprive this telegraphic communication of all special meaning.

Meanwhile the escaping Platæans, masters of the two adjoining towers—on the top of which some of them mounted, while others held the doorway through, so as to repel with spears and darts all approach of the blockaders—prosecuted their flight without interruption over the space between, shoving down the battlements in order to make it more level and plant a greater number of ladders. In this manner they all successively got over and crossed the outer ditch. Every man, immediately after crossing, stood ready on the outer bank with bow and javelin to repel assailants and maintain safe passages for his comrades in the rear. At length, when all had descended, there remained the last and greatest difficulty—the escape of those who occupied the two towers and kept the intermediate portion of wall free: yet even this was accomplished successfully and without loss. The outer ditch was found embarrassing—so full of water from the rain as to be hardly fordable, yet with thin ice on it also, from a previous frost: for the storm, which in other respects was the main help to their escape, here retarded their passage of the ditch by an unusual accumulation of water. It was not, however, until all had crossed except the defenders of the towers—who were yet descending and scrambling through—that the Peloponnesian reserve of 300 were seen approaching the spot with torches. Their unshielded right side being turned toward the ditch, the Platæans, already across and standing on the bank, immediately assailed them with arrows and javelins—in which the torches enabled them to take tolerable aim, while the Peloponnesians on their side could not distinguish their enemies in the dark, and had no previous knowledge of their position. They were thus held in check until the rearmost Platæans had surmounted the difficulties of the passage: after which the whole body stole off as speedily as they could, taking at first the road toward Thebes, while their pursuers were seen with their torch-lights following the opposite direction, on the road which led by the heights called Dryos-Kephalæ to Athens. After having marched about three-quarters of a mile on the road to Thebes (leaving the chapel of the Hero Androkrates on their right hand), the fugitives quitted it, and striking to the eastward toward Erythræ and Hysiæ, soon found themselves in safety

among the mountains which separate Bœotia from Attica at that point, from whence they passed into the glad harbor and refuge of Athens.

Two hundred and twelve brave men thus emerged to life and liberty, breaking loose from that impending fate which too soon overtook the remainder, and preserving for future times the genuine breed and honorable traditions of Platæa. One man alone was taken prisoner at the brink of the outer ditch, while a few, who had enrolled themselves originally for the enterprise, lost courage and returned in despair even from the foot of the inner wall, telling their comrades within that the whole band had perished. Accordingly, at day-break, the Platæans within sent out a herald to solicit a truce for burial of the dead bodies, and it was only by the answer made to this request, that they learnt the actual truth. The description of this memorable outbreak exhibits not less daring in the execution than skill and foresight in the design, and is the more interesting inasmuch as the men who thus worked out their salvation were precisely the bravest men who best deserved it.

Meanwhile Paches and the Athenians kept Mitylene closely blocked up, the provisions were nearly exhausted, and the besieged were already beginning to think of capitulation, when their spirits were raised by the arrival of the Lacedæmonian envoy Salæthus, who had landed at Pyrrha on the west of Lesbos, and contrived to steal in through a ravine which obstructed the continuity of the blockading wall (about February, 427 B.C). He encouraged the Mitylenæans to hold out, assuring them that a Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas was on the point of setting out to assist them, and that Attica would be forthwith invaded by the general Peloponnesian army. His own arrival, also, and his stay in the town, was in itself no small encouragement: we shall see hereafter, when we come to the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, how much might depend upon the presence of one single Spartan. All thought of surrender was accordingly abandoned, and the Mitylenæans awaited with impatience the arrived of Alkidas, who started from Peloponnesus at the beginning of April, with forty-two triremes; while the Lacedæmonian army at the same time invaded Attica, in order to keep the attention of Athens fully employed. Their ravages on this occasion were more diligent, searching, and destructive to the country than before, and were continued the longer because they awaited the arrival of news from Lesbos. But no news reached them, their stock of provisions was exhausted, and the army was obliged to break up.

The tidings which at length arrived proved very unsatisfactory.

Salæthus and the Mitylenæans had held out until their provisions were completely exhausted, but neither relief nor encouragement reached them from Peloponnesus. At length even Salæthus became convinced that no relief would come; he projected, therefore, as a last hope, a desperate attack upon the Athenians and their wall of

blockade. For this purpose he distributed full panoplies among the mass of the people or commons, who had hitherto been without them having at best nothing more than bows or javelins.

But he had not sufficiently calculated the consequences of this important step. The Mitylenæan multitude, living under an oligarchical government, had no interest in the present contest, which had been undertaken without any appeal to their opinion. They had no reason for aversion to Athens, seeing that they suffered no practical grievance from the Athenian alliance: and (to repeat what has been remarked in the early portion of this volume) we find that even among the subject-allies (to say nothing of a privileged ally like Mitylene), the bulk of the citizens were never forward, sometimes positive reluctant, to revolt. The Mitylenæan oligarchy had revolted, in spite of the absence of practical wrongs, because they desired an uncontrolled town-autonomy as well as security for its continuance. But this was a feeling to which the people were naturally strangers, having no share in the government of their own town, and being kept dead and passive, as it was the interest of the oligarchy that they should be, in respect to political sentiment. A Grecian oligarchy might obtain from its people quiet submission under ordinary circumstances; but if ever it required energetic effort, the genuine devotion under which alone such effort could be given was found wanting. The Mitylenæan Demos, so soon as they found themselves strengthened and ennobled by the possession of heavy armor, refused obedience to the orders of Salæthus for marching out and imperiling their lives in a desperate struggle. They were under the belief—not unnatural under the secrecy of public affairs habitually practiced by an oligarchy, but which assuredly the Athenian Demos would have been too well informed to entertain—that their governors were starving them and had concealed stores of provision for themselves. Accordingly, the first use which they made of their arms was to demand that these concealed stores should be brought out and fairly apportioned to all; threatening unless their demand was complied with at once, to enter into negotiations with the Athenians and surrender the city. The ruling Mitylenæans, unable to prevent this, but foreseeing that it would be their irretrievable ruin, preferred the chance of negotiating themselves for a capitulation. It was agreed with Paches that the Athenian armament should enter into possession of Mitylene; that the fate of its people and city should be left to the Athenian assembly, and that the Mitylenæans should send envoys to Athens to plead their cause: until the return of these envoys, Paches engaged that no one should be either killed, or put in chains, or sold in slavery. Nothing was said about Salæthus, who hid himself as well as he could in the city. In spite of the guarantee received from Paches, so great was the alarm of those Mitylenæans who had chiefly instigated the revolt, that when he actually took possession of the city, they threw themselves as suppliants upon the altars for protection.

But being induced by his assurances to quit their sanctuary, they were placed in the island of Tenedos until answer should be received from Athens.

Having thus secured possession of Mitylene, Paches sent round some triremes to the other side of the island, and easily captured Antissa. But before he had time to reduce the two remaining towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, he received news which forced him to turn his attention elsewhere.

To the astonishment of every one, the Peloponnesian fleet of Alkidas was seen on the coast of Ionia. It ought to have been there much earlier, and had Alkidas been a man of energy, it would have reached Mitylene even before the surrender of the city. But the Peloponnesians, when about to advance into the Athenian waters and brave the Athenian fleet, were under the same impression of conscious weakness and timidity (especially since the victories of Phormio in the preceding year) as that which beset land-troops when marching up to attack the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed. Alkidas, though unobstructed by the Athenians, who were not aware of his departure—though pressed to hasten forward by Lesbian and Ionian exiles on board, and aided by expert pilots from those Samian exiles who had established themselves at Anæa on the Asiatic continent, and acted as zealous enemies of Athens—nevertheless, instead of sailing straight to Lesbos, lingered first near Peloponnesus, next at the island of Delos, making capture of private vessels with their crews, until at length, on reaching the islands of Ikarns and Mykonus, he heard the unwelcome tidings that the besieged town had capitulated. Not at first crediting the report, he sailed onward to Embaton, in the Erythræan territory on the coast of Asia Minor, where he found the news confirmed. As only seven days had elapsed since the capitulation had been concluded, Teutiaplus, an Eleian captain in the fleet, strenuously urged the daring project of sailing on forthwith, and surprising Mitylene by night in its existing unsettled condition: no preparation would have been made for receiving them, and there was good chance that the Athenians might be suddenly overpowered, the Mitylenæans again armed, and the town recovered.

Such a proposition, which was indeed something more than daring, did not suit the temper of Alkidas. Nor could he be induced by the solicitation of the exiles to fix and fortify himself either in any port of Ionia, or in the Æolic town of Kyme, so as to afford support and countenance to such subjects of the Athenian empire as were disposed to revolt; though he was confidently assured that many of them would revolt on his proclamation, and that the satrap Pissuthnes of Sardis would help him to defray the expense. Having been sent for the express purpose of relieving Mitylene, Alkidas believed himself interdicted from any other project. He determined to return to Peloponnesus at once, dreading nothing so much as the pursuit of Paches and the Athenian fleet. From Embaton accordingly he started on

his return, coasting southward along Asia Minor as far as Ephesus. But the prisoners taken in his voyage were now an incumbrance to his flight; and their number was not inconsiderable, since all the merchant-vessels in his route had approached the fleet without suspicion, believing it to be Athenian: a Peloponnesian fleet near the coast of Ionia was as yet something unheard of and incredible. To get rid of his prisoners, Alkidas stopped at Myonnesus near Teos, and there put to death the greater number of them—a barbarous proceeding which excited lively indignation among the neighboring Ionic cities to which they belonged; insomuch that when he reached Ephesus, the Samian exiles dwelling at Anæa, who had come forward so actively to help him, sent him a spirited remonstrance, reminding him that the slaughter of men neither engaged in war, nor enemies, nor even connected with Athens except by constraint, was disgraceful to one who came forth as the liberator of Greece—and that if he persisted, he would convert his friends into enemies, not his enemies into friends. So keenly did Alkidas feel this animadversion, that he at once liberated the remainder of his prisoners, several of them Chians, and then departed from Ephesus, taking his course across sea toward Krete and Peloponnesus. After much delay off the coast of Krete from stormy weather, which harassed and dispersed his fleet, he at length reached in safety the harbor of Kyllene in Elis, where his scattered ships were ultimately reunited.

Thus inglorious was the voyage of the first Peloponnesian admiral who dared to enter that *Mare clausum* which passed for a portion of the territory of Athens. But though he achieved little, his mere presence excited everywhere not less dismay than astonishment: for the Ionic towns were all unfortified, and Alkidas might take and sack any one of them by sudden assault, even though unable to hold it permanently. Pressing messages reached Paches from Erythræ and from several other places, while the Athenian triremes called Paralus and Salaminia (the privileged vessels which usually carried public and sacred deputations) had themselves seen the Peloponnesian fleet anchored at Ikarus, and brought him the same intelligence. Paches, having his hands now free by the capture of Mitylene, set forth immediately in pursuit of the intruder, whom he chased as far as the island of Patmos. It was there ascertained that Alkidas had finally disappeared from the eastern waters, and the Athenian admiral, though he would have rejoiced to meet the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, accounted it fortunate that they had not taken up a position in some Asiatic harbor—in which case it would have been necessary for him to undertake a troublesome and tedious blockade, besides all the chances of revolt among the Athenian dependencies. We shall see how much, in this respect, depended upon the personal character of the Lacedæmonian commander, when we come hereafter to the expedition of Brasidas.

On his return from Patmos to Mitylene Paches was induced to

stop at Notium by the solicitations of some exiles. Notium was the port of Kolophon, from which it was at some little distance, as Peiræus was from Athens.

About three years before, a violent internal dissension had taken place in Kolophon, and one of the parties, invoking the aid of the Persian Itamanes (seemingly one of the generals of the satrap Pissuthnes), had placed him in possession of the town; whereupon the opposite party, forced to retire, had established itself separately and independently at Notium. But the Kolophonians who remained in the town soon contrived to procure a party in Notium, whereby they were enabled to regain possession of it, through the aid of a body of Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Pissuthnes. These Arcadians formed a standing garrison at Notium, in which they occupied a separate citadel or fortified space, while the town became again attached as harbor to Kolophon. A considerable body of exiles, however, expelled on that occasion, now invoked the aid of Paches to reinstate them, and to expel the Arcadians. On reaching the place the Athenian general prevailed upon Hippias, the Arcadian captain, to come forth to a parley, under the promise that if nothing mutually satisfactory could be settled, he would again replace him "safe and sound" in the fortification. But no sooner had the Arcadian come forth to this parley than Paches, causing him to be detained under guard but without fetters or ill-usage, immediately attacked the fortification while the garrison were relying on the armistice, carried it by storm, and put to death both the Arcadians and the Persians who were found within. Having got possession of the fortification, he next brought Hippias again into it—"safe and sound," according to the terms of the convention, which was thus literally performed—and then immediately afterwards caused him to be shot with arrows and javelins. Of this species of fraud, founded on literal performance and real violation of an agreement, there are various examples in Grecian history; but nowhere do we read of a more flagitious combination of deceit and cruelty than the behavior of the Paches at Notium. How it was noticed at Athens we do not know: yet we remark, not without surprise, that Thucydides recounts it plainly and calmly, without a single word of comment.

Notium was now separated from Kolophon and placed in possession of those Kolophonians who were opposed to the Persian supremacy in the upper town. But as it had been, down to this time, a mere appendage of Kolophon and not a separate town, the Athenians soon afterwards sent Œkists and performed for it the ceremonies of colonization according to their own laws and customs, inviting from every quarter the remaining exiles of Kolophon. Whether any new settlers went from Athens itself, does not appear. But the step was intended to confer a sort of Hellenic citizenship and recognized collective personality on the new-born town of Notium; without which neither its theory or solemn deputation would have been admitted to

offer public sacrifice, nor its private citizens to contend for the prize at Olympic and other great festivals.

Having cleared the Asiatic waters from the enemies of Athens, Paches returned to Lesbos, reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, and soon found himself so completely master both of Mitylene and the whole island as to be able to send home the larger part of his force; carrying with them as prisoners those Mitylenæans who had been deposited in Tenedos, as well as others prominently implicated in the late revolt, to the number altogether of rather more than a thousand. The Lacedæmonian Salæthus, being recently detected in his place of concealment, was included among the prisoners transmitted.

Upon the fate of these prisoners the Athenians had now to pronounce. They entered upon the discussion in a temper of extreme wrath and vengeance. As to Salæthus, their resolution to put him to death was unanimous and immediate. They turned a deaf ear to his promises, assuredly delusive, of terminating the blockade of Platæa in case his life was spared. What to do with Mitylene and its inhabitants was a point more doubtful, and was submitted to formal debate in the public assembly.

It is in this debate that Thucydides first takes notice of Kleon, who is, however, mentioned by Plutarch as rising into importance some few years earlier, during the lifetime of Perikles. Under the great increase of trade and population in Athens and Peiræus during the last forty years, a new class of politicians seems to have grown up; men engaged in various descriptions of trade and manufacture, who began to rival more or less in importance the ancient families of Attic proprietors. This change was substantially analogous to that which took place in the cities of Mediæval Europe, when the merchants and traders of the various guilds gradually came to compete with, and ultimately supplanted, the patrician families in whom the supremacy had originally resided. In Athens, persons of ancient family and station enjoyed at this time no political privilege—since through the reforms of Ephialtes and Perikles, the political constitution had become thoroughly democratical. But they still continued to form the two highest classes in the Solonian census founded on property—the Pentakosiomedimni, and the Hippeis or Knights. New men enriched by trade doubtless got into these classes, but probably only in minority, and imbibed the feeling of the class as they found it, instead of bringing into it any new spirit. Now an individual Athenian of this class, though without any legal title to preference, yet when he stood forward as candidate for political influence, continued to be decidedly preferred and welcomed by the social sentiment at Athens, which preserved in its spontaneous sympathies distinctions effaced from the political code. Besides this place ready prepared for him in the public sympathy, especially advantageous at the outset of political life—he found himself farther borne up by the family connec-

tions, associations, and political clubs, etc., which exercised very great influence both on the politics and the judicature of Athens, and of which he became a member as a matter of course. Such advantages were doubtless only auxiliary, carrying a man up to a certain point of influence, but leaving him to achieve the rest by his own personal qualities and capacity. But their effect was nevertheless very real, and those who, without possessing them, met and buffeted him in the public assembly, contended against great disadvantages. A person of such low or middling station obtained no favorable presumptions or indulgence on the part of the public to meet him halfway; nor did he possess established connections to encourage first successes, or help him out of early scrapes. He found others already in possession of ascendency, and well-disposed to keep down new competitors; so that he had to win his own way unaided, from the first step to the last, by qualities personal to himself; by assiduity of attendance—by acquaintance with business—by powers of striking speech—and withal by unflinching audacity, indispensable to enable him to bear up against that opposition and enmity which he would incur from the high-born politicians and organized party-clubs, as soon as he appeared to be rising into importance.

The free march of political and judicial affairs raised up several such men, during the years beginning and immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. Even during the lifetime of Perikles, they appear to have risen in greater or less numbers. But the personal ascendency of that great man—who combined an aristocratical position with a strong and genuine democratical sentiment, and an enlarged intellect rarely found attached to either—impressed a peculiar character on Athenian politics. The Athenian world was divided into his partisans and his opponents, among each of whom there were individuals high-born and low-born—though the aristocratical party properly so called, the majority of wealthy and high-born Athenians, either opposed or disliked him. It is about two years after his death that we begin to hear of a new class of politicians—Eukrates, the rope-seller—Kleon, the leather-seller—Lysikles, the sheep-seller—Hyberbolus, the lamp-maker; the two first, of whom must, however, have been already well known as speakers in the Ekklesia even during the lifetime of Perikles. Among them all, the most distinguished was Kleon, son of Kleænetus.

Kleon acquired his first importance among the speakers against Perikles, so that he would thus obtain for himself, during his early political career, the countenance of the numerous and aristocratical anti-Perikleans. He is described by Thucydides in general terms as a person of the most violent temper and character in Athens—as being dishonest in his calumnies, and virulent in his invective and accusation. Aristophanes, in his comedy of the Knights, reproduces these features with others new and distinct, as well as with exaggerated details, comic, satirical, and contemptuous. His comedy depicts

Kleon in the point of view in which he would appear to the knights of Athens—a leather-dresser, smelling of the tan-yard—a low-born brawler, terrifying opponents by the violence of his criminations, the loudness of his voice, the impudence of his gestures—moreover as venal in his politics—threatening men with accusations and then receiving money to withdraw them—a robber of the public treasury—persecuting merit as well as rank—and courting the favor of the assembly by the basest and most guilty cajolery. The general attributes set forth by Thucydides (apart from Aristophanes, who does not profess to write history), we may reasonably accept—the powerful and violent invective of Kleon, often dishonest—together with his self-confidence and audacity in the public assembly Men of the middling class, like Kleon and Hyperbolus, who persevered in addressing the public assembly and trying to take a leading part in it, against persons of greater family pretension than themselves, were pretty sure to be men of more than usual audacity. Without this quality, they would never have surmounted the opposition made to them. It is probable enough that they had it to a displeasing excess—and even if they had not, the same measure of self-assumption which in Alkibiades would be tolerated from his rank and station, would in them pass for insupportable impudence. Unhappily we have no specimens to enable us to appreciate the invective of Kleon. We cannot determine whether it was more virulent than that of Demosthenes and Æschines, seventy years afterward; each of those eminent orators imputing to the other the grossest impudence, calumny, perjury, corruption, loud voice, and revolting audacity of manner in language which Kleon can hardly have surpassed in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably short of it in classical finish. Nor can we even tell in what degree Kleon's denunciations of the veteran Perikles were fiercer than those memorable invectives against the old age of Sir Robert Walpole, with which Lord Chatham's political career opened. The talent for invective possessed by Kleon, employed first against Perikles, would be counted as great impudence by the partisans of that illustrious statesman, as well as by impartial and judicious citizens. But among the numerous enemies of Perikles, it would be applauded as a burst of patriotic indignation, and would procure for the orator that extraneous support at first, which would sustain him until he acquired his personal hold on the public assembly.

By what degrees or through what causes that hold was gradually increased, we do not know. At the time when the question of Mitylene came on for discussion, it had grown into a sort of ascendency which Thucydides describes by saying that Kleon was "at that time by far the most persuasive speaker in the eyes of the people." The fact of Kleon's great power of speech and his capacity of handling public business in a popular manner, is better attested than anything else respecting him, because it depends upon two witnesses both hos

tile to him—Thucydides and Aristophanes. The assembly and the dikastery were Kleon's theater and holding-ground: for the Athenian people taken collectively in their place of meeting—and the Athenian people taken individually—were not always the same person and had not the same mode of judgment: Demos sitting in the Pnyx was a different man from Demos sitting at home. The lofty combination of qualities possessed by Perikles exercised influence over both one and the other, but Kleon swayed considerably the former, without standing high in the esteem of the latter.

When the fate of Mitylene and its inhabitants was submitted to the Athenian assembly, Kleon took the lead in the discussion. There never was a theme more perfectly suited to his violent temperament and power of fierce invective. Taken collectively, the case of Mitylene presented a revolt as inexcusable and aggravated as any revolt could be. Indeed we have only to read the grounds of it, as set forth by the Mitylenæan speakers themselves before the Peloponnesians at Olympia, to be satisfied that such a proceeding, when looked at from the Athenian point of view, would be supposed to justify, and even to require, the very highest pitch of indignation. The Mitylenæans admit not only that they have no ground of complaint against Athens, but that they have been well and honorably treated by her, with special privilege. But they fear that she may oppress them in future: they hate the very principle of her empire, and eagerly instigate, as well as aid, her enemies to subdue her: they select the precise moment in which she has been worn down by a fearful pestilence, invasion, and cost of war. Nothing more than this would be required to kindle the most intense wrath in the bosom of an Athenian patriot. But there was yet another point which weighed as much as the rest, if not more. The revolters had been the first to invite a Peloponnesian fleet across the Ægean, and the first to proclaim, both to Athens and her allies, the precarious tenure of her empire. The violent Kleon would on this occasion find in the assembly an audience hardly less violent than himself, and would easily be able to satisfy them that anything like mercy to the Mitylenæans was treason to Athens. He proposed to apply to the captive city the penalties tolerated by the custom of war, in their harshest and fullest measure: to kill the whole Mitylenæan male population of military age, probably about 6,000 persons—and to sell as slaves all the women and children. The proposition, though strongly opposed by Diodotus and others, was sanctioned and passed by the assembly, and a trireme was forthwith dispatched to Mitylene, enjoining Paches to put it in execution.

Such a sentence was, in principle, nothing more than a very rigorous application of received laws of war. Not merely the reconquered rebel, but even the prisoner of war (apart from any special convention) was at the mercy of his conqueror to be slain, sold, or admitted to ransom. We shall find the Lacedæmonians carrying out the

maxim without the smallest abatement toward the Platæan prisoners in the course of a very short time. And doubtless the Athenian people—so long as they remained in assembly, under that absorbing temporary intensification of the common and predominant sentiment which springs from the mere fact of multitude—and so long as they were discussing the principle of the case,—What had Mitylene deserved?—thought only of this view. Less than the most rigorous measure of war (they would conceive) would be inadequate to the wrong done by the Mitylenæans.

But when the assembly broke up—when the citizen, no longer wound up by sympathizing companions and animated speakers in the Pnyx, subsided into the comparative quiescence of individual life—when the talk came to be, not about the propriety of passing such a resolution, but about the details of executing it—a sensible change, and marked repentance became presently visible. We must also recollect—and it is a principle of no small moment in human affairs, especially among a democratical people like the Athenians, who stand charged with so many resolutions passed and afterward unexecuted—that the sentiment of wrath against the Mitylenæans had been really in part discharged by the mere *passing* of the sentence, quite apart from its execution; just as a furious man relieves himself from overboiling anger by imprecations against others, which he would himself shrink from afterward realizing. The Athenians, on the whole the most humane people in Greece (though humanity, according to our ideas, cannot be predicated of any Greeks), became sensible that they had sanctioned a cruel and frightful decree. Even the captain and seamen to whom it was given to carry, set forth on their voyage with mournful repugnance. The Mitylenæan envoys present in Athens (who had probably been allowed to speak in the assembly and plead their own cause), together with those Athenians who had been proxeni and friends of Mitylene; and the minority generally of the previous assembly—soon discerned, and did their best to foster, this repentance; which became during the course of the same evening so powerful as well as so wide-spread, that the Strategi acceded to the prayer of the envoys, and convoked a fresh assembly for the morrow to reconsider the proceeding. By so doing, they committed an illegality, and exposed themselves to the chance of impeachment. But the change of feeling among the people was so manifest as to overbear any such scruples.

Though Thucydides has given us only a short summary without any speeches, of what passed in the first assembly—yet as to this second assembly, he gives us at length the speeches both of Kleon and Diodotus—the two principal orators of the first also. We may be sure that this second assembly was in all points one of the most interesting and anxious of the whole war; and though we cannot certainly determine what were the circumstances which determined Thucydides in his selection of speeches, yet this cause, as well as the

signal defeat of Kleon, whom he disliked, may probably be presumed to have influenced him here.

That orator coming forward to defend his prosposition passed on the preceding day, denounced in terms of indignation the unwise tenderness and scruples of the people, who could not bear to treat their subject-allies, according to the plain reality, as men held only by naked fear. He dwelt upon the mischief and folly of reversing on one day what had been decided on the day preceding; also upon the guilty ambition of orators, who sacrificed the most valuable interests of the commonwealth, either to pecuniary gains, or to the personal credit of speaking with effect, triumphing over rivals, and setting up their own fancies in place of fact and reality. He deprecated the mistaken encouragement given to such delusions by a public "wise beyond what was written," who came to the assembly, not to apply their good sense in judging of public matters, but merely for the delight of hearing speeches. He restated the heinous and unprovoked wrong committed by the Mitylenæans—and the grounds for inflicting upon them that maximum of punishment which "justice" enjoined. He called for "justice" against them, nothing less, but nothing more; warning the assembly that the imperial necessities of Athens essentially required the constant maintenance of a sentiment of fear in the minds of unwilling subjects, and that they must prepare to see their empire pass away if they suffered themselves to be guided either by compassion for those who, if victors, would have no compassion on them—or by unseasonable moderation toward those who would neither feel nor requite it—or by the mere impression of seductive discourses. Justice against the Mitylenæans, not less than the strong political interests of Athens, required the infliction of the sentence decreed on the day preceding.

The harangue of Kleon is in many respects remarkable. If we are surprised to find a man, whose whole importance resided in his tongue, denouncing so severely the license and the undue influence of speech in the public assembly, we must recollect that Kleon had the advantage of addressing himself to the intense prevalent sentiment of the moment: that he could therefore pass off the dictates of this sentiment as plain, downright, honest sense and patriotism—while the opponents, speaking against the reigning sentiment and therefore driven to collateral argument, circumlocution, and more or less of maneuver, might be represented as mere clever sophists, showing their talents in making the worse appear the better reason—if not actually bribed, at least unprincipled and without any sincere moral conviction. As this is a mode of dealing with questions, both of public concern and of private morality, not less common at present than it was in the time of the Peloponnesian war—to seize upon some strong and tolerably wide-spread sentiment among the public, to treat the dictates of that sentiment as plain common sense and obvious right, and then to shut out all rational estimate of

coming good and evil as if it were unholy or immoral, or at best mere uncandid subtlety—we may well notice a case in which Kleon employs it to support a proposition now justly regarded as barbarous.

Applying our modern views to this proposition, indeed, the prevalent sentiment would not only not be in favor of Kleon, but would be irresistibly in favor of his opponents. To put to death in cold blood some 6,000 persons, would so revolt modern feelings, as to overbalance all considerations of past misconduct in the persons to be condemned. Nevertheless the speech of Diodotus, who followed and opposed Kleon, not only contains no appeal to any such merciful predispositions, but even positively disclaims appealing to them: the orator deprecates, not less than Kleon, the influence of compassionate sentiment, or of a spirit of mere compromise and moderation. He further discards considerations of justice or the analogies of criminal judicature—and rests his opposition altogether upon reasons of public prudence, bearing upon the future welfare and security of Athens.

He begins by vindicating the necessity of reconsidering the resolution just passed, and insists on the mischief of deciding so important a question in haste or under strong passion. He enters a protest against the unwarrantable insinuations of corruption or self-conceit by which Kleon had sought to silence or discredit his opponents; and then, taking up the question on the ground of public wisdom and prudence, he proceeds to show that the rigorous sentence decreed on the preceding day was not to be defended. That sentence would not prevent any other among the subject-allies from revolting, if they saw, or fancied that they saw, a fair chance of success: but it might perhaps drive them, if once embarked in revolt, to persist even to desperation, and bury themselves under the ruins of their city. While every means ought to be employed to prevent them from revolting, by precautions beforehand, it was a mistaken reckoning to try to deter them by enormity of punishment, inflicted afterward upon such as were reconquered. In developing this argument, the speaker gives some remarkable views on the theory of punishment generally, and on the small addition obtained in the way of preventive effect, even by the greatest aggravation of the suffering inflicted upon the condemned criminal—views which might have passed as rare and profound even down to the last century. And he further supports his argument by emphatically setting forth the impolicy of confounding the Mitylenæan Demos in the same punishment with their oligarchy: the revolt had been the act exclusively of the latter, and the former had not only taken no part in it, but as soon as they obtained possession of arms, had surrendered the city spontaneously. In all the allied cities, it was the commons who were well-affected to Athens, and upon whom her hold chiefly depended against the doubtful fidelity of the oligarchies: but this feeling could not possibly continue, if it were now seen that all the Mitylenæans indiscrim-

inately were confounded in one common destruction. Diodotus concludes by recommending that those Mitylenæans whom Paches had sent to Athens as chiefs of the revolt should be put upon their trial separately, but that the remaining population should be spared.

This speech is that of a man who feels that he has the reigning and avowed sentiment of the audience against him, and that he must therefore win his way by appeals to their reason. The same appeals however might have been made, and perhaps had been made, during the preceding discussion, without success. But Diodotus knew that the reigning sentiment, though still ostensibly predominant, had been silently undermined during the last few hours, and that the reaction toward pity and moderation, which had been growing up under it, would work in favor of his arguments, though he might disclaim all intention of invoking its aid. After several other discourses, both for and against, the assembly came to a vote, and the proposition of Diodotus was adopted; but adopted by so small a majority, that the decision seemed at first doubtful.

The trireme carrying the first vote had started the day before, and was already twenty-four hours on its way to Mitylene. A second trireme was immediately put to sea bearing the new decree; yet nothing short of superhuman exertions could enable it to reach the condemned city before the terrific sentence now on its way might be actually in course of execution. The Mitylenæan envoys stored the vessel well with provisions, promising large rewards to the crew if they arrived in time. An intensity of effort was manifested, without parallel in the history of Athenian seamanship. The oar was never once relaxed between Athens and Mitylene—the rowers merely taking turns for short intervals of rest, with refreshment, of barley-meal steeped in wine and oil, swallowed on their seats. Luckily there was no unfavorable wind to retard them: but the object would have been defeated if it had not happened that the crew of the first trireme were as slow and averse in the transmission of their rigorous mandate as those of the second were eager for the delivery of the reprieve in time. And after all, it came only just in time. The first trireme had arrived, the order for execution was actually in the hands of Paches, and his measures were already preparing. So near was the Mitylenæan population to this wholesale destruction: so near was Athens to the actual perpetration of an enormity which would have raised against her throughout Greece a sentiment of exasperation more deadly than that which she afterward incurred even from the proceedings at Melos, Skione, and elsewhere. Had the execution been realized, the person who would have suffered most by it, and most deservedly, would have been the proposer Kleon. For if the reaction in Athenian sentiment was so immediate and sensible after the mere passing of the sentence, far more violent would it have been when they learnt that the deed had been irrevocably done, and when all its painful details were presented to their imaginations: and Kleon

would have been held responsible as the author of that which had so disgraced them in their own eyes. As the case turned out, he was fortunate enough to escape this danger; and his proposition, to put to death those Mitylenæans whom Paches had sent home as the active revolting party, was afterward adopted and executed. It doubtless appeared so moderate, after the previous decree passed but rescinded, as to be adopted with little resistance, and to provoke no after-repentance: yet the men so slain were rather more than 1000 in number.

Besides this sentence of execution, the Athenians razed the fortifications of Mitylene, and took possession of all her ships of war. In lieu of tribute, they further established a new permanent distribution of the land of the island; all except Methymna, which had remained faithful to them. They distributed it into 3,000 lots, of which 300 were reserved for consecration to the gods, and the remainder assigned to Athenian kleruchs, or proprietary settlers, chosen by lot among the citizens; the Lesbian proprietors still remaining on the land as cultivating tenants, and paying to the Athenian kleruch an annual rent of two minæ (about seven pounds sixteen shillings sterling) for each lot. We should have been glad to learn more about this new land-settlement than the few words of the historian suffice to explain. It would seem that 2,700 Athenian citizens with their families must have gone to reside, for the time at least, in Lesbos—as kleruchs: that is, without abnegating their rights as Athenian citizens, and without being exonerated either from Athenian taxation or from personal military service. But it seems certain that these men did not continue long to reside in Lesbos. We may even suspect that the kleruchic allotment of the island must have been subsequently abrogated. There was a strip on the opposite mainland of Asia, which had hitherto belonged to Mitylene; this was now separated from that town, and henceforward enrolled among the tributary subjects of Athens.

To the misfortunes of Mitylene belongs, as a suitable appendix, the fate of Paches, the Athenian commander, whose perfidy at Notium has been recently recounted. It appears that, having contracted a passion for two beautiful free women at Mitylene, Hellanis and Lamaxis, he slew their husbands, and got possession of them by force. Possibly they may have had private friends at Athens, which must, of course, have been the case with many Mitylenæan families. At all events they repaired thither, bent on obtaining redress for this outrage, and brought their complaint against Paches before the Athenian dikastery, in that trial of accountability to which every officer was liable at the close of his command. So profound was the sentiment which their case excited, in this open and numerous assembly of Athenian citizens, that the guilty commander, not waiting for sentence, slew himself with his sword in open court.

The surrender of Platæa to the Lacedæmonians took place not

long after that of Mitylene to the Athenians—somewhat later in the same summer. Though the escape of one-half of the garrison had made the provisions last longer for the rest, still their whole stock had now come to be exhausted, so that the remaining defenders were enfeebled, and on the point of perishing by starvation. The Lacedæmonian commander of the blockading force, knowing their defenseless condition, could easily have taken the town by storm, had he not been forbidden by express orders from Sparta. For the Spartan government, calculating that peace might one day be concluded with Athens on terms of mutual cession of places acquired by war, wished to acquire Platæa, not by force, but by capitulation and voluntary surrender, which would serve as an excuse for not giving it up: though such a distinction, between capture by force and by capitulation, not admissible in modern diplomacy, was afterward found to tell against the Lacedæmonians quite as much as in their favor. Acting upon these orders, the Lacedæmonian commander sent in a herald, summoning the Platæans to surrender voluntarily, and submit themselves to the Lacedæmonians as judges—with a stipulation "that the wrong-doers should be punished, but that none should be punished unjustly." To the besieged, in their state of hopeless starvation, all terms were nearly alike, and they accordingly surrendered the city. After a few days' interval, during which they received nourishment from the blockading army, five persons arrived from Sparta to sit in judgment upon their fate—one Aristomenidas, a Herakleid of the regal family.

The five Spartans having taken their seat as judges, doubtless in full presence of the blockading army, and especially with the Thebans, the great enemies of Platæa, by their side—the prisoners taken, 200 Platæans and twenty-five Athenians, were brought up for trial or sentence. No accusation was preferred against them by any one: but the simple question was put to them by the judges—"Have you, during the present war, rendered any service to the Lacedæmonians, or to their allies?" The Platæans were confounded at a question alike unexpected and preposterous. It admitted but of one answer—but before returning any categorical answer at all, they entreated permission to plead their cause at length. In spite of the opposition of the Thebans, their request was granted. Astymachus and Lakon (the latter, proxenus of Sparta at Platæa) were appointed to speak on behalf of the body. Possibly both these delegates may have spoken: if so, Thucydides has blended the two speeches into one.

A more desperate position cannot be imagined. The interrogatory was expressly so framed as to exclude allusion to any facts preceding the Peloponnesian war. But the speakers, though fully conscious how slight was their chance of success, disregarded the limits of the question itself, and while upholding with unshaken courage the dignity of their little city, neglected no topic which could touch the sympathies of their judges. After remonstrating against the mere

mockery of trial and judgment to which they were submitted, they appealed to the Hellenic sympathies, and lofty reputation for commanding virtue, of the Lacedæmonians. They adverted to the first alliance of Platæa with Athens, concluded at the recommendation of the Lacedæmonians themselves, who had then declined, though formally solicited, to undertake the protection of the town against Theban oppression. They next turned to the Persian war, wherein Platæan patriotism toward Greece was not less conspicuous than Theban treason—to the victory gained over the Persians on their soil, whereby it had become hallowed under the promises of Pausanias, and by solemn appeals to the local gods. From the Persian war they passed on to the flagitious attack made by the Thebans on Platæa, in the midst of the truce. They did not omit to remind the judges of an obligation personal to Sparta—the aid which they had rendered, along with the Athenians, to Sparta, when pressed by the revolt of the Helots at Ithome. This speech is as touching as any which we find in Thucydides; the skill of it consisting in the frequency with which the hearers are brought back, time after time, and by well-managed transitions, to these same topics. And such was the impression which it seemed to make on the five Lacedæmonian judges, that the Thebans near at hand found themselves under the necessity of making a reply to it: although we see plainly that the whole scheme of proceeding—the formal and insulting question, as well as the sentence destined to follow upon answer given—had been settled beforehand between them and the Lacedæmonians.

The Theban speakers contended that the Platæans had deserved, and brought upon themselves by their own fault, the enmity of Thebes—that they had stood forward earnestly against the Persians, only because Athens had done so too—and that the merit, whatever it might be, which they had thereby acquired, was counterbalanced and canceled by their having allied themselves with Athens afterward for the oppression and enslavement of the Æginetans, and of other Greeks equally conspicuous for zeal against Xerxes, and equally entitled to protection under the promises of Pausanias. The Thebans went on to vindicate their nocturnal surprise of Platæa, by maintaining that they had been invited by the most respectable citizens of the town, who were anxious only to bring back Platæa from its alliance with a stranger to its natural Bœotian home—and that they had abstained from anything like injurious treatment of the inhabitants, until constrained to use force in their own defense. They then reproached the Platæans, in their turn, with that breach of faith whereby, ultimately, the Theban prisoners in the town had been put to death. And while they excused their alliance with Xerxes, at the time of the Persian invasion, by affirming that Thebes was then under a dishonest party-oligarchy, who took this side for their own factious purposes, and carried the people with them by force—they at the same time charged the Platæans with permanent treason

against the Bœotian customs and brotherhood. All this was farther enforced by setting forth the claims of Thebes to the gratitude of Lacedæmon, both for having brought Bœotia into the Lacedæmonian alliance at the time of the battle of Koroneia, and having furnished so large a portion of the common force in the war then going on.

The discourse of the Thebans, inspired by bitter, and, as yet, unsatisfied hatred against Platæa, proved effectual: or, rather, it was superfluous—the minds of the Lacedæmonians having before been made up. After the proposition, twice made by Archidamus to the Platæans, inviting them to remain neutral, and even offering to guarantee their neutrality—after the solemn apologetic protest tendered by him, upon their refusal, to the gods, before he began the siege—the Lacedæmonians conceived themselves exonerated from all obligation to respect the sanctity of the place; looking upon the inhabitants as having voluntarily renounced their inviolability, and sealed their own ruin. Hence the importance attached to that protest, and the emphatic detail with which it is set forth in Thucydides. The five judges, as their only reply to the two harangues, again called the Platæans before them, and repeated to every one of them, individually, the same question which had before been put. Each of them, as he successively replied in the negative, was taken away and killed, together with the twenty-five Athenian prisoners. The women captured were sold as slaves: and the town and territory of Platæa were handed over to the Thebans, who at first established in them a few oligarchical Platæan exiles, together with some Megarian exiles—but after a few months, recalled this step, and blotted out Platæa, as a separate town and territory, from the muster-roll of Hellas. Having pulled down all the private buildings, they employed the materials to build a vast barrack all round the Heræum, or temple of Here, 200 feet in every direction, with apartments of two stories above and below; partly as accommodation for visitors to the temple, partly as an abode for the tenant-farmers, or graziers who were to occupy the land. A new temple, of 100 feet in length, was also built in honor of Here, and ornamented with couches prepared from the brass and iron furniture found in the private houses of the Platæans. The Platæan territory was let out for ten years, as public property belonging to Thebes, and was hired by private Theban cultivators.

Such was the melancholy fate of Platæa, after sustaining a blockade of about two years. Its identity and local traditions were extinguished, and the sacrifices, in honor of the deceased victors who had fought under Pausanias, suspended—which the Platæan speakers had urged upon the Lacedæmonians as an impiety not to be tolerated, and which, perhaps, the latter would hardly have consented to under any other circumstances, except from an anxious desire of conciliating the Thebans in their prominent antipathy. It is in this way that Thucydides explains the conduct of Sparta, which he pronounces to have been rigorous in the extreme. And in truth it was more rigorous, considering only the principle of the case, and apart from the number of victims, than even the first unexecuted sentence of Athens against the Mitylenæans. For neither Sparta, nor even Thebes, had any fair pretense for considering Platæa as a revolted town, whereas Mitylene was a city which had revolted under circumstances peculiarly offensive to Athens. Moreover, Sparta promised trial and justice to the Platæans on their surrender: Paches promised nothing to the Mitylenæans except that their fate should be reserved for the decision o the Athenian people. This little city—interesting from its Helleni patriotism, its grateful and tenacious attachments, and its unmerite suffering—now existed only in the persons of its citizens harbored a Athens. We shall find it hereafter restored, destroyed again, and finally again restored: so checkered was the fate of a little Grecian state swept away by the contending politics of greater neighbors. The slaughter of the twenty-five Athenian prisoners, like that of Salæthus by the Athenians, was not beyond the rigor admitted and tolerated, though not always practiced on both sides—toward prisoners of war.

We have now gone through the circumstances, painfully illustrating the manners of the age, which followed on the surrender of Mitylene and Platæa. We next pass to the west of Greece—the island of Korkyra—where we shall find scenes not less bloody, and even more revolting.

It has been already mentioned that in the naval combats between the Corinthians and Korkyræans during the year before the Peloponnesian war, the former had captured 250 Korkyræan prisoners, men of the first rank and consequence in the island. Instead of following the impulse of blind hatred in slaughtering their prisoners, the Corinthians displayed, if not greater humanity, at least a more long-sighted calculation. They had treated the prisoners well, and made every effort to gain them over, with a view of employing them on the first opportunity to effect a revolution in the island—to bring it into alliance with Corinth, and disconnect it from Athens. Such an opportunity appears first to have occurred during the winter or spring of the present year, while both Mitylene and Platæa were under blockade; probably about the time when Alkidas departed for Ionia, and when it was hoped that not only Mitylene would be relieved, but the neighboring dependencies of Athens excited to revolt, and her whole attention thus occupied in that quarter. Accordingly, the Korkyræan prisoners were then sent home from Corinth, nominally under a heavy ransom of 800 talents, for which those Korkyræan citizens who acted as proxeni to Corinth made themselves responsible. The proxeni, lending themselves thus to the deception, were doubtless participant in the entire design.

But it was soon seen in what form the ransom was really to be paid. The new-comers, probably at first heartily welcomed after so

long a detention, employed all their influence, combined with the most active personal canvass, to bring about a complete rupture of alliance with Athens. Intimation being sent to Athens of what was going on, an Athenian trireme arrived with envoys to try and defeat these maneuvers; while a Corinthian trireme also brought envoys from Corinth to aid the views of the opposite party. The mere presence of Corinthian envoys indicated a change in the political feeling of the island. But still more conspicuous did this change become when a formal public assembly, after hearing both envoys, decided that Korkyra would maintain her alliance with Athens according to the limited terms of simple mutual defense originally stipulated; but would at the same time be in relations of friendship with the Peloponnesians, as she had been before the Epidamnian quarrel. Since that event, however, the alliance between Athens and Korkyra had become practically more intimate, and the Korkyræan fleet had aided the Athenians in the invasion of Peloponnesus. Accordingly, the resolution now adopted abandoned the present to go back to the past —and to a past which could not be restored.

Looking to the war then raging between Athens and the Peloponnesians, such a declaration was self-contradictory. It was intended by the oligarchical party only as a step to a more complete revolution, both foreign and domestic. They followed it up by a political prosecution against Peithias, the citizen of greatest personal influence among the people, who acted by his own choice as proxenus to the Athenians. They accused him of practicing to bring Korkyra into slavery to Athens. What were the judicial institutions of the island, under which he was tried, we do not know: but he was acquitted of the charge. He then revenged himself by accusing in his turn five of the richest among his oligarchical prosecutors, of the crime of sacrilege—of having violated the sanctity of the sacred grove of Zeus and Alkinous, by causing stakes, for their vine-props, to be cut in it. This was an act distinctly forbidden by law, under a penalty of a stater or four drachmas for every stake so cut. But it is no uncommon phenomenon, even in societies politically better organized than Korkyra, to find laws existing and unrepealed, yet habitually violated, sometimes even by everyone, but still oftener by men of wealth and power, whom most people would be afraid to prosecute. Moreover, in this case, no individual was injured by the act, so that any one who came forward to prosecute would incur the odium of an informer—which probably Peithias might not have chosen to brave under ordinary circumstances, though he thought himself justified in adopting this mode of retaliation against those who had prosecuted him. The language of Thucydides implies that the fact was not denied: nor is there any difficulty in conceiving that these rich men may have habitually resorted to the sacred property for vine-stakes. On being found guilty and condemned, they cast themselves as suppliants at the temples, and entreated the indulgence of being allowed

to pay the fine by installments. But Peithias, then a member of the (annual) senate, to whom the petition was referred, opposed it, and caused its rejection, leaving the law to take its course. It was, moreover, understood that he was about to avail himself of his character of senator—and of his increased favor, probably arising from the recent judicial acquittal—to propose in the public assembly a reversal of the resolution recently passed; together with a new resolution, to recognize only the same friends and the same enemies as Athens.

Pressed by the ruinous fine upon the five persons condemned, as well as by the fear that Peithias might carry his point and thus completely defeat their project of Corinthian alliance, the oligarchical party resolved to carry their point by violence and murder. They collected a party armed with daggers, burst suddenly into the senate-house during full sitting, and there slew Peithias with sixty other persons, partly senators, partly private individuals. Some others of his friends escaped the same fate by getting aboard the Attic trireme which had brought the envoys, and which was still in the harbor, but now departed forthwith to Athens. These assassins, under the fresh terror arising from their recent act, convoked an assembly, affirmed that what they had done was unavoidable to guard Korkyra against being made the slave of Athens, and proposed a resolution of full neutrality both toward Athens and toward the Peloponnesians—permitting no visit from either of the belligerents, except of a pacific character and with one single ship at a time. And this resolution the assembly was constrained to pass—it probably was not very numerous, and the oligarchical partisans were at hand in arms. At the same time they sent envoys to Athens, to communicate the recent events with such coloring as suited their views, and to dissuade the fugitive partisans of Peithias from provoking any armed Athenian intervention, such as might occasion a counter-revolution in the island. With some of the fugitives, representations of this sort, or perhaps the fear of compromising their own families left behind, prevailed. But most of them, and the Athenians along with them, appreciated better both what had been done and what was likely to follow. The oligarchical envoys, together with such of the fugitives as had been induced to adopt their views, were seized by the Athenians as conspirators, and placed in detention at Ægina; while a fleet of sixty Athenian triremes under Eurymedon was immediately fitted out to sail for Korkyra—for which there was the greater necessity, as the Lacedæmonian fleet under Alkidas, lately mustered at Kyllene after its return from Ionia, was understood to be on the point of sailing thither.

But the oligarchical leaders at Korkyra having little faith in the chances of this mission to Athens, proceeded in the execution of their conspiracy with that rapidity which was best calculated to insure its success. On the arrival of a Corinthian trireme—which brought ambassadors from Sparta, and probably also brought news

that the fleet of Alkidas would shortly appear—they organized their force, and attacked the people and the democratic authorities. The Korkyræan Demos were at first vanquished and dispersed. But during the night they collected together and fortified themselves in the upper part of the town near the acropolis, and from thence down to Hyllaic harbor—one of the two harbors which the town possessed; while the other harbor and the chief arsenal, facing the mainland of Epirus, was held by the oligarchical party, together with the market-place near to it, in and around which the wealthier Korkyræans chiefly resided. In this divided state the town remained throughout the ensuing day, during which the Demos sent emissaries around the territory soliciting aid from the working slaves, and promising to them emancipation as a reward, while the oligarchy also hired and procured 800 Epirotic mercenaries from the mainland Re-enforced by the slaves, who flocked in at the call received, the Demos renewed the struggle on the morrow more furiously than before. Both in position and numbers they had the advantage over the oligarchy, and the intense resolution with which they fought communicated itself even to the women, who, braving danger and tumult, took active part in the combat, especially by flinging tiles from the housetops. Toward the afternoon the people became decidedly victorious, and were even on the point of carrying by assault the lower town, together with the neighboring arsenal. The oligarchy had no other chance of safety except the desperate resource of setting fire to that part of the town, with the market-place, houses, and buildings all around it, their own among the rest. This proceeding drove back the assailants, but destroyed much property belonging to the merchants in the warehouses, together with a large part of the town: indeed had the wind been favorable, the entire town would have been consumed. The people being thus victorious, the Corinthian trireme, together with most of the Epirotic mercenaries, thought it safer to leave the island; while the victors were still further strengthened on the ensuing morning by the arrival of the Athenian admiral Nikostratus, with twelve triremes from Naupaktus, and 500 Messenian hoplites.

Nikostratus did his best to allay the furious excitement prevailing, and to persuade the people to use their victory with moderation. Under his auspices a convention of amnesty and peace was concluded between the contending parties, save only ten proclaimed individuals, the most violent oligarchs, who were to be tried as ringleaders. These men of course soon disappeared, so that there would have been no trial at all, which seems to have been what Nikostratus desired. At the same time an alliance offensive and defensive was established between Korkyra and Athens, and the Athenian admiral was then on the point of departing, when the Korkyræan leaders entreated him to leave with them, for greater safety, five ships out of his little fleet of twelve—offering him five of their own triremes instead. Notwithstanding the peril of this proposition to himself, Nikostratus acceded to it; and the Korkyræans, preparing the five ships to be sent along with him, began to enroll among the crews the names of their principal enemies. To the latter this presented the appearance of sending them to Athens, which they accounted a sentence of death. Under such impression they took refuge as suppliants in the temple of Dioskuri, where Nikostratus went to visit them, and tried to reassure them by the promise that nothing was intended against their personal safety. But he found it impossible to satisfy them, and as they persisted in refusing to serve, the Korkyræan Demos began to suspect treachery. They took arms again, searched the houses of the recusants for arms, and were bent on putting some of them to death, if Nikostratus had not taken them under his protection. The principal men of the defeated party, to the number of about 400, now took sanctuary in the temple and sacred ground of Here; upon which the leaders of the people, afraid that in this inviolable position they might still cause further insurrection in the city, opened a negotiation and prevailed upon them to be ferried across to the little island immediately opposite to the Heræum; where they were kept under watch, with provisions regularly transmitted across to them for four days.

At the end of these four days, while the uneasiness of the popular leaders still continued, and Nikostratus still adjourned his departure, a new phase opened in this melancholy drama. The Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas arrived at the road of Sybota on the opposite mainland—fifty-three triremes in number, since the forty triremes brought back from Ionia had been re-enforced by thirteen more from Leukas and Ambrakia. Moreover, the Lacedæmonians had sent down Brasidas as advising companion—himself worth more than the new thirteen triremes, if he had been sent to supersede Alkidas, instead of bringing nothing but authority to advise. Despising the small squadron of Nikostratus, then at Naupaktus, the Spartans were only anxious to deal with Korkyra before re-enforcements should arrive from Athens; but the repairs necessary for the ships of Alkidas, after their disastrous voyage home, occasioned an unfortunate delay. When the Peloponnesian fleet was seen approaching from Sybota at break of day, the confusion at Korkyra was unspeakable. The Demos and the newly emancipated slaves were agitated alike by the late terrible combat and by fear of the invaders—the oligarchical party, though defeated was still present, forming a considerable minority—and the town was half-burnt. Amidst such elements of trouble, there was little authority to command, and still less confidence or willingness to obey. Plenty of triremes were indeed at hand, and orders were given to man sixty of them forthwith—while Nikostratus, the only man who preserved the cool courage necessary for effective resistance, entreated the Korkyræan leaders to proceed with regularity, and to wait till all were manned, so as to sail forth

from the harbor in a body. He offered himself with his twelve Athenian triremes to go forth first alone, and occupy the Peloponnesian fleet, until the Korkyræan sixty triremes could all come out in full array to support him. He accordingly went forth with his squadron, but the Korkyræans instead of following his advice, sent their ships out one by one and without any selection of crews. Two of them deserted forthwith to the enemy, while others presented the spectacle of crews fighting among themselves: even those who actually joined battle came up by single ships, without the least order or concert.

The Peloponnesians soon seeing that they had little to fear from such enemies, thought it sufficient to set twenty of their ships against the Korkyræans, while with the remaining thirty-three they moved to contend with the twelve Athenians. Nikostratus, having plenty of sea-room, was not afraid of this numerical superiority; the more so as two of his twelve triremes were the picked vessels of the Athenian navy—the Salaminia and the Paralus. He took care to avoid entangling himself with the center of the enemy, and to keep rowing about their flanks; and as he presently contrived to disable one of their ships by a fortunate blow with the beak of one of his vessels, the Peloponnesians, instead of attacking him with their superior numbers, formed themselves into a circle and stood on the defensive, as they had done in the first combat with Phormio in the middle of the Gulf at Rhium. Nikostratus (like Phormio) rowed round this circle, trying to cause confusion by feigned approach, and waiting to see some of the ships lose their places or run foul of each other, so as to afford him an opening for attack. And he might perhaps have succeeded, if the remaining twenty Peloponnesian ships, seeing the proceeding and recollecting with dismay the success of a similar maneuver in the former battle, had not quitted the Korkyræan ships, whose disorderly condition they despised, and hastened to join their comrades. The whole fleet of fifty-three triremes now again took the aggressive, and advanced to attack Nikostratus, who retreated before them, but backing astern and keeping the head of his ships toward the enemy. In this manner he succeeded in drawing them away from the town, so as to leave the most of the Korkyræan ships opportunity for getting back to the harbor; while such was the superior maneuvering of the Athenian triremes, that the Peloponnesians were never able to come up with him or force him to action. They returned back in the evening to Sybota, with no greater triumph than their success against the Korkyræans, thirteen of whose triremes they carried away as prizes.

It was the expectation in Korkyra that they would on the morrow make a direct attack (which could hardly have failed of success) on the town and harbor. We may easily believe (what report afterward stated) that Brasidas advised Alkidas to this decisive proceeding. The Korkyræan leaders, more terrified than ever, first removed their prisoners from the little island to the Heræum, and then tried to come

to a compromise with the oligarchical party generally, for the purpose of organizing some effective and united defense. Thirty triremes were made ready and manned, wherein some even of the oligarchical Korkyræans were persuaded to form part of the crews.

But the slackness of Alkidas proved their best defense. Instead of coming straight to the town, he contented himself with landing in the island at some distance from it, on the promontory of Leukimne: after ravaging the neighboring lands for some hours, he returned to his station at Sybota. He had lost an opportunity which never again returned: for on the very same night the fire-signals of Leukas telegraphed to him the approach of the fleet under Eurymedon from Athens—sixty triremes. His only thought was now for the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet, which was in fact saved by this telegraphic notice. Advantage was taken of the darkness to retire close along the land as far as the isthmus which separates Leukas from the mainland—across which isthmus the ships were dragged by hand or machinery, so that they might not fall in with, or be descried by, the Athenian fleet in sailing round the Leukadian promontory. From hence Alkidas made the best of his way home to Peloponnesus, leaving the Korkyræan oligarchs to their fate.

That fate was deplorable in the extreme. The arrival of Eurymedon opens a third unexpected transition in this checkered narrative—the Korkyræan Demos passing, abruptly and unexpectedly, from intense alarm and helplessness to elate and irresistible mastery. In the bosom of Greeks, and in a population seemingly amongst the least refined of all Greeks—including too a great many slaves just emancipated against the will of their masters, and of course the fiercest and most discontented of all the slaves in the island—such a change was but too sure to kindle a thirst for revenge almost ungovernable, as the only compensation for foregone terror and suffering.

As soon as the Peloponnesian fleet was known to have fled and that of Eurymedon was seen approaching, the Korkyræan leaders brought into the town the 500 Messenian hoplites who had hitherto been encamped without; thus providing a resource against any last effort of despair on the part of their interior enemies. Next, the thirty ships recently manned—and held ready in the harbor facing the continent, to go out against the Peloponnesian fleet, but now no longer needed—were ordered to sail round to the other or Hyllaic harbor. Even while they were thus sailing round, some obnoxious men of the defeated party, being seen in public, were slain. But when the ships arrived at the Hyllaic harbor, and the crews were disembarked, a more wholesale massacre was perpetrated, by putting to death those individuals of the oligarchical faction who had been persuaded on the day before to go aboard as part of the crews. Then came the fate of those suppliants, about 400 in number, who had been brought back from the islet opposite, and were still under sanctuary, in the sacred precinct of the Heræum. It was proposed to them to

quit sanctuary and stand their trial. Fifty of them accepted the proposition, were put on their trial—all condemned, and all executed. Their execution took place, as it seems, immediately on the spot, and within actual view of the unhappy men still remaining in the sacred ground; who, seeing that their lot was desperate, preferred dying by their own hands to starvation or the sword of their enemies. Some hung themselves on branches of the trees surrounding the temple, others helped their friends in the work of suicide, and in one way or another the entire band thus perished. It was probably a consolation to them to believe that this desecration of the precinct would bring down the anger of the gods upon their surviving enemies.

Eurymedon remained with his fleet for seven days, during all which time the victorious Korkyræans carried on a sanguinary persecution against the party who had been concerned in the late oligarchical revolution. Five hundred of this party contrived to escape by flight to the mainland; while those who did not or could not flee were slain wherever they could be found. Some received their death-wounds even on the altar itself—others shared the same fate after having been dragged away from it by violence. In one case a party of murderers having pursued their victims to the temple of Dionysus, refrained from shedding their blood, but built up the doorway and left them to starve, as the Lacedæmonians had done on a former occasion respecting Pausanias. Such was the ferocity of the time, that in one case a father slew his own son. It was not merely the oligarchical party who thus suffered: the flood-gates of private feud were also opened, and various individuals, under false charges of having been concerned in the oligarchical movements, were slain by personal enemies or debtors. This deplorable suspension of legal as well as moral restraints continued during the week of Eurymedon's stay—a period long enough to satiate the fierce sentiment out of which it arose; yet without any apparent effort on his part to soften the victors or protect the vanquished. We shall see further reason hereafter to appreciate the baseness and want of humanity in his character. Had Nikostratus remained in command, we may fairly presume, judging by what he had done in the earlier part of the sedition with very inferior force, that he would have set much earlier limits to the Korkyræan butchery; unfortunately, Thucydides tells us nothing at all about Nikostratus, after the naval battle of the preceding day.

We should have been glad to hear something about the steps taken in the way of restoration or healing, after this burst of murderous fury, in which doubtless the newly emancipated slaves were not the most backward—and after the departure of Eurymedon. But here again Thucydides disappoints our curiosity. We only hear from him that the oligarchical exiles who had escaped to the mainland were strong enough to get possession of the forts and most part of the territory there belonging to Korkyra; just as the exiles from Samos and Mitylene became more or less completely masters of the

Perœa or mainland possessions belonging to those islands. They even sent envoys to Corinth and Sparta, in hopes of procuring aid to accomplish their restoration by force; but their request found no favor, and they were reduced to their own resources. After harassing for some time the Korkyræans in the island by predatory incursions, so as to produce considerable dearth and distress, they at length collected a band of Epirotic mercenaries, passed over to the island, and there established a fortified position on the mountain called Istone, not far from the city. Having burnt their vessels in order to cut off all hopes of retreat, they maintained themselves for near two years by a system of ravage and plunder which inflicted great misery on the island. This was a frequent way whereby, of old, invaders wore out and mastered a city, the walls of which they found impregnable. The ultimate fate of these occupants of Istone, which belongs to a future chapter, will be found to constitute a close suitable to the bloody drama yet unfinished in Korkyra.

Such a drama could not be acted in an important city belonging to the Greek name, without producing a deep and extensive impression throughout all the other cities. And Thucydides has taken advantage of it to give a sort of general sketch of Grecian politics during the Peloponnesian war; violence of civil discord in each city, aggravated by foreign war, and by the contending efforts of Athens and Sparta—the former espousing the democratical party everywhere; the latter, the oligarchical. The Korkyræan sedition was the first case in which these two causes of political antipathy and exasperation were seen acting with full united force, and where the malignity of sentiment and demoralization flowing from such a union was seen without disguise. The picture drawn by Thucydides of moral and political feeling under these influences, will ever remain memorable as the work of an analyst and a philosopher. He has conceived and described the perverting causes with a spirit of generalization which renders these two chapters hardly less applicable to other political societies far distant both in time and place (especially, under many points of view, to France between 1789 and 1799) than to Greece in the fifth century before the Christian era. The deadly bitterness infused into intestine party contests by the accompanying dangers of foreign war and intervention of foreign enemies—the mutual fears between political rivals, where each thinks that the other will forestall him in striking a mortal blow, and where constitutional maxims have ceased to carry authority either as restraint or as protection—the superior popularity of the man who is most forward with the sword, or who runs down his enemies in the most unmeasured language, coupled with the disposition to treat both prudence in action and candor in speech as if it were nothing but treachery or cowardice—the exclusive regard to party ends, with the reckless adoption, and even admiring preference, of fraud or violence as the most effectual means—the loss of respect for legal authority as well as of confidence

in private agreement, and the surrender even of blood and friendship to the overruling ascendency of party-ties—the perversion of ordinary morality, bringing with it altered signification of all the common words importing blame or approbation—the unnatural predominance of the ambitious and contentious passions, overpowering in men's minds all real public objects, and equalizing for the time the better and the worse cause, by taking hold of democracy on one side, and aristocracy on the other, as mere pretenses to sanctify personal triumph—all these gloomy social phenomena, here indicated by the historian; have their causes deeply seated in the human mind, and are likely, unless the bases of constitutional morality shall come to be laid more surely and firmly than they have hitherto been, to recur from time to time, under diverse modifications, "so long as human nature shall be the same as it is now," to use the language of Thucydides himself. He has described, with fidelity not inferior to his sketch of the pestilence at Athens, the symptoms of a certain morbid political condition, wherein the vehemence of intestine conflict, instead of being kept within such limits as consists with the maintenance of one society among the contending parties, becomes for the time inflamed and poisoned with all the unscrupulous hostility of foreign war, chiefly from actual alliance between parties within the state and foreigners without. In following the impressive description of the historian, we have to keep in mind the general state of manners in his time, especially the cruelties tolerated by the laws of war, as compared with that greater humanity and respect for life which has grown up during the last two centuries in modern Europe. And we have further so recollect that if he had been describing the effects of political fury among Carthaginians and Jews, instead of among his contemporary Greeks, he would have added to his list of horrors mutilation, crucifixion, and other refinements on simple murder.

The language of Thucydides is to be taken rather as a generalization and concentration of phenomena which he had observed among different communities, than as belonging to any one of them. I do not believe—what a superficial reading of his opening words might at first suggest—that the bloodshed in Korkyra was only the earliest, but by no means the worst, of a series of similar horrors spread over the Grecian world. The facts stated in his own history suffice to show that though the same causes which worked upon this unfortunate island became disseminated and produced analogous mischiefs throughout many other communities, yet the case of Korkyra, as it was the first, so it was also the worst and most aggravated in point of intensity. Fortunately the account of Thucydides enables us to understand it from beginning to end, and to appreciate the degree of guilt of the various parties implicated, which we can seldom do with certainty; because when once the interchange of violence has begun, the feelings arising out of the contest itself presently overpower in the

minds of both parties the original cause of dispute, as well as all scruples as to fitness of means. Unjustifiable acts in abundance are committed by both, and in comparing the two, we are often obliged to employ the emphatic language which Tacitus uses respecting Otho and Vitellius—"deteriorem fore, quisquis vicisset"—of two bad men all that the Roman world could foresee was, that the victor, whichsoever he was, would prove the worst.

But in regard to the Korkyræan revolution, we can arrive at a more discriminating criticism. We see that it is from the beginning the work of a selfish oligarchical party, playing the game of a foreign enemy, and the worst and most ancient enemy, of the island—aiming to subvert the existing democracy and acquire power for themselves, and ready to employ any measure of fraud or violence for the attainment of these objects. While the democracy which they attack is purely defensive and conservative, the oligarchical movers, having tried fair means in vain, are the first to employ foul means, which latter they find retorted with greater effect against themselves. They set the example of judicial prosecution against Peithias, for the destruction of a political antagonist; in the use of this same weapon, he proves more than a match for them, and employs it to their ruin. Next, they pass to the use of the dagger in the senate-house against him and his immediate fellow-leaders, and to the wholesale application of the sword against the democracy generally. The Korkyræan Demos are thus thrown upon the defensive. Instead of the affections of ordinary life, all the most intense anti-social sentiments —fear, pugnacity, hatred, vengeance—obtain unqualified possession of their bosoms; exaggerated too through the fluctuations of victory and defeat, successively brought by Nikostratus, Alkidas, and Eurymedon. Their conduct as victors is such as we should expect under such maddening circumstances, from coarse men mingled with liberated slaves. It is vindictive and murderous in the extreme, not without faithless breach of assurances given. But we must remember that they are driven to stand upon their defense, and that all their energies are indispensable to make that defense successful. They are provoked by an aggression no less guilty in the end than in the means—an aggression, too, the more gratuitous, because, if we look at the state of the island at the time when the oligarchical captives were restored from Corinth, there was no pretense for affirming that it had suffered, or was suffering, any loss, hardship, or disgrace, from its alliance with Athens. These oligarchical insurgents find the island in a state of security and tranquillity, since the war imposed upon it little necessity for effort. They plunge it into a sea of blood, with enormities as well as suffering on both sides, which end at length in their own complete extermination. Our compassion for their final misery must not hinder us from appreciating the behavior whereby it was earned.

In the course of a few years from this time, we shall have occasion

to recount two political movements in Athens similar in principle and general result to this Korkyræan revolution; exhibiting oligarchical conspirators against an existing and conservative democracy—with this conspiracy at first successful, but afterwards put down, and the Demos again restored. The contrast between Athens and Korkyra under such circumstances will be found highly instructive, especially in regard to the Demos both in the hours of defeat and in those of victory. It will then be seen how much the habit of active participation in political and judicial affairs—of open, conflicting discussion, discharging the malignant passions by way of speech, and followed by appeal to the vote—of having constantly present, to the mind of every citizen in his character of Dikast or Ekklesiast, the conditions of a pacific society, and the paramount authority of a constitutional majority—how much all these circumstances, brought home as they were at Athens more than in any other democracy to the feelings of individuals, contributed to soften the instincts of intestine violence and revenge, even under very great provocation.

But the case of Korkyra, as well as that of Athens, different in so many respects, conspire to illustrate another truth of much importance in Grecian history. Both of them show how false and impudent were the pretentions set up by the rich and great men of the various Grecian cities, to superior morality, superior intelligence, and greater fitness for using honorably and beneficially the powers of government, as compared with the mass of citizens. Though the Grecian oligarchies, exercising powerful sway over fashion, and more especially over the meaning of words, bestowed upon themselves the appellation of "the best men, the honorable and good, the elegant, the superior," etc., and attached to those without their own circle epithets of a contrary tenor, implying low moral attributes—no such difference will be found borne out by the facts of Grecian history. Abundance of infirmity, with occasional bad passions, was doubtless liable to work upon the people generally, often corrupting and misguiding even the Athenian democracy, the best apparently of all the democracies in Greece. But after all, the rich and great men were only a part of the people, and taking them as a class (apart from honorable individual exceptions) by no means the best part. If exempted by their position from some of the vices which beset smaller and poorer men, they imbibed from that same position an unmeasured self-importance—and an excess of personal ambition as well as of personal appetite—peculiar to themselves, not less antisocial in tendency, and operating upon a much grander scale. To the prejudices and superstitions belonging to the age, they were no way superior, considering them as a class; while their animosities among one another, virulent and unscrupulous, were among the foremost causes of misfortune in Grecian commonwealths. Indeed many of the most exceptionable acts committed by the democracies, consisted in their allowing themselves to be made the tools of one aristocrat for the ruin of another. Of the intense party-selfishness which characterized them as a body, sometimes exaggerated into the strongest anti-popular antipathy, as we see in the famous oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle—we shall find many illustrations as we advance in the history, but none more striking than this Korkyræan revolution.

CHAPTER LI.

FROM THE TROUBLES IN KORKYRA, IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE END OF THE SIXTH YEAR.

About the same time as the troubles of Korkyra occurred, Nikias the Athenian general conducted an armament against the rocky island of Minoa, which lay at the mouth of the harbor of Megara, and was occupied by a Megarian fort and garrison. The narrow channel, which separated it from the Megarian port of Nisæa and formed the entrance of the harbor, was defended by two towers projecting out from Nisæa, which Nikias attacked and destroyed by means of battering machines from his ships. He thus cut off Minoa from communication on that side with the Megarians, and fortified it on the other side, where it communicated with the mainland by a lagoon bridged over with a causway. Minoa, thus becoming thoroughly insulated, was more completely fortified and made an Athenian possession; since it was eminently convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the Megarian harbor, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the opposite shore of Salamis.

Though Nikias, son of Nickeratus, had been for some time conspicuous in public life, and is said to have been more than once Strategus along with Perikles, this is the first occasion on which Thucydides introduces him to our notice. He was now one of the Strategi or generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed on the whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In wealth and in family, he ranked among the first class of Athenians; in political character, Aristotle placed him, together with Thucydides son of Melesias and Theramenes, above all other names in Athenian history—seemingly even above Perikles.

Such a criticism, from Aristotle, deserves respectful attention, though the facts before us completely belie so lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the position occupied by Nikias in Athenian politics, as the principal person of what may be called the oligarchical party, succeeding Kimon and Thucydides, and preceding Theramenes. In looking to the conditions under which this party continued to subsist, we shall see that during the interval between Thucy-

dides (son of Melesias) and Nikias, the democratical forms had acquired such confirmed ascendency that it would not have suited the purpose of any politician to betray evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to the Silician expedition and the great embarrassment in the foreign relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive, so that we shall find Theramenes among the chief conspirators in the revolution of the Four Hundred. But Nikias represents the oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity, accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the form of common sentiment rather than of common purposes. And it is a remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, that a man of this character, known as an oligarch but not feared as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in the city.

Nikias was a man of even mediocrity, in intellect, in education, and in oratory: forward in his military duties, and not only personally courageous in the field, but hitherto found competent as a general under ordinary circumstances: assiduous, too, in the discharge of all political duties at home, especially in the post of Strategus or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently chosen and rechosen. Of the many valuable qualities combined in his predecessor Perikles, the recollection of whom was yet fresh in the Athenian mind, Nikias possessed two, on which, most of all, his influence rested—though, properly speaking, that influence belongs to the sum total of his character, and not to any special attributes in it: First, he was thoroughly incorruptible as to pecuniary gains—a quality so rare in Grecian public men of all the cities, that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could have bestowed upon him: next, he adopted the Periklean view as to the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for Athens, avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous risks, or provocation to fresh enemies. With this important point of analogy there were at the same time material differences between them even in regard to foreign policy. Perikles was a conservative, resolute against submitting to loss or abstraction of empire, but at the same time refraining from aggrandizement: Nikias was in policy faint-hearted, averse to energetic effort for any purpose whatever, and disposed not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by considerable sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was the leading champion of the conservative party of his day, always powerful at Athens: and as he was constantly familiar with the details and actual course of public affairs, capable of giving full effect to the cautious and prudential point of view, and enjoying unqualified credit for honest purposes—his value

as a permanent counselor was steadily recognized, even though in particular cases his counsel might not be followed.

Besides these two main points, which Nikias had in common with Perikles, he was perfect in the use of minor and collateral modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had taken but little pains to practice. While Perikles attached himself to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities did not redeem, in the eyes of the public, either her foreign origin or her unchastity, the domestic habits of Nikias appear to have been strictly conformable to the rules of Athenian decorum. Perikles was surrounded by philosophers, Nikias by prophets—whose advice was necessary both as a consolation to his temperament and as a guide to his intelligence under difficulties. One of them was constantly in his service and confidence, and his conduct appears to have been sensibly affected by the difference of character between one prophet and another, just as the government of Louis XIV. and other Catholic princes has been modified by the change of confessors. To a life thus rigidly decorous and ultra-religious—both eminently acceptable to the Athenians—Nikias added the judicious employment of a large fortune with a view to popularity. Those liturgies (or expensive public duties undertaken by rich men, each in his turn, throughout other cities of Greece as well as in Athens) which fell to his lot were performed with such splendor, munificence, and good taste, as to procure for him universal encomiums; and so much above his predecessors as to be long remembered and extolled. Most of these liturgies were connected with the religious service of the state, so that Nikias, by his manner of performing them, displayed his zeal for the honor of the gods at the same time that he laid up for himself a store of popularity. Moreover, the remarkable caution and timidity—not before an enemy, but in reference to his own fellow-citizens—which marked his character, rendered him pre-eminently scrupulous as to giving offense or making personal enemies. While his demeanor toward the poorer citizens generally was equal and conciliating, the presents which he made were numerous, both to gain friends and to silence assailants. We are not surprised to hear that various bullies, whom the comic writers turn to scorn, made their profit out of this susceptibility. But most assuredly Nikias as a public man, though he might occasionally be cheated out of money, profited greatly by reputation thus acquired.

The expenses unavoidable in such a career, combined with strict personal honesty, could not have been defrayed except by another quality, which ought not to count as discreditable to Nikias, though in this, too, he stood distinguished from Perikles. He was a careful and diligent money-getter; a speculator in the silver-mines of Laurium, and proprietor of one thousand slaves, whom he let out for work in them, receiving a fixed sum per head for each. The super-

intending slaves who managed the details of this business were men of great ability and high pecuniary value. Most of the wealth of Nikias was held in this form, and not in landed property. Judging by what remains to us of the comic authors, this must have been considered as a perfectly gentlemanlike way of making money: for while they abound with derision of the leather-dresser Kleon, the lamp-maker Hyperbolus, and the vegetable-selling mother to whom Euripides owes his birth, we hear nothing from them in disparagement of the slave-letter Nikias.

The degree to which the latter was thus occupied with the care of his private fortune, together with the general moderation of his temper, made him often wish to abstract himself from public duty. But such unambitious reluctance, rare among the public men of the day, rather made the Athenians more anxious to put him forward and retain his services. In the eyes of the Pentakosiomedimni and the Hippeis, the two richest classes in Athens, he was one of themselves —and, on the whole, the best man, as being so little open to reproach or calumny, whom they could oppose to the leather-dressers and lamp-makers, who often out-talked them in the public assembly. The hoplites, who despised Kleon—and did not much regard even the brave, hardy, and soldierlike Lamachus, because he happened to be poor—respected in Nikias the union of wealth and family with honesty, courage, and carefulness in command. The maritime and trading multitude esteemed him as a decorous, honest, religious gentleman, who gave splendid choragies, treated the poorest men with consideration, and never turned the public service into a job for his own profit—who, moreover, if he possessed no commanding qualities, so as to give to his advice imperative and irresistible authority, was yet always worthy of being consulted, and a steady safeguard against public mischief. Before the fatal Sicilian expedition, he had never commanded on any very serious or difficult enterprise; but what he had done had been accomplished successfully; so that he enjoyed the reputation of a fortunate as well as a prudent commander. He appears to have acted as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians at Athens; probably by his own choice, and among several others.

The first half of the political life of Nikias—after the time when he rose to enjoy full consideration in Athens, being already of mature age—was in opposition to Kleon; the last half, in opposition to Alkibiades. To employ terms which are not suitable to the Athenian democracy, but which yet bring to view the difference intended to be noted better than any others, Nikias was a minister or ministerial man, often actually exercising, and always likely to exercise, official functions—Kleon was a man of the opposition, whose province it was to supervise and censure official men for their public conduct. We must divest these words of that accompaniment which they are understood to carry in English political life—a standing

parliamentary majority in favor of one party: Kleon would often carry in the public assembly resolutions, which his opponents Nikias and others of like rank and position—who served in the posts of Strategus, ambassador, and other important offices designated by the general vote—were obliged against their will to execute.

In attaining such offices they were assisted by the political clubs, or established *conspiracies* (to translate the original literally) among the leading Athenians to stand by each other both for acquisition of office and for mutual insurance under judicial trial. These clubs, or Hetæries, must have played an important part in the practical working of Athenian politics, and it is much to be regretted that we are possessed of no details respecting them. We know that in Athens they were thoroughly oligarchical in disposition—while equality, or something near to it, in rank and position, must have been essential to the social harmony of the members. In some towns, it appears that such political associations existed under the form of gymnasia for the mutual exercise of the members, or of syssitia for joint banquets. At Athens they were numerous, and doubtless not habitually in friendship with each other; since the antipathies among different oligarchical men were exceedingly strong, and the union brought about between them at the time of the Four Hundred, arising only out of common desire to put down the democracy, lasted but a little while. But the designation of persons to serve in the capacity of Strategus and other principal offices greatly depended upon them—as well as the facility of passing through that trial of accountability to which every man was liable after his year of office. Nikias, and men generally of his rank and fortune, helped by these clubs and lending help in their turn, composed what may be called the ministers, or executive individual functionaries of Athens: the men who acted, gave orders as to specific acts, and saw to the execution of that which the senate and the public assembly resolved. Especially in regard to the military and naval force of the city, so large and so actively employed at this time, the powers of detail possessed by the Strategi must have been very great, and essential to the safety of the state.

While Nikias was thus in what may be called ministerial function, Kleon was not of sufficient importance to attain the same, but was confined to the inferior function of opposition. We shall see in the coming chapter how he became as it were promoted, partly by his own superior penetration, partly by the dishonest artifice and misjudgment of Nikias and other opponents, in the affair of Sphakteria. But his vocation was now to find fault, to censure, to denounce; his theater of action was the senate, the public assembly, the dikasteries; his principal talent was that of speech, in which he must unquestionably have surpassed all his contemporaries. The two gifts which had been united in Perikles—superior capacity for speech, as well as for action—were now severed, and had fallen, though both in greatly

inferior degree, the one to Nikias, the other to Kleon. As an opposition-man, fierce and violent in temper, Kleon was extremely formidable to all acting functionaries; and from his influence in the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the public assembly, he was not for that reason the most influential person in the democracy. His powers of speech in fact stood out the more prominently, because they were found apart from that station and those qualities which were considered, even at Athens, all but essential to make a man a leader in political life.

To understand the political condition of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to take this comparison between Nikias and Kleon, and to remark, that though the latter might be a more victorious speaker, the former was the more guiding and influential leader. The points gained by Kleon were all noisy and palpable, sometimes, however, without doubt, of considerable moment—but the course of affairs was much more under the direction of Nikias.

It was during the summer of this year (the fifth of the war—B.C. 427) that the Athenians began operations on a small scale in Sicily; probably contrary to the advice both of Nikias and Kleon, neither of them seemingly favorable to these distant undertakings. I reserve, however, the series of Athenian measures in Sicily—which afterward became the turning-point of the fortunes of the state—for a department by themselves. I shall take them up separately, and bring them down to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, when I reach the date of that important event.

During the autumn of the same year, the epidemic disorder, after having intermitted for some time, resumed its ravages at Athens, and continued for one whole year longer, to the sad ruin both of the strength and the comfort of the city. And it seems that this autumn, as well as the ensuing summer, were distinguished by violent atmospheric and terrestrial disturbance. Numerous earthquakes were experienced at Athens, in Eubœa, in Bœotia, especially near Orchomenus. Sudden waves of the sea and unexampled tides were also felt on the coast of Eubœa and Lokris, and the islands of Atalante and Peparethus: the Athenian fort and one of the two guard-ships at Atalante were partially destroyed. The earthquakes produced one effect favorable to Athens. They deterred the Lacedæmonians from invading Attica. Agis, king of Sparta, had already reached the isthmus for that purpose; but repeated earthquakes were looked upon as an unfavorable portent, and the scheme was abandoned.

These earthquakes, however, were not considered sufficient to deter the Lacedæmonians from the foundation of Herakleia, a new colony near the strait of Thermopylæ. On this occasion, we hear of a branch of the Greek population not before mentioned during the war. The coast north-west of the strait of Thermopylæ was occupied by the three subdivisions of the Malians—Paralii, Hieres, and Trachinians. These latter, immediately adjoining Mount Œta on its north side—as well as the Dorians (the little tribe properly so called, which was accounted the primitive hearth of the Dorians generally) who joined the same mountain range on the south—were both of them harassed and plundered by the predatory mountaineers, probably Ætolians, on the high lands between them. At first the Trachinians were disposed to throw themselves on the protection of Athens. But not feeling sufficiently assured as to the way in which she would deal with them, they joined with the Dorians in claiming aid from Sparta: in fact, it does not appear that Athens, possessing naval superiority only and being inferior on land, could have given them effective aid.

The Lacedæmonians, eagerly embracing the opportunity, determined to plant a strong colony in this tempting situation. There was wood in the neighboring regions for ship-building, so that they might hope to acquire a naval position for attacking the neighboring island of Eubœa, while the passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace would also be facilitated; the impracticability of such passage had forced them, three years before, to leave Potidæa to its fate. A considerable body of colonists, Spartans and Lacedæmonian Periœki, was assembled under the conduct of three Spartan Œkists—Leon, Damagon, and Alkidas; the latter (we are to presume, though Thucydides does not say so) the same admiral who had met with such little success in Ionia and at Korkyra. Proclamation was further made to invite the junction of all other Greeks as colonists, excepting by name Ionians, Achæans, and some other tribes not here specified. Probably the distinct exclusion of the Achæans must have been rather the continuance of ancient sentiment than dictated by any present reasons; since the Achæans were not now pronounced enemies of Sparta. A number of colonists, stated as not less than 10,000, flocked to the place, having confidence in the stability of the colony under the powerful protection of Sparta. The new town, of large circuit, was built and fortified under the name of Herakleia; not far from the site of Trachis, about two miles and a quarter from the nearest point of the Maliac Gulf, and about double that distance from the strait of Thermopylæ. Near to the latter, and for the purpose of keeping effective possession of it, a port with dock and accommodation for shipping was constructed.

A populous city, established under Lacedæmonian protection in this important post, alarmed the Athenians, and created much expectation in every part of Greece. But the Lacedæmonian Œkists were harsh and unskillful in their management; while the Thessalains, to whom the Trachinian territory was tributary, considered the colony as an encroachment upon their soil. Anxious to prevent its increase, they harassed it with hostilities from the first moment. The Œtæan assailants were also active enemies; so that Herakleia, thus pressed

from without and misgoverned within, dwindled down from its original numbers and promise, barely maintaining its existence. We shall find it in later times, however, revived, and becoming a place of considerable importance.

The main Athenian armament of this summer, consisting of sixty triremes under Nikias, undertook an expedition against the island of Melos. Melos and Thera, both inhabited by ancient colonists from Lacedæmon, had never been from the beginning, and still refused to be, members of the Athenian alliance or subjects of the Athenian empire. They thus stood out as exceptions to all the other islands in the Ægean, and the Athenians thought themselves authorized to resort to constraint and conquest; believing themselves entitled to command over all the islands. They might indeed urge, and with considerable plausibility, that the Melians now enjoyed their share of the protection of the Ægean from piracy, without contributing to the cost of it: but considering the obstinate reluctance and strong philo-Laconian prepossessions of the Melians, who had taken no part in the war and given no ground of offense to Athens, the attempt to conquer them by force could hardly be justified even as a calculation of gain and loss, and was a mere gratification to the pride of power in carrying out what, in modern days, we should call the principle of maritime empire. Melos and Thera formed awkward corners, which defaced the symmetry of a great proprietor's field; and the former ultimately entailed upon Athens the heaviest of all losses—a deed of blood which deeply dishonored her annals. On this occasion, Nikias visited the island with his fleet, and after vainly summoning the inhabitants, ravaged the lands, but retired without undertaking a siege. He then sailed away, and came to Oropus, on the north-east frontier of Attica bordering on Bœotia. The hoplites on board his ships, landing in the night, marched into the interior of Bœotia to the vicinity of Tanagra. They were here met, according to signal raised, by a military force from Athens which marched thither by land; and the joint Athenian army ravaged the Tanagræan territory, gaining an insignificant advantage over its defenders. On retiring, Nikias re-assembled his armament, sailed northward along the coast of Lokris with the usual ravages, and returned home without effecting anything further.

About the same time that he started, thirty other Athenian triremes, under Demosthenes and Prokles, had been sent round Peloponnesus to act upon the coast of Akarnania. In conjunction with the whole Akarnanian force, except the men of Œniadæ—with fifteen triremes from Korkyra and some troops from Kephallenia and Zakynthus—they ravaged the whole territory of Leukas, both within and without the isthmus, and confined the inhabitants to their town, which was too strong to be taken by anything but a wall of circumvallation and a tedious blockade. And the Akarnanians, to whom the city was especially hostile, were urgent with Demosthenes to undertake this

measure forthwith, since the opportunity might not again recur, and success was nearly certain.

But this enterprising officer committed the grave imprudence of offending them on a matter of great importance, in order to attack a country of all others the most impracticable—the interior of Ætolia. The Messenians of Naupaktus, who suffered from the depredations of the neighboring Ætolian tribes, inflamed his imagination by suggesting to him a grand scheme of operations, more worthy of the large force which he commanded than the mere reduction of Leukas. The various tribes of Ætolians—rude, brave, active, predatory, and unrivaled in the use of the javelin, which they rarely laid out of their hands—stretched across the country from between Parnassus and Œta to the eastern bank of the Achelous. The scheme suggested by the Messenians was that Demosthenes should attack the great central Ætolian tribes—the Apodoti, Ophioneis, and Eurytanes:—if they were conquered, all the remaining continental tribes between the Ambrakian Gulf and Mount Parnassus might be invited or forced into the alliance of Athens—the Akarnanians being already included in it. Having thus got the command of a large continental force, Demosthenes contemplated the ulterior scheme of marching at the head of it on the west of Parnassus through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians—inhabiting the north of the Corinthian Gulf, friendly to Athens, and enemies to the Ætolians, whom they resembled both in their habits and in their fighting—until he arrived at Kitynium in Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephisus. He would then easily descend that valley into the territory of the Phokians, who were likely to join the Athenians if a favorable opportunity occurred, but who might at any rate be constrained to do so. From Phokis the scheme was to invade from the northward the conterminous territory of Bœotia, the great enemy of Athens; which might thus perhaps be completely subdued, if assailed at the same time from Attica. Any Athenian general who could have executed this comprehensive scheme would have acquired at home a high and well-merited celebrity. But Demosthenes had been ill-informed both as to the invincible barbarians and the pathless country comprehended under the name of Ætolia. Some of the tribes spoke a language scarcely intelligible to Greeks, and even ate their meat raw; while the country has even down to the present time remained not only unconquered, but untraversed by an enemy in arms.

Demosthenes accordingly retired from Leukas, in spite of the remonstrance of the Akarnanians, who not only could not be induced to accompany him, but went home in visible disgust. He then sailed with his other forces—Messenians, Kephallenians, and Zakynthians—to Œneon in the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, a maritime township on the Corinthian Gulf, not far eastward of Naupaktus—where his army was disembarked, together with 300 epibatæ (or marines) from the triremes—including on this occasion, what was not

commonly the case on shipboard, some of the choice hoplites, selected all from young men of the same age, on the Athenian muster-roll. Having passed the night in the sacred precinct of Zeus Nemeus at Œneon, memorable as the spot where the poet Hesiod was said to have been slain, he marched early in the morning, under the guidance of the Messenian Chromon, into Ætolia. On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Krokyleium, on the third Teichium—all of them villages unfortified and undefended, for the inhabitants abandoned them and fled to the mountains above. He was here inclined to halt and await the junction of the Ozolian Lokrians, who had engaged to invade Ætolia at the same time, and were almost indispensable to his success, from their familiarity with Ætolian warfare, and their similarity of weapons. But the Messenians again persuaded him to advance without delay into the interior, in order that the villages might be separately attacked and taken before any collective force could be gathered together: and Demosthenes was so encouraged by having as yet encountered no resistance, that he advanced to Ægitium, which he also found deserted, and captured without opposition.

Here, however, was the term of his good fortune. The mountains round Ægitium were occupied not only by the inhabitants of that village, but also by the entire force of Ætolia, collected even from the distant tribes Bomies and Kallies, who bordered on the Maliac Gulf. The invasion of Demosthenes had become known beforehand to the Ætolians, who not only forewarned all their own tribes of the approaching enemy, but also sent ambassadors to Sparta and Corinth to ask for aid. However, they showed themselves fully capable of defending their own territory without foreign aid. Demosthenes found himself assailed in his position at Ægitium, on all sides at once by these active highlanders armed with javelins, pouring down from the neighboring hills. Not engaging in any close combat, they retreated when the Athenians advanced forward to charge them—resuming their aggression the moment that the pursuers, who could never advance far in consequence of the ruggedness of the ground, began to return to the main body. The small number of bowmen along with Demosthenes for some time kept their unshielded assailants at bay. But the officer commanding the bowmen was presently slain; the stock of arrows became nearly exhausted; and what was still worse, Chromon the Messenian, the only man who knew the country and could serve as guide, was slain also. The bowmen became thus either ineffective or dispersed; while the hoplites exhausted themselves in vain attempts to pursue and beat off an active enemy, who always returned upon them and in every successive onset thinned and distressed them more and more. At length the force of Demosthenes was completely broken and compelled to take flight; without beaten roads, without guides, and in a country not only strange to them, but impervious, from continual mountain,

rock, and forest. Many of them were slain in the flight by pursuers, superior not less in rapidity of movement than in knowledge of the country: some even lost themselves in the forest, and perished miserably in flames kindled around them by the Ætolians. The fugitives were at length reassembled at Œneon near the sea, with the loss of Perikles, the colleague of Demosthenes in command, as well as of 120 hoplites, among the best-armed and most vigorous in the Athenian muster-roll. The remaining force was soon transported back from Naupaktus to Athens, but Demosthenes remained behind, being too much afraid of the displeasure of his countrymen to return at such a moment. It is certain that his conduct was such as justly to incur their displeasure; and that the expedition against Ætolia, alienating an established ally and provoking a new enemy, had been conceived with a degree of rashness which nothing but the unexpected favor of fortune could have counterbalanced.

The force of the new enemy, whom his unsuccessful attack had raised into activity, soon made itself felt. The Ætolian envoys, who had been dispatched to Sparta and Corinth, found it easy to obtain the promise of a considerable force to join them in an expedition against Naupaktus. About the month of September, a body of 3,000 Peloponnesian hoplites, including 500 from the newly founded colony of Herakleia, was assembled at Delphi, under the command of Eurylochus, Makarius, and Menedemus. Their road of march to Naupaktus lay through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, whom they proposed either to gain over or to subdue. With Amphissa, the largest Lokrian township and in the immediate neighborhood of Delphi, they had little difficulty—for the Amphissians were in a state of feud with their neighbors on the other side of Parnassus, and were afraid that the new armament might become the instrument of Phokian antipathy against them. On the first application they joined the Spartan alliance, and gave hostages for their fidelity to it: moreover, they persuaded many other Lokrian petty villages—among others the Myoneis, who were masters of the most difficult pass on the road—to do the same. Eurylochus received from these various townships re-enforcements for his army, as well as hostages for their fidelity, whom he deposited at Kytinium in Doris: and he was thus enabled to march through all the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians without resistance; except from Œneon and Eupalion, both which places he took by force. Having arrived in the territory of Naupaktus, he was there joined by the full force of the Ætolians. Their joint efforts, after laying waste all the neighborhood, captured the Corinthian colony of Molykreion, which had become subject to the Athenian empire.

Naupaktus, with a large circuit of wall and thinly defended, was in the greatest danger, and would certainly have been taken, had it not been saved by the efforts of the Athenian Demosthenes, who had remained there ever since the unfortunate Ætolian expedition.

Apprised of the coming march of Eurylochus, he went personally to the Akarnanians, and persuaded them to send a force to aid in the defense of Naupaktus. For a long time they turned a deaf ear to his solicitations in consequence of the refusal to blockade Leukas—but they were at length induced to consent. At the head of 1000 Akarnanian hoplites, Demosthenes threw himself into Naupaktus, and Eurylochus, seeing that the town had been thus placed out of the reach of attack, abandoned all his designs upon it—marching farther westward to the neighboring territories of Ætolia—Kalydon, Pleuron, and Proschium, near the Achelous and the borders of Akarnania.

The Ætolians, who had come down to join him for the common purpose of attacking Naupaktus, here abandoned him and retired to their respective homes. But the Ambrakiots, rejoiced to find so considerable a Peloponnesian force in their neighborhood, prevailed upon him to assist them in attacking the Amphilochian Argos as well as Akarnania; assuring him that there was now a fair prospect of bringing the whole of the population of the mainland, between the Ambrakian and Corinthian Gulfs, under the supremacy of Lacedæmon. Having persuaded Eurylochus thus to keep his forces together and ready, they themselves, with 3,000 Ambrakiot hoplites, invaded the territory of the Amphilochian Argos, and captured the fortified hill of Olpæ, immediately bordering on the Ambrakian Gulf, about three miles from Argos itself; a hill employed in former days by the Akarnanians as a place for public judicial congress of the whole nation.

This enterprise, communicated forthwith to Eurylochus, was the signal for movement on both sides. The Akarnanians, marching with their whole force to the protection of Argos, occupied a post called Krenæ in the Amphilochian territory, to prevent Eurylochus from effecting his junction with the Ambrakiots at Olpæ. They at the same time sent urgent messages to Demosthenes at Naupaktus, and to the Athenian guard-squadron of twenty triremes under Aristoteles and Hierophon, entreating their aid in the present need, and inviting Demosthenes to act as their commander. They had forgotten their displeasure against him, arising out of his recent refusal to blockade at Leukas—for which they probably thought that he had been sufficiently punished by his disgrace at Ætolia; while they knew and esteemed his military capacity. In fact, the accident whereby he had been detained at Naupaktus now worked fortunately for them as well as for him. It secured to them a commander whom all of them respected, obviating the jealousies among their own numerous petty townships—it procured for him the means of retrieving his own reputation at Athens. Demosthenes, not backward in seizing this golden opportunity, came speedily into the Ambrakian Gulf with the twenty triremes, conducting 200 Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen. Finding the whole Akarnanian force concentrated at the Amphilochian Argos, he was named general, nominally along

with the Akarnanian generals, but in reality enjoying the whole direction of operations.

He found also the whole of the enemy's force, both the 3,000 Ambrakiot hoplites and the Peloponnesian division under Eurylochus, already united and in position at Olpæ, about three miles off. For Eurylochus, as soon as he was apprised that the Ambrakiots had reached Olpæ, broke up forthwith his camp at Proschium in Ætolia, knowing that his best chance of traversing the hostile territory of Akarnania consisted in celerity: the whole Akarnanian force, however, had already gone to Argos, so that his march was unopposed through that country. He crossed the Achelous, marched westward of Stratus, through the Akarnanian townships of Phytia, Medeon, and Limnæa, then quitting both Akarnania and the direct road from Akarnania to Argos, he struck rather eastward into the mountainous district of Thyamus in the territory of the Agræans, who were enemies of the Akarnanians. From hence he descended at night into the territory of Argos, and passed unobserved, under cover of the darkness, between Argos itself and the Akarnanian force at Krenæ, so as to join in safety the 3,000 Ambrakiots at Olpæ, to their great joy. They had feared that the enemy at Argos and Krenæ would have arrested his passage; and believing their force inadequate to contend alone, they had sent pressing messages home to demand large re-enforcements for themselves and their own protection.

Demosthenes, thus finding a united and formidable enemy, superior in number to himself, at Olpæ, conducted his troops from Argos and Krenæ to attack them. The ground was rugged and mountainous, and between the two armies lay a steep ravine, which neither liked to be the first to pass; so that they lay for five days inactive. If Herodotus had been our historian, he would probably have ascribed this delay to unfavorable sacrifices (which may indeed have been the case), and would have given us interesting anecdotes respecting the prophets on both sides; but the more positive practical genius of Thucydides merely acquaints us, that on the sixth day both armies put themselves in order of battle—both probably tired of waiting. The ground being favorable for ambuscade, Demosthenes hid in a bushy dell 400 hoplites and light-armed, so that they might spring up suddenly in the midst of the action upon the Peloponnesian left, which outflanked his right. He was himself on the right with the Messenians and some Athenians, opposed to Eurylochus on the left of the enemy: the Akarnanians with the Amphilochian akontists, or darters, occupied his left, opposed to the Ambrakiot hoplites: Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians were, however, intermixed in the line of Eurylochus, and it was only the Mantineans who maintained a separate station of their own toward the left center. The battle accordingly began, and Eurylochus, with his superior numbers, was proceeding to surround Demosthenes, when on a sudden the men in ambush rose up and set upon his rear. A panic seized his men, who

made no resistance worthy of their Peloponnesian reputation: they broke and fled, while Eurylochus, doubtless exposing himself with peculiar bravery in order to restore the battle, was early slain. Demosthenes, having near him his best troops, pressed them vigorously, and their panic communicated itself to the troops in the center, so that all were put to flight and pursued to Olpæ. On the right of the line of Eurylochus, the Ambrakiots, the most warlike Greeks in the Epirotic regions, completely defeated the Akarnanians opposed to them, and carried their pursuit even as far as Argos. So complete, however, was the victory gained by Demosthenes over the remaining troops, that these Ambrakiots had great difficulty in fighting their way back to Olpæ, which was not accomplished without severe loss, and late in the evening. Among all the beaten troops, the Mantineans were those who best maintained their retreating order. The loss in the army of Demosthenes was about 300; that of the opponents much greater, but the number is not specified.

Of the three Spartan commanders, two, Eurylochus and Makarius, had been slain: the third, Menedæus, found himself beleaguered both by sea and land—the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast. It would seem, indeed, that he might have fought his way to Ambrakia, especially as he would have met the Ambrakiot re-enforcement coming from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander, too much dispirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with Demosthenes and the Akarnanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining an unmolested retreat. This was peremptorily refused: but Demosthenes (with the consent of the Akarnanian leaders) secretly intimated to the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together with the Mantineans and other Peloponnesian troops—that if they chose to make a separate and surreptitious retreat, abandoning their comrades, no opposition would be offered. He designed by this means not merely to isolate the Ambrakiots, the great enemies of Argos and Akarnania, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries who had come under Eurylochus—but also to obtain the more permanent advantage of disgracing the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the eyes of the Epirotic Greeks, as cowards and traitors to military fellowship. The very reason which prompted Demosthenes to grant a separate facility of escape, ought to have been imperative with Menedæus and the Peloponnesians around him, to make them spurn it with indignation. Yet such was their anxiety for personal safety, that this disgraceful convention was accepted, ratified, and carried into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Grecian history as an example of separate treason in officers to purchase safety for themselves and their immediate comrades, by abandoning the general body under their command. Had the officers been Athenian, it would have been doubtless quoted as evidence of the pretended faithlessness of democracy. But as it was the act of a

Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians, we will only venture to remark upon it as a further manifestation of that intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and carelessness of obligation toward extra-Peloponnesian Greeks, which we found so lamentably prevalent during the invasion of Xerxes; in this case, indeed, heightened by the fact, that the men deserted were fellow-Dorians and fellow-soldiers who had just fought in the same ranks.

As soon as the ceremony of burying the dead had been completed, Menedæus, and the Peloponnesians who were protected by this secret convention, stole away slyly and in small bands under pretense of collecting wood and vegetables. On getting to a little distance, they quickened their pace and made off—much to the dismay of the Ambrakiots, who ran after them trying to overtake them. The Akarnanians pursued, and their leaders had much difficulty in explaining to them the secret convention just concluded. It was not without some suspicions of treachery, and even personal hazard from their own troops, that they at length caused the fugitive Peloponnesians to be respected; while the Ambrakiots, the most obnoxious of the two to Akarnanian feeling, were pursued without any reserve, and 200 of them were slain before they could escape into the friendly territory of the Agræans. To distinguish Ambrakiots from Peloponnesians, similar in race and dialect, was however no easy task. Much dispute arose in individual cases.

Unfairly as this loss fell upon Ambrakia, a far more severe calamity was yet in store for her. The large re-enforcement from the city, which had been urgently invoked by the detachment at Olpæ, started in due course as soon as they could be got ready, and entered the territory of Amphilochia about the time when the battle of Olpæ was fought; but ignorant of that misfortune, and hoping to arrive soon enough to stand by their friends. Their march was made known to Demosthenes, on the day after the battle, by the Amphilochians, who at the same time indicated to him the best way of surprising them in the rugged and mountainous road along which they had to march, at the two conspicuous peaks called Idomene, immediately above a narrow pass leading farther on to Olpæ. It was known beforehand, by the line of march of the Ambrakiots, that they would rest for the night at the lower of these two peaks, ready to march through the pass on the next morning. On that same night a detachment of Amphilochians, under direction from Demosthenes, seized the higher of the two peaks; while that commander himself, dividing his forces into two divisions, started from his position at Olpæ in the evening after supper. One of these divisions, having the advantage of Amphilochian guides in their own country, marched by an unfrequented mountain road to Idomene; the other, under Demosthenes himself, went directly through the pass leading from Idomene to Olpæ. After marching all night they reached the camp of the Ambrakiots a little before daybreak—Demosthenes himself with his

Messenians in the van. The surprise was complete. The Ambrakiots were found still lying down and asleep, while even the sentinels, uninformed of the recent battle—hearing themselves accosted in the Doric dialect by the Messenians, whom Demosthenes had placed in front for that express purpose—and not seeing very clearly in the morning twilight—mistook them for some of their own fellow-citizens coming back from the other camp. The Akarnanians and Messenians thus fell among the Ambrakiots sleeping and unarmed, and without any possibility of resistance. Large numbers of them were destroyed on the spot, and the remainder fled in all directions among the neighboring mountains, none knowing the roads and the country. It was the country of the Amphilochians—subjects of Ambrakia, but subjects averse to their condition, and now making use of their perfect local knowledge and light-armed equipment, to inflict a terrible revenge on their masters. Some of the Ambrakiots became entangled in ravines—others fell into ambuscades laid by the Amphilochians. Others again, dreading most of all to fall into the hands of the Amphilochians—barbaric in race as well as intensely hostile in feeling—and seeing no other possibility of escaping them, swam off to the Athenian ships cruising along the shore. There were but a small proportion of them who survived to return to Ambrakia.

The complete victory of Idomene, admirably prepared by Demosthenes, was achieved with scarce any loss. The Akarnanians, after erecting their trophy and despoiling the enemy's dead, prepared to carry off the arms thus taken to Argos.

On the morrow, however, before this was done, they were visited by a herald, coming from those Ambrakiots who had fled into the Agræan territory after the battle of Olpæ and the subsequent pursuit. He came with the customary request from defeated soldiers, for permission to bury their dead who had fallen in that pursuit. Neither he, nor those from whom he came knew anything of the destruction of their brethren at Idomene—just as these latter had been ignorant of the defeat at Olpæ; while, on the other hand, the Akarnanians in the camp, whose minds were full of the more recent and capital advantage at Idomene, supposed that the message referred to the men slain in that engagement. The numerous panoplies just acquired at Idomene lay piled up in the camp, and the herald, on seeing them, was struck with amazement at the size of the heap, so much exceeding the number of those who were missing in his own detachment. An Akarnanian present asked the reason of his surprise, and inquired how many of his comrades had been slain—meaning to refer to the slain at Idomene. "About two hundred," the herald replied. "Yet these arms here show, not that number, but more than a thousand men."—"Then they are not the arms of those who fought with us."—"Nay—but they are—if ye were the persons who fought yesterday at Idomene."—"We fought with no one yesterday: it was the day before yesterday, in the retreat."—"O, then—ye have to learn, that

we were engaged yesterday with these others, who were on their march as re-enforcement from the city of Ambrakia."

The unfortunate herald now learnt for the first time that the large re-enforcement from his city had been cut to pieces. So acute was his feeling of mingled anguish and surprise that he raised a loud cry of woe, and hurried away at once, without saying another word; not even prosecuting his request about the burial of the dead bodies—which appears on this fatal occasion to have been neglected.

His grief was justified by the prodigious magnitude of the calamity, which Thucydides considers to have been the greatest that afflicted any Grecian city during the whole war prior to the peace of Nikias; so incredibly great, indeed, that though he had learnt the number slain, he declines to set it down, from fear of not being believed—a scruple which we his readers have much reason to regret. It appears that nearly the whole adult military population of Ambrakia was destroyed, and Demosthenes was urgent with the Akarnanians to march thither at once. Had they consented, Thucydides tells us positively that the city would have surrendered without a blow. But they refused to undertake the enterprise, fearing (according to the historian) that the Athenians at Ambrakia would be more troublesome neighbors to them than the Ambrakiots. That this reason was operative we need not doubt, but it can hardly have been either the single, or even the chief reason; for had it been so, they would have been equally afraid of Athenian co-operation in the blockade of Leukas, which they had strenuously solicited from Demosthenes, and had quarreled with him for refusing. Ambrakia was less near to them than Leukas—and in its present exhausted state, inspired less fear: but the displeasure arising from the former refusal of Demosthenes had probably never been altogether appeased, nor were they sorry to find an opportunity of mortifying him in a similar manner.

In the distribution of the spoil, 300 panoplies were first set apart as the perquisite of Demosthenes: the remainder were then distributed, one-third for the Athenians, the other two-thirds among the Akarnanian townships. The immense reserve personally appropriated to Demosthenes enables us to make some vague conjecture as to the total loss of Ambrakiots. The fraction of one-third, assigned to the Athenian people, must have been, we may imagine, six times as great, and perhaps even in larger proportion, than the reserve of the general. For the latter was at that time under the displeasure of the people, and anxious above all things to regain their favor—an object which would be frustrated rather than promoted, if his personal share of the arms were not greatly disproportionate to the collective claim of the city. Reasoning upon this supposition, the panoplies assigned to Athens would be 1800, and the total of Ambrakiot slain whose arms became public property would be 5,400. To which must be added some Ambrakiots killed in their flight from

Idomene by the Amphilochians, in dells, ravines, and by-places: probably those Amphilochians, who slew them, would appropriate the arms privately, without bringing them into the general stock. Upon this calculation, the total number of Ambrakiots slain in both battles and both pursuits, would be about 6,000; a number suitable to the grave expressions of Thucydides, as well as to his statements, that the first detachment which marched to Olpæ was 3,000 strong—and that the message sent home invoked as re-enforcement the total force of the city. How totally helpless Ambrakia had become, is still more conclusively proved by the fact that the Corinthians were obliged shortly afterward to send by land a detachment of 300 hoplites for its defense.

The Athenian triremes soon returned to their station at Naupaktus, after which a convention was concluded between the Akarnanians and Amphilochians on the one side, and the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians (who had fled after the battle of Olpæ into the territory of Salynthius and the Agræi) on the other—insuring a safe and unmolested egress to both of the latter. With the Ambrakiots a more permanent pacification was effected: the Akarnanians and Amphilochians concluded with them a peace and alliance for 100 years, on condition that they should surrender all the Amphilochian territory and hostages in their possession, and should bind themselves to furnish no aid to Anaktorium, then in hostility to the Akarnanians. Each party, however, maintained its separate alliance—the Ambrakiots with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the Akarnanians with Athens. It was stipulated that the Akarnanians should not be required to assist the Ambrakiots against Athens, nor the Ambrakiots to assist the Akarnanians against the Peloponnesian league; but against all other enemies, each engaged to lend aid to the other.

To Demosthenes personally, the events on the coast of the Ambrakian Gulf proved a signal good fortune, well-earned indeed by the skill which he had displayed. He was enabled to atone for his imprudence in the Ætolian expedition, and to re-establish himself in the favor of the Athenian people. He sailed home in triumph to Athens, during the course of the winter, with his reserved present of 300 panoplies, which acquired additional value from the accident, that the larger number of panoplies, reserved out of the spoil for the Athenian people, were captured at sea and never reached Athens. Accordingly, those brought by Demosthenes were the only trophy of the victory, and as such were deposited in the Athenian temples, where Thucydides mentions them as still existing at the time when he wrote.

It was in this same autumn that the Athenians were induced by an oracle to undertake the more complete purification of the sacred island of Delos. This step was probably taken to propitiate Apollo, since they were under the persuasion that the terrible visitation of the epidemic was owing to his wrath. And as it was about this

period that the second attack of the epidemic, after having lasted a year, disappeared—many of them probably ascribed this relief to the effect of their pious cares at Delos. All the tombs in the island were opened; the dead bodies were then exhumed and re-interred in the neighboring island of Rheneia: and orders were given that for the future neither deaths nor births should take place in the sacred island. Moreover, the ancient Delian festival—once the common point of meeting and solemnity for the whole Ionic race, and celebrated for its musical contests, before the Lydian and Persian conquests had subverted the freedom and prosperity of Ionia—was now renewed. The Athenians celebrated the festival with its accompanying matches, even the chariot race, in a manner more splendid than had ever been known in former times. They appointed a similar festival to be celebrated every fourth year. At this period they were excluded both from the Olympic and the Pythian games, which probably made the revival of the Delian festival more gratifying to them. The religious zeal and munificence of Nikias were strikingly displayed at Delos.

CHAPTER LII.

SEVENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.—CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA.

The invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians had now become an ordinary enterprise, undertaken in every year of the war except the third and sixth, and then omitted only from accidental causes: though the same hopes were no longer entertained from it as at the commencement of the war. During the present spring Agis king of Sparta conducted the Peloponnesian army into the territory, seemingly about the end of April, and repeated the usual ravages.

It seemed, however, as if Korkyra were about to become the principal scene of the year's military operations. For the exiles of the oligarchical party, having come back to the island and fortified themselves on Mount Istone, carried on war with so much activity against the Korkyræans in the city, that distress and even famine reigned there. Sixty Peloponnesian triremes were sent thither to assist the aggressors. As soon as it became known at Athens how hardly the Korkyræans in the city were pressed, orders were given to an Athenian fleet of forty triremes, about to sail for Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophokles, to halt in their voyage at Korkyra, and to lend whatever aid might be needed. But during the course of this voyage an incident occurred elsewhere, neither foreseen nor imagined by any one, which gave a new character and promise to the whole war—illustrating forcibly the observations of Perikles and Archida-

mus before its commencement, on the impossibility of calculating what turn events might take.

So high did Demosthenes stand in the favor of his countrymen after his brilliant successes in the Ambrakian Gulf, that they granted him permission at his own request to go aboard and to employ the fleet in any descent which he might think expedient on the coast of Peloponnesus. The attachment of this active officer to the Messenians at Naupaktus inspired him with the idea of planting a detachment of them on some well-chosen maritime post in the ancient Messenian territory, from whence they would be able permanently to harass the Lacedæmonians and provoke revolt among the Helots—the more so from their analogy of race and dialect. The Messenians, active in privateering, and doubtless well acquainted with the points of this coast, all of which had formerly belonged to their ancestors, had probably indicated to him Pylus on the southwestern shore.

That ancient and Homeric name was applied specially and properly to denote the promontory which forms the northern termination of the modern bay of Navarino opposite to the island of Sphagia or Sphakteria; though in vague language the whole neighboring district seems also to have been called Pylus. Accordingly, in circumnavigating Laconia, Demosthenes requested that the fleet might be detained at this spot long enough to enable him to fortify it, engaging himself to stay afterward and maintain it with a garrison. It was an uninhabited promontory—about forty-five miles from Sparta, that is, as far distant as any portion of her territory—presenting rugged cliffs, and easy of defense both by sea and land. But its great additional recommendation, with reference to the maritime power of Athens, consisted in its overhanging the spacious and secure basin now called the bay of Navarino. That basin was fronted and protected by the islet called Sphakteria or Sphagia, untrodden, untenanted, and full of wood: which stretched along the coast for about a mile and three-quarters, leaving only two narrow entrances; one at its northern end, opposite to the position fixed on by Demosthenes, so confined as to admit only two triremes abreast—the other at the southern end about four times as broad; while the inner water approached by these two channels was both roomy and protected. It was on the coast of Peloponnesus, a little within the northern or narrowest of the two channels, that Demosthenes proposed to plant his little fort—the ground being itself eminently favorable; with a spring of fresh water in the center of the promontory.

But Eurymedon and Sophokles decidedly rejected all proposition of delay; and with much reason, since they had been informed (though seemingly without truth) that the Peloponnesian fleet had actually reached Korkyra. They might well have remembered the mischief which had ensued three years before, from the delay of the re-enforcement sent to Phormio in some desultory operations on the

coast of Krete. The fleet accordingly passed by Pylus without stopping: but a terrible storm drove them back and forced them to seek shelter in the very harbor which Demosthenes had fixed upon—the only harbor anywhere near. That officer took advantage of this accident to renew his proposition, which however appeared to the commanders chimerical. There were plenty of desert capes round Peloponnesus (they said), if he chose to waste the resources of the city in occupying them. They remained unmoved by his reasons in reply. Finding himself thus unsuccessful, Demosthenes presumed upon the undefined permission granted to him by the Athenian people, to address himself first to the soldiers, last of all to the taxiarchs or inferior officers—and to persuade them to second his project, even against the will of the commanders. Much inconvenience might well have arisen from such clashing of authority: but it happened that both the soldiers and the taxiarchs took the same view of the case as their commanders, and refused compliance. Nor can we be surprised at such reluctance, when we reflect upon the seeming improbability of being able to maintain such a post against the great real, and still greater supposed, superiority of Lacedæmonian land-force. It happened however that the fleet was detained there for some days by stormy weather; so that the soldiers, having nothing to do, were seized with the spontaneous impulse of occupying themselves with the fortification, and crowded around to execute it with all the emulation of eager volunteers. Having contemplated nothing of the kind on starting from Athens, they had neither tools for cutting stone, nor hods for carrying mortar. Accordingly, they were compelled to build their wall by collecting such pieces of rock or stones as they found, and putting them together as each happened to fit in: whenever mortar was needed, they brought it up on their bended backs, with hands joined behind them to prevent it from slipping away. Such deficiencies were made up, however, partly by the unbounded ardor of the soldiers, partly by the natural difficulties of the ground, which hardly required fortification except at particular points; the work was completed in a rough way in six days, and Demosthenes was left in garrison with five ships, while Eurymedon with the main fleet sailed away to Korkyra. The crews of the five ships (two of which, however, were sent away to warn Eurymedon afterward) would amount to about 1000 men in all. But there presently arrived two armed Messenian privateers, from which Demosthenes obtained a re-enforcement of forty Messenian hoplites, together with a supply of wicker shields, though more fit for show than for use, wherewith to arm his rowers. Altogether, it appears that he must have had about 200 hoplites, besides the half-armed seamen.

Intelligence of this attempt to plant, even upon the Lacedæmonian territory, the annoyance and insult of a hostile post, was soon transmitted to Sparta. Yet no immediate measures were taken

to march to the spot; as well from the natural slowness of the Spartan character, strengthened by a festival which happened to be then going on, as from the confidence entertained that, whenever attacked, the expulsion of the enemy was certain. A stronger impression however was made by the news upon the Lacedæmonian army invading Attica, who were at the same time suffering from want of provisions (the corn not being yet ripe), and from an unusually cold spring: accordingly, Agis marched them back to Sparta, and the fortification of Pylus thus produced the effect of abridging the invasion to the unusually short period of fifteen days. It operated in like manner to the protection of Korkyra: for the Peloponnesian fleet, recently arrived thither or still on its way, received orders immediately to return for the attack of Pylus. Having avoided the Athenian fleet by transporting the ships across the isthmus of Leukas, it reached Pylus about the same time as the Lacedæmonian land-force from Sparta, composed of the Spartans themselves and the neighboring Periœki. For the more distant Periœki, as well as the Peloponnesian allies, being just returned from Attica, though summoned to come as soon as they could, did not accompany this first march.

At the last moment before the Peloponnesian fleet came in and occupied the harbor, Demosthenes detached two out of his five triremes to warn Eurymedon and the main fleet, and to entreat immediate succor; the remaining ships he hauled ashore under the fortification, protecting them by palisades planted in front, and prepared to defend himself in the best manner he could. Having posted the larger portion of his force—some of them mere seamen without arms, and many only half-armed—round the assailable points of the fortification, to resist attacks from the land-force, he himself, with sixty chosen hoplites and a few bowmen, marched out of the fortification down to the sea-shore. It was on that side that the wall was weakest, for the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had given themselves little trouble to provide against an assailant fleet. Accordingly, Demosthenes foresaw that the great stress of the attack would lie on the sea-side. His only safety consisted in preventing the enemy from landing; a purpose seconded by the rocky and perilous shore, which left no possibility of approach for ships except on a narrow space immediately under the fortification. It was here that he took post, on the water's edge, addressing a few words of encouragement to his men, and warning them that it was useless now to display acuteness in summing up perils which were but too obvious—and that the only chance of escape lay in boldly encountering the enemy before they could set foot ashore; the difficulty of effecting a landing from ships in the face of resistance being better known to Athenian mariners than to any one else.

With a fleet of forty-three triremes under Thrasymelidas, and a powerful land-force, simultaneously attacking, the Lacedæmonians had good hopes of storming at once a rock so hastily converted into a military post. But as they foresaw that the first attack might possibly fail, and that the fleet of Eurymedon would probably return, they resolved to occupy forthwith the island of Sphakteria, the natural place where the Athenian fleet would take station for the purpose of assisting the garrison ashore. The neighboring coast on the main-land of Peloponnesus was both harborless and hostile, so that there was no other spot near, where they could take station. And the Lacedæmonian commanders reckoned upon being able to stop up, as it were mechanically, both the two entrances into the harbor, by triremes lashed together from the island to the main-land, with their prows pointing outward: so that they would be able at at any rate, occupying the island as well as the two channels, to keep off the Athenian fleet, and to hold Demosthenes closely blocked up on the rock of Pylus; where his provisions would quickly fail him. With these views they drafted off by lot some hoplites from each of the Spartan lochi, accompanied as usual by Helots, and sent them across to Sphakteria; while their land-force and their fleet approached at once to attack the fortification.

Of the assault on the land-side we hear little. The Lacedæmonians were proverbially unskillful in the attack of anything like a fortified place, and they appear now to have made little impression. But the chief stress and vigor of the attack came on the sea-side, as Demosthenes had foreseen. The landing-place, even where practicable, was still rocky and difficult—and so narrow in dimensions, that the Lacedæmonian ships could only approach by small squadrons at a time; while the Athenians maintained their ground firmly to prevent a single man from setting foot on land. The assailing triremes rowed up with loud shouts and exhortations to each other, striving to get so placed as that the hoplites in the bow could effect a landing: but such were the difficulties arising partly from the rocks and partly from the defense, that squadron after squadron tried this in vain. Nor did even the gallant example of Brasidas procure for them any better success. That officer, commanding a trireme, and observing that some of the pilots near him were cautious in driving their ships close in shore for fear of staving them against the rocks, indignantly called to them not to spare the planks of their vessels when the enemy had insulted them by erecting a fort in the country: Lacedæmonians (he exclaimed) ought to carry the landing by force, even though their ships should be dashed to pieces: the Peloponnesian allies ought to be forward in sacrificing their ships for Sparta, in return for the many services which she had rendered to them. Foremost in performance as well as in exhortation, Brasidas constrained his own pilot to drive his ship close in, and advanced in person even on to the landing-steps, for the purpose of leaping first ashore. But here he stood exposed to all the weapons of the Athenian defenders, who beat him back and pierced him with so many wounds, that he fainted

away and fell back in to the bows (or foremost part of the trireme, beyond the rowers); while his shield, slipping away from the arm, dropped down and rolled overboard into the sea. His ship was obliged to retire, like the rest, without having effected any landing. All these successive attacks from the sea, repeated for one whole day and a part of the next, were repulsed by Demosthenes and his little band with victorious bravery. To both sides it seemed a strange reversal of ordinary relations, that the Athenians, essentially maritime, should be fighting on land—and that too Lacedæmonian land—against the Lacedæmonians, the select land-warriors of Greece, now on shipboard, and striving in vain to compass a landing on their own shore. The Athenians, in honor of their success, erected a trophy, the chief ornament of which was the shield of Brasidas, cast ashore by the waves.

On the third day, the Lacedæmonians did not repeat their attack, but sent some of their vessels round to Asine in the Messenian Gulf for timber to construct battering machines; which they intended to employ against the wall of Demosthenes on the side toward the harbor, where it was higher, and could not be assailed without machines, but where at the same time there was great facility in landing—for their previous attack had been made on the side fronting the sea, where the wall was lower, but the difficulties of landing insuperable.

But before these ships came back, the face of affairs was seriously changed by the unwelcome return of the Athenian fleet from Zakynthus under Eurymedon, re-enforced by four Chian ships and some of the guard-ships at Naupaktus, so as now to muster fifty sail. The Athenian admiral, finding the enemy's fleet in possession of the harbor, and seeing both the island of Sphakteria occupied, and the opposite shore covered with Lacedæmonian hoplites—for the allies from all parts of Peloponnesus had now arrived—looked around in vain for a place to land. He could find no other night-station except the uninhabited island of Prote, not very far distant. From hence he sailed forth in the morning to Pylus, prepared for a naval engagement—hoping that perhaps the Lacedæmonians might come out to fight him in the open sea, but resolved, if this did not happen, to force his way in and attack the fleet in the harbor; the breadth of sea between Sphakteria and the mainland being sufficient to admit of nautical maneuver. The Lacedæmonian admirals, seemingly confounded by the speed of the Athenian fleet in coming back, never thought of sailing out of the harbor to fight, nor did they even realize their scheme of blocking up the two entrances of the harbor with triremes closely lashed together. Leaving both entrances open, they determined to defend themselves within: but even here, so defective were their precautions that several of their triremes were yet moored, and the rowers not fully aboard, when the Athenian admirals sailed in by both entrances at once, to attack them. Most of the Lacedæmonian triremes, afloat and in fighting trim, resisted the attack for a certain time, but were at length vanquished and driven back to the shore, many of them with serious injury. Five of them were captured and towed off, one with all her crew aboard. The Athenians, vigorously pursuing their success, drove against such as took refuge on the shore, as well as those which were not manned at the moment when the attack began, and had not been able to get afloat or into action. Some of the vanquished triremes being deserted by their crews, who jumped out upon the land, the Athenians were proceeding to tow them off, when the Lacedæmonian hoplites on the shore opposed a new and strenuous resistance. Excited to the utmost pitch by witnessing the disgraceful defeat of their fleet, and aware of the cruel consequences which turned upon it—they marched all armed into the water, seized the ships to prevent them from being dragged off, and engaged in a desperate conflict to baffle the assailants. We have already seen a similar act of bravery, two years before, on the part of the Messenian hoplites accompanying the fleet of Phormio near Naupaktus. Extraordinary daring and valor was here displayed on both sides, in the attack as well as in the defense, and such was the clamor and confusion, that neither the land-skill of the Lacedæmonians, nor the sea-skill of the Athenians, were of much avail: the contest was one of personal valor, and considerable suffering, on both sides. At length the Lacedæmonians carried their point and saved all the ships ashore; none being carried away except those at first captured. Both parties thus separated: the Athenians retired to the fortress at Pylus, where they were doubtless hailed with overflowing joy by their comrades, and where they erected a trophy for their victory—giving up the enemy's dead for burial, and picking up the floating wrecks and pieces.

But the great prize of the victory was neither in the five ships captured, nor in the relief afforded to the besieged at Pylus. It lay in the hoplites occupying the island of Sphakteria, who were now cut off from the mainland, as well as from all supplies. The Athenians, sailing round it in triumph, already looked upon them as their prisoners; while the Lacedæmonians on the opposite mainland, deeply distressed but not knowing what to do, sent to Sparta for advice. So grave was the emergency, that the Ephors came in person to the spot forthwith. Since they could still muster sixty triremes, a greater number than the Athenians—besides a large force on land, and the whole command of the resources of the country—while the Athenians had no footing on shore except the contracted promontory of Pylus, we might have imagined that a strenuous effort to carry off the imprisoned detachment across the narrow strait to the mainland would have had a fair chance of success. And probably, if either Demosthenes or Brasidas had been in command, such an effort would have been made. But Lacedæmonian courage was rather steadfast and unyielding than adventurous. Moreover the Athenian superior-

ity at sea exercised a sort of fascination over men's minds analogous to that of the Spartans themselves on land; so that the Ephors, on reaching Pylus, took a desponding view of their position, and sent a herald to the Athenian generals to propose an armistice, in order to allow time for envoys to go to Athens and treat for peace.

To this Eruymedon and Demosthenes assented, and an armistice was concluded on the following terms. The Lacedæmonians agreed to surrender not only all their triremes now in the harbor, but also all the rest in their ports, altogether to the number of sixty; also to abstain from an attack upon the fortress at Pylus either by land or sea, for such time as should be necessary for the mission of envoys to Athens as well as for their return, both to be effected in an Athenian trireme provided for the purpose. The Athenians on their side engaged to desist from all hostilities during the like interval, but it was agreed that they should keep strict and unremitting watch over the island, yet without landing upon it. For the subsistence of the detachment in the island, the Lacedæmonians were permitted to send over every day two chœnikes of barley-meal in cakes ready baked, two kotylæ of wine, and some meat, for each hoplite—together with half that quantity for each of the attendant Helots; but this was all to be done under the supervision of the Athenians, with peremptory obligations to send no secret additional supplies. It was moreover expressly stipulated that if any one provision of the armistice, small or great, were violated, the whole should be considered as null and void. Lastly, the Athenians engaged, on the return of the envoys from Athens, to restore the triremes in the same condition as they received them

Such terms sufficiently attest the humiliation and anxiety of the Lacedæmonians; while the surrender of their entire naval force, to the number of sixty triremes, which was forthwith carried into effect, demonstrates at the same time that they sincerely believed in the possibility of obtaining peace. Well-aware that they were themselves the original beginners of the war, at a time when the Athenians desired peace—and that the latter had besides made fruitless overtures while under the pressure of the epidemic—they presumed that the same disposition still prevailed at Athens, and that their present pacific wishes would be so gladly welcomed as to procure without difficulty the relinquishment of the prisoners in Sphakteria.

The Lacedæmonian envoys, conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme, appeared before the public assembly to set forth their mission, according to custom, prefacing their address with some apologies for that brevity of speech which belonged to their country. Their proposition was in substance a very simple one—"Give up to us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange for this favor, peace, with the alliance of Sparta." They enforced their cause by appeals, well-turned and conciliatory, partly indeed to the generosity, but still more to the prudential calculation of Athens; explicitly

admitting the high and glorious vantage-ground on which she was now placed, as well as their own humbled dignity and inferior position. They, the Lacedæmonians, the first and greatest power in Greece, were smitten by adverse fortune of war—and that too without misconduct of their own, so that they were for the first time obliged to solicit an enemy for peace; which Athens had the precious opportunity of granting, not merely with honor to herself, but also in such manner as to create in their minds an ineffaceable friendship. And it became Athens to make use of her present good fortune while she had it—not to rely upon its permanence nor to abuse it by extravagant demands. Her own imperial prudence, as well as the present circumstances of the Spartans, might teach her how unexpectedly the most disastrous casualties occurred. By granting what was now asked, she might make a peace which would be far more durable than if it were founded on the extorted compliances of a weakened enemy, because it would rest on Spartan honor and gratitude; the greater the previous enmity, the stronger would be such reactionary sentiment. But if Athens should now refuse, and if, in the farther prosecution of the war, the men in Sphakteria should perish—a new and inexpiable ground of quarrel, peculiar to Sparta herself, would be added to those already subsisting, which rather concerned Sparta as the chief of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Nor was it only the goodwill and gratitude of the Spartans which Athens would earn by accepting the proposition tendered to her; she would farther acquire the grace and glory of conferring peace on Greece, which all the Greeks would recognize as her act. And when once the two preeminent powers, Athens and Sparta, were established in cordial amity, the remaining Grecian states would be too weak to resist what they two might prescribe.

Such was the language held by the Lacedæmonians in the assembly at Athens. It was discreetly calculated for their purpose, though when we turn back to the commencement of the war, and read the lofty declarations of the Spartan Ephors and assembly respecting the wrongs of their allies and the necessity of extorting full indemnity for them from Athens—the contrast is indeed striking. On this occasion, the Lacedæmonians acted entirely for themselves and from consideration of their own necessities; severing themselves from their allies, and soliciting a special peace for themselves, with as little scruple as the Spartan general Menedæus during the preceding year, when he abandoned his Ambrakiot confederates after the battle of Olpæ, to conclude a separate capitulation with Demosthenes.

The course proper to be adopted by Athens in reference to the proposition, however, was by no means obvious. In all probability, the trireme which brought the Lacedæmonian envoys also brought the first news of that unforeseen and instantaneous turn of events, which had rendered the Spartans in Sphakteria certain prisoners (so

it was then conceived), and placed the whole Lacedæmonian fleet in their power: thus giving a totally new character to the war. The sudden arrival of such prodigious intelligence—the astounding presence of Lacedæmonian envoys, bearing the olive-branch and in an attitude of humiliation—must have produced in the susceptible public of Athens emotions of the utmost intensity; an elation and confidence such as had probably never been felt since the reconquest of Samos. It was difficult at first to measure the full bearings of the new situation, and even Perikles himself might have hesitated what to recommend. But the immediate and dominant impression with the general public was, that Athens might now ask her own terms, as consideration for the prisoners in the island.

Of this reigning tendency Kleon made himself the emphatic organ, as he had done three years before in the sentence passed on the Mitylenæans; a man who—like leading journals in modern times—often appeared to guide the public because he gave vehement utterance to that which they were already feeling, and carried it out in its collateral bearings and consequences. On the present occasion he doubless spoke with the most genuine conviction, for he was full of the sentiment of Athenian force and Athenian imperial dignity, as well as disposed to a sanguine view of future chances. Moreover, in a discussion like that now opened, where there was much room for doubt, he came forward with a proposition at once plain and decisive. Reminding the Athenians of the dishonorable truce of Thirty years to which they had been compelled by the misfortunes of the times to accede, fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war —Kleon insisted that now was the time for Athens to recover what she had then lost—Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achaia. He proposed that Sparta should be required to restore these to Athens, in exchange for the soldiers now blocked up in Sphakteria; after which a truce might be concluded for as long a time as might be deemed expedient.

This decree, adopted by the assembly, was communicated as the answer of Athens to the Lacedæmonian envoys, who had probably retired after their first address, and were now sent for again into the assembly to hear it. On being informed of the resolution, they made no comment on its substance, but invited the Athenians to name commissioners, who might discuss with them freely and deliberately suitable terms for a pacification. Here, however, Kleon burst upon them with an indignant rebuke. He had thought from the first (he said) that they came with dishonest purposes, but now the thing was clear—nothing else could be meant by this desire to treat with some few men apart from the general public. If they had really any fair proposition to make, he called upon them to proclaim it openly to all. But this the envoys could not bring themselves to do. They had probably come with authority to make certain concessions; but to announce these concessions forthwith would have rendered negotiation impossible, besides dishonoring them in the face of their allies.

Such dishonor would be incurred, too, without any advantage, if the Athenians should after all reject the terms, which the temper of the assembly before them rendered but too probable. Moreover, they were totally unpracticed in the talents for dealing with a public assembly, such discussions being so rare as to be practically unknown in the Lacedæmonian system. To reply to the denunciation of a vehement speaker like Kleon, required readiness of elocution, dexterity, and self-command, which they had had no opportunity of acquiring. They remained silent—abashed by the speaker and intimidated by the temper of the assembly. Their mission was thus terminated, and they were reconveyed in the trireme to Pylus.

It is probable that if these envoys had been able to make an effective reply to Kleon, and to defend their proposition against his charge of fraudulent purpose, they would have been sustained by Nikias and a certain number of leading Athenians, so that the assembly might have been brought at least to try the issue of a private discussion between diplomatic agents on both sides. But the case was one in which it was absolutely necessary that the envoys should stand forward with some defense for themselves; which Nikias might effectively second, but could not originate: and as they were incompetent to this task, the whole affair broke down. We shall hereafter find other examples in which the incapacity of Lacedæmonian envoys to meet the open debate of Athenian political life is productive of mischievous results. In this case, the proposition of the envoys to enter into treaty with select commissioners was not only quite reasonable, but afforded the only possibility (though doubtless not a certainty) of some ultimate pacification: and the maneuver whereby Kleon discredited it was a grave abuse of publicity—not unknown in modern, though more frequent in ancient, political life. Kleon probably thought that if commissioners were named, Nikias, Laches, and other politicians of the same rank and color, would be the persons selected; persons whose anxiety for peace and alliance with Sparta would make them over-indulgent and careless in securing the interests of Athens. It will be seen, when we come to describe the conduct of Nikias four years afterward, that this suspicion was not ill-grounded.

Unfortunately Thucydides, in describing the proceedings of this assembly, so important in its consequences because it intercepted a promising opening for peace, is brief as usual—telling us only what was said by Kleon and what was decided by the assembly. But though nothing is positively stated respecting Nikias and his partisans, we learn from other sources, and we may infer from what afterward occurred, that they vehemently opposed Kleon, and that they looked coldly on the subsequent enterprise against Sphakteria as upon his peculiar measure.

It has been common to treat the dismissal of the Lacedæmonian envoys on this occasion as a peculiar specimen of democratical folly.

Yet over-estimation of the prospective chances arising out of success, to a degree more extravagant than that of which Athens was now guilty, is by no means peculiar to democracy. Other governments, opposed to democracy not less in temper than in form—an able despot like the Emperor Napoleon, and a powerful aristocracy like that of England—have found success to the full as misleading. That Athens should desire to profit by this unexpected piece of good fortune, was perfectly reasonable: that she should make use of it to regain advantages which former misfortunes had compelled herself to surrender, was a feeling not unnatural. And whether the demand was excessive, or by how much—is a question always among the most embarrassing for any government—kingly, oligarchical, or democratical—to determine.

We may, however, remark that Kleon gave an impolitic turn to Athenian feeling, by directing it toward the entire and literal reacquisition of what had been lost twenty years before. Unless we are to consider his quadruple demand as a flourish, to be modified by subsequent negotiation, it seems to present some plausibility, but little of long-sighted wisdom. For while on the one hand, it called upon Sparta to give up much which was not in her possession, and must have been extorted by force from allies—on the other hand, the situation of Athens was not the same as it had been when she concluded the Thirty years' truce; nor does it seem that the restoration of Achaia and Trœzen would have been of any material value to her. Nisæa and Pegæ—which would have been tantamount to the entire Megarid, inasmuch as Megara itself could hardly have been held with both its ports in the possession of an enemy—would indeed have been highly valuable, since she could then have protected her territory against invasion from Peloponnesus, besides possessing a port in the Corinthian gulf. And it would seem that if able commissioners had now been named for private discussion with the Lacedæmonian envoys, under the present urgent desire of Sparta coupled with her disposition to abandon her allies—this important point might possibly have been pressed and carried, in exchange for Sphakteria. Nay, even if such acquisition had been found impracticable, still the Athenians would have been able to effect some arrangement which would have widened the breach and destroyed the confidence between Sparta and her allies; a point of great moment for them to accomplish. There was therefore every reason for trying what could be done by negotiation, under the present temper of Sparta; and the step, by which Kleon abruptly broke off such hopes was decidedly mischievous.

On the return of the envoys without success to Pylus, twenty days after their departure from that place, the armistice immediately terminated; and the Lacedæmonians redemanded the triremes which they had surrendered. But Eurymedon refused compliance with this demand, alleging that the Lacedæmonians had during the truce

made a fraudulent attempt to surprise the rock of Pylus, and had violated the stipulations in other ways besides; while it stood expressly stipulated in the truce, that the violation by either side even of the least among its conditions should cancel all obligation on both sides. Thucydides, without distinctly giving his opinion, seems rather to imply that there was no just ground for the refusal: though if any accidental want of vigilance had presented to the Lacedæmonians an opportunity for surprising Pylus, they would be likely enough to avail themselves of it, seeing that they would thereby drive off the Athenian fleet from its only landing-place, and render the continued blockade of Sphakteria impracticable. However the truth may be, Eurymedon persisted in his refusal, in spite of loud protests of the Lacedæmonians against his perfidy. Hostilities were energetically resumed: the Lacedæmonian army on land began again to attack the fortifications of Pylus, while the Athenian fleet became doubly watchful in the blockade of Sphakteria, in which they were re-enforced by twenty fresh ships from Athens, making a fleet of seventy triremes in all. Two ships were perpetually rowing round the island, in opposite directions, throughout the whole day; while at night the whole fleet were kept on watch, except on the sea side of the island in stormy weather.

The blockade, however, was soon found to be more full of privation in reference to the besiegers themselves, and more difficult of enforcement in respect to the island and its occupants, than had been originally contemplated. The Athenians were much distressed for want of water. They had only one really good spring in the fortification of Pylus itself, quite insufficient for the supply of a large fleet: many of them were obliged to scrape the shingle and drink such brackish water as they could find; while ships as well as men were perpetually afloat, since they could take rest and refreshment only by relays successively landing on the rock of Pylus, or even on the edge of Sphakteria itself, with all the chance of being interrupted by the enemy—there being no other landing-place, and the ancient trireme affording no accommodation either for eating or sleeping.

At first, all this was patiently borne, in the hopes that Sphakteria would speedily be starved out, and the Spartans forced to renew the request for capitulation. But no such request came, and the Athenians in the fleet gradually became sick in body as well as impatient and angry in mind. In spite of all their vigilance, clandestine supplies of provisions continually reached the island, under the temptation of large rewards offered by the Spartan government. Able swimmers contrived to cross the strait, dragging after them by ropes skins full of linseed and poppy-seed mixed with honey; while merchant-vessels, chiefly manned by Helots, started from various parts of the Laconian coast, selecting by preference the stormy nights, and encountering every risk in order to run their vessel with its cargo

ashore on the sea side of the island, at a time when the Athenian guard-ships could not be on the lookout. They cared little about damage to their vessel in landing, provided they could get the cargo on shore; for ample compensation was insured them, together with emancipation to every Helot who succeeded in reaching the island with a supply. Though the Athenians redoubled their vigilance, and intercepted many of these daring smugglers, still there were others who eluded them. Moreover the rations supplied to the island by stipulation during the absence of the envoys in their journey to Athens had been so ample, that Epitadas the commander had been able to economize, and thus to make the stock hold out longer. Week after week passed without any symptoms of surrender. The Athenians not only felt the present sufferings of their own position, but also became apprehensive for their own supplies, all brought by sea round Peloponnesus to this distant and naked shore. They began even to mistrust the possibility of thus indefinitely continuing the blockade, against the contingencies of such violent weather as would probably ensue at the close of summer. In this state of weariness and uncertainty, the active Demosthenes began to organize a descent upon the island, with the view of carrying it by force. He not only sent for forces from the neighboring allies, Zakynthus and Naupaktus, but also transmitted an urgent request to Athens that re-enforcements might be furnished to him for the purpose—making known explicitly both the uncomfortable condition of the armament and the unpromising chances of simple blockade.

The arrival of these envoys caused infinite mortification to the Athenians at home. Having expected to hear long before that Sphakteria had surrendered, they were now taught to consider even the ultimate conquest as a matter of doubt. They were surprised that the Lacedæmonians sent no fresh envoys to solicit peace, and began to suspect that such silence was founded upon well-grounded hopes of being able to hold out. But the person most of all discomposed was Kleon, who observed that the people now regretted their insulting repudiation of the Lacedæmonian message, and were displeased with him as the author of it; while on the contrary, his numerous political enemies were rejoiced at the turn events had taken, as it opened a means of effecting his ruin. At first, Kleon contended that the envoys had misrepresented the state of facts. To which the latter replied by entreating, that if their accuracy were mistrusted, commissioners of inspection might be sent to verify it; and Kleon himself, along with Theogenes, was forthwith named for this function.

But it did not suit Kleon's purpose to go as commissioner to Pylus. His mistrust of the statement was a mere general suspicion, not resting on any positive evidence. Moreover he saw that the dispositions of the assembly tended to comply with the request of Demosthenes, and to dispatch a re-enforcing armament. He accordingly altered

his tone at once: "If ye really believe the story (he said), do not waste time in sending commissioners, but sail at once to capture the men. It would be easy with a proper force, if our generals were *men* (here he pointed reproachfully to his enemy Nikias, than Strategus), to sail and take the soldiers in the island. That is what *I* at least would do if *I* were general." His words instantly provoked a hostile murmur from a portion of the assembly: "Why do you not sail then at once, if you think the matter so easy?" Nikias, taking up this murmur, and delighted to have caught his political enemy in a trap, stood forward in person and pressed him to set about the enterprise without delay; intimating the willingness of himself and his colleagues to grant him any portion of the military force of the city which he chose to ask for.

Kleon at first closed with this proposition, believing it to be a mere stratagem of debate and not seriously intended. But so soon as he saw that what was said was really meant, he tried to back out, and observed to Nikias—"It is your place to sail: *you* are general, not I." Nikias only replied by repeating his exhortation, renouncing formally the command against Sphakteria, and calling upon the Athenians to recollect what Kleon had said, as well as to hold him to his engagement. The more Kleon tried to evade the duty, the louder and more unanimous did the cry of the assembly become that Nikias should surrender it to him, and that *he* should undertake it. At last, seeing that there was no possibility of receding, Kleon reluctantly accepted the charge, and came forward to announce his intention in a resolute address—"I am not at all afraid of the Lacedæmonians (he said): I shall sail without even taking with me any of the hoplites from the regular Athenian muster-roll, but only the Lemnian and Imbrian hoplites who are now here (that is, Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens who had properties in Lemnos and Imbros, and habitually resided there), together with some peltasts brought from Ænos in Thrace, and 400 bowmen. With this force, added to what is already at Pylus, I engage in the space of twenty days either to bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria hither as prisoners, or to kill them in the island." The Athenians (observes Thucydides) laughed somewhat at Kleon's looseness of tongue; but prudent men had pleasure in reflecting that one or other of the two advantages was now certain: either they would get rid of Kleon, which they anticipated as the issue at once most probable and most desirable—or if mistaken on this point, the Lacedæmonians in the island would be killed or taken. The vote was accordingly passed for the immediate departure of Kleon, who caused Demosthenes to be named as his colleague in command, and sent intelligence to Pylas at once that he was about to start with the re-enforcement solicited.

This curious scene, interesting as laying open the interior feeling of the Athenian assembly, suggests, when properly considered, reflections very different from those which have been usually connected

with it. It seems to be conceived by most historians as a mere piece of levity or folly in the Athenian people, who are supposed to have enjoyed the excellent joke of putting an incompetent man against his own will at the head of this enterprise, in order that they might amuse themselves with his blunders: Kleon is thus contemptible, and the Athenian people ridiculous. Certainly, if that people had been disposed to conduct their public business upon such childish fancies as are here implied, they would have made a very different figure from that which history actually presents to us. The truth is, that in regard to Kleon's alleged looseness of tongue, which excited more or less of laughter among the persons present, there was no one really ridiculous except the laughers themselves. For the announcement which he made was so far from being extravagant, that it was realized to the letter—and realized too, let us add, without any peculiar aid from unforeseen favorable accident. To illustrate further what is here said, we have only to contrast the jesters before the fact with the jesters after it. While the former deride Kleon as a promiser of extravagant and impossible results, we find Aristophanes (in his comedy of the Knights about six months afterward) laughing at him as having achieved nothing at all—as having cunningly put himself into the shoes of Demosthenes, and stolen away from that general the glory of taking Sphakteria, after all the difficulties of the enterprise had been already got over, and "the cake ready baked"—to use the phrase of the comic poet. Both of the jests are exaggerations in opposite directions; but the last in order of time, if it be good at all against Kleon, is a galling sarcasm against those who derided Kleon as an extravagant boaster.

If we intend fairly to compare the behavior of Kleon with that of his political adversaries, we must distinguish between the two occasions: first, that in which he had frustrated the pacific mission of the Lacedæmonian envoys; next, the subsequent delay and dilemma which has been recently described. On the first occasion, his advice appears to have been mistaken in policy, as well as offensive in manner: his opponents, proposing a discussion by special commissioners as a fair change for honorable terms of peace, took a juster view of the public interests. But the case was entirely altered when the mission for peace (wisely or unwisely) had been broken up, and when the fate of Sphakteria had been committed to the chances of war. There were then imperative reasons for prosecuting the war vigorously, and for employing all the force requisite to insure the capture of that island. And looking to this end, we shall find that there was nothing in the conduct of Kleon either to blame or to deride; while his political adversaries (Nikias among them) are deplorably timid, ignorant, and reckless of the public interest; seeking only to turn the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party-opportunity for ruining him.

To grant the re-enforcement asked for by Demosthenes was obviously

the proper measure, and Kleon saw that the people would go along with him in proposing it. But he had at the same time good grounds for reproaching Nikias and the other Strategi, whose duty it was to originate that proposition, with their backwardness in remaining silent, and in leaving the matter to go by default, as if it were Kleon's affair and not theirs. His taunt—"This is what *I* would have done, if *I* were general"—was a mere phrase of the heat of debate, such as must have been very often used without any idea on the part of the hearers of construing it as a pledge which the speaker was bound to realize. It was no disgrace to Kleon to decline a charge which he had never sought, and to confess his incompetence to command. The reason why he was forced into the post, in spite of his own unaffected reluctance, was not (as some historians would have us believe) because the Athenian people loved a joke, but from two feelings, both perfectly serious, which divided the assembly—feelings opposite in their nature, but coinciding on this occasion to the same result. His enemies loudly urged him forward, anticipating that the enterprise under him would miscarry and that he would thus be ruined: his friends, perceiving this maneuver, but not sharing in such anticipations, and ascribing his reluctance to modesty, pronounced themselves so much the more vehemently on behalf of their leader, and repaid the scornful cheer by cheers of sincere encouragement. "Why do not you try your hand at this enterprise, Kleon, if you think it so easy? you will soon find that it is too much for you"—was the cry of his enemies: to which his friends would reply—"Yes, to be sure, try, Kleon: by all means, try: do not be backward; we warrant that you will come honorably out of it, and we will stand by you." Such cheer and counter-cheer is precisely in the temper of an animated multitude (as Thucydides states it) divided in feeling. Friends as well as enemies thus concurred to impose upon Kleon a compulsion not to be eluded. Of all the parties here concerned, those whose conduct is the most unpardonably disgraceful are Nikias and his oligarchical supporters, who force a political enemy into the supreme command against his own strenuous protest, persuaded that he will fail so as to compromise the lives of many soldiers and the destinies of the state on an important emergency—but satisfying themselves with the idea that they shall bring him to disgrace and ruin.

It is to be remarked that Nikias and his fellow Strategi were backward on this occasion, partly because they were really afraid of the duty. They anticipated a resistance to the death at Sphakteria such as that at Thermopylæ: in which case, though victory might perhaps be won by a superior assailant force, it would not be won without much bloodshed and peril, besides an inexpiable quarrel with Sparta. If Kleon took a more correct measure of the chances, he ought to have credit for it as one "bene ausus vana contemnere." And it seems probable that if he had not been thus forward in support-

ing the request of Demosthenes for re-enforcement—or rather, if he had not been so placed that he was compelled to be forward—Nikias and his friends would have laid aside the enterprise, and reopened negotiations for peace under circumstances neither honorable nor advantageous to Athens. Kleon was in this matter one main author of the most important success which Athens obtained throughout the whole war.

On joining Demosthenes with his re-enforcement, Kleon found every preparation for attack made by that general, and the soldiers at Pylus eager to commence such aggressive measures as would relieve them from the tedium of a blockade. Sphakteria had become recently more open to assault in consequence of an accidental conflagration of the wood, arising from a fire kindled by the Athenian seamen, while landing at the skirt of the island and cooking their food. Under the influence of a strong wind, most of the wood in the island had thus caught fire and been destroyed. To Demosthenes this was an accident especially welcome: for the painful experience of his defeat in the forest-covered hills of Ætolia had taught him how difficult it was for assailants to cope with an enemy whom they could not see, and who knew all the good points of defense in the country. The island being thus stripped of its wood, he was enabled to survey the garrison, to count their number, and to lay his plan of attack on certain data. He now, too, for the first time discovered that he had underrated their real number, having before suspected that the Lacedæmonians had sent in rations for a greater total than was actually there. The island was occupied altogether by 420 Lacedæmonian hoplites, out of whom more than 120 were native Spartans, belonging to the first families in the city. The commander Epitadas, with the main body, occupied the center of the island, near the only spring of water which it afforded: an advanced guard of thirty hoplites was posted not far from the sea-shore in the end of the island farthest from Pylus; while the end immediately fronting Pylus, peculiarly steep and rugged, and containing even a rude circuit of stones, of unknown origin, which served as a sort of defense —was held as a post of reserve.

Such was the prey which Kleon and Demosthenes were anxious to grasp. On the very day of the arrival of the former, they sent a herald to the Lacedæmonian generals on the mainland, inviting the surrender of the hoplites on the island on condition of being simply detained under guard without any hardship, until a final pacification should take place. Of course the summons was refused; after which, leaving only one day for repose, the two generals took advantage of the night to put all their hoplites aboard a few triremes, making show as if they were merely commencing the ordinary nocturnal circumnavigation, so as to excite no suspicion in the occupants of the island. The entire body of the Athenian hoplites, 800 in number, were thus disembarked in two divisions, one on each side of the island, a little

before daybreak: the outposts, consisting of thirty Lacedæmonians, completely unprepared, were surprised even in their sleep, and all slain. At the point of day, the entire remaining force from the seventy-two triremes was also disembarked, leaving on board none but the thalamii or lowest tier of rowers, and reserving only a sufficient number to man the walls of Pylus. Altogether there could not have been less than 10,000 troops employed in the attack on the island—men of all arms: 800 hoplites, 800 peltasts, 800 bowmen; the rest armed with javelins, slings, and stones. Demosthenes kept his hoplites in one compact body, but distributed the light-armed into separate companies of about 200 men each, with orders to occupy the rising grounds all round, and harass the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonians.

To resist this large force, the Lacedæmonian commander Epitadas had only 360 hoplites around him; for his outlying company of thirty men had been slain, and as many more must have been held in reserve to guard the rocky station in his rear. Of the Helots who were with him, Thucydides says nothing during the whole course of the action. As soon as he saw the numbers and disposition of his enemies, Epitadas placed his men in battle array, and advanced to encounter the main body of hoplites whom he saw before him. But the Spartan march was habitually slow: moreover, the ground was rough and uneven, obstructed with stumps, and overlaid with dust and ashes, from the recently burnt wood, so that a march at once rapid and orderly was hardly possible. He had to traverse the whole intermediate space, since the Athenian hoplites remained immovable in their opposition. No sooner had his march commenced, than he found himself assailed both in rear and flanks, especially in the right or unshielded flanks, by the numerous companies of light-armed. Notwithstanding their extraordinary superiority of number, these men were at first awe-stricken at finding themselves in actual contest with Lacedæmonian hoplites. Still they began the fight, poured in their missile weapons, and so annoyed the march that the hoplites were obliged to halt, while Epitadas ordered the most active among them to spring out of their ranks and repel the assailants. But pursuers with spear and shield had little chance of overtaking men lightly clad and armed, who always retired, in whatever direction the pursuit was commenced—had the advantage of difficult ground—redoubled their annoyance against the rear of the pursuers, as soon as the latter retreated to resume their place in the ranks—and always took care to get ground to the rear of the hoplites.

After some experience of the inefficacy of Lacedæmonian pursuit, the light-armed, becoming far bolder than at first, closed upon them nearer and more universally, with arrows, javelins, and stones—raising shouts and clamors that rent the air, rendering the word of command inaudible by the Lacedæmonian soldiers—who at the same time were almost blinded by the thick clouds of dust, kicked up from

the recently spread wood-ashes. Such method of fighting was one for which Lykurgean drill made no provision. The longer it continued, the more painful did the embarrassment of the exposed hoplites become. Their repeated efforts, to destroy, or even to reach nimble and ever-returning enemies, all proved abortive, whilst their own numbers were incessantly diminishing by wounds which they could not return. Their only offensive arms consisted of the long spear and short sword usual to the Grecian hoplite, without any missile weapons whatever; nor could they even pick up and throw back the javelins of their enemies, since the points of these javelins commonly broke off and stuck in the shields, or sometimes even in the body which they had wounded. Moreover, the bows of the archers, doubtless carefully selected before starting from Athens, were powerfully drawn, so that their arrows may sometimes have pierced and inflicted wounds even through the shield or the helmet—but at any rate, the stuffed doublet, which formed the only defense of the hoplite on his unshielded side, was a very inadequate protection against them. Under this trying distress did the Lacedæmonians continue for a long time, poorly provided for defense, and in this particular case altogether helpless for aggression—without being able to approach at all nearer to the Athenian hoplites. At length the Lacedæmonian commander, seeing that his position grew worse and worse, gave orders to close the ranks and retreat to the last redoubt in the rear. But this movement was not accomplished without difficulty, for the light-armed assailants became so clamorous and forward, that many wounded men, unable to move, or at least to keep in rank, were overtaken and slain.

A diminished remnant, however, reached the last post in safety. Here they were in comparative protection, since the ground was so rocky and impracticable that their enemies could attack them neither in flank nor rear; though the position at any rate could not have been long tenable separately, inasmuch as the only spring of water in the island was in the center, which they had just been compelled to abandon. The light-armed being now less available, Demosthenes and Kleon brought up their 800 Athenian hoplites, who had not before been engaged. But the Lacedæmonians were here at home with their weapons, and enabled to display their well-known superiority against opposing hoplites, especially as they had the vantage-ground against enemies charging from beneath. Although the Athenians were double in numbers, and withal yet unexhausted, they were repulsed in many successive attacks. The besieged maintained their ground in spite of all previous fatigue and suffering, harder to be borne from the scanty diet on which they had recently subsisted. The struggle lasted so long that heat and thirst began to tell even upon the assailants, when the commander of the Messenians came to Kleon and Demosthenes, and intimated that they were now laboring in vain; promising at the same time that if they would confide to

him a detachment of light troops and bowmen, he would find his way round to the higher cliffs in the rear of the assailants. He accordingly stole away unobserved from the rear, scrambling round over pathless crags, and by an almost impracticable footing on the brink of the sea, through approaches which the Lacedæmonians had left unguarded, never imagining that they could be molested in that direction. He suddenly appeared with his detachment on the higher peak above them, so that their position was thus commanded, and they found themselves, as at Thermopylæ, between two fires, without any hope of escape. Their enemies in front, encouraged by the success of the Messenians, pressed forward with increased ardor, until at length the courage of the Lacedæmonians gave way, and the position was carried.

A few moments more, and they would have been all overpowered and slain—when Kleon and Demosthenes, anxious to carry them as prisoners to Athens, constrained their men to halt, and proclaimed by herald an invitation to surrender, on condition of delivering up their arms, and being held at the disposal of the Athenians. Most of them, incapable of farther effort, closed with the proposition forthwith, signifying compliance by dropping their shields and waving their hands above their heads. The battle being thus ended, Styphon the commander—originally only third in command, but now chief; since Epitadas had been slain, and the second in command, Hippagretes, was lying disabled by wounds on the field—entered into conference with Kleon and Demosthenes, and entreated permission to send across for orders to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland. The Athenian commanders, though refusing this request, sent a messenger of their own, inviting Lacedæmonian heralds over from the mainland, through whom communications were exchanged twice or three times between Styphon and the chief Lacedæmonian authorities. At length the final message came—"The Lacedæmonians direct you to take counsel for yourselves, but to do nothing disgraceful." Their counsel was speedily taken; they surrendered themselves and delivered up their arms; 292 in number, the survivors of the original total of 420. And out of these no less than 120 were native Spartans, some of them belonging to the first families in the city. They were kept under guard during that night, and distributed on the morrow among the Athenian trierarchs to be conveyed as prisoners to Athens; while a truce was granted to the Lacedæmonians on shore, in order that they might carry across the dead bodies for burial. So careful had Epitadas been in husbanding the provisions, that some food was yet found in the island; though the garrison had subsisted for fifty-two days upon casual supplies, aided by such economies as had been laid by during the twenty days of the armistice, when food of a stipulated quantity was regularly furnished. Seventy-two days had thus elapsed, from the first imprisonment in the island to the hour of their surrender.

The best troops in modern times would neither incur reproach, nor occasion surprise, by surrendering, under circumstances in all respects similar to this gallant remnant in Sphakteria. Yet in Greece the astonishment was prodigious and universal, when it was learnt that the Lacedæmonians had consented to become prisoners. For the terror inspired by their name, and the deepstruck impression of Thermopylæ had created a belief that they would endure any extremity of famine, and perish in the midst of any superiority of hostile force, rather than dream of giving up their arms and surviving as captives. The events of Sphakteria, shocking as they did this preconceived idea, discredited the military prowess of Sparta in the eyes of all Greece, and especially in those of her own allies. Even in Sparta itself, too, the same feeling prevailed—partially revealed in the answer transmitted to Styphon from the generals on shore, who did not venture to forbid surrender, yet discountenanced it by implication. It is certain that the Spartans would have lost less by their death than by their surrender. But we read with disgust the spiteful taunt of one of the allies of Athens (not an Athenian) engaged in the affair, addressed in the form of a question to one of the prisoners—"Have your best men then been all slain?" The reply conveyed an intimation of the standing contempt entertained by the Lacedæmonians for the bow and its chance-strokes in the line—"That would be a capital arrow which could single out the best man." The language which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Demaratus, composed in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, attests this same belief in Spartan valor—"The Lacedæmonians die, but never surrender." Such impression was from henceforward, not indeed effaced, but sensibly enfeebled, nor was it ever again restored to its full former pitch.

But the general judgment of the Greeks respecting the capture of Sphakteria, remarkable as it is to commemorate, is far less surprising than that pronounced by Thucydides himself. Kleon and Demosthenes returning with a part of the squadron and carrying all the prisoners, started from Sphakteria on the next day but one after the action, and reached Athens within twenty days after Kleon had left it. Thus "the promise of Kleon, *insane as it was*, came true"—observes the historian.

Men with arms in their hands have always the option between death and imprisonment, and Grecian opinion was only mistaken in assuming as a certainty that the Lacedæmonians would choose the former. But Kleon had never promised to bring them home as prisoners: his promise was disjunctive—that they should be either so brought home, or slain, within twenty days. No sentence throughout the whole of Thucydides astonishes me so much as that in which he stigmatizes such an expectation as "insane." Here are 420 Lacedæmonian hoplites, without any other description of troops to aid them—without the possibility of being re-enforced—without any regular fortification—

without any narrow pass such as that of Thermopylæ—without either a sufficient or a certain supply of food—cooped up in a small open island less than two miles in length. Against them are brought 10,000 troops of divers arms, including 800 fresh hoplites from Athens, and marshaled by Demosthenes, a man alike enterprising and experienced. For the talents as well as the presence and preparations of Demosthenes are a part of the data of the case, and the personal competence of Kleon to command alone is foreign to the calculation. Now if, under such circumstances, Kleon engaged that this forlorn company of brave men should be either slain or taken prisoners, how could he be looked upon, I will not say as indulging in an insane boast, but even as overstepping a cautious and mistrustful estimate of probability? Even to doubt of this result, much more to pronounce such an opinion as that of Thucydides, implies an idea not only of superhuman power in the Lacedæmonian hoplites, but a disgraceful incapacity on the part of Demosthenes and the assailants. The interval of twenty days, named by Kleon, was not extravagantly narrow, considering the distance of Athens from Pylus. For the attack of this petty island could not possibly occupy more than one or two days at the utmost, though the blockade of it might by various accidents have been prolonged, or might even, by some terrible storm, be altogether broken off. If, then, we carefully consider this promise, made by Kleon to the assembly, we shall find that so far from deserving the sentence pronounced upon it by Thucydides, of being a mad boast which came true by accident—it was a reasonable and even a modest anticipation of the future: reserving the only really doubtful point in the case—whether the garrison of the island would be ultimately slain or made prisoners. Demosthenes, had he been present at Athens instead of being at Pylus, would willingly have set his seal to the engagement taken by Kleon.

I repeat with reluctance, though not without belief, the statement made by one of the biographers of Thucydides—that Kleon was the cause of the banishment of the latter as a general, and has therefore received from him harder measure than was due in his capacity of historian. But though this sentiment is not probably without influence in dictating the unaccountable judgment which I have just been criticising—as well as other opinions relative to Kleon, on which I shall say more in a future chapter—I nevertheless look upon that judgment not as peculiar to Thucydides, but as common to him with Nikias and those whom we must call, for want of a better name, the oligarchical party of the time at Athens. And it gives us some measure of the prejudice and narrowness of vision which prevailed among that party at the present memorable crisis; so pointedly contrasting with the clear-sighted and resolute calculations, and the judicious conduct in action, of Kleon, who, when forced against his will into the post of general, did the very best which could be done in his situation—he selected Demosthenes as colleague and heartily seconded

his operations. Though the military attack of Sphakteria, one of the ablest specimens of generalship in the whole war, and distinguished not less by the dexterous employment of different descriptions of troops than by care to spare the lives of the assailants—belongs altogether to Demosthenes; yet if Kleon had not been competent to stand up in the Athenian assembly and defy those gloomy predictions which we see attested in Thucydides, Demosthenes would never have been re-enforced nor placed in condition to land on the island. The glory of the enterprise, therefore, belongs jointly to both. Kleon, far from stealing away the laurels of Demosthenes (as Aristophanes represents in his comedy of the Knights), was really the means of placing them on his head, though he at the same time deservedly shared them. It has hitherto been the practice to look at Kleon only from the point of view of his opponents, through whose testimony we know him. But the real fact is that this history of the events of Sphakteria, when properly surveyed, is a standing disgrace to those opponents, and no inconsiderable honor to him; exhibiting them as alike destitute of political foresight and of straightforward patriotism—as sacrificing the opportunities of war, along with the lives of their fellow-citizens and soldiers, for the purpose of ruining a political enemy. It was the duty of Nikias, as Strategus, to propose, and undertake in person if necessary, the reduction of Sphakteria. If he thought the enterprise dangerous, that was a good reason for assigning to it a larger military force, as we shall find him afterward reasoning about the Sicilian expedition—but not for letting it slip or throwing it off upon others.

The return of Kleon and Demosthenes to Athens, within the twenty days promised, bringing with them nearly 300 Lacedæmonian prisoners, must have been by far the most triumphant and exhilarating event which had occurred to the Athenians throughout the whole war. It at once changed the prospects, position, and feelings of both the contending parties. Such a number of Lacedæmonian prisoners, especially 120 Spartans, was a source of almost stupefaction to the general body of Greeks, and a prize of inestimable value to the captors. The return of Demosthenes in the preceding year from the Ambrakian Gulf, when he brought with him 300 Ambrakian panoplies, had probably been sufficiently triumphant. But the entry into Peiræus on this occasion from Sphakteria, with 300 Lacedæmonian prisoners, must doubtless have occasioned emotions transcending all former experience. It is much to be regretted that no description is preserved to us of the scene, as well as of the elate manifestations of the people when the prisoners were marched up from Peiræus to Athens. We should be curious also to read some account of the first Athenian assembly held after this event—the overwhelming cheers heaped upon Kleon by his joyful partisans, who had helped to invest him with the duties of general, in confidence that he would discharge them well—contrasted with the silence or retractation of

Nikias and the other humiliated political enemies. But all such details are unfortunately denied to us—though they constitute the blood and animation of Grecian history, now lying before us only in its skeleton.

The first impulse of the Athenians was to regard the prisoners as a guarantee to their territory against invasion. They resolved to keep them securely guarded until the peace; but if at any time before that event the Lacedæmonian army should enter Attica, then to bring forth the prisoners, and put them to death in sight of the invaders. They were at the same time full of spirits in regard to the prosecution of the war, and became further confirmed in the hope, not merely of preserving their power undiminished, but even of recovering much of what they had lost before the Thirty years' truce. Pylus was placed in an improved state of defense, with the adjoining island of Sphakteria doubtless as a subsidiary occupation. The Messenians, transferred thither from Naupaktus, and overjoyed to find themselves once more masters even of an outlying rock of their ancestorial territory, began with alacrity to overrun and ravage Laconia: while the Helots, shaken by the recent events, manifested inclination to desert to them. The Lacedæmonian authorities, experiencing evils before unfelt and unknown, became sensibly alarmed lest such desertions should spread through the country. Reluctant as they were to afford obvious evidence of their embarrassments, they nevertheless brought themselves (probably under the pressure of the friends and relatives of the Sphakterian captives) to send to Athens several missions for peace; but all proved abortive. We are not told what they offered, but it did not come up to the expectations which the Athenians thought themselves entitled to indulge.

We, who now review these facts with a knowledge of the subsequent history, see that the Athenians could have concluded a better bargain with the Lacedæmonians during the six or eight months succeeding the capture of Sphakteria, than it was ever open to them to make afterward: and they had reason to repent letting slip the opportunity. Perhaps indeed Perikles, had he been still alive, might have taken a more prudent measure of the future, and might have had ascendency enough over his countrymen to be able to arrest the tide of success at its highest point, before it began to ebb again.

But if we put ourselves back into the situation of Athens during the autumn which succeeded the return of Kleon and Demosthenes from Sphakteria, we shall easily enter into the feelings under which the war was continued. The actual possession of the captives now placed Athens in a far better position than she had occupied when they were only blocked up in Sphakteria, and when the Lacedæmonian envoys first arrived to ask for peace. She was now certain of being able to command peace with Sparta on terms at least tolerable, whenever she chose to invite it—she had also a fair certainty of escaping the hardship of invasion. Next—and this was perhaps the

most important feature of the case—the apprehension of Lacedæmonian prowess was now greatly lowered, and the prospects of success to Athens considered as prodigiously improved, even in the estimation of impartial Greeks: much more in the eyes of the Athenians themselves. Moreover, the idea of a tide of good fortune—of the favor of the gods now begun and likely to continue—of future success as a corollary from past—was one which powerfully affected Grecian calculations generally. Why not push the present good fortune and try to regain the most important points lost before and by the Thirty years' truce, especially in Megara and Bœotia—points which Sparta could not concede by negotiation, since they were not in her possession? Though these speculations failed (as we shall see in the coming chapter), yet there was nothing unreasonable in acting upon them, Probably the almost universal sentiment of Athens was at this moment warlike. Even Nikias, humiliated as he must have been by the success in Sphakteria, would forget his usual caution in the desire of retrieving his own personal credit by some military exploit. That Demosthenes, now in full measure of esteem, would be eager to prosecute the war, with which his prospects of personal glory were essentially associated (just as Thucydides observes about Brasidias on the Lacedæmonian side), can admit of no doubt. The comedy of Aristophanes called the Acharnians was acted about six months before the affair of Sphakteria, when no one could possibly look forward to such an event—the comedy of the Knights about six months after it. Now there is this remarkable difference between the two—that while the former breathes the greatest sickness of war, and presses in every possible way the importance of making peace, although at that time Athens had no opportunity of coming even to a decent accommodation—the latter, running down the general character of Kleon with unmeasured scorn and ridicule, talks in one or two places only of the hardships of war, and drops altogether that emphasis and repetition with which peace had been dwelt upon in the Acharnians—although coming out at a moment when peace was within the reach of the Athenians.

To understand properly the history of this period, therefore, we must distinguish various occasions which are often confounded. At the moment when Sphakteria was first blockaded, and when the Lacedæmonians first sent to solicit peace, there was a considerable party at Athens disposed to entertain the offer. The ascendency of Kleon was one of the main causes why it was rejected. But after the captives were brought home from Sphakteria, the influence of Kleon, though positively greater than it had been before, was no longer required to procure the dismissal of Lacedæmonian pacific offers and the continuance of the war. The general temper of Athens was then warlike, and there were very few to contend strenuously for an opposite policy. During the ensuing year, however, the chances of war turned out mostly unfavorable to Athens, so that

by the end of that year she had become much more disposed to peace. The truce for one year was then concluded. But even after that truce was expired, Kleon still continued eager (and on good grounds, as will be shown hereafter) for renewing the war in Thrace, at a time when a large proportion of the Athenian public had grown weary of it. He was one of the main causes of that resumption of warlike operations which ended in the battle of Amphipolis, fatal both to himself and to Brasidas. There were thus two distinct occasions on which the personal influence and sanguine character of Kleon seems to have been of sensible moment in determining the Athenian public to war instead of peace. But at the moment which we have now reached—that is, the year immediately following the capture of Sphakteria—the Athenians were sufficiently warlike without him; probably Nikias himself as well as the rest.

It was one of the earliest proceedings of Nikias, immediately after the inglorious exhibition which he had made in reference to Sphakteria, to conduct an expedition, in conjunction with two colleagues, against the Corinthian territory. He took with him 80 triremes, 2,000 Athenian hoplites, 200 horsemen aboard of some horse-transports, and some additional hoplites from Miletus, Andros, and Karystus. Starting from Peiræus in the evening, he arrived a little before daybreak on a beach at the foot of the hill and village of Solygeia, about seven miles from Corinth, and two or three miles south of the Isthmus. The Corinthian troops, from all the territory of Corinth within the Isthmus, were already assembled at the Isthmus itself to repel him; for intelligence of the intended expedition had reached Corinth some time before from Argos, with which latter place the scheme of the expedition may have been in some way connected. The Athenians having touched the coast during the darkness, the Corinthians were only apprised of the fact by fire-signals from Solygeia. Not being able to hinder the landing, they dispatched forthwith half their forces, under Battus and Lykophron, to repel the invader, while the remaining half were left at the harbor of Kenchreæ, on the northern side of Mount Oneion, to guard the port of Krommyon (outside of the Isthmus) in case it should be attacked by sea. Battus with one lochus of hoplites threw himself into the village of Solygeia, which was unfortified, while Lykophron conducted the remaining troops to attack the Athenians. The battle was first engaged on the Athenian right, almost immediately after its landing, on the point called Chersonesus. Here the Athenian hoplites, together with their Karystian allies, repelled the Corinthian attack, after a stout and warmly disputed hand-combat of spear and shield. Nevertheless the Corinthians, retreating up to a higher point of ground, returned to the charge, and with the aid of a fresh lochus drove the Athenians back to the shore and to their ships: from hence the latter again turned, and again recovered a partial advantage. The battle was no less severe on the left wing of the Athenians. But here, after a contest

of some length, the latter gained a more decided victory, greatly by the aid of their cavalry—pursuing the Corinthians, who fled in some disorder to a neighboring hill and there took up a position. The Athenians were thus victorious throughout the whole line, with the loss of about forty-seven men, while the Corinthians had lost 212, together with the general Lykophron. The victors erected their trophy, stripped the dead bodies and buried their own dead. The Corinthian detachment left at Kenchreæ could not see the battle, in consequence of the interposing ridge of Mount Oneium: but it was at last made known to them by the dust of the fugitives, and they forthwith hastened to afford help. Re-enforcements also came both from Corinth and from Kenchreæ, and as it seems too, from the neighboring Peloponnesian cities—so that Nikias thought it prudent to retire on board of his ships, and halt upon some neighboring islands. It was here first discovered that two of the Athenians slain had not been picked up for burial; upon which he immediately sent a herald to solicit a truce, in order to procure these two missing bodies. We have here a remarkable proof of the sanctity attached to that duty: for the mere sending of the herald was tantamount to confession of defeat.

From hence Nikias sailed to Krommyon, where after ravaging the neighborhood for a few hours he rested for the night. On the next day he re-embarked, sailed along the coast of Epidaurus, upon which he inflicted some damage in passing, and stopped at last on the peninsula of Methana, between Epidaurus and Trœzen. On this peninsula he established a permanent garrison, drawing a fortification across the narrow neck of land which joined it to the Epidaurian peninsula. This was his last exploit. He then sailed home: but the post at Methana long remained as a center for pillaging the neighboring regions of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Halieis.

While Nikias was engaged in this expedition, Eurymedon and Sophokles had sailed forward from Pylus with a considerable portion of that fleet which had been engaged in the capture of Sphakteria, to the island of Korkyra. It has been already stated that the democratical government at Korkyra had been suffering severe pressure and privation from the oligarchical fugitives, who had come back into the island with a body of barbaric auxiliaries, and established themselves upon Mount Istone, not far from the city. Eurymedon and the Athenians, joining the Korkyræans in the city, attacked and stormed the post on Mount Istone; while the vanquished, retiring first to a lofty and inaccessible peak, were forced to surrender themselves on terms to the Athenians. Abandoning altogether their mercenary auxiliaries, they only stipulated that they should themselves be sent to Athens, and left to the discretion of the Athenian people. Eurymedon, assenting to these terms, deposited the disarmed prisoners in the neighboring islet of Ptychia, under the distinct condition that if a single man tried to escape, the whole capitulation should be null and void.

Unfortunately for these men, the orders given to Eurymedon carried him onward straight to Sicily. It was irksome therefore to him to send away a detachment of his squadron to convey prisoners to Athens; where the honors of delivering them would be reaped, not by himself, but by the officer to whom they might be confided. And the Korkyræans in the city, on their part, were equally anxious that the men should not be sent to Athens. Their animosity against them being bitter in the extreme, they were afraid that the Athenians might spare their lives, so that their hostility against the island might be again resumed. And thus a mean jealousy on the part of Eurymedon, combined with revenge and insecurity on the part of the victorious Korkyræans, brought about a cruel catastrophe, paralleled nowhere else in Greece, though too well in keeping with the previous acts of the bloody drama enacted in this island.

The Korkyræan leaders, seemingly not without the privity of Eurymedon, sent across to Ptychia fraudulent emissaries under the guise of friends to the prisoners. These emissaries,—assuring the prisoners that the Athenian commanders, in spite of the convention signed, were about to hand them over to the Korkyræan people for destruction,—induced some of them to attempt escape in a boat prepared for the purpose. By concert, the boat was seized in the act of escaping, so that the terms of the capitulation were really violated: upon which Eurymedon handed over the prisoners to their enemies in the island, who imprisoned them all together in one vast building, under guard of hoplites. From this building they were drawn out in companies of twenty men each, chained together in couples, and compelled to march between two lines of hoplites marshaled on each side of the road. Those who loitered in the march were hurried on by whips from behind: as they advanced, their private enemies on both sides singled them out, striking and piercing them until at length they miserably perished. Three successive companies were thus destroyed —ere the remaining prisoners in the interior, who thought merely that their place of detention was about to be changed, suspected what was passing. As soon as they found it out, one and all refused either to quit the building or to permit any one else to enter. They at the same time piteously implored the intervention of the Athenians, if it were only to kill them and thus preserve them from the cruelties of their merciless countrymen. The latter, abstaining from attempts to force the door of the building, made an aperture in the roof, from whence they shot down arrows, and poured showers of tiles upon the prisoners within; who sought at first to protect themselves, but at length abandoned themselves to despair, and assisted with their own hands in the work of destruction. Some of them pierced their throats with the arrows shot down from the roof; others hung themselves, either with cords from some bedding which happened to be in the building, or with strips torn and twisted from their own garments. Night came on, but the work of destruction, both from above and

within, was continued without intermission, so that before morning all these wretched men had perished, either by the hands of their enemies or by their own. At daybreak the Korkyræans entered the building, piled up the dead bodies on carts, and transported them out of the city: the exact number we are not told, but seemingly it cannot have been less than 300. The women who had been taken at Istone along with these prisoners were all sold as slaves.

Thus finished the bloody dissensions in this ill-fated island: for the oligarchical party were completely annihilated, the democracy was victorious, and there were no farther violences throughout the whole war. It will be recollected that these deadly feuds began with the return of the oligarchical prisoners from Corinth, bringing along with them projects both of treason and of revolution. They ended with the annihilation of that party, in the manner above described; the interval being filled by mutual atrocities and retaliation, wherein of course the victors had most opportunity of gratifying their vindictive passions. Eurymedon, after the termination of these events, proceeded onward with the Athenian squadron to Sicily. What he did there will be described in a future chapter devoted to Sicilian affairs exclusively.

The complete prostration of Ambrakia during the campaign of the preceding year had left Anaktorium without any defense against the Akarnanians and Athenian squadron from Naupaktus. They besieged and took it during the course of the present summer; expelling the Corinthian proprietors, and re-peopling the town and its territory with Akarnanian settlers from all the townships in the country.

Throughout the maritime empire of Athens matters continued perfectly tranquil, except that the inhabitants of Chios, during the course of the autumn, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians from having recently built a new wall to their city, as if it were done with the intention of taking the first opportunity to revolt. They solemnly protested their innocence of any such designs, but the Athenians were not satisfied without exacting the destruction of the obnoxious wall. The presence on the opposite continent of an active band of Mitylenæan exiles, who captured both Rhœteium and Antandrus during the ensuing spring, probably made the Athenians more anxious and vigilant on the subject of Chios.

The Athenian regular tribute-gathering squadron, circulating among the maritime subjects, captured, during the course of the present autumn, a prisoner of some importance and singularity. It was a Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, seized at Eion on the Strymon, in his way to Sparta with dispatches from the Great King. He was brought to Athens, where his dispatches, which were at some length and written in the Assyrian character, were translated and made public. The Great King told the Lacedæmonians, in substance, that he could not comprehend what they meant; for that among the numerous envoys whom they had sent, no two told the same story. Accordingly he desired them, if they wished to make themselves understood, to send some envoys with fresh and plain instructions to accompany Artaphernes. Such was the substance of the dispatch, conveying a remarkable testimony as to the march of the Lacedæmonian government in its foreign policy. Had any similar testimony existed respecting Athens, demonstrating that her foreign policy was conducted with half as much unsteadiness and stupidity, ample inferences would have been drawn from it to the discredit of democracy. But there has been no motive generally to discredit Lacedæmonian institutions, which included kingship in double measure—two parallel lines of hereditary kings; together with an entire exemption from everything like popular discussion. The extreme defects in the foreign management of Sparta, revealed by the dispatch of Artaphernes, seem traceable partly to an habitual faithlessness often noted in the Lacedæmonian character—partly to the annual change of Ephors, so frequently bringing into power men who strove to undo what had been done by their predecessors—and still more to the absence of everything like discussion or canvass of public measures among the citizens. We shall find more than one example, in the history about to follow, of this disposition on the part of Ephors not merely to change the policy of their predecessors, but even to subvert treaties sworn and concluded by them. Such was the habitual secrecy of Spartan public business, that in doing this they had neither criticism nor discussion to fear. Brasidas, when he started from Sparta on the expedition which will be described in the coming chapter, could not trust the assurances of the Lacedæmonian executive without binding them by the most solemn oaths.

The Athenians sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and availed themselves of this opportunity for procuring access to the Great King. They sent envoys along with him, with the intention that they should accompany him up to Susa; but on reaching Asia, the news met them that King Artaxerxes had recently died. Under such circumstances, it was not judged expedient to prosecute the mission, and the Athenians dropped their design.

Respecting the great monarchy of Persia, during this long interval of fifty-four years since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece, we have little information before us except the names of the successive kings. In the year 465 B.C., Xerxes was assassinated by Artabanus and Mithridates, through one of those plots of great household officers, so frequent in Oriental palaces. He left two sons, or at least two sons present and conspicuous among a greater number, Darius and Artaxerxes. But Artabanus persuaded Artaxerxes that Darius had been the murderer of Xerxes, and thus prevailed upon him to revenge his father's death by becoming an accomplice in killing his brother Darius: he next tried to assassinate Artaxerxes himself, and to

appropriate the crown. Artaxerxes, however, being apprised beforehand of the scheme, either slew Artabanus with his own hand or procured him to be slain, and then reigned (known under the name of Artaxerxes Longimanus) for forty years, down to the period at which we are now arrived.

Mention has already been made of the revolt of Egypt from the dominion of Artaxerxes, under the Libyan prince Inarus, actively aided by the Athenians. After a few years of success, this revolt was crushed and Egypt again subjugated, by the energy of the Persian general Megabyzus—with severe loss to the Athenian forces engaged. After the peace of Kallias, erroneously called the Kimonian peace, between the Athenians and the king of Persia, war had not been since resumed. We read in Ktesias, amid various anecdotes seemingly collected at the court of Susa, romantic adventures ascribed to Megabyzus, his wife Amytis, his mother Amestris, and a Greek physician of Kos, named Apollonides. Zopyrus son of Megabyzus, after the death of his father, deserted from Persia and came as an exile to Athens.

At the death of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the family violences incident to a Persian succession were again exhibited. His son Xerxes succeeded him, but was assassinated, after a reign of a few weeks or months. Another son, Sogdianus, followed, who perished in like manner after a short interval. Lastly, a third son, Ochus (known under the name of Darius Nothus), either abler or more fortunate, kept his crown and life between nineteen and twenty years. By his queen the savage Parysatis, he was father to Artaxerxes Mnemon and Cyrus the younger, both names of interest in reference to Grecian history, to whom we shall hereafter recur

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CHAPTER LIII.

EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE eighth year of the war, on which we now touch, presents events of a more important and decisive character than any of the preceding. In reviewing the preceding years we observe that though there is much fighting, with hardship and privation inflicted on both sides, yet the operations are mostly of a desultory character, not calculated to determine the event of the war. But the capture of Sphakteria and its prisoners, coupled with the surrender of the whole Lacedæmonian fleet, was an event full of consequences and imposing in the eyes of all Greece. It stimulated the Athenians to a series of operations, larger and more ambitious than anything which they had yet conceived—directed, not merely against Sparta in her

own country, but also to the reconquest of that ascendency in Megara and Bœotia which they had lost on or before the Thirty years' truce. On the other hand, it intimidated so much both the Lacedæmonians, the revolted Chalkidic allies of Athens in Thrace, and Perdikkas king of Macedonia—that between them the expedition of Brasidas, which struck so serious a blow at the Athenian empire, was concerted. This year is thus the turning-point of the war. If the operations of Athens had succeeded, she would have regained nearly as great a power as she enjoyed before the Thirty years' truce. But it happened that Sparta, or rather the Spartan Brasidas, proved successful, gaining enough to neutralize all the advantages derived by Athens from the capture of Sphakteria.

The first enterprise undertaken by the Athenians in the course of the spring was against the island of Kythera, on the southern coast of Laconia. It was inhabited by Lacedæmonian Periœki, and administered by a governor and garrison of hoplites annually sent thither. It was the usual point of landing for merchantmen from Libya and Egypt; and as it lay very near to Cape Malea, immediately over against the Gulf of Gythium—the only accessible portion of the generally inhospitable coast of Laconia—the chance that it might fall into the hands of an enemy was considered as so menacing to Sparta, that some politicians are said to have wished the island at the bottom of the sea. Nikias, in conjunction with Nikostratus and Autokles, conducted thither a fleet of sixty triremes, with 2,000 Athenian hoplites, some few horsemen, and a body of allies mainly Milesians.

There were in the island two towns—Kythera and Skandeia; the former having a lower town close to the sea, fronting Cape Malea, and an upper town on the hill above; the latter seemingly on the south or west coast. Both were attacked at the same time by order of Nikias: ten triremes and a body of Milesian hoplites disembarked and captured Skandeia; while the Athenians landed at Kythera, and drove the inhabitants out of the lower town into the upper, where they speedily capitulated. A certain party among them had, indeed, secretly invited the coming of Nikias, through which intrigue easy terms were obtained for the inhabitants. Some few men, indicated by the Kytherians in intelligence with Nikias, were carried away as prisoners to Athens; but the remainder were left undisturbed and enrolled among the tributary allies under obligation to pay four talents per annum; an Athenian garrison being placed at Kythera for the protection of the island. From hence Nikias employed seven days in descents and inroads upon the coast, near Helos, Asine, Aphrodisia, Kotyrta, and elsewhere. The Lacedæmonian force was disseminated in petty garrisons, which remained each for the defense of its own separate post, without uniting to repel the Athenians, so that there was only one action, and that of little importance, which the Athenians deemed worthy of a trophy.

In returning home from Kythera, Nikias first ravaged the small

strip of cultivated land near Epidaurus Limera, on the rocky eastern coast of Laconia, and then attacked the Æginetan settlement at Thyrea, the frontier strip between Laconia and Argolis. This town and district had been made over by Sparta to the Æginetans, at the time when they were expelled from their own island by Athens in the first year of the war. The new inhabitants, finding the town too distant from the sea for their maritime habits, were now employed in constructing a fortification close on the shore; in which work a Lacedæmonian detachment under Tantalus, on guard in that neighborhood, was assisting them. When the Athenians landed, both Æginetans and Lacedæmonians at once abandoned the new fortification. The Æginetans, with the commanding officer Tantalus, occupied the upper town of Thyrea; but the Lacedæmonian troops, not thinking it tenable, refused to take part in the defense, and retired to the neighboring mountains, in spite of urgent entreaty from the Æginetans. Immediately after landing, the Athenians marched up to the town of Thyrea, and carried it by storm, burning or destroying everything within it. All the Æginetans were either killed or made prisoners, and even Tantalus, disabled by his wounds, became prisoner also. From hence the armament returned to Athens, where a vote was taken as to the disposal of the prisoners. The Kytherians brought home were distributed for safe custody among the dependent islands: Tantalus was retained along with the prisoners from Sphakteria; but a harder fate was reserved for the Æginetans. They were all put to death, victims to the long-standing antipathy between Athens and Ægina. This cruel act was nothing more than a strict application of admitted customs of war in those days. Had the Lacedæmonians been the victors, there can be little doubt that they would have acted with equal rigor.

The occupation of Kythera, in addition to Pylus, by an Athenian garrison, following so closely upon the capital disaster in Sphakteria, produced in the minds of the Spartans feelings of alarm and depression such as they had never before experienced. Within the course of a few short months their position had completely changed from superiority and aggression abroad, to insult and insecurity at home. They anticipated nothing less than incessant foreign attacks on all their weak points, with every probability of internal defection, from the standing discontent of the Helots. It was not unknown to them probably that even Kythera itself had been lost partly through betrayal. The capture of Sphakteria had caused peculiar emotion among the Helots, to whom the Lacedæmonians had addressed both appeals and promises of emancipation, in order to procure succor for their hoplites while blockaded in the island. If the ultimate surrender of these hoplites had abated the terrors of Lacedæmonian prowess throughout all Greece, such effect had been produced to a still greater degree among the oppressed Helots. A refuge at Pylus, and a nucleus which presented some possibility of expanding into regenerated Messenia, were now before their eyes; while the establishment of an Athenian garrison at Kythera opened a new channel of communication with the enemies of Sparta, so as to tempt all the Helots of daring temper to stand forward as liberators of their enslaved race. The Lacedæmonians, habitually cautious at all times, felt now as if the tide of fortune had turned decidedly against them, and acted with confirmed mistrust and dismay—confining themselves to measures strictly defensive, but organizing a force of 400 cavalry, together with a body of bowmen, beyond their ordinary establishment.

The precautions which they thought it necessary to take in regard to the Helots afford the best measure of their apprehensions at the moment, and exhibit, moreover, a refinement of fraud and cruelty rarely equaled in history. Wishing to single out from the general body such as were most high-courageous and valiant, the Ephors made proclamation, that those Helots, who conceived themselves to have earned their liberty by distinguished services in war, might stand forward to claim it. A considerable number obeyed the call—probably many who had undergone imminent hazards during the preceding summer in order to convey provisions to the blockaded soldiers in Sphakteria. After being examined by the government, 2,000 of them were selected as fully worthy of emancipation; which was forthwith bestowed upon them in public ceremonial—with garlands, visits to the temples, and the full measure of religious solemnity. The government had now made the selection which it desired; presently every man among these newly enfranchised Helots was made away with—no one knew how. A stratagem at once so perfidious in the contrivance, so murderous in the purpose, and so complete in the execution, stands without parallel in Grecian history—we might almost say, without a parallel in any history. It implies a depravity far greater than the rigorous execution of a barbarous customary law against prisoners of war or rebels, even in large numbers. The Ephors must have employed numerous instruments, apart from each other, for the performance of this bloody deed. Yet it appears that no certain knowledge could be obtained of the details—a striking proof of the mysterious efficiency of this Council of Five, surpassing even that of the Council of Ten at Venice—as well as of the utter absence of public inquiry or discussion.

It was while the Lacedæmonians were in this state of uneasiness at home that envoys reached them from Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Chalkidians of Thrace, entreating aid against Athens; who was considered likely, in her present tide of success, to resume aggressive measures against them. There were, moreover, other parties, in the neighboring cities subject to Athens, who secretly favored the application, engaging to stand forward in open revolt as soon as any auxiliary force should arrive to warrant their incurring the hazard. Perdikkas (who had on his hands a dispute with his kinsman Arrhibæus, prince of the Lynkestæ-Macedonians, which he was anxious to

be enabled to close successfully) and the Chalkidians offered at the same time to provide the pay and maintenance, as well as to facilitate the transit, of the troops who might be sent to them. And—what was of still greater importance to the success of the enterprise—they specially requested that Brasidas might be invested with the command. He had now recovered from his wounds received at Pylus, and his reputation for adventurous valor, great as it was from positive desert, stood out still more conspicuously, because not a single other Spartan had as yet distinguished himself. His other great qualities, apart from personal valor, had not yet been shown, for he had never been in any supreme command. But he burned with impatience to undertake the operation destined for him by the envoys; although at this time it must have appeared so replete with difficulty and danger, that probably no other Spartan except himself would have entered upon it with hopes of success. To raise up embarrassments for Athens in Thrace was an object of great consequence to Sparta, while she also obtained an opportunity of sending away another large detachment of dangerous Helots. Seven hundred of these latter were armed as hoplites and placed under the orders of Brasidas, but the Lacedæmonians would not assign to him any of their own proper forces. With the sanction of the Spartan name—with 700 Helot hoplites, and with such other hoplites as he could raise in Peloponnesus by means of the funds furnished from the Chalkidians—Brasidas prepared to undertake this expedition, alike adventurous and important.

Had the Athenians entertained any suspicion of his designs, they could easily have prevented him from ever reaching Thrace. But they knew nothing of it until he had actually joined Perdikkas, nor did they anticipate any serious attack from Sparta, in this moment of her depression—much less an enterprise far bolder than any which she had ever been known to undertake. They were now elate with hopes of conquests to come on their own part—their affairs being so prosperous and promising, that parties favorable to their interests began to revive, both in Megara and in Bœotia; while Hippokrates and Demosthenes, the two chief strategi for the year, were men of energy, well qualified both to project and execute military achievements.

The first opportunity presented itself in regard to Megara. The inhabitants of that city had been greater sufferers by the war than any other persons in Greece. They had been the chief cause of bringing down the war upon Athens, and the Athenians revenged upon them all the hardships which they themselves endured from the Lacedæmonian invasion. Twice in every year they laid waste the Megarid, which bordered upon their own territory; and that, too, with such destructive efficacy throughout its limited extent that they intercepted all subsistence from the lands near the town—at the same time keeping the harbor of Nisæa closely blocked up. Under such

bad conditions the Megarians found much difficulty in supplying even the primary wants of life. But their case had now, within the last few months, become still more intolerable by an intestine commotion in the city, ending in the expulsion of a powerful body of exiles, who seized and held possession of Pegæ, the Megarian port in the Gulf of Corinth. Probably imports from Pegæ had been their chief previous resource against the destruction which came on them from the side of Athens; so that it became scarcely possible to sustain themselves, when the exiles in Pegæ not only deprived them of this resource, but took positive part in harassing them. These exiles were oligarchical, and the government in Megara had now become more or less democratical. But the privations in the city presently reached such a height, that several citizens began to labor for a compromise, whereby the exiles in Pegæ might be readmitted. It was evident to the leaders in Megara that the bulk of the citizens could not long sustain the pressure of enemies from both sides—but it was also their feeling, that the exiles in Pegæ, their bitter political rivals, were worse enemies than the Athenians, and that the return of these exiles would be a sentence of death to themselves. To prevent this counter-revolution, they opened a secret correspondence with Hippokrates and Demosthenes, engaging to betray both Megara and Nisæa to the Athenians; though Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, about one mile from the city, was a separate fortress, occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison, and by them exclusively, as well as the Long Walls—for the purpose of holding Megara first to the Lacedæmonian confederacy.

The scheme for surprise was concerted, and what is more remarkable—in the extreme publicity of all Athenian affairs, and in a matter to which many persons must have been privy—was kept secret until the instant of execution. A large Athenian force, 4,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry, was appointed to march at night by the high road through Eleusis to Megara; but Hippokrates and Demosthenes themselves went on ship-board from Peiræus to the island of Minoa, which was close against Nisæa, and had been for some time under occupation by an Athenian garrison. Here Hippokrates concealed himself with 600 hoplites, in a hollow out of which brick earth had been dug, on the mainland opposite to Minoa, and not far from the gate in the Long Wall which opened near the junction of that wall with the ditch and wall surrounding Nisæa; while Demosthenes, with some light-armed Platæans and a detachment of active young Athenians (called Peripoli, and serving as the movable guard of Attica) in their first or second year of military service, placed himself in ambush in the sacred precincts of Ares, still closer to the same gate.

To procure that the gate should be opened, was the task of the conspirators within. Amid the shifts to which the Megarians had been reduced in order to obtain supplies (especially since the blockading

force had been placed at Minoa), predatory sally by night was not omitted. Some of these conspirators had been in the habit, before the intrigue with Athens was projected, of carrying out a small sculler-boat by night upon a cart, through this gate, by permission of the Peloponnesian commander of Nisæa and the Long Walls. The boat, when thus brought out, was first carried down to the shore along the hollow of the dry ditch which surrounded the wall of Nisæa —then put to sea for some nightly enterprise—and lastly, brought back again along the ditch before daylight in the morning; the gate being opened, by permission, to let it in. This was the only way by which any Megarian vessel could get to sea, since the Athenians at Minoa were complete masters of the harbor.

On the night fixed for the surprise, this boat was carried out and brought back at the usual hour. But the moment that the gate in the Long Wall was opened to readmit it, Demosthenes with his comrades sprang forward to force their way in; the Megarians along with the boat at the same time setting upon and killing the guards, in order to facilitate his entrance. This active and determined band were successful in mastering the gate, and keeping it open, until the 600 hoplites under Hippokrates came up, and got in to the interior space between the Long Walls. They immediately mounted the walls on each side, every man as he came in, with little thought of order, to drive off or destroy the Peloponnesian guards; who, taken by surprise, and fancying that the Megarians generally were in concert with the enemy against them—confirmed too in such belief by hearing the Athenian herald proclaim aloud that every Megarian who chose might take his post in the line of Athenian hoplites—made at first some resistance, but were soon discouraged and fled into Nisæa. By a little after daybreak, the Athenians found themselves masters of all the line of the Long Walls, and under the very gates of Megara —as well as re-enforced by the larger force, which having marched by land through Eleusis, arrived at the concerted moment.

Meanwhile the Megarians within the city were in the greatest tumult and consternation. But the conspirators, prepared with their plan, had resolved to propose that the gates should be thrown open and that the whole force of the city should be marched out to fight the Athenians. When once the gates should be open, they themselves intended to take part with the Athenians and facilitate their entrance—and they had rubbed their bodies over with oil in order to be visibly distinguished in the eyes of the latter. The plan was only frustrated the moment before it was about to be put in execution, by the divulgation of one of their own comrades. Their opponents in the city, apprised of what was in contemplation, hastened to the gate, and intercepted the men rubbed with oil as they were about to open it. Without betraying any knowledge of the momentous secret which they had just learned, these opponents loudly protested against opening the gate and going out to fight an enemy for whom

they had never conceived themselves, even in moments of greater strength, to be a match in the open field. While insisting only on the public mischiefs of the measure, they at the same time planted themselves in arms against the gate, and declared that they would perish before they would allow it to be opened. For such obstinate resistance the conspirators were not prepared, so that they were forced to abandon their design and leave the gate closed.

The Athenian generals, who were waiting in expectation that it would be opened, soon perceived by the delay that their friends within had been baffled, and immediately resolved to make sure of Nisæa which lay behind them; an acquisition, important not less in itself, than as a probable means for the mastery of Megara. They set about the work with the characteristic rapidity of Athenians. Masons and tools in abundance being forthwith sent for from Athens, the army distributed among themselves the wall of circumvallation round Nisæa in distinct parts. First, the interior space between the Long Walls themselves was built across, so as to cut off the communication with Megara; next, walls were carried out from the outside of both the Long Walls down to the sea, so as completely to inclose Nisæa with its fortifications and ditch. The scattered houses, which formed a sort of ornamental suburb to Nisæa, furnished bricks for this inclosing circle, or were sometimes even made to form a part of it as they stood, with the parapets on their roofs; while the trees were cut down to supply material wherever palisades were suitable. In a day and a half the work of circumvallation was almost completed, so that the Peloponnesians in Nisæa saw before them nothing but a hopeless state of blockade. Deprived of all communication, they not only fancied that the whole city of Megara had joined the Athenians, but they were moreover without any supply of provisions, which had been always furnished to them in daily rations from the city. Despairing of speedy relief from Peloponnesus, they accepted easy terms of capitulation offered to them by the Athenian generals. After delivering up their arms, each man among them was to be ransomed for a stipulated price; we are not told how much, but doubtless a moderate sum. The Lacedæmonian commander, and such other Lacedæmonians as might be in Nisæa, were however required to surrender themselves as prisoners to the Athenians, to be held at their disposal. On these terms Nisæa was surrendered to the Athenians, who cut off its communication with Megara, by keeping the intermediate space between the Long Walls effectively blocked up—walls, of which they had themselves, in former days, been the original authors.

Such interruption of communication by the Long Walls indicated in the minds of the Athenian generals a conviction that Megara was now out of their reach. But the town in its present distracted state would certainly have fallen into their hands had it not been snatched from them by the accidental neighborhood and energetic interven-

tion of Brasidas. That officer, occupied in the levy of troops for his Thracian expedition, was near Corinth and Sikyon when he first learnt the surprise and capture of the Long Walls. Partly from the alarm which the news excited among these Peloponnesian towns, partly from his own personal influence, he got together a body of 2,700 Corinthian hoplites, 600 Sikyonian, and 400 Phliasian, besides his own small army, and marched with this united force to Tripodiskus in the Megarid, half-way between Megara and Pegæ, on the road over Mount Geraneia; having first dispatched a pressing summons to the Bœotians, to request that they would meet him at that point with re-enforcements. He trusted by a speedy movement to preserve Megara, and perhaps even Nisæa; but on reaching Tripodiskus in the night, he learnt that the latter place had already surrendered. Alarmed for the safety of Megara, he proceeded thither by a night-march without delay. Taking with him only a chosen band of 300 men, he presented himself, without being expected, at the gates of the city; entreating to be admitted, and offering to lend his immediate aid for the recovery of Nisæa. One of the two parties in Megara would have been glad to comply; but the other, knowing well that in that case the exiles from Pegæ would be brought back upon them, was prepared for a strenuous resistance, in which case the Athenian force, still only one mile off, would have been introduced as auxiliaries. Under these circumstances the two parties came to a compromise and mutually agreed to refuse admittance to Brasidas. They expected that a battle would take place between him and the Athenians and each calculated that Megara would follow the fortunes of the victor.

Returning back without success to Tripodiskus, Brasidas was joined there early in the morning by 2,000 Bœotian hoplites and 600 cavalry; for the Bœotians had been put in motion by the same news as himself, and had even commenced their march before his messenger arrived, with such celerity as to have already reached Platæa. The total force under Brasidas was thus increased to 6,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry, with whom he marched straight to the neighborhood of Megara. The Athenian light troops, dispersed over the plain, were surprised and driven in by the Bœotian cavalry; but the Athenian cavalry, coming to their aid, maintained a sharp action with the assailants, wherein, after some loss on both sides, a slight advantage remained on the side of the Athenians. They granted a truce for the burial of the Bœotian officer of cavalry, who was slain with some others. After this indecisive cavalry skirmish, Brasidas advanced with his main force into the plain between Megara and the sea, taking up a position near to the Athenian hoplites, who were drawn up in battle array hard by Nisæa and the Long Walls. He thus offered them battle if they chose it; but each party expected that the other would attack; and each was unwilling to begin the attack on his own side. Brasidas was well aware that if the Athenians refused to fight, Megara would be preserved from falling into their hands—which loss it was his main object to prevent, and which had in fact been prevented only by his arrival. If he attacked and was beaten, he would forfeit this advantage—while if victorious, he could hardly hope to gain much more. The Athenian generals on their side reflected that they had already secured a material acquisition in Nisæa, which cut off Megara from their sea; that the army opposed to them was not only superior in number of hoplites, but composed of contingents from many different cities, so that no one city hazarded much in the action; while their own force was all Athenian and composed of the best hoplites in Athens, which would render a defeat severely ruinous to the city. They did not think it worth while to encounter this risk, even for the purpose of gaining possession of Megara. With such views in the leaders on both sides, the two armies remained for some time in position, each waiting for the other to attack. At length the Athenians, seeing that no aggressive movement was contemplated by their opponents, were the first to retire into Nisæa. Thus left master of the field, Brasidas retired in triumph to Megara, the gates of which were now opened without reserve to admit him.

The army of Brasidas, having gained the chief point for which it was collected, speedily dispersed—he himself resuming his preparations for Thrace; while the Athenians on their side also returned home, leaving an adequate garrison for the occupation both of Nisæa and of the Long Walls. But the interior of Megara underwent a complete and violent revolution. While the leaders friendly to Athens, not thinking it safe to remain, fled forthwith and sought shelter with the Athenians—the opposite party opened communication with the exiles at Pegæ and readmitted them into the city; binding them, however, by the most solemn pledges to observe absolute amnesty of the past, and to study nothing but the welfare of the common city. The new-comers only kept their pledge during the interval which elapsed until they acquired power to violate it with effect. They soon got themselves placed in the chief commands of state, and found means to turn the military force to their own purposes. A review, and examination of arms, of the hoplites in the city, having been ordered, the Megarian lochi were so marshaled and tutored as to enable the leaders to single out such victims as they thought expedient. They seized many of their most obnoxious enemies—some of them suspected as accomplices in the recent conspiracy with Athens. The men thus seized were subjected to the forms of a public trial, before that which was called a public assembly; wherein each voter, acting under military terror, was constrained to give his suffrage openly. All were condemned to death and executed, to the number of one hundred. The constitution of Megara was then shaped into an oligarchy of the closest possible kind, a few of the most violent men taking complete possession of the government.

But they must probably have conducted it with vigor and prudence for their own purposes, since Thucydides remarks that it was rare to see a revolution accomplished by so small a party, and yet so durable. How long it lasted, he does not mention. A few months after these incidents, the Megarians regained possession of their Long Walls, by capture from the Athenians (to whom indeed they could have been of no material service), and leveled the whole line of them to the ground: but the Athenians still retained Nisæa. We may remark, as explaining in part the durability of this new government, that the truce concluded at the beginning of the ensuing year must have greatly lightened the difficulties of any government, whether oligarchical or democratical, in Megara.

The scheme for surprising Megara had been both laid and executed with skill, and only miscarried through an accident to which such schemes are always liable, as well as by the unexpected celerity of Brasidas. It had moreover succeeded so far as to enable the Athenians to carry Nisæa—one of the posts which they had surrendered by the Thirty years' truce, and of considerable positive value to them: so that it counted on the whole as a victory, leaving the generals with increased encouragement to turn their activity elsewhere. Accordingly, very soon after the troops had been brought back from the Megarid, Hippokrates and Demosthenes concerted a still more extensive plan for the invasion of Bœotia, in conjunction with some malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down and democratize the oligarchical governments—and especially through the agency of a Theban exile named Ptœodorus. Demosthenes, with forty triremes, was sent round Peloponnesus to Naupaktus, with instructions to collect an Akarnanian force—to sail into the inmost recess of the Corinthian or Krissæan Gulf—and to occupy Siphæ, a maritime town belonging to the Bœotian Thespiæ, where intelligences had been already established. On the same day, determined beforehand, Hippokrates engaged to enter Bœotia, with the main force of Athens, at the south-eastern corner of the territory near Tanagra, and to fortify Delium, the temple of Apollo on the coast of the Eubœan strait; while at the same time it was concerted that some Bœotian and Phokian malcontents should make themselves masters of Chæroneia on the borders of Phokis. Bœotia would thus be assailed on three sides at the same moment, so that the forces of the country would be distracted and unable to co-operate. Internal movements were farther expected to take place in some of the cities, such as perhaps to establish democratical governments and place them at once in alliance with the Athenians.

Accordingly, about the month of August, Demosthenes sallied from Athens to Naupaktus, where he collected his Akarnanian allies—now stronger and more united than ever, since the refractory inhabitants of Œniadæ had been at length compelled to join their Akarnanian brethren: moreover the neighboring Agræans with their prince Salynthius were also brought into the Athenian alliance. On the appointed day, seemingly about the beginning of October, he sailed with a strong force of these allies up to Siphæ, in full expectation that it would be betrayed to him. But the execution of this enterprise was less happy than that against Megara. In the first place, there was a mistake as to the day understood between Hippokrates and Demosthenes: in the next place, the entire plot was discovered and betrayed by a Phokian of Phanoteus (bordering on Chæroneia) named Nikomachus—communicated first to the Lacedæmonians, and through them to the bœotarchs. Siphæ and Chæroneia were immediately placed in so good a state of defense that Demosthenes, on arriving at the former place, found not only no party within it favorable to him, but a formidable Bœotian force which rendered attack unavailing. Moreover Hippokrates had not yet begun his march, so that the defenders had nothing to distract their attention from Siphæ. Under these circumstances, while Demosthenes was obliged to withdraw without striking a blow, and to content himself with an unsuccessful descent upon the territory of Sikyon—all the expected internal movements in Bœotia were prevented from breaking out.

It was not till after the Bœotian troops, having repelled the attack by sea, had retired from Siphæ, that Hippokrates commenced his march from Athens to invade the Bœotian territory near Tanagra. He was probably encouraged by false promises from the Bœotian exiles, otherwise it seems remarkable that he should have persisted in executing his part of the scheme alone, after the known failure of the other part. It was however executed in a manner which implies unusual alacrity and confidence. The whole military population of Athens was marched into Bœotia, to the neighborhood of Delium, the eastern coast-extremity of the territory belonging to the Bœotian town of Tanagra; the expedition comprising all classes, not merely citizens, but also metics or resident non-freemen, and even non-resident strangers then by accident at Athens. Of course this statement must be understood with the reserve of ample guards being left behind for the city; but besides the really effective force of 7,000 hoplites, and several hundred horsemen, there appear to have been not less than 25,000 light-armed, half-armed, or unarmed, attendants accompanying the march. The number of hoplites is here prodigiously great; brought together by general and indiscriminate proclamation, not selected by a special choice of the Strategi out of the names on the muster-roll, as was usually the case for any distant expedition. As to light-armed, there was at this time no trained force of that description at Athens, except a small body of archers. No pains had been taken to organize either darters or slingers: the hoplites, the horsemen, and the seamen constituted the whole effective force of the city. Indeed it appears that the Bœotians also were hardly less destitute than the Athenians of native darters and slingers, since those which they employed in the subsequent siege of Delium

were in great part hired from the Malian Gulf. To employ at one and the same time heavy-armed and light-armed was not natural to any Grecian community, but was a practice which grew up with experience and necessity. The Athenian feeling, as manifested in the "Persæ" of Æschylus a few years after the repulse of Xerxes, proclaims exclusive pride in the spear and shield, with contempt for the bow. It was only during this very year, when alarmed by the Athenian occupation of Pylus and Kythera, that the Lacedæmonians, contrary to their previous custom, had begun to organize a regiment of archers. The effective manner in which Demosthenes had employed the light-armed in Sphakteria against the Lacedæmonian hoplites, was well calculated to teach an instructive lesson as to the value of the former description of troops.

The Bœotian Delium, which Hippokrates now intended to occupy and fortify, was a temple of Apollo, strongly situated, overhanging the sea about five miles from Tanagra, and somewhat more than a mile from the border territory of Oropus—a territory originally Bœotian, but at this time dependent on Athens, and even partly incorporated in the political community of Athens, under the name of the Deme of Græa. Oropus itself was about a day's march from Athens—by the road which led through Dekeleia and Sphendale, between the mountains Parnes and Phelleus. so that as the distance to be traversed was so inconsiderable, and the general feeling of the time was that of confidence, it is probable that men of all ages, arms, and dispositions crowded to join the march—in part from mere curiosity and excitement. Hippokrates reached Delium on the day after he had started from Athens. On the succeeding day he began his work of fortification, which was completed—all hands aiding, and tools as well as workmen having been brought along with the army from Athens—in two days and a half. Having dug a ditch all round the sacred ground, he threw up the earth in a bank alongside of the ditch, planting stakes, throwing in fascines, and adding layers of stone and brick, to keep the work together and make it into a rampart of tolerable height and firmness. The vines round the temple, together with the stakes which served as supports to them, were cut to obtain wood; the houses adjoining furnished bricks and stone: the outer temple buildings themselves also, on some of the sides, served as they stood to facilitate and strengthen the defense. But there was one side on which the annexed building, once a portico, had fallen down: and here the Athenians constructed some wooden towers as a help to the defenders. By the middle of the fifth day after leaving Athens, the work was so nearly completed that the army quitted Delium, and began its march homeward out of Bœotia; halting, after it had proceeded about a mile and a quarter, within the Athenian territory of Oropus. It was here that the hoplites awaited the coming of Hippokrates, who still remained at Delium stationing the garrison, and giving his final orders about future defense; while

the greater number of the light-armed and unarmed, separating from the hoplites, and seemingly without any anticipation of the coming danger, continued their return-march to Athens. The position of the hoplites was probably about the western extremity of the plain of Oropus, on the verge of the low heights between that plain and Delium.

During these five days, however, the forces from all parts of Bœotia had time to muster at Tanagra. Their number was just completed as the Athenians were beginning their march homeward from Delium. The contingents had arrived, not only from Thebes and its dependent townships around, but also from Haliartus, Koroneia, Orchomenus, Kopæ, and Thespiæ: that of Tanagra joined on the spot. The government of the Bœotian confederacy as this time was vested in eleven bœotarchs—two chosen from Thebes, the rest in unknown proportion by the other cities, immediate members of the confederacy—and in four senates or councils, the constitution of which is not known.

Though all the bœotarchs, now assembled at Tanagra, formed a sort of council of war, yet the supreme command was vested in Pagondas and Arianthides, the bœotarchs from Thebes—either in Pagadonas, as the senior of the two, or perhaps in both, alternating with each other day by day. As the Athenians were evidently in full retreat, and had already passed the border, all the other bœotarchs, except Pagondas, unwilling to hazard a battle on soil not Bœotian, were disposed to let them return home without obstruction. Such reluctance is not surprising, when we reflect that the chances of defeat were considerable, and that probably some of these bœotarchs were afraid of the increased power which a victory would lend to the oppressive tendencies of Thebes. But Pagondas strenuously opposed this proposition, and carried the soldiers of the various cities along with him, even in opposition to the sentiments of their separate leaders, in favor of immediately fighting. He called them apart and addressed them by separate divisions, in order that all might not quit their arms at one and the same moment. He characterized the sentiment of the other bœotarchs as an unworthy manifestation of weakness, which, when properly considered, had not even the recommendation of superior prudence. For the Athenians, having just invaded the country, and built a fort for the purpose of continuous devastation, were not less enemies on one side of the border than the other. Moreover, they were the most restless and encroaching of all enemies; so that the Bœotians who had the misfortune to be their neighbors, could only be secure against them by the most resolute promptitude in defending themselves as well as in returning the blows first given. If they wished to protect their autonomy and their property against the condition of slavery under which their neighbors in Eubœa had long suffered, as well as so many other portions of Greece, their only chance was to march onward and beat

these invaders, following the glorious example of their fathers and predecessors in the field of Koroneia. The sacrifices were favorable to an advancing movement; while Apollo, whose temple the Athenians had desecrated by converting it into a fortified place, would lend his cordial aid to the Bœotian defense.

Finding his exhortations favorably received, Pagondas conducted the army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. He was anxious to fight them before they should have retreated farther; moreover, the day was nearly spent—it was already late in the afternoon.

Having reached a spot where he was only separated from the Athenians by a hill, which prevented either army from seeing the other, he marshaled his troops in the array proper for fighting. The Theban hoplites, with their dependent allies, ranged in a depth of not less than twenty-five shields, occupied the right wing: the hoplites of Haliartus, Koroneia, Kopæ, and its neighborhood, were in the center: those of Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, on the left; for Orchomenus, being the second city in Bœotia next to Thebes, obtained the second post of honor at the opposite extremity of the line. Each contingent adopted its own mode of marshaling the hoplites, and its own depth of files: on this point there was no uniformity—a remarkable proof of the prevalence of dissentient custom in Greece, and how much each town, even among confederates, stood apart as a separate unit. Thucydides specifies only the prodigious depth of the Theban hoplites; respecting the rest, he merely intimates that no common rule was followed. There is another point also which he does not specify—but which, though we learn it only on the inferior authority of Diodorus, appears both true and important. The front ranks of the Theban heavy-armed were filled by 300 select warriors, of distinguished bodily strength, valor, and discipline, who were accustomed to fight in pairs, each man being attached to his neighbor by a peculiar tie of intimate friendship. These pairs were termed the Heniochi and Parabatæ—charioteers and companions; a denomination probably handed down from the Homeric times, when the foremost heroes really combated in chariots in front of the common soldiers, but now preserved after it had outlived its appropriate meaning. This band, composed of the finest men in the various palæstræ of Thebes, was in after days placed under peculiar training (for the defense of the Kadmeia or citadel), detached from the front ranks of the phalanx, and organized into a separate regiment under the name of the Sacred Lochus or Band: we shall see how much it contributed to the short-lived military ascendency of Thebes. On both flanks of this mass of Bœotian hoplites, about 7,000 in total number, were distributed 1000 cavalry, 500 peltasts, and 10,000 light-armed or unarmed. The language of the historian seems to imply that the light-armed on the Bœotian side were something more effective than the mere multitude who followed the Athenians.

Such was the order in which Pagondas marched his army over the hill, halting them for a moment in front and sight of the Athenians, to see that the ranks were even, before he gave the word for actual charge. Hippokrates, on his side, apprised while still at Delium that the Bœotians had moved from Tanagra, first sent orders to his army to place themselves in battle array, and presently arrived himself to command them; leaving 300 cavalry at Delium, partly as garrison, partly for the purpose of acting on the rear of the Bœotians during the battle. The Athenian hoplites were ranged eight deep along the whole line—with the cavalry, and such of the light-armed as yet remained, placed on each flank. Hippokrates, after arriving on the spot and surveying the ground occupied, marched along the front of the line briefly encouraging his soldiers, who, as the battle was just on the Oropian border, might fancy that they were not in their own country, and that they were therefore exposed without necessity. He too, in a strain similar to that adopted by Pagondas, reminded the Athenians, that on either side of the border they were alike fighting for the defense of Attica, to keep the Bœotians out of it; since the Peloponnesians would never dare to enter the country without the aid of the Bœotian horse. He farther called to their recollection the great name of Athens, and the memorable victory of Myronides at Œnophyta, whereby their fathers had acquired possession of all Bœotia. But he had scarcely half finished his progress along the line, when he was forced to desist by the sound of the Bœotian pæan. Pagondas, after a few additional sentences of encouragement, had given the word: the Bœotian hoplites were seen charging down the hill; and the Athenian hoplites, not less eager, advanced to meet them at a running step.

At the extremity of the line on each side, the interposition of ravines prevented the actual meeting of the armies: but throughout all the rest of the line, the clash was formidable and the conduct of both sides resolute. Both armies, maintaining their ranks compact and unbroken, came to the closest quarters; to the contact and pushing of shields against each other. On the left half of the Bœotian line, consisting of hoplites from Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, the Athenians were victorious. The Thespians, who resisted longest, even after their comrades had given way, were surrounded and sustained the most severe loss from the Athenians, who in the ardor of success, while wheeling round to encircle the enemy, became disordered and came into conflict even with their own citizens, not recognizing them at the moment: some loss of life was the consequence.

While the left of the Bœotian line was thus worsted and driven to seek protection from the right, the Thebans on that side gained decided advantage. Though the resolution and discipline of the Athenians was noway inferior, yet as soon as the action came to close quarters and to propulsion with shield and spear, the prodig-

ious depth of the Theban column (more than triple of the depth of the Athenians, twenty-five against eight) enabled them to bear down their enemies by mere superiority of weight and mass. Moreover the Thebans appear to have been superior to the Athenians in gymnastic training and acquired bodily force, as they were inferior both in speech and in intelligence. The chosen Theban warriors in the front rank were especially superior: but apart from such superiority, if we assume simple equality of individual strength and resolution on both sides, it is plain that when the two opposing columns came into conflict, shield against shield—the comparative force of forward pressure would decide the victory. This motive is sufficient to explain the extraordinary depth of the Theban column—which was increased by Epaminondas, half a century afterwards, at the battle of Leuktra, from a depth of twenty-five men to the still more astonishing depth of fifty. We need not suspect the correctness of the text, with some critics—or suppose with others, that the great depth of the Theban files arose from the circumstance that the rear ranks were to poor to provide themselves with armor. Even in a depth of eight, which was that of the Athenian column in the present engagement, and seemingly the usual depth in a battle—the spears of the four rear ranks could hardly have protruded sufficiently beyond the first line to do any mischief. The great use of all the ranks behind the first four, was partly to take the place of such of the foremost lines as might be slain—partly, to push forward the lines before them from behind. The greater the depth of the files, the more irresistible did this propelling force become. Hence the Thebans at Delium as well as at Leuktra, found their account in deepening the column to so remarkable a degree—a movement to which we may fairly presume that their hoplites were trained beforehand.

The Thebans on the right thus pushed back the troops on the left of the Athenian line, who retired at first slowly and for a short space, maintaining their order unbroken—so that the victory of the Athenians on their own right would have restored the battle, had not Pagondas detached from the rear two squadrons of cavalry; who, wheeling unseen round the hill behind, suddenly appeared to the relief of the Bœotian left, and produced upon the Athenians on that side, already deranged in their ranks by the ardor of pursuit, the intimidating effect of a fresh army arriving to re-enforce the Bœotians. And thus, even on the right, the victorious portion of their line, the Athenians lost courage and gave way; while on the left, where they were worsted from the beginning, they found themselves pressed harder and harder by the pursuing Thebans: so that in the end, the whole Athenian army was broken and put to flight. The garrison of Delium, re-enforced by 300 cavalry whom Hippokrates had left there to assail the rear of the Bœotians during the action, either made no vigorous movement, or were repelled by a Bœotian reserve stationed to watch them.

Flight having become general among the Athenians, the different parts of their army took different directions. The right sought refuge at Delium, the center fled to Oropus, and the left took a direction toward the high lands of Parnes. The pursuit of the Bœotians was vigorous and destructive. They had an efficient cavalry, strengthened by some Lokrian horse who had arrived even during the action; their peltasts also, and their light-armed would render valuable service against retreating hoplites. Fortunately for the vanquished, the battle had begun very late in the afternoon, leaving no long period of daylight. This important circumstance saved the Athenian army from almost total destruction. As it was, however, the general Hippokrates, together with nearly 1000 hoplites, and a considerable number of light-armed and attendants, were slain; while the loss of the Bœotians, chiefly on their defeated left wing, was rather under 500 hoplites. Some prisoners seem to have been made, but we hear little about them. Those who had fled to Delium and Oropus were conveyed back by sea to Athens.

The victors retired to Tanagra, after erecting their trophy, burying their own dead, and despoiling those of their enemies. An abundant booty of arms from the stript warriors long remained to decorate the temples of Thebes, while the spoil in other ways is said to have been considerable. Pagondas also resolved to lay siege to the newly established fortress of Delium. But before commencing operations—which might perhaps prove tedious, since the Athenians could always re-enforce the garrison by sea—he tried another means of attaining the same object. He dispatched to the Athenians a herald—who, happening in his way to meet the Athenian herald coming to ask the ordinary permission for burial of the slain, warned him that no such request would be entertained until the message of the Bœotian general had first been communicated, and thus induced him to come back to the Athenian commanders. The Bœotian herald was instructed to remonstrate against the violation of holy custom committed by the Athenians in seizing and fortifying the temple of Delium: wherein their garrison was now dwelling, performing numerous functions which religion forbade to be done in a sacred place, and using as their common drink the water especially consecrated to sacrificial purposes. The Bœotians therefore solemnly summoned them in the name of Apollo and the gods inmates along with them, to evacuate the place, carrying away all that belonged to them. Finally, the herald gave it to be understood, that unless this summons were complied with, no permission would be granted to bury their dead.

Answer was returned by the Athenian herald, who now went to the Bœotian commanders, to the following effect: The Athenians did not admit that they had hitherto been guilty of any wrong in reference to the temple, and protested that they would persist in respecting it for the future as much as possible. Their object in taking pos-

session of it had been no evil sentiment toward the holy place, but the necessity of avenging the repeated invasions of Attica by the Bœotians. Possession of the territory, according to the received maxims of Greece, always carried along with it possession of temples therein situated, under obligation to fulfill all customary observances to the resident god, as far as circumstances permitted. It was upon this maxim that the Bœotians had themselves acted when they took possession of their present territory, expelling the prior occupants and appropriating the temples: it was upon the same maxim that the Athenians would act in retaining so much of Bœotia as they had now conquered, and in conquering more of it, if they could. Necessity compelled them to use the consecrated water—a necessity not originating in the ambition of Athens, but in prior Bœotian aggressions upon Attica—a necessity which they trusted that the gods would pardon, since their altars were allowed as a protection to the involuntary offender, and none but he who sinned without constraint experienced their displeasure. The Bœotians were guilty of far greater impiety—in refusing to give back the dead except on certain conditions connected with the holy ground—than the Athenians, who merely refused to turn the duty of sepulture into an unseemly bargain. "Tell us unconditionally," concluded the Athenian herald, "that we may bury our dead under truce, pursuant to the maxims of our forefathers. Do not tell us that we may do so, on condition of going out of Bœotia—for we are no longer in Bœotia—we are in our own territory, won by the sword."

The Bœotian generals dismissed the herald with a reply short and decisive: "If you are in Bœotia, you may take away all that belongs to you, but only on condition of going out of it. If, on the other hand, you are in your own territory, you can take your own resolution without asking us."

In this debate, curious as an illustration of Grecian manners and feelings, there seems to have been special pleading and evasion on both sides. The final sentence of the Bœotians was good as a reply to the incidental argument raised by the Athenian herald, who had rested the defense of Athens in regard to the temple of Delium on the allegation that the territory was Athenian, not Bœotian—Athenian by conquest and by the right of the strongest—and had concluded by affirming the same thing about Oropia, the district to which the battle-field belonged. It was only this same argument, of actual superior force, which the Bœotians retorted, when they said—"If the territory to which your application refers is yours by right of conquest (i.e., if you are de facto masters of it and are strongest within it)—you can of course do what you think best in it: you need not ask any truce at our hands; you can bury your dead without a truce." The Bœotians knew that at this moment the field of battle was under guard by a detachment of their army, and that the Athenians could not obtain the dead bodies without permission. But

since the Athenian herald had asserted the reverse as a matter of fact, we can hardly wonder that they resented the production of such an argument; meeting it by a reply sufficiently pertinent in mere diplomatic fencing.

But if the Athenian herald, instead of raising the incidental point of territorial property, combined with an incautious definition of that which constituted territorial property, as a defense against the alleged desecration of the temple of Delium—had confined himself to the main issue—he would have put the Bœotians completely in the wrong. According to principles universally respected in Greece, the victor, if solicited, was held bound to grant to the vanquished a truce for burying his dead; to grant and permit it absolutely, without annexing any conditions. On this, the main point in debate, the Bœotians sinned against the sacred international law of Greece, when they exacted the evacuation of the temple at Delium as a condition for consenting to permit the burial of the Athenian dead. Ultimately, after they had taken Delium, we shall find that they did grant it unconditionally. We may doubt whether they would have ever persisted in refusing it if the Athenian herald had pressed this one important principle separately and exclusively—and if he had not, by an unskillful plea in vindication of the right to occupy and live at Delium, both exasperated their feelings, and furnished them with a collateral issue as a means of evading the main demand.

To judge this curious debate with perfect impartiality, we ought to add, in reference to the conduct of the Athenians in occupying Delium—that for an enemy to make special choice of a temple, as a post to be fortified and occupied, was a proceeding certainly rare, perhaps hardly admissible, in Grecian warfare. Nor does the vindication offered by the Athenian herald meet the real charge preferred. It is one thing for an enemy of superior force to overrun a country, and to appropriate everything within it, sacred as well as profane: it is another thing for a border enemy, not yet in sufficient force for conquering the whole, to convert a temple of convenient site into a regular garrisoned fortress, and make it a base of operations against the neighboring population. On this ground, the Bœotians might reasonably complain of the seizure of Delium: though I apprehend that no impartial interpreter of Grecian international custom would have thought them warranted in requiring the restoration of the place, as a peremptory condition to their granting the burial-truce when solicited..

All negotiation being thus broken off, the Bœotian generals prepared to lay siege to Delium, aided by 2,000 Corinthian hoplites, together with some Megarians and the late Peloponnesian garrison of Nisæa—who joined after the news of the battle. Though they sent for darters and slingers, probably Œtæans and Ætolians, from the Maliac Gulf, yet their direct attacks were at first all repelled by the garrison, aided by an Athenian squadron off the coast, in spite of the

hasty and awkward defenses by which alone the fort was protected. At length they contrived a singular piece of fire-mechanism, which enabled them to master the place. They first sawed in twain a thick beam, pierced a channel through it long-ways from end to end, sheathed most part of the channel with iron, and then joined the two halves accurately together. From the further end of this hollowed beam they suspended by chains a large metal pot, full of pitch, brimstone, and burning charcoal; lastly, an iron tube, projected from the end of the interior channel of the beam, so as to come near to the pot. Such was the machine, which, constructed at some distance, was brought on carts and placed close to the wall, near the palisading and the wooden towers. The Bœotians then applied great bellows to their own end of the beam, blowing violently a current of air through the interior channel, so as to raise an intense fire in the caldron at the other end. The wooden portions of the wall, soon catching fire, became untenable for the defenders—who escaped in the best way they could, without attempting further resistance. Two hundred of them were made prisoners, and a few slain; but the greater number got safely on shipboard. This recapture of Delium took place on the seventeenth day after the battle, during all which interval the Athenians slain had remained on the field unburied. Presently however arrived the Athenian herald to make fresh application for the burial-truce; which was now forthwith granted, and granted unconditionally.

Such was the memorable expedition and battle of Delium—a fatal discouragement to the feeling of confidence and hope which had previously reigned at Athens, besides the painful immediate loss which it inflicted on the city. Among the hoplites who took part in the vigorous charge and pushing of shields, the philosopher Sokrates is to be numbered. His bravery, both in the battle and the retreat, was much extolled by his friends, and doubtless with good reason. He had before served with credit in the ranks of the hoplites at Potidæa, and he served also at Amphipolis; his patience under hardship, and endurance of heat and cold, being not less remarkable than his personal courage. He and his friend Laches were among those hoplites who in the retreat from Delium, instead of flinging away their arms and taking to flight, kept their ranks, their arms, and their firmness of countenance; insomuch that the pursuing cavalry found it dangerous to meddle with them, and turned to an easier prey in the disarmed fugitives. Alkibiades also served at Delium in the cavalry, and stood by Sokrates in the retreat. The latter was thus exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanes was exposing him to derision in the comedy of the Clouds, as a dreamer alike morally worthless and physically incapable.

Severe as the blow was which the Athenians suffered at Delium, their disasters in Thrace about the same time, or toward the close of the same summer and autumn, were yet more calamitous. I have

already mentioned the circumstances which led to the preparation of a Lacedæmonian force intended to act against the Athenians in Thrace, under Brasidas, in concert with the Chalkidians, revolted subjects of Athens, and with Perdikkas of Macedon. Having frustrated the Athenian designs against Megara (as described above), Brasidas completed the levy of his division—1700 hoplites, partly Helots, partly Dorian Peloponnesians—and conducted them, toward the close of the summer, to the Lacedæmonian colony of Herakleia, in the Trachinian territory near the Maliac Gulf.

To reach Macedonia and Thrace, it was necessary for him to pass through Thessaly, which was no easy task; for the war had now lasted so long that every state in Greece had become mistrustful of the transit of armed foreigners. Moreover, the mass of the Thessalian population were decidedly friendly to Athens, and Brasidas had no sufficient means to force a passage; while, should he wait to apply for formal permission, there was much doubt whether it would be granted—and perfect certainty of such delay and publicity as would put the Athenians on their guard. But though such was the temper of the Thessalian people, yet the Thessalian governments, all oligarchical, sympathized with Lacedæmon. The federal authority or power of the tagus, which bound together the separate cities, was generally very weak. What was of still greater importance, the Macedonian Perdikkas, as well as the Chalkidians, had in every city powerful guests and partisans, whom they prevailed upon to exert themselves actively in forwarding the passage of the army.

To these men Brasidas sent a message at Pharsalus, as soon as he reached Herakleia. Nikonidas of Larissa with other Thessalian friends of Perdikkas, assembling at Melitæa in Achaia Phthiotis, undertook to escort him through Thessaly. By their countenance and support, combined with his own boldness, dexterity, and rapid movements, he was enabled to accomplish the seemingly impossible enterprise of running through the country, not only without the consent, but against the feeling of its inhabitants—simply by such celerity as to forestall opposition. After traversing Achaia Phthiotis, a territory dependent on the Thessalians, Brasidas began his march from Melitæa through Thessaly itself, along with his powerful native guides. Notwithstanding all possible secrecy and celerity, his march became so far divulged, that a body of volunteers from the neighborhood, offended at the proceeding, and unfriendly to Nikonidas, assembled to oppose his progress down the valley of the river Enipeus. Reproaching him with wrongful violation of an independent territory, by the introduction of armed forces without permission from the general government, they forbade him to proceed further. His only chance of making progress lay in disarming their opposition by fair words. His guides excused themselves by saying that the suddenness of his arrival had imposed upon them as his guests the obligation of conducting him through, without waiting to ask for

formal permission: to offend their countrymen, however, was the furthest thing from their thoughts—and they would renounce the enterprise if the persons now assembled persisted in their requisition. The same conciliatory tone was adopted by Brasidas himself. "He protested his strong feeling of respect and friendship for Thessaly and its inhabitants: his arms were directed against the Athenians, not against them: nor was he aware of any unfriendly relation subsisting between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, such as to exclude either of them from the territory of the other. Against the prohibition of the parties now before them, he could not possibly march forward, nor would he think of attempting it; but he put it to their good feeling whether they ought to prohibit him." Such conciliatory language was successful in softening the opponents and inducing them to disperse. But so afraid were his guides of renewed opposition in other parts, that they hurried him forward still more rapidly, and he "passed through the country at a running pace without halting." Leaving Melitæa in the morning he reached Pharsalus on the same night, encamping on the river Apidanus: thence he proceeded on the next day to Phakium, and on the day afterward into Perrhæbia—a territory adjoining to and dependent on Thessaly, under the mountain range of Olympus. Here he was in safety, so that his Thessalian guides left him; while the Perrhæbians conducted him over the pass of Olympus (the same over which the army of Xerxes had marched) to Dium in Macedonia, in the territory of Perdikkas, on the northern edge of the mountain.

The Athenians were soon apprised of this stolen passage, so ably and rapidly executed, in a manner which few other Greeks, certainly no other Lacedæmonian, would have conceived to be possible. Aware of the new enemy thus brought within reach of their possessions in Thrace, they transmitted orders thither for greater vigilance, and at the same time declared open war against Perdikkas; but unfortunately without sending any efficient force, at a moment when timely defensive intervention was imperiously required.

Perdikkas immediately invited Brasidas to join him in the attack of Arrhibæus, prince of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ, or of Lynkus; a summons which the Spartan could not decline, since Perdikkas provided half of the pay and maintenance of the army—but which he obeyed with reluctance, anxious as he was to commence operations against the allies of Athens. Such reluctance was still further strengthened by envoys from the Chalkidians of Thrace—who, as zealous enemies of Athens, joined him forthwith, but discouraged any vigorous efforts to relieve Perdikkas from embarrassing enemies in the interior, in order that the latter might be under more pressing motives to conciliate and assist them. Accordingly Brasidas, though he joined Perdikkas and marched along with the Macedonian army toward the territory of the Lynkestæ, was not only averse to active military operations, but even entertained with favor propositions

from Arrhibæus—wherein the latter expressed his wish to become the ally of Lacedæmon, and offered to refer all his differences with Perdikkas to the arbitration of the Spartan general himself. Communicating these propositions to Perdikkas, Brasidas invited him to listen to an equitable compromise, admitting Arrhibæus into the alliance of Lacedæmon. But Perdikkas indignantly refused: "he had not called in Brasidas as a judge to decide disputes between him and his enemies, but as an auxiliary to put them down wherever he might point them out; and he protested against the iniquity of Brasidas in entering into terms with Arrhibæus, while the Lacedæmonian army was half paid and maintained by him" (Perdikkas). Notwithstanding such remonstrance, and even a hostile protest, Brasidas persisted in his intended conference with Arrhibæus, and was so far satisfied with the propositions made, that he withdrew his troops without marching over the pass into Lynkus. Too feeble to act alone, Perdikkas loudly complained. He even contracted his allowance for the future, so as to provide for only one-third of the army of Brasidas instead of one-half.

To this inconvenience, however, Brasidas submitted, in haste to begin his march into Chalkidike, and his operations jointly with the Chalkidians, for seducing or subduing the subject-allies of Athens. His first operation was against Akanthus, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Athos, the territory of which he invaded a little before the vintage—probably about the middle of September, when the grapes were ripe, but still out, and the whole crop of course exposed to ruin at the hands of an enemy superior in force. So important was it to Brasidas to have escaped the necessity of wasting another month in conquering the Lynkestæ. There was within the town of Akanthus a party in concert with the Chalkidians, anxious to admit him and to revolt openly from Athens. But the mass of the citizens were averse to this step. It was only by dwelling on the terrible loss from exposure of the crop without, that the anti-Athenian party could persuade them even to grant the request of Brasidas to be admitted singly—so as to explain his purposes formally before the public assembly, which would take its own decision afterward. "For a Lacedæmonian (says Thucydides) he was no mean speaker." If he is to have credit for that which we find written in Thucydides, such an epithet would be less than his desert. Doubtless however the substance of the speech is genuine: and it is one of the most interesting in Grecian history—partly as a manifesto of professed Lacedæmonian policy—partly because it had a great practical effect in determining, on an occasion of paramount importance, a multitude which, though unfavorably inclined to him, was not beyond the reach of argument. I give the chief points of the speech, without binding myself to the words.

"Myself and my soldiers have been sent, Akanthians, to realize the purpose which we proclaimed on beginning the war—that we took arms to liberate Greece from the Athenians. Let no man blame us

for having been long in coming, or for the mistake which we made at the outset in supposing that we should quickly put down the Athenians by operations against Attica, without exposing you to any risk. Enough, that we are now here on the first opportunity, resolved to put them down if you will lend us your aid. To find myself shut out of your town—nay, to find that I am not heartily welcomed—astonishes me. We Lacedæmonians undertook this long and perilous march, in the belief that we were coming to friends eagerly expecting us. It would indeed be monstrous if you should now disappoint us, and stand out against your own freedom as well as against that of other Greeks. Your example, standing high as you do both for prudence and power, will fatally keep back other Greeks. It will make them suspect that I am wanting either in power to protect them against Athens, or in honest purpose. Now, in regard to power, my own present army was one which the Athenians, though superior in number, were afraid to fight near Nisæa; nor are they at all likely to send an equal force hither against me by sea. And in regard to my purpose, it is not one of mischief, but of liberation—the Lacedæmonian authorities having pledged themselves to me by the most solemn oaths, that every city which joins me shall retain its autonomy. You have therefore the best assurance both as to my purposes and as to my power: you need not apprehend that I am come with factious designs, to serve the views of any particular men among you, and to remodel your established constitution to the disadvantage either of the Many or of the Few. That would be worse than foreign subjugation; and by such dealing we Lacedæmonians should be taking trouble to earn hatred instead of gratitude. We should play the part of unworthy traitors, worse even than that high-handed oppression of which we accuse the Athenians: we should at once violate our oaths, and sin against our strongest political interests. Perhaps you may say, that though you wish me well, you desire for your parts to be let alone, and to stand aloof from a dangerous struggle. You will tell me to carry my propositions elsewhere, to those who can safely embrace them, but not to thrust my alliance upon any people against their own will. If this should be your language, I shall first call your local gods and heroes to witness that I have come to you with a mission of good, and have employed persuasion in vain; I shall then proceed to ravage your territory and extort your consent, thinking myself justly entitled to do so, on two grounds. First, that the Lacedæmonians may not sustain actual damage from these good wishes which you profess toward me without actually joining—damage in the shape of that tribute which you annually send to Athens. Next, that the Greeks generally may not be prevented by you from becoming free. It is only on the ground of common good that we Lacedæmonians can justify ourselves for liberating any city against its own will. But as we are conscious of desiring only extinction of the empire of others, not acquisition of empire for ourselves, we should fail in our duty

if we suffered you to obstruct that liberation which we are now carrying to all. Consider well my words then: take to yourselves the glory of beginning the era of emancipation for Greece—save your own properties from damage—and attach an ever-honorable name to the community of Akanthus."

Nothing could be more plausible or judicious than this language of Brasidas to the Akanthians—nor had they any means of detecting the falsity of the assertion (which he afterward repeated in other places besides) that he had braved the forces of Athens at Nisæa with the same army as that now on the outside of the walls. Perhaps the simplicity of his speech and manner may even have lent strength to his assurances. As soon as he had retired, the subject was largely discussed in the assembly, with much difference of opinion among the speakers, and perfect freedom on both sides: and the decision, not called for until after a long debate, was determined partly by the fair promises of Brasidas, partly by the certain loss which the ruin of the vine-crop would entail. The votes of the citizens present being taken secretly, a majority resolved to accede to the propositions of Brasidas and revolt from Athens. Exacting the renewal of his pledge and that of the Lacedæmonian authorities, for the preservation of full autonomy to every city which should join him, they received his army into the town. The neighboring city of Stageirus (a colony of Andros, as Akanthus also was) soon followed the example.

There are few acts in history wherein Grecian political reason and morality appear to greater advantage than in this proceeding of the Akanthians. The habit of fair, free, and pacific discussion—the established respect to the vote of the majority—the care to protect individual independence of judgment by secret suffrage—the deliberate estimate of reasons on both sides by each individual citizen—all these main laws and conditions of healthy political action appear as a part of the confirmed character of the Akanthians. We shall not find Brasidas entering other towns in a way so creditable or so harmonious.

But there is another inference which the scene just described irresistibly suggests. It affords the clearest proof that the Akanthians had little to complain of as subject-allies of Athens, and that they would have continued in that capacity, if left to their own choice without the fear of having their crop destroyed. Such is the pronounced feeling of the mass of the citizens: the party who desire otherwise are in a decided minority. It is only the combined effect of severe impending loss and of tempting assurances held out by the worthiest representative whom Sparta ever sent out, which induces them to revolt from Athens. Nor even then is the resolution taken without long opposition, and a large dissentient minority, in a case where secret suffrage insured free and genuine expression of preference from every individual. Now it is impossible that the scene

in Akanthus at this critical moment could have been of such a character, had the empire of Athens been practically odious and burdensome to the subject-allies, as it is commonly depicted. Had such been the fact—had the Akanthians felt that the imperial ascendency of Athens oppressed them with hardship or humiliation from which their neighbors, the revolted Chalkidians in Olynthus and elsewhere, were exempt—they would have hailed the advent of Brasidas with that cordiality which he himself expected and was surprised not to find. The sense of present grievance, always acute and often excessive, would have stood out as their prominent impulse. They would have needed neither intimidation nor cajolery to induce them to throw open their gates to the liberator—who, in his speech within the town, finds no actual suffering to appeal to, but is obliged to gain over an audience, evidently unwilling, by alternate threats and promises.

As in Akanthus, so in most of the other Thracian subjects of Athens—the bulk of the citizens, though strongly solicited by the Chalkidians, manifest no spontaneous disposition to revolt from Athens. We shall find the party who introduce Brasidas to be a conspiring minority, who not only do not consult the majority beforehand, but act in such a manner as to leave no free option to the majority afterward, whether they will ratify or reject; bringing in a foreign force to overawe them and compromise them without their own consent in hostility against Athens. Now that which makes the events of Akanthus so important as an evidence, is, that the majority is not thus entrapped and compressed, but pronounces its judgment freely after ample discussion. The grounds of that judgment are clearly set forth to us, so as to show, that hatred of Athens, if even it exists at all, is in no way a strong or determining feeling. Had there existed any such strong feeling among the subject-allies of Athens in the Chalkidic peninsula, there was no Athenian force now present to hinder them all from opening their gates to the liberator Brasidas by spontaneous majorities; as he himself, encouraged by the sanguine promises of the Chalkidians, evidently expected that they would do. But nothing of this kind happened.

That which I before remarked in recounting the revolt of Mitylene, a privileged ally of Athens, is now confirmed in the revolt of Akanthus, a tributary, and subject-ally. The circumstances of both prove that imperial Athens neither inspired hatred nor occasioned painful grievance to the population of her subject-cities generally. The movements against her arose from party minorities, of the same character as that Platæan party which introduced the Theban assailants into Platæa at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. There are of course differences of sentiment between one town and another; but the conduct of the towns generally demonstrates that the Athenian empire was not felt by them to be such a scheme of plunder and oppression as Mr. Mitford and others would have us

believe. It is indeed true that Athens managed her empire with reference to her own feelings and interest, and that her hold was rather upon the prudence than upon the affection of her allies; except in so far as those among them who were democratically governed, sympathized with her democracy. It is also true that restrictions in any form on the autonomy of each separate city were offensive to the political instincts of the Greeks: moreover Athens took less and less pains to disguise or soften the real character of her empire, as one resting simply on established fact and superior force. But this is a different thing from the endurance of practical hardship and oppression, which, had it been real, would have inspired strong positive hatred among the subject-allies—such Brasidas expected to find universal in Thrace, but did not really find, in spite of the easy opening which his presence afforded.

The acquisition of Akanthus and Stageirus enabled Brasidas in no very long time to extend his conquests; to enter Argilus, and from thence to make the capital acquisition of Amphipolis.

Argilus was situated between Stageirus and the river Strymon, along the western bank of which river its territory extended. Along the eastern bank of the same river—south of the lake which it forms under the name of Kerkinitis, and north of the town of Eion at its mouth—was situated the town and territory of Amphipolis, communicating with the lands of Argilus by the important bridge there situated. The Argilians were colonists from Andros, like Akanthus and Stageirus. The adhesion of those two cities to Brasidas gave him opportunity to cultivate intelligences in Argilus, wherein there had existed a standing discontent against Athens, ever since the foundation of the neighboring city of Amphipolis. The latter city had been established by the Athenian Agnon, at the head of a numerous body of colonists, on a spot belonging to the Edonian Thracians called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways, about five years prior to the commencement of the war (B.C. 437), after two previous attempts to colonize it—one by Histiæus and Aristagoras at the period of the Ionic revolt, and a second by the Athenians about 465 B.C.—both of which lamentably failed. So valuable however was the site, from its vicinity to the gold and silver mines near Mount Pangæus and to large forests of ship-timber, as well as for command of the Strymon, and for commerce with the interior of Thrace and Macedonia, that the Athenians had sent a second expedition under Agnon, who founded the city and gave it the name of Amphipolis. The resident settlers there, however, were only in small proportion Athenian citizens; the rest of mixed origin, some of them Argilian—a considerable number Chalkidians. The Athenian general Eukles was governor in the town, though seemingly with no paid force under his command. His colleague Thucydides the historian was in command of a small fleet on the coast.

Among these mixed inhabitants a conspiracy was organized to

betray the town to Brasidas. The inhabitants of Argilus as well as the Chalkidians each tampered with those of the same race who resided in Amphipolis; while the influence of Perdikkas, not inconsiderable in consequence of the commerce of the place with Macedonia, was also employed to increase the number of partisans. Of all the instigators, however, the most strenuous as well as the most useful were the inhabitants of Argilus. Amphipolis, together with the Athenians as its founders, had been odious to them from its commencement. Its foundation had doubtless abridged their commerce and importance as masters of the lower course of the Strymon. They had been long laying snares against the city, and the arrival of Brasidas now presented to them an unexpected chance of success. It was they who encouraged him to attempt the surprise, deferring proclamation of their own defection from Athens until they could make it subservient to his conquest of Amphipolis.

Starting with his army from Arne in the Chalkidic peninsula, Brasidas arrived in the afternoon at Aulon and Bromiskus, near the channel whereby the lake Bolbe is connected with the sea. From hence, after his men had supped, he began his night march to Amphipolis, on a cold and snowy night of November or the beginning of December. He reached Argilus in the middle of the night, where the leaders at once admitted him, proclaiming their revolt from Athens. With their aid and guidance, he then hastened forward without delay to the bridge across the Strymon, which he reached before break of day. It was guarded only by a feeble picket—the town of Amphipolis itself being situated on the hill at some little distance higher up the river; so that Brasidas, preceded by the Argilian conspirators, surprised and overpowered the guard without difficulty. Thus master of this important communication, he crossed with his army forthwith into the territory of Amphipolis, where his arrival spread the utmost dismay and terror. The governor Eukles, the magistrates, and the citizens, were all found wholly unprepared: the lands belonging to the city were occupied by residents with their families and property around them, calculating upon undisturbed security, as if there had been no enemy within reach. Such of these as were close to the city succeeded in running thither with their families, though leaving their property exposed—but the more distant became in person as well as in property at the mercy of the invader. Even within the town, filled with the friends and relatives of these victims without, indescribable confusion reigned, of which the conspirators within tried to avail themselves in order to get the gates thrown open. And so complete was the disorganization, that if Brasidas had marched up without delay to the gates and assaulted the town, many persons supposed that he would have carried it at once. Such a risk, however, was too great even for his boldness—the rather as repulse would have been probably his ruin. Moreover, confiding in the assurances of the conspirators that the gates would be thrown open, he thought it safer to seize as many persons as he could from the out-citizens, as a means of working upon the sentiments of those within the walls. Lastly, this process of seizure and plunder, being probably more to the state of his own soldiers, could not well be hindered.

But he waited in vain for the opening of the gates. The conspirators in the city, in spite of the complete success of their surprise and the universal dismay around them, found themselves unable to carry the majority along with them. As in Akanthus, so in Amphipolis, those who really hated Athens and wished to revolt were only a party minority. The greater number of citizens, at this critical moment, stood by Eukles and the few native Athenians around him in resolving upon defense, and in sending off an express to Thucydides at Thasos (the historian), the colleague of Eukles, as general in the region of Thrace, for immediate aid. This step, of course, immediately communicated to Brasidas from within, determined him to make every effort for enticing the Amphipolitans to surrender before the re-enforcement should arrive; the rather as he was apprised that Thucydides, being a large proprietor and worker of gold mines in the neighboring region, possessed extensive personal influence among the Thracian tribes, and would be able to bring them together for the relief of the place, in conjunction with his own Athenian squadron. He, therefore, sent in propositions for surrender on the most favorable terms—guaranteeing to every citizen who chose to remain, Amphipolitan or even Athenian, continued residence with undisturbed property and equal political rights—and granting to every one who chose to depart, five days for the purpose of carrying away his effects.

Such easy conditions, when made known in the city, produced presently a sensible change of opinion among the citizens—proving acceptable both to Athenians and Amphipolitans, though on different grounds. The properties of the citizens without, as well as many of their relatives, were all in the hands of Brasidas. No one counted upon the speedy arrival of re-enforcement—and even if it did arrive, the city might be preserved, but the citizens without would still be either slain or made captive: a murderous battle would ensue, and perhaps after all, Brasidas, assisted by the party within, might prove victorious. The Athenian citizens in Amphipolis, knowing themselves to be exposed to peculiar danger, were perfectly well pleased with his offer, as extricating them from a critical position and procuring for them the means of escape, with comparatively little loss; while the non-Athenian citizens, partakers in the same relief from peril, felt little reluctance in accepting a capitulation which preserved both their rights and their properties inviolate, and merely severed them from Athens—toward which city they felt, not hatred, but indifference. Above all, the friends and relatives of the citizens exposed in the out-region were strenuous in urging on the capitulation, so that

the conspirators soon became bold enough to proclaim themselves openly—insisting upon the moderation of Brasidas and the prudence of admitting him. Eukles found that the tone of opinion, even among his own Athenians, was gradually turned against him. He could not prevent the acceptance of the terms, and the admission of the enemy into the city, on that same day.

No such resolution would have been adopted had the citizens been aware how near at hand Thucydides and his forces were. The message dispatched early in the morning from Amphipolis found him at Thasos with seven triremes; with which he instantly put to sea, so as to reach Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis, on the same evening. He hoped to be in time for saving Amphipolis: but the place had surrendered a few hours before. He arrived, indeed, only just in time to preserve Eion; for parties in that town were already beginning to concert the admission of Brasidas, who would probably have entered it at daybreak the next morning. Thucydides, putting the place in a condition of defense, successfully repelled an attack which Brasidas made both by land and by boats on the river. He at the same time received and provided for the Athenian citizens who were retiring from Amphipolis.

The capture of this city, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens—and the opening of the bridge over the Strymon, by which even all her eastern allies became approachable by land—occasioned prodigious emotion throughout all the Grecian world. The dismay felt at Athens was greater than had been ever before experienced. Hope and joy prevailed among her enemies, while excitement and new aspirations became widely spread among her subject allies. The bloody defeat at Delium, and the unexpected conquests of Brasidas, now again lowered the *prestige* of Athenian success, sixteen months after it had been so powerfully exalted by the capture of Sphakteria. The loss of reputation, which Sparta had then incurred, was now compensated by a reaction against the unfounded terrors since conceived about the probable career of her enemy. It was not merely the loss of Amphipolis, serious as that was, which distressed the Athenians; but also their insecurity respecting the maintenance of their whole empire. They knew not which of their subject-allies might next revolt, in contemplation of aid from Brasidas, facilitated by the newly-acquired Strymonian bridge. And as the proceedings of that general counted in part to the credit of his country, it was believed that Sparta, now for the first time shaking off her languor, had taken to herself the rapidity and enterprise once regarded as the exclusive characteristic of Athens.

But besides all these chances of evil to the Athenians, there was another yet more threatening—the personal ascendency and position of Brasidas himself. It was not merely the boldness, the fertility of aggressive resource, the quick movements, the power of stimulating the minds of soldiers—which lent efficiency to that general; but also

his incorruptible probity, his good faith, his moderation, his abstinence from party-cruelty or corruption, and from all intermeddling with the internal constitutions of the different cities—in strict adherence to that manifesto whereby Sparta had proclaimed herself the liberator of Greece. Such talents and such official worth had never before been seen combined. Set off as they were by the full brilliancy of successes, such as were deemed incredible before they actually occurred, they inspired a degree of confidence, and turned a tide of opinion, toward this eminent man, which rendered him personally one of the first powers in Greece. Numerous solicitations were transmitted to him at Amphipolis from parties among the subject-allies of Athens, in their present temper of large hopes from him and diminished fear of the Athenians. The anti-Athenian party in each was impatient to revolt, the rest of the population less restrained by fear.

Of those who indulged in these sanguine calculations, many had yet to learn by painful experience that Athens was still but little abated in power. Still her inaction during this important autumn had been such as may well explain their mistake. It might have been anticipated that on hearing the alarming news of the junction of Brasidas with the Chalkidians and Perdikkas so close upon their dependent allies, they would forthwith have sent a competent force to Thrace—which, if dispatched at that time, would probably have obviated all the subsequent disasters. So they would have acted at any other time—and perhaps even then, if Perikles had been alive. But the news arrived just at the period when Athens was engaged in the expedition against Bœotia, which ended very shortly in the ruinous defeat of Delium. Under the discouragement arising from the death of the Strategus Hippokrates and 1000 citizens, the idea of a fresh expedition to Thrace would probably have been intolerable to Athenian hoplites. The hardships of a winter service in Thrace, as experienced a few years before in the blockade of Potidæa, would probably also aggravate their reluctance. In Grecian history, we must steadfastly keep in mind that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers; and that the temper of the time, whether of confidence or dismay, modifies to an unspeakable degree all the calculations of military and political prudence. Even after the rapid success of Brasidas, not merely at Akanthus and Stageirus, but even at Amphipolis, they sent only a few inadequate guards to the points most threatened—thus leaving to their enterprising enemy the whole remaining winter for his operations, without hindrance. Without depreciating the merits of Brasidas, we may see that his extraordinary success was in great part owing to the no less extraordinary depression which at that time pervaded the Athenian public; a feeling encouraged by Nikias and other leading men of the same party, who were building upon it their hopes of getting the Lacedæmonian proposals for peace accepted.

But while we thus notice the short-comings of Athens in not sending timely forces against Brasidas, we must at the same time admit, that the most serious and irreparable loss which she sustained—that of Amphipolis—was the fault of her officers more than her own. Eukles and the historian Thucydides, the two joint Athenian commanders in Thrace, to whom was confided the defense of that important town, had means amply sufficient to place it beyond all risk of capture, had they employed the most ordinary vigilance and precaution beforehand. That Thucydides became an exile immediately after this event, and remained so for twenty years, is certain from his own statement. And we hear, upon what in this case is quite sufficient authority, that the Athenians condemned him (probably Eukles also) to banishment, on the proposition of Kleon.

In considering this sentence, historians commonly treat Thucydides as an innocent man, and find nothing to condemn except the calumnies of the demagogue, followed by the injustice of the people. But this view of the case cannot be sustained, when we bring together all the facts even as indicted by Thucydides himself.

At the moment when Brasidas surprised Amphipolis, Thucydides was at Thasos; and the event is always discussed as if he was there by necessity or duty—as if Thasos was his special mission. Now we know from his own statement that his command was not special or confined to Thasos. He was sent as joint commander along with Eukles generally to Thrace, and especially to Amphipolis. Both of them were jointly and severally responsible for the proper defense of Amphipolis, with the Athenian empire and interests in that quarter. Such nomination of two or more officers, co-ordinate and jointly responsible, was the usual habit of Athens, wherever the scale or the area of military operations was considerable—instead of one supreme responsible commander, with subordinate officers acting under him and responsible to him. If, then, Thucydides "was stationed at Thasos" (to use the phrase of Dr. Thirlwall), this was because he chose to station himself there, in the exercise of his own discretion.

Accordingly, the question which we have to put is, not whether Thucydides did all that could be done, after he received the alarming express at Thasos (which is the part of the case that *he* sets prominently before us), but whether he and Eukles jointly took the best general measures for the security of the Athenian empire in Thrace—especially for Amphipolis, the first jewel of her empire.

They suffer Athens to be robbed of that jewel—and how? Had they a difficult position to defend? Were they overwhelmed by a superior force? Were they distracted by simultaneous revolts in different places, or assailed by enemies unknown or unforeseen? Not one of these grounds for acquittal can be pleaded. First, their position was of all others the most defensible. They had only to keep the bridge over the Strymon adequately watched and guarded—or to retain the Athenian squadron at Eion—and Amphipolis was safe.

Either one or the other of these precautions would have sufficed: both together would have sufficed so amply, as probably to prevent the scheme of attack from being formed. Next, the force under Brasidas was in no way superior—not even adequate to the capture of the inferior place Eion, when properly guarded—much less to that of Amphipolis. Lastly, there were no simultaneous revolts to distract attention, nor unknown enemies to confound a well-laid scheme of defense. There was but one enemy, in one quarter, having one road by which to approach; an enemy of surpassing merit indeed, and eminently dangerous to Athens—but without any chance of success, except from the short-comings of the Athenian officers.

Now Thucydides and Eukles both knew that Brasidas had prevailed upon Akanthus and Stageirus to revolt, and that too in such a way as to extend his own personal influence materially. They knew that the population of Argilus was of Andrian origin, like that of Akanthus and Stageirus, and therefore peculiarly likely to be tempted by the example of those two towns. Lastly, they knew (and Thucydides himself tells us) that this Argilian population—whose territory bordered on the Strymon and the western foot of the bridge, and who had many connections in Amphipolis—had been long disaffected to Athens, and especially to the Athenian possession of that city. Yet having such foreknowledge, ample warning for the the necessity of vigilant defense, Thucydides and Eukles withdraw, or omit, both the two precautions upon which the security of Amphipolis rested—precautions both of them obvious, either of them sufficient. The one leaves the bridge under a feeble guard, and is caught so unprepared in every way, that one might suppose Athens to be in profound peace; the other is found with his squadron, not at Eion, but at Thasos—an island out of all possible danger, either from Brasidas (who had no ships) or any other enemy. The arrival of Brasidas comes on both of them like a clap of thunder. Nothing more is required than this plain fact, under the circumstances, to prove their improvidence as commanders.

The presence of Thucydides on the station of Thrace was important to Athens, partly because he possessed valuable family-connections, mining-property, and commanding influence among the continental population round Amphipolis. This was one main reason why he was named. The Athenian people confide much in his private influence, over and above the public force under his command—looking to him even more than to his colleague Eukles for the continued security of the town: instead of which they find that not even their own squadron under him is at hand near the vulnerable point at the moment when the enemy comes. Of the two, perhaps, the conduct of Eukles admits of conceivable explanation more easily than that of Thucydides. For it seems that Eukles had no paid force in Amphipolis; no other force than the citizen hoplites, partly Athenian, partly of other lineage. Doubtless these men found it

irksome to keep guard through the winter on the Strymonian bridge. Eukles might fancy, that by enforcing a large perpetual guard, he ran the risk of making Athens unpopular. Moreover, strict constancy of watch, night after night, when no actual danger comes, with an unpaid citizen force—is not easy to maintain. This is an insufficient excuse, but it is better than anything which can be offered on behalf of Thucydides; who had with him a paid Athenian force, and might just as well have kept it at Eion as at Thasos. We may be sure that the absence of Thucydides with his fleet, at Thasos, was one essential condition in the plot laid by Brasidas with the Argilians.

To say, with Dr. Thirlwall, that "human prudence and activity could not have accomplished more than Thucydides did *under the same circumstances*" —is true as a matter of fact, and creditable as far as it goes. But it is wholly inadmissible as a justification, and meets only one part of the case. An officer in command is responsible not only for doing most "under the circumstances," but also for the circumstances themselves, insofar as they are under his control. Now nothing is more under his control than the position which he choses to occupy. If the Emperor Napoleon, or the Duke of Wellington, had lost by surprise of an enemy not very numerous, a post of supreme importance which they thought adequately protected, would they be satisfied to hear from the responsible officer in command—"Having no idea that the enemy would attempt any surprise, I thought that I might keep my force half a day's journey off from the post exposed, at another post which it was physically impossible for the enemy to reach. But the moment I was informed that the surprise had occurred, I hastened to the scene, did all that human prudence and activity could do to repel the enemy; and though I found that he had already mastered the capital post of all, yet I beat him back from a second post which he was on the point of mastering also?" Does any one imagine that these illustrious chiefs, smarting under the loss of an inestimable position which alters the whole prospects of a campaign, would be satisfied with such a report, and would dismiss the officer with praises for his vigor and bravery "under the circumstances?" They would assuredly reply that he had done right in coming back—that his conduct after coming back had been that of a brave man—and that there was no impeachment on his courage. But they would at the same time add, that his want of judgment and foresight, in omitting to place the valuable position really exposed under sufficient guard beforehand, and leaving it thus open to the enemy, while he himself was absent in another place which was out of danger—and his easy faith that there would be no dangerous surprise, at a time when the character of the enemy's officer, as well as the disaffection of the neighbors (Argilus), plainly indicated that there *would* be, if the least opening were afforded—that these were defects meriting serious reproof, and disqualifying

him from any future command of trust and responsibility. Nor can we doubt that the whole feeling of the respective armies, who would have to pay with their best blood the unhappy miscalculation of this officer would go along with such a sentence; without at all suspecting themselves to be guilty of injustice, or of "directing the irritation produced by the loss against an innocent object."

The vehement leather-seller in the Pnyx at Athens, when he brought forward what are called "his calumnies" against Thucydides and Eukles, as having caused through culpable omission a fatal and irreparable loss to their country, might perhaps state his case with greater loudness and acrimony. But it may be doubted whether he would say anything more really galling, than would be contained in the dignified rebuke of an esteemed modern general, to a subordinate officer under similar circumstances. In my judgment, not only the accusation against these two officers (I assume Eukles to have been included) was called for on the fairest *presumptive* grounds —which would be sufficient as a justification of the leather-seller Kleon—but the positive verdict of guilty against them was fully merited. Whether the banishment inflicted was a greater penalty than the case warranted, I will not take upon me to pronounce. Every age has its own standard of feeling for measuring what is a proper intensity of punishment: penalties which our grandfathers thought right and meet, would in the present day appear intolerably rigorous. But when I consider the immense value of Amphipolis to Athens, combined with the conduct whereby it was lost, I cannot think that there was a single Athenian or a single Greek, who would deem the penalty of banishment too severe.

It is painful to find such strong grounds of official censure against a man who as an historian has earned the lasting admiration of posterity—my own among the first and warmest. But in criticizing the conduct of Thucydides the officer, we are bound in justice to forget Thucydides the historian. He was not known in the latter character, at the time when this sentence was passed. Perhaps he never would have been so known (like the Neapolitan historian Colletta), if exile had not thrown him out of the active duties and hopes of a citizen.

It may be doubted whether he ever went home from Eion to encounter the grief, wrath, and alarm, so strongly felt at Athens after the loss of Amphipolis. Condemned, either with or without appearance, he remained in banishment for twenty years; not returning to Athens until after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. Of this long exile much is said to have been spent on his property in Thrace; yet he also visited most parts of Greece—enemies of Athens as well as neutral states. However much we may deplore such a misfortune on his account, mankind in general has, and ever will have, the strongest reason to rejoice at it. To this compulsory leisure we owe the completion, or rather the near approach to comple-

tion, of his history. And the opportunities which an exile enjoyed of personally consulting neutrals and enemies, contributed much to form that impartial, comprehensive, Pan-hellenic, spirit, which reigns generally throughout his immortal work.

Meanwhile Brasidas, installed in Amphipolis about the beginning of December 424 B.C., employed his increased power only the more vigorously against Athens. His first care was to reconstitute Amphipolis—a task wherein the Macedonian Perdikkas, whose intrigues had contributed to the capture, came and personally assisted. That city went through a partial secession and renovation of inhabitants; being now moreover cut off from the port of Eion and the mouth of the river, which remained in the hands of the Athenians. Many new arrangements must have been required, as well for its internal polity as for its external defense. Brasidas took measures for building ships of war, in the lake above the city, in order to force the lower part of the river: but his most important step was to construct a palisade work, connecting the walls of the city with the bridge. He thus made himself permanently master of the crossing of the Strymon, so as to shut the door by which he himself had entered, and at the same time to keep an easy communication with Argilus and the western bank of the Strymon. He also made some acquisitions on the eastern side of the river. Pittakus, prince of the neighboring Edonian Thracian township of Myrkinus, had been recently assassinated by his wife Brauro and by some personal enemies. He had probably been the ally of Athens, and his assassins now sought to strengthen themselves by courting the alliance of the new conqueror of Amphipolis. The Thasian continental colonies of Galepsus and Œsyme also declared their adhesion to him.

While he sent to Lacedæmon, communicating his excellent position as well as his large hopes, he at the same time, without waiting for the answer, began acting for himself, with all the allies whom he could get togther. He marched first against the peninsula called Akte—the narrow tongue of land which stretches out from the neighborhood of Akanthus to the mighty headland called Mount Athos—near thirty miles long, and between four and five miles for the most part in breadth. The long, rugged, woody ridge—covering this peninsula so as to leave but narrow spaces for dwelling, or cultivation, or feeding of cattle—was at this time occupied by many distinct petty communities, some of them divided in race and language. Sane, a colony from Andros, was situated in the interior gulf (called the Singitic Gulf) between Athos and the Sithonian peninsula, near the Xerxeian canal. The rest of the Akte was distributed among Bisaltians, Krestonians and Edonians, all fractions of the Thracian name—Pelasgians or Tyrrhenians, of the race which had once occupied Lemnos and Imbros—and some Chalkidians. Some of these little communities spoke habitually two languages. Thyssus, Kleone, Olophyxus, and others, all submitted on the arrival of Brasidas; but Sane and Dion held out, nor could he bring them to terms even by ravaging their territory.

He next marched into the Sithonian peninsula, to attack Torone, situated near the southern extremity of that peninsula—opposite to Cape Kanastræum, the extreme headland of the peninsula of Pallene.

Torone was inhabited by a Chalkidic population, but had not partaken in the revolt of the neighboring Chalkidians against Athens. A small Athenian garrison had been sent there, probably since the recent dangers, and were now defending it as well as repairing the town-wall in various parts where it had been so neglected as to crumble down. They occupied as a sort of distinct citadel the outlying cape called Lekythus, joining by a narrow isthmus the hill on which the city stood, and forming a port wherein lay two Athenian triremes as guardships. A small party in Torone, without privity or even suspicion of the rest, entered into correspondence with Brasidas, and engaged to provide for him the means of entering and mastering the town. Accordingly he advanced by a night-march to the temple of the Dioskuri (Kastor and Pollux) within about a quarter of a mile of the town-gates, which he reached a little before daybreak; sending forward 100 peltasts to be still nearer, and to rush upon the gate at the instant when signal was made from within. His Toronæan partisans, some of whom were already concealed on the spot awaiting his arrival, made their final arrangements with him, and then returned into the town—conducting with them seven determined men from his army, armed only with daggers, and having Lysistratus of Olynthus as their chief. Twenty men had been originally named for this service, but the danger appeared so extreme, that only seven of them were bold enough to go. This forlorn hope, enabled to creep in, through a small aperture in the wall toward the sea, were conducted silently up to the topmost watch-tower on the city hill, where they surprised and slew the guards, and set open a neighboring postern gate, looking toward Cape Kanastræum, as well as the great gate leading toward the agora. They then brought in the peltasts from without, who, impatient with the delay, had gradually stolen close under the walls, Some of these peltasts kept possession of the great gate, others were led round to the postern at the top, while the fire-signal was forthwith lighted to invite Brasidas himself. He and his men hastened forward toward the city at their utmost speed and with loud shouts—a terror-striking notice of his presence to the unprepared citizens. Admission was easy through the open gates, but some also clambered up by means of beams or a sort of scaffolding, which was lying close to the wall as a help to the workmen repairing it. And while the assailants were thus active in every direction, Brasidas himself conducted a portion of them to assure himself of the high and commanding parts of the city.

So completely were the Toronæans surprised and thunderstruck,

that hardly any attempt was made to resist. Even the fifty Athenian hoplites who occupied the agora, being found still asleep, were partly slain, and partly compelled to seek refuge in the separately garrisoned cape of Lekythus, whither they were followed by a portion of the Toronæan population; some from attachment to Athens, others from sheer terror. To these fugitives Brasidas addressed a proclamation inviting them to return, and promising them perfect security for person, property, and political rights; while at the same time he sent a herald with a formal summons to the Athenians in Lekythus, requiring them to quit the place as belonging to the Chalkidians, but permitting them to carry away their property. They refused to evacuate the place, but solicited a truce of one day for the purpose of burying their slain. Brasidas granted them two days, which were employed both by them and by him, in preparations for the defense and attack of Lekythus; each party fortifying the houses on or near the connecting isthmus.

In the meantime he convened a general assembly of the Toronæan population, whom he addressed in the same conciliating and equitable language as he had employed elsewhere. "He had not come to harm either the city or any individual citizen. Those who had let him in, ought not to be regarded as bad men or traitors—for they had acted with a view to the benefit and the liberation of their city, not in order to enslave it, or to acquire profit for themselves. On the other hand, he did not think the worse of those who had gone over to Lekythus, for their liking toward Athens: he wished them to come back freely, and he was sure that the more they knew the Lacedæmonians, the better they would esteem them. He was prepared to forgive and forget previous hostility; but while he invited all of them to live for the future as cordial friends and fellow-citizens—he should also for the future hold each man responsible for his conduct, either as friend or as enemy."

On the expiration of the Two days' truce, Brasidas attacked the Athenian garrison in Lekythus, promising a recompense of thirty minæ to the soldier who should first force his way into it. Notwithstanding very poor means of defense—partly a wooden palisade, partly houses with battlements on the roof—this garrison repelled him for one whole day. On the next morning he brought up a machine, for the same purpose as that which the Bœotians had employed at Delium, to set fire to the wood-work. The Athenians on their side, seeing this fire machine approaching, put up, on a building in front of their position, a wooden platform, upon which many of them mounted, with casks of water and large stones to break it or to extinguish the flames. At last, the weight accumulated becoming greater than the supports could bear, it broke down with a prodigious noise; so that all the persons and things upon it rolled down in confusion. Some of these men were hurt, yet the injury was not in reality serious,—had not the noise, the cries, and the strangeness of the

incident alarmed those behind, who could not see precisely what had occurred, to such a degree that they believed the enemy to have already forced the defenses. Many of them accordingly took to flight, while those who remained were insufficient to prolong the resistance successfully; so that Brasidas, perceiving the disorder and diminished number of the defenders, relinquished his fire-machine and again renewed his attempt to carry the place by assault, which now fully succeeded. A considerable portion of the Athenians and others in the fort escaped across the narrow gulf to the peninsula of Pallene, by means of two triremes and some merchant-vessels at hand: but every man found in it was put to death. Brasidas, thus master of the fort, and considering that he owed his success to the sudden rupture of the Athenian scaffolding, regarded this incident as a divine interposition, and presented the thirty minæ (which he had promised as a reward to the first man who broke in) to the goddess Athene for her temple at Lekythus. He, moreover, consecrated to her the entire cape of Lekythus; not only demolishing the defenses, but also dismantling the private residences which it contained, so that nothing remained except the temple, with its ministers and appurtenances.

What proportion of the Toronæans who had taken refuge at Lekythus, had been induced to return by the proclamation of Brasidas, alike generous and politic—we are not informed. His language and conduct were admirably calculated to set this little community again in harmonious movement, and to obliterate the memory of past feuds. And above all, it inspired a strong sentiment of attachment and gratitude toward himself personally—a sentiment which gained strength with every successive incident in which he was engaged, and which enabled him to exercise a greater ascendency than could ever be acquired by Sparta, and in some respects greater than had ever been possessed by Athens. It is this remarkable development of commanding individuality, animated throughout by straightforward public purposes, and binding together so many little communities who had few other feelings in common—which lends to the short career of this eminent man, a romantic, and even an heroic, interest.

During the remainder of the winter Brasidas employed himself in setting in order the acquisitions already made, and in laying plans for farther conquests in the spring. But the beginning of spring—or the close of the eighth year, and beginning of the ninth year, of the war, as Thucydides reckons—brought with it a new train of events, which will be recounted in the following chapter.

CHAPTER LIV.

TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR.—RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.—PEACE OF NIKIAS.

THE eighth year of the war, described in the last chapter, had opened with sanguine hopes for Athens, and with dark promise for Sparta, chiefly in consequence of the memorable capture of Sphakteria toward the end of the preceding summer. It included, not to mention other events, two considerable and important enterprises on the part of Athens—against Megara and against Bœotia; the former plan, partially successful—the latter, not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. Lastly, the losses in Thrace following close upon the defeat at Delium, together with the unbounded expectations everywhere entertained from the future career of Brasidas, had again seriously lowered the impression entertained of Athenian power. The year thus closed amid humiliations the more painful to Athens, as contrasted with the glowing hopes with which it had begun.

It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever she desired it. Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she had played a bold game, and aimed at larger acquisitions during the past year. This speculation, though not in itself unreasonable, had failed: moreover, a new phenomenon, alike unexpected by all, had occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her empire in Thrace. Still, so great was the anxiety of the Spartans to regain their captives, who had powerful friends and relatives at home, that they considered the victories of Brasidas chiefly as a stepping-stone toward that object, and as a means of prevailing upon Athens to make peace. To his animated representations sent home from Amphipolis, setting forth the prospects of still farther success and entreating re-enforcements—they had returned a discouraging reply, dictated in no small degree by the miserable jealousy of some of their chief men; who, feeling themselves cast into the shade, and looking upon his splendid career as an eccentric movement breaking loose from Spartan routine, were thus on personal as well as political grounds disposed to labor for peace. Such collateral motives, working upon the caution usual with Sparta, determined her to make use of the present fortune and realized conquests of Brasidas, as a basis for negotiation and recovery of the prisoners; without opening the chance of ulterior enterprises, which, though they might perhaps end in results yet more triumphant, would unavoidably put in risk that which was now secure. The history of the Athenians during the past year might, indeed, serve as a warning to deter the Spartans from playing an adventurous game.

Ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the Lacedæmonians had been attempting, directly or indirectly, negotiations for peace and the recovery of the prisoners. Their pacific dispositions were especially instigated by King Pleistoanax, whose peculiar circumstances gave him a strong motive to bring the war to a close. He had been banished from Sparta, fourteen years before the commencement of the war, and a little before the Thirty years' truce, under the charge of having taken bribes from the Athenians on occasion of invading Attica. For more than eighteen years he lived in banishment close to the temple of Zeus Dykæus in Arcadia; in such constant fear of the Lacedæmonians that his dwelling-house was half within the consecrated ground. But he never lost the hope of procuring restoration, through the medium of the Pythian priestess at Delphi, whom he and his brother Aristokles kept in their pay. To every sacred legation which went from Sparta to Delphi, she repeated the same imperative injunction—"They must bring back the seed of (Herakles) the demigod son of Zeus from foreign land to their own; if they did not, it would be their fate to plow with a silver plowshare." The command of the god, thus incessantly repeated, and backed by the influence of those friends who supported Pleistoanax at home, at length produced an entire change of sentiment at Sparta. In the fourth or fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, the exile was recalled; and not merely recalled, but welcomed with unbounded honors—received with the same sacrifices and choric shows as those which were said to have been offered to the primitive kings, on the first settlement of Sparta.

As in the case of Kleomenes and Demaratus, however, it was not long before the previous intrigue came to be detected, or at least generally suspected and believed; to the great discredit of Pleistoanax, though he could not be again banished. Every successive public calamity which befell the state—the miscarriages of Alkidas, the defeat of Eurylochus in Amphilochia, and above all, the unprecedented humiliation in Sphakteria—were imputed to the displeasure of the gods in consequence of the impious treachery of Pleistoanax. Suffering under such an imputation, this king was most eager to exchange the hazards of war for the secure march of peace, so that he was thus personally interested in opening every door for negotiation with Athens, and in restoring himself to credit by regaining the prisoners.

After the battle of Delium, the pacific dispositions of Nikias, Laches, and the philo-Laconian party, began to find increasing favor at Athens; while the unforeseen losses in Thrace, coming thick upon each other—each successive triumph of Brasidas apparently increasing his means of achieving more—tended to convert the discouragement of the Athenians into positive alarm. Negotiations appear to have been in progress throughout great part of the winter. The con-

tinual hope that these might be brought to a close, combined with the impolitic aversion of Nikias and his friends to energetic military action, help to explain the unwonted apathy of Athens under the pressure of such disgraces. But so much did her courage flag, toward the close of the winter, that she came to look upon a truce as her only means of preservation against the victorious progress of Brasidas. What the tone of Kleon now was, we are not directly informed. He would probably still continue opposed to the propositions of peace, at least indirectly, by insisting on terms more favorable than could be obtained. On this point his political counsels would be wrong; but on another point they would be much sounder and more judicious than those of his rival Nikias: for he would recommend a strenuous prosecution of hostilities by Athenian force against Brasidas in Thrace. At the present moment this was the most urgent political necessity of Athens, whether she entertained or rejected the views of peace. And the policy of Nikias, who cradled up the existing depression of the citizens by encouraging them to rely on the pacific inclinations of Sparta, was ill-judged and disastrous in its results, as the future will hereafter show.

Attempts were made by the peace party both at Athens and Sparta to negotiate at first for a definitive peace. But the conditions of such a peace were not easy to determine, so as to satisfy both parties—and became more and more difficult, with every success of Brasidas. At length the Athenians, eager above all things to arrest his progress, sent to Sparta to propose a truce for one year—desiring the Spartans to send to Athens envoys with full powers to settle the terms: the truce would allow time and tranquillity for settling the conditions of a definitive treaty. The proposition of the truce for one year, together with the first two articles ready prepared, came from Athens, as indeed we might have presumed even without proof; since the interest of Sparta was rather against it, as allowing to the Athenians the fullest leisure for making preparations against farther losses in Thrace. But her main desire was, not so much to put herself in condition to make the best possible peace, as to insure some peace which would liberate her captives. She calculated that when once the Athenians had tasted the sweets of peace for one year, they would not again voluntarily impose upon themselves the rigorous obligations of war.

In the month of March, 423 B.C., on the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, and on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius at Sparta, a truce for one year was concluded and sworn, between Athens on one side, and Sparta, Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, and Megara on the other. The Spartans, instead of merely dispatching plenipotentiaries to Athens as the Athenians had desired, went a step farther. In concurrence with the Athenian envoys, they drew up a form of truce, approved by themselves and their allies, in such manner that it only required to be adopted and ratified by the Athenians.

The general principle of the truce was uti possidetis, and the conditions were in substance as follows:—

1. Respecting the temple at Delphi, every Greek shall have the right to make use of it honestly and without fear, pursuant to the customs of his particular city.—The main purpose of this stipulation, prepared and sent verbatim from Athens, was to allow Athenian visitors to go thither, which had been impossible during the war, in consequence of the hostility of the Bœotians and Phokians. The Delphian authorities also were in the interest of Sparta, and doubtless the Athenians received no formal invitation to the Pythian games. But the Bœotians and Phokians were no parties to the truce: accordingly the Lacedæmonians, while accepting the article and proclaiming the general liberty in principle, do not pledge themselves to enforce it by arms as far as the Bœotians and Phokians are concerned, but only to try and persuade them by amicable representations. The liberty of sacrificing at Delphi was at this moment the more welcome to the Athenians, as they seem to have fancied themselves under the displeasure of Apollo.

2. All the contracting parties will inquire out and punish, each according to its own laws, such persons as may violate the property of the Delphian god.—This article also is prepared at Athens, for the purpose seemingly of conciliating the favor of Apollo and the Delphians. The Lacedæmonians accept the article literally, of course.

3. The Athenian garrisons at Pylus, Kythera, Nisæa, and Minoa, and Methana in the neighborhood of Trœzen, are to remain as at present. No communication to take place between Kythera and any portion of the main-land belonging to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The soldiers occupying Pylus shall confine themselves within the space between Buphras and Tomeus; those in Nisæa and Minoa, within the road which leads from the chapel of the hero Nisus to the temple of Poseidon—without any communication with the population beyond that limit. In like manner the Athenians in the peninsula of Methana near Trœzen, and the inhabitants of the latter city, shall observe the special convention concluded between them respecting boundaries.

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make use of the sea for trading-purposes, on their own coasts, but shall not have liberty to sail in any ship of war, nor in any rowed merchant-vessel of tonnage equal to 500 talents. [All war-ships were generally impelled by oar: they sometimes used sails, but never when wanted for fighting. Merchant-vessels seem generally to have sailed, but were sometimes rowed: the limitation of size is added, to insure that the Lacedæmonians shall not, under color of merchantmen, get up a warlike navy.]

5. There shall be free communication by sea as well as by land, between Peloponnesus and Athens for herald or embassy, with suit-

able attendants, to treat for a definitive peace or for the adjustment of differences.

6. Neither side shall receive deserters from the other, whether free or slave. [This article was alike important to both parties. Athens had to fear the revolt of her subject-allies—Sparta the desertion of Helots.]

7. Disputes shall be amicably settled, by both parties, according to their established laws and customs.

Such was the substance of the treaty prepared at Sparta—seemingly in concert with Athenian envoys—and sent by the Spartans to Athens for approval, with the following addition—"If there be any provision which occurs to you, more honorable or just than these, come to Lacedæmon and tell us: for neither the Spartans nor their allies will resist any just suggestions. But let those who come bring with them full powers to conclude—in the same manner as you desire of us. The truce shall be for one year."

By the resolution which Laches proposed in the Athenian public assembly, ratifying the truce, the people farther decreed that negotiations should be opened for a definitive treaty, and directed the Strategi to propose to the next ensuing assembly, a scheme and principles for conducting the negotiations. But at the very moment when the envoys between Sparta and Athens were bringing the truce to final adoption, events happened in Thrace which threatened to cancel it altogether. Two days after the important fourteenth of Elaphebolion, but before the truce could be made known in Thrace, Skione revolted from Athens to Brasidas.

Skione was a town calling itself Achæan, one of the numerous colonies which, in the want of an acknowledged mother-city, traced its origin to warriors returning from Troy. It was situated in the peninsula of Pallene (the westernmost of those three narrow tongues of land into which Chalkidike branches out); conterminous with the Eretrian colony Mende. The Skionæans, not without considerable dissent among themselves, proclaimed their revolt from Athens, under concert with Brasidas. He immediately crossed the Gulf into Pallene, himself in a little boat, but with a trireme close at his side; calculating that she would protect him against any small Athenian vessel—while any Athenian trireme which he might encounter would attack his trireme, paying no attention to the little boat in which he himself was. The revolt of Skione was, from the position of the town, a more striking defiance of Athens than any of the preceding events. For the isthmus connecting Pallene with the main-land was occupied by the town of Potidæ—a town assigned at the period of its capture, seven years before, to Athenian settlers, though probably containing some other residents besides. Moreover the isthmus was so narrow that the wall of Potidæ barred it across completely from sea to sea. Pallene was therefore a quasi-island, not open to the aid of land force from the continent, like the towns

previously acquired by Brasidas. The Skionæans thus put themselves, without any foreign aid, into conflict against the whole force of Athens, bringing into question her empire not merely over continental towns but over islands.

Even to Brasidas himself, their revolt appeared a step of astonishing boldness. On being received into the city, he convened a public assembly, and addressed to them the same language which he had employed at Akanthus and Torone; disavowing all party preferences as well as all interference with the internal politics of the town, and exhorting them only to unanimous efforts against the common enemy. He bestowed upon them at the same time the warmest praise for their courage. "They, though exposed to all the hazards of islanders, had stood forward of their own accord to procure freedom, without waiting like cowards to be driven on by a foreign force toward what was clearly their own good. He considered them capable of any measure of future heroism, if the danger now impending from Athens should be averted—and he should assign to them the very first post of honor among the faithful allies of Lacedæmon."

This generous, straightforward, and animating tone of exhortation—appealing to the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind, the love of complete city-autonomy, and coming from the lips of one whose whole conduct had hitherto been conformable to it—had proved highly efficacious in all the previous towns. But in Skione it roused the population to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. It worked even upon the feelings of the dissentient minority, bringing them round to partake heartily in the movement. It produced a unanimous and exalted confidence which made them look forward cheerfully to all the desperate chances in which they had engaged themselves; and it produced at the same time, in still more unbounded manifestation, the same personal attachment and admiration as Brasidas inspired elsewhere. The Skionæans not only voted to him publicly a golden crown, as the liberator of Greece, but when it was placed on his head, the burst of individual sentiment and sympathy was the strongest of which the Grecian bosom was capable. "They crowded round him individually, and encircled his head with fillets, like a victorious athlete," says the historian. This remarkable incident illustrates what I observed before—that the achievements, the self-relying march, the straightforward politics, and probity of this illustrious man—who in character was more Athenian than Spartan, yet with the good qualities of Athens predominant—inspired a personal emotion toward him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life. The sympathy and admiration felt in Greece toward a victorious athlete was not merely an intense sentiment in the Grecian mind, but was perhaps, of all others, the most wide-spread and Pan-hellenic. It was connected with the religion, the taste, and the love of recreation common to the whole nation—while politics tended rather to disunite the separate cities: it was farther a senti-

ment at once familiar and exclusively personal. Of its exaggerated intensity throughout Greece the philosophers often complained, not without good reason. But Thucydides cannot convey a more lively idea of the enthusiasm and unanimity with which Brasidas was welcomed at Skione, just after the desperate resolution taken by the citizens, than by using this simile.

The Lacedæmonian commander knew well how much the utmost resolution of the Skionæans was needed, and how speedily their insular position would draw upon them the vigorous invasion of Athens. He accordingly brought across to Pallene a considerable portion of his army, not merely with a view to the defense of Skione, but also with the intention of surprising both Mende and Potidæa, in both which places there were small parties of conspirators prepared to open the gates.

It was in this position that he was found by the commissioners who came to announce formally the conclusion of the truce for one year, and to enforce its provisions: Athenæus from Sparta—one of the three Spartans who had sworn to the treaty; Aristonymus, from Athens. The face of affairs was materially altered by this communication; much to the satisfaction of the newly-acquired allies of Sparta in Thrace, who accepted the truce forthwith—but to the great chagrin of Brasidas, whose career was thus suddenly arrested. Yet he could not openly refuse obedience, and his army was accordingly transferred from the peninsula of Pallene to Torone.

The case of Skione however, immediately raised an obstruction, doubtless very agreeable to him. The commissioners, who had come in an Athenian trireme, had heard nothing of the revolt of that place, and Aristonymus was astonished to find the enemy in Pallene. But on inquiring into the case, he discovered that the Skionæans had not revolted until two days after the day fixed for the commencement of the truce. Accordingly, while sanctioning the truce for all the other cities in Thrace, he refused to comprehend Skione in it, sending immediate news home to Athens. Brasidas, protesting loudly against this proceeding, refused on his part to abandon Skione, which was peculiarly endeared to him by the recent scenes; and even obtained the countenance of the Lacedæmonian commissioners, by falsely asseverating that the city had revolted before the day named in the truce.

Violent was the burst of indignation when the news sent home by Aristonymus reached Athens. It was nowise softened, when the Lacedæmonians, acting upon the version of the case sent to them by Brasidas and Athenæus, dispatched an embassy thither to claim protection for Skione—or at any rate to procure the adjustment of the dispute by arbitration or pacific decision. Having the terms of the treaty on their side, the Athenians were least of all disposed to relax from their rights in favor of the first revolting islanders. They

resolved at once to undertake an expedition for the reconquest of Skione; and further, on the proposition of Kleon, to put to death all the adult male inhabitants of that place as soon as it should have been reconquered. At the same time, they showed no disposition to throw up the truce generally. The state of feeling on both sides tended to this result—that while the war continued in Thrace, it was suspended everywhere else.

Fresh intelligence soon arrived—carrying exasperation at Athens yet further—of the revolt of Mende, the adjoining town to Skione. Those Mendæans, who had laid their measures for secretly introducing Brasidas, were at first baffled by the arrival of the truce-commissioners. But they saw that he retained his hold on Skione, in spite of the provisions of the truce; and they ascertained that he was willing still to protect them if they revolted, though he could not be an accomplice, as originally projected, in the surprise of the town. Being moreover only a small party, with the sentiment of the population against them—they were afraid, if they now relinquished their scheme, of being detected and punished for the partial steps already taken, when the Athenians should come against Skione. They therefore thought it on the whole the least dangerous course to persevere. They proclaimed their revolt from Athens, constraining the reluctant citizens to obey them. The government seems before to have been democratical, but they now found means to bring about an oligarchical revolution along with the revolt. Brasidas immediately accepted their adhesion, and willingly undertook to protect them; professing to think that he had a right to do so, because they had revolted openly after the truce had been proclaimed. But the truce upon this point was clear—which he himself virtually admitted, by setting up as justification certain alleged matters in which the Athenians had themselves violated it. He immediately made preparation for the defense both of Mende and Skione against the attack which was now rendered more certain than before; conveying the women and children of those two towns across to the Chalkidic Olynthus, and sending thither as garrison 500 Peloponnesian hoplites with 300 Chalkidic peltasts; the commander of which force, Polydamidas, took possession of the acropolis with his own troops separately.

Brasidas then withdrew himself with the greater part of his army, to accompany Perdikkas on an expedition into the interior against Arrhibæus and the Lynkestæ. On what ground, after having before entered into terms with Arrhibæus, he now became his active enemy, we are left to conjecture. Probably his relations with Perdikkas, whose alliance was of essential importance, were such that this step was forced upon him against his will; or he may really have thought that the force under Polydamidas was adequate to the defense of Mende and Skione—an idea which the unaccountable backwardness of Athens for the last six or eight months might well foster. Had he

even remained, indeed, he could hardly have saved them, considering the situation of Pallene and the superiority of Athens at sea: but his absence made their ruin certain.

While Brasidas was thus engaged far in the interior, the Athenian armament under Nikias and Nikostratus reached Potidæa; fifty triremes, ten of them Chian—1000 hoplites and 600 bowmen from Athens—1000 mercenary Thracians—with some peltasts from Methone and other towns in the neighborhood. From Potidæa they proceeded by sea to Cape Poseidonium, near which they landed for the purpose of attacking Mende. Polydamidas, the Peloponnesian commander in the town, took post with his force of 700 hoplites, including 300 Skionæans, upon an eminence near the city, strong and difficult of approach: upon which the Athenian generals divided their forces; Nikias, with sixty Athenian chosen hoplites, 120 Methonean peltasts, and all the bowmen, tried to march up the hill by a side path and thus turn the position—while Nikostratus with the main army attacked it in front. But such were the extreme difficulties of the ground that both were repulsed: Nikias was himself wounded, and the division of Nikostratus was thrown into great disorder, narrowly escaping a destructive defeat. The Mendæans, however, evacuated the position in the night and retired into the city; while the Athenians, sailing round on the morrow to the suburb on the side of Skione, ravaged the neighboring land; Nikias on the ensuing day carried his devastations still further, even to the border of the Skionæan territory.

But dissensions so serious had already commenced within the walls, that the Skionæan auxiliaries, becoming mistrustful of their situation, took advantage of the night to return home. The revolt of Mende had been brought about against the will of the citizens, by the intrigues and for the benefit of an oligarchical faction. Moreover, it does not appear that Brasidas personally visited the town, as he had visited Skione and the other revolted towns. Had he come, his personal influence might have done much to soothe the offended citizens, and create some disposition to adopt the revolt as a fact accomplished, after they had once been compromised with Athens. But his animating words had not been heard, and the Peloponnesian troops, whom he had sent to Mende, were mere instruments to sustain the newly-erected oligarchy, and keep out the Athenians. The feelings of the citizens generally toward them were soon unequivocally displayed. Nikostratus with half of the Athenian force was planted before the gate of Mende which opened toward Potidæa. In the neighborhood of that gate, within the city, was the place of arms and the chief station both of the Peloponnesians and of the citizens. Polydamidas, intending to make a sally forth, was marshaling both of them in battle order, when one of the Mendæan Demos, manifesting with angry vehemence a sentiment common to most of them, told him "that he would not sally forth, and did not choose to take

part in the contest." Polydamidas seized hold of the man to punish him, when the mass of the armed Demos, taking part with their comrade, made a sudden rush upon the Peloponnesians. The latter, unprepared for such an onset, sustained at first some loss, and were soon forced to retreat into the acropolis—the rather as they saw some of the Mendæans open the gates to the besiegers without, which induced them to suspect a preconcerted betrayal. No such concert however existed; though the besieging generals, when they saw the gates thus suddenly opened, soon comprehended the real position of affairs. But they found it impossible to restrain their soldiers, who pushed in forthwith, from plundering the town: and they had even some difficulty in saving the lives of the citizens.

Mende being thus taken, the Athenian generals desired the body of the citizens to resume the former government, leaving it to them to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. What use was made of this permission, we are not told: but probably most of the authors had already escaped into the acropolis along with Polydamidas. Having erected a wall of circumvallation, round the acropolis, joining the sea at both ends—and left a force to guard it—the Athenians moved away to begin the siege at Skione, where they found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a strong hill, not far from the walls. As it was impossible to surround the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked it at once and were more fortunate than they had been before Mende; for they carried it by assault, compelling the offenders to take refuge in the town. After erecting their trophy, they commenced the wall of circumvallation. Before it was finished, the garrison who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mende got into Skione at night, having broken out by a sudden sally where the blockading wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Nikias from prosecuting his operations, so that Skione was in no long time completely inclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of circumvallation

Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from the inland Macedonia. Unable either to recover Mende or to relieve Skione, he was forced to confine himself to the protection of Torone. Nikias, however, without attacking Torone, returned soon afterward with his armament to Athens, leaving Skione under blockade.

The march of Brasidas into Macedonia had been unfortunate in every way. Nothing but his extraordinary gallantry rescued him from utter ruin. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas consisted of 3000 Grecian hoplites—Peloponnesian, Akanthian, and Chalkidian—with 1000 Macedonian and Chalkidian horse—and a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they had got beyond the mountain-pass into the territory of the Lynkestæ, they were met by Arrhibæus, and a battle ensued, in which that prince was completely worsted. They halted here a few days, awaiting—before they

pushed forward to attack the villages in the territory of Arrhibæus —the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries, with whom Perdikkas had concluded a bargain. At length Perdikkas became impatient to advance without them, while Brasidas, on the contrary, apprehensive of the fate of Mende during his absence, was bent on returning back. The dissension between them becoming aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments at some distance from each other—when both received unexpected intelligence which made Perdikkas as anxious to retreat as Brasidas. The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhibæus, and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The untold number of these barbarians was reported as overwhelming, while such was their reputation for ferocity as well as for valor, that the Macedonian army of Perdikkas, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night, and fled without orders, hurrying Perdikkas himself along with them, and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had been concerted about the retreat. In the morning the latter found Arrhibæus and the Illyrians close upon him: the Macedonians being already far advanced in their journey homeward.

The contrast between the man of Hellas and of Macedonia—general as well as soldiers—was never more strikingly exhibited than on this critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline; the commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square or oblong, with the light-armed and attendants in the center, for the retreating march. Youthful soldiers were posted either in the outer ranks, or in convenient stations, to run out swiftly and repel the assailing enemy; while Brasidas himself, with 300 chosen men, formed the rear-guard.

The short harangue which (according to a custom universal with Grecian generals) he addressed to his troops immediately before the enemy approached, is in many respects remarkable. Though some were Akanthians, some Chalkidians, some Helots, he designates all by the honorable title of "Peloponnesians." Reassuring them against the desertion of their allies, as well as against the superior numbers of the advancing enemy—he invokes their native, homebred courage. "*Ye* do not require the presence of allies to inspire you with bravery—nor do ye fear superior numbers of an enemy; for ye belong not to those political communities in which the larger number governs the smaller, but to those in which a few men rule subjects more numerous than themselves—having acquired their power by no other means than by superiority in battle." Next, Brasidas tried to dissipate the *prestige* of the Illyrian name. His army had already vanquished the Lynkestæ, and these other barbarians were noway better. A nearer acquaintance would soon show that they were only formidable from the noise, the gestures, the clashing of

arms and the accompaniments of their onset; and that they were incapable of sustaining the reality of close combat, hand to hand. "They have no regular order (said he) such as to impress them with shame for deserting their post. Flight and attack are with them in equally honorable esteem, so that there is nothing to test the really courageous man: their battle, wherein every man fights as he chooses, is just the thing to furnish each with a decent pretense for running away."—"Repel ye their onset whenever it comes, and so soon as opportunity offers, resume your retreat in rank and order. Ye will soon arrive in a place of safety; and ye will be convinced that such crowds, when their enemy has stood to defy the first onset, keep aloof with empty menace and a parade of courage which never strikes—while if their enemy gives way, they show themselves smart and bold in running after him where there is no danger."

The superiority of disciplined and regimented force over disorderly numbers, even with equal individual courage, is now a truth so familiar, that we require an effort of imagination to put ourselves back into the fifth century before the Christian era, when this truth was recognized only among the Hellenic communities; when the practice of all their neighbors, Illyrians, Thracians, Asiatics, Epirots, and even Macedonians—implied ignorance or contradiction of it. In respect to the Epirots, the difference between their military habits and those of the Greeks has been already noticed—having been pointedly manifested in the memorable joint attack on the Akarnanian town of Stratus, in the second year of the war. Both Epirots and Macedonians, however, are a step nearer to the Greeks than either Thracians, or these Illyrian barbarians against whom Brasidas was now about to contend, and in whose case the contrast comes out yet more forcibly. It is not merely the contrast between two modes of fighting which the Lacedæmonian commander impresses upon his soldiers. He gives what may be called a moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded; a theory of large range, and going to the basis of Grecian social life, in peace as well as in war. The sentiment, in each individual man's bosom, of a certain place which he has to fill and duties which he has to perform—combined with fear of the displeasure of his neighbors as well as of his own self-reproach if he shrinks back—but at the same time essentially bound up with the feeling, that his neighbors are under corresponding obligations toward him—this sentiment, which Brasidas invokes as the settled military creed of his soldiers in their ranks, was not less the regulating principle of their intercourse in peace as citizens of the same community. Simple as the principle may seem, it would have found no response in the army of Xerxes, or of the Thracian Sitalkes or of the Gaul Brennus. The Persian soldier rushes to death by order of the Great King, perhaps under terror of a whip which the Great King commands to be administered to him. The Illyrian or the Gaul scorns such a stimulus, and obeys only the instigation of

his own pugnacity, or vengeance, or love of blood, or love of booty —but recedes as soon as that individual sentiment is either satisfied, or overcome by fear. It is the Greek soldier alone who feels himself bound to his comrades by ties reciprocal and indissoluble—who obeys neither the will of a king, nor his own individual impulse, but a common and imperative sentiment of obligation—whose honor or shame is attached to his own place in the ranks, never to be abandoned nor overstepped. Such conceptions of military duty, established in the minds of these soldiers whom Brasidas addressed, will come to be farther illustrated when we describe the memorable Retreat of the Ten Thousand. At present I merely indicate them as forming a part of that general scheme of morality, social and political as well as military, wherein the Greeks stood exalted above the nations who surrounded them.

But there is another point in the speech of Brasidas which deserves notice: he tells his soldiers—"Courage is your homebred property: for ye belong to communities wherein the small number governs the larger, simply by reason of superior prowess in themselves and conquest by their ancestors." First, it is remarkable that a large proportion of the Peleponnesian soldiers, whom Brasidas thus addresses, consisted of Helots—the conquered race, not the conquerors: yet so easily does the military or regimental pride supplant the sympathies of race, that these men would feel flattered by being addressed as if they were themselves sprung from the race which had enslaved their ancestors. Next, we here see the right of the strongest invoked as the legitimate source of power, and as an honorable and ennobling recollection by an officer of Dorian race, oligarchical politics, unperverted intellect, and estimable character. We shall accordingly be prepared, when we find a similar principle hereafter laid down by the Athenian envoys at Melos, to disallow the explanation of those who treat it merely as a theory invented by demagogues and sophists —upon one or other of whom it is common to throw the blame of all that is objectionable in Grecian politics or morality.

Having finished his harangue, Brasidas gave orders for retreat. As soon as his march began, the Illyrians rushed upon him with all the confidence and shouts of pursuers against a flying enemy, believing that they should completely destroy his army. But wherever they approached near, the young soldiers specially stationed for the purpose turned upon and beat them back with severe loss; while Brasidas himself with his rear-guard of 300 was present everywhere rendering vigorous aid. When the Lynkestæ and Illyrians attacked, the army halted and repelled them, after which it resumed its retreating march. The barbarians found themselves so rudely handled, and with such unwonted vigor—for they probably had had no previous experience of Grecian troops—that after a few trials they desisted from meddling with the army in its retreat along the plain. They ran forward rapidly, partly in order to overtake the Macedonians under Perdikkas, who had fled before—partly to occupy the narrow pass, with high hills on each side, which formed the entrance into Lynkestis, and which lay in the road of Brasidas. When the latter approached this narrow pass, he saw the barbarians masters of it. Several of them were already on the summits, and more were ascending to re-enforce them; while a portion of them were moving down upon his rear. Brasidas immediately gave orders to his chosen 300, to charge up the most assailable of the two hills, with their best speed, before it became more numerously occupied—not staying to preserve compact ranks. This unexpected and vigorous movement disconcerted the barbarians, who fled, abandoning the eminence to the Greeks, and leaving their own men in the pass exposed on one of their flanks. The retreating army, thus master of one of the side hills, was enabled to force its way through the middle pass, and to drive away the Lynkestian and Illyrian occupants. Having got through this narrow outlet, Brasidas found himself on the higher ground. His enemies did not dare to attack him farther: so that he was enabled to reach, even in that day's march, the first town or village in the kingdom of Perdikkas, called Arnissa. So incensed were his soldiers with the Macedonian subjects of Perdikkas, who had fled on the first news of danger without giving them any notice —that they seized and appropriated all the articles of baggage, not inconsiderable in number, which happened to have been dropped in the disorder of a nocturnal flight. They even unharnessed and slew the oxen out of the baggage carts.

Perdikkas keenly resented this behavior of the troops of Brasidas, following as it did immediately upon his own quarrel with that general, and upon the mortification of his repulse from Lynkestis. From this moment he broke off his alliance with the Peloponnesian, and opened negotiations with Nikias, then engaged in constructing the wall of blockade round Skione. Such was the general faithlessness of this prince, however, that Nikias required as a condition of the alliance, some manifest proof of the sincerity of his intentions; and Perdikkas was soon enabled to afford a proof of considerable importance.

The relation between Athens and Peloponnesus, since the conclusion of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious combination. In Thrace, war was prosecuted by mutual understanding, and with unabated vigor; but everywhere else the truce was observed. The main purpose of the truce, however, that of giving time for discussion preliminary to a definite peace, was completely frustrated. The decree of the Athenian people (which stands included in their vote sanctioning the truce), for sending and receiving envoys to negotiate such a peace, seems never to have been executed.

Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians dispatched a considerable re-enforcement by land to join Brasidas; probably at his own request,

and also instigated by hearing of the Athenian armament now under Nikias in Pallene. But Ischagoras, the commander of the re-enforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all farther progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops. For Perdikkas, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests to keep the new-comers off; which was far more easily executed, and was gratifying to the feelings of Perdikkas himself, as well as an essential service to the Athenians.

Ischagoras however—with a few companions but without his army—made his way to Brasidas, having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as harmosts or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas. This was among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of the ancient Spartan custom—that none except elderly men, above the military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed Brasidas himself was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. This mission of these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any but Spartans to such posts—for there were no Spartans in the army of Brasidas. One of the new-comers, Klearidas, was made governor of Amphipolis—another, Pasitelidas, of Torone. It is probable that these inspecting commissioners may have contributed to fetter the activity of Brasidas. Moreover the newly-declared hostility of Perdikkas, together with disappointment in the non-arrival of the fresh troops intended to join him, much abridged his means. We hear of only one exploit performed by him at this time—and that too, more than six months after the retreat from Macedonia—about January or February, 422 B.C. Having established intelligence with some parties in the town of Potidæa, in the view of surprising it, he contrived to bring up his army in the night to the foot of the walls, and even to plant his scaling-ladders, without being discovered. The sentinel carrying and ringing the bell had just passed by on the wall, leaving for a short interval an unguarded space (the practice apparently being, to pass this bell round along the walls from one sentinel to another throughout the night)—when some of the soldiers of Brisidas took advantage of the moment to try and mount. But before they could reach the top of the wall, the sentinel came back, alarm was given, and the assailants were compelled to retreat.

In the absence of actual war between the ascendent powers in and near Peloponnesus, during the course of the summer, Thucydides mentions to us some incidents which perhaps he would have omitted had there been great warlike operations to describe. The great temple of Here, between Mykenæ and Argos (nearer to the former, and in early times more intimately connected with it, but now an appendage of the latter; Mykenæ itself having been subjected

and almost depopulated by the Argeians)—enjoyed an ancient Panhellenic reputation. The catalogue of its priestesses, seemingly with a statue or bust of each, was preserved or imagined through centuries of past time, real and mythical, beginning with the goddess herself or her immediate nominees. Chrysis, an old woman who had been priestess there for fifty-six years, happened to fall asleep in the temple with a burning lamp near to her head; the fillet encircling her head took fire, and though she herself escaped unhurt, the temple itself, very ancient and perhaps built of wood, was consumed. From fear of the wrath of the Argeians, Chrysis fled to Phlius, and subsequently thought it necessary to seek protection as a suppliant in the temple of Athene Alea at Tegea: Phaeinis was appointed priestess in her place. The temple was rebuilt on an adjoining spot by Eupolemus of Argos, continuing as much as possible the antiquities and traditions of the former, but with greater splendor and magnitude. Pausanias the traveller, who describes this second edifice as a visitor near 600 years afterward, saw near it the remnant of the old temple which had been burnt.

We hear farther of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities of Mantineia and Tegea—each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly free, partly subject. In a battle fought between them at Laodikion, the victory was disputed. Each party erected a trophy—each sent spoils to the temple of Delphi. We shall have occasion soon to speak farther of these Arcadian dissensions.

The Bœotians had been no parties to the truce sworn between Sparta and Athens in the preceding month of March. But they seem to have followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities de facto: and we may conclude that they acceded to the request of Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and sacred envoys through Bœotia to the Delpian temple. The only actual incident which we hear of in Bœotia during this interval, is one which illustrates forcibly the harsh and ungenerous ascendency of the Thebans over some of the inferior Bœotian cities. The Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespiæ, and condemned the city to remain unfortified, on the charge of *atticising* tendencies. How far this suspicion was well-founded, we have no means of judging But the Thespians, far from being dangerous at this moment, were altogether helpless—having lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium, where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very helplessness, brought upon them by their services to Thebes against Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce the rigorous sentence above-mentioned.

But the month of March (or the Attic Elaphebolion) 422 B.C.—the time prescribed for expiration of the One year's truce—had now arrived. It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more than partially observed. Brasidas in Thrace had disregarded it from the beginning. Both the contracting powers had

tacitly acquiesced in the anomalous condition, of war in Thrace coupled with peace elsewhere. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we plainly see that the paramount feeling and ascendent parties, among both, tended to peace of their own accord, at that time. There was nothing except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive the war in Thrace. Under such a state of feeling, the oath taken to maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties—always excepting Thracian affairs. Moreover the Athenians were to a certain degree soothed by their success at Mende and Skione, and by their acquisition of Perdikkas as an ally, during the summer and autumn of 423 B.C. But the state of sentiment between the contracting parties was not such as to make it possible to treat for any longer peace, or to conclude any new agreement; though neither were disposed to depart from that which had been already concluded.

The mere occurrence of the last day of the truce made no practical difference at first in this condition of things. The truce had expired: either party might renew hostilities; but neither actually did renew them. To the Athenians there was this additional motive for abstaining from hostilities for a few months longer: the great Pythian festival would be celebrated at Delphi in July or the beginning of August, and as they had been excluded from that holy spot during all the interval between the beginning of the war and the conclusion of the One year's truce, their pious feelings seem now to have taken a peculiar longing toward the visits, pilgrimages, and festivals connected with it. Though the truce therefore had really ceased, no actual warfare took place until the Pythian games were over.

But though the actions of Athens remained unaltered, the talk at Athens became very different. Kleon and his supporters renewed their instances to obtain a vigorous prosecution of the war, and renewed them with great additional strength of argument; the question being now open to considerations of political prudence, without any binding obligation.

"At this time (observes Thucydides) the great enemies of peace were, Brasidas on one side, and Kleon on the other: the former, because he was in full success and rendered illustrious by the war—the latter because he thought that, if peace were concluded, he should be detected in his dishonest politics, and be less easily credited in his criminations of others." As to Brasidas, the remark of the historian is indisputable. It would be wonderful indeed, if he, in whom so many splendid qualities were brought out by the war, and who had moreover contracted obligations with the Thracian towns which gave him hopes and fears of his own, entirely apart from Lacedæmon—it would be wonderful if the war and its continuance were not in his view the paramount object. In truth *his* position in Thrace constituted an insurmountable obstacle to any solid or steady peace, independently of the dispositions of Kleon.

But the coloring which Thucydides gives to Kleon's support of the war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the question, whether Kleon had any real interest in war—whether his personal or party consequence in the city was at all enhanced by it. He had himself no talent or competence for warlike operations—which tended infallibly to place ascendency in the hands of others, and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on dishonest intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of his political ascendency. Matter of crimination against others (assuming him to be careless of truth or falsehood) could hardly be wanting either in war or peace. And if the war brought forward unsuccessful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw up successful generals, who would certainly outshine him and would probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of Phokion, a plain and straightforward military man, we read that one of the frequent and criminative speakers of Athens (of character analogous to that which is ascribed to Kleon) expressed his surprise on hearing Phokion dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new war: "Yes (said Phokion), I think it right to dissuade them: though I know well, that if there be war, I shall have command over you—if there be peace, you will have command over me." This is surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the comparative importance of the orator and the military officer, than that which Thucydides pronounces in reference to the interests of Kleon. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of Syracuse, we shall find the demagogue Athenagoras ultra-pacific, and the aristocrat Hermokrates far more warlike. The former is afraid, not without reason, that war will raise into consequence energetic military leaders dangerous to the popular constitution. We may add, that Kleon himself had not been always warlike. He commenced his political career as an opponent of Perikles, when the latter was strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the Peloponnesian war.

But further—if we should even grant that Kleon had a separate party-interest in promoting the war—it will still remain to be considered, whether at this particular crisis, the employment of energetic warlike measures in Thrace was not really the sound and prudent policy for Athens. Taking Perikles as the best judge of policy, we shall find him at the outset of the war inculcating emphatically two important points—1. To stand vigorously upon the defensive, maintaining unimpaired their maritime empire, "keeping their subject-allies well in hand," submitting patiently even to see Attica ravaged; 2. To abstain from trying to enlarge their empire or to make new conquests during the war.—Consistently with this well-defined plan of action, Perikles, had he lived, would have taken care to interfere

vigorously and betimes to prevent Brasidas from making his conquests. Had such interference been either impossible or accidentally frustrated, he would have thought no efforts too great to recover them. To maintain undiminished the integrity of the empire, as well as that impression of Athenian force upon which the empire rested, was his cardinal principle. Now it is impossible to deny that in reference to Thrace, Kleon adhered more closely than his rival Nikias to the policy of Perikles. It was to Nikias, more than to Kleon, that the fatal mistake made by Athens in not interfering speedily after Brasidas first broke into Thrace is to be imputed. It was Nikias and his partisans, desirous of peace at almost any price, and knowing that the Lacedæmonians also desired it—who encouraged the Athenians, at a moment of great public depression of spirit, to leave Brasidas unopposed in Thrace, and rely on the chance of negotiation with Sparta for arresting his progress. The peace-party at Athens carried their point of the truce for a year, with the promise, and for the express purpose, of checking the further conquests of Brasidas; also with the further promise of maturing that truce into a permanent peace, and obtaining under the peace even the restoration of Amphipolis.

Such was the policy of Nikias and his party, the friends of peace, and opponents of Kleon. And the promises which they thus held out might perhaps appear plausible in March, B.C. 423, at the moment when the truce for one year was concluded. But subsequent events had frustrated them in the most glaring manner, and had even shown the best reason for believing that no such expectations could possibly be realized, while Brasidas was in unbroken and unopposed action. For the Lacedæmonians, though seemingly sincere in concluding the truce on the basis of uti possidetis, and desiring to extend it to Thrace as well as elsewhere, had been unable to enforce the observance of it upon Brasidas, or to restrain him even from making new acquisitions —so that Athens never obtained the benefit of the truce exactly in that region where she most stood in need of it. Only by the dispatch of her armament to Skione and Mende had she maintained herself in possession even of Pallene.

Now what was the lesson to be derived from this experience, when the Athenians came to discuss their future policy, after the truce was at an end? The great object of all parties at Athens was to recover the lost possessions in Thrace—especially Amphipolis. Nikias, still urging negotiations for peace, continued to hold out hopes that the Lacedæmonians would be willing to restore that place, as the price of their captives now at Athens. His connection with Sparta would enable him to announce her professions even upon authority. But to this Kleon might make, and doubtless did make, a complete reply, grounded upon the most recent experience:—"If the Lacedæmonians consent to the restitution of Amphipolis (he would say), it will probably be only with the view of finding some means to escape performance, and yet to get back their prisoners. But granting that they are perfectly sincere, they will never be able to control Brasidas, and those parties in Thrace who are bound up with him by community of feeling and interest; so that after all, you will give them back their prisoners, on the faith of an equivalent beyond their power to realize. Look at what has happened during the truce! So different are the views and obligations of Brasidas in Thrace from those of the Lacedæmonians, that he would not even obey their order when they directed him to stand as he was, and to desist from further conquest. Much less will he obey them when they direct him to surrender what he has already got: least of all, if they enjoin the surrender of Amphipolis, his grand acquisition and his central point for all future effort. Depend upon it, if you desire to regain Amphipolis, you will only regain it by energetic employment of force, as has happened with Skione and Mende. And you ought to put forth your strength for this purpose immediately, while the Lacedæmonian prisoners are yet in your hands, instead of waiting until after you shall have been deluded into giving them up, thereby losing all your hold upon Lacedæmon."

Such anticipations were fully verified by the result: for subsequent history will show that the Lacedæmonians when they had bound themselves by treaty to give up Amphipolis, either would not, or could not, enforce performance of their stipulation, even after the death of Brasidas. Much less could they have done so during his life, when there was his great personal influence, strenuous will, and hopes of future conquest, to serve as increased obstruction to them. Such anticipations were also plainly suggested by the recent past: so that in putting them into the mouth of Kleon, we are only supposing him to read the lesson open before his eyes.

Now since the war-policy of Kleon, taken at this moment after the expiration of the One year's truce, may be thus shown to be not only more comformable to the genius of Perikles, but also founded on a juster estimate of events both past and future, than the peace-policy of Nikias, what are we to say to the historian, who, without refuting such presumptions, every one of which is deduced from his own narrative—nay, without even indicating their existence—merely tells us that "Kleon opposed the peace in order that he might cloak dishonest intrigues and find matter for plausible crimination"? We cannot but say of this criticism, with profound regret that such words must be pronounced respecting any judgment of Thucydides, that it is harsh and unfair toward Kleon, and careless in regard to truth and the instruction of his readers. It breathes not that same spirit of honorable impartiality which pervades his general history. It is an interpolation by the officer whose improvidence had occasioned to his countrymen the fatal loss of Amphipolis, retaliating upon the citizen who justly accused him. It is conceived in the same tone as his unaccountable judgment in the matter of Sphakteria.

Rejecting on this occasion the judgment of Thucydides, we may confidently affirm that Kleon had rational public grounds for urging his countrymen to undertake with energy the reconquest of Amphipolis. Demagogue and leather-seller though he was, he stands here honorably distinguished, as well from the tameness and inaction of Nikias, who grasped at peace with hasty credulity, through sickness of the efforts of war, as from the restless movement, and novelties, not merely unprofitable, but ruinous, which we shall presently find springing up under the auspices of Alkibiades. Perikles had said to his countrymen, at a time when they were enduring all the miseries of pestilence, and were in a state of despondency even greater than that which prevailed in B.C. 422—"You hold your empire and your proud position by the condition of being willing to encounter cost, fatigue, and danger: abstain from all views of enlarging the empire, but think no effort too great to maintain it unimpaired.—To lose what we have once got is more disgraceful than to fail in attempts at acquisition." The very same language was probably held by Kleon when exhorting his countrymen to an expedition for the reconquest of Amphipolis. But when uttered by him, it would have a very different effect from that which it had formely produced when held by Perikles—and different also from that which it would now have produced if held by Nikias. The entire peace-party would repudiate it when it came from Kleon—partly out of dislike to the speaker, partly from conviction, doubtless felt by every one, that an expedition against Brasidas would be a hazardous and painful service to all concerned in it, general as well as soldiers—partly also from a persuasion, sincerely entertained at the time though afterward proved to be illusory by the result, that Amphipolis might really be got back through peace with the Lacedæmonians.

If Kleon, in proposing the expedition, originally proposed himself as the commander, a new ground of objection, and a very forcible ground, would thus be furnished. Since everything which Kleon does is understood to be a manifestation of some vicious or silly attribute, we are told that this was an instance of his absurd presumption, arising out of the success of Pylus, and persuading him that he was the only general who could put down Brasidas. But if the success at Pylus had really filled him with such overweening military conceit, it is most unaccountable that he should not have procured for himself some command during the year which immediately succeeded the affair at Sphakteria—the eighth year of the war: a season of most active warlike enterprise, when his presumption and influence arising out of the Sphakterian victory must have been fresh and glowing. As he obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period, we may fairly doubt whether he ever really conceived such excessive personal presumption of his own talents for war, and whether he did not retain after the affair of Sphakteria the same character which he had manifested in that affair

—reluctance to engage in military expeditions himself, and a disposition to see them commanded as well as carried on by others. It is by no means certain that Kleon, in proposing the expedition against Amphipolis, originally proposed to take the command of it himself: I think it at least equally probable that his original wish was to induce Nikias or the Strategi to take the command of it, as in the case of Sphakteria. Nikias doubtless opposed the expedition as much as he could. When it was determined by the people, in spite of his opposition, he would peremptorily decline the command for himself, and would do all he could to force it upon Kleon, or at least would be better pleased to see it under his command than under that of any one else. He would be not less glad to exonerate himself from a dangerous service, than to see his rival entangled in it. And he would have before him the same alternative which he and his friends had contemplated with so much satisfaction in the affair of Sphakteria; either the expedition would succeed, in which case Amphipolis would be taken—or it would fail, and the consequence would be the ruin of Kleon. The last of the two was really the more probable at Amphipolis—as Nikias had erroneously imagined it to be at Sphakteria.

It is easy to see, however, that an expedition proposed under these circumstances by Kleon, though it might command a majority in the public assembly, would have a large proportion of the citizens unfavorable to it, and even wishing that it might fail. Moreover, Kleon had neither talents nor experience for commanding an army; so that the being engaged under his command in fighting against the ablest officer of the time, could inspire no confidence to any man in putting on his armor. From all these circumstances united, political as well as military, we are not surprised to hear that the hoplites whom he took out with him went with much reluctance. An ignorant general with unwilling soldiers, many of them politically disliking him, stood little chance of wresting Amphipolis from Brasidas. But had Nikias or the Strategi done their duty and carried the entire force of the city under competent command to the same object, the issue would probably have been different as to gain and loss—certainly very different as to dishonor.

Kleon started from Peiræus, apparently toward the beginning of August, with 1200 Athenian, Lemnian, and Imbrian hoplites, and 300 horsemen—troops of excellent quality and condition; besides an auxiliary force of allies (number not exactly known) and thirty triremes. This armament was not of magnitude at all equal to the taking of Amphipolis; for Brasidas had equal numbers, besides all the advantages of the position. But it was a part of the scheme of Kleon, on arriving at Eion, to procure Macedonian and Thracian re-enforcements before he commenced his attack. He first halted in his voyage near Skione, from which place he took away such of the hoplites as could be spared from the blockade. He next sailed across

the Gulf from Pallene to the Sithonian peninsula, to a place called the Harbor of the Kolophonians near Torone. Having here learnt that neither Brasidas himself nor any considerable Peloponnesian garrison were present in Torone, he landed his forces, and marched to attack the town—sending ten triremes at the same time round a promontory which separated the harbor of the Kolophonians from Torone to assail the latter place from seaward.

It happened that Brasidas, desiring to enlarge the fortified circle of Torone, had broken down a portion of the old wall and employed the materials in building a new and larger wall inclosing the proasteion or suburb. This new wall appears to have been still incomplete and in an imperfect state of defense. Pasitelidas, the Peloponnesian commander, resisted the attack of the Athenians as long as he could; but when already beginning to give way, he saw the ten Athenian triremes sailing into the harbor, which was hardly guarded at all. Abandoning the defense of the suburb, he hastened to repel these new assailants, but came too late, so that the town was entered from both sides at once. Brasidas, who was not far off, rendered aid with the utmost celerity, but was yet at five miles' distance from the city, when he learnt the capture and was obliged to retire unsuccessfully. Pasitelidas, the commander, with the Peloponnesian garrison and the Toronæan male population, were dispatched as prisoners to Athens; while the Toronæan women and children, by a fate but too common in those days, were sold as slaves.

After this not unimportant success, Kleon sailed round the promontory of Athos to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis. From hence, in execution of his original scheme, he sent envoys to Perdikkas, urging him to lend effective aid as the ally of Athens in the attack of Amphipolis with his whole forces; and to Polles, the king of the Thracian Odomantes, inviting him also to come with as many Thracian mercenaries as could be levied. The Edonians, the Thracian tribe nearest to Amphipolis, took part with Brasidas. The local influence of the banished Thucydides would no longer be at the service of Athens—much less at the service of Kleon. Awaiting the expected re-enforcements, Kleon employed himself, first in an attack upon Stageirus in the Strymonic Gulf, which was repulsed; next upon Galepsus, on the coast opposite the island of Thasos, which was successful. But the re-enforcements did not at once arrive, and being too weak to attack Amphipolis without them, he was obliged to remain inactive at Eion; while Brasidas on his side made no movement out of Amphipolis, but contented himself with keeping constant watch over the forces of Kleon, the view of which he commanded from his station on the hill of Kerdylion, on the western bank of the river, communicating with Amphipolis by the bridge. Some days elapsed in such inaction on both sides. But the Athenian hoplites, becoming impatient of doing nothing, soon began to give vent to those feelings of dislike which

they had brought out from Athens against their general, "whose ignorance and cowardice (says the historian) they contrasted with the skill and bravery of his opponent." Athenian hoplites, if they felt such a sentiment, were not likely to refrain from manifesting it. And Kleon was presently made aware of the fact in a manner sufficiently painful to force him against his will into some movement; which, however, he did not intend to be anything else than a march for the purpose of surveying the ground all round the city, and a demonstration to escape the appearance of doing nothing—being aware that it was impossible to attack the place with any effect before his re-enforcements arrived.

To comprehend the important incidents which followed, it is necessary to say a few words on the topography of Amphipolis, as far as we can understand it on the imperfect evidence before us. That city was placed on the left bank of the Strymon, on a conspicuous hill around which the river makes a bend, first in a south-westerly direction, then, after a short course to the southward, back in a south-easterly direction. Amphipolis had for its only artificial fortification one long wall, which began near the point north-east of the town where the river narrows again into a channel, after passing through the lake Kerkinitis—ascended along the eastern side of the hill, crossing the ridge which connects it with Mount Pangæus—and then descended so as to touch the river again at another point south of the town—thus being, as it were, a string to the highly-bent bow formed by the river. On three sides, north, west, and south, the city was defended only by the Strymon. It was thus visible without any intervening wall to spectators from the side of the sea (south), as well as from the side of the continent (or west and north). At some little distance below the point where the wall touched the river south of the city, was the bridge, a communication of great importance for the whole country, which connected the territory of Amphipolis with that of Argilus. On the western or right bank of the river, bordering it and forming an outer bend corresponding to the bend of the river, was situated Mount Kerdylium. In fact the course of the Strymon is here determined by these two steep eminences, Kerdylium on the west and the hill of Amphipolis on the east, between which it flows. At the time when Brasidas first took the place, the bridge was totally unconnected with the long city wall. But during the intervening eighteen months he had erected a palisade work (probably an earthen bank topped with a palisade) connecting the two. By means of this palisade the bridge was thus at the time of Kleon's expedition comprehended within the fortifications of the city; so that Brasidas, while keeping watch on Mount Kerdylium, could pass over whenever he chose into the city without impediment.

In the march which Kleon now undertook, he went up to the top of the ridge (which runs nearly in an easterly direction from Amphipolis to Mount Pangæus) in order to survey the city and its adjoining

ground on the northern and north-eastern side, which he had not yet seen; that is, the side toward the lake, and toward Thrace—which was not visible from the lower ground near Eion. The road which he was to take from Eion lay at a small distance eastward of the city long wall, and from the palisade which connected that wall with the bridge. But he had no expectation of being attacked in his march—the rather as Brasidas with the larger portion of his force was visible on Mount Kerdylium. Moreover the gates of Amphipolis were all shut—not a man was on the wall—nor were many symptoms of movement to be detected. As there was no evidence before him of intention to attack, he took no precautions, and marched in careless and disorderly array. Having reached the top of the ridge, and posted his army on the strong eminence fronting the highest portion of the Long Wall, he surveyed at leisure the lake before him, and the side of the city which lay toward Thrace—or toward Myrkinus, Drabeskus, etc—thus viewing all the descending portion of the Long Wall northward toward the Strymon. The perfect quiescence of the city imposed upon and even astonished him. It seemed altogether undefended, and he almost fancied that if he had brought battering engines, he could have taken it forthwith. Impressed with the belief that there was no enemy prepared to fight, he took his time to survey the ground; while his soldiers became more and more relaxed and careless in their trim—some even advancing close up to the walls and gates.

But this state of affairs was soon materially changed. Brasidas, knowing that the Athenian hoplites would not long endure the tedium of absolute inaction, calculated that by affecting exteme backwardness and apparent fear, he should seduce Kleon into some incautious movement, of which advantage might be taken. His station on Mount Kerdylium enabled him to watch the march of the Athenian army from Eion, and when he saw them pass up along the road outside of the long wall of Amphipolis, he immediately crossed the river with his forces and entered the town. But it was not his intention to march out and offer them open battle. For his army, though equal in number to theirs, was extremely inferior in arms and equipment; in which points the Athenian force now present was so admirably provided, that his own men would not think themselves a match for it, if the two armies faced each other in open field. He relied altogether on the effect of sudden sally and well-timed surprise, when the Athenians should have been thrown into a feeling of contemptuous security by an exaggerated show of impotence in their enemy.

Having offered the battle sacrifice at the temple of Athene, Brasidas called his men together to address to them the usual encouragements prior to an engagement. After appealing to the Dorian pride of his Peloponnesians, accustomed to triumph over Ionians, he explained to them his design of relying upon a bold and sudden movement with comparatively small numbers, against the Athenian army when not

prepared for it—when their courage was not wound up to battle pitch—and when, after carelessly mounting the hill to survey the ground, they were thinking only of quietly returning to quarters. He himself at the proper moment would rush out from one gate, and be foremost in conflict with the enemy. Klearidas, with that bravery which became him as a Spartan, would follow the example by sallying out from another gate; and the enemy, taken thus unawares, would probably make little resistance. For the Amphipolitans, this day and their own behavior would determine whether they were to be allies of Lacedæmon, or slaves of Athens—perhaps sold into captivity, or even put to death, as a punishment for their recent revolt.

These preparations, however, could not be completed in secrecy. Brasidas and his army were perfectly visible while descending the hill of Kerdylium, crossing the bridge and entering Amphipolis, to the Athenian scouts without. Moreover, so conspicuous was the interior of the city to spectators without, that the temple of Athene, and Brasidas with its ministers around him performing the ceremony of sacrifice, was distinctly recognized. The fact was made known to Kleon as he stood on the high ridge taking his survey, while at the same time those who had gone near to the gates reported that the feet of many horses and men were beginning to be seen under them, as if preparing for a sally. He himself went close to the gate, and satisfied himself of the circumstance: we must recollect that there was no defender on the walls, nor any danger from missiles. Anxious to avoid coming to any real engagement before his re-enforcements should arrive, he at once gave orders for retreat, which he thought might be accomplished before the attack from within could be fully organized. For he imagined that a considerable number of troops would be marched out, and ranged in battle order, before the attack was actually begun—not dreaming that the sally would be instantaneous, made with a mere handful of men. Orders having been proclaimed to wheel to the left, and retreat in column on the left flank toward Eion, Kleon, who was himself on the top of the hill with the right wing, waited only to see his left and center actually in march on the road to Eion, and then directed his right also to wheel to the left and follow them.

The whole Athenian army were thus in full retreat, marching in a direction nearly parallel to the Long Wall of Amphipolis, with their right or unshielded side exposed to the enemy—when Brasidas, looking over the southernmost gates of the Long Wall with his small detachment ready marshaled near him, burst out into contemptuous exclamations on the disorder of their array. "These men will not stand us: I see it by the quivering of their spears and of their heads. Men who reel about in that way never stand an assailing enemy. Open the gates for me instantly, and let us sally out with confidence."

With that, both the gate of the Long Wall nearest to the palisade,

and the adjoining gate of the palisade itself, were suddenly thrown open, and Brasidas with his 150 chosen soldiers issued through them to attack the retreating Athenians. Running rapidly down the straight road which joined laterally the road toward Eion along which the Athenians were marching, he charged their central division on the right flank. Their left wing had already got beyond him on the road toward Eion. Taken completely unprepared, conscious of their own disorderly array, and astounded at the boldness of their enemy—the Athenians of the center were seized with panic, made not the least resistance, and presently fled. Even the Athenian left, though not attacked at all, instead of halting to lend assistance, shared the panic and fled in disorder. Having thus disorganized this part of the army, Brasidas passed along the line to press his attack on the Athenian right: but in this movement he was mortally wounded and carried off the field unobserved by his enemies. Meanwhile Klearidas, sallying forth from the Thracian gate, had attacked the Athenian right on the ridge opposite to him, immediately after it began its retreat. But the soldiers on the Athenian right had probably seen the previous movement of Brasidas against the other division, and though astonished at the sudden danger, had thus a moment's warning, before they were themselves assailed, to halt and form on the hill. Klearidas here found a considerable resistance, in spite of the desertion of Kleon; who, more astounded than any man in his army by a catastrophe so unlooked for, lost his presence of mind and fled at once; but was overtaken by a Thracian peltast from Myrkinus, and slain. His soldiers on the right wing, however, repelled two or three attacks in front from Klearidas, and maintained their ground, until at length the Chalkidian cavalry and the peltasts from Myrkinus, having come forth out of the gates, assailed them with missiles in flank and rear so as to throw them into disorder. The whole Athenian army was thus put to flight; the left hurrying to Eion, the men of the right dispersing and seeking safety among the hilly grounds of Pangæus in their rear. Their sufferings and loss in the retreat, from the hands of the pursuing peltasts and cavalry, were most severe. When they at last again mustered at Eion, not only the commander Kleon, but 600 Athenian hoplites, half of the force sent out, were found missing.

So admirably had the attack been concerted, and so entire was its success, that only seven men perished on the side of the victors. But of those seven, one was the gallant Brasidas himself, who being carried into Amphipolis, lived just long enough to learn the complete victory of his troops and then expired. Great and bitter was the sorrow which his death occasioned throughout Thrace, especially among the Amphipolitans. He received, by special decree, the distinguished honor of interment within their city—the universal habit being to inter even the most eminent deceased persons in a suburb without the walls. All the allies attended his funeral, in arms and with

military honors. His tomb was encircled by a railing, and the space immediately fronting it was consecrated as the great agora of the city, which was remodeled accordingly. He was also proclaimed Œkist or Founder of Amphipolis, and as such, received heroic worship with annual games and sacrifices to his honor. The Athenian Agnon, the real founder and originally recognized Œkist of the city, was stripped of all his commemorative honors and expunged from the remembrance of the people; the buildings, which served as visible memento of his name, being destroyed. Full of hatred as the Amphipolitans now were toward Athens—and not merely of hatred, but of fear, since the loss which they had just sustained of their saviour and protector—they felt repugnance to the idea of rendering farther worship to an Athenian Œkist. It was inconvenient to keep up such a religious link with Athens, now that they were forced to look anxiously to Lacedæmon for assistance. Klearidas, as governor of Amphipolis, superintended those numerous alterations in the city which this important change required, together with the erection of the trophy, just at the spot where Brasidas had first charged the Athenians; while the remaining armament of Athens, having obtained the usual truce and buried their dead, returned home without farther operations.

There are few battles recorded in history wherein the disparity and contrast of the two generals opposed has been so manifest—consummate skill and courage on the one side against ignorance and panic on the other. On the singular ability and courage of Brasidas there can be but one verdict of unqualified admiration. But the criticism passed by Thucydides on Kleon, here as elsewhere, cannot be adopted without reserves. He tells us that Kleon undertook his march, from Eion up to the hill in front of Amphipolis, in the same rash and confident spirit with which he had embarked on the enterprise against Pylus—in the blind confidence that no one would resist him. Now I have already, in a former chapter, shown grounds for concluding that the anticipations of Kleon respecting the capture of Sphakteria, far from being marked by any spirit of unmeasured presumption, were sober and judicious—realized to the letter without any unlooked-for aid from fortune. The remarks here made by Thucydides on that affair are not more reasonable than the judgment on it in his former chapter; for it is not true (as he here implies) that Kleon expected no resistance, in Sphakteria—he calculated on resistance, but knew that he had force sufficient to overcome it. His fault even at Amphipolis, great as that fault was, did not consist in rashness and presumption. This charge at least is rebutted by the circumstance, that he himself wished to make no aggressive movement until his re-enforcements should arrive—and that he was only constrained, against his own will, to abandon his intended temporary inactivity during that interval, by the angry murmurs of his soldiers, who reproached him with ignorance and backwardness—the latter

quality being the reverse of that with which he is branded by Thucydides.

When Kleon was thus driven to do something, his march up to the top of the hill, for the purpose of reconnoitering the ground, was not in itself ill-judged. It might have been accomplished in perfect safety if he had kept his army in orderly array, prepared for contingencies. But he suffered himself to be out-generaled and overreached by that simulated consciousness of impotence and unwillingness to fight which Brasidas took care to present to him. Among all military stratagems, this has perhaps been the most frequently practiced with success against inexperienced generals; who are thrown off their guard and induced to neglect precaution, not because they are naturally more rash or presumptuous than ordinary men, but because nothing except either a high order of intellect, or special practice and training, will enable a man to keep steadily present to his mind liabilities even real and serious, when there is no discernible evidence to suggest their approach—much more when there *is* positive evidence, artfully laid out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault substantially the same had been committed by Thucydides himself and his colleague Eukles a year and a half before, when they suffered Brasidas to surprise the Strymonian bridge and Amphipolis; not even taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the fleet at Eion. They were not men peculiarly rash and presumptuous, but ignorant and unpracticed, in a military sense; incapable of keeping before them dangerous contingencies which they perfectly knew, simply because there was no present evidence of approaching explosion.

This military incompetence, which made Kleon fall into the trap laid for him by Brasidas, also made him take wrong measures against the danger, when he unexpectedly discovered at last that the enemy within were preparing to attack him. His fatal error consisted in giving instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away before the enemy's attack could be brought to bear. An abler officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper array, to warn and address them with the usual harangue, and to wind up their courage to the fighting-point. Up to that moment they had no idea of being called upon to fight; and the courage of Grecian hoplites—taken thus unawares while hurrying to get away in disorder visible both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the usual preliminaries of battle—was but too apt to prove deficient. To turn the right or unshielded flank to the enemy was unavoidable, from the direction of the retreating movement; nor is it reasonable to blame Kleon for this, as some historians have done—or for causing his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as Dr. Arnold seems to think. The grand fault seems to have consisted in not waiting to marshal his men and prepare them for standing fight during their retreat. Let us add, however—and the remark, if it serves to explain Kleon's idea of being able to get away before he was actually assailed, counts as a double compliment to the judgment as well as boldness of Brasidas—that no other Lacedæmonian general of that day (perhaps not even Demosthenes, the most enterprising general of Athens) would have ventured upon an attack with so very small a band, relying altogether upon the panic produced by his sudden movement.

But the absence of military knowledge and precaution is not the worst of Kleon's faults on this occasion. His want of courage at the moment of conflict is yet more lamentable, and divests his end of that personal sympathy which would otherwise have accompanied it. A commander who has been out-generaled is under a double force of obligation to exert and expose himself to the uttermost, in order to retrieve the consequences of his own mistakes. He will thus at least preserve his own personal honor, whatever censure he may deserve on the score of deficient knowledge and judgment.

What is said about the disgraceful flight of Kleon himself must be applied, with hardly less severity of criticism, to the Athenian hoplites under him. They behaved in a manner altogether unworthy of the reputation of their city; especially the left wing, which seems to have broken and run away without waiting to be attacked. And when we read in Thucydides that the men who thus disgraced themselves were among the best and the best-armed hoplites in Athens—that they came out unwillingly under Kleon—that they began their scornful murmurs against him before he had committed any error, despising him for backwardness when he was yet not strong enough to attempt anything serious, and was only manifesting a reasonable prudence in awaiting the arrival of expected re-enforcements—when we read this, we shall be led to compare the expedition against Amphipolis with former artifices respecting the attack of Sphakteria, and to discern other causes for its failure besides the military incompetence of the commander. These hoplites brought out with them from Athens the feelings prevalent among the political adversaries of Kleon. The expedition was proposed and carried by him, contrary to the wishes of these adversaries. They could not prevent it, but their opposition enfeebled it from the beginning, kept within too narrow limits the force assigned, and was one main reason which frustrated its success.

Had Perikles been alive, Amphipolis might perhaps still have been lost, since its capture was the fault of the officers employed to defend it. But if lost, it would probably have been attacked and recovered with the same energy as the revolted Samos had been; with the full force, and the best generals, that Athens could furnish. With such an armament under good officers, there was nothing at all impracticable in the reconquest of the place; especially as at that time it had no defense on three sides except the Strymon, and might thus be

approached by Athenian ships on that navigable river. The armament of Kleon, even if his re-enforcements had arrived, was hardly sufficient for the purpose. But Perikles would have been able to concentrate upon it the whole strength of the city, without being paralyzed by the contentions of political party. He would have seen as clearly as Kleon that the place could only be recovered by force, and that its recovery was the most important object to which Athens could devote her energies.

It was thus that the Athenians, partly from political intrigue, partly from the incompetence of Kleon, underwent a disastrous defeat instead of carrying Amphipolis. But the death of Brasidas converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained no Spartan, like or second to that eminent man, either as a soldier or a conciliating politician; none who could replace him in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thrace; none who could prosecute those enterprising plans against Athens on her unshielded side, which he had first shown to be practicable. With him the fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta, in respect to the future, alike disappeared. The Athenian generals Phormio and Demosthenes had both of them acquired among the Akarnanians an influence personal to themselves, apart from their post and from their country. But the career of Brasidas exhibited an extent of personal ascendency and admiration, obtained as well as deserved, such as had never before been paralleled by any military chieftain in Greece: and Plato might well select him as the most suitable historical counterpart to the heroic Achilles. All the achivements of Brasidas were his own individually, with nothing more than bare encouragement, sometimes even without encouragement, from his country. And when we recollect the strict and narrow routine in which as a Spartan he had been educated, so fatal to the development of everything like original thought or impulse, and so completely estranged from all experience of party or political discussion—we are amazed at his resource and flexibility of character, his power of adapting himself to new circumstances and new persons, and his felicitous dexterity in making himself the rallying-point of opposite political partles in each of the various cities which he acquired. The combination "of every sort of practical excellence"—valor, intelligence, probity, and gentleness of dealing—which his character presented, was never forgotten among the subject-allies of Athens; and procured for other Spartan officers in subsequent years favorable presumptions, which their conduct was seldom found to realize. At the time when Brasidas perished, in the flower of his age, he was unquestionably the first man in Greece. And though it is not given to us to predict what he would have become had he lived, we may be sure that the future course of the war would have been sensibly modified, perhaps even to the advantage of Athens, since she might

have had sufficient occupation at home to keep her from undertaking her disastrous enterprise in Sicily.

Thucydides seems to take pleasure in setting forth the gallant exploits of Brasidas, from the first at Methone to the last at Amphipolis—not less than the dark side of Kleon; both, though in different senses, the causes of his banishment. He never mentions the latter except in connection with some proceeding represented as unwise or discreditable. The barbarities which the offended majesty of empire thought itself entitled to practice in ancient times against dependencies revolted and reconquered, reached their maximum in the propositions against Mitylene and Skione: both of them are ascribed to Kleon by name as their author. But when we come to the slaughter of the Melians—equally barbarous, and worse in respect to grounds of excuse, inasmuch as the Melians had never been subjects of Athens—we find Thucydides mentioning the deed without naming the proposers.

Respecting the foreign policy of Kleon, the facts already narrated will enable the reader to form an idea of it as compared with that of his opponents. I have shown grounds for believing that Thucydides has forgotten his usual impartiality in criticising this personal enemy; that in regard to Sphakteria, Kleon was really one main and indispensable cause of procuring for his country the greatest advantage which she obtained throughout the whole war; and that in regard to his judgment, as advocating the prosecution of war, three different times must be distinguished—1. After the first blockade of the hoplites in Sphakteria—2. After the capture of the island—3. After the expiration of the One-year truce. On the earliest of those three occasions, he was wrong, for he seems to have shut the door on all possibilities of negotiation, by his manner of dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys. On the second occasion, he had fair and plausible grounds to offer on behalf of his opinion, though it turned out unfortunate: moreover, at that time, all Athens was warlike, and Kleon is not to be treated as the peculiar adviser of that policy. On the third and last occasion, after the expiration of the truce, the political counsel of Kleon was right, judicious, and truly Periklean—much surpassing in wisdom that of his opponents. We shall see in the coming chapters how those opponents managed the affairs of the state after his death—how Nikias threw away the interests of Athens in the enforcement of the conditions of peace—how Nikias and Alkibiades together shipwrecked the power of their country on the shores of Syracuse. And when we judge the demagogue Kleon in this comparison, we shall find ground for remarking that Thucydides is reserved and even indulgent toward the errors and vices of other statesmen—harsh only toward those of his accuser.

As to the internal policy of Kleon, and his conduct as a politician in Athenian constitutional life, we have but little trustworthy evi-

dence. There exists, indeed, a portrait of him drawn in colors broad and glaring—most impressive to the imagination, and hardly effaceable from the memory; the portrait in the "Knights" of Aristophanes. It is through this representation that Kleon has been transmitted to posterity, crucified by a poet who admits himself to have a personal grudge against him, just as he has been commemorated in the prose of an historian whose banishment he had proposed. Of all the productions of Aristophanes, so replete with comic genius throughout, the "Knights" is the most consummate and irresistible—the most distinct in its character, symmetry, and purpose. Looked at with a view to the object of its author, both in reference to the audience and to Kleon, it deserves the greatest possible admiration, and we are not surprised to learn that it obtained the first prize. It displays the maximum of that which wit combined with malice can achieve, in covering an enemy with ridicule, contempt, and odium. Dean Swift could have desired nothing worse, even for Ditton and Whiston. The old man Demos of Pnyx, introduced on the stage as personifying the Athenian people—Kleon, brought on as his newly-bought Paphlagonian slave, who by coaxing, lying, impudent and false denunciation of others, has gained his master's ear, and heaps ill-usage upon every one else, while he enriches himself—the Knights or chief members of what we may call the Athenian aristocracy, forming the chorus of the piece as Kleon's pronounced enemies—the sausage-seller from the market-place, who instigated by Nikias and Demosthenes along with these Knights, overdoes Kleon in all his own low arts, and supplants him in the favor of Demos—all this, exhibited with inimitable vivacity of expression, forms the masterpiece and glory of libelous comedy. The effect produced upon the Athenian audience when this piece was represented at the Lenæan festival (January, B.C. 424, about six months after the capture of Sphakteria), with Kleon himself and most of the real Knights present, must have been intense beyond what we can now easily imagine. That Kleon could maintain himself after this humiliating exposure, is no small proof of his mental vigor and ability. It does not seem to have impaired his influence—at least not permanently. For not only do we see him the most effective opponent of peace during the next two years, but there is ground for believing that the poet himself found it convenient to soften his tone toward this powerful enemy.

So ready are most writers to find Kleon guilty, that they are satisfied with Aristophanes as a witness against him; though no other public man, of any age or nation, has ever been condemned upon such evidence. No man thinks of judging Sir Robert Walpole, or Mr. Fox, or Mirabeau, from the numerous lampoons put in circulation against them. No man will take measure of a political Englishman from Punch, or of a Frenchman from the Charivari. The unrivaled comic merit of the "Knights" of Aristophanes is only one reason the more for distrusting the resemblance of its picture to the real Kleon.

We have means too of testing the candor and accuracy of Aristophanes by his delineation of Sokrates, whom he introduced in the comedy of "Clouds" in the year after that of the "Knights." As a comedy, the "Clouds" stands second only to the "Knights:" as a picture of Sokrates, it is little better than pure fancy: it is not even a caricature, but a totally different person. We may, indeed, perceive single features of resemblance; the bare feet, and the argumentative subtlety, belong to both: but the entire portrait is such, that if it bore a different name, no one would think of comparing it with Sokrates, whom we know well from other sources. With such an analogy before us, not to mention what we know generally of the portraits of Perikles by these authors, we are not warranted in treating the portrait of Kleon as a likeness, except on points where there is corroborative evidence. And we may add, that some of the hits against him, where we can accidentally test their pertinence, are decidedly not founded in fact—as, for example, where the poet accuses Kleon of having deliberately and cunningly robbed Demosthenes of his laurels in the enterprise against Sphakteria.

In the prose of Thucydides, we find Kleon described as a dishonest politician—a wrongful accuser of others—the most violent of all the citizens. Throughout the verse of Aristophanes, these same charges are set forth with his characteristic emphasis, but others are also superadded—Kleon practices the basest artifices and deceptions to gain favor with the people, steals the public money, receives bribes, and extorts compositions from private persons by wholesale, and thus enriches himself under pretense of zeal for the public treasury. In the comedy of the "Acharnians," represented one year earlier than the "Knights," the poet alludes with great delight to a sum of five talents, which Kleon had been compelled "to disgorge:" a present tendered to him by the insular subjects of Athens (if we may believe Theopompus) for the purpose of procuring a remission of their tribute, and which the Knights, whose evasions of military service he had exposed, compelled him to relinquish.

But when we put together the different heads of indictment accumulated by Aristophanes, it will be found that they are not easily reconcilable one with the other. For an Athenian, whose temper led him to violent crimination of others, at the inevitable price of multiplying and exasperating personal enemies, would find it peculiarly dangerous, if not impossible, to carry on peculation for his own account. If, on the other hand, he took the latter turn, he would be inclined to purchase connivance from others even by winking at real guilt on their part, far from making himself conspicuous as a calumniator of innocence. We must therefore discuss the side of the indictment which is indicated in Thucydides; not Kleon as truckling to the people and cheating for his own pecuniary profit (which is certainly not the character implied in his speech about the Mitylenæans as given to us by the historian), but Kleon as a man of

violent temper and fierce political antipathies—a bitter speaker—and sometimes dishonest in his calumnies against adversaries. These are the qualities which, in all countries of free debate, go to form what is called a great opposition speaker. It was thus that the elder Cato —"the universal biter, whom Persephone was afraid even to admit into Hades after his death"—was characterized at Rome, even by the admission of his admirers to some extent, and in a still stronger manner by those who were unfriendly to him, as Thucydides was to Kleon. In Cato such a temper was not inconsistent with a high sense of public duty. And Plutarch recounts an anecdote respecting Kleon, that on first beginning his political career, he called his friends together, and dissolved his intimacy with them, conceiving that private friendships would distract him from his paramount duty to the commonwealth.

Moreover, the reputation of Kleon, as a frequent and unmeasured accuser of others, may be explained partly by a passage of his enemy Aristophanes: a passage the more deserving of confidence as a just representation of fact, since it appears in a comedy (the "Frogs") represented (405 B.C.) fifteen years after the death of Kleon, and five years after that of Hyperbolus, when the poet had less motive for misrepresentations against either. In the "Frogs," the scene is laid in Hades, whither the god Dionysus goes, in the attire of Herakles and along with his slave Xanthias, for the purpose of bringing up again to earth the deceased poet Euripides. Among the incidents, Xanthias in the attire which his master had worn, is represented as acting with violence and insult toward two hostesses of eating-houses; consuming their substance, robbing them, refusing to pay when called upon, and even threatening their lives with a drawn sword. Upon which the women, having no other redress left, announce their resolution of calling, the one upon her protector Kleon, the other on Hyperbolus, for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice before the dikastery. This passage shows us (if inferences on comic evidence are to be held as admissible) that Kleon and Hyperbolus became involved in accusations partly by helping poor persons, who had been wronged, to obtain justice before the dikastery. A rich man who had suffered injury might purchase of Antipho or some other rhetor, advice and aid as to the conduct of his complaint. But a poor man or woman would think themselves happy to obtain the gratuitous suggestion, and sometimes the auxiliary speech, of Kleon or Hyperbolus, who would thus extend their own popularity, by means very similar to those practiced by the leading men in Rome.

But besides lending aid to others, doubtless Kleon was often also a prosecutor, in his own name, of official delinquents, real or alleged. That some one should undertake this duty, was indispensable for the protection of the city; otherwise the responsibility to which official persons were subjected after their term of office would have been

merely nominal: and we have proof enough that the general public morality of these official persons, acting individually, was by no means high. But the duty was at the same time one which most persons would and did shun. The prosecutor, while obnoxious to general dislike, gained nothing even by the most complete success; and if he failed so much as not to procure a minority of votes among the dikasts, equal to one-fifth of the numbers present, he was condemned to pay a fine of 1000 drachmas. What was still more serious, he drew upon himself a formidable mass of private hatred, from the friends, partisans, and the political club of the accused party—extremely menacing to his own future security and comfort, in a community like Athens. There was therefore little motive to accept, and great motive to decline, the task of prosecuting on public grounds. A prudent politician at Athens would undertake it occasionally, and against special rivals: but he would carefully guard himself against the reputation of doing it frequently or by inclination —and the orators constantly do so guard themselves, in those speeches which yet remain.

It is this reputation which Thucydides fastens upon Kleon, and which, like Cato the censor at Rome, he probably merited; from native acrimony of temper, from a powerful talent for invective, and from his position both inferior and hostile to the Athenian knights or aristocracy, who overshadowed him by their family importance. But in what proportion of cases his accusations were just or calumnious—the real question upon which a candid judgment turns—we have no means of deciding, either in his case or in that of Cato. "To lash the wicked (observes Aristophanes himself) is not only no blame, but is even a matter of honor to the good." It has not been common to allow to Kleon the benefit of this observation, though he is much more entitled to it than Aristophanes. For the attacks of a poetical libeller admit neither of defense nor retaliation; whereas a prosecutor before the dikastery found his opponent prepared to reply or even to retort—and was obliged to specify his charge, as well as to furnish proof of it—so that there was a fair chance for the innocent man not to be confounded with the guilty.

The quarrel of Kleon with Aristophanes is said to have arisen out of an accusation which he brought against that poet in the senate of Five Hundred, on the subject of his second comedy, the "Babylonians," exhibited B.C. 426 at the festival of the urban Dionysia in the month of March. At that season many strangers were present at Athens; especially many visitors and deputies from the subject-allies, who were bringing their annual tribute. And as the "Babylonians" (now lost), like so many other productions of Aristophanes, was full of slashing ridicule not only against individual citizens, but against the functionaries and institutions of the city, Kleon instituted a complaint against it in the senate, as an exposure dangerous to the public security before strangers and allies. We have to recollect that Athens

was then in the midst of an embarrassing war—that the fidelity of her subject-allies was much doubted—that Lesbos, the greatest of her allies, had been reconquered only in the preceding year, after a revolt both troublesome and perilous to the Athenians. Under such circumstances, Kleon might see plausible reason for thinking that a political comedy of the Aristophanic vein and talent tended to degrade the city in the eyes of strangers, even granting that it was innocuous when confined to the citizens themselves. The poet complains that Kleon summoned him before the senate, with terrible threats and calumny: but it does not appear that any penalty was inflicted. Nor indeed, had the senate competence to find him guilty or punish him, except to the extent of a small fine. They could only bring him to trial before the dikastery, which in this case plainly was not done. He himself, however, seems to have felt the justice of the warning: for we find that three out of his four next following plays, before the peace of Nikias (the "Acharnians," the "Knights," and the "Wasps"), were represented at the Lenæan festival, in the month of January, a season when no strangers nor allies were present. Kleon was doubtless much incensed with the play of the "Knights," and seems to have annoyed the poet either by bringing an indictment against him for exercising freeman's rights without being duly qualified (since none but citizens were allowed to appear and act in the dramatic exhibitions), or by some other means which are not clearly explained. We cannot make out in what way the poet met him, though it appears that finding less public sympathy than he thought himself entitled to, he made an apology without intending to be bound by it. Certain it is, that his remaining plays subsequent to the "Knights," though containing some few bitter jests against Kleon, manifest no second deliberate plan of attack against him.

The battle of Amphipolis removed at once the two most pronounced individual opponents of peace, Kleon and Brasidas. Athens, too, was more than ever discouraged and averse to prolonged fighting; for the number of hoplites slain at Amphipolis doubtless filled the city with mourning, besides the unparalleled disgrace now tarnishing Athenian soldiership. The peace-party under the auspices of Nikias and Laches, relieved at once from the internal opposition of Kleon, as well as from the foreign enterprise of Brasidas, were enabled to resume their negotiations with Sparta in a spirit promising success. King Pleistoanax, and the Spartan ephors of the year, were on their side equally bent on terminating the war, and the deputies of all the allies were convoked at Sparta for discussion with the envoys of Athens. Such discussion was continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. At first the pretentions advanced were found very conflicting; but at length, after several debates, it was agreed to treat upon the basis of each party surrendering what had been acquired by war. The Athenians insisted at first on the restoration

of Platæa; but the Thebans replied that Platæa was theirs neither by force nor by treason—but by voluntary capitulation and surrender of the inhabitants. This distinction seems to our ideas somewhat remarkable, since the capitulation of a besieged town is not less the result of force than capture by storm. But it was adopted in the present treaty; and under it the Athenians, while foregoing their demand of Platæa, were enabled to retain Nisæa, which they had acquired from the Megarians, and Anaktorium and Sollium which they had taken from Corinth. To insure accommodating temper on the part of Athens, the Spartans held out the threat of invading Attica in the spring, and of establishing a permanent fortification in the territory: and they even sent round proclamation to their allies, enjoining all the details requisite for this step. Since Attica had now been exempt from invasion for three years, the Athenians were probably not insensible to this threat of renewal under a permanent form.

At the beginning of spring—about the end of March, 421 B.C.—shortly after the urban Dionysia at Athens—the important treaty was concluded for the term of fifty years. The following were its principal conditions:—

1. All shall have full liberty to visit all the public temples of Greece—for purposes of private sacrifice, consultation of oracle, or visit to the festivals. Every man shall be undisturbed both in going and coming.—[The value of this article will be felt when we recollect that the Athenians and their allies had been unable to visit either the Olympic or the Pythian festival since the beginning of the war].

2. The Delphians shall enjoy full autonomy and mastery of their temple and their territory.—[This article was intended to exclude the ancient claim of the Phokian confederacy to the management of the temple; a claim which the Athenians had once supported, before the Thirty years' truce: but they had now little interest in the matter, since the Phokians were in the ranks of their enemies.]

3. There shall be peace for fifty years between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, with abstinence from mischief either overt or fraudulent, by land as well as by sea.

4. Neither party shall invade for purposes of mischief the territory of the other—not by any artifice or under any pretense.

Should any subject of difference arise, it shall be settled by equitable means, and by oaths tendered and taken, in form to be hereafter agreed on.

5. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians.

They shall farther *relinquish* to the Athenians Argilaus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But these cities shall remain autonomous, on condition of paying tribute to Athens according to the assessment of Aristeides. Any citizen of these cities (Amphipolis as well as the others) who may choose to quit them shall be at

liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Nor shall the cities be counted hereafter either as allies of Athens or of Sparta, unless Athens shall induce them by amicable persuasions to become her allies, which she is at liberty to do if she can.

The inhabitants of Mekyberna, Sane, and Singe, shall dwell independently in their respective cities, just as much as the Olynthians and Acanthians.—[These were towns which adhered to Athens and were still numbered as her allies; though they were near enough to be molested by Olynthus and Akanthus, against which this clause was intended to insure them.]

The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Panaktum to the Athenians.

6. The Athenians shall restore to Sparta Koryphasium, Kythera, Methone, Pteleum, Atalante—with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies. They shall farther release all Spartans or allies of Sparta now blocked up in Skione.

7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall give back all the captives in their hands, from Athens or her allies.

8. Respecting Skione, Torone, Sermylus, or any other town in the possession of Athens—the Athenians may take their own measures.

9. Oaths shall be exchanged between the contracting parties according to the solemnities held most binding in each city respectively, and in the following words—"I will adhere to this convention and truce sincerely and without fraud." The oaths shall be annually renewed, and the terms of peace shall be inscribed on columns at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, as well as at Sparta and Athens.

10. Should any matter have been forgotten in the present convention, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians may alter it by mutual understanding and consent, without being held to violate their oaths.

These oaths were accordingly exchanged. They were taken by seventeen principal Athenians, and as many Spartans, on behalf of their respective countries—on the 26th day of the month Artemisius at Sparta, and on the 24th day of Elaphebolion at Athens, immediately after the urban Dionysia; Pleistolas being Ephor eponymus at Sparta, and Alkæus Archon eponymus at Athens. Among the Lacedæmonians swearing are included the two kings, Agis and Pleistoanax—the Ephor Pleistolas (and perhaps other ephors, but this we do not know)—and Tellis, the father of Brasidas. Among the Athenians sworn are comprised Nikias, Laches, Agnon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

Such was the peace (commonly known by the name of the peace of Nikias) concluded in the beginning of the eleventh spring of the war, which had just lasted ten full years. Its conditions being put to the vote at Sparta in the assembly of deputies from the Lacedæmonian allies, the majority accepted them; which, according to the condition adopted and sworn to by every member of the confederacy, made it binding upon all. There was, indeed, a special reserve allowed to any particular state in case of religious scruple, arising out of the fear of offending some of their gods or heroes. Saving this reserve, the peace had been formally acceded to by the decision of the confederates. But it soon appeared how little the vote of the majority was worth, even though enforced by the strong pressure of Lacedæmon herself—when the more powerful members were among the dissentient minority. The Bœotians, Megarians and Corinthians all refused to accept it.

The Corinthians were displeased because they did not recover Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians, because they were required to surrender Panaktum. In spite of the urgent solicitations of Sparta, the deputies of all these powerful states not only denounced the peace as unjust, and voted against it in the general assembly of allies—but refused to accept it when the vote was carried, and went home to their respective cities for instructions.

Such were the conditions, and such the accompanying circumstances, of the peace of Nikias, which terminated, or professed to terminate, the great Peloponnesian War, after a duration of ten years. Its consequences and fruits in many respects, such as were not anticipated by either of the concluding parties, will be seen in the following chapters.

CHAPTER LV

FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90.

My last chapter terminated with the peace called the Peace of Nikias, concluded in March, 421 B.C., between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading them to listen to the peace party who acted with Nikias. The general principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties of what had been acquired by war—yet excluding such places as had been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve, the Athenians, while prevented from recovering Platæa, continued to hold Nisæa, the harbor of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection

with the revolted allies of Athens in Thrace—that is, Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. These six cities, however, were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose voluntarily to become so—but only to pay regularly to Athens the tribute originally assessed by Aristeides, as a sort of recompense for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy. Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave them, was at liberty to do so and to carry away his property. Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens, together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to Skione, Torone, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore Pylus, Kythera, Methone, Pteleon, and Atalante; and to liberate all the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skione.

Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should have free access to the sacred pan-Hellenic festivals, either by land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be guaranteed.

The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which might arise.

Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterward occur as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as many principal Lacedæmonians.

Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace—and ratified as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates—still there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent, but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians also, on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of them, moreover, took common offense at the article which provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent, and without consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought proper. Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.

So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, that having obtained the favorable vote of the majority, they resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now expiring. They had, indeed, made application to Argos for renewing it, through

Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to fear, therefore, that this new and powerful force might be thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.

Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions required, the Athenians drew the favorable lot:—an advantage so very great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot conferred.

The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and dispatching Ischagoras with two others to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, Ischagoras met with nothing but unanimous opposition; and so energetic were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government, pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this impossible. He was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly be done: if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them to compliance were fruitless.

The Spartans were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should execute hers: and they were threatened with the

double misfortune of forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the moment was now favorable for alliance with Athens, from the decided pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Laches. The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing of the peace—awaiting the fulfillment of the conditions; Nikias or Laches, one or both, being very probably among them. When they saw that Sparta was unable to fulfill her bond, so that the treaty seemed likely to be canceled, they would doubtless encourage, and perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan captives should be restored. Accordingly a treaty was concluded between the two, for fifty years—not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance. Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was the single provision of the alliance—with one addition, however, of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians respecting their serf-population. But at the present moment it was of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylus, planted there by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.

An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the envoys from Amphipolis—probably not more than a month or two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both sides: with similar declaration that the oath should be annually renewed—and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without violating the oath. Moreover, the treaty was directed to be inscribed on two columns; one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athene in the acropolis of Athens.

The most important result of this new alliance was something not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well assured, between the Spartan Ephors and Nikias at the time when it was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith restored.

Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquies-

cent feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alkibiades was competing with Nikias for the favor of Sparta, as will be stated presently), than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to assist in keeping down th Helots—and the still more important after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her second best—without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided advantage in regard to her chief enemy—advantage, however, which had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses. This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the commencement of spring; whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for the actual falfillment of such concessions by the Spartans, before she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized any one of their promised concessions: nay more—in trying to do so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as made it plain that nothing short of the most stringent necessity would convert their promises into realities. Yet under these marked indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second treaty which practically annuls the first, and which insures to the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for such alliance was at this moment (under the uncertain relations with Argos) not less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little doubt that if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives: for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might have been removed by decisive co-operation on the part of Sparta with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years before, when the hoplites were first inclosed in Sphakteria, but before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but merely said, through their envoys, "Give us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange, peace, together with our alliance." At that moment there were some plausible reasons in favor of granting the proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled to make a better bargain. But *now*, there were no reasons in its favor, and a strong

concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material importance to her—but peace had been already sworn to on both sides, after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position, accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit—and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterward proved unproductive in reality? The alliance in fact prevented the peace from being fulfilled: it became (as Thucydides himself admits) no peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.

Thucydides states on more than one occasion—and it was the sentiment of Nikias himself—that at the moment of concluding the peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of disadvantage and dishonor in reference to Athens. He alludes chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter—for as to other matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythera, and Methone. Yet so inconsiderate and short-sighted were the philo-Laconian leanings of Nikias and the men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away this advantage—suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace—and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which she desired. Most certainly, there was never any public recommendation of Kleon (as far as our information goes) so ruinously impolitic as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein both Nikias and Alkibiades concurred. Probably the Spartan Ephors amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser, with his criminative eloquence, had passed away—replaced only by an inferior successor, the lamp-maker Hyperbolus—and leaving the Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for birth and station, descended from gods and heroes—there remained no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence—"Wait, as you are entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in exchange for the captives."

The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they

had forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a freedom of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first blockade of Sphakteria. Yet it seems that under the present Ephors Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas to surrender Amphipolis, if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course the place was not surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained unperformed. The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice with Athens, terminable at ten days' notice on either side.

In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians had sworn for themselves and their allies, yet the most powerful among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which was (they said) all the intervention in their power, since they were not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian cities against their will. As to the Bœotians and Corinthians, the Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms along with Athens, for the purpose of constraining them to accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the surrender of Pylus—or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian garrison with the Helot deserters from that place—leaving in it none but native Athenian soldiers, until further progress should be made in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None of the stipulations of the treaty in their favor had yet been performed—

none even seemed in course of being performed; so that they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives. Their remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless they suffered themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from Pylus to Kephellania, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.

The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain were Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders, who had first accepted from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next—though favored by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her promises—renounced all these advantages, and procured for Sparta almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The many critics on Grecian history who think no term too harsh for the demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens. Amphipolis had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydides and Eukles: it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of Nikias.

So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendency of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fullness of wealth, power, and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both sides; while her military force was just now further strengthened by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth and station, to receive constant military training at the public expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, apart from the other citizens. To a democratical government like Argos such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present moment the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something like headship in Peloponnesus.

The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing them to turn their attention toward Argos as a new chief. They had mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing

that she had separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get back her captives. In the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they choose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy. And the alarm, once roused, was still farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely afterward, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.

Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring from the conferences at Sparta—where the recent alliance between the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the latter had vainly endeavored to prevail upon their allies to accept the peace—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as savior of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy—and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for reciprocal defense, every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the Corinthians, who returned home immediately afterward—was eagerly adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those two cities no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly.

Meanwhile the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantineia and Tegea, being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia,

were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself, only a year and a half before, in a bloody, but indecisive battle. Tegea, situated on the frontiers of Laconia and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached to Sparta; while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantineia was less so—though she was still enrolled in, and acted as a member of, the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself a little empire in her own neighborhood, composed of village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject-allies, and comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens—a period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against the common enemy—so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay moreover near to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.

To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations under the ascendency of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta—especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by insuring to every lesser state a substantitive vote at the meetings of the confederacy. Moreover the rivalry of Tegea would probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantineia. Under such apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta (for so it was considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent, to follow the example.

In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. "They (the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the peace—for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy, that the decision of the majority should be binding on all, except in such cases as involved some offense to Gods or Heroes." Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies—Bœotian, Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace, etc.—the Corinthians replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim their real ground for rejecting the peace—viz. that it had not procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and Anaktorium: since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had no interest—next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their stand upon a pretense at once generous and religious—upon that reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each member with reference to his own pious feeling. "It *was* a religious impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths ourselves apart from the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they revolted from Athens, and we should have infringed those separate oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation with our friends here present." With this unsatisfactory answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the purpose of urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their side to obtain a decided affirmative—being requested to come again at the next conference.

Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new Argeian confederacy, and compromised Argos in an open proclamation, yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. They were restrained in part, doubtless, by the bitterness of Lacedæmonian reproof—for the open consummation of this revolt, apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very old feelings—but still more by the discovery that their friends, who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from aversion toward the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the oligarchy at Sparta. They were linked together by communion of interest, not merely as being both neighbors and intense enemies of Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back

from visiting Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse—the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, and next to go on and enroll Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join the new confederacy.

The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantineia, in thus revolting from Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it, under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the Olympian Zeus—in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When the Peloponnesian war began, and the Lacedæmonians began to call for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at the close of which, Elis became entitled, under the same agreement, to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly in their favor. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more disposed to carry out her general system of favoring the autonomy of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of the confederacy. Accordingly, the Eleians, accusing her of unjust bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians. The latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and denounced the Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies, contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general confederacy when the war began—to the effect that each imperial city should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted. After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.

That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantineia, had now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the junction of that city—seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success, we are not told. The mere fact of Mantineia having joined Argos, seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing the same: and so it proved—for the Tegeans decidedly refused the proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened by this repulse, which they had by no means expected—having been so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all further extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position insecure on the side of Athens, with whom they were not at peace, while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already once refused, and not likely to be now granted—but intended to usher in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, such as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, they were further entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far the Bœotians complied as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and back their application for an armistice—which the Athenians declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer, the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The Bœotians maintained their ten days's armistice; and the Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing conditions of peace de facto, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which they had sustained by the revolt of Mantineia and Elis. At the request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia, the Lacedæ-

monians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defense and means of observation on the frontiers of Elis. These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished commanders, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they had caused 2,000 of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims personally, but simply from fear of the whole body, and of course greater fear of the bravest.

It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots that the Lacedæmonians had to guard, but also against danger (real or supposed) from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of Sphakteria had been untarnished by any real cowardice or military incompetence, nevertheless, under the inexorable customs and tone of opinion at Sparta, these men would be looked upon as more or less degraded; or at least there would be enough to make them fancy that they were so looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already in the exercise of various functions, when the Ephors, contracting suspicions of their designs, condemned them all to temporary disqualification for any official post; placing the whole of their property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, from every act either of purchase or sale. This species of disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers were at length relieved from it—the danger being supposed to be over. The nature of the interdict confirms what we know directly from Thucydides, that many of these captives were among the first and wealthiest families in the state; and the Ephors may have apprehended that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a long imprisonment (justly pointed out by modern historians), would not weigh much with the Ephors under any symptoms of public danger.

Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear nothing, except that the town of Skione at length surrendered to them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death the male population of military age—selling the women and children into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two years and a half before belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be sufficiently

accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Skione and its territory was made over to the Platæan refugees. The native population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions—were now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat at Amphipolis had created a belief in Athens that this removal had offended the gods—under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian exiles. They further lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian Gulf, which were captured by the Chalkidians of Thrace.

Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled. The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success. Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—King Pleistoanax as well as the Ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice, and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover, the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the summer (seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, B.C. 421) the year of these Ephors expired, and new Ephors were nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things this was an important revolution: for out of the five new Ephors, two (Kleobulus and Xenares) were decidedly hostile to peace with Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent. And we may here remark that this fluctuation and instability of public policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional monarchy of Sparta—the least popular government in Greece, in principle and detail.

The new Ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the settlement of the pending differences, at which, among the rest, Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobulus and Xenares, together with many of their partisans, originated, in concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private

underhand maneuvers for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would grasp at it in preference (so these Ephors affirmed), even if it cost them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was further essential that they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos—for Sparta could not easily go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.

Such were the plans which Kleobulus and Xenares laid with the Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favor the purpose at once: for on their road home they were accosted by two Argeians, senators in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the Bœotarchs, on their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan Ephors and the wishes of these Argeians. The Bœotarchs also entered heartily into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked favor, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance with Argos.

That sanction was to be obtained from "the Four Senates of the Bœotians"—bodies of the constitution of which nothing is known. But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent, that the Bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of course, even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans accordingly. They proposed to these four Senates a resolution in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial. Their particular object was (as they stated) to form alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace—for mutual defense, and for war as well as peace with others only by common consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connection with Corinth had always been intimate, while the position of the four parties named was the same—all being recusants of the recent peace. But the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive terms, in order that it might authorize them to proceed further afterward, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which might surprise and alarm the Senates. The maneuver, skillfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures which they never contemplated, illustrates

the manner in which an oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control its proceedings. But the Bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even hear of alliance with Corinth—so much did they fear to offend Sparta by any special connection with a city which had revolted from her. Nor did the Bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications with Kleobulus and Xenares, or to acquaint the Senates that the whole plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly, under this formal refusal on the part of the Senates, no farther proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian envoys left Thebes, while the promise of sending Bœotian envoys to Argos remained unexecuted.

But the anti-Athenian Ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency of the Bœotians, did not the less persist in their views upon Panaktum. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range between Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phyle, and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led through Phyle—had been an Athenian possession, until six months before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the Bœotians. A special provision of the treaty between Athens and Sparta prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Bœotia, to request from the Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to Athens, she might be induced to surrender Pylus. The Bœotians refused compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the Athenians. Now the Spartans stood pledged by their covenant with the latter (either by its terms or by its recognized import) not to enter into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent upon getting possession of Panaktum—while the prospect of breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly that which Kleobulus and Xenares desired. Under these feelings, the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for surrender as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to the ground; under pretense of some ancient oaths which had been exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect that the district round it should always remain without resident inhabitants—as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common pasture.

These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian Ephors thus seemed to be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably sur-

prised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of realizing their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But when they learnt that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future. Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens—the destruction of Panaktum being conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession. Under such a persuasion—no way unreasonable in itself, when the two contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished no collateral evidence to explain their real intent—the Argeians saw themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta, and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without a moment's delay, they dispatched Eustrophus and Æson—two Argeians much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city—to press for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to obtain the best terms they could.

To the Lacedæmonian Ephors this application was eminently acceptable—the very event which they had been maneuvering underhand to bring about. Negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory negative—the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the question respecting Thyrea open in some way or other, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will be recollected, that, about 120 years before this date, there had been a combat of this sort by 300 champions on each side, in which, after desperate valor on both sides, the victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined.

The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now appeared a perfect absurdity—even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, the most old-fashioned people in Greece. Yet since they hazarded nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.

Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan Ephors seemed now to have carried all their points—friendship with Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means (through the possession of Panaktum) of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylus. But they were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedes and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on to Athens and prosecuting the negotiations about Panaktum (at the time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at Sparta), they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at Athens: nevertheless Andromedes proceeded thither, taking with him all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens, at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact: Panaktum as well as the prisoners were thus *restored* (he pretended)—for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and he claimed the cession of Pylus in exchange.

But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for keeping such alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum and Pylus had been brought to a close. Both the alliance and the demolition of Panaktum excited among the Athenians the strongest marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened by the quibble of Andromedes—that demolition of the fort, being tantamount to restitution and precluding any further tenancy by the enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated still further by the recollection of all the other unperformed items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed amidst frequent notes and protocols (to employ a modern phrase):

nevertheless not one of the conditions favorable to Athens had yet been executed (except the restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number)—while she on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought to a head by this mission of Andromedes, discharged itself in the harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.

Even Nikias, Laches, and the other leading Athenians, to whose improvident facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing, were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation against Spartan perfidy—if it were only to divert attention from their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiades son of Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the Ekklesia, and giving to it a substantive aim.

The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was the splendor, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage through the heroes Eurysakes and Ajax—and such the effect of that lineage upon the democratical public of Athens—that he stepped speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also through his mother Deinomache to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he was related to Perikles, who became his guardian when he was left an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honor in a trireme of his own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. A Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiades, and a slave named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch over him. But even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens was full of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of Perikles and his brother Ariphron. His violent passions, love of enjoyment, ambition of pre-eminence, and insolence toward others, were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout his life. His finished beauty of person, both as boy, youth, and mature man, caused him to be much run after by women—and even by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public palæstræ. These men not only endured his petulance, but were even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them. Amidst such universal admiration

and indulgence—amidst corrupting influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an age, combined with great wealth and the highest position—it was not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiades. The anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly marked and sufficiently established in all.

A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort of his wife Hipparete, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at the battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents: when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiades violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one, which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiades. He strikes the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a copy of Homer—he strikes Taureas, a rival choregus, in the public theater, while the representation is going on—he strikes Hipponikus (who afterward became his father-in-law), out of a wager of mere wantonness, afterward appeasing him by an ample apology—he protects the Thasian poet Hegemon, against whom an indictment had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with his own hand from the list put up in the public edifice, called Metroon; defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on for trial. Nor does it appear that any injured person ever dared to bring Alkibiades to trial before the dikastery, though we read with amazement the tissue of lawlessness which marked his private life—a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amid the perfect legal, judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or discredited—and which were recognized as modifying elements in the current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom they injured as well as by those whom they favored. In the speech which Thucydides ascribes to Alkibiades before the Athenian public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts in Athenian society, show that if not approved,

it was at least tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints of the democracy.

Amid such unprincipled exorbitances of behavior, Alkibiades stood distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger; owing his life only to the exertions of Sokrates, who served in the ranks along with him. Eight years afterward, Alkibiades also served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokrates by protecting him against the Bœotian pursuers. As a rich young man, also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him: expensive duties, which (as we might expect) he discharged not merely with sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact expenditure of this sort, though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves off. The first appearance of Alkibiades in public life is said to have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the Ekklesia, when various citizens were handing in their contributions: and the loud applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy among the citizens present: the bird was caught and restored to him by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favor, and in after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.

To a young man like Alkibiades, thirsting for power and pre-eminence, a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers—Prodikus, Protagoras, and others; but most of all, that of Sokrates. His intimacy with Sokrates has become celebrated on many grounds, and is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiades (like the oligarchical Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter) was attracted to Sokrates by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation—his suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting new thoughts and combinations—his mastery of apposite and homely illustrations—his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long cross-examination—his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete, when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental activity of listeners,

while the faculty itself was one of peculiar value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate; with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the knack of Sokrates, and to copy his formidable string of interrogations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom this eminent talent resided; especially Alkibiades, who not only owed his life to the generous valor of Sokrates at Potidæa, but had also learnt in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in his armor, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship. But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokrates with the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes of discussion, in the society of all these sophists—Prodikus, and Protagoras not less than Sokrates; for in the Athenian sense of the word, Sokrates was a sophist as well as the others: and to the rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiades and Kritias, such society was highly useful. It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition, including mental accomplishments as well as political success: it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded: it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and obstructions of human well-being, both public and private:—it even suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence from which their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference between truth and error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics. Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had thus, as far as it went, a moralizing effect, though this was rarely their purpose in the pursuit.

Alkibiades, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to be found in Athens, that of Sokrates most of all and most frequently. The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as could be done without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoilt youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life. But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alkibiades attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got footing in his mind—how much the ends which he pursued

were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokrates was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of Alkibiades and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public life, Alkibiades came forward with a reputation stained by private enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent demeanor. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that position to which his rank, connections, and club-partisans, afforded him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigor in execution—not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Grecks: and what distinguished him from all, was his extraordinary flexibility of character, and consummate power of adapting himself to new habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances required. Like Themistokles—whom he resembled as well in ability and vigor as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means—Alkibiades was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a secondary quality subordinate to action; and though he possessed enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at least according to the high standard of Athens. But his career affords a memorable example of splendid qualities both for action and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from meddling citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in the public festivals, transcending the largest measure of private fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself by plundering the public, and even, if opportunity offered, by overthrowing the constitution to make himself master of the persons and properties of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired confidence or esteem to any one; and sooner or later, among a public like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting sentiments: "the Athenians desired him, hated him, but still wished to have him"—was said in the latter years of his life by a contemporary poet—while we find also another pithy precept delivered in regard to him—"You ought not to keep a lion's whelp in your city at all; but if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his behavior." Athens had to feel the force

of his energy, as an exile and enemy; but the great harm which he did to her was, in his capacity of adviser—awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for showy, rapacious, uncertain perilous aggrandizement which dictated his own personal actions.

Mentioning Alkibiades now for the first time, I have somewhat anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment which we have now reached (March, 420 B.C.) the lion's whelp was yet young, and had neither acquired his entire strength, nor disclosed his full-grown claws.

He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long before the peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in his family, as in that of his relation Perikles, were democratical: his grandfather Alkibiades had been vehement in his opposition to the Peisistratids, and had even afterward publicly renounced an established connection of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But Alkibiades himself, in commencing political life, departed from this family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical and philo-Laconian sentiment—doubtless far more consonant to his natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same general party with Nikias, and with Thessalus son of Kimon, who afterward became his bitter opponents. And it was in part probably to put himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his grandfather had broken off.

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens. Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favorable sympathies of their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration of her captives. Indeed he not only advocated these measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent of Sparta, for carrying them through at Athens. From such selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of Proxenus of Sparta—Alkibiades thus became a partisan of the blind and gratuitous philo-Laconian concessions of Nikias. But the captives on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his advances—not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans should thus judge, is no way astonishing, considering their extreme reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally preferred Nikias and Laches, whose prudence would commend, if it

did not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had Alkibiades yet shown the mighty movement of which he was capable. But this contemptuous refusal from the Spartans stung him so to the quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course, he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still more favorable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favor of Athens had yet been accomplished. Alkibiades had therefore ample pretext for altering his tone respecting the Spartans—and for denouncing them as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful friends and family guests. The condition of that city, disengaged by the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of connection with Athens—a policy now strongly recommended by Alkibiades, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful allies—Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such acquisition rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to the Athenians.

It was not so much however the inclination toward Argos, but the growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argeian plans of Alkibiades. And when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedes arrived at Athens from Bœotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of Panaktum in exchange for Pylus,—when it further became known that the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the Bœotians without consulting Athens—the unmeasured expression of displeasure in the Athenian Ekklesia showed Alkibiades that the time was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent his own voice to strengthen the discontent against Sparta, he at the same time dispatched a private intimation to his correspondents at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace; having been sent thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without allies, to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them

of alliance with Athens—a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial state at sea, yet not interfering with their own primacy in Peloponnesus—than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and dispatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint embassy, Argeian, Eleian and Mantineian. The alliance between these three cities had already been rendered more intimate, by a second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a party—though Corinth had refused all concern in the second.

But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of their envoy Andromedes, and probably warned by reports from Nikias and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without a moment's delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens—Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; with full powers to settle all matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all alliance of Athens with Argos—to explain that the alliance of Sparta with Bœotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of evil to Athens—and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylus should be restored to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum. Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition. And when the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an audience bofore the public assembly, the impression which they made, on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly favorable. It was indeed so favorable, that Alkibiades became alarmed lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.

To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular manœuver. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their two families. This probably assisted in procuring for him a secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanor of the senate; so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come, not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain nothing by

intimidation—explanations would be heard, and disputed points be discussed with temper—while he (Alkibiades) would speak emphatically in their favor. He would advise, and felt confident that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylus—a step which his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing. He gave them his solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to Plutarch—that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his counsel. The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity of these suggestions, and still more delighted to find that the man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was prepared to speak in their favor. His language obtained with them, probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta, only a few months before; and he appeared now to be simply resuming that policy. They were sure of the support of Nikias and his party, under all circumstances: if, by complying with the recommendation of Alkibiades, they could gain *his* strenuous advocacy and influence also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly, they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting, but without even warning, Nikias—which was exactly what Alkibiades desired, and had probably required them to promise.

Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced; upon which Alkibiades himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put the question to them, upon what footing they came? what powers they brought with them? They immediately declared that they had brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with which their declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct contrary; the assembled people, who, made aware of that previous affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from their lips; lastly, most of all, Nikias himself—their confidential agent and probably their host at Athens—who had doubtless announced them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management of their case before the assembly—all were alike astounded, and none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation of the people equaled their astonishment. There was an unanimous burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together. To crown the whole, Alkibiades himself affected to share all the surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed before. Nor was this all: he took advantage of the vehement acclamation which welcomed his invectives to propose that the Argeian envoys

should be called in and the alliance with Argos concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a remarkable phenomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it; causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a religious scruple then recognized as paramount.

This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from Thucydides. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which will be found to attach to Alkibiades through life, and presents indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein of Fielding's Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus, historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic. Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon whom Aristophanes heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if they ever equaled, the impudence of this descendant of Æakus and Zeus in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of public faith and consistency—a facility in publicly unsaying what they have just before publicly said—and a treachery toward their own confidential agent—which is truly surprising, and goes far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonian character.

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: but this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage—the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honorable, must

show it forthwith—1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens.

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required; a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy—a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just—but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all further evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobulus and Xenares, the anti-Athenian Ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos—the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that, too, as a personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiades was permitted to introduce the envoys (already at hand in the city) from Argos, Mantineia, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.

The words of this convention, which Thucydides gives us doubtless from the record on the public column, comprise two engagements—one for peace, another for alliance.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire. [The express terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of Mantineia and Elis toward Sparta, was connected with their imperial power.]

Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purpose of damage.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim

that city their enemy and attack it; neither of the four shall in that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

Reciprocal obligations are imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantineia, or Elis, shall be attacked.

Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory or the territory of allies over whom they may at the time be exercising command either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.

In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman, per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all.

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision was then made for the oaths—by whom? where? when? in what words? how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, with their respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantineia; by these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater Panathenæa. "The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities—and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost, at Olympia, for the festival now approaching."

"The four cities may by joint consent make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths."

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire, still subsisted. A peace had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis; which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance concluded between

themselves, without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there was an armistice terminable at ten days' notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies toward Sparta.

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad or 420 B.C.; the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May. That festival was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great Panhellenic temples, with liberty of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their solemn legations or Theories, and from attending as spectators, at the Olympic games. Now that such exclusion was removed, and that the Eleian heralds (who came to announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with them) again trod the soil of Attica, the visit of the Athenians was felt both by themselves and by others as a novelty. No small curiosity was entertained to see what figure the Theory of Athens would make as to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumors, that Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the presence of Olympic Zeus.

Alkibiades took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders. The Athenian Theory, of which he was a member, was set out with first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden ewers, censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession. But when the chariot-races came on, Alkibiades himself appeared as competitor at his own cost—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four,

which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary personal glory, but with the prodigous number of seven distinct chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another a second prize, so that Alkibiades was twice crowned with sprigs of the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation (it seems) was awarded to any after the second in order. We must recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend against—not merely private men, but even despots and governments. Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian Theors provided for their countrymen visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; but a separate tent which Alkibiades himself provided for a public banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of Hellas.

Five years afterward, on an important discussion which will be hereafter discribed, Alkibiades maintained publicly before the Athenian assemby that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens; dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power. He was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient to repel the charge from himself (which it was his purpose to do) both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation or violence at the public cost. All the unfavorable impressions suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life were aggravated by such a stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public favor.

If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking—the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. Such exclusion was the consequence of the new political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Mantineia. It has already been mentioned that since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians acting as arbitrators in the

case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency, had declared it to be autonomous and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of 1000 hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce, during which all violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the 1000 hoplites into Lepreum, and had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions—after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the "Olympian law," of two minæ for each man—2000 minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before their heralds crossed the borders), so that *they* were interdicted from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the Lacedæmonians rejoined that the behavior of the Eleians themselves contradicted their own allegation; for they had sent the Eleian heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the sending of the hoplites—thus showing that they did not consider the truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added that after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question we have no means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition, being alike refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine at once, would publicly, on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment or of promise. Accordingly, the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition at the games; that is, from attendance in the form of sacred legation called Theory, occupying a formal and recognized place at the solemnity.

As all the other Grecian states (with the single exception of Lepreum) were present by their Theories as well as by individual spectators, so the Spartan Theory "shone by its absence" in a manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, indeed, was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken—so pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back of the Sphakterian disaster—that they were supposed likely to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their Theors into the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid 1000 hoplites from Martineia, as well as the same number from Argos, for the purpose of repelling this probable attack; while a detachment of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival, to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot-racing. Lichas, a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum, and known violation of the order of the festival: accordingly, the official attendants with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows. Hence arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption. The boldness of the Eleians in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alkibiades, and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in showing off Athens.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ in the third year of the war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of settlers,

in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by the neighboring tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbors, especially the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenares the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies and waverers to be able to succor it; and the Bœotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Bœotian troops; dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance.

CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.

SHORTLY after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a promising opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her: but Spartan envoys were present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution was adopted. An earthquake—possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for convenience—abruptly terminated the congress. The Corinthians—though seemingly distrusting Argos now that she was united with Athens, and leaning rather toward Sparta—were unwilling to pronounce themselves in favor of one so as to make an enemy of the other.

In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under the inspirations of Alkibiades, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and influence. At the beginning of the war she had been maritime defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Perikles.

After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage to aim at the recovery of Megara and Bœotia, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the Thirty Years' truce—at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with signal ill success; while Brasidas during that period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became, to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed—the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also: Athens had surrendered her capital advantage without regaining Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done (as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward), if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently undergone there; next, that Alkibiades, the new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens (if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case), was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardor into a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover, his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amid the center of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and barbarous region: lastly, he probably recollected with discomfort the hardships and extreme cold (insupportable to all except the iron frame of Sokrates) which he had himself endured at the blockade of Potidæa twelve years before, and which any armament destined to conquer Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organizing a counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.

Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, and re-enforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiades exhibited the spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters—a spectacle at that moment new and striking. He first turned his attention to the Achæan towns in the north-west, where he persuaded the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to

undertake the labor of connecting their town with the sea by means of long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian Gulf; whereby the Athenians, who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would have become masters of the commerce of the Gulf. But the Corinthians and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, dispatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme—and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ. Yet the march of Alkibiades doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian interest throughout the Achæan coast.

He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina, now occupied by the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, dispensing with the labor of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum (the south-eastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula) whenever they sent forces to Argos. Moreover, the territory of Epidaurus bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering state of the temple of Apollo Pythaeus (situated within the walls of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over Epidaurus and other neighboring cities—seemingly the remnant of that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in early times had been theirs. The Epidaurians owed to this temple certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations—one of which, arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.

Their invading march, however, was for a time suspended by the news that king Agis, with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies, had advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on the north-west, toward Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers, or allies. But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was found so unfavorable that he abandoned his march for the present and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an outmarch as soon as that month had expired.

On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argeians prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which they set out was already the 26th of the month preceding the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of their lunar system. Having begun their march on the 26th of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding day still the 26th, thus disallowing the lapse of time. and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This proceeding was further facilitated by the circumstance that their allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, not being Dorians, were under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly the army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste; all this time being really, according to the reckoning of the other Dorian states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, adopting their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to be violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the field, invoked the aid of their allies, who however had already been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose, any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself. Some allies however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend aid by entering the territory alone.

Meanwnile the Athenians had convoked another congress of deputies at Mantineia, for the purpose of discussing propositions of peace: perhaps this may have been a point carried by Nikias at Athens, in spite of Alkibiades. What other deputies attended, we are not told: but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animadverted, even at the opening of the debates, upon the inconsistency of assembling a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this observation, that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still, however, the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcilable, and the congress broke up; upon which the Argeians again returned to renew their devastations in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians, immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested and forced to return by unfavorable border-sacrifices. Intimation of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which Alkibiades, at the head of 1000 Athenian hoplites, was sent to join

the Argeians. But before he arrived the Lacedæmonian army had been already disbanded: so that his services were no longer required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.

The Epidaurians were re-enforced about the end of September by a detachment of 300 Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this the Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens. They had good reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not having kept better naval watch at their neighboring station of Ægina, and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbor of Epidaurus. But they took another ground of complaint somewhat remarkable. In the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, it had been stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of troops through its territory without the joint consent of all. Now the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens: so that the Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back the Messenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylus, and allow them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion Alkibiades, complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths. Nevertheless they still abstained from formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmon, or breaking it in any other way. The relations between Athens and Sparta thus remained, in name—peace and alliance—so far as concerns direct operations against each other's territory; in reality—hostile action as well as hostile maneuvering, against each other, as allies respectively of third parties.

The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even had the advantage, yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now experienced throughout Peloponnesus, the Lacedæmonians determined, during the course of the ensuing summer, to put forth their strength vigorously, and win back their lost ground.

Toward the month of June (B.C. 418), they marched with their full force, freemen as well as Helots, under King Agis, against Argos. The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the Isthmus—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Philasians, etc.—were directed to assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter allies was very considerable—for we hear of 5,000 Bœotian hoplites, and 2,000 Corinthian: the Bœotians had with them also 5,000 light-armed, 500 horsemen, and 500 foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thucydides himself know: for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantineia. Such muster of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argeians, who marching first to Mantineia, and there taking up the force of that city as well as 3,000 Elian hoplites who came to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrium in Arcadia. The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians had resolved to attack Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at Phlius. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction in safety. We do not hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of lochus, who, copying the unreasonable punctilio of Amompharetus before the battle of Platæa, refused to obey the order of retreat before the enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact that no similar incident occurred now, may be held to prove that the Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of actual warfare.

As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the Argeians left their position also, and marched with their allies, first to Argos itself, next to Nemea, on the ordinary road from Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians, taking a short but very rugged and difficult road, crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Philasians were directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same plain upon a different point: while the Bœotians, Corinthians, and Sikyonians followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route, by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine called the Tretus, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis was much superior in number to the Argeians: but if all had marched in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Tretus, their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst the Argeians would have had a position highly favorable to their defense. By dividing his force, and takingt he mountain road with his own division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith quit the advantageous ground near Nemea to come and attack him in the plain: the Bœotian division would thus find the road by Nemea and

the Tretus open, and would be able to march without resistance into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the night; while the Argeians, hearing at daybreak that he was near their city, ravaging Saminthus and other places, left their position at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which, having reached a high ground immediately above the Argeian plain, was found nearly in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon found themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who lay between them and their city.

On both sides the armies were marshaled, and order taken for battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little less than desperate: for while they had Agis and his division in their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take them in flank, and the Bœotians marching along the undefended road through the Tretus would attack them in the rear. The Bœotian cavalry, too, would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantineia seem to have possessed any horsemen: a description of force which ought to have been sent from Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of a position so very critical, both the Argeians and their allies were elate with confidence and impatience for battle; thinking only of the division of Agis immediately in their front which appeared to be inclosed between them and their city—and taking no heed to the other formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argeian generals were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger: and just as the two armies were about to charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of the Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without consultation or privity on the part of their own army. They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction, in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge against them—and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis, at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also took this step without consulting either his army or his allies, simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to one of the official Spartans near him. Immediately he gave the order for retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted out of the Argeian territory, through the Nemean road whereby the Bœotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual discipline of Lacedæmonian soldiers to make them obey this order of the Spartan king, alike

unexpected and unwelcome. For the army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force, so that all the three divisions were loud in their denunciations of Agis, and penetrated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful a retreat. And when they all saw themselves in one united body at Nemea, previous to breaking up and going home—so as to have before their eyes their own full numbers and the complete equipment of one of the finest Hellenic armies which had ever been assembled—the Argeian body of allies, before whom they were now retiring, appeared contemptible in the comparison, and they separated with yet warmer and more universal indignation against the king who had betrayed their cause.

On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Spartan authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly no more than he deserved: but we read, with no small astonishment, that the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more exasperated against Thrasyllus, whom they accused of having traitorously thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom, on returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before entering the city, at a place called the Charadrus or winter torrent near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offenses and faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion against Thrasyllus that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to seek personal safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated,

Very shortly afterward the expected Athenian contingent arrived, which probably ought to have come earlier: 1000 hoplites, with 300 horsemen, under Laches and Nikostratus. Alkibiades came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against Thrasyllus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiades even permitted to approach and address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused. An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, along with the Argeians. Alkibiades contended strenuously that the recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void; since it had been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with the reenforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to join

him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus; the Argeians, also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely because its territory joined that of Mantineia on the northward, but because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee for fidelity. Its walls were, however, in bad condition, and its inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to become allies of Mantineia—to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion to such alliance—and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them by Sparta.

Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should next undertake. The Eleians contended strenuously for a march against Lepreum, while the Mantineians were anxious to attack their enemy and neighbor Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians preferred the latter—incomparably the more important enterprise of the two: but such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home. Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies continued together at Mantineia organizing their attack upon Tegea, in which city they had a strong favorable party, who had actually laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt of the city from Sparta, when the philo-Laconian Tegeans just saved themselves by dispatching an urgent message to Sparta and receiving the most rapid succor. The Lacedæmonians, filled with indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in the sum of 100,000 drachmæ or about 27⅞ Attic talents. He urgently entreated that an opportunity might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name which he had incurred: if he failed in doing so, then they might inflict upon him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly withdrawn: but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been, before, a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his own authority; but a council of Ten was now named, without whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.

To the great good fortune of Agis, the pressing message now arrived announcing imminent revolt of Tegea—the most important ally of Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by this news, that the whole military population instantly started off to relieve the place, Agis at their head—the most rapid movement ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers. When they arrived at Orestheium in Arcadia in their way, perhaps hearing that the danger was somewhat less pressing, they sent back to Sparta one-sixth part of the forces, for home defense—the oldest

as well as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They farther sent messages to the Corinthians and Bœotians, as well as to the Phokians, and Lokrians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of Mantineia. The arrival of such re-enforcements, however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the rather as it appears that they could not get into the territory of Mantineia except by passing through that of Argos—which could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present into the territory of Mantineia, and took up a position near the Herakleion or temple of Herakles, from whence he began to ravage the neighboring lands. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth from Mantineia, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and impracticable ground—and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted by the difficulties of the position, he marshaled his army and led it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to Thrasyllus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him that he was now merely proceeding "to heal mischief by mischief." So forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, or by the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to assault, that he suddenly halted the army, and gave orders for retreat—though actually within distance no greater than the cast of a javelin, from the enemy.

His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between Mantineia and Tegea—both situated on a lofty but inclosed plain, drained only by katabothra or natural subterranean channels in the mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the purpose of turning the water toward the side of Mantineia, where it would occasion serious damage; calculating that the Mantineians and their allies would certainly descend from their position to hinder it. No stratagem, however, was necessary to induce the latter to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt—next retreat—and lastly disappear—their surprise was very great; and this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals, not sharing such confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position: upon which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time, as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably not be the same

with those who had incurred, a short time before, so much undeserved censure for their convention with Agis: but the murmurs on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders for advance. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed in his operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, or not spread so much terror, as he had expected: and he accordingly desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained their position on the hill. But in the course of his march he came suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in the least prepared to see them. They were not only in the plain, but already drawn up in perfect order of battle. The Mantineians occupied the right wing, the post of honor, because the ground was in their territory; next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies: then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and family trained in arms at the cost of the state: alongside of them, the remaining Argeian hoplites with their dependent allies of Kleonæ and Orneæ: last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their hoplites as well as their horsemen.

It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld this unexpected apparition. To any other Grecks than Lacedæmonians, the sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned a feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience. But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training and habit of military obedience, as well as of that subordination of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other Grecian armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice by a herald, who received them personally from the general: each *taxis* or company, indeed, had its own taxiarch, but the latter did not receive his orders separately from the general, and seems to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by his soldiers. Subordinate and responsible military authority was not recognized. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a regular gradation of military and responsible authority—"commanders of commanders"—each of whom had his special duty in insuring the execution of orders. Every order emanated from the Spartan king when he was present, and was given to the Polemarchs (each commanding a Mora, the largest military division), who intimated it to the Lochagi, or colonels of the respective Lochi. These again gave command to each Pentekonter, or captain of a Pentekosty; lastly, he

to the Enomotarch, who commanded the lowest subdivision called an Enomoty. The soldier thus received no immediate orders except from the Enomotarch, who was in the first instance responsible for his Enomoty; but the Pentekonter and the Lochage were responsible also each for his larger division; the pentekosty including four enomoties, and the lochus four pentekosties—at least so the numbers stood on this occasion. All the various military maneuvers were familiar to the Lacedæmonians from their unremitting drill, so that their armies enjoyed the advantage of readier obedience along with more systematic command. Accordingly, though thus taken by surprise, and called on now for the first time in their lives to form in the presence of an enemy, they only manifested the greater promptitude and anxious haste in obeying the orders of Agis, transmitted through the regular series of officers. The battle array was attained, with regularity as well as with speed.

The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient privilege to the Skiritæ; mountaineers of the border district of Laconia skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii, seemingly east of the Eurotas near its earliest and highest course. These men, originally Arcadians, now constituted a variety of Laconian Periœki, with peculiar duties as well as peculiar privileges. Numbered among the bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally formed the vanguard in an advancing march; and the Spartans stand accused of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with unbecoming recklessness. Next to the Skiritæ. who were 600 in number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamodes, both probably summoned home from Lepreum, where we were told before that they had been planted. After them, in the center of the entire line, came the Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian dependent allies, Heræan and Mænalian, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the extreme right, as the post of honor. On each flank there were some Lacedæmonian horsemen.

Thucydides, with a frankness which enhances the value of his testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that this silence is not for want of having inquired—but none of the answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about *their* numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks served only to mislead. In the absence of assured information about aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, though in what capacity, we cannot determine, as he was an exile

from his country. First he states that the Lacedæmonian army *appeared* more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us, that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were 600 in number —the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their right wing, consisted of 448 men; each enomoty having four men in front. In respect to depth, the different enomoties were not all equal; but for the most part, the files were eight deep. There were seven lochi in all (apart from the Skiritæ); each lochus comprised four pentekosties—each pentekosty contained four enomoties. Multiplying 448 by 8, and adding the 600 Skiritæ, this would make a total of 4184 hoplites, besides a few horsemen on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. I have no confidence in such an estimate—but the total is smaller than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians had marched out from Sparta with their entire force on a pressing emergency, and that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total, their oldest and youngest soldiers.

It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side made any attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation and encouragement; and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians may probably have attained their order. The Mantineian officers reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether Mantineia should continue to be a free and imperial city, with Arcadian dependencies of her own, as she now was—or or should again be degraded into a dependency of Lacedæmon. The Argeian leaders dwelt upon the opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her lost ascendency in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her worst enemy and neighbor. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show themselves worthy of the many brave allies with whom they were now associated, as well as to protect their own territory and empire by vanquishing their army in Peloponnesus.

It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character, that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either by Agis or any of the officers. "They knew (says the historian) that long practice beforehand, in the business of war, was a better preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment." As among professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course, without any special exhortation: but mutual suggestions were heard among them with a view to get their order of battle and position perfect, which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover, various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the ranks. At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipers in attendance (an hereditary caste at Sparta) began to play, while the slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the time given by these instruments without any break or

wavering in the line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by the enemy; who, having no pipers or other musical instruments, rushed forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious, fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them.

It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into conflict, to march not exactly straightforward, but somewhat aslant toward the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right-hand neighbor. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was not merely the post of honor, but also of comparative safety. So it proved on the present occasion; even the Lacedæmonian discipline being no way exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with the Lochi in the center, saw plainly that when the armies closed, his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to accomplish through the exact discipline, practiced evolutions, and slow march of his soldiers.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order. Accordingly, Agis gave signal to the Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians; while in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent orders to the two polemarchs Aristokles and Hipponoidas, who had their Lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders: so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the center, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed: and the Skiritæ and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from

their own center. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the Lacedæmonian center, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-wagons in the rear; some of the elder troops who guarded the wagons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.

But the victorious Mantenecians and their comrades thinking only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Lacedæmonian center and right; where Agis, with his body-guard of 300 chosen youths called Hippeis, and with the Spartan Lochi, found himself in front conflict with the center and left of the enemy—with the Argeians, their elderly troops and the so-called Five Lochi—with the Kleonæans and Orneates, dependent allies of Argos—and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance—indeed on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops gave way without crossing spears, and even with a panic so headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape. While thus defeated in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis's army, and the Athenians here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand. Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back, was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians—and which Agis might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system, enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named Pharax, enjoined abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated enemy. There fell in this battle 700 men of the Argeians, Kleonæans, and Orneates; 200 Athenians, together with both the generals Laches and Nikostratus; and 200 Mantineians. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about 300 men. They stripped the enemy's dead, spreading out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the

defeated enemy. Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea with a re-enforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory, he returned home.

Such was the important battle of Mantineia, fought in the month of June, 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was however greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the pre-existing stain upon the honor of Sparta. The disaster in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantineia silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military pre-eminence before the eyes of Greece. It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The maneuver of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs; but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantineia any of that professional aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled "artists in warlike affairs." So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and center, so that they might have taken the center in flank, and ought to have done so had they been well-advised—the troops in the center, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in re-establishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus.

We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristokles and Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had well-nigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards on their return to Sparta.

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we may remark that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their 3,000 men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of

Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark of Perikles at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious co-operation. Shortly after the defeat, the 3,000 Eleians came back to the aid of Mantineia—probably regretting their previous untoward departure—together with a re-enforcement of 1000 Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began—a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even dispatching messengers to countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late battle—and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success—now found their own territory overrun by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians were here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work committed to them (the fortification of the cape on which the Heræum or temple of Here was situated) was indefatigably prosecuted and speedily brought to completion—their allies, both Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them, in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory.

So far the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very center of their enemy's force—at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party—philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the effect of the defeat at Mantineia had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders—who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiades, had aspired to maintain an ascendency in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not superior, to Sparta—now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defense against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantineia, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian center. They had thus reaped positive glory, and doubtless felt contempt

for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat of Mantineia reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and re-enforced, entered into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy,

As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiades, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which, being already adopted by the Ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos—and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows:—

"The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as hostages from Orchomenus, and the men hostages from the Mænalii. They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantineia, whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken.

Respecting the sacrifice alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear themselves. Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Poloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus—and shall hold their own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send them home about their business."

Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibades at the same time retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantineia—and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following terms:—

"There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance—holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound to enter upon amicable adjustment. If any allied city shall quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution."

It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance the disputed question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty—that of insuring autonomy to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the empire of Elis, Mantineia, or any other larger state which might have dependencies. And accordingly the Mantineians, finding themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies, renouncing all command over their Arcadian subjects, and delivering up the hostages of these latter—according to the stipulation in the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos. The Lacedæmonians do not seem to have meddled further with Elis. Being already possessed of Lepreum (through the Brasideian settlers planted there), they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon (about November or December, 418 B.C.) had still further depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as bound together by their common military training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views, and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta, they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens. Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were dispatched to Thrace and Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed, and even new engagements concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens. In further pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly

by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged it prudent to send Demosthenes to bring them away. That general not only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem which gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily shutting the gates, he remained master of the place. Having no intention, however, of keeping it, he made it over presently to the Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they had been parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before, two years before the peace of Nikias.

The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of 1000 hoplites from each city (the first joint expedition under the new alliance), against Sikyon, for the purpose of introducing more thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyonian government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyon: yet that city seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably, therefore, that joint enterprise against Sikyon was nothing more than a pretext to cover the introduction of 1000 Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyon had been accomplished. Thus re-enforced, the oligarchical leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the government.

This revolution (accomplished about February B.C. 417)—the result of the victory of Mantineia and the consummation of a train of policy laid by Sparta—raised her ascendency in Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose—perhaps since the march of Alkibiades thither two years before—accordingly she now remodeled their governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counterwork her or to favor Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.

But the Spartan ascendency at Argos was not destined to last. Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional routine, and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to govern—yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, and threatened the security of the rulers enough to make them suspicious and probably cruel. Such cruelty, moreover, was not their only fault: they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. With the population of Argos—comparatively coarse and brutal in all ranks, and more like Korkyra than like Athens—such abuse was pretty sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of the Thousand—men in the vigor of their age, and proud of their military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a period of individual license to themselves. The behavior and fate of their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanor of the troop. After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the ravisher while he was fast asleep: a terrible revenge, which the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled women to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as protection among the people generally, against the indignant efforts of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.

From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults which so flagitious an outrage implies as co-existent, we are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the Gymnopædiæ was in course of being solemnized at Sparta—a festival at which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection; and after a sharp contest, gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth

the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march toward Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, urgently entreating them to proceed; but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.

Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown—after a continuance of about four months, from February to June, 417 B.C.—and the chosen Thousand regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities, who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city, felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favorable treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still, the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very zealous in the cause,—and least of all at this moment, when the period of harvest was at hand: so that about three months intervened before any actnal force was brought together.

This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and re-enforcement from Athens in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argeian population—men and women, free and slave—set about the work with the utmost ardor; while Alkibiades brought assistance from Athens—especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls adequate for defense, along the line of four miles and a half between Argos and the sea, required a long time. Moreover, the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles without—a party defeated but not annihilated—strenuously urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew near to assist—the same intrigue which had been entered into by the

oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Peiræus were in course of erection. Accordingly, about the end of September (417 B.C.), king Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the Long Walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiæ, where he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighboring territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.

The close neighborhood of such exiles—together with the declared countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical party within the walls—kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand. To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiades was dispatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in ascendency, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert with them, he selected 300 marked oligarchical persons, whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as hostages for the quiescence of the party (B.C. 416). Another ravaging march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of Phlius, wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And again about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as the borders, they found the sacrifices (always offered previous to leaving their own territory) so unfavorable that they returned back and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least were suspected of doing so—to such a degree that some of them were seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their escape. Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians became more fortunate with their border sacrifices—entered the Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the Corinthians, who refused to take part)—and established the Argeian oligarchical exiles at Orneæ; from which town these latter were again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian re-enforcement.

To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterward be extended, of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a source of strength to Athens; very different from the splendid hopes

which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantineia—hopes of supplanting Sparta in her ascendency within the Isthmus. It is remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling between Athens and Sparta—and continued reciprocal hostilities, in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third party—nevertheless, neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real truth, though each half year brought them a step nearer to it in fact. Thus, during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.), the Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylus became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians. Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation. Nor was the license of free intercourse for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 91st Olympiad), and sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Dorian Greeks.

Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, having as an ally of Athens engaged to co-operate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis—now withdrew his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an enemy.

Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiades, and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis: the center of a great commercial and mining region —situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could

readily command—and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman Perikles. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; the more so as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails—partly through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint—partly through the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a portion of his fellow-citizens which rendered the military force not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Laches, and Alkibiades, all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, under express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceeding which display as much silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiades, the result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen: his inertness of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When he discovered that he had been out-maneuvered by the Lacedæmonian diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiades begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nikias—the passion for showy, precarious, boundless, and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Mantineia had put an end to the political speculations of Alkibiades in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious perfidy. It was not by any half exertions of force that the place could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the peace of Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters—where she is brought near to ruin by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiades combined: for by singular misfortune she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.

It was in one of the three years between 420–416 B.C., though we do not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiades. The political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken, and this proposition (probably made by the partisans of Nikias, since Alkibiades was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous) was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Chremes, a speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenously supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiades. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanes as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership of the rostrum in the Pnyx: if this were true, his supposed demagogic pre-eminence would commence about September 422 B.C., the period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydides does not name him in any of the important debates which took place at and after the peace of Nikias. Thucydides only mentions him once —in 411 B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He terms him, "one Hyperbolus, a person of bad character, who had been ostracized, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a disgrace to the city." This sentence of Thucydides is really the only evidence against Hyperbolus: for it is not less unjust in his case than in that of Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as if they were so much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by Thucydides.

At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between Nikias and Alkibiades, about twenty-four years had elapsed since a similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been that of Perikles and Thucydides son of Milesias, the latter of whom was ostracized about 442 B.C. The democratical constitution had become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers: moreover there was now full confidence in the numerous Dikasteries as competent to deal with the greatest of such criminals—thus abating the necessity as conceived in men's minds, not less than the real necessity, for such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things, altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised to find that the vote

of ostracism now invoked, though we do not know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At a moment of extreme heat of party-dispute, the friends of Alkibiades probably accepted the challenge of Nikias and concurred in supporting a vote of ostracism: each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place, the partisans of both changed their views, preferring to let the political dissension proceed without closing it by separating the combatants. But the ostracizing vote, having been formally pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place: it was always however perfectly general in its form, admitting of any citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly the two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs or Hetæries, and according to some accounts, the friends of Phæax also, united to turn the vote against some one else. They fixed upon a man whom all of them jointly disliked—Hyperbolus. By thus concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him to pass the sentence which sent him into temporary banishment. But such a result was in no one's contemplation when the vote was decreed to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognized by every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydides himself distinctly implies this: for if we even grant that Hyperbolus fully deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was, even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of it as employed afterward. It had been extremely valuable in earlier days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry between individual leaders: but the democracy was now strong enough to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiades had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.

It was in the beginning of summer 416 B.C., that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Melos—one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thera, which was not already included in their empire. Melos and Thera were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens; but at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth

year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomedes and Tisias: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian, and two Lesbian—1200 Athenian hoplites, and 1500 hoplites, from the allies—with 300 bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject-ally of Athens.

It was a practice frequent, if not universal, in Greece—even in governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, admitting the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of the conversation which passed, Thucydides professes to give a detailed and elaborate account—at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians; no one of them separately long, and some very short—but the dialogue carried on is dramatic and very impressive. There is indeed every reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydides is in far larger proportion his own, and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Now as all the Melian prisoners of military age, and certainly all those leading citizens then in the town who had conducted this interview, were slain immediately after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thucydides could possibly have heard what really passed. That he did hear either from or through them, the general character of what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.

The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in which they now stand; in spite of the disposition of the Melians to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians—or to set forth injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable under existing circumstances,

since they know as well as he, that justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows, and the weak submitting to it. To this the Melians reply, that (omitting all appeal to justice and speaking only of what was expedient) they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with some indulgence even toward those who may be unable to make out a case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be awful both as punishment to herself and as a lesson to others. "We are not afraid of *that* (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover our present contest is not undertaken against Sparta — it is a contest to determine whether subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us to judge of: in the meantime let us remind you that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we are now speaking with a view to your safety—wishing to get you under our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutal benefit of both of us."—"Cannot you leave us alone, and let us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor of Sparta?"—said the Melians. "No (is the reply)—your friendship does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies—your enmity will give a demonstration of our power."—"But do your subjects really take such a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of connection with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been reconquered?"—"They do: for they think that both one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the whole; especially as you are islanders, and feeble islanders too, while we are lords of the sea."—"But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert them into enemies."—"We are in little fear of continental cities, who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us—but only of islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you, or already in our empire and discontented with the restraint which it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves into peril."—"We know well (said the Melians, after some other observations had been interchanged)

how terrible it is to contend against your superior power and your good fortune; nevertheless we trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from the Gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice—and as to our inferior power we trust that the deficiency will be made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from very shame to aid us."—"We too (replied the Athenians) think that we shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favor. For we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, overpassing that which men believe in regard to the Gods, and wish in regard to themselves. What we believe about the Gods is the same as that which we see to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This is the principle on which we now proceed—not having been the first either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established and likely to continue forever—and knowing well too that you or others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their remaining deaf to your call, we congratulate you on your innocent simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at their behavior toward others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honorable, and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations of safety."

After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a certain interval, were recalled by the Melian council to hear the following words—"We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of Athens. We shall not surrender the independence of a city which has already stood for 700 years: we shall yet make an effort to save ourselves—relying on that favorable fortune which the Gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party; and that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may be mutually acceptable." — "Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance through your own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and with your all you will come to ruin."

The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation,

distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was constructed round the town; which was left under full blockade both by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of that time the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an additional detachment under Philokrates. At length the provisions within were exhausted; plots for betrayal commenced among the Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age, and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydides does not say; but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiades was strenuous in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently sent thither, to form a new community; apparently not as kleruchs, or out-citizens of Athens, but as new Melians.

Taking the proceedings of the Athenians toward Melos from the beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in Naupaktus, Nisæa, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigor of the laws of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover the acquisition of the island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens. Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this small insular population who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in after-times as among the first of her misdeeds.

To gratify her pride of empire, by a new conquest—easy to effect, though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted—and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the Melians. This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with still more fatal predominance.

Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked in the dialogue set forth by Thucydides. I have already stated that this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except as to

a few general points, which the historian has followed out into deductions and illustrations, thus dramatizing the given situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language put into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers; as Dionysius of Halikarnassus long ago remarked, intimating his suspicion that Thucydides had so set out the case for the purpose of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are more open to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false pretenses, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called *sophistry* where their purpose needs it. Now the language of the envoy at Melos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating the immorality of the class or profession (falsely called a school) named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for a sort of audacious frankness—a disdain not merely of sophistry in the modern sense of the word, but even of such plausible excuse as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued as if "*the good old plan, That they should take who have the power, And they should keep who can*"—had been first discovered and openly promulgated by Athenian sophists: whereas the true purpose and value of sophists, even in the modern and worst sense of the word (putting aside the perversion of applying that sense to the persons called Sophists at Athens), is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive justification—so that the strong man may be enabled to act upon this "good old plan as much as he pleases, but without avowing it, and while professing fair dealing or just retaliation for some imaginary wrong. The wolf in Æsop's fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb) speaks like a sophist; the Athenian envoy at Melos speaks in a manner totally unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as Dionysius has observed.

As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory in Greece, expect Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerers who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves, as matter of pride and glory: and when we come to the times of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the lust of conquest reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Melos: but that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian

envoy of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification, looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of argument: a civilized conquerer is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification—a good plea if he can—a false plea, or sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies the cotemptuous silence of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra. He even disdains to mention—what might have been said with perfect truth as matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency as a justification—that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her allies, without any payment of their own.

So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic fragment —*Μήλου Ἅλωσις* (The Capture of Melos)—if we may parody the title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus—"The Capture of Miletus." And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucydides will suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and tragical effect. The capture of Melos comes immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon three or four months afterward, and dispatched during the course of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to recover. Though crippled, indeed, she struggled against its effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main, declining—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration—until her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydides, just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by his dramatic fragment of the envoys at Melos. It will be recollected that Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxes into Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation—impresses his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch's insolence and superhuman pride by various conversations between him and the courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek mind. And Thucydides—having before him an act of great injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at this point of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and

confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are, however, his own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation; not those of the Athenian envoy—still less, those of the Athenian public—last of all, those of that much calumniated class of men, the Athenian sophists.

CHAPTER LVII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY.

In the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connection between the two has been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect; so that I have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this blank; to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events during the interval between 461–416 B.C.; and to assign the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard.

The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the island, left the various Grecian cities to reorganize themselves in free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately our memorials respecting this revolution are miserably scanty; but there is enough to indicate that it was something much more than a change from single-headed to popular government. It included, farther, transfers on the largest scale both of inhabitants and of property. The preceding despots had sent many old citizens into exile, transplanted others from one part of Sicily to another, and provided settlements for numerous immigrants and mercenaries devoted to their interest. Of these proceedings much was reversed, when the dynasties were overthrown, so that the personal and proprietary revolution was more complicated and perplexing than the political. After a period of severe commotion, an accommodation was concluded, whereby the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted partly in the territory of Messene, partly in the re-established city of Kamarina, in the eastern portion of the southern coast, bordering on Syracuse.

But though peace was thus re-established, these large mutations of

inhabitants, first begun by the despots—and the incoherent mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, etc., which was brought about unavoidably during the process—left throughout Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the long traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and numbered by foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness. The wonder, indeed, rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular governments, that the half-century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the island.

The southern coast of Sicily was occupied (beginning from the westward) by Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came Syracuse, possessing the south-eastern cape, and the southern portion of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katana, and Naxos: Messene, on the strait adjoining Italy. The center of the island, and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikans; on this coast, Himera was the only Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybæum, the western corner of the island was occupied by the non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and Eryx, and by the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo) was the principal.

Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse was the first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above noticed, disturbing the first commencement of popular governments in all of them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there established, but its stability was threatened by more than one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the scepter of Gelo and Hiero. The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, who employed a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring partisans among the poor. His political designs were at length so openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put to death; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried and failed in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorizing the infliction of temporary preventive banishment. Under this law several powerful citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse of the new engine by the political parties in the city, that men of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent than those which it checked, insomuch that the Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the meager abstract given by Diodorus—and especially to know the precautionary secu-

rities by which the application of the ostracizing sentence was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities provided by Kleisthenes at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the institution, though tutelary if reserved for its proper emergencies, was eminently open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens.

Although the ostracism (or petalism) at Syracuse was speedily discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, as far as we can judge from the fact that new pretenders to despotism are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth and manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan admiral Phayllus was dispatched with a powerful fleet to repress the piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the island of Elba, returned home, under the suspicion of having been bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was tried and banished—a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apelles being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the island of Corsica (at that time a Tyrrhenian possession), and reduced the island of Elba completely. His return was signalized by a large number of captives and a rich booty.

Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian cities in Sicily, had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the interior, and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit and ability, with large ideas of aggrandizement. Many exiled Greeks having probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement, that he commenced the plan of bringing the pretty Sikel communities into something like city-life and collective co-operation. Having acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of Morgantina, he induced all the Sikel communities (with the exception of Hybla) to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little town from the hill top, called Menæ, down to a convenient spot of the neighboring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called Paliki. As the veneration paid to these gods, determined in part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighborhood, rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels generally, Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city of Palike, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population, probably with some Greeks intermingled.

The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired is attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had

appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks expelled from Ætna, and had received from them the name of Ætna: Duketius now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by stratagem the leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade the territory of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their country garrisons called Motyum. We are impressed with a high idea of his power when we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching to relieve the place, thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracusans, who sent to them a force under Bolkon. Over this united force Duketius gained a victory—in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Bolkon, as the Syracusans believed—insomuch that they condemned him to death. In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sikel prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised the blockade of Motyum, completely defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown, and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the agora, surrendering himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens, exciting in them the strongest emotions: and when the magistrates convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy was found paramount, in spite of the contrary recommendations of some of the political leaders. The most respected among the elder citizens earnestly recommending mild treatment toward a foe thus fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis—found their appeal to the generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of "Save the suppliant." Duketius, withdrawn from the altar, was sent off to Corinth under his engagement to live there quietly for the future: the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance.

Amidst the cruelty habitual in ancient warfare, this remarkable incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the lenient impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Duketius actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence—just as the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of the captive Dorieus, and induced to spare his life, on an occasion which will be hereafter recounted. If in some instances the assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous sentiment, carried severities to excess, so, in other cases, as well as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after residing a

year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kale Akte on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels. We cannot doubt that when the Syracusans found in what manner their lenity was requited, the speakers who had recommended severe treatment would take great credit on the score of superior foresight.

But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to spare Duketius had been adopted without the concurrence of the Agrigentines, who had helped to conquer him; and the latter, when they saw him again in the island and again formidable, were so indignant that they declared war against Syracuse. A standing jealousy prevailed between these two great cities, the first and second powers in Sicily. War actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and especially a serious defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera, these latter solicited and obtained peace. The discord between the two cities however had left leisure to Duketius to found the city of Kale Akte, and to make some progress in re-establishing his ascendency over the Sikels, in which operation he was overtaken by death. He probably left no successor to carry on his plans, so that the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously, reduced many of the Sikel townships in the island—regaining his former conquest, Morgantine, and subduing even the strong position and town called Trinakia, after a brave and desperate resistance on the part of the inhabitants.

By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was elevated to the height of power, and began to indulge schemes for extending her ascendency throughout the island: with which view her horsemen were doubled in number, and one hundred new triremes were constructed. Whether any, or what steps were taken to realize her designs, our historian does not tell us. But the position of Sicily remains the same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war: Syracuse, the first city as to power—indulging in ambitious dreams, if not in ambitious aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and almost a rival; the remaining Grecian states maintaining their independence, yet not without mistrust and apprehension.

Though the particular phenomena of this period, however, have not come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that it was one of great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, commerce, and public monuments of Agrigentum, especially, appear to have even surpassed those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time neither the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and the Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory of

Sicily, particularly that of Agrigentum. The temples of the city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, were on the grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as slave, was very great: the number of rich men, keeping chariots, and competing for the prize at the Olympic games, was renowned—not less than the accumulation of works of art, statues and pictures, with manifold insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly brought to our notice, because of the frightful catastrophe which desolated Agrigentum in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians. It was in the interval which we are now describing, that such prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum alone, but more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the island.

Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished. At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable town of Elea in the Gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest speculative philosophers in Greece—Parmenides and Zeno. Empedokles of Agrigentum was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical studies, wherein not only Empedokles and Polus at Agrigentum, but Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more, Gorgias at Leontini, acquired great reputation. The constitution established at Agrigentum after the dispossession of the Theronian dynasty was at first not thoroughly democratical, the principal authority residing in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We are told even that an ambitious club of citizens were aiming at the re-establishment of a despotism, when Empedokles, availing himself of wealth and high position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One Thousand and render the government completely democratical. His influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism, and pretense to miraculous or divine endowments, which accompanied his philosophical speculations, in a manner similar to Pythagoras. The same combination of rhetoric with metaphysical speculation appears also in Gorgias of Leontini; whose celebrity as a teacher throughout Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the judicatures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers Tisias and Korax at Syracuse.

In such state of material prosperity, popular politics, and intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears to have

never aimed at any political ascendency even over that town—much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference—were yet connected by sympathy, and on one side even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Sicily—Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps Himera and Messene—together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among the allies of Athens, perhaps, the Chalkidic or Ionic Rhegium in Italy. Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty, is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior to the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connection of the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency, than of pronounced obligation and action. The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtless sharing the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any co-operation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbor, Syracuse.

It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 433–432), which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to co-operation in the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting the most violent anti-Athenian war-spirit in Corinth, with whom the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy—next, by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an established footing in Korkyra. But Plutarch (whom most historians have followed) is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydides, when he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven or eight years afterward. At the outbreak, and for some years before the outbreak, of the war, the policy of Athens was purely conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive, as I have shown in a former chapter. At that moment Sparta and Corinth anticipated large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in money, and in provisions; while the value of Korkyra as an ally of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such re-enforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.

In the spring of 431 B.C., the Spartans, then organizing their first invasion of Attica and full of hope that Athens would be crushed in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a vast fleet of 500 ships of war among the confederacy. A considerable portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian and Sicilian Dorians, and a contribution in money besides; with instructions to refrain from

any immediate declaration against Athens until their fleet should be ready. Of such expected succor, indeed, little was ever realized in any way; in ships, nothing at all. But the expectations and orders of Sparta show that here, as elsewhere, she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample re-enforcements from Syracuse and the neighboring towns—a hope which must have contributed largely to the confidence with which they began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from being realized we are not distinctly told: and we find Hermokrates the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterward (immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse) with their antecedent apathy. But it is easy to see that as the Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest—neither wrongs to avenge, nor dangers to apprehend, from Athens—nor any habit of obeying requisitions from Sparta, so they might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case of need, without taxing themselves to the enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar motive would be found operative either at Agrigentum or at Gela or Selinus.

Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that it weighed materially in determining the latter afterward to assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of dispatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable hopes of conquering and appropriating—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. These cities doubtless sympathized with Athens in her struggle against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her or to threaten their Dorian neighbors, they were unable to defend themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city Syracuse—and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth summer of the war, finding themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succor as allies and Ionians—and to represent that if Syracuse succeeded in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been invoking. The eminent rhetor Gorgias of Leontini, whose peculiar style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this embassy. It is certain that

this rhetor procured for himself numerous pupils and large gains not merely in Athens, but in many other towns of Central Greece, though it is exaggeration to ascribe to his pleading the success of the present application.

Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island, as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus: and they sent twenty triremes under Laches and Charœades, —with instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests. Taking station at Rhegium, Laches did something towards rescuing the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which were in alliance with Syracuse. Throughout the ensuing year, he pressed the war in the neighborhood of Rhegium and Messene, his colleague Charœades being slain. Attacking Mylæ in the Messenian territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops of Messene, that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic cities. He also contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic city of Egesta, in the north-west portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokri, capturing one of the country forts on the river Halex: after which, in a second debarkation, he defeated a Lokrian detachment under Proxenus. But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior of Sicily against Inessus. This was a native Sikel township, held in coercion by a Syracusan garrison in the acropolis; which the Athenians vainly attempted to storm, being repulsed with loss. Laches concluded his operations in the autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory of Himera and on the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the ensuing year (B.C. 425), he found Pythodorus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.

That officer had come as the forerunner of a more considerable expedition, intended to arrive in the spring under Eurymedon and Sophokles, who were to command in conjunction with himself. The Ionic cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Laches insufficient to render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for farther re-enforcements—at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes in full hopes of bringing the contest to a speedy close.

Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophokles started from Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions to afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenes on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet which,

in conjunction with the land forces under the command of Kleon, making a descent almost by accident on the Laconian coast at Pylus, achieved for Athens the most signal success of the whole war—the capture of the Lacedæmonian hoplites in Sphakteria. But the fleet was so long occupied, first in the blockade of that island, next in operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about the month of September.

Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For Pythodorus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Laches at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messene; which had surrendered to Laches a few months before, and which, together with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. Apprised of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; and a fleet of twenty sail—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was enabled by the concurrence of a party in Messene, to seize the town. It would appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that town was at the same time threatened by the entrance of the entire land force of Lokri, together with a body of Rhegine exiles: these latter were even not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of a favorable party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the diversion prevented all succor from Rhegium to Messene. The latter town now served as a harbor for the fleet hostile to Athens, which was speedily re-enforced to more than thirty sail, and began maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes together with eight others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory—in an action brought on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through the strait. They put the enemy's ships to flight, and drove them to seek refuge, some under protection of the Syracusan land-force at cape Pelorus near Messene, others under the Lokrian force near Rhegium—each as they best could, with the loss of one trireme. This defeat so broke up the scheme of Lokrian operations against the latter place, that their land-force retired from the Rhegine territory, while the whole defeated squadron was reunited on the opposite coast under cape Pelorus. Here the ships were moored close on shore under the protection of the land force, when the Athenians and Rhegines came up to attack them; but without success, and even with the loss of one trireme which the men on shore contrived to seize and detain by a grappling iron; her crew escaping by swimming to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along shore, partly aided by tow-ropes, to the harbor of Messene, in which transit they were again attacked, but the Athenians were a second time

beaten off with the loss of another ship. Their superior seamanship was of no avail in this along-shore fighting.

The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party under Archias threatened revolt: and the Messenian forces, thus left free, invaded the territory of their neighbor the Chalkidic city of Naxos, sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akesines near that city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels was seen descending the neighboring hills to succor the Naxians, upon which, the latter, elate with the sight and mistaking the new-comers for their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less than 1000 men, and with a still greater loss sustained in their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet went back als to Messene, from whence such of the ships as were not Messenian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that a Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection under Demomeles, while the Leontines and Naxines, together with the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamarina, attacked it by land and sea in this moment of distress. A well-timed sally of the Messenians and Lokrians, however, dispersed the Leontine land-force, but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the assailants while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme against Messene however, had now become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium.

Thus indecisive was the result of operations in Sicily, during the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war: nor does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the atumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had then joined Pythodorus. Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind—the triumphant promise of Athenian affairs, and the astonishing humiliation of Sparta, during the months immediately following the capture of Sphakteria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylus and Kythera, so that a rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their island. The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had hitherto acted along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a separate accommodation with its neighboring city of Gela; at which

latter place deputies were invited to attend from all the cities in the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.

This congress met in the spring of 424 B.C., when Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermokrates, chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave, and able man, superior to all pecuniary corruption, and clear-sighted in regard to the foreign interests of his country; but at the same time of pronounced oligarchical sentiments, mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to their internal constitution. The speech which Thucydides places in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermokrates impresses upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they enfeebled one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The Athenians were but too ready to encroach everywhere even without invitation: they had now come, with a zeal outrunning all obligation, under pretense of aiding the Chalkidic cities who had never aided them—but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The Chalkidic cities must not rely upon their Ionic kindred for security against evil designs on the part of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign intruders. Complaints should be exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance; of which Syracuse—the first city in the island and best able to sustain the brunt of war—was prepared to set the example; without that foolish over-valuation of favorable chances so ruinous even to first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the future. Let them all feel that they were neighbors, inhabitants of the same island, and called by the common name of Sikeliots; and let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their affairs, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.

This harangue from Hermokrates and the earnest dispositions of Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities, Ionic as well as Doric. All of them doubtless suffered by the war, and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention of the Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the evident uneasiness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific demeanor for

the future. Accordingly the peace was accepted by all the belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except that the Syracusans agreed to cede Morgantine to Kamarina, on receipt of a fixed sum of money. The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens should be included in the pacification; a condition agreed to by all, except the Epizephyrian Lokrians. They next acquainted Eurymedon and his colleagues with the terms; inviting them to accede to the pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet from Sicily. These generals had no choice but to close with the proposition. Athens thus was placed on terms of peace with all the Sicilian cities; with liberty of access reciprocally for any single ship of war, but not for any larger force, to cross the sea between Sicily and Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.

On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his colleagues, Sophokles and Pythodorus banished, on the charge of having been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet (so the Athenians believed) was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the three colleagues were differently treated, we are not informed. This sentence was harsh and unmerited; for it does not seem that Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from concluding peace—while it is certain that without them he could have achieved nothing serious. All that seems unexplained, in his conduct as recounted by Thucydides, is—that his arrival at Rhegium with the entire fleet in September, 425 B.C., does not seem to have been attended with any increased vigor or success in the prosecution of the war. But the Athenians (besides an undue depreciation of the Sicilian cities which we shall find fatally misleading them hereafter) were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant hopes, counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment, and careless of proportion between the means intrusted to, and the objects expected from, their commanders. Such unmeasured confidence was painfully corrected in the course of a few months, by the battle of Delium and the losses in Thrace. But at the present moment, it was probably not less astonishing than grievous to the three generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in Sphakteria.

The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between Leontini and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invocation of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon after the pacification of Gela. The democratical government of Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrollment of many new citizens; and a redivision of the territorial property of the state was projected in order to provide lots of land for these newcomers. But the aristocracy of the town, upon whom the necessity would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of their lands,

forestalled the project, seemingly before it was even formally decided, by entering into a treasonable correspondence with Syracuse, bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos. While these exiles found shelter as they could in other cities, the rich Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their residence to Syracuse, and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up a portion of it called Phokeis, together with a neighboring strong post called Brikinnies. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.

The new enrollment of citizens, projected by the Leontine democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse—thus compensating for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Leontine Demos, in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repenting that they had concurred in dismissing these auxiliaries, sent envoys to Athens with complaints, and renewed prayers for help.

But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call. Her defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed by the truce for one year, and even during that truce, she had been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of the truce, she sent Phæax and two colleagues to Sicily (B.C. 422) with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try and organize an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of re-establishing the Leontine Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amicable relations with some of the Grecian cities, especially with Lokri, which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens: and his first addresses in Sicily appeared to promise success. His representations of danger from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and Agrigentum. For on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens which had dictated the pacification of Gela had now disappeared; while on the other hand the proceeding of Syracuse in regard to Leontini was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by that proceeding that sympathy between democracies in different towns was not universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined with the Leontine aristocracy to expel the Demos—just as the despot Gelon had combined with the aristocracy of Megara and Eubœa, sixty years before, and had sold the Demos of those towns into slavery. The birthplace of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited cities; its temples were deserted; and its territory had become a part of Syracuse.

All these were circumstances so powerfully affecting Grecian imagination that the Kamarinæans, neighbors of Syracuse on the other side, might well fear lest the like unjust conquest, expulsion, and absorption, should soon overtake them. Agrigentum, though without any similar fear, was disposed, from policy and jealousy of Syracuse, to second the views of Phæax. But when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the adhesion of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by so resolute an opposition that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor did he think it advisable even to open his case at Selinus or Himera. In returning, he crossed the interior of the island through the territory of the Sikels to Katana, passing in his way by Brikinnies, where the Leontine Demos were still maintaining a precarious existence. Having encouraged them to hold out by assurances of aid, he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the strait of Messina he struck upon some vessels conveying a body of expelled Lokrians from Messene to Lokri. The Lokrians had got possession of Messene after the pacification of Gela, by means of an internal sedition; but after holding it some time, they were now driven out by a second revolution. Phæax, being under agreement with Lokri, passed by these vessels without any act of hostility.

The Leontine exiles at Brikinnies, however, received no benefit from his assurances, and appear soon afterward to have been completely expelled. Nevertheless Athens was noway disposed, for a considerable time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of Phæax to that island, came the peace of Nikias. The consequences of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while the ambition of Alkibiades carried her on for three years in intra-Peloponnesian projects and co-operation with Argos against Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose desertion frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Melos was besieged and taken.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued at Athens pressing their entreaties for aid; which began to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel broke out between the neighboring cities of Selinus (Hellenic) and Egesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily; partly about a piece of land on the river which divided the two territories, partly about some alleged wrong in cases of internuptial connection. The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus reduced Egesta to considerable

straits by land as well as by sea. Now the Egestæans had allied themselves with Laches ten years before, during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her intervention for their defense, after having in vain applied both to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage did not at this time readily embrace the pretext for interference—considering that ten years afterward she interfered with such destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at Carthage, thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of their neighbors.

The Egestæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 B.C., at a time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy their thoughts, except the enterprise against Melos, which could not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not appear like the Leontines, as mere helpless suppliants, addressing themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second (Egesta), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to Peloponnesus both by race and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens herself. It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval expedition adequate to the rescue of Egesta, the Egestæans themselves engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.

Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan aggrandizement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon the Athenian public, favorable from the first, was wound up to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were repeatedly heard in the public assembly, together with those citizens who supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiades, who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous; and that a considerable party sustained Nikias in a prudential opposition. Even at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but a mean term such as perhaps Nikias himself could not resist. Special envoys were dispatched to Egesta—partly to ascertain the means of the town to fulfill its assurance of defraying the costs of

war—partly to make investigations on the spot, and report upon the general state of affairs.

Perhaps the commissioners dispatched were men themselves not unfriendly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may have been individually bribed by the Egestæans:—at least such a supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice to delude them on their arrival at Egesta. They were conducted to the rich temple of Aphrodite on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donatives were exhibited before them; abundant in number, and striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which, though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egestæan citizens were profuse in their hospitalities and entertainments both to the commissioners and to the crews of the triremes.

They collected together all the gold and silver vessels, dishes and goblets, of Egesta, which they farther enlarged by borrowing additional ornaments of the same kind from the neighboring cities, Hellenic as well as Carthaginian. At each successive entertainment every Egestæan host exhibited all this large stock of plate as his own property—the same stock being transferred from house to house for the occasion. A false appearance was thus created of the large number of wealthy men in Egesta; and the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were won by the caresses, saw with amazement this prodigious display of gold and silver, and were thoroughly duped by fraud. To complete the illusion, by resting it on a basis of reality and prompt payment, sixty talents of uncoined silver were at once produced as ready for the operations of war. With this sum in hand, the Athenian commissioners, after finishing their examination, and the Egestæan envoys also, returned to Athens, which they reached in the spring of 415 B.C., about three months after the capture of Melos.

The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their report, the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of the wealth, public and private, which they had actually seen and touched at Egesta, and presented the sixty talents (one month's pay for a fleet of sixty triremes) as a small installment out of the vast stock remaining behind. While they thus officially certified the capacity of the Egestæans to perform their promise of defraying the cost of the war, the seamen of their trireme, addressing the assembly in their character of citizens—beyond all suspicion of being bribed—overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had just been so cordially welcomed—and full of wonder at the display of wealth which they had witnessed—would probably contribute still more effectually to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen. Accordingly when the Egestæan envoys again renewed their petitions and representations, confidently appealing to the scrutiny which they had undergone—when the distress of the suppliant Leontines was again depicted—the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals with full powers—Nikias, Alkibiades, and Lamachus; for the purpose, first, of relieving Egesta; next, as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of re-establishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find practicable. Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the details.

We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Egesta were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to Alkibiades and those who had from the first advocated the expedition—as well as of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias, who had opposed it. He was probably more astonished than any one else at the statements of the commissioners and seamen, because he did not believe in the point which they went to establish. Yet he could not venture to contradict eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith—and as the assembly went heartily along with them, he labored under great difficulty in repeating his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened in public favor. Accordingly, his speech was probably hesitating and ineffective; the more so, as his opponents, far from wishing to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of his own declared repugnance. But when the assembly broke up, he became fearfully impressed with the perilous resolution which it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to avail himself of the next assembly four days afterward, for the purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to hear him on this subject. Indeed, the question which he raised could not be put without illegality; the principle of the measure had been already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable sample both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by Thucydides. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself to the exact expressions.

"Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the instance of aliens, into a dangerous war no way belonging to us. To myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honorable appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before prevented me, nor shall

now prevent me, from giving you my honest opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell you, then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your truce with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name, indeed (though only in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there), that truce may stand, so long as your power remains unimpaired; but on your first serious reverses, the enemy will eagerly take the opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most powerful enemies have never even accepted the truce; and if you divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure as co-operating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt, and have never yet been conquered: other continental subjects, too, are not much to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but Sicily is so distant and the people so powerful, that you will never be able to maintain permanent ascendency; and it is absurd to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent, while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the prospect of Syracusan aggrandizement. But to me it seems that the Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be less dangerous to you than they are at present: for as matters stand now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the part of each to gain the favor of Lacedæmon—but imperial Syracuse would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust the Spartans: they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to repair their own dishonor: their oligarchical machinations against you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of these foreigners at Egesta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this newly acquired strength for our own purpose, instead of wasting it upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily."

Nikias then continued, doubtless turning toward Alkibiades: "If any man, delighted to be named to the command, though still too young for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own selfish interests, looking to admiration for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to profit from his command as a means of making good his extravagances—do not let such a man gain celebrity for himself at the hazard of the entire city. Be persuaded that such persons are alike unprincipled in regard to the public property and wasteful as to their own—and that this

matter is too serious for the rash counsels of youth. I tremble when I see before me this band sitting, by previous concert, close to their leader in the assembly—and I in my turn exhort the elderly men, who are near them, not to be shamed out of their opposition by the fear of being called cowards. Let them leave to these men the ruinous appetite for what is not within reach: in the conviction that few plans ever succeeded from passionate desire—many, from deliberate foresight. Let them vote against the expedition—maintaining undisturbed our present relations with the Sicilian cities, and desiring the Egestæans to close the war against Selinus, as they have begun it, without the aid of Athens. Nor be thou afraid, Prytanis (Mr. President) to submit this momentous question again to the decision of the assembly,—seeing that breach of the law in the presence of so many witnessses, cannot expose thee to impeachment, while thou wilt afford opportunity for the correction of a perilous misjudgment."

Such were the principal points in the speech of Nikias on this memorable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably made some impression; since it completely re-opened the entire debate, in spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiades rose to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary acquisition. Opposed to Nikias both in personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his rivalry to such a degree of bitterness, that at one moment a vote of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged upon Hyperbolus; yet the hostile feeling still continued on both sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack of the most galling character—all the more galling because it was strictly accurate and well-deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, Alkibiades started up forthwith—his impatience breaking loose from the formalities of an exordium.

"Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of commander (for the taunts of Nikias force me to begin here) and I account myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters, with which he reproaches me, are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, on witnessing my splendid Theory at Olympia, were induced to rate the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as broken down by the war; when I sent into the lists seven chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent before—winning the first prize, coming in also second and fourth, and performing all the accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic victory. Custom attaches honor to such exploits, but the power of the performers is at the same time brought home to the feelings of spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are naturally viewed

with jealousy by my rivals here; but in the eyes of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if he were their equal; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear a share of it. Just as, when we are in distress, we find no one to speak to us—in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the insolence of the prosperous; or else let him give equal dealing to the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well that such exalted personages, and all who have in any way attained eminence, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in society with their equals, and to certain extent with others also; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation as to make people claim kindred with them falsely—and to induce their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or wrong-doers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honor. It is this glory which I desire; and in pursuit of which I incur such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at Mantineia on the fortune of one day: a peril so great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in their own strength.

"Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find suitable words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give them confidence and obtain their co-operation. Be not now, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine: but so long as I possess it in full vigor, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn us each to account in our own way."

Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiades went on to deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities (he said) were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent resident nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they had never yet been more without hope of damaging Athens, than they were now: they were not more desperate enemies now, than they had been in former days, they might invade Attica by land, whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies? To be sure *they* could bring no help to Attica in return:

—but Athens did not want them on her own side of the water—she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinizing such invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects—on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nikias was not less at variance with the temper, than with the position of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of that aspiring readiness of enterprise, which, having become ingrafted upon her laws and habits, could not be now renounced, even if bad in itself, without speedy destruction.

Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiades to Nikias. The debate was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the assembly on both sides; more, however, decidedly, in favor of the expedition than against it. The alarmed Egestæans and Leontines renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the city: probably also, those Athenians who had visited Egesta stood forward again to protest against what they would call the ungenerous doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a maneuver, designed indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without hopes that they might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with completeness and confidence.

Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the people, he reminded them that the cities which they were about to attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were powerful, populous, free—well prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other allies in Sicily except Naxus and Katana, from their kindred

with the Leontines. It was no mere fleet, therefore, which could cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet, indeed, must be prodigiously great, for the purpose not merely of maritime combat, but of keeping open communication at sea, and insuring the importation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers—a large stock of provisions in transports—and above all, an abundant amount of money: for the funds promised by the Egestæans would be found mere empty delusion. The army must be not simply a match for the enemy's regular hoplites and powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first day of their landing. If not, in case of the least reverse, they would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single friend. "I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust to good fortune, serious as it is for mere men to do so. But I choose to leave as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have in hand all means of reasonable security at the time when I leave Athens. Looking merely to the interests of the commonwealth, this is the most assured course; while to us who are to form the armament it is indispensable for preservation. If any man thinks differently, I resign to him the command."

The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, coming as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much greater than that which had been produced by his first. But it was an effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated and intended. Far from being discouraged or alienated from the expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified, the people only attached themselves to it with yet greater obstinacy. The difficulties which stood in the way of Sicilian conquest served but to endear it to them the more, calling forth increased ardor and eagerness for personal exertion in the cause. The people not only accepted, without hesitation or deduction, the estimate which Nikias had laid before them of risk and cost, but warmly extolled his frankness not less than his sagacity, as the only means of making success certain. They were ready to grant without reserve everything which he asked, with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely seen to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech of Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected. While his partisans seconded it as the best way of neutralizing the popular madness, his opponents—Alkibiades, the Egestæans, and the Leontines—caught at it with acclamation, as realizing more than they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to propose. If Alkibiades had demanded an armament on so vast a scale, the people would have turned a deaf ear. But such was their respect for Nikias—on the united grounds of prudence, good fortune, piety, and favor with the gods—that his opposition to their favorite scheme had really made them uneasy; and when he made the same demand, they were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such conditions as he imposed.

It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its projectors had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardor beyond all former example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. Some were tempted by the love of gain; others by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region; others again by the pride and supposed safety of enlisting in so irresistible an armament. So overpowering was the popular voice in calling for the execution of the scheme, that the small minority who retained their objections were afraid to hold up their hands, for fear of incurring the suspicion of want of patriotism. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, an orator named Demostratus, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment, urged Nikias to declare at once, without farther evasion, what force he required from the people. Disappointed as Nikias was, yet being left without any alternative, he sadly responded to the appeal; saying that he would take farther counsel with his colleagues, but that, speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes required must be not less than one hundred, nor the hoplites less than 5,000—Athenians and allies together. There must farther be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments, especially Kretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of Athens.

Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrollment and preparation of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantineia, and to hire bowmen and slingers elsewhere. For three months the generals were busily engaged in this proceeding, while the city was in a state of alertness and bustle—fatally interrupted, however, by an incident which I shall recount in the next chapter.

Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy will not find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, for-

warded to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Egesta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly certifying all that the Egestæans had promised. We cannot at all wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby their commissioners had been duped.

Upon the result of that mission from Egesta, the two parties for and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue; and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so decisive in favor of the former, the party, thus strengthened, thought itself warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the renewed and hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally ratified. It was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often repeated but always outreasoned, which, working gradually deeper and deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or more deliberately and unanimously resolved.

The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As a dissuasive and warning counselor, he took a right view of it; but in that capacity he could not carry the people along with him. Yet such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their reluctance to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they eagerly embraced any conditions which he thought proper to impose. And the conditions which he named had the effect of exaggerating the enterprise into such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated; thus casting into it so prodigious a proportion of the blood of Athens, that its discomfiture would be equivalent to the ruin of the commonwealth. This was the first mischief occasioned by Nikias, when, after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted to the indirect maneuver of demanding more than he thought the people would be willing to grant. It will be found only the first among a sad series of other mistakes—fatal to his country as well as to himself.

Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his skepticism about the reports from Egesta, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in Alkibiades. His speech is not merely full of overweening insolence as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous instigations in

regard to the foreign policy of his country. The arguments whereby he enforces the expedition against Syracuse are indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the expedition itself, for the failure of which Alkibiades is not to be held responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was aiming at an unmeasured breadth of empire, which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Perikles had advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus—we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending aggression inculcated by Alkibiades, and the destructive principles which he lays down that Athens must forever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire, and tearing herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her military and naval force (as Nikias had truly observed), Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were still unsubdued; and the first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant hazards and treacherous novelties, creating for Athens a position in which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel which Alkibiades draws, between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the undefined speculations which he was himself recommending—is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the Ægean Sea. Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily was in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find Alkibiades asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would impart new stability to the pre-existing Athenian empire. How strange also to read the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily; the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian!—so notice the honor which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantineia, which had ended in complete failure, and in restoring Sparta to the maximum of her credit as it had stood before the events of Sphakteria! There is in fact no speech in Thucydides so replete with rash, misguiding, and fallacious counsels as this harangue of Alkibiades.

As a man of action, Alkibiades was always brave, vigorous, and full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was especially mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine and enterprising temper into a temerity which overlooked all permanent calculation. The Athenians had now contracted the belief that they, as lords of the sea, were entitled to dominion and receipt of tribute from all islands—a belief which they had not only acted upon, but openly professed, in their attack upon Melos during the preceding autumn. As Sicily was an island, it seemed to fall naturally under this category of subjects: for we ought not to wonder, amidst the inaccurate geographical data current in that day, that they were ignorant how much larger Sicily was than the largest island in the Ægean. Yet they seem to have been aware that it was a prodigious conquest to struggle for; as we may judge from the fact, that the object was one kept back rather than openly avowed, and that they acceded to all the immense preparations demanded by Nikias. Moreover we shall see presently that even the armament which was dispatched had conceived nothing beyond vague and hesitating ideas of something great to be achieved in Sicily. But if the Athenian public were rash and ignorant, in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more extravagant were the views of Alkibiades: though I cannot bring myself to believe that even he (as he afterward asserted) really looked beyond Sicily to the conquest of Carthage and her empire. It was not merely ambition which he desired to gratify. He was not less eager for the immense private gains which would be consequent upon success, in order to supply those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure had occasioned.

When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred against Kleon—of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motive, in reference to Sphakteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, and to Amphipolis; and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct of Alkibiades as here described—we shall see how much more forcibly such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen that the vices of Alkibiades, and the defects of Nikias, were the cause of far greater ruin to Athens than either Kleon or Hyperbolus, even if we regard the two latter with the eyes of their worst enemies.

END OF VOL. II.

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